Hitler's Last Chief of Foreign Intelligence: Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg

HITLER’S LAST CHIEF OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg

HITLER’S LAST CHIEF OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE Allied Interrogations of Walter Schellenberg

REINHARD R.DOERRIES

FRANK CASS LONDON • PORTLAND, OR

First published in 2003 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate London N14 5BP This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “ To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to http://www.ebookstore.tandf.co.uk/.” and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS c/o ISBS, 5824 N.E.Hassalo Street Portland, Oregon, 97213–3644 Website: http://www.frankcass.com/ Copyright © 2003 Reinhard R.Doerries British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Hitler’s last chief of foreign intelligence: Allied interrogations of Walter Schellenberg 1. Schellenberg, Walter, 1910–1952—Interviews 2. Schutzstaffel 3. Intelligence officers— Germany— Interviews 4. Intelligence service—Germany—History— 20th century 5. Germany— Politics and government— 1933–1945 I. Doerries, Reinhard R. 940.5′48743′092 ISBN 0-203-01809-5 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-5400-0 (Print Edition) (cloth) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hitler’s last chief of foreign intelligence: Allied interrogations of Walter Schellenberg/ edited by Reinhard R.Doerries. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5400-0 1. Schellenberg, Walter, 1910–1952. 2. World War, 1939–1945—Secret service—Germany. 3. Military intelligence—Germany—History—20th century. 4. Nazis-Biography. 5. Intelligence officers—Germany—Biography. 6. Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei. Schutzstaffel—Biography. I. Doerries, Reinhard R. DD247.S338H58 2003 940.54′8743′092–dc21 [B] 2003040936 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher of this book.

Contents List of Illustrations

vii

List of Abbreviations

ix

Foreword Preface

SS-Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg

Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg

Appendices Appendix I: Amt IV (Gruppe IV E) Organisation and Cases

xiii xv

1

42

176 178

Appendix II: Schellenberg’s observations on the organisation of Amt VI and 191 Mil. Amt 200 Appendix III: Amt VI and Russia Appendix IV: Amt VI—Collaboration with the Japanese Appendix V: Amt VI—Activities against Persia, Palestine and India Appendix VI: Amt VI—Post-Defeat plans Appendix VII: Financial Affairs of the RSHA and Amt VI Appendix VIII: Amt VI—Penetration of German Industry Appendix IX: The Work of the Police Attaches Appendix X: Horia Sima and Rumania

204 209 214 217 221 224 225

Appendix XI: Schellenberg’s Relations with the Swedish Intelligence Service 227

Appendix XII: Schellenberg’s Relations with the Swiss Intelligence Service

229

Appendix XIII: The Vlassov Movement

232

Appendix XIV: Rote Kapelle

234

Appendix XV: Jahnke and the Jahnkeburo Appendix XVI: Kranefuss and the Freundeskreis

236 239

Appendix Kersten, Himmler’s Osteopath Masseur XVII:

241

Appendix ‘Irrefuhrung’ (Deception) XVIII:

245

Appendix XIX: Werewolf Appendix XX: Deciphering Appendix XXI: The I-Netze in Occupied Territories

248 250 253

Appendix The I-Netze in Neutral Countries XXII:

263

Appendix Miscellaneous Personalities XXIII:

268

Notes

281

Bibliography

318

Index

320

List of Illustrations 1.

Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1933. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

2.

Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1934. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

3.

Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1937. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

4.

Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1938. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

5.

Sigismund Payne Best. From After the Battle (London).

6.

Richard Stevens. From After the Battle (London).

7.

Heinrich Himmler, 1938. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 183R 99621.

8.

Folke Count Bernadotte. Courtesy of Friedrich Reinhardt AG, Basel.

9.

Reinhard Heydrich, 1940. Courtesy of Budesarchiv, Koblenz, 183-R 98683.

10. Wilhelm Canaris. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 146– 79/13/43. 11. Joachim von Ribbentrop, 1938. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 102–18086. 12. Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 183-R 64933.

13. Walter Schellenberg, date uncertain. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD. 14. Walter Schellenberg, during the Nuremberg trials. Courtesy of Der Spiegel, Hamburg. 15. The parole of Walter Schellenberg, 1950. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

Abbreviations Most of the abbreviations listed appear in the ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’. Not all abbreviations could be identified. AA

Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Office)

AB

Aktiebolaget

AO

Ausländer-Organisation

Ast

Abwehrstelle

Auslandsabtl.

Auslandsabteilung

Auslandsabtg.

Auslandsabteilung

BAB

Bundesarchiv Berlin (National Archives, Germany)

BAMA

Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg

BAOR (B.A.O.R.)

British Army of the Rhine

BDC

Berlin Document Center

C.E.

Counter Espionage

CI

Counter Intelligence

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency

CO

Commanding Officer

Col.

Colonel

COSSAC

Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Command

CSDIC

Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Center

CSS

Central Security Service

DNB

Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro

E

Entry (NA)

F.I.A.T.

Field Information Agency, Technical Control Commission for Germany

FAK

Frontaufklärung/Frontaufklärungskommando

FO

Foreign Office (PRO)

Frl.

Fräulein

G-2

US Military Intelligence

Gestapo

Geheime Staatspolizei (Secret State Police)

GIS

German Intelligence Service

H.Q. (HQ)

Headquarter(s)

Hqs

Headquarters

Hauptsturmf

Hauptsturmführer

Hptstmfr

Hauptsturmführer

Hstuf

Hauptsturmführer

HSSPF (H.S.S.P.F., H.S.S.Pf)

Höhere SS- und Polizeiführer

i.G.

im Generalstab

I.S.

Intelligence Service

IFZ

Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich

IPA

Internationale Presse-Agentur

IRR

Records of the Investigative Records Repository (NA)

IS

Impersonal Series (IRR)

Kdo.

Kommando (command unit)

KO

Kriegsorganisation (office of Abwehr)

Kulturabt.

Kulturabteilung

KZ

Konzentrationslager (concentration camp)

Lt. Col.

Lieutenant Colonel

Lt.

Lieutenant

MD

Maryland

MI (M.I.)

Military Intelligence

NA

National Archives, Washington, DC/College Park, MD

NCO

non-commissioned officer

NSA

National Security Agency

NSDAP

Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei

Obergruf

Obergruppenführer

Obgfr

Obergruppenführer

Obgruf

Obergruppenführer

Ogruf

Obergruppenführer

Oberregrat

Oberregierungsrat (German administrative title)

Ober.Reg.Rat

Oberregierungsrat

Oberstlt

Oberstleutnant

Obstlt

Oberstleutnant

Obstbnfr

Obersturmbannführer

OKH (O.K.H.)

Oberkommando des Heeres (Supreme Command Army)

OKW (O.K.W.)

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command Armed Forces)

ORPO

Ordnungspolizei

OSS

Office of Strategic Services

Ostubaf

Obersturmbannführer

PA

Pennsylvania

PA

Politisches Archiv (German Foreign Office, Berlin)

POW (P.O.W.)

Prisoner of War

PoW

Prisoner of War

PW

Prisoner of War

PRO

Public Record Office, London/Kew

PS

Personal Series (IRR)

RSS (R.S.S.)

Radio Security Service

RG

Record Group (NA)

RSHA (R.S.H.A.)

Reichssicherheitshauptamt

SA

Sturmabteilung

SAINT

OSS indicator for messages (security and counterintelligence)

SAN

Staatsarchiv Nuremberg

SAS

Special Air Service

SCI

Special Counter-Intelligence (of the OSS and MI5)

SD

Sicherheitsdienst

SHAEF

Supreme Headquarters American Expeditionary Forces

SIPO

Sicherheitspolizei (security police)

SIS (S.I.S.)

Secret Intelligence Service

Sonderf.

Sonderführer

Sonderkdo.

Sonderkommando (special command unit)

SS

Schutzstaffel

STAB

Svenska Taendsticks Aktiebolaget

Staf

Standartenführer

Stapo

Staatspolizei

Stubaf

Sturmbannführer

(Transl.)

Translation by author/editor

u.

und (and)

UK

United Kingdom

USA

United States of America

USAMHI

US Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks

USFET

United States Forces European Theatre

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VN

Verlässliche Nachrichten

W/T

Wireless Telegraph

WDGS

War Department General Staff

WO

War Office (PRO)

WW

World War

WZA

Wehrmachtszentralamt (armed forces central office)

X-2

Counter-Intelligence Branch (of the OSS)

Z Organisation

British intelligence organisation in the Netherlands and in Switzerland

Ic (IC)

Intelligence Officer of a military unit

VI Kult

Department VI Kultur (Culture)

VI Wi

Department VI Wirtschaft (Economics)

Foreword As an established expert on the history of intelligence, and one of the few in Germany who has been interested in the modern history in that field, Reinhard Doerries is exceptionally well qualified to explain, annotate, and publish the interrogation report on Walter Schellenberg, the last head of Germany’s World War II intelligence service. Since Schellenberg died soon after his release from confinement, and there are—in part as a result of this situation—various versions of his memoirs, it is of particular importance both for scholars interested in Germany’s intelligence services during the war and those more generally interested in the history of that great conflict that the formal report on Schellenberg’s immediate post-war interrogations be made available to the public in full and with a proper introduction as well as appropriate notes. Because of the wide range of the interrogations that led up to the writing of the report, readers will find in it information on an enormous range of subjects. Given the endless jurisdictional and personal feuds within the government of National Socialist Germany, there is seemingly endless discussion of such matters. More important, perhaps, are the signs that point unmistakably to some kind of close personal relationship between Schellenberg and Heinrich Himmler, the head of the whole security and police system, who evidently took the ambitious and energetic young man under his wing and, from time to time, into his confidence. It is unlikely that we will ever know the precise reasons for this development, but the evidence for it is clear. This personal relationship goes a long way to explain not only Schellenberg’s rise to a position of importance but also the latitude that Himmler appears to have given him in putting out periodic and entirely unsuccessful peace feelers through neutral countries. Furthermore, in the hectic last months of the war Schellenberg expanded these frantic but futile efforts to arrange a separate peace treaty with the Western Powers. In connection with his development of contacts in neutral Sweden, Schellenberg had assisted in obtaining the release of some Swedes imprisoned and sentenced by the Germans. In the final weeks of the war, perhaps to demonstrate his good faith as an advocate of peace or to provide himself with a better post-war future, he was able to rescue substantial numbers of Jews from the killing that was intended as a last stage of the systematic murder of any and all Jews that German might could reach. In these endeavours he repeatedly met and worked with Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte, who looms large in these materials and who tried to assist Schellenberg after the war had ended. There is, of course, considerable detail on the organizational history of the foreign intelligence section of the Reich Security Main Office, which Schellenberg headed, and on some of its largely unsuccessful operations inside and outside wartime Germany. Because the British interrogators at the time were, for obvious reasons, especially interested in any German stay behind networks and related underground activities, there is more than enough about this equally futile aspect of German activity. Of greater historic interest is the information about Schellenberg’s contacts with those who were

involved in, and in many cases executed for, opposition to the regime of Adolf Hitler. It must be noted that the references to these persons by Schellenberg long antedate the many publications that appeared about the coup attempt of 20 July 1944 and those who participated in it, in subsequent years. The detailed introduction will be found helpful as placing the interrogation report in a setting that clarifies both chronology and the source problems associated with the life and memoirs of Schellenberg. In this, Professor Doerries has drawn on both secondary literature on the subject and very recently declassified documents that practically no one else has hitherto examined. Half a century after Schellenberg’s death, there is a massive literature on the history of the Third Reich, and it is a singular service to have it related to an important figure of that era. We see how an ambitious and talented young man harnessed his considerable energies—in spite of serious health problems—to a career in the service of an evil regime whose nature and likely fate he appears to have understood somewhat earlier and more clearly than many of his German contemporaries. Neither his efforts in the field of intelligence nor his early recognition of the impending total defeat of Germany produced very much of substance. As usual, Shakespeare had the appropriate comment: ‘The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in ourselves that we are underlings.’ Gerhard L.Weinberg Professor Emeritus, University of North Carolina October 2002

Preface For a number of reasons German historians until very recently have preferred to disregard the history of intelligence. The emphasis on social history and almost continuous quarrels within the profession, such as the Fritz Fischer Controversy1 and the Historians’ Conflict (Historikerstreit)2, may explain some of the neglect. Because the German records of the period up to 1945 were captured by Allied Forces and later returned with the stipulation that they be open to researchers, access to most pre-1945 documents is particularly encouraging in Germany. This also holds true for intelligence files from both World Wars.3 In spite of such optimal research conditions, German studies of World War I intelligence operations, however, are rare and, in marked contrast to their British and American colleagues, German historians have rather shied away from accepting the challenges of the intelligence history of World War II. Thus, it is not surprising that we still lack reliable studies on both Wilhelm Canaris and Walter Schellenberg.4 The published memoirs of SS-Brigadeführer Walter Schellenberg, the chief of Nazi foreign intelligence, are apparently all based on the same papers, namely the voluminous handwritten memoirs held by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich and a document entitled ‘Brigadeführer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography, compiled during his stay in Stockholm, June 1945’. The first edition is The Schellenberg Memoirs, its American edition is The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg.5 The first German edition Memoiren does not offer the same text as the English volume.6 The editor, Gita Petersen, in her introductory remarks explains that she has extracted a greater amount of detail from the handwritten memoirs than the English publishers for their earlier edition. On the other hand, she had no access to Schellenberg’s document from Stockholm, and for the last five chapters of the German edition she was obliged to sift the respective information from the British publication, which was partially based on the brief Stockholm ‘Autobiography’. The British first edition contains a well-written ‘Introduction’ by Alan Bullock, who arrives at the summarizing comment that ‘Schellenberg, with all his faults (and they are plain enough to need no underlining), had two rare qualities in a writer of memoirs. For the most part he limits himself to describing events of which he has first-hand knowledge, and he is comparatively free from that passion for tortuous self-justification which disfigures so many German memoirs of these years.’7 The ‘Vorwort’ of the German edition is written by Klaus Harpprecht, who had worked with Schellenberg when publication was still foreseen in Switzerland. Harpprecht was, therefore, one of the few persons who had an opportunity to become acquainted with Schellenberg in 1951 after he was pardoned by John J.McCloy and to discuss with him his life and activities. His ‘Vorwort’ is a rather well-balanced comment on the controversial SS leader, including the observation:

[In spite of his possibly opportunistic policies] his position during the stormy period of the final collapse nevertheless deserves some respect. Thousands owe their lives to his prudence. There can be no doubt that during those months day by day he took a high risk.8 For an appraisal of these two versions of the memoirs it needs to be recalled that Walter Schellenberg did not see either text before publication. Editors in both cases selected large parts of the handwritten texts left by Schellenberg, but they also decided on the exclusion of other text parts. Because Schellenberg died several years prior to the first publication, we are not in a position to know which texts he would have wished to have published from his handwritten notes. The ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’ was written by Allied interrogators, mostly British, in 1945. While we have no particular reason to doubt the honest intentions of the interrogators or of the final editor of the document, ‘Squadron Leader R.A.F.H.C.Harrison’, they were British intelligence officers in the summer of 1945 with definite views on Nazi intelligence.9 These views may inadvertently have influenced their selection of topics and the weight assigned to some aspects over others. In order to fully present what these men thought were the results of their interrogations, the ‘Final Report’ has not been abridged or altered in any way. If as a consequence, some passages of the ‘Final Report’ may be thought to read somewhat curiously, this would seem an acceptable price for the preservation of the original character of the document. Because the minutes and results of most interrogations and the texts requested from Schellenberg on certain topics are accessible in the National Archives in College Park, it was possible to collate much of the content of the ‘Final Report’ with the respective interrogations and texts.10 More difficult seems to be the question of an assessment of Schellenberg, the person and the Nazi leader, and of the historical value of the data and information produced in the course of the interrogations. There is no doubt that the British, the American and the Soviet intelligence services wanted to have him for such interrogations, but clearly the British won the game and after a very brief interval in Oberursel were able to bring him to London. The records show that he was thought to be one of the most important prisoners and that British intelligence was extremely interested to learn what he knew. Occasional negative comments on Schellenberg’s intellectual capabilities may be justified in certain instances, but the doubts of the interrogators were obviously overcome by their desire to keep him in London as long as possible. Finally, the point should be made that Walter Schellenberg was not only the head of an intelligence service, but also a high-ranking official of the immoral and criminal German system which inaugurated the holocaust and numerous other crimes against humanity. Such recognition would seem to imply that any treatment of Schellenberg and his foreign intelligence service will be different from otherwise comparable intelligence studies. This perception of the man and his activities has influenced my findings as they are presented in the introductory chapters to the ‘Final Report’. The difficult task could not have been accomplished without the generous assistance of a great number of friends, colleagues and institutions. I acknowledge with gratitude the permission of the National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives, College Park, to publish from their holdings the ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter

Friedrich Schellenberg’ and related documents. I further gratefully acknowledge permission from the editors of After the Battle and from Ms Belser of Friedrich Reinhardt AG to publish photographs identified respectively. I also acknowledge gratefully permission from Der Spiegel, Hamburg, to publish a photograph identified accordingly. Those who assisted my research and therefore made this publication possible are legion. Some of them I have known for years and they have become real friends who listen with patience and debate the issues. Without the ceaseless efforts of Tim Nenninger this volume just would not be. Rich Boylan and Bob Wolfe never lost patience when I was impatient and surely unkind under the pressures of research. To Maria Keipert and Ludwig Biewer of the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office I owe much gratitude for being there when I needed them. Gunther Fischer of the Staatsarchiv Nuremberg was ready to assist when I rushed through the records. Klaus Harpprecht and Heinz Höhne answered questions and, well, just bore with me. Lord Dacre and Sir Stuart Newton Hampshire endured stubborn questions about times long gone and I would like to express my appreciation for their willingness to help. Among those who tolerated impatient questions and tried to respond and help were Doron Arazi, Greg Bradsher, Richard Breitman, Terry Charman, Ben Fischer, Detlef Garbe, Paulgerhard Gladen, Jan Heitmann, Wolfgang Helbich, Heinz Lohfeldt, Larry McDonald, Christof Mauch, Ulrich Schlie, John Taylor and Gerhard Weinberg. Ralph Erskine has been a delightful conversation partner who freely shared his wide knowledge of the records. My younger colleagues Daniel Gossel and Matthias Fifka helped in many ways and patiently read texts with me. I thank them for assistance and candid discussions of the material. Special recognition goes to Heidi Thiesen who typed the texts without rebelling in spite of problematic editorial and organisational procedures. Reinhard R.Doerries September 2001

SS-BRIGADEFÜHRER WALTER SCHELLENBERG

Hitler's last chief of foreign intelligence

2

The Formative Period On 14 April 1949, the American Military Tribunal IV in Case 11 sentenced the SSBrigadeführer Walter Schellenberg ‘to six years imprisonment’. His term was ‘to begin from June 17, 1945, the time of confinement before and during the trial’.1 Case No. 11, the so-called ‘Ministries Case’ or ‘Wilhelmstrasse Case’ was in fact, United States of America vs. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al.2 Military Tribunal IV was actually Military Tribunal IVA because the original Military Tribunal IV handled the Flick Case. As it took 17 months from indictment to judgment and more than two years between indictment and ‘postjudgment rulings…upon defense motions alleging error in the judgment’, the Wilhelmstrasse Case was the longest of all Nuremberg cases.3 SS-Brigadeführer Schellenberg had been seriously ill for some time and, when being sentenced, his physical condition was such that it appeared uncertain whether he could be transported from Nuremberg to the prison in Landsberg.4 After having seen the end of World War II in neutral Sweden, Schellenberg had come back to Germany voluntarily. He had then been taken to Britain for lengthy interrogations and, when the Nuremberg trials began, had been returned to Germany as ‘one of the star prosecution witnesses’,5 as well as a defendant. Germany’s last chief of foreign intelligence and a high-ranking member of the country’s Nazi (National Socialist) elite was just 39 years old when he was sentenced. Born in Saarbrücken on 16 January 1910, Friedrich Walter Schellenberg was the seventh child of a piano builder who had a difficult time earning a decent living for his large family.6 Following the usual four years of elementary school, Schellenberg was sent to high school, graduating in 1929. Though seriously strapped for funds he was able to study law at Marburg where in his first semester he joined the Corps Guestphalia, a wellknown German student fraternity. After five semesters in Marburg he moved to Bonn and in 1933 passed the junior bar exam in front of the provincial court in Düsseldorf. As a junior barrister he spent time at a district court in Sinzig, in the state attorney’s office in Bonn, with the state police in Frankfurt (Staatspolizei), with the secret state police, and at the provincial court in Düsseldorf. In December of 1936 Schellenberg completed the final German legal state exam.7 Prior to passing all these requirements for a legal career, he had joined the SS (Schutzstaffel) on 1 April 1933 (SS-No. 124 817), very shortly after Adolf Hitler’s fateful takeover of power in Germany and on the day of the Nazi-organised boycott of Jewish stores. Also in April he became a member of the NSDAP (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei/National Socialist German Workers’ Party) with the Pg. Nr. (Membership no.) 3 504 508. Less than a year later, on 1 January 1934, he was accepted as a full-fledged member of the SS. He quickly rose through the ranks, and by the time of his final legal exam in 1936, the 26-year-old had advanced to SS-Oberscharführer and

SS-Brigadefuhrer walter schellenberg

3

joined the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Service, SD).8 In his memoirs, published post mortem, his joining the Nazi organisations is briefly explained as follows: All young men who joined the Party had to join one of its formations as well. The SS was already considered an ‘elite’ organization. The black uniform of the Führer’s special guard was dashing and elegant… In the SS one found the ‘better type of people’ and membership of it brx ought considerable prestige and social advantages. At the age of 23, Schellenberg was much impressed by such ‘social prestige’ and ‘the glamour of a smart uniform’, even if the realities of routine SS activities did not especially appeal to him.9 Sitting in Stockholm in May of 1945, after the collapse of Germany, Schellenberg in his so-called Trosa Memorandum quite frankly tells us that as a young man he was dependent on financial assistance from the government and that such grants presupposed that the applicants were active Nazis. This, he wrote in Trosa, was the ‘first reason why I joined the Party and the organisation’. Undoubtedly such pressures were at work. Young people may well have felt attracted by the advantages offered through membership in the Nazi cadre and financial straights would have enforced the desire to join.10 In 1935, while working for the state police, Schellenberg came to the attention of the electrical engineer and former Free Corps (Freikorps) member Wilhelm Albert, a ranking SS member and chief of the administrative section of the SD head office (Hauptamt) in Berlin. Albert called the young man to the German capital and used him for writing legal papers on state reform.11 Because his parents had planned for him to join the legal practice of a family friend, he left Berlin for a short time to test that opportunity.12 Early in 1937 Schellenberg was back at the SD head office in Berlin, continuing previous projects and becoming involved in administrative and personnel questions of the SD. Evidently, the young, ambitious and productive Schellenberg found acceptance in Berlin, and as time went on his assignments became more significant. His supervisor in the Department II of the SD Hauptamt was the SS-Oberführer Dr. Herbert Mehlhorn, who seems to have voiced his contrary opinions all too freely and, according to Schellenberg, in 1937 was charged by a ‘Court of Honor’ and dismissed.13 Schellenberg’s rapid climb on the career ladder of the SS is reflected in his personnel file that ended up at the Berlin Document Center. In 1938 the Nazis called on him to investigate certain questions of international law pertaining to places, such as the Sudetenland, Danzig and Austria, and he soon found himself working on the ‘preparations of the entire Reich Administration for the mobilization’.14 In the summer of 1945, Wilhelm Hoettl, a trained Austrian historian and fellow SS leader of Schellenberg, told Allied interrogators that Schellenberg did not belong to the Alte Kaempfer [fighting founders of the Nazis]. He joined the NSDAP and SS at a relatively late date. He received his start as a subordinate NCO in Amt I in the personnel section. With a keen understanding of the potentialities of this section he knew how to place himself in the foreground and soon Heydrich’s watchful eye had become aware of the young man. The latter [Heydrich] soon accepted

Hitler's last chief of foreign intelligence

4

Schellenberg into his inner circle, in order to, as he put it, ‘train the youngster himself’. The human relationship between the two became ever closer, Schellenberg became one of Heydrich’s most trusted confidants.15 Considering that Schellenberg was a well-educated and adaptable jurist entering the SS hierarchy at the opportune time of its formation, it is no surprise that both Heinrich Himmler and Reinhard Heydrich recognized the talented young man. Understanding the opportunities of the time, Schellenberg became a dedicated functionary of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD), Heydrich’s important organisational tool of power control within the Nazi system. By 1939 Schellenberg had advanced to the rank of SS-Sturmbannführer and had penetrated the network at the SD-Hauptamt to such a degree that he was given the task of running Department IV E of the newly organised Reichssicherheitshauptamt. Chief of Department IV, Geheime Staatspolizei/Gestapo (Secret State Police), was the muchfeared Heinrich Mueller.16 Department IV E was concerned with counterintelligence inside and outside Germany,17 and Schellenberg, who increasingly had become occupied with intelligence matters, must have been in his element. Counterespionage activities, however, never kept the workaholic Schellenberg18 from pursuing his goal of unifying the diverse security services into a single powerful organisation. A 29-page organisational memorandum dated 24 February 1939, although stiffly written, allows an insight into his plans at the time. Schellenberg proposes that the SS, in line with its ‘special laws of military discipline and ideological conduct’, would absorb the governmental sector of police and thus create a new state security corps (Staatsschutz-Korps). In the new combined organisation, Schellenberg calls it ‘Personalunion’ (personnel union), the SD, a branch of the SS, would aim to achieve a ‘politische Ziellinie’ (political goal line). On the other hand, Schellenberg argues for the necessity of ‘developing the purely impartial work of a total political intelligence service’ which would become the primary vehicle of the SD organisation and through its activities would develop its own dynamics. In Schellenberg’s view, the real challenge would be to create a healthy balance between these developments. Much of the memorandum, in fact the largest part of it, treats organisational details which, not surprisingly, do not divulge his own targets in the organisation. All in all the memorandum is a highly interesting sample of the work of the 29-year-old SS leader and his ways of moving about in the dangerously competitive and often unpredictable Nazi elite.19

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The Early Assignments Schellenberg headed Department IV E of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Imperial Security Head Office)20 from August 1939 until June 1941. Already prior to 1939, and certainly during his time with Department IV E, Schellenberg was not at all tied to his desk and, in fact, appears to have been under considerable pressure to demonstrate his professional acumen on actual assignments.21 Earlier he had stood out among his peers because of his education and a facility to grasp situations quickly. The Nazi functionaries had recognized the clever young man and dispatched him to the capital. His intelligence combined with a measure of cheeky daring plus a certain amount of mere fortune had worked for him and later indeed would enable him to avoid direct participation in the abhorrent massacres committed by Germany’s Einsatzgruppen (special commandos) in occupied Eastern Europe. In the early stages of his career in the SS, he, like many others, had to perform simple guard duties. One such assignment is described in his memoirs. It was 30 June 1934, and the leaders of Germany were meeting at the Hotel Dreesen in Bad Godesberg. Schellenberg later remembered ‘strange and disquieting rumours’ in the air of ‘plots, divisions in the Party and impending disasters’. When, later that day, the Nazi elite departed from the hotel and headed for the nearby airport of Hangelar to fly to Munich, it was indeed a significant moment in the history of Germany.22 In the course of the socalled [Ernst] Röhm Putsch (uprising) Germany’s Nazi leadership destroyed its own supposedly revolutionary wing.23 They felt it was inspired by what to them seemed like socialist views of Gregor Strasser, an early member of the NSDAP (1921) and a powerful figure during the formative years of the party, particularly when Hitler was jailed after the Nazi rising in Munich in November 1923. To quell a mutiny expected from the SA (Sturmabteilung) Gregor Strasser and scores of others were murdered by the SS.24 In Schellenberg’s own words: ‘June 30 marked the ascendancy within the Nazi structure of the SS, whose black uniform with the death’s-head insignia I now wore.’25 Schellenberg soon advanced from SS guard duty to more challenging assignments.26 Still, in 1934 he found himself dispatched to Paris in order to observe for some weeks the activities of a professor at the Sorbonne. The consequences for the professor are not discernable from the sources, but one is left to conclude that Schellenberg’s work was quite satisfactory to his superiors.27 Following the completion of his legal exams and apparently fruitful work for the SD Hauptamt in Berlin, Schellenberg found himself ordered to Vienna on 12 March 1938, the moment of the Anschluss to Germany of what used to be Austria and would now be referred to as the ‘Ostmark’. Not only was it to be his first personal encounter with Heinrich Himmler,28 but since the Gestapo Chief, Schellenberg’s superior Heinrich Mueller, was absent for some days, Schellenberg actually assumed control over a number of important administrative developments in Vienna during the early days of the Anschluss. Schellenberg remembers that they were accompanied by troops from the Waffen-SS and the so-called Austrian Legion.29 Aside from administrative and legal desk

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work, Schellenberg seems to have been involved in the collection of Austrian documents the Nazis wanted to get their hands on. In his memoirs he reports that Heydrich ‘told me to secure all the files and documents of the Chief of the Austrian Secret Service, Colonel [Max] Ronge’. If Jacques Delarue has it right, Schellenberg and his men got to Ronge before Canaris could reach him. Schellenberg, according to this version, ‘carried out his mission, which consisted in seizing the statute books and records of the Austrian Secret Service chief’. André Brissaud, on the contrary, reports that Erwin Lahousen, formerly of the Austrian military intelligence and later with Canaris’ Abwehr, had told him that Canaris was there first and obtained from Ronge the intelligence files created by the Austrians on Adolf Hitler, Hermann Göring, Reinhard Heydrich and Wilhelm Canaris. Schellenberg’s own version of the results of his assignment is worded rather sparsely: ‘The papers that I found were not very up-to-date, though there was some interesting material on deciphering codes. Colonel Ronge himself expressed his willingness to work in future for the German Secret Service.’30 Probably not without positive consequences for his further career, Schellenberg also ended up with the risky task of handling the security arrangements for Hitler’s triumphant entry into Vienna.31 All went well as, in the words of Sir Nevile Henderson, ‘the curtain for Act I fell amid the cheers of the Austrian mob which welcomed their new Fuehrer and applauded his announcement of the final incorporation of the Ostmark in the German Reich’.32 Indeed, his work in Vienna was valued so highly in Berlin that he was almost immediately sent on to Rome to take control of security measures connected with Hitler’s impending visit to the Duce. A good number of reliable SS men were filtered into Italy under cover, and Schellenberg had them posted at ‘key points along the various routes of Hitler’s tour’. Schellenberg later recalled that he used the assignment in Italy to organise a far-flung network of German agents collecting information on the political climate in that country. His claim to have dispatched as many as 500 agents, divided into groups of three, into Italy may well be an exaggeration, but his description of the undertaking leaves no doubt that the interior situation in Italy was of considerable concern to the Nazis.33 Later in 1938, Schellenberg occupied himself with the documents related to the murder of the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. Presumably the respective papers fell into German hands during the Anschluss. Schellenberg’s findings, not included in the English version of his memoirs, were as follows: The death of Dollfuss at the hands of a motley crew of Nazis on 25 July 1934, was murder, but the available papers contained no evidence pointing to an involvement of Germany. In Schellenberg’s view ‘the crime therefore was an unauthorized deed committed by Austrian National Socialists’.34 Having been suggested for promotion on 7 July 1938, the ‘Hauptabteilungsleiter 1/11 im SD-Hauptamt’ was made SS-Hauptsturmführer on 1 August 1938.35 He had been overburdened with the recently intensified intelligence work in Czechoslovakia and the close cooperation with Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei). Frictions between the different political groupings of the Sudeten Germans had led to worried observation by the Germans. If one is to trust Schellenberg’s memoirs, Konrad Henlein was less interested in the total dissolution of Czechoslovakia than others, such as Karl Hermann Frank, second-in-command in the Sudeten German Party. Henlein, who Schellenberg argues was merely interested in autonomy for his Sudeten Germans, cultivated contacts with ‘Colonel Christie, a representative of the British Secret

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Service’.36 Henlein’s encounters with Christie presumably took place in Switzerland, and in August 1938 Heydrich ordered Schellenberg to observe Henlein’s meetings with Christie and to discover what was being planned. Henlein’s message for the British, if Schellenberg reports correctly, could not have been much of a surprise: Waiting was not an alternative anymore; ‘the problem would have to be solved by force’.37 The events of autumn 1938 and spring 1939 appear to have proved him correct. The destruction of Czechoslovakia took its course after the British and the French acceded to Hitler’s blunt demands in Munich. When Prague was finally being occupied by German troops, Schellenberg, according to his English memoirs, was in Hitler’s company, rushing with break-neck speed to be first at the Hradčany, while, according to the German memoirs, he was forced to remain behind to hold up the return journey from Berlin to Prague of Emil Hacha, who had been pressured by the Nazis to agree to the protection of the Czech people by the Grossdeutsche Reich.38 In the absence of notable opposition from other nations, Germany’s expansion would evidently continue and Poland appeared to be the next target. Schellenberg offers only a very abbreviated version of the preparations for the feigned Polish attack on German territory. Heydrich, Schellenberg’s protector in the higher echelons of the Nazi hierarchy, had come up with the proposal and everything had been set in motion for 25 August 1939. Schellenberg’s report of events skips the early activities and Hitler’s drawing back under the influence of unfavourable news from abroad, and instead he has much to say about his experiences travelling with Hitler and Himmler behind the rapidly advancing invasion army. On 8 September 1939, Schellenberg accompanied Heydrich to Warsaw in order to organise the security needed for the upcoming visit of Adolf Hitler. Schellenberg: ‘Warsaw was a dead city.’39 More important for Schellenberg was the generous harvest from captured Polish intelligence documents: 430 names of German agents working for the Poles. The English edition of Schellenberg’s memoirs makes it clear that it was the massive evidence of Polish espionage that caused him to proceed to the Rhein-Ruhr region to check the controls against industrial espionage. By contrast, the German memoirs give the impression that he was ordered to study counterespionage to be better prepared for taking over Department IVE in the Reichssicher-heitshauptamt.40 Though a number of commentators have voiced doubts concerning the real capabilities of Walter Schellenberg,41 there is nothing to indicate that either the challenges of war or the increasingly competitive atmosphere within the Nazi hierarchy were able to curtail his successful drive to the top. In fact, his work schedule became so hectic that one is left wondering who may have counselled him and what support systems he could have relied on. It is rather unlikely that had time to develop friendships or even close relationships of mutual trust with other men in the service, though Schellenberg occasionally does refer to certain persons as friends.42 The destruction of Poland had just begun when Schellenberg was able to pull off one of the more publicized feats of his relatively short career. Engaging the British intelligence service itself, he seems to have come out unscathed, though it remains somewhat difficult to determine what Germany gained from the exercise. If Christopher Andrew’s assessment of the British side, namely that ‘the “Venlo incident” was one of the most embarrassing episodes in the history of the SIS’ is correct, that might well explain the somewhat surprising brevity of the treatment of Venlo in the largely British

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‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’ edited below.43 Some authors still recount events as if the rather surprising interaction between Nazi representatives and British intelligence were part of a general immediate reaction to the onset of World War II, but most of the evidence suggests the existence of such contacts well before September 1939.44 The British, of course, had been aware of a certain unrest in various quarters of German society and were informed about the latent discontent among parts of German military leadership.45 Several authors have described the background of the so-called Z organisation run by Claude Dansey for the purpose of better collecting intelligence from Germany and Italy.46 While, not surprisingly, one of the most significant bases of Z was in Switzerland, Dansey also maintained offices in the Netherlands. One of the early key figures in the hazy connections established between British and German agents was a Dr. Franz Fischer, at times also referred to as Dr. Fischer or SD agent F479. Fischer, who is said to have left Germany under a cloud and was thought to be a ‘German refugee’, successfully penetrated a group of German exiles in Paris led by Dr. Klaus Spieker.47 Early in 1938 Spieker was able to elicit a promise from Johannes Travaglio, an Abwehr man from Stuttgart,48 to persuade a member of the German military opposition to come to the Netherlands and meet with representatives of Major R.H.Stevens, an intelligence officer stationed at the British Embassy in The Hague. The prospect of actual talks with one of Hitler’s dissident military leaders so enthused Captain Sigismund Payne Best, one of the men of the Z organisation in Holland, that he requested Franz Fischer to arrange such an encounter. Presumably Best was unaware that Fischer was working for both the British and the German intelligence services.49 According to most accounts, the first meeting took place at the beginning of September 1939, at the Hotel Wilhelmina in Venlo on the Dutch-German border. There ‘Dr Franz’ or rather Franz Fischer introduced Captain S.Payne Best to the German ‘Major Solms’, in fact Johannes Travaglio. Predictably, the reports about the conversations in Venlo offer different details, but afterwards Fischer seems to have contacted his SD controlling officer Dr. Helmut Knochen, claiming that British intelligence desired to meet a ranking German officer who would be in a position to discuss possibilities of an early peace.50 MacDonald’s view that ‘Schellenberg and Knochen, certainly believed that they were engaged in genuine peace negotiations’, fits in well with much of the generally confused political thinking prevalent at the time in Berlin and London. Concurrently with the intelligence contacts in the Netherlands, there had been similar German feelers in Switzerland. Here the shadowy and very active Nazi emissary Max Egon Prince Hohenlohe met with British Group Captain Malcolm G. Christie, who had excellent German contacts from his earlier tour of duty in Berlin as Air Attaché. The Germans now audibly whispered that they might well imagine replacing Hitler with Hermann Göring, and the British listened with some interest.51 However one may be inclined to interpret the encounters in Switzerland at this point, there were some indications suggesting a German willingness to explore contingencies other than war and the British would therefore have considered meeting representatives of a German military resistance group in Holland. Meanwhile, Reinhard Heydrich had chosen young Walter Schellenberg to conduct the risky game of conferring with British intelligence in still neutral Holland. Hitler himself

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appears to have been informed and apparently had voiced no objections. Dates and places of the following meeting or meetings quite clearly are less than reliable in the pertinent sources.52 This unreliability matters because according to the report on the events of 20 October 1939,53 Schellenberg was not present, but instead sent two SS-men named Salisch and Christensen, while in his own memoirs Schellenberg covers in considerable detail his meeting with Stevens and Best at Arnhem on 21 October 1939, after having been taken there from Zutphen by Captain Best. If Schellenberg remembers accurately, ‘The British officers assured me that His Majesty’s Government were definitely interested in our enterprise and that their Government attached the greatest importance to preventing a further extension of war…’, and a new encounter was planned for 30 October 1939, ‘at the Central Office of British Intelligence in The Hague’.54 The meeting on 30 October, almost cancelled due to precautionary controls by the Dutch police, actually did take place. Schellenberg went as Captain Schemmel,55 in actuality an officer attached to the German Supreme Command, and took with him Colonel Martini, who, in fact, was a close acquaintance of his from Berlin, namely Professor Max de Crinis, an Austrian by birth and professor of medicine in Berlin.56 From all appearances the SS leaders actually met their British counterparts in Stevens’ office in The Hague. Schellenberg recalls that they discussed getting rid of Hitler and arranging a peace with the Western nations. Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland were to regain their independence; Germany was to return to the gold standard; and her former colonies might be restored. The day ended with a dinner that turned into a rather pleasant social event. Later Schellenberg recalled a feeling of success, but also commented on his impression from the conversation with his British hosts as follows: ‘I gained a greater insight into the attitude of the British towards the war. They had not undertaken it lightly, and would fight to the bitter end. Indeed, if Germany were successful in invading Britain, they would carry on the war from Canada.’57 Stevens and Best, however, were so taken in by Schellenberg and de Crinis that they gave them a set for transmitting to and receiving from the British secret service station in The Hague. The calling number was to be O-N4.58 Whether it is correct that the responsible persons in London actually considered the negotiations in the Netherlands an indication of German weakness and were led to deduce optimistic prognoses59 is quite another matter, but there can be no doubt that Prime Minister, Foreign Office and SIS decided to continue to play the dangerous game.60 The events in Venlo of 9 November 1939, are generally well known. On the previous evening an attempt on Hitler’s life had been made in the Bürgerbräukeller of Haidhausen in Munich. There is some discrepancy in the dates given for Himmler’s—or Hitler’s—decision to kidnap the MI6 representatives at the next encounter. Schellenberg’s version has him return to Venlo twice more to meet with his British counterparts and even to prepare his own planned flight to London for further negotiations.61 According to his account, in the evening of 8 November he went to sleep exhausted only to be awakened by the exited, demanding voice of Heinrich Himmler who telephoned to relate what shortly after Hitler’s departure had transpired in the Munich beer cellar. Himmler was or acted certain that ‘there’s no doubt that the British Secret Service is behind it all’. Schellenberg’s orders were to abduct the British intelligence men. An SS detachment would be there at the border to cover him.62

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Aside of some minor details, the course of events at the Venlo border crossing has been clarified.63 Captain Sigismund Payne Best, Major Richard Stevens and a Dutch citizen, Jan Frederik Lemmens,64 were kidnapped. The Dutch General Staff officer, Lieutenant Dirk Klop, was fatally wounded during the ensuing exchange of shots and died later that evening.65 Schellenberg himself came close to being hit but managed to return across the border after seeing that the SS men of the special detachment had carried out the assignment. Christopher Andrew’s appraisal of Schellenberg’s performance at Venlo appears sensible: ‘Schellenberg could have inaugurated a longterm system of deception… Instead, he threw away at Venlo a major intelligence asset for a mere propaganda victory.’66 When looking closer at Schellenberg’s role, however, one becomes less certain about the extent of his influence in the Venlo undertaking. Schellenberg’s position in the top group of Nazi leaders was clearly still somewhat subordinate and his ceaseless ambition was likely to alert his enemies in the Nazi hierarchy. The documentary evidence not being persuasive in all aspects, it would indeed appear that he simply chose to execute an order without question. On the German side tangible results of the Venlo action were endless interrogations of Best and Stevens and their stay in German captivity until the very end of the war.67 Experts differ on the extent of useful information the Germans may have pried out of the unfortunate agents. Schellenberg later considered turning Best around and, if one can believe him, Best appeared willing to be used, though, as Schellenberg himself surmised, probably for no other reason than to return to Britain. No decisions were taken, and Schellenberg later recalled that he attempted to persuade Himmler to let the British agents go, but that Himmler was forced to hold on to them just in case Hitler should decide on a show trial.68 On the British side, the capture of these important agents destroyed much of the network in the Netherlands and left London uncertain about the extent of knowledge gained by the Germans. Lord Dacre’s comment ‘our entire espionage system in Western Europe was mopped up by the German Secret Service’ may reflect British feelings at the time, in the long run, however, Venlo does not appear to have been the onset of a largely successful German intelligence campaign against the British services.69 The question of a direct linkage between Venlo and the forthcoming German invasion of the Netherlands and, even more so, of a possible connection between the destruction of the British Z organisation and German plans for the occupation of Britain has continued to intrigue a number of authors. Viewing the overall aggressive designs of the Germans, however, there is no evidence that their military campaigns against the Netherlands and later Great Britain were influenced significantly by what transpired at Venlo.70 After the demise of Poland, Hitler’s real aim in late 1939 became the defeat of Britain, and Hermann Göring’s air force was expected to prepare the target for the onslaught.71 For Walter Schellenberg, Venlo did have personal consequences. In the aftermath of the stressful encounter on the Dutch-German border, his health seems to have deteriorated, and he was forced to take time off for recuperation. Whether young Schellenberg actually suffered ‘a heart attack’ may be open to question, but undoubtedly the strain of the last weeks had been considerable. Final divorce procedures ending his marriage to Käthe Kortekamp in November 1939 may have aggravated matters further.72 His respite was to be brief. In April and May, after spending the winter and spring running Department IV E in Berlin, attending to an assignment in the Ruhr area and

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serving a short stint as liaison officer to the OKW, Schellenberg tensely observed the progress of ‘Weserübung’, Germany’s successful military assault on Denmark and Norway.73 In May 1940, German armies unleashed their attack in the West, overrunning the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and finally France. On 22 June, Germans and French once again confronted each other in that railroad car at Compiegne. The armistice they signed sealed Germany’s control over much of Europe with the important exception of Great Britain. Schellenberg’s curious tale of the air drop over France of Nostradamus’ predictions may be looked upon as an example of several peculiar incidents in his professional life that have caused some authors to ridicule him.74 Aspects bordering on the ridiculous and not totally free of a certain operatic quality are evident also in Schellenberg’s next assignment related to Germany’s planned conquest of Britain. ‘Operation Sea Lion’ was the name of the multifaceted campaign. When the British finally let the Germans know they were disinterested in further Nazi offers of supposed cooperation or coexistence, the Germans became determined to force them into an alliance of the Germanic peoples. Schellenberg’s Herculean task was the delivery of an English king who would serve the Germans’ purpose. Edward VIII or rather the Duke of Windsor was the personage he was expected to procure for his superiors in Berlin. The origins of the hackneyed idea are not entirely clear. Undoubtedly, the Duke of Windsor by travelling to Germany in 1937 and including a visit with Adolf Hitler in his itinerary had contributed to creating the impression that he might be used to assist in building bridges between London and Berlin. Moreover, the Duke repeatedly had voiced sentiments that could be construed to appear as pro-German.75 Whether the Germans planned to set him up in some neutral country, available as a useful tool in their diplomatic manoeuvrings following the envisioned military defeat of Britain, or whether, as some sources suggest, he was scheduled to be king in an English vassal state, has not been fully clarified.76 By contrast, the details of Schellenberg’s assignment in July 1940, originating with Ribbentrop and condoned by Heydrich, seem to be quite apparent. Schellenberg was to invite the Duke to place himself in a neutral country, preferably Switzerland, and in return for ‘dissociating himself from the manoeuvres of the British Royal Family’ accept financial security in form of a deposit of 50 million Swiss Francs. Should matters turn out more problematic than expected, for instance British intelligence might wish to interfere, Schellenberg was authorized more forcefully to coerce the Duke to arrive at the proper decision. When it occurred to Schellenberg to voice some doubt about the Duke’s willingness to cooperate with the Germans, Ribbentrop was very noncommittal in his response but cited Hitler’s personal desire to have the operation completed successfully.77 Considering the significance of the assignment and Schellenberg’s relatively junior position, it is no surprise that he left for Spain almost immediately. Unlike a number of other capitals, Madrid was a fruitful working place for a good number of German agents, and Schellenberg therefore had people at his disposal if needed. His first contacts were the German Ambassador, Eberhard von Stohrer, and his own SD representative, the Police Attaché at the Embassy, Paul Winzer, who under a German-Spanish agreement could operate in Spain with 25–30 men.78 Schellenberg’s memoirs do not contain any surprises, except for the astonishing openness that evidently characterized his conversations with Stohrer. It needs to be said that very frank exchanges of political

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estimates were not part of the social interaction in Nazi Germany and that this was even less so when different cadres, such as the Foreign Office and the SS or SD, came across each other. His encounter shortly thereafter with the German Ambassador in Lisbon, Oswald Baron von Hoyningen, appears to have been equally rewarding, and Schellenberg, in fact, found his suspicions confirmed that whatever the Duke may be reported to have thought or said, it ought to be taken with a grain of salt. Schellenberg’s contacts with diverse agents in Spain and Portugal seem to have been routine and normal procedure in an operation of this nature. Considering his generally sober style of reporting on the entire Windsor operation, one is all the more surprised about a slip such as this: ‘An open contact with the Duke, which I could have obtained quite routinely, seemed less than appropriate, because I saw no prospects of success [for my undertaking]. He was after all an Englishman.’79 Schellenberg’s respect for Britain and British achievements, registered somewhat humorously by his Allied interrogators after the war, seems to have been an important part of his frame of mind on international issues and not at all a put-on facet of the postwar interrogation situation. With the arrival of a brusque order from Berlin, the entire operation took on a new character. ‘The Führer orders that an abduction is now to be prepared’, was the text of the message signed by Ribbentrop.80 There is little to indicate that Schellenberg had changed his mind concerning the use of violence. His frank discussions of the operation with representatives and agents in Portugal indicate that they shared his doubts about the future usefulness of a man taken away by force. The result was his simple decision to refrain from violence, and when the Duke of Windsor boarded the American liner SS Excalibur to Bermuda on 1 August 1940, Schellenberg gently observed the departure with field glasses from the windows of the German Embassy in Lisbon. It was the next day, 2 August, that ‘Operation Eagle’, Göring’s massive air attack on Britain was launched. The curtain was raised for the overture of ‘Operation Sea Lion’. Seen from Berlin, Schellenberg had been highly unsuccessful but he apparently found the right words in his reports to the brass. The reception in Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office was cordial.81 Reinhard Heydrich, whom Schellenberg had to face straight afterwards, even used the Windsor operation to promote his protégé: ‘In spite of it all, quite skillful. And I think you can change to your much longed for Department VI as soon as you have completed the organisational work in counterespionage.’82 Before examining Schellenberg’s role as chief of Department VI of the Sicherheitsdienst, a few observations should be made concerning the historical context of the Windsor operation. Clearly the undertaking was thought to be a part of the envisioned destruction of Great Britain. With the unrealistic idea of using Edward VIII as a tool of National Socialist Germany being out of the way now, there remained but the confrontation of the two nations. Seen that way, Schellenberg’s failure to persuade or kidnap the Duke of Windsor contributed to Germany’s decision to attack Great Britain. From this particular perspective, Germany’s plans against Ireland would be closely tied in. The complicated relations of Nazi Germany with the IRA leader Sean Russell and his associate Frank Ryan and their deployment to Ireland (‘Operation Dove’) are therefore parts of the general picture in the summer of 1940.83 While Ireland’s controversial neutrality may have been a rather sensible decision from a pre-World War II Irish viewpoint and, of course, in view of the background of Irish-

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British relations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for Germany that neutrality offered opportunities in the bitter struggle against Britain.84 The activities of Nazi Germany in Ireland went much further than the hosting of Sir Roger Casement by Imperial Germany in World War I. SS-Standartenführer Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer was the man Ribbentrop had chosen to bring about a cooperation with the Irish Republican Army, leading to a rebellion or civil war in Ireland. Despising England and the English and lacking historical understanding, Ribbentrop thought it opportune to accompany the long-planned ‘Operation Sea Lion’ with activities in Ireland.85 John P.Duggan, the Irish military scholar, wrote a fitting caustic remark on German foreign policy in 1940: All the initiatives for this move [appointing Veesenmayer to create war in Ireland] came from the Foreign Ministry at the same time as it was orchestrating the so-called peace feelers.’86 ‘Fall Grün’ or ‘Operation Green’, the military intervention in and intended occupation of Ireland, was activated in early August of 1940 and can be seen as an integral part of ‘Operation Sea Lion’ and therefore at the time closely related to the Luftwaffe’s battle against the Royal Air Force.87 Although Dr. Eduard Hempel, the German Minister in Dublin, may have assured Eamon de Valera that a landing of German troops would not be a part of the onslaught against Britain,88 what saved Ireland from German occupation was Britain’s victory in the Battle of Britain, not any special consideration for Ireland on the part of German military and political leadership. ‘Operation Sea Lion’ and the possible role of the Emerald Isle in the planned destruction of Britain should, of course, also be seen in the larger context of that summer’s German victories in Western Europe, Hitler’s rapidly maturing plans for a war against Russia and the increasing realization that a war with the United States of America would have to be considered likely. Britain’s refusal to be turned into a German dependency had weighty consequences. However one may be inclined to interpret the priorities of the German General Staff, the Nazi hierarchy and Germany’s industrial leaders, the defeat of Britain, if need be by occupation, was recognized as a primary condition for the envisioned world domination. That Germany’s plans for an invasion of Britain were very real can be concluded, among other things, from a handbook produced as a guide for Hitler’s victorious soldiers and administrators who would carry Germanic order to Britain and cleanse British society of its racial impurities. How the Germans intended to do this can be seen easily from the Sonderfahndungsliste G.B., reprinted in 1989 by the Imperial War Museum. Knowing the ruthless and thorough eradication of all opposition in the countries occupied by German forces, this Special Wanted List G.B., in spite of its many curiosities and errors, is less a humorous reflection of uninformed German bureaucracy, than an indication of what Britain and its society were to be subjected to under German occupation. The Special Wanted List G.B. is part of a more voluminous handbook Schellenberg was ordered by Hitler to produce for the advancing German troops ‘and the political and administrative units that would accompany them’, i.e. the special commands charged with Aryanizing the conquered territories. Walter Schellenberg’s memoirs remarkably understate the meaning of the handbook: ‘at the end of June 1940, I was ordered to prepare a small handbook for the invading troops and the political and administrative units that would accompany them, describing briefly the most important political, administrative and economic institutions of Great Britain and the leading public figures.’89 To expedite the complex task of turning British society into a manageable condition, the Germans had

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designated none other than Franz Alfred Six, one of their cultural experts and a fanatical Nazi.90 While the first edition of Schellenberg’s memoirs, published in Britain, would indeed give the impression that he did much or most of the initial work on the handbook, there are numerous factors suggesting that a team of specialists would have been needed to take on the rather enormous task of gathering the material, putting it into some kind of order, and checking the accuracy of more significant items, and that final production could not have been accomplished by Schellenberg himself even had he not been occupied simultaneously with other time-consuming assignments, such as the Windsor operation in Portugal. Undoubtedly though, the ‘20,000 copies’ of the book were produced by Schellenberg’s people and responsibility for its contents would have rested with him. Incidentally, there are hints that famed A 54 or rather Paul Thümmel helped the British to read an early copy of the Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. Contrary to Schellenberg’s later assumption not all 20,000 copies of the unusual guide book seem to have been burned in an air raid.91

Chief of Department VI Although it is difficult correctly to appraise the significance of the assignment in Portugal and the relative importance of Edward VIII for the German scheme of overcoming the stubborn survival instinct of Great Britain, there is no doubt that Schellenberg failed to perform as expected. Having survived the ensuing visits with Ribbentrop and Heydrich relatively unscathed, he returned to Department IV E (Counter-Intelligence). Things could not have been too depressing, for in early October 1940 he married again, and he and his second wife, Irene Grosse-Schoenepauck, were able to spend a honeymoon with his parents in Luxembourg.92 If we are to give credence to his memoirs, Schellenberg quickly landed another difficult, if not to say undoable assignment that autumn. For a number of reasons Adolf Hitler had arrived at the conclusion that the murder of Gregor Strasser was not enough and that, in fact, Otto Strasser, his brother, was a real threat to him and would have to be done away with. In the presence of Himmler and Heydrich, Hitler gave Schellenberg the unmistakable order: ‘I have therefore decided to extinguish Otto Strasser, regardless of the means necessary. I herewith give you the assignment to take care of the matter.’ Schellenberg found no other reply but: ‘Yes, my Führer.’ As it was, he was outfitted with a deadly substance provided by a bacteriologist at the University in Munich. The journey to Portugal, where the murder was to take place, went well—even with the life-threatening flasks in his baggage—but Otto Strasser may have been warned and evidently preferred not to travel to Lisbon.93 Unlike his brother Gregor, he survived the Nazi system to return to Germany after World War II and become peripherally active in politics. Schellenberg’s failure to eliminate Otto Strasser, just like the Portugal fiasco, does not seem to have hindered his career within the Nazi hierarchy. Or could it have been that Himmler or Heydrich did not share Hitler’s sentiments in this case and protected Schellenberg accordingly?94

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The flight of Rudolf Hess to Britain in May 1941 again had all the makings of potential harm for Schellenberg, who knew Kurt Jahnke, at that time the right-hand man of Franz Pfeffer von Salomon, the disgraced former grand leader of the SA who survived 1934 but had come down to running a small intelligence service for Rudolf Hess. Even now, most of the background of Hess’ curious adventure remains conjecture but speculations have it that Kurt Jahnke was somehow involved in the Hess undertaking, whatever its purpose may have been.95 Whether Schellenberg was asked to investigate the background of the Hess flight before or after his move from Department IV E to Department VI appears somewhat unclear, or rather the exact date of Schellenberg’s move remains uncertain. Whenever it was, Schellenberg’s scrutiny of the available information does not seem to have left note-worthy traces in the records.96 His final comment on the Hess affair, however, has a clear message for those who continue the search for evidence otherwise: ‘On the basis of my full knowledge of the records, the course of the investigation of the Abwehr, and the course of events of the Hess affair, it is impossible that Hitler had given an explicit order for the flight to England in order to make a last offer of peace.’97 Schellenberg’s takeover of Department VI (Foreign Intelligence Service) of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt clearly must have been a rather complicated procedure and involved the less than elegant removal of his predecessor Heinz Jost.98 Department VI had been under the leadership of Jost since its organisation in 1939, but Heydrich had not been happy with his accomplishments. In retrospect, it is somewhat difficult to sort out the traps planted to bring about the downfall of Jost. Wilhelm Höttl later told Allied interrogators that Schellenberg ‘was appointed deputy chief Amt VI…and given the specific mission by Heydrich to build up a damaging case against Jost’. He soberly added that ‘Schellenberg went about this task with his customary circumspection’.99 Surely Schellenberg’s takeover of Department VI was a clear indicator that he enjoyed as much confidence as might ever be gained from Reinhard Heydrich, but it also meant that he was finally in a position to construct his long-planned unified intelligence service. If his promotion had not coincided with the German invasion of the vast Soviet Union, it would have been a moment of great success. With the Soviet Union and soon the United States of America becoming enemies of the Nazi Reich, it appears that even the ambitious Schellenberg came to the dire realization that victory might be elusive for the 1,000-year empire. He began to consider the need to look for non-military ways out of the increasingly foreseeable catastrophe. After all, Schellenberg was probably one of the few members of the highest Nazi cadre able to speak two foreign languages and familiar with non-German culture. Sorting out his priorities, however, he realized that in order to build a unified intelligence service, he would first have to rid Department VI of what he considered to be wide-spread and ‘serious irregularities’ in the ‘handling of currencies and in the general accounts’.100 Possibly more threatening than the traditions of widely accepted corruption, however, was the abysmally manipulative mind of his former chief in Department IV. Schellenberg understood the necessity to quickly free himself from the fangs of Gestapo Müller who, no friend of his, controlled the police attaches abroad and thus possessed the means to interfere in the foreign intelligence work of Schellenberg’s Department VI. It was fortunate for Schellenberg that Heydrich, while supporting Müller’s secret police work abroad, held Schellenberg in high esteem and therefore devised ways to separate the

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power spheres of the dangerous competitors before irreparable damage would be caused.101 One of Schellenberg’s problems as a newly appointed department chief was of his own making for there was no time to approach the personnel turnover more cautiously. The pressures on him were considerable. To restructure the Department efficiently, he had no choice but to speedily remove a number of men from leading positions while knowing that the intelligence requirements of an ongoing worldwide conflict did not allow much time for the new men to become acquainted with their tasks.102 Breakdowns therefore had to be expected. To make things worse, Schellenberg’s plan of a single unified intelligence service almost assured a bitterly competitive relationship between his originally purely political intelligence organisation and the traditional military intelligence service of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr. Whether Germany’s intelligence organisation on the whole, as some have suggested, would have been more efficient in the absence of that conflict, remains an open question.103 The change at the top brought about by Heydrich’s violent death in June 1942 was one of the most significant events in the short professional life of Schellenberg for with it he lost what had appeared to be his relatively reliable protector.104 In his new chief, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, he acquired a vicious competitor who would hardly hesitate to eliminate him if he found it necessary. That Schellenberg survived this struggle was least of all a consequence of his own sly manoeuvring. More than anything else it was, until the final days of the German Third Reich, the protection he was now to enjoy from the wily Heinrich Himmler. Schellenberg, as is well known, fully understood the permanent threat and learned to develop an almost incredible loyalty toward his powerful protector, a loyalty that may help to explain his unrealistic ideas during the final months of the war when he thought that replacing Adolf Hitler with Heinrich Himmler might offer Germany a way out of total defeat. Following the painful changes of personnel and other departmental alterations, Schellenberg, as during most of his career, seems to have tackled the work with an almost obsessive drive. Department VI or Foreign Intelligence was to be turned into a functioning intelligence service without the weaknesses of the Abwehr. Not surprisingly, Schellenberg also discovered that, in line with his growing apprehension that Germany might not be able to end the war successfully, he would have to establish contacts and communication lines to the Allies, not an easy undertaking with the idea of unconditional surrender already in the air.105 Only two countries were left for the difficult game of covert negotiations, but both Switzerland and Sweden had active networks of Allied intelligence, thus making the German search for initial contacts a dangerous operation. For a variety of reasons both nations were decidedly neutral and in both cases Schellenberg was able to gain access to personages of some influence and stature. Schellenberg’s lines to Switzerland have been investigated rather thoroughly and a number of impressive and reliable documentations and studies have been published.106 Schellenberg’s predecessor in office, Heinz Jost, had planted the first SD representatives in Switzerland but the rather open and clumsy attempts of certain individuals in Switzerland to organise their Nazi sympathizers and, in fact, create a Swiss SS, had produced swift reactions from the Swiss Government. Considering the activities of the people associated with the Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz and the connections of such persons to SS- Obersturmführer Willi (Wilhelm) Gröbl and Eugen Lang, the

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Germans were quite fortunate to be able to extract their principal representatives without extensive damage to the official relations between Bern and Berlin.107 It meant, however, that Schellenberg was forced to start from scratch. He was, moreover, sufficiently farsighted to comprehend that if anything were to be accomplished at all, Swiss neutrality would have to be preserved at almost any price. Curiously enough, his first representative in Switzerland was Hans-Christian Daufeldt, an experienced SD man and considered, probably less than justifiably, somewhat of a specialist on Great Britain and the United States.108 When Daufeldt clearly did not deliver the type of performance expected, Schellenberg attempted to place other representatives in Switzerland. Because the Foreign Office procrastinated and the Swiss remained alert, Schellenberg was practically forced to create his own personal lines. The most significant of these, the one to the Swiss intelligence chief Roger Masson, was constructed with the assistance of SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Wilhelm Eggen, a German pursuing a variety of business interests for himself and others in Switzerland as early as 1940.109 Eggen cultivated contacts with Dr. Paul Meyer, a lawyer, businessman and writer. Meyer in turn knew Paul Holzach, a member of Swiss military intelligence.110 The beginnings of Schellenberg’s contacts with important Swiss personalities are well known and can be traced in various publications. They were a muddled mixture of private business interests, Swiss wishes to free certain Swiss citizens arrested in Germany, and a Swiss desire to safeguard the country’s neutrality and therefore silence voices, especially those in Germany, who wanted to have it otherwise.111 Whether such factors were the real origins of Schellenberg’s Swiss connection or whether Schellenberg quite apart from these concerns sought out other negotiation partners in neutral countries, such as the British in Switzerland,112 is not of immediate relevance for the achievements in Switzerland, achievements possibly of such significance that they may well have contributed to the rather generous treatment of the SS-Brigadeführer in Military Court in Nuremberg.113 When Schellenberg, as he remembered it, initiated contacts with the British in Switzerland, he came very close to harvesting trouble at home. It was Himmler, however, who gave him the impression that he might indeed pursue the matter further: ‘Well, I don’t wish to know all the details—that’s your responsibility.’114 Schellenberg, one may assume, was not alone in having to be concerned about the personal consequences of the German—Swiss contacts. Roger Masson also accepted a considerable risk when engaging in clandestine meetings with German representatives, and General Henri Guisan, Supreme Commander of the Swiss Armed Forces, could easily be slandered should the wrong people come to hear of such contacts.115 The flip side of the coin was that both services had to have a serious interest in the connection. Early on, the Swiss were aware that German occupation forces in France had come upon controversial papers, later referred to as La Charité-sur-Loire documents, suggesting French-Swiss cooperation in case of war. The thought that Germany might see the find as a handy and easily emotionalized cause, if not to say a casus belli, suggesting the necessity of military measures against Switzerland was not so strange.116 Nor are Schellenberg’s efforts—on one hand to let the Swiss believe that a German attack would be conceivable, and on the other to work against these very ideas when they surfaced in Germany—unusual in the often hazy and multifaceted context of intelligence operations. Schellenberg’s claim that he worked for the preservation of Swiss neutrality would not be invalidated by the game played. The fact that Switzerland as a neutral nation with several

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national languages became home to a number of foreign agent networks was no surprise and led to the introduction of additional counter-intelligence agents whose presence was not always helpful for the development of high-level confidential talks between representatives of the belligerents and Swiss officials. Finally, it need not be emphasized that multi-ethnic and neutral Switzerland, like most other democracies, harboured a considerable variety of political interests with potentially differing views on the world conflict. Without delving into the intricate mesh of the contacts between Schellenberg and his Swiss conversation partners,117 it does seem astonishing that both Schellenberg and Masson concluded that the other side was generally dealing above board and that certain human aspects could actually enter the relationship. Roger Masson, for instance, might have been unavailable for an affidavit when Schellenberg stood accused at Nuremberg. He might also have composed a more reserved non-committal statement, as some others did. Instead he chose to state for the record: C’est moi et non lui qui ai cherché et pris l’initiative de cette liaison et que, contrairement aux affirmations d’une partie de notre presse suisse, je n’ai pas été victime d’une stratagème invente par Schellenberg…mais que ce dernier est venu a ma rencontre pour me rendre les services que je lui demandais et sur lesquels je vais revenir.118 Some rather vague hints seem to suggest that Schellenberg may also have considered taking himself and his family to safety in Switzerland in the event of final defeat—which he foresaw much earlier than most German leaders. The evidence, however, is scanty and, what is more important, Allied investigations into the financial situation of the SS leader have not yielded any suggestion of noteworthy financial planning for the post-war period.119 The lines from Department VI to Sweden and German intelligence activities in the country have not been scrutinized by historians as thoroughly as the Nazi activities in Switzerland. While it is true that German preventive military action against Sweden may have been less of an option than the actually discussed invasion of Switzerland,120 there were other differences. One of these was the significant Russian diplomatic representation in Stockholm121 and, as a consequence, the fact that Stockholm became an arena where all three big Allied powers, the US, the USSR and Great Britain participated in the game of off and on open and covert connections. Undoubtedly Otto Köcher, the German Minister in Bern,122 was deeply involved in the international contacts in neutral Switzerland, but Bern, prior to the negotiations of Allen Dulles with SSObergruppenführer Karl Wolff near the end of the war, does not seem to have developed the international tenseness repeatedly registered in Stockholm. From February 1943, the German Minister in Stockholm was Hans Thomsen, an experienced German functionary and diplomat ‘of partial Norwegian descent’, who had administered the German Embassy in Washington after Franklin D.Roosevelt recalled his Ambassador from Berlin, following the anti-Semitic excesses of the so-called Reichskristallnacht, 9–10 November 1938.123 Almost from the beginning of his takeover of Department VI, Schellenberg’s Swedish activities were concentrated in two areas. He tried to supervise the work of his

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representatives and their contacts, a difficult undertaking as long as the Allies honoured the Casablanca agreement on unconditional surrender for Germany.124 His second task, more crisis management than routine intelligence activity, came down to risky attempts to free Scandinavians, who had been arrested for various reasons and were now being held in Germany, and other persons who were of particular interest to his Swedish contacts. The Swedish personalities encountered in the course of this were powerful professionals and members of influential families, men who might be inclined later to show some gratitude. The covert lines to Germany’s enemies, however, were problematic not only as a consequence of a visible cooperation practised by the Allies and the apparent unwillingness of any of the big three powers to deal seriously with the Nazis, but also because of the often nearly unmanageable melange of more or less permanently stationed agents and persons passing through, representing certain interests, not necessarily matching those of Schellenberg’s foreign intelligence service. Already in 1941 Schellenberg made the acquaintance of Martin Lundquist, chief of the Stockholm security police. Apparently an excellent working relationship was established, but a cooperation in the sense of a political understanding was never achieved. Schellenberg intelligently decided to leave it at that.125 He later recalled that Lundquist ‘was particularly interested in the Japanese Information Service, apparently in order to be able to maintain a better check on its activities in Sweden’. If the Swedes were eager to learn about the Japanese from their German allies, the Germans in turn were, of course, equally interested in benefitting from what the Swedes knew from the Japanese about the Russians.126 A third aspect, perhaps of no small import to Walter Schellenberg, would have been the creation of friendly contacts in Sweden for the time after the German defeat.127 An additional aspect of considerable interest would be the clear indication that Schellenberg, tolerated or supported in this by parts of the Nazi leadership in Berlin, did keep his lines to the USSR open while appearing to look to the West for opportune developments.128 It was no coincidence that Schellenberg and Lundquist shared an albeit unfruitful ‘common anti-Communist attitude’.129 Because at least one of the players in this game, namely Bruno Peter Kleist, has gone public with his memoirs of the events130 and because Allied intelligence in Stockholm was never far off,131 the contacts in the Swedish capital have caused a few historians to take a closer look at the records. Peter Kleist was most definitely a representative of the Germans—or did Schellenberg have a doubt?132—and he had close affiliations with Ribbentrop’s Foreign Office, as well as with the SS. While exact dates and details continue to be disputed, Kleist, often referred to as ‘honorary’ SS-Standartenführer seems to have been closer to the Foreign Office at the start of his travels to Scandinavia but to have been drawn into Schellenberg’s sphere of influence as time went on and the fortunes of war turned in favour of the Soviet Union. His major discussion partner was Edgar Klaus, a man of somewhat unclear origin who appears to have worked briefly for the Danes at the end of World War I and who later developed connections with German intelligence. Looking back, it is quite evident that the Germans used him and assumed that he could serve as a line to Moscow or that indeed he already was in the employ of some Russian service. The difficulty of the evaluation of these contacts, which were known to the German Foreign Office, to the SD, to the Russians, to the Japanese, to the Americans and presumably to most anyone who wished to be informed about such matters, is that most participants of the game were

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caught in a serious predicament of how to present their position or function.133 In Berlin, Schellenberg and his representatives constantly had to be on guard not to appear defeatist. Those who, like Klaus, probably represented Soviet interests were unlikely to state that clearly. The Russians, while resentful of what they assumed to be contacts of their Western Allies to Nazi Germany, were themselves not averse to exploring possible avenues in Eastern Europe. Both Germans and Russians were likely to be extremely interested in discovering other ways than costly battles to reach some of their respective objectives, but each also would have wanted to assure the other of unabated military strength and political determination. Schellenberg’s representatives in Sweden were numerous, but the sources suggest that in most cases they were neither very qualified nor overly productive. Aside from the highest Abwehr representative Colonel Hans Wagner (cover name Dr. Neumann), who was attached to the Military Attaché Bruno von Uthmann, Schellenberg’s main representatives were August Finke and Karl Heinz Krämer, the latter acting as a member of the Legation. Finke, who controlled a network of contacts that included the Swedish journalist Johannsson, the German journalist Pentzlin, a student exchange administrator called Bauersfeldt and Countess Knyphausen, worked with Kleist and assisted in the difficult connections to the Soviet Union. Schellenberg’s estimate of Finke’s professional acumen was not high, but apparently his reporting on Sweden and Swedish society was very instructive and thus helpful.134 Krämer, by contrast, was rather highly rated by Schellenberg, and it is difficult to escape the impression that a kind of mutual trust may have entered their relationship.135 Whether anything of substance was ever agreed upon, or whether most of these operations in Stockholm in the final analysis were routine, delivering informative or deception material136 in considerable quantities but not shortening the war in any measurable manner, remains a difficult appraisal, even in such extraordinary cases like Klaus where most of the data—but not all—seem to have become accessible.137 The high-risk crisis management in the business of freeing seven Swedes had already begun in 1942. Schellenberg took enormous risks because by engaging himself in these cases he clearly opposed Ribbentrop and his Foreign Ministry.138 The Gestapo had arrested five high-ranking managers of the Polish affiliate of Svenska Taendsticks Aktiebolaget and two managers of AB L.M.Ericsson, also in Warsaw, accusing them of espionage and having contacts with the Polish underground. They were not only top management but evidently persons tied in with influential groups in Swedish society.139 Alvar Moeller, from 1941 Axel Brandin’s successor as chief of the German affiliate of STAB in Berlin, immediately activated the Swedish Government to intercede, but no quick results were to be registered in Germany. Moeller and Brandin therefore lost patience and through Ludwig Kastl were able to contact Carl Langbehn, who agreed to try to influence matters through Felix Kersten, a masseur who treated Heinrich Himmler and a number of other Nazi leaders. Because things still did not seem to move and the lives of the Swedes were in great danger at the upcoming trial, Moeller and Brandin took matters in their own hands and contacted Kersten directly. As in many other cases, Felix Kersten was quite willing to help140 and promised to introduce Alvar Moeller and Axel Brandin to Walter Schellenberg, whom he described to the Swedes as ‘helpful and completely trustworthy’.141 Schellenberg actually agreed to meet with Moeller and Brandin, the encounters most probably taking place in Moeller’s house in Berlin-

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Wannsee and on Kersten’s country estate, Hartzwalde. When the cases came before the much-feared Volksgerichtshof (people’s court), Alvar Moeller sat in the courtroom and was probably not surprised by the harshness of the verdict: 4 death sentences, 1 life imprisonment and 2 acquittals.142 In the course of time-consuming and extremely chancy negotiations behind closed doors, Schellenberg apparently was successful in winning Himmler over to his view that the neutrality of Sweden and its continued good political and certainly economic relations with Germany were very important considerations.143 Alleviating the lot of a handful of high-class Swedish prisoners—be they spies or traitors—seemed a modest price to pay, and Himmler allowed Schellenberg to proceed. Pressed by his internationally well-versed Swedish contacts and eager to create positive relations with Sweden, Schellenberg now went to work using the power of his office and influential connections to the fullest extent. As he was to recall later, it was, for example, a more than fortunate coincidence that the Reichsjustizminister (Minister of Justice), Otto Georg Thierack, happened to be a fraternity brother of his with whom apparently he was able to address problems more directly.144 Schellenberg’s intensive manipulations in influential places in Berlin to save the Swedes were clearly very difficult and dangerous, but in the long run, though in several separate steps, blessed with success. The death sentences were not executed,145 all seven Swedes were given better living conditions in confinement and eventually released, the last just before Christmas 1944.146 Interceding on behalf of the Swedes and finally freeing them, however, was more than a good deed which saved a few lives. Through the negotiations with Swedish business leaders, such as Alvar Moeller, Axel Brandin and even Jacob Wallenberg,147 Schellenberg gained access to a European social class far above the crude and often degenerate German leadership of those years. From the positive reactions of those whom he met outside Germany, it is evident that Schellenberg not only became acquainted with internationally connected social circles and interest groups but that these foreigners found him humanly acceptable. Schellenberg’s contacts with the Swedish Minister in Berlin, Arvid Richert, in the equally difficult cases of the releases of a greater number of Norwegian students and Danish policemen,148 all held in German prisons and concentration camps, certainly left the impression with the Swedish diplomat that Schellenberg was approachable in humanitarian questions.149 Schellenberg’s intervention in the case of Gottfried Count von Bismarck is of particular interest in this context, because Bismarck, whose family knew the Wallenbergs well, was arrested in July 1944, a week after the attempted assassination of Hitler, and was accused of being involved in that event. Considering the extremely explosive political situation in Berlin and the tendency of everyone to suspect everyone else, Schellenberg’s however covert assistance of Count Bismarck could have had fatal consequences for the SS leader. From the evidence available it is possible that Schellenberg, probably through the alreadymentioned connections to Thierack, succeeded in getting the trial at the Volksgerichtshof postponed. The quick reactions of Bismarck’s Swedish friends and their use of Schellenberg most likely saved the life of Count Bismarck.150 The immediate result of the humanitarian engagement of the high-ranking SS leader and, following the 1944 absorption of the Abwehr into the Sicherheitsdienst, Germany’s Chief of Foreign Intelligence, was the realization abroad that he might be considered as a mediator in the final stretch of the criminal German Reich.151 Quite independently from

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serious questions concerning the motivations of Schellenberg, there can be no doubt that he knew his own system well enough to assume that death would be his reward if others in the Nazi hierarchy should succeed in marking him as a traitor.

Armageddon The final months of the Thousand Year German Reich in most aspects were less the dénouement of a great power than the unabated perseverance of evil until total defeat and utter destruction through Allied military forces. In the absence of moral considerations, German society under National Socialism had become totally corrupt. Expulsion and murder had largely removed all societal influences which might have served to correct and restructure while that was still possible. Corruption and criminal instincts had entered all spheres of German life and even institutions like the church or academia had become subservient to the criminal state. Some experts have been inclined to see the military as one institution able to withstand the pressures of National Socialism and therefore to be expected to rise and correct the nation’s path. Looking back, however, from the brief distance of half a century, one hesitates to share Lord Dacre’s view that ‘the General Staff was the one centre of opposition which Hitler, though he succeeded in ruining it, was never able to conquer’.152 The German armed forces not only did not act as a corrective, but Germany’s military leadership became an integral part of the evil system and allowed itself to be employed as the tool with which to commit mass murder in the conquered regions.153 The 20th of July 1944, thus was but a minor irregular implosion in a system of self-serving, all-pervasive immorality.154 In view of the available documentary evidence the historian’s view of Germany during the era of National Socialism has undergone some notable changes. It has for some time now been understood that it is a misconception that the German people or the German nation were ‘conquered’ by an Austrian and his gang of criminal outsiders. Instead, devastating evidence increasingly has shown that National Socialism and Germany or the German people were one and the same. An intelligent functionary like Schellenberg, trained in and formed almost entirely by the National Socialist system,155 then would not be moved by the events of 20 July. Although the records indicate that over time he had come to rather realistic conclusions about the eventual outcome of the Nazi war against civilization and therefore might have welcomed with some relief the signs of renewal from within, however weak they may have appeared to an informed functionary in 1944, Schellenberg was too much of the system not to sense that it would continue after the events of 20 July and that he would continue to function in it.156 His role as a part of the system and his seemingly natural personal decision to continue as that were tested and confirmed beyond any doubt on a Sunday morning in August 1944, when Gestapo Müller telephoned him to pass on what he said was an order from Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, to arrest Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the Abwehr chief, a competitor of Schellenberg but also a man whom

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Schellenberg considered something like a friend. Schellenberg thought about his options and ‘I finally decided to comply.’157 It is of some importance to register that this was Walter Schellenberg, the same SS leader who in the coming months would become deeply involved not only in the risky game of seeking a negotiated end to the war that could not be won, but also in the near impossible undertaking of saving the lives of thousands of unfortunate Jews and gentiles. Schellenberg’s negotiation partners were Swiss and Swedes, some were Jewish. Predictably only the two neutrals, Switzerland and Sweden, offered the kind of open and functioning communication channels needed in both cases. Schellenberg’s earlier activities in these countries and his previous contacts with influential personalities there were the background for his frantic engagement during the final phase of the great slaughter. Also, it needs to be said, the Swiss and the Swedes had witnessed already how Schellenberg, for whatever reason and with whatever means, had been able to free a considerable number of men and women. In view of the pressing question asked in recent years why more effective measures were not taken at an earlier time to save Jewish lives in Germany and the regions occupied by German military forces, Schellenberg’s attempts to rescue large numbers of concentration camp inmates would seem to take on a new relevance.158 Helping the victims may be significant simply because it took place. Even if it is correct, as has often been stated, that Schellenberg was buying insurance for the postwar period, it does seem meaningful to register the however weak and remote existence of surviving humanitarian instincts. While Allied armies were pushing forward towards Berlin and millions of people, civilians and soldiers alike, were savagely victimized on all fields of battle, the salvage transports of human beings arranged by such dedicated persons as Jean-Marie Musy from Switzerland and Count Folke Bernadotte of the Swedish royal family were small indicators of hope for humanity. Musy’s entire project rested on the simple idea of persuading the Germans to permit the Jews to be taken to Switzerland from where they would eventually be moved to the United States. Musy, the experienced elderly statesman and his son Benoit were well connected with American Jewish groups.159 They first arrived in bombed-out Berlin in October 1944 and huddled with Schellenberg who personally rushed the elder Musy to Vienna to meet with Heinrich Himmler. Musy’s later testimony under oath shockingly reveals what civilization in Germany had come down to. Musy spoke for the abolishment of the concentration camps, for the release of all Jews from the concentration camps to be taken to America via Switzerland, the release of all women from the KZ Ravensbrück, and the release of several individuals, especially members of the family of the French general, Henri Giraud. According to Musy, Himmler was not averse to considering the release of 500,000 Jews to the United States for the price of ‘trucks as well as cars’. Against that vulgar request Musy held the possibility of money to be used to help ‘poor Germans…through the Red Cross’. The records suggest that Roswell D.McClelland of the American Legation in Bern agreed to 5,000,000 Swiss Francs to be deposited in a Swiss bank pending the release of the Jews.160 Musy paid a number of visits to Germany and stayed in close touch with Schellenberg, but it took an additional encounter with Himmler in Wildbad in the Black Forest, arranged by Schellenberg in January 1945, before the first transport to Switzerland of 1,200 Jews could actually take place in early February. A second transport with 1,800 Jews was agreed on but did not materialize.161 Jean-Marie Musy later underlined that he considered it ‘out of the question that the

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liberation of people, as it took place, would have been possible without the assistance of General Schellenberg’.162 When Kaltenbrunner, or Hitler himself, stopped the transport of Jews to Switzerland,163 Jean-Marie Musy and his son Benoit did not resign but instead continued going to Germany, struggling against all odds to pry lose smaller groups of concentration camp inmates.164 Almost more important, however, than the heartening liberation efforts, was the need to stop the death marches of inmates organised by the Germans as Allied troops approached the camps. Not only were some inmates physically incapable of surviving strenuous marches, but others were unable to even move themselves out of the camps and would therefore be killed in order to leave no witnesses. To put an end to this inhuman procedure, Musy actually returned to Berlin in April 1945, to reach an agreement on the dissolution of the concentration camps. The proposal was to stop the evacuation procedures and instead hand the camps over to special representatives of the Allies. As a suggestion of this nature was out of the question for Hitler and Kaltenbrunner, Schellenberg, with the help of Felix Kersten who was able to exert his influence, turned to Himmler. On 7 April 1945, Musy heard from Schellenberg that Himmler had given his consent and that the decision should be relayed to General Eisenhower.165 Considering travel conditions in Germany with British and American troops moving in quickly from the west and Soviet armies pushing in from the east, it is more than surprising that Benoit Musy and Franz Goering, mostly travelling by car, even reached the camps they needed to visit. After making their way across Germany through desperate masses of refugees clogging the roads, the scenes awaiting them at the camps were quite beyond the imagination of any normal human being. SS men would be in the process of driving the hapless and decrepit inmates out of the camps, following orders from the top.166 In one case, at the concentration camp Ravensbrück, Franz Goering and Benoit Musy were trying to get the camp commander SS-Hauptsturmführer Fritz Suhren to organise a transport of women to be taken out by a convoy of Scandinavian Red Cross busses. Suhren refused to cooperate saying that he had an order from SS-Gruppenführer Richard Glücks, Inspector of Concentration Camps, to hold the inmates. Only after Goering called Himmler’s adjutant, SS-Standartenführer Dr. Rudolf Brandt, in the ‘Sonderzug Steiermark’ for confirmation of their undertaking, did Suhren seem willing to ignore ‘the specific order by Hitler, via Kaltenbrunner, to keep the prisoners in the camp and to liquidate them at the approach of the enemy’. With that achieved Goering discovered that another large group of Polish and French women was being held back. Commander Suhren finally informed Goering ‘that the persons in question had received injections to cause a disease and then operations had been performed on them to remove part of their muscles and bones’. To prevent their falling into the hands of Allied troops, they were to be killed. Franz Goering was actually able to see two of the women, to call back Dr. Brandt at Himmler’s headquarters, and finally, with the assistance of Dr. Hans Arnoldsson of the Swedish Red Cross, personally to remove these women from the camp and have them included in the Red Cross transport.167 How Schellenberg’s adjutant Goering and the foreigner Musy succeeded in prying the unfortunates out of the totally brutalized concentration camp is difficult to imagine. That Schellenberg should also consider the series of visits by the well-connected and dedicated Jean-Marie Musy as another chance to explore even far-removed possibilities

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of negotiations with the Western Allies is not at all surprising. That nothing came of these attempts during the final phase of total chaos in Germany comes as even less of a surprise. Such ‘an ambitious scheme’ considered by Musy and Schellenberg, namely to call a short-term armistice in order to deliver imprisoned persons—and thereby provide time for possible negotiation contacts—had no chance of being realized.168 How Schellenberg was able to function during these last weeks of the Reich remains an enigma, particularly if one realizes that it was indeed only a matter of coincidence that Heinrich Müller or Ernst Kaltenbrunner did not get their hands on him.169 His demise would have been one of their final curtain pleasures. Looking closer at the confusing power structures during the last throes of the criminal Third Reich, one may also conclude, however, that Schellenberg’s survival was less a matter of fortunate coincidence than an indication that the still mighty arm of Heinrich Himmler was protecting the loyal functionary to the very end.170 In spite of the dedicated labours of Jean-Marie Musy and his son Benoit, who rescued some 1,200 Theresienstadt inmates in one swoop and a good number of other Nazi victims, history seems to have remembered them less than Count Folke Bernadotte, probably for no other reason than the tragic death of Bernadotte in Jerusalem at the hands of Jewish extremists on 17 September 1948.171 For historians, Bernadotte’s efforts may also appear to have had greater impact because a larger number of concentration camp inmates could actually be saved and, certainly, because the negotiations of the Swedish Red Cross representative Bernadotte with the SS leader Schellenberg included a Nazi surrender proposal addressed to General Dwight D.Eisenhower. Finally, the historical memory of the Bernadotte-Schellenberg meetings appears slightly marred by an inharmonious exchange of opinions between Count Bernadotte and the British historian Hugh Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre). The latter’s earlier professional work with British intelligence172 and later historical evaluation of the developments in which he had participated173 led him to express disagreement with some of Bernadotte’s views as published in 1945 in The Fall of the Curtain.174 Schellenberg, in his own memoirs, evidently wishes to state for the historical record that it was not he who suggested or in any way brought about the first visit of Count Bernadotte to Berlin. While there is no reason to doubt Schellenberg’s version, it should be added he certainly must have been aware nevertheless of Bernadotte’s strong interest in international affairs. Moreover, it would seem more than likely that during his journeys to Stockholm or from one of his representatives in Sweden he would have learned of Bernadotte’s however fleeting contacts with men like Peter Kleist or Edgar Klaus.175 When Bernadotte arrived in Germany in February 1945, Schellenberg therefore knew much about him and his interests, and, it needs to be remembered, he had already encountered such influential Swedish personalities as Jacob Wallenberg and acquired most useful experience in working with the Swedish upper class. It is no surprise to discover that the two men, in spite of crass differences between their backgrounds, as well as their present functions, almost immediately found a common base for pursuing extremely difficult objectives.176 What were these objectives? Originally the Swedish plan of trying to extract inmates from German concentration camps had concerned only Danes and Norwegians, but as the negotiations with Schellenberg and through him with Heinrich Himmler got under way and other interested parties became involved, the entire undertaking changed and turned

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into what in the end was undoubtedly the most successful salvage operation for Jewish inmates from Germany. A further objective of Bernadotte’s mission was to negotiate a framework of conditions for ending the war in the Scandinavian countries and thereby not only preventing neutral Sweden from being drawn into the conflict, but also planning the foreseeable withdrawal of German occupation troops to take place in an orderly and non-belligerent fashion and without further harm to Denmark and Norway. Schellenberg almost immediately understood that Bernadotte’s desire to bring about a non-violent end to the war for Scandinavia, that is to find peaceful avenues for a German withdrawal, could be a natural platform from which to address a much wider perspective, namely from Schellenberg’s viewpoint ‘to secure Sweden as a mediator for a compromise peace’.177 Accordingly, the first meeting of Bernadotte with Himmler and Schellenberg178 took place in February 1945, at Hohenlychen where Himmler was keeping himself under the care of his favourite medical doctor, Professor Karl Gebhardt. The exchange concerned the removal of all Danish and Norwegian prisoners from the various camps and, as Bernadotte had hoped, their transport to neutral Sweden where they were to be held in a collective camp until the end of hostilities. Himmler certainly would not lay himself open to such far-reaching proposals and the outcome, a somewhat meagre compromise, was his concession to indeed extricate the Scandinavians from the different concentration camps and collect them at one central German camp. Transport facilities and care for the prisoners were to be provided by the Swedish Red Cross.179 Most important for Schellenberg, and in some ways an indication of Himmler’s trust in him, was the order to attend to all aspects of the envisaged Bernadotte operation. When Schellenberg used the moments after Bernadotte’s departure to suggest carefully that it might be possible to employ the Swede as a line to the Western Allies, Himmler recoiled and made it clear that any scheme of seeking talks with the enemy was totally out of the question. Schellenberg, however, would not have been Schellenberg had he left it at that. Instead he cautiously twisted Himmler’s arm to produce a slight, though significant, change of position. The undecided and hard-pressed Himmler agreed that Schellenberg might carefully influence Count Bernadotte in such a way as to help him to come to the decision to contact General Eisenhower ‘on his own initiative’. If that was what Himmler actually said, it certainly opened the door for a great variety of activities for Schellenberg. Whatever it may have been that Himmler thought could be done, Schellenberg welcomed the apparent green light for negotiations with the west and acted accordingly.180 While Schellenberg pursued the clearly hopeless enterprise of a negotiated or separate peace in the west and occupied himself with the difficult logistics of collecting the Danish and Norwegian inmates, a new factor entered the picture and was soon to change the entire rescue operation. Felix Kersten, Himmler’s masseur, who in 1943 had been permitted to permanently move from Germany to Sweden, had started, quite independently and separately from Count Bernadotte, a scheme to remove Dutch prisoners from the German camps and offer them temporary sanctuary in Sweden. In talks with Christian Günther, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Kersten had been assured that Sweden would gladly receive any inmates freed from German concentration camps. In February 1945, Kersten was introduced to Hillel Storch of the World Jewish Congress. Storch was fully aware of the chaotic conditions in Germany and the great danger that the Germans would want to exterminate the Jews in their camps before these were taken over

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by the advancing Allied troops. As a consequence of the meeting with Storch, Kersten took with him to Germany the idea of doing something for the Jewish camp inmates at the very moment when Bernadotte, Himmler and Schellenberg were actively seeking ways to assist Scandinavian inmates. Kersten, it must be added however, drove matters to a point when he decided to take the Jewish spokesman Hillel Storch with him to Germany.181 Under the circumstances, it was very fortunate that, through his medical treatment, Kersten had direct access to Himmler and because of an established personal relationship could freely discuss all topics with Schellenberg. If one believes the recollections of the various survivors, Schellenberg served as a vital intermediary in the contacts between Bernadotte, Kersten and Himmler. Some authors have emphasized their suspicion that Schellenberg was driven by his desire to build a base for what he saw as a possible post-war construction, namely a new Germany under the leadership of Heinrich Himmler. While there is much in the documentary evidence to support such a view, one is nevertheless at a loss to fathom how Schellenberg could have arrived at such a vision. He would have had to sense that the Allies would not consider a German structure connected to a man like Heinrich Himmler, who for much of the world was but the personification of evil.182 There can be no doubt that Schellenberg had indeed fully realized the abysmal depravation of his country and its society. If he was fully aware of the realities, and it is difficult to assume that he may not have been, there is only the disturbing question about his motivation in the rescue operations and the futile search for an end to the war at least in the west. Was he responding to a need to do whatever could still be done in the final hours of the German catastrophe or was he indeed busily engaged in producing his own cover for a future183 that might have been? The question must remain unanswered. As it was, the unimaginable did take place on 20 April 1945, when the SSBrigadeführer Walter Schellenberg broke bread at breakfast with the representative of the World Jewish Congress, Norbert Masur, who had just arrived to stand in for Hillel Storch.184 With bombing raids around them, endless masses of wretched refugees pushing west ahead of the advancing Soviet forces, and the disorganised remnants of German troops everywhere, it was no small task for Schellenberg to fulfil Masur’s urgent request to meet with Heinrich Himmler. To complicate matters, Himmler was anything but ready to sit down with an official delegate of the Jews. The details of the meeting have been reported. That these two men sat down and spoke to each other is the remarkable achievement. Most important, however, was Himmler’s renewed assurance to the Jewish representative that the concentration camps would not be evacuated and that all killings would stop. While participants in the events and historians have engaged in a meticulous debate over the protagonists and antagonists who were on stage, it would appear more important to emphasize, as Steven Koblik has done, the success of the giant Red Cross mission in rescuing human beings from Germany. The mission was a dangerous and daring operation that would not have taken place if men like Count Bernadotte, Felix Kersten, Norbert Masur and others had not been willing to enter what to them must have been like hell itself and there to risk their own lives to negotiate the relief for the inmates with an unpredictable criminal like Heinrich Himmler. Without his consent nothing could have been done.185

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In retrospect, and without the ability to cast any light into the immoral world of which Schellenberg was a part, it does not seem naive to point out that Himmler may have been less willing to allow this wholly abnormal humanitarian operation to proceed had not Schellenberg continued to expose him to pressing encounters with Jean-Marie Musy, Count Bernadotte and the Jewish delegate from Sweden, Norbert Masur. It should also be recalled that from day to day Schellenberg was fully aware that his own life was at stake. Hillel Storch shortly afterwards wrote to Schellenberg: ‘I should like to express to you my warmest thanks for your work and achievements in connection with the saving of unhappy human beings in their dark hours.’186 SS-Brigadeführer Schellenberg managed to survive the final chaotic weeks of Nazi Germany and he continued to function. It was his order which sent Franz Goering on his way to assist in organising the life-saving transports from concentration camps to Switzerland and to the concentration camp Neuengamme on the edge of Hamburg from where they would be taken to Scandinavia. Men and women who in many cases had lost even the capacity for hope were given back human dignity.187 However one may be inclined to appraise the motivations of the negotiators, the remarkable result of their many meetings was the permission to rescue a large number of helpless inmates from the concentration camps. ‘Nehmen Sie alle Juden, die Sie wollen’, the exhausted Heinrich Himmler had said to Count Bernadotte on the evening of 21 April 1945, a few hours after he had met with the Jewish representative Norbert Masur.188 Some 10,000 women and children could be transported from the horror camp Ravensbrück to Denmark and later Sweden.189 The drivers of the buses and trucks of the Swedish Red Cross, directed by Count Bernadotte, risked their own lives when they entered the small remaining part of Germany not occupied yet by Allied forces. The immoral and corrupt system of National Socialist Germany had collapsed and in many locations the last remnants of some civil order had given way to the brutal struggle for survival. Masses of desperate refugees from the East were the most visible sign of defeat. Summary executions of so-called traitors, often hours before the arrival of Allied troops, were the last spasms of the wretched German system. Threatened by left-over Nazi fanatics and low-flying attacking Allied planes, the Red Cross vehicles slowly made their way north. For more than 20,000 inmates the long convoys of white buses with their doctors and helpers were an indication that somewhere humanity had survived.190 The unbelievable operation was made possible by the negotiations of such men as Count Bernadotte, Hillel Storch, Norbert Masur, Jean-Marie and Benoit Musy, but also Felix Kersten, Walter Schellenberg and Franz Goering to name just a few of those who cared. On 20/21 April 1945, Heinrich Himmler not only gave up his last resistance to the humanitarian efforts of rescuing men and women from the concentration camps, but a few hours after his meeting with Count Bernadotte, for the first time ever spoke to Schellenberg about ‘what he would do, if he once had the power in Germany in his hand.’ Far removed from reality they discussed new structures for Germany even to the extent of starting a new political party. Before they parted at 4:30 a.m. Himmler made ‘Vague hints’ about removing Hitler. On 22 April they had to make a ‘hasty departure’ from Wustrow as Russian tank forces were reported to be closing in. At about midday Schellenberg finally had Himmler where he had wanted him for some time: ‘He, Himmler, was now prepared to request the Count officially in his name to carry the declaration of capitulation to the Western powers.’191

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Schellenberg literally raced out into the battlefield and was fortunate not only to locate Count Bernadotte, but also to persuade him to attend another meeting with Himmler. That took place at almost midnight on 23 April in the cellar of the Swedish Consulate in Lübeck. As there was an air raid nearby, they had to use candlelight. It was decided to ask the Swedes to permit Count Bernadotte to deliver the German declaration of surrender to General Eisenhower directly. In the early morning hours they parted. Count Bernadotte returned from Stockholm on 27 April, bringing with him the negative news that the Western Allies were not prepared to deal with Heinrich Himmler. The Count’s evident desire to negotiate an armistice or some other agreement to stop all fighting in the ‘Northern Sector’, that is Denmark and Norway, could not disguise Himmler’s rejection by the Allies, but Schellenberg, quite aware that his life might be in danger, once more tried to arrange a meeting in Lübeck on 28 April between Himmler and Count Bernadotte. Himmler refused and instead ordered Schellenberg to report to him. In the night from 28 April to 29 April, Schellenberg did so, taking along Himmler’s favourite astrologer to help mollify any emotional outbreaks. It was a dangerous encounter, for Himmler was wounded by the Allies’ rejection of his person. There are no minutes of the meeting held during these night hours, but Schellenberg not only succeeded in talking Himmler into agreeing to an end to German occupation of Norway and the withdrawal of the German forces into internment in Sweden until the end of the war, but he also managed to persuade Himmler to appoint him as ‘Sonderbevollmächtigter’ (Special Envoy) for the negotiations. Schellenberg felt that Himmler was certain he would be head of state as Hitler’s successor ‘within the next day or two’.192 Schellenberg drove up to Denmark, met Count Bernadotte and began talks with Swedish officials about the end to hostilities in the ‘Northern Sector’. He was back in Flensburg in the early hours of 1 May to learn that Kaltenbrunner had dismissed him from office.193 Making his way through retreating troops and being attacked by dive bombers, he reached Kalkhorst at 8:00 a.m. to receive the next equally stunning news: not Himmler but Karl Dönitz was Hitler’s successor, and Himmler had persuaded Dönitz to fire Ribbentrop and replace him with Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk.194 Schellenberg met the new persons in power in Plön, then the seat of government, and apparently had a congenial conversation with Krosigk. After another journey to Denmark, this time in Count Bernadotte’s Red Cross car while driving in Denmark, there were still more distressful meetings in Mürwick, presently the apparent seat of government. Krosigk appointed him to the post of Minister (Gesandter) and he was empowered to return to Scandinavia and this time to include in his talks the end of hostilities in Denmark. Admiral Dönitz later remembered that he did not trust the Swedes and feared they would hand over the Germans to Russia once pressure was exerted on them. Schellenberg therefore, he recalls, was only authorized to negotiate with the Swedes, not ‘to conclude any formal agreement’.195 On 4 May he was off to Copenhagen where crowds jammed the streets celebrating the upcoming surrender of Germany. To spare him unpleasantries Count Bernadotte had him picked up and taken to safety. On 5 May 1945, Walter Schellenberg, now Minister of the new German Government, boarded a Red Cross plane for Malmoe.196

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The Aftermath Intensive discussions between Schellenberg and Swedish officials began almost upon his arrival in Stockholm. There was no doubt that he spoke as the official representative of the new German government of Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz who, on 4 May 1945, had signed a document stating: ‘In the name of the German Reich I confer on the Brigadefuehrer and Major General Walter Schellenberg the official title Minister.’ He had authorized Schellenberg ‘to carry on negotiations with the Royal Swedish Government in the name of the German Reich Government on all questions that could result from the abandonment of the occupation of Norway by the German Armed Forces in the German-Swedish relations’ and to ‘conclude agreements, subject to ratification where necessary on the basis of the present law’.197 As before, the Swedes were intensely interested in bringing about a quick end to hostilities in the ‘Northern Sector’, but in view of the rapidly changing international situation, it is not surprising that they insisted on informing ‘the representatives of the Western Powers, present in Stockholm’.198 Germany’s total collapse, however, was clearly evident and there was no time left to arrive at useful agreements. When Schellenberg tried to reach his government by telephone, Krosigk could only inform him that ‘Germany had declared total capitulation’ and that negotiations were under way. Schellenberg recorded his last telephone call to Germany on 9 May when he learned that Germany had indeed surrendered. He noted: ‘In so far as I was concerned the German Government had nothing further to say.’199 Because all versions of Schellenberg’s memoirs end with the German surrender, the further developments after 9 May 1945, must be reconstructed from a variety of largely unpublished and in some instances seemingly contradictory diplomatic and military records. There is no doubt that Schellenberg was the guest of Count Bernadotte while staying in Sweden. It also seems clear that Bernadotte had some influence on the treatment and the activities of the then former SS-Brigadeführer who, in fact, would have been a prisoner-of-war had he not been in neutral Sweden. During the first days of his time in Stockholm, he stayed with Count Bernadotte and was able to some extent to recover from the mental and physical stress of the previous weeks. Although avoiding the crowd of journalists wanting a glimpse of the high-ranking Nazi, Schellenberg through Bernadotte—and presumably with the agreement of the Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther—met with a number of Swedes to discuss recent events, as well as his own immediate prospects.200 It was during these early days in Sweden that Count Bernadotte spoke of his own plan to write down his memoirs of the recent months and suggested that Schellenberg do the same. Schellenberg had originally wanted merely to write a draft for a later book but decided on the brief summary when it became clear that he would be handed over to the Western Allies. As Count Bernadotte was murdered in 1948 and Schellenberg was held a prisoner in Britain and Germany for most of the few remaining years of his life, we lack the usual evidence from later statements and correspondence concerning the origins and concepts of the memoirs. Schellenberg’s interest in depicting his role in the efforts to rescue a large number of concentration camp inmates is therefore the only motivation that would appear certain. He would have hoped that the rescue activities would be helpful in a potential trial.

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The result of his writing efforts is the curious document entitled ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography, compiled during his stay in Stockholm, June 1945’201 and deposited in various forms, handwritten or typed, German or English, in a number of accessible depositories.202 By all indications, Schellenberg was assisted by his favourite secretary of many years, Marie-Luise Schienke, and perhaps also by his adjutant, the former SS-Hauptsturmführer Franz Goering.203 The document was considered of such importance that representatives of the World Jewish Congress asked for a copy and requested that Schellenberg initial each page to ensure that it would not be considered a forgery.204 As Schellenberg had given away only an extremely limited number of copies and had asked recipients to treat the matter confidentially,205 it is no surprise that the member of the World Jewish Congress ‘who allowed the copy to be photographed was most insistent that the fact he had done so should be kept strictly confidential’. In fact, the document was so confidential that Allied governments greatly desired to see it and, like the British, found ways to obtain copies.206 Whether, during his stay in Sweden, Schellenberg also contributed to Count Bernadotte’s memoirs to any measurable extent, as has been suggested by several authors,207 is a question which may be of considerable interest to those wishing to cast more light upon the bitter post-war conflict between Count Bernadotte and Felix Kersten over their respective roles in the most laudable rescue efforts; considering the short time he was in the country and the many pressures he was living under, it seems unlikely that Schellenberg could have played a significant part in Bernadotte’s collision with Kersten.208 Schellenberg certainly must have understood rather quickly that, whatever his expectations may have been, he would not be able to stay in Sweden. The question was not whether he would be turned over to the Allies, but rather where he might be sent. The records certainly permit the conclusion that Great Britain, the United States and the USSR all wanted to have him, even to the extent that some of the interested parties were not always informed about his whereabouts. There was an inter-service competition to get a hold of the last German intelligence chief. Therefore on 5 June 1945, the British Air Attaché in Stockholm actually sent a message ‘for Air Chief Marshal Tedder personal and secret from Sir V.Mallet [British Minister in Stockholm]’ indicating that he has heard ‘security authorities’ in London want Schellenberg, that he also knows that ‘Col. Rayens, American Assistant Military Attaché has left Stockholm for SHAEF H.Q. to discuss disposal of this man’, and thirdly: ‘If you really want him at your H.Q. I suggest you send to fetch him before London snatch him.’209 One of the unanswered questions in this context remains why Schellenberg was not taken to the United States. Washington was very much interested and said as much: ‘War Department Washington advises Schellenberg greatly needed in USA.’210 Equally unexplained is the fact that it seems to have been the American Assistant Military Attaché in Stockholm, Chas. E.Rayens, who contributed heavily to the transfer of Schellenberg to Frankfurt for brief interrogations,211 with the almost certain knowledge that he would be taken to London shortly thereafter. While much of the documentation on both the British and the American sides still remains incomplete, it would appear that Count Bernadotte, who often saw Schellenberg even after he had been moved to Trosa, told him on 8 June that he would be flying with him to Frankfurt on 16 or 17 June to be made available to ‘the American authorities’.212 On 18 June 1945, The New York Times reported the news of 17 June, namely that ‘Walter

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Schellenberg, former right-hand man to Heinrich Himmler…may soon be turned over to the Allies as a war criminal by the Swedish Government.’213 On that day Schellenberg, accompanied by Colonel Rayens and Count Bernadotte, was flown from Stockholm to SHAEF Forward Headquarters in Frankfurt.214 What transpired in Frankfurt can be traced in the records only with some difficulty and much detail remains to be uncovered. Apparently Schellenberg was not taken to either ‘Ashcan’215 or ‘Dustbin’216, the two storage places used by the Western Allies to collect the Nazi elite. Instead the records contain an earlier suggestion telephoned by Colonel (Dick) White and passed on by Helenus Patrick Milmo of MI5 on 9 June 1945, ‘that he [White] was now able to arrange for Schellenberg to be held for a short period, say a week or ten days, at a private house in Frankfurt, where U.35. could operate on him.’ From the rest of the document it is evident that U.35. had to be brought to Frankfurt from elsewhere for this purpose and that therefore a delay in Schellenberg’s departure from Stockholm for a week or so would have been rather welcomed.217 Since Schellenberg was flown to Frankfurt on 18 June, the busy interrogators would have had the delay they desired. If this was so, it seems to conflict with the fact that Schellenberg was subjected to the ‘first interrogation’ only on 27 June 1945. Unless we are to assume that U.35. had reasons for giving an incorrect date, his cheerful report of 27 June confirms the date of the start of interrogations: ‘The first interrogation of Walter Schellenberg left nothing to be desired and justified reasonable hope that complete answers will be received to all queries which Schellenberg is competent to answer.’218 Though most of the interrogation reports do not disclose the interrogators’ names, it is fairly certain that while in the Frankfurt area Schellenberg was questioned by U.35., Stuart Hampshire and Helenus Milmo.219 Another often practiced method of obtaining information, in the case of Schellenberg, were requests for written statements on particular questions or themes. In a few cases it would appear that Schellenberg was permitted to dictate to someone, after which the shorthand text would be typed and translated. The most important result of the first period of interrogations, most of them presumably held in the American Frankfurt facilities220 and with open access to the MI5 personnel, is a lengthy document entitled ‘Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg 27th June–12th July 1945’, dated ‘12 July 1945’ and marked ‘Secret’.221 Although parts of this report give the appearance of being incomplete, it is a significant document on Schellenberg and the Foreign Intelligence work of Department VI. In addition, it may be assumed that it was used as a starting point by some of the new interrogators in Britain and that almost certainly it served as a kind of prototype for the ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’ edited below. While the interrogators had fully understood the enormous implications for German society of ‘his grandiose, not to say megalomaniac plans’ for an all-permeating ‘Geheime Meldedienst’ (Secret Reporting Service), their comment on Schellenberg following the interrogations in Frankfurt is not without interest: Walter Schellenberg…is facing his present plight as a prisoner in Allied hands in a spirit of complete realism. This does not mean that he is dejected at the thought of the fate that may befall the former SS Brigadefuehrer. The fact that Schellenberg seems to be possessed by a certain amount of good faith in Allied goodwill is due to his conviction

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that he has, ever since becoming conscious in 1940 that Germany had lost the war, been striving for a settlement with the Western powers and for an improvement of the lot of Allied nationals, soldiers and civilians in German hands… The general impression left by Schellenberg is that of a man who, aided by remarkable intelligence and zest for work and abetted by a seemingly insatiable ambition, saw his chance for meteoric career on the wings of the SS in the domain that monopolised his interests—‘the Intelligence Service’; and then, disillusioned by the enmity he incurred amongst some of his socially and intellectually inferior colleagues, and the change in Germany’s war fortunes, paid in instalments for his passage home.222 Considering the short time Schellenberg was held at SHAEF in Frankfurt, the densely structured preliminary report was quite an accomplishment. Since his departure for London had been planned for some time, Schellenberg was issued a bureaucratic ‘Authorization to Travel out of Germany’ on 5 July and indeed packed off to Britain on 7 July.223 His interrogators quite obviously enjoyed accompanying their prisoner to London. Prior to landing at Croydon Airport, the plane which brought Schellenberg to England on a glorious summer day passed over Greater London. Schellenberg, who for the first time in his life flew ‘gegen Engelland’, stared spellbound down on the giant living city. His eyes sount [sought?] anxiously for the wounds inflicted on the centre of the British Empire. He could find no wounds, nor even scars. Giving up the hopeless search, he whispered: ‘I cannot understand—no destruction at all’.224 As in the Frankfurt area, it is very difficult in retrospect to ascertain exactly when Schellenberg was held where in Britain and where the different interrogations took place. Though there appear to have been various locations for the interrogations, one must assume that he was actually housed for most of the time in Camp 020, located ‘near Ham Common in the London Borough of Richmond’.225 The records suggest that he was interrogated frequently and that during the interrogations mostly specific themes requested by higher authorities were treated. Also, on numerous issues he was given a question and asked to elaborate in writing. When questioned in Nuremberg in February 1946, concerning interrogations on the US code from Bern to Washington, Schellenberg replied that after having been first interrogated by American officers in Frankfurt… I was twice interrogated in London by English officers. Afterwards I was brought to London proper, where I was twice interrogated by a commission composed of a British chairman, a British specialist on deciphering and an American specialist on deciphering. Finally I was interrogated also in London with regard to deciphering in general, the OKW code and the research station.226

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Certainly a great variety of military and intelligence men interrogated Schellenberg, most likely indeed at Camp 020 itself and probably more often at the Counter Intelligence War Room in London, a central intelligence office organised by both OSS and MI6 and in the summer of 1945 run by the British Lieutenant Colonel T.A.Robertson and the American Mr R.Blum, representing their respective services. The War Room cooperated closely with Camp 020 and evidently not only shared personnel from OSS/X-2, MI5 and MI6, but also interrogation facilities in Camp 020 and in London.227 The official British publication Camp 020 contains a section entitled ‘Part Two. On the interrogation of spies’ which offers a considerable amount of detail on the procedures.228 Schellenberg, who already was very ill, must have suffered under the hardships common at Camp 020, for shortly after his arrival at Nuremberg he told his interrogator, the well-known R.M. W.Kempner, that the interrogations in Britain had been rather tough. When Kempner asked him ‘With light?’, Schellenberg responded ‘With light, being hollered at, cold water baths.’ To Kempner’s question ‘Was it useful?’, he answered, ‘I was finished. Eight weeks in a lightless cell. I wanted to kill myself. It was not possible.’229 While Schellenberg, therefore, may have been relieved to learn that he would soon be taken to Nuremberg to appear as a witness at the International Military Tribunal, his interrogators were not at all pleased with the prospect of losing him. The reasons for wishing to hold him at Camp 020 were primarily connected to the fact that the War Room people considered him one of their most significant prisoners and, consequently, very early on decided to produce a major report on him and his intelligence activities. In retrospect, their decidedly strong desire to learn all that Schellenberg could or would tell them seems to clash with the equally strong negative appraisal of Schellenberg by some other intelligence officers, such as Hugh Trevor-Roper.230 The Counter Intelligence people in the War Room, however, could hardly have been more vocal: ‘If he were to be transferred to Germany, even temporarily, and required to appear as a witness, it would destroy his usefulness to Counter Intelligence and sour his willingness to cooperate.’ Indeed, Colonel H.G.Sheen, GSC, Chief, Counter Intelligence Branch, the officer who had collaborated with the Assistant Military Attaché in Stockholm, Colonel Chas. E.Rayens, to extract Schellenberg from the Swedes, now went so far as to request that Schellenberg ‘not be called as a witness’ in order ‘to save for Counter Intelligence the great value of Schellenberg’s knowledge’.231 The records also suggest that the Counter Intelligence people were painfully aware that the possibility of having Schellenberg prosecuted at Nuremberg would reduce even further his willingness to talk to them.232 Another hope, never quite abandoned in some American quarters, had been to bring him to the United States. The respective correspondence,233 however, is much more patchy than the pile of pressing letters trying to prevent him being used in one way or another at the Nuremberg trials.234 Perhaps rightly surmizing that it might be more difficult to get him back from Washington, the Counter Intelligence War Room, London, was even more concerned about Washington’s interests than about the eventuality of his being used in Nuremberg. When, in the autumn of 1945, they were literally forced to hand over Schellenberg,235 the Counter Intelligence people of Camp 020 and the War Room were quite far along with the production of what in December they described as ‘a full IR [interrogation report?] on Schellenberg, which should be ready in January, and should undoubtedly be the most important single report on any member of the GIS’.236 The so-called ‘Final

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Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, edited below, was the work of a considerable number of interrogators and other British and American intelligence experts, but the final text appears to have been written by or produced under the supervision of a British officer, namely Squadron Leader R.A.F.H.C. Harrison, who signed the ‘Conclusion’ between the actual report and the extensive and informative appendices.237 For several reasons the move from Camp 020 to Nuremberg must have markedly affected the former SS-Brigadeführer. First of all he escaped the largely British interrogators who had wanted to keep him but at the same time had discovered that the debriefing sessions became less fruitful as time went on.238 Whether this was caused by Schellenberg’s worsening state of health239 or whether the procedures in Camp 020 and the War Room were less efficient than they had earlier been, must remain an open question. Secondly, of course, the transfer to Nuremberg meant that Schellenberg was returning home, though it seems questionable whether the bombed-out city of Nuremberg would have raised his spirits.240 Thirdly, and possibly most important, he was being taken from a prison-camp atmosphere dominated by British guards and interrogators to what, somewhat euphemistically, is called the Nuremberg Palace of Justice, with its infrastructure heavily influenced by the American Forces. True, he continued to live in a cell in the ‘witnesses’ wings’, but under rather strictly regulated legal proceedings he would be interrogated mostly by lawyers and their assistants rather than intelligence officers wanting to get a job done.241 Schellenberg’s first role at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal was that of a witness, especially in the prosecution of the Chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Reading the minutes of his testimony, one can sense the strong antipathies that had developed between the two men over the years. In the past, Schellenberg had often feared the vicious temper of Heydrich’s successor but survived thanks to the protection of Heinrich Himmler. There was no love lost between the two SS leaders, and their confrontation in the Nuremberg Palace of Justice demonstrates that their mutual dislike had not mellowed with time. Schellenberg’s testimony clearly indicated Kaltenbrunner’s power and therefore responsibility,242 and Kaltenbrunner, calling Schellenberg a liar, even at the Nuremberg trial lamented the closeness between Schellenberg and Himmler.243 Whether Schellenberg’s testimony for the prosecution was an important factor in the court’s final deliberation of the case and the decision for the death penalty must remain speculation. The inhuman Nazi leader, Kaltenbrunner, was hanged in Nuremberg on 16 October 1946, at 1:30 a.m.244 Schellenberg’s own trial which, the records show, he had hoped to be spared,245 was a part of Case No. 11 United States of America vs. Ernst von Weizsaecker et al., the socalled ‘Wilhelmstrasse Case’. Schellenberg was one of 21 defendants from different German government offices and organisations. Also referred to as the ‘Ministries Case’, the original indictments were filed on 4 November 1947, and sentences were passed on 14 April 1949. The statistics of the historically significant trial are a small indicator of the legal work performed during this period of time. Of the 21 defendants, 19 testified on their own behalf; 339 witnesses were heard; the prosecution presented 382 affidavits, the defense 2298; the English text of the trial transcript is 28,813 pages long.246 A rather impressive array of judges, lawyers and other legal personnel assumed the difficult task of determining the innocence or guilt of the accused, or, in the words of the ‘dissenting

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opinion of Judge Powers’: ‘All the elements necessary to establish the personal guilt of the individual charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’247 Indictments against the defendants were pronounced on nine counts altogether. Under Count One, the ‘Planning, Preparation, Initiation and Waging of Wars of Aggression and Invasion of Other Countries’, Schellenberg was indicted and specifically accused of having ‘participated in the fabrication of pretexts for aggression…and…in SS and SD plans and preparations for aggressive war’. Not at all surprisingly, he was specifically charged with having ‘participated in the staging of the ‘Venlo Incident’ which involved the kidnapping of enemy and neutral nationals to fabricate a pretext for the invasion of the Low Countries’. A more perilous charge was that of having ‘participated in the creation…of the… Einsatzgruppen’. Evidently, however, the extremely complex question of the origin of the Einsatzgruppen did not play a major part in the deliberations about Schellenberg’s guilt under Count One. Because there was ‘no evidence tending to prove’ that he had an active part in the preparations of the wars considered here, Schellenberg was acquitted under this count.248 Count Two was the charge of ‘Common Plan and Conspiracy’, that is, the planning and committing of ‘crimes against peace’, including ‘war crimes’ and ‘crimes against humanity’. Schellenberg was one of 17 indicted, but charges under Count Two were dismissed for all defendants.249 Count Three was the grave accusation of ‘War Crimes: Murder and Ill Treatment of Belligerents and Prisoners of War’, which included shocking cases of plain murder of helpless prisoners and other persons. Schellenberg was not indicted under this Count.250 Count Four, an indictment for ‘Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and Offenses Committed against German Nationals on Political, Racial, and Religious Grounds from 1933 to 1939’ concerned largely internal German crimes. Schellenberg, in spite of his brief service in Amt IV, the Gestapo, was not indicted.251 Under Count Five 19 defendants were indicted for ‘War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Atrocities and Offenses committed against Civilian Population’ and Schellenberg was among them. Under Point 45 of Count Five the Court was of the opinion that ‘In May 1941, the defendant Schellenberg drafted the final agreement which established special task forces called “Einsatzgruppen” for the purpose of exterminating hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children of Jewish extraction…’252 In court, Schellenberg stated under oath that Heydrich had assigned him the task of mediating between the Reichssicherheitshauptamt and the Army after Quartermaster General Eduard Wagner had been unable to deal with Heinrich Mueller, chief of Amt IV. At the time, Schellenberg was chief of IVE, one of the sections under Mueller. The purpose of the agreement, negotiated between Schellenberg and General Wagner, he testified, was the execution of an order by Adolf Hitler that the SIPO (Sicherheitspolizei), the SD and the Army should fully cooperate in ‘breaking quickly and totally’ all forms of resistance in the occupied areas behind the front lines. Schellenberg said that he was present when the agreement he attained was signed by Wagner for the Army and Heydrich for the SS. However, immediately after the signing, Schellenberg claimed, he was asked to leave the room for a half hour to give Heydrich and Wagner an opportunity to discuss the further interpretation of the ‘Führerbefehl’ (Fuehrer’s order) among themselves. Schellenberg confessed that he later saw the gruesome reports of the Einsatzgruppen and under oath voiced the opinion:

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Therefore today I must express my certain persuasion that during the secret and oral deliberation between Wagner and Heydrich the extensive future activities of the Einsatzgruppen and the Einsatzkommandos within the frame of the fighting unit of the Army [des Kampfverbandes des Feldheeres] including the planned mass killings [geplante Massenvernichtungen] were probably discussed and agreed upon. The above mentioned and already during the first weeks of the Russian campaign practiced cooperation between Army and Einsatzgruppen leads me to express today my decided persuasion, that the Supreme Command of the Army Groups and Armies who were to participate in the Russian campaign were exactly informed through the normal channels of communication of the OKH [Supreme Command Army] already prior to that campaign about the future broad assignment of the Einsatzgruppen and Einsatzkommandos of the SIPO and the SD including mass killings of Jews, Communists and all other elements of resistance.253 Even from the distance of half a century, this statement of Schellenberg’s, aside from conceding a personal connection to the administrative origins of the Einsatzgruppen massacres in Eastern Europe, unmistakably links the National Socialist Army to the SS in the context of mass killings. Understandably the linking of both Army and SS to the excesses of German mass murder in Eastern Europe has troubled all those who would prefer to draw a sharp dividing line between traditional German military forces and the Nazi extermination units. There have been numerous studies on the events of 1941/1942, and Schellenberg’s testimony has often been cited to illustrate one or the other viewpoint.254 When going through the mass of available documentary evidence and perceiving the scholarly arguments concerning motivations of witnesses and defendants,255 dates of decisions and meetings,256 or relating to the development of Hitler’s personal thoughts on the ‘final solution’,257 one is left with a numb feeling of incomprehension of the German minds who conceived and administered the destruction of millions. That both the Army and the SS participated in the extermination of the Jews, and any other human beings in their way, appears undisputed. The Court on this part of Count Five arrived at the following verdict: While we doubt that Schellenberg was as ignorant of the mission of the Einsatzgruppen as he now asserts, the proof that he had knowledge does not convince us to a moral certainty We therefore give him the benefit of the doubt and as to this incident we ACQUIT him.258 Schellenberg’s involvement with, if not to say responsibility for criminal acts in connection with the so-called ‘Operation Zeppelin’ was quite another matter, one predictably considered by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal. Also referred to as ‘Unternehmung Zeppelin’, the project had as its main purpose the use of Russian prisoners of war who would be selected from the prison camps, receive special training including radio work, and be sent behind the lines of the Soviet Army with espionage and sabotage assignments.259 Presumably the men volunteered for service against the USSR.260 The indictment charged that ‘in a number of instances’ the men who had gone

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out to perform certain assignments had been executed upon their return ‘without trial or notice of any offense of which they were alleged to be guilty’. There were witnesses who recalled that SD representatives had delivered these unfortunates to a concentration camp as ‘Zeppelin Geheimnisträger’ (Zeppelin bearers of secret information). Apparently these men were not even entered into the usual exacting records of the camp but killed by way of ‘Sonderbehandlung’ (special treatment).261 One witness told the court that some 200 such men were brought to Auschwitz and killed.262 Schellenberg’s defence at the trial was not persuasive to say the least. When confronted with the evidence, he became evasive and appeared uninformed to a degree hardly matching his active engagement while running Amt VI: How many Aktivists [sic.] did you have working for you in Operation Zeppelin? I am unable to give you the figure. It is very difficult for me to do so, because the figure fluctuated constantly. It would not be possible for me to tie myself down to any figure.263 When the critical question ‘the Sonderkommando Zeppelin was within your jurisdiction in Amt VI, wasn’t it?’ was asked, Schellenberg had no choice but to respond ‘Zeppelin was subordinated to me.’264 The SS leader who had been able to avoid service in the Einsatzgruppen265 had suddenly reached the end of the rope. The Court recognized that Schellenberg had not individually committed murder but was responsible for the ‘official practice’ of ‘criminal acts’ committed under his leadership. ‘We hold that Schellenberg in fact knew of these practices and is GUILTY of the crimes as set forth.’266 Under Count Six the indictment charges 16 of the defendants with ‘War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Plunder and Spoliation’. Walter Schellenberg was not among those indicted.267 The same was true under Count Seven ‘War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity: Slave Labor’. Schellenberg had not participated in ‘the slave labor program of the Third Reich’ and, therefore, was not indicted. Count Eight was the charge of ‘Membership in Criminal Organizations’, and Schellenberg was among the 14 indicted. He had been aware of the possibility of problems with his memberships in the SS and the SD, certainly at least since his interrogation by Robert Kempner on 13 November 1947. Then Schellenberg had thought that he would soon be done with the trial, and Kempner had courteously replied: ‘There is your membership in the organizations.’268 Kempner turned out to be right, and Schellenberg was charged ‘with membership…in the Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsfuehrers SS…declared to be criminal by the International Military Tribunal…’.269 He was found guilty. On 14 April 1949, with the Honorable William C.Christianson presiding, sentences were pronounced in the Palace of Justice, and Walter Schellenberg was sentenced in absentia because he had been operated on recently and was incapable of sitting up in court. His sentence was generous: …the Tribunal now sentences him to a term of imprisonment of six years. The period already spent by him in confinement before and during the trial is to be credited on the term stated, and to this end the term of his imprisonment as now adjudged shall be deemed to begin on 17 June 1945.270

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Most historians, often for good reasons, have not looked at the personal side of the SS elite. In the case of Walter Schellenberg, however, this could mean overlooking a few perhaps significant aspects of his life. Not only did Schellenberg develop relations with men like Wilhelm Canaris, but it appears that after 1945 a number of well-known personalities tried to assist him to an extent quite beyond what might be expected in the case of an SS leader and war criminal at the Nuremberg trials. Though some publications report otherwise, Count Bernadotte certainly went out of his way to speak up for the German SS-Brigadeführer with whom he had worked closely during the final throes of the Third Reich.271 However one may be inclined to view Roger Masson, the Swiss intelligence chief, his depositions on behalf of Schellenberg were sensitive personal statements of recognition.272 Jean-Marie Musy, the elderly Swiss statesman, vociferously spoke up about Schellenberg’s humanitarian efforts.273 Isaac Sternbuch of the Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States of America and Canada, underlines that the Musy rescue operation was purely charitable with the 5,000,000 Swiss Francs deposited in Switzerland having been returned to the United States after the war.274 These and other voices for Schellenberg do not extenuate his failures, but the intonation chosen by these speakers seems to suggest that our understanding of the events might be helped if we were willing to look closer.275 The misunderstandings and false information in the case of Walter Schellenberg, however, go farther and concern basic aspects of his life. While it was not entirely unknown that his health had been fragile for some time, it can now be stated that Schellenberg was seriously ill for a number of years. His physical condition was such that a good part of his time in Nuremberg was spent in a hospital room rather than a cell of the Palace of Justice. As a consequence, he not only missed the sentencing, but he had not been in court for a considerable time prior to that day. In fact, it can be said that much of what has been published about him after May 1945 is simply inaccurate guess work.276 From the relatively complete records we now know that Schellenberg had been seriously ill since at least 1940.277 This may explain the apparently close relationship he developed with Felix Kersten, from whom he may have gained temporary relief from otherwise constant discomfort and pain. Moreover, Schellenberg’s almost ascetic life as a nonsmoking and nondrinking workaholic, who would turn night into day and have his secretaries cook special food in the office, might help to understand the man who in many instances does not fit the common mould of an SS leader.278 The records reveal that Schellenberg was far too ill to be placed at Landsberg penitentiary where most of those sentenced at Nuremberg were detained. Instead he was kept in a Nuremberg City Hospital room with a 24-hour guard in the hallway. Contrary to a report in Germany’s best-known news magazine, Schellenberg did not die ‘in the penitentiary’.279 Rather, at least since 1940 he had gone through a series of gall bladder and liver problems, usually accompanied by great pain, fever bouts and comas. In the spring of 1949 Schellenberg ‘underwent a serious operation of extreme technical difficulty’ removing his gall bladder and, as the records indicate, was kept alive by a strong daily dose of penicillin. A further operation was considered necessary but had to be postponed because of his physical weakness.280 The chances for a successful operation were not good and his general life expectancy was quite short. These were the medical facts leading to a petition for Medical Pardon, strongly supported by those who

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remembered his help to others in the war years. It was signed by John Jay McCloy, the US High Commissioner for Germany, on 27 March 1950.281 Contrary to most published reports about Schellenberg, he was not in the Landsberg penitentiary282 but in mid-May, 1950, was moved by ambulance from the Nuremberg City Hospital to the Franziskus Hospital in Iburg.283 Following a slight improvement in his condition, he was able to travel to Switzerland and, perhaps with the assistance of Roger Masson, succeeded in seeing some Swiss specialists. When there were difficulties with his permit to stay in Switzerland, he moved across the border to Italy where, following another operation, he died in Torino on 31 March 1952.284 Among the last to see him were Klaus Harpprecht and André Brissaud. Both spoke with him at some length and were able to attempt some appraisal of the highly controversial SS leader.285 During the final months of his life Schellenberg apparently saw a few former colleagues and spent much of his time jotting down texts for his memoirs to be published shortly thereafter.286

Editor’s Note The ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’ is a significant historical document, written in Camp 020 and other locations in the London area in the immediate post-World War II period. While it is very likely that American interrogators contributed some sections of the text, most of the document was evidently produced by British intelligence officers. Final editing of the report was done or supervised by ‘Squadron Leader R.A.F.H.C.Harrison’.287 In view of certain textual specificities it should be remembered that the document was not intended to be a ‘belles-lettres’ exercise. Instead, the purpose was to provide very quickly to military and political professionals a source of information on Nazi Germany. The writers of the report worked under considerable time pressure. They were well informed, but there was much that was still hazy or even unknown. The document is often short on personal detail and in various instances names are given incorrectly. The edition presented here is unabridged and unaltered.288 In some places where the document was written in extremely brief paragraphs, referring to a name or a fact, it was decided to make the text more readable by joining the small text pieces into comprehensible paragraphs. In the document the many subtitles were typed into a very wide margin on the left. These subtitles have now been placed between the sections or paragraphs as is common practice. Only clear typing errors have been corrected without informing the reader. All other corrections, additions or changes, such as suggesting another spelling, adding a first name or pointing out unusual, possibly incorrect information, are offered in square brackets. All numbered annotations are from the editor; annotations with an asterisk are a part of the original document. The only page of the entire document not reproduced in this edition is an unnumbered sheet between the title page and the table of contents containing a few personal data of Schellenberg and a passport-style photograph.

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Because Schellenberg’s published memoirs have been selected and edited from handwritten and typed text left at the time of his death in 1952, it remains unknown whether and how he would have published them. In those instances where a comparison of the ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’ with the published memoirs might be helpful, references are given in the annotations.

FINAL REPORT ON THE CASE OF WALTER FRIEDRICH SCHELLENBERG

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Foreword The information contained in this report has been obtained principally through direct interrogation. With regard to that part of Schellenberg’s story, however, which deals with his efforts in the peace negotiations of the last few weeks before capitulation, Schellenberg’s autobiographical statement, supplemented by further interrogation where necessary, has been used as a basis. This account of the events of that time was written in Sweden shortly after the surrender of Germany and it has been considered that it was more chronologically and factually accurate than his subsequent statements. Apart from certain observations the information furnished by Schellenberg on the organisation and structure of Amt IV and Amt VI has not been included in the Appendices as more accurate details have been available from other sources. In this connection it must be stressed that, taken by and large, Schellenberg has shown himself under interrogation to have little capacity for lucid exposition and to be confused and obscure in his written statements.

Introduction On the 7th of July 1945 a German who gave his name as Walter Friedrich Schellenberg was admitted for purposes of interrogation to Camp 020. Schellenberg’s name was known to have received a certain prominence in the World Press, not only because of the important position in the G.I.S. that he had held during the greater part of the war, but also on account of the leading part he had played in certain peace negotiations. Some few days before the capitulation of Germany, Schellenberg had in fact been empowered by the new German Government under Admiral Doenitz to open negotiations with the Swedish Government with the intention of arranging the surrender of the German forces in the Northern Zone and the opening of peace negotiations with the Western Powers. But Schellenberg’s efforts to fulfill his mission were without result as the general capitulation of Germany, including the Northern area, took place before the conclusion of negotiations. After the cessation of hostilities Schellenberg remained in Sweden and was, at the beginning of June 1945, approached by the American authorities with a view to supplying certain information. It was then put to him that he should place himself at the disposal of the Allies and furnish them with all the information in his possession to which proposal he agreed. On the morning of the 17th of June, therefore, in the company of

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Count Bernadotte he flew in a Dakota to Frankfurt on Main where he was taken in charge by the Allied authorities. On the 7th of July he was flown to London.

Contents of Report [Format of dates adjusted] EARLY LIFE 1910–1928

Early Education.

1928–1933

University Studies.

1933

Appointment to the S.S.

1933–1935

Legal Training.

1935 Spring

Work for S.D.Hauptamt.

1935 Nov.–1937 Jan.

Legal Practice.

1937 Jan.–1938 March

Berlin and Reappointment with S.D.Hauptamt. [sic.]

1938 March

Work in Vienna.

1938 April

Visit to Rome.

1938 May 18th

First Marriage.

1938 June

Duties at S.D.Hauptamt.

1939 May

Schellenberg’s Illness.

ACTIVITIES IN AMT IV 1939 July [sic.]

Transfer to R.S.H.A. Gruppe IV E.

[1939 August] 1939 Sept.

Visit to Poland.

1939 Oct.

Visit to Dortmund.

1939 Oct. [sic.]

The Venlo Incident.

1939 Nov.

Divorce.

1939 Nov.

Work with Gruppe IV.E.

1940 May

Attachment to Himmler. Request for active service.

1940 July

Return to the R.S.H.A.

1940 July

Mission to Portugal.

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1940 Oct. 10th

Remarriage.

1940 Nov. 15th

Further illness.

1941 Feb.

Final period with Gruppe IV.E. Reasons for transfer to Amt VI.

1941 Spring

Conversation with Heydrich. Dismissal of Jost.

SCHELLENBERG’S ACTIVITIES WITH AMT VI. [1941 July] 1941 Autumn

Relations with Jahnke.

[1941 Oct.] 1941 Nov.

Visit to Sweden and meeting with Wagner and Neumann. Meeting with Lundquist, head of the Swedish I.S.

1941 December

Conference with Ribbentrop.

1942 January

Hunting Party.

1942 End of January

Negotiations with Unterstaatssekretaer Luther.

1942 February

Co-operation with the Foreign Office. The Henkedienst. The Subordination of Amt VII to Amt VI. The Europaeische Standart [sic.] Electric Gesellschaft.

1942 March

Dismissal of Amt VI Dienststellen representatives. G.I.S. Conference in Prague. Increased financial provision for Amt VI.

1942 May

Journey to the Hague. Consequences of Heydrich’s death.

1942 June

Negotiations with General Kousi.

1942 July

Visit to the Iberian Peninsula. Meeting with Plinio y Salgado. Sojourn in Spain. Conference of the Spanish and Portugese K.Os. Conversation with Prince Max von Hohenlohe.

1942 July 21st

Promotion. Development of VI Wi and VI Kult.

1942 July

Preliminary Peace Feelers. Hunting Party at Nauen.

1942 August

Zhitomir. Further Peace Feelers. Kranefuss and the Freundeskreis [sic.]. Havel Institute and Unternehmung Zeppelin. Obersturmbannfuehrer Schaefer.

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Dr Kersten. 1942 Sept.

Visit to Paris.

1942 end Sept.

Imprisonment of Luther.

[1942 Sept.]

[Meeting with Masson.]

1942 October

Association with Langbehn.

1942 October

Visit of Swiss Chief of Police to Germany.

1942 end Oct.

Technical discussions with General Feligiebel [sic.] Discussions with Staatssekretaer Koerner. The Auslands Organisation. Restriction of Intelligence Activities. The arrested Swedes.

1942 Nov.

The Influence of Dr. Hitter.

1942 November

Further discussions with Hohenlohe.

1942 November

Geheimrat Kreuter.

1942 Dec.

Consequences of the Allied Landing in North Africa.

1942 Mid Dec.

Further meeting with Masson.

1943 Jan.

Visit of Turkish officials to Berlin.

1943 Jan.

Appointment of Kaltenbrunner as Head of the R.S.H.A.

1943 March

Frl. Hanfstaengl. German threats to Switzerland.

[1943 March]

Meeting with General Guisan in Berne, Biklen [sic.] and Arosa. Reciprocal German guarantee.

1943 May

Kaltenbrunner takes over Police Attaches. Difficulties with Kaltenbrunner.

1943 May

Resumed Peace Feelers in Lisbon. Discussions with Ribbentrop regarding U.S.A. Implementing Ribbentrop’s proposals.

1943 June

Schellenberg’s journey to Sweden—Folkets Dagblad and 7 Swedes.

1943 July

Fall of Italy. Schellenberg visits Turkey. Liberation of Mussolini. Political contacts banned by Hitler for Intelligence Personnel.

1943 August

Deterioration in relations with Himmler. Wulff the Astrologer. Peace discussions with German C.G. of Tangier.

1943 September

Closer co-operation with the Abwehr. The Trial of the seven Swedes.

[1943 September]

Visit of the directors Brandin and Mueller to Berlin. Schellenberg’s relations with the Grand Mufti.

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1943 October

Conversations with [Dragoliub] Mihailov and the Tsilew-IMRO Movement [sic.]. Meetings with Bismarck and Wallenberg. Schellenberg’s last visit to Switzerland.

1943 October

Setting up of the I-Netze [sic.]. Kersten’s emigration to Sweden.

1943 October

Peace conversations with Hewitt. Serum from Turkey.

1943 November

Journey to Sweden. Unternehmung Zeppelin Conference.

1944 Jan. end

Dismissal of Canaris. Unified German Intelligence Service.

1944 March

The setting up of Amt Mil.

1944 March

Relations with German Foreign Office.

1944 March

Prophesies of the Astrologer Wulff and his meeting with Himmler. Further discussions with Hansen.

1944 April

Frau Chanel and Frau Lombardi. Mil Amt conference in Salzburg.

1944 May

Further treatment from Kersten. Reports of invasion. Fraulein Hanfstaengl [sic.]. Himmler receives Japanese representatives. Further arrangements for fusion.

1944 June

Problems of amalgamation [sic.]. I-Netze. Frontaufklaerung. Disputes about the division of III F [sic.].

1944 June

First intimation of the July plot. Conference with Skorzeny re night fighter. Visit of Hungarian Intelligence Service members. Activities in July 1944.

1944 July 20th

The “Putsch of July 20th”.

1944 July 21st

Events of days following the “Putsch”. Schellenberg takes over Amt Mil.

1944 July

Arrest of Canaris. Intercession on behalf of Bismarck.

[1944 August]

Amt Mil. Renewed Attempts to Improve Relations with the Foreign Office. Differences on Rumanian policy. Further Balkan difficulties. Complaints by Goebbels. The Egmont reports.

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1944 September

The Defection of Bulgaria. Further Peace Feelers in Switzerland. Lectures by Schellenberg to the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab.

1944 October

Frontaufklaerung. Meeting between Musy and Himmler. Schellenberg refuses further peace proposals. Visit by Schellenberg to Himmler at Triberg. Frontaufklaerung. Bibelforscher. Schellenberg secures further releases.

1945 January

Berger’s hunting party.

1945 12th January

Musy again visits Himmler. Working agreement with the German Foreign Office.

[1945 January]

Promotion to Major General of the Waffen S.S. Relations with Admiral Kojima.

1945 February

Evacuation of Amt VI from Berlin. Proposed repatriation of British officers. Schellenberg’s illness.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING CAPITULATION 1945 10th February

Events leading up to and the arrival of Bernadotte.

1945 February 17th

Bernadotte’s first interview with Himmler. Kaltenbrunner’s objections to carrying into effect Bernadotte’s plan.

1945 February end

Schellenberg’s proposals for capitulation to the Western Powers.

1945 February

Himmler’s illness.

1945 March

Discussions with Himmler. Discussions with Bernadotte.

1945 March

Second and third visit by Bernadotte to Himmler. Kersten returns to Stockholm. Proposal of a four day truce for evacuation of Jews and other foreigners. The evacuation of the camps.

1945 Mid March

Intercession on behalf of the Jews by Dr. Burckhardt. Bernadotte’s efforts on behalf of the Jews; fourth visit to Himmler. Hitler’s health.

1945 April 13th

The vacillations of Himmler. Schellenberg arranges meeting between Graf Schwerin von Krosigk and Himmler.

[1945 April 19th]

Meeting between Himmler and von Krosigk. Arrival of Masur and Kersten.

1945 April 20th

Preliminary discussions with Masur. Discussions with Himmler preparatory to meetings with Masur and

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Bernadotte. [1945 April 21st]

Meeting with Masur. Fifth discussion between Bernadotte and Himmler. Departure of Bernadotte. Return to Hohenlychen. Journey to Wustrow. The condemnation of Prof. Dr. Brandt.

[1945 April 22nd]

Dissentions [sic.] on military decisions. The Vannamann [sic.] case. Departure from Wustrow. Himmler authorises capitulation offer.

1945 April 23rd

Capitulation discussions with Bernadotte. Capitulation discussions between Himmler and Bernadotte.

1945 April 24th

Himmler’s anxiety. Bernadotte’s departure.

1945 April 25th

Instructions to Dr. Best regarding Danish and Norwegian internees.

1945 April 26th

Messages regarding capitulation.

1945 April 27th

Bernadotte reports Allied refusal to negotiate with Himmler.

1945 April 28th

Schellenberg and Wulff visit Himmler at Luebeck. Schellenberg’s discussions with Himmler on the failure of Bernadotte’s mission.

1945 April 29th

Meeting with Bernadotte at Apenrade.

1945 April 30th

Discussions with representatives of the Swedish Government.

1945 May 1st

Schellenberg’s dismissal from Amt VI by Kaltenbrunner. Grossadmiral Doenitz takes over the Government of the Reich. Visit of Himmler and Schellenberg to Doenitz. Schellenberg drafts memorandum for submission to von Krosigk.

1945 May 2nd

Schellenberg explains the position to von Post and Oesstroem.

1945 May 3rd

Return to Ploen. Removal of seat of Government to Marineschule Muerwick. Interview with Doenitz.

1945 May 4th

Schellenberg is appointed as “Gesandter” with plenary powers. Arrival at Copenhagen and demonstrations in Dagmarhaus.

1945 May 5th

Negotiations with von Post and State Secretary Boheman.

1945 May 6th

Capitulation discussions with Generaloberst Boehme’s staff.

1945 May 9th

Last telephone conversation with Germany.

1945 May 8th–15th

Stay in Bernadotte’s house.

1945 May 15th– June Schellenberg moves to Saltjoe-Duvnaes and writes an autobiographical 10th summary of events immediately preceding capitulation.

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1945 June 10th– June Departure from Sweden. 17th [1945 June 17th]

CONCLUSIONS APPENDIX I.

Amt IV/Gruppe IV. E Organisation and Cases.

APPENDIX II.

Schellenberg’s Observations on the Organisation of Amt VI and the Mil.Amt.

APPENDIX III.

Amt VI and Russia.

APPENDIX IV. Amt IV Collaboration with the Japanese. APPENDIX V.

Amt VI Activities against Persia, Palestine and India.

APPENDIX VI.

Amt VI—Post Defeat Plans.

APPENDIX VII. Financial Affairs of the RSHA and Amt VI. APPENDIX VIII.

Amt VI Penetration of German Industry.

APPENDIX IX.

The Work of the Police Attaches.

APPENDIX X.

Horia Sima and Rumania.

APPENDIX XI.

Schellenberg’s Relations with the Swedish Intelligence Service.

APPENDIX XII. Schellenberg’s Relations with the Swiss Intelligence Service. APPENDIX XIII.

The Vlassov Movement.

APPENDIX XIV.

Rote Kapelle.

APPENDIX XV. Jahnke and the Jahnkeburo. APPENDIX XVI.

Kranefuss and the Freundeskreis.

APPENDIX XVII.

Kersten, Himmler’s Osteopath Masseur.

APPENDIX XVIII.

“Irrefuhrung” (Deception).

APPENDIX XIX.

Werewolf.

APPENDIX XX. Deciphering. APPENDIX XXI.

The I-Netze in Occupied Territories.

APPENDIX XXII.

The I-Netze in Neutral Countries.

APPENDIX

Miscellaneous Personalities.

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XXIII.

EARLY LIFE 1910–1928. Early Education. Friedrich Walter Schellenberg was born in Saarbruecken in Germany of German middle class parents on the 16th January 1910. He attended the Volksschule in Saarbruecken from 1915 to 1918 and continued his studies at the Reform-Realgymnasium of the same city until 1928 when he matriculated with the certificate “good”. 1928–1933. University Studies. In 1928 he commenced his university education passing his “Referendar” examination in Duesseldorf on the 18th March 1933. During this time he was occupied in the study of jurisprudence at the Universities at Marburg and Bonn a/Rhein and attended the University of Cologne as Gasthoerer (an immatriculated person admitted as a guest to the University lectures without fee).1 1933. Appointment to the S.S. In May or June 1933 in order to qualify for a State subsidy which he required as he was without means of his own and so as to make progress in his profession Schellenberg joined the S.S. with the rank of Anwaerter and became a member of the National Socialist Party.2 Schellenberg insists that he was not influenced in his decision by any political considerations.3 1933–1935. Legal Training. From about April 1933 Schellenberg began training as Gerichtsreferendar at the Land- u. Amtsgericht at Bonn and Sinzig a/Rhein and in the spring of 1935 was attached as Gerichtsreferendar to the Administrational Training Centre at Police H.Q. (Kriminal and Staatspolizei) at Frankfurt a/Main. While undergoing instruction at Bonn Schellenberg was obliged to attend compulsory regular S.S. parades and in order to avoid these contrived to obtain permission to lecture on legal questions to the other members of the S.S. Through these lectures he came in touch with a Prof. Nehlis, a Prof. of philology and an honorary worker for the S.D. who was impressed with Schellenberg’s legal abilities and in the spring of 1935 introduced him in Frankfurt to Brigadefuehrer [Dr Wilhelm] Albert, head of the section dealing with administration (Leiter I Verwaltung) of the S.D.Hauptamt [Sicherheitsdienst Head Office].4 Schellenberg subsequently met Albert on a number of occasions and in the spring of 1935 Albert being aware of Schellenberg’s somewhat precarious financial position,

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suggested that he should undertake some work for the S.D.Hauptamt in Berlin where someone was required with legal knowledge to carry out work concerning Reich reform. 1935 Spring. Work for S.D.Hauptamt. Later in the spring of the same year Schellenberg therefore accepted a position in the S.D.Hauptamt (Organisation and Verwaltungs Abteilung [Organization and Administration Department]) at Berlin, permission for the transfer having been given by the Innen Ministerium [Ministry of the Interior]. Furthermore an arrangement had been come to that he should receive pay as a probationary assessor of the Police Department of the Innen Ministerium as well as his pay from the S.D.Hauptamt. 1935 Nov–1936 Jan. [sic.]. Legal Practice. Schellenberg did not remain long in Berlin for in November 1935 he was sent on a course of legal training at the Referendar Camp at Jueterbog lasting for three months. At the termination of the course Schellenberg found employment at first at the Oberlandesgericht [provincial court] in Duesseldorf and later assisting an elderly lawyer, a friend of his father, whose practice it was at this time intended that Schellenberg should take over when he had passed his final examinations for which he was then preparing himself. On Dec 8th 1936 Schellenberg passed his Assessor examination with honours (Praedikat) experiencing little difficulty as he found himself well suited by nature for the legal profession. At this time the National Socialist Government were proceeding with the reform of the legal profession, nationalization being foreshadowed and it appeared to Schellenberg that there would be little, if any future, in a private lawyer’s practice, this branch of the profession being almost generally discredited as being “liberal”. After long discussions with his father’s friend it was decided that Schellenberg should return to Berlin at least for a year and that a partnership would be kept open for him for the time being. 1937 Jan–1938 March. Return to Berlin and Reappointment with S.D.Hauptamt. Therefore in January 1937 Schellenberg returned to Berlin and was appointed assistant to the Hauptabteilungsleiter [Head of Department] of I/II Administrational Department of the S.D.Hauptamt. Schellenberg’s work in his new position was concerned with administrational and legal questions and in particular problems arising out of the dual construction of the German Reich, namely the State itself and the Party. He further dealt with questions of salaries paid by the State, coordination of administration and certain other matters such as old age pension schemes etc. When Schellenberg took up his duties with Abt [Dept.] I/II the Department was under the control of Regierungsrat [privy councillor] Dr. [Herbert] Mehlhorn whom he succeeded in 1938. He was assisted in his work by a number of jurists chief among these being Dr. [Theodor] Paeffgen, Dr. [Franz] Marmon, Dr. [Reiner] Gottstein and Dr. [Alfred] Ploetz. The head of Amt I and Schellenberg’s immediate superior after he took over the Department was Brigadefuehrer Albert, Leiter [head] I. At the beginning of 1938

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Schellenberg received the title and pay of Regierungsassessor [administrative assistant], his work however covering the same field as hitherto until the summer of 1939. 1938 March. Work in Vienna. In March 1938 shortly after the Anschluss5 arrangements were made up by Albert with [Reinhard] Heydrich, at that time head of the Sicherheitspolizei and S.D. to send Schellenberg to Vienna. The object of his visit was to take the necessary temporary measures to assimilate the Austrian legal system with that of the German Reich and to formulate such further legal provisions as were necessary in Austria from an administrational point of view. Schellenberg accordingly journeyed by air in company with [Heinrich] Himmler, the Reich Fuehrer S.S. whom he was meeting for the first time.6 Executive control of Austria immediately subsequent to the Union of the two countries was in the hands of Oberfuehrer [Heinrich] Mueller previously personally unknown to Schellenberg but with whom he now had frequent discussions on legal questions. For a short time during his stay in Vienna control of administrational matters was taken over by Schellenberg, Mueller being absent in Italy, but the only question of importance which arose was the request by Berlin for the documents concerning “Planetta” which had already been seized by the Wehrmacht [Armed Forces].7 On April 15th 1938 Schellenberg returned to Berlin. 1938 April. Visit to Rome. A few days after he came back from Vienna Schellenberg received orders from Heydrich through Albert to proceed to Rome, there to assist Gruppenfuehrer Mueller, head of the Staatspolizei, in making security arrangements for a meeting between [Adolf] Hitler and [Benito] Mussolini which was to take place early in May. The German Government was dissatisfied with the security measures taken for the coming meeting by the Italian authorities who were opposed to the bringing in of large numbers of German security police. Some 60 or 70 members of the S.D.Hauptamt had therefore been introduced into the country as visiting civilians and were to be posted at strategic points throughout the city. Schellenberg was entrusted with the mission of interviewing and briefing the German Secret Contingent. This task was carried out by Schellenberg at the Albergo Reale where he himself was living and where Mueller, by arrangement with the Italian Police, had made his headquarters. During Schellenberg’s four-week stay in Rome he did not attend any of Mueller’s conferences with the Italian Police and in fact met none of the Italian Police officials until the farewell dinner when he was introduced to [Arturo] Bocchini, chief of the Secret Police [Opera Vigilanza Repressione Antifascismo] and a certain Manganiello whom he describes as having a position with the Italian Cabinet. 1938 May 18th. First Marriage. Schellenberg’s marriage to Kathe Kortekamp took place on 18th May 1938 almost immediately after his return from Rome to Berlin about the middle of May.

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From the very commencement this marriage was a failure. Schellenberg entered upon it not from his own inclinations but almost on the instructions of his chief, Albert, who maintained that it was his duty to marry the woman on moral grounds.8 1938 June. Duties at S.D.Hauptamt. From June 1938 Schellenberg returned to his duties at the S.D. Hauptamt once again taking up his work on the unification of the German Reich and at the same time dealing with questions of international law concerning the legal administrations of Sudetenland, Danzig and Austria. 1939 May. Schellenberg’s Illness. In May 1939 a combination of Schellenberg’s private worries occasioned by his married life and difficulties in his work brought on a nervous breakdown. A close friendship existed between his wife and Albert’s mistress. Between them, these two women succeeded in creating trouble between Schellenberg and his colleagues, especially Albert who was an ardent party protagonist and in any case opposed to Schellenberg’s designs for the Party’s incorporation in the state. The position was further complicated by Schellenberg’s friendship with Frau Heydrich, wife of the future Reichsprotektor of Prague,9 for although Schellenberg denies that there was ever any foundation for the suggestion that this friendship was other than innocent he admits that it was the cause of a good deal of gossip. Schellenberg met Frau Heydrich at a state function in 1935 and during the next few years [they] became firm if not intimate friends.10 During the years 1937/38 marital difficulties increased in the Heydrich menage and in order to avoid being made the pretext for a separation Schellenberg stopped seeing Frau Heydrich except on official occasions. Frau Heydrich nevertheless continued to be favourably disposed towards Schellenberg and even went so far as to intercede on his behalf with his wife in the later stages of the divorce. Because of all these difficulties the position became untenable and Schellenberg determined to seek a change of work.

ACTIVITIES IN AMT IV 1939 August [July]. Transfer to R.S.H.A. Gruppe IV.E. When in August 1939 Schellenberg was sufficiently recovered to take up his duties he was interviewed by Heydrich who agreed to arrange his transfer. Heydrich intimated that Schellenberg’s proposals for the state incorporation of the S.D. had been adopted and were to form the basis for a process of reorganisation to be carried out by the then Oberfuehrer [Werner] Best.11 Schellenberg’s new appointment was to be that of head of a new Department in Amt IV of the R.S.H.A.

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The reasons for the establishment of the new department, Gruppe IV. E.* were the administrative difficulties especially in the regional Police Offices arising out of the amalgamation of Abt II (Staatspolizei) and Abt III (Abwehrabteilung [counter intelligence]) of the Geheime Staatspolizei [secret state police] which was to have taken place on the establishment of the R.S.H.A. These difficulties being considered by Schellenberg as considerable he put forward the suggestions in August 1939 that the old Abt III should be introduced as an independent section into Amt IV with the designation of Gruppe IV.E. without * For details of the Genesis of the new Department IV.E. and its organisation see Appendix I.

however, for the time being, interfering with the organisation of the subordinated “Dienststellen” [offices]. This arrangement was accepted and the new section of the R.S.H.A. Gruppe IV. E. whose chief concern was counter-espionage was placed in his hands. The head of the new department required a thorough legal knowledge as it operated according to the German Penal Law in co-operation with the Oberreichsanwalt, the Oberreichskriegsanwalt, the Reichkriegsgericht [sic.] and the O.K.W., and Schellenberg was therefore a generally approved choice. 1939 August. Schellenberg immediately took up his duties, set to work to organise the new section and at the same time made every effort to acquire experience of counter espionage [sic.] and relative questions. 1939 Sept. Visit to Poland. In September 1939 Himmler made an application to Heydrich for Schellenberg’s temporary release from his work in Berlin in order that he might accompany him to Poland in the capacity of personal [sic.] (Ordonnanz Offizier [staff officer]) to undertake liaison work between Himmler and the staff of the Higher Command of the O.K.W. Between this mission and the work that Schellenberg had but newly taken over there was no connection other than Himmler’s wish to make Schellenberg’s closer acquaintance in view of the important position that he was now to hold. After three or four weeks Schellenberg returned to his work with the R.S.H.A., the organisation of the new Department, following largely the suggestions made by Schellenberg himself, being completed by October 1939. 1939 Oct. Visit to Dortmund. The organisation of Gruppe IV.E. having been accomplished it was suggested by Best that Schellenberg should proceed to Dortmund, there to make personal observations with a view to reorganising industrial espionage. Amongst the questions to be dealt with by Schellenberg in Dortmund was the settling of a dispute between the lately retired head of the Staatspolizeistelle [state police office] in Dortmund and the Regierungspraesident

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[head of government] of the administrational district of North Westphalia. This man had repeatedly given offence to the Regierungspraesident and had been removed at his request, Regierungsrat [privy councillor] Krack having temporarily taken over his duties. Schellenberg’s activities in Dortmund, excluding interruptions, lasted at the most four weeks, and were mainly devoted to arranging a system of industrial espionage applicable to Dortmund but which could be used as a model for other industrial areas. In this Schellenberg was able to achieve his purpose and was also successful in establishing good relations with the governing authorities which had been badly disturbed by the overbearing behaviour of the former head of the Dienststelle mentioned above. Shortly before the end of October Schellenberg returned to Berlin to report to Heydrich the result of his mediation and in a conversation with Heydrich’s adjutant, [Hans-Hendrik] Neumann, was informed that some important intelligence project was jointly contemplated by Amt IV and Amt VI and that Schellenberg had been mentioned as a possible assistant to Dr. [Helmut] Knochen of Amt VI. Neumann’s information proved to be accurate for after Schellenberg had made this report Heydrich raised the subject and without giving any details suggested that Schellenberg should place himself in touch with Knochen. 1939 Oct. [sic.]. The Venlo Incident. From Knochen Schellenberg learnt that discussions with the two British agents, [Captain Sigismund Payne] Best and [Major Richard] Stevens, had already been in progress for some time and that these proceedings were but the pretext for an attempted kidnapping which was to take place as soon as it could be successfully accomplished. Plans were already far advanced by the time Schellenberg entered into the affair and he took part in none of the preliminary arrangements. Nevertheless it was agreed that he should be assigned the role of that of an additional member of the augmented delegation which was to continue the meetings in order to set the stage for the last scene and it was also arranged that he should be present on the occasion of the actual kidnapping. Preliminary discussions with the two British Agents proceeded and the eventual abduction was carried out on the 9th or 10th November (exact date unknown to Schellenberg) at an inn standing in No Man’s Land at a place called Venlo.12 The success of the operation was communicated to Heydrich the same night by teleprinter. A few days later all who took part were warmly congratulated, Schellenberg himself receiving the Iron Cross First Class. On 7th November a few days before the carrying off of the two agents Schellenberg had communicated by telephone with both Heydrich and Himmler putting forward the view that the proposed abduction was inadvisable because of the possible risk of an international scandal involved, but because of the inferior rank he held at that time he was unable to stress his opinion. In any case any prospect of success for his suggestion was destroyed when on the following day 8th November, during the Party celebrations in Munich, the attempt was made on Hitler’s life. On receipt of this news it was decided to proceed with the plan, which had already been approved, as its success would stifle any criticism of the S.D. and even enhance its prestige as well as being ideal material for propaganda. Schellenberg puts forward the suggestion that the Munich attempt was

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deliberately staged and designed to establish Hitler’s popularity beyond question, at this early stage of the war.13 1939 Nov. Divorce. Proceedings having been instituted some months previously Schellenberg’s divorce was granted in November 1939.14 1939 Nov. Work with Gruppe IV.E. The excitement of the Venlo incident brought on a heart attack and Schellenberg was obliged to remain in Duesseldorf for a short time before continuing his journey to Berlin where he was to again take up his work with the R.S.H.A. Early in his efforts to perfect the organisation of the new department Schellenberg discovered that the whole machinery of the counter-espionage apparatus in its working and form had become obsolete and was very little effective. His first endeavour was to rationalise its working and with this end in view he instituted the compilation of a hand book which capitulated all matters appertaining to counter-espionage questions in a systematic form. The counter-espionage field relating to foreign countries had hardly been developed at all and the principles of such work Schellenberg now laid down on a firm basis. He also laid great stress on the necessities for preventative measures in counter-espionage, formulating the axiom that counter-espionage should begin on the other side of the frontier in order to control internal foreign activities. This necessitated frontier control and co-operation with the customs, passport control and other official departments of this nature and this was instituted together with the protection of vulnerable places and the establishment of a system of V-men [Vertrauensmänner].15 Lastly Schellenberg emphasised the importance of co-operation with all official departments of the state especially those on [sic.] contact with the public in order to stimulate assistance from the civilian population. On the industrial side, a system of counter-espionage in the various industrial concerns was instituted and this, especially in the big towns, assumed large proportions. Co-operation with Abt III of the Abwehr Amt [military counter-intelligence office] in the O.K.W. was likewise put on a new basis and resulted in particularly close working association which included exchange of views and information. Despite, however, the reforms roughly outlined above Schellenberg did not consider that a real state of security existed as a change of measures alone could not produce efficiency without a change in personnel, the existing officials being hide-bound and over age. 1940 May. Attachment to Himmler. For some weeks in September 1939 Schellenberg had accompanied Himmler while he was on manoeuvres in Poland. Once again in May 1940 he was selected by Himmler for this post and accompanied him to Westwald near Koblenz where manoeuvres were being carried out.

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Although an interruption in his work, Schellenberg was delighted at the prospect of a spell in the field, regarding it as a pleasant interlude which would enable him to lead an open air life to the benefit of his health. Furthermore he was on good terms with Himmler who appeared happy in the company of a younger man and enjoyed playing the role of school master coming as he did from a long line of pedagogues. His duties consisted mainly in delivering Himmler’s orders to various authorities and attending him on his many excursions. As on the previous occasion Himmler showed himself to be well disposed towards Schellenberg, more so than Schellenberg’s junior rank of Sturmbannfuehrer would appear to warrant, dining with him often and discussing subjects of scientific rather than service interest. Request for active service. For a long time Schellenberg had been dissatisfied with the purely executive position that he held, as he believed that anyone who had not done service at the Front would be looked down upon at the termination of the war. With this in mind Schellenberg took this opportunity to approach Himmler, asking that he might be given leave of absence from the Ministry of the Interior and the R.S.H.A. and be allowed to proceed to the Front as a member of the Wehrmacht. This request was refused by Himmler as he stated Schellenberg’s services were [of] more use to the state in his present capacity and he pointed out at the same time that even he himself could not be spared for active war service. He agreed, however, as he wished to compensate Schellenberg in some measure for his disappointment, to arrange to send him as a liaison officer to the O.K.W. for two months. 1940 July. Return to the R.S.H.A. On his return from his duties with the O.K.W. Schellenberg once again took up the threads of direction of Gruppe IV.E. and continued on the same lines as before. 1940 July. Mission to Portugal. Schellenberg’s alleged success in the Venlo incident caused [Joachim von] Ribbentrop to choose him for yet another mission this time in connection with the Duke of Windsor. Ribbentrop had conceived a fantastic plan consisting of inviting the Duke of Windsor [His Royal Highness Edward VIII] to visit Germany in order to make use of him for purposes of propaganda against the British. The Duke of Windsor was at the time on the point of embarking for the West Indies and Schellenberg was instructed by Ribbentrop to contact him before his departure in order to persuade him to accept his invitation to Germany. At the end of July 1940, without informing Heydrich of his intentions, Schellenberg left Berlin by air for Madrid and immediately got in touch with [Paul] Winzer,16 who was to place all his agents in Portugal at his disposal. A few days later Schellenberg left Portugal [Spain?] with the intention of personally approaching the Duke, having in the mean time [sic.] discussed plans for the accomplishment of his mission with Winzer.

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On arrival in Portugal Schellenberg made every effort to contact the Duke and actually posted himself in the neighbourhood of his residence, but without success.17 In his report on the results of his mission submitted to Heydrich he claimed, however, that one of Winzer’s men actually proposed Ribbentrop’s invitation to the Duke of Windsor but the latter flatly turned down this impertinent suggestion and sailed the following day for the West Indies. Schellenberg returned from his journey much depressed by his failure and once again took up his duties in Berlin. 1940 Oct 10th. Remarriage. On October 10th 1940 Schellenberg married his second wife, Irene GrosseSchoenepauck, a woman of Polish descent. The newly married pair spent their honeymoon with Schellenberg’s parents in Luxemburg and made pleasure trips to Nancy and Brussels.18 1940 Nov 15th. Further illness. Shortly after Schellenberg’s resumption of his work in mid November 1940 his health sharply deteriorated and it was found that he had contracted an internal complaint diagnosed by his medical attendants as poisoning of the liver or gall bladder. Although this trouble had not developed until after he arrived back from Portugal medical opinion considered that it was of some months standing and could not disallow the possibility that it was caused by a deliberate poisoning attempt although they were unable to express themselves with certainty on this point. Because of this Schellenberg obtained sick leave and when he was on the road to recovery went into convalescence at Karlsbad and later Thuringia. 1941 Feb. Final period with Gruppe IV.E. By February 1941 Schellenberg had sufficiently recovered his health to again resume his work with Gruppe IV.E. but he was already thinking of leaving this department and turning his energies in another direction. Reasons for transfer to Amt VI. For a long time it had been no secret to Schellenberg’s superiors nor yet to most of his acquaintances that he entertained the wish to be employed at Amt VI or possibly even in the Foreign Office. During the time that he had been occupied at Amt IV Schellenberg had given a great deal of thought to questions of foreign policy and his association with many of the leading German economic experts, in his efforts to combat economic espionage in Germany, had shown him the importance of economics in the life of the state. From a study of these subjects he soon became convinced that most Germans in positions of authority had little instinctive or acquired understanding of countries other than their own, and he conceived the idea of forming a central information office for foreign countries from which information on political-economic questions could be collected and disseminated. In Germany there was in fact no such centre for political or

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political-economic matters for although there was a military information service under Canaris this he considered was too narrowly confined to military affairs to be generally useful. As time went on Schellenberg became convinced of the misdirection of foreign policy and the lack of knowledge of those in whose hands its direction lay and he believed that mistakes and faults could be rectified only by a knowledge of the formative political and economic forces of the world which up to then was wholly lacking. Another cause for despondency was the incompetence of officials both on the higher and lower levels due to the absence of any principles of selection, ability being no criterion for choice for even important positions. Schellenberg also had a profound distrust of what he termed the “obstructive Fuehrer-Ribbentrop policy” and believed that the only member of the higher hierarchy of the Nazi regime capable of grappling with the corruption and ignorance of the administration was Himmler. From Himmler Schellenberg received in fact an increasing measure of understanding and to a certain extent support for his projects although he accuses him of being imbued with National Socialist prejudices and of having a policeman’s mentality and charges him with failing in the end through hesitancy. But of Himmler’s alleged brutality he states he saw no evidence and was never able to make up his mind on this point. As regards Hitler Schellenberg complains that he, Hitler, at no time would have anything to do with him or his work but nevertheless he, Schellenberg, made every effort to keep him informed of what he terms “the true disposition and distribution of world potential” as he considered him sufficiently astute to see the force of these considerations and reach a compromise with the outside world. But apart from considerations of policy and his own interest in the work there was also a more personal reason for Schellenberg’s wish to transfer to Amt VI, this was the personal difficulties that he had experienced with Mueller of Amt IV. 1941 Spring. Conversation with Heydrich. Already in the spring of 1941 on the occasion of a hunting party at Paralov near Berlin, at which both [Wilhelm] Canaris and Heydrich were present, Schellenberg had raised the subject of Amt VI. The general inefficiency of this Amt and the failure of Brigade-fuehrer [Heinz] Jost in his capacity as chief, to both control his subordinates and manage the department’s affairs was common knowledge. In an illuminating pen-picture Jost has been described by Schellenberg as a worn out, tired, lazy individual lacking initiative or the will to work, who was active at the most for three or four hours a day. During these hours he read a few reports, which he mostly passed on without appreciation or criticism and permitted a small number of individual referents [Referenten/advisers] who had often been waiting weeks for an interview, to bring various matters before him. Because of his inability to say “no”, Schellenberg says, his subordinates worked without direction needlessly duplicating their work. In his conversation with Canaris and Heydrich Schellenberg, in response to a scornful question regarding Jost from Canaris, put forward the view that failure to realize the importance of the establishment of an efficient intelligence service abroad and the farreaching consequences of the present incapacity of Amt VI would result in great harm

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to Germany. He further expressed the opinion that a change in control was well overdue since such an organisation required years of work in order to expand healthily and efficiently, and that a department of such importance needed a staff other than the inefficient people who were sent to it. Heydrich replied that he had little knowledge or interest in the functions of Amt VI as he only concerned himself with home affairs and possessed no great knowledge or [sic.] foreign countries. Nevertheless although Schellenberg had not specifically mentioned his wish to work for Amt VI, Heydrich must have realised what he had in mind for he terminated the conversation by saying: “We’ll see, but what will become of the counter-espionage.—Oh well, someone can easily be found for that.” Schellenberg’s failure in respect to his mission in Spain [Portugal?] for Ribbentrop, had for several months subsequent to July 1940, caused him not to be received by Heydrich. He assumed, however, that he was once again in favour by this time although, because of Heydrich’s uncertain temper, it was impossible to be certain. In addition to approaching Heydrich Schellenberg had also put out feelers through a certain Astubaf [Stubaf.?] Vollheim, a member of Jost’s staff, and in this manner Jost had become aware of Schellenberg’s interest in the Amt, asking him openly on one occasion, when he had turned to Schellenberg for advice, whether he would like to work for Amt VI. But it was not until Schellenberg had had further conversation with Heydrich that he agreed to take over the post as assistant Amtschef [head of office] to Jost, it being understood at least on Schellenberg’s side that he would eventually assume complete command of the department. Dismissal of Jost. While these negotiations were taking place Amt VI was suffering one serious setback after another, saddling Heydrich with the difficult task of producing satisfactory explanations usually to Himmler or Ribbentrop. A typical example of these blunders was a case that had a bearing on Germany’s relations with a neutral state which, when brought to the notice of Hitler by Ribbentrop, was the cause of the temporary interdiction of political activities of the S.D. abroad. In this affair the trouble was raised by the Turkish Government who lodged a verbal note requesting information regarding a remarkable document which had fallen into their hands. On enquiries being made it came to light that a member of Amt VI had made a written agreement with a certain Caucasian People’s Group, in which definite political and territorial assurances were given, the signature being affixed, on what authority was not clear, “in the name of the Reich”. Incidents such as this caused friction with all the Reich authorities and in particular with the Foreign Office, but scandals were also being uncovered which seriously brought into question the integrity of the members of the Amt. Such a case arose in connection with a certain [Alfred] Naujocks and Sanner, both members of the Amt, whose proposal had been accepted for the establishment of a press bureau, Schellenberg believes in the A.E.G., with the purpose of procuring foreign newspapers and information. It was soon noticed, however, that the standard of living of these two officials was disproportionate to their salaries and an enquiry disclosed discrepancies in their accounts. Jost had married

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Sanner’s secretary and was generally regarded as possibly implicated in the defalcations but even before this an even more serious charge was proffered against him. Shortly after Schellenberg’s entry into Amt VI an enquiry was set up to investigate the actions of certain Amt VI officials in regard to their relations with a banker of Prague. A large Czech Jewish banking concern had been aryanised and had lent, at a high rate of interest, the money obtained gratis with the help of Amt VI, giving however specially favourable terms to the members of Jost’s Amt. Vollheim, one of Jost’s collaborators, had received in this manner a loan of 200,000 R.M. at almost nominal interest and had reloaned it at 7%. Many others had also participated in these doubtful financial transactions, Jost himself having been enabled to buy a small house in Berlin from the proceeds of his share. The implication of Amt VI officials in these illegal transactions were [sic.] discovered when this banker himself came under suspicion for other irregular activities. Abteilung IV.E./2 on Mueller’s instructions conducted the investigations and Mueller derived considerable satisfaction from the case as he had always been hostile towards the whole Amt and especially Jost himself. Another incident which had shaken Jost’s position even further was the taking over by Amt VI of a large export and import textile concern in Berlin. Jost and his advisers had allowed themselves to be induced to advance large sums of money in order to restore this firm to solvency but did not realise that according to German commercial law they were deemed to be partners responsible for its debts. Even after Schellenberg had assumed control of the Amt VI he was obliged to come forward with considerable further advances in order to avoid renewed insolvency. This case was the cause of regulations being formulated, at the suggestion of Schellenberg, under which his personal consent was required before firms were formed or materially used for Secret Service purposes. Proceedings against Jost were initiated by Himmler himself in September 1941 and he was suspended from his duties escaping further punitive measures by reason of his old party membership and according to Schellenberg, his friendship with [Ernst] Kaltenbrunner who energetically took his part. Heydrich also did not appear to wish to push the charges because, it was believed, of his close relations with Frau Jost. With Heydrich’s tacit consent Jost applied for the post of District Commissioner in the Ukraine but his request was not granted and he remained unemployed for three years using his influence wherever possible to prejudice Kaltenbrunner against Schellenberg.

SCHELLENBERG’S ACTIVITIES WITH AMT VI 1941 July. Schellenberg abandoned his work with Gruppe IV.E. and took up duties with Amt VI as assistant Amtschef [head of office] in July 1941.19 On Heydrich’s instructions and with Jost’s knowledge Schellenberg applied himself initially to studying the general position in the Amt and to the formulation of a plan of campaign of reorganisation and did no

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constructive work until he took over the Amt. But his actual assumption of authority subsequent to Jost’s suspension did not bring with it the appointment of Amtschef I, the position that had been held by Jost, and it was only on the death of Heydrich in June 1942 that his nomination was confirmed. His rank also, that of Obersturmbannfuehrer, remained unchanged but his official appointment carried with it the increased pay attached to such office.20 On his virtual accession to control of the Amt Schellenberg immediately set to work to introduce the necessary measures of reform. His first action was a revision of the personnel of the department and the wholesale dismissal of those members of his staff, some 30% of the total, who appeared to him undesirable. Amongst this number Schellenberg makes particular mention of the following: Ostubaf [Hermann] Rossner, Stubaf Bielstein, Ostubaf Wossagk, Stubaf von Wittinghof-Scheel. The remaining officials at first welcomed Schellenberg’s arrival for they had seen the serious need for reform. Their enthusiasm was of short duration however when they grasped the fact that Schellenberg’s energetic and far reaching programme was going to entail a great deal of work. Despite the drastic reduction in personnel the working capacities of the department were enhanced rather than deteriorated but nevertheless it did not conform to Schellenberg’s ideal of a completely independent “set-up” owing to its clumsy and orthodox police methods and its position within the existing organisational structure of the R.S.H.A. which he was obliged to preserve. The replacement of personnel was also a matter of great difficulty. The only medium of obtaining fresh staff was through Amt I of the R.S.H.A. For the time being therefore Schellenberg contented himself with introducing administrational officials, mostly lawyers, from Amt I and using them for the essential preliminary work of establishing definite principles of procedure within the department. In spite of Heydrich’s and later Himmler’s support Schellenberg’s somewhat revolutionary organisational schemes drew upon him the antagonism of the other Amtschefs especially Mueller. As a personal safeguard therefore Schellenberg made his first official act as head of the department, the compilation of an official report on the status quo of Amt VI as at the date of Jost’s suspension thus enabling him to refute any blame attributable to Jost’s inefficiency. Practical reforms that Schellenberg introduced were firstly the introduction of a system of evaluation of information. Hitherto reports had been passed on by the referents of Amt VI indiscriminately to the various Reich authorities very often in the original form in which they had been received from the agents, without any reference to what is termed by Schellenberg as the three basic principles of evaluation, presentation, explanation and appreciation. To meet the difficulty therefore an editing section was set up to deal with the unchecked reports received from the V-men. Schellenberg also instituted lectures to the staff on relevant matters, constant inspections, the observance of working hours, the tightening of security regulations and the setting up of an Amt registry, this latter question having been entirely neglected, the filing of documents being formerly entirely according to individual caprice. After a few months Schellenberg set up in Gruppe VI.B.C.D. and E. two distinct sections as follows: (I) Erfassung (Collation)

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Responsible for the collation of material, summary of agents, etc., the members of the sections working in close touch with: (2) Auswertung (Evaluation) Responsible for the evaluation of reports as and when they came to hand. There were three stages of Auswertung: (a) Vorordnung [preliminary classification] The assessment of reports for reliability and whether or not expenses incurred by the agent were justified. (b) Politische Auslegung [political interpretation] Under this heading is understood the scrutinising of reports by officials possessing special knowledge of the country or subject concerned for the political implications of the material. Also the editing and grading according to their value. (c) Verwertung [utilization/disposal] This stage Schellenberg admits could be more accurately termed Verteilung. (Distribution) This work very often presented extremely difficult problems in determining to which official quarters the reports should be passed. Later in February of 1942 an attempt was made with the aid of the various Reich Ministries to render further, the resources of the home field accessible to the Secret Service and this resulted in the establishment of Abt VI Wi and Abt Kult. The purpose of Abt VI Wi was the exploitation, for intelligence purposes, of individuals and organisations connected with the economic field. As a legacy from the Jost administration there were twenty or so S.S. officials in minor commercial positions under the pretext that they were important Secret Service collaborators. These men had prejudiced business circles against the department and before anything constructive could be done in Abt VI Wi this abuse had to be suppressed and confidence re-established. The intelligence possibilities in the domain of science and art were dealt with by Abt Kult. By mid 1942 results began to be achieved as a consequence of the formation of these two departments. The whole financial structure and administration of the Amt was also overhauled, new forms and systems of inspection ensuring the future control of expenditure. Having laid down the foundations for an efficient headquarters administration Schellenberg then turned his attention to the reorganisation of the Secret Service in enemy and neutral countries. In order to bring about the improvement in this it was necessary for Schellenberg to obtain the support of the higher authorities of the Reich so as to overcome the opposition for the necessary expansion and the rational training of personnel. The Amt’s foreign commitments like the central administration had been equally neglected and Spain can be quoted as a typical example. In this country at the time that Schellenberg took over Amt VI there were only three or four V-men and even these were considered to be of such poor quality that their services were immediately dispensed with. Furthermore V-men were operating in the following countries:– Portugal Italy Belgium

After occupation

Sweden Greece

One man only. [Josef?] Wagner, a journalist.

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Bulgaria.

In these countries there was no uniform class of “Informants” but in some, Hauptbeauftragte [chief representatives] had been placed usually under cover of some commercial activity. These “Haupt-beauftragte” had no uniform means of communication although they often did use private channels as for instance the smuggling of their reports by Deutsche Lufthansa pilots. The best results were obtained from Greece and Bulgaria but Schellenberg maintains that reports from these countries did not possess particular importance for Germany* 1941 Autumn. Relations with Jahnke. In the autumn of 1941 Schellenberg came into relations with a certain [Kurt] Jahnke, the organiser and director of the Jahnke Buro, a semi official espionage service working in conjunction with certain branches of the G.I.S.21 The Jahnke Buro had in some obscure manner evolved from the administration of Jahnke’s private estates in Pomerania. It’s [sic.] establishment went back long before the seizure of power by the Nazis and at one time or another it had been used by many of the leading members of the Nazi hierarchy as a source of information. At the time that Jahnke came to the notice of Schellenberg he had fallen into disrepute because of his association with [Rudolf] Hess, the suspicion which attached to his liaison officer, S.S.Oberst von Pfeffer [Franz Pfeffer von Salomon] (on what grounds is not known to Schellenberg) and for reasons of certain reports which had brought the displeasure of Hitler, causing Ribbentrop to refuse him the assistance of the Foreign Office. As the result of his fall from grace Jahnke’s office had been requisitioned by Heydrich and his documents confiscated while Jahnke himself had been ordered to desist from any participation in intelligence activities. 1941 Oct. Schellenberg conceived the opinion that such an experienced intelligence worker would be of the utmost service to him and although after what had transpired there was a strong estrangement between Heydrich and Jahnke he was able to effect a reconciliation. Moreover in October 1941 he was successful in arranging a meeting between the *For further details of the organisation of Amt VI see Appendix II.

two men and a subsequent smoothing out of existing misunderstandings. Permission was now given to Schellenberg to make use of Jahnke’s services and a sum of 2,000 R.Ms. was paid to Jahnke by Amt VI in addition to ancillary concessions in the matter of car, petrol allowance, etc.* 1941 Nov. Visit to Sweden and meeting with Wagner and Neumann. In November 1941 Schellenberg decided to make a visit of inspection to Stockholm in connection with the work of Amt VI in Sweden. On his arrival the first person he visited

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was a certain Wagner, the Stockholm correspondent of the Essener National Zeitung who was engaged simultaneously with his journalistic duties in intelligence activities on behalf of Amt VI. Wagner had at the time good grounds for supposing that the Swedish Police were alive to his clandestine activities and would demand his return to Germany, a supposition which was justified by such action being taken by the Swedish authorities very shortly afterwards. While in Sweden Schellenberg renewed contact with Neumann. Neumann had held the post of chief adjutant to Heydrich, his friendship with Schellenberg dating from 1937 or 1938. At this period Neumann was working somewhat unenthusiastically for Amt IV being nominally employed as an assistant to the Press Attache at the German Legation in Stockholm, as a suggestion to appoint him Police Attache at the Legation had proved unacceptable to the Swedes. Schellenberg and Neumann had already been in communication before the former’s visit to Sweden and he was thus well aware of Neumann’s desire to work for Amt VI. The subject under discussion was the acquisition of information by the Amt from the Swedish Fascist Party the arrangements for which were to be conducted secretly by Neumann. Neumann through his work for Amt IV was already acquainted with the then leader of the Fascist Party who was editor of the Folkets Dagblad (the name Schellenberg has forgotten but believes it begins with F).** At Schellenberg’s request Neumann arranged a meeting between the former and “F” at which they discussed mutual co-operation. It was agreed that members of the Swedish Fascist Party should employ every means for intelligence activities on behalf of Germany. Many members of this party were alleged to be influential and prominent people who could and would render general reports on the Swedish political situation. They were also to maintain links with other agents *For further information regarding Jahnke see Appendix XV. **F. was succeeded after his death in 1943 by a man called Johansson.

employed in or by Foreign Legations in Stockholm. In consideration for this assistance Schellenberg assented to provide financial support for the Folkets Dagblad and as a result of this arrangement did in fact pay some 10–12,000 Kr. monthly to this newspaper. Some three months later Neumann was more or less forced to leave Sweden when the Swedes pointed out that his employment at the German Legation was superfluous. After his departure Schellenberg made use of August Finke’s service instead.22 Meeting with Lundquist, head of the Swedish I.S. During his visit Neumann also introduced Schellenberg in a cafe to [Martin] Lundquist, head of the Swedish Intelligence Service. Lundquist’s attitude towards Germany was in general somewhat utilitarian, but the two men immediately took a personal liking to one another and henceforward Schellenberg always made a point of seeing him on his visits to Stockholm. Throughout their relations Lundquist never made any efforts to press Schellenberg for information although his interest in Russia caused him to welcome any intelligence regarding that country. Schellenberg claims that the two men never actively collaborated and in fact in either 1943 or 1944 Lundquist stated quite openly that as much

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as he liked Schellenberg as a person there could be no close association between them for political reasons.* 1941 December. Conference with Ribbentrop. Because of the disrepute into which Amt VI had fallen in consequence of Jost’s conduct and weakness, Schellenberg was constantly aware that no support could be expected from the direction of the German Foreign Office. The “Putsch” brought about by the Iron Guard in Roumania had considerably strengthened Ribbentrop’s hand enabling him to wring the concession from Himmler that all R.S.H.A. employees or agents abroad were to be subordinated to the Foreign Office. Schellenberg now sought to set up his agents in diplomatically protected positions, and at the same time to ensure that they were no longer dependent upon the police attache system under Ribbentrop. He therefore arranged to confer with Ribbentrop. The conference took place either at the Foreign Office or at Ribbentrop’s own residence, Schloss Fuschl, Schellenberg is uncertain which, and lasted three hours. Astonishingly enough Ribbentrop listened with unaccustomed patience to Schellenberg’s outline of his plans, but when he went [on] to explain that the service he was contemplating would be as necessary in war as in peace time, Ribbentrop strongly disagreed. Ribbentrop contended that some four or five agents under Foreign Office control could yield quite as much information in war time as in peace, as the cumbersome seeming structure Schellenberg was outlining. Finally when Schellenberg put forward that it would soon be seen that as a result of his plans much more reliable information concerning Russia and England could be obtained than had been achieved hitherto, Ribbentrop lost his temper and peremptorily dismissed Schellenberg from his presence. 1942 January. Hunting Party. In January 1942 Schellenberg was invited by Heydrich together with a number of high ranking Reich officials to a hunting party in Bohemia. Schellenberg who was living in Berlin accepted despite the long journey, the invitation entailed, and there met Canaris. Canaris was aware that Schellenberg had but lately taken over Amt VI and was disposed to treat this “young beginner” benevolently promising him an insight into the work of the Abwehr and in particular the K.O.s, an offer which Schellenberg gratefully accepted. 1942 End of January. Negotiations with Unterstaatssekretaer Luther. Towards the end of January 1942, Schellenberg obtained an interview with Unterstaatssekretaer [Martin] Luther of the German Foreign Office with a view to commencing negotiations to secure the use of diplomatic channels for the transmission of his agents [sic.] reports. Luther had formerly consistently refused to grant interviews or in *For further details regarding relations with Swedish Intelligence Service see Appendix XI.

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fact have any relations with members of the R.S.H.A. but Schellenberg felt that having lost the support of Ribbentrop at their fruitless interview in the previous month that he must now turn to some other high ranking personage of the Foreign Office in order to obtain the basic help in the furtherance of his plans, without which he could not progress. Schellenberg set out the general principles he wished to follow and succeeded in enlisting Luther’s co-operation arranging that his agents should be appointed as assistants to press and commercial attaches in foreign countries. In exchange for these concessions he agreed to keep Luther informed of visa and passport matters within the Amt and also to give the Foreign Office advance notice of the journeys abroad undertaken by Amt VI officials. Certain further questions relating to his plans for Amt VI were discussed but it was only later that the conversations progressed sufficiently for the question of the use of diplomatic channels for Amt VI communications to be negotiated. Schellenberg emphasises that this was being by way of a preliminary discussion and that the conversations with the German Foreign Office that followed, were irregular and spasmodic so that it is virtually impossible to attribute any particular result or agreement to any particular negotiation. 1942 February. Co-operation with the Foreign Office. The negotiations that had been entered into with Luther the previous month now began to show results. It had been agreed that Amt VI reports should be furnished in duplicate to the Foreign Office, one copy for the Foreign Minister and the other for the use of the political section. Once this distribution had been arranged, more or less regular bimonthly conferences on the subject of these reports took place between Luther and Schellenberg in the course of which Luther became convinced of the useful possibilities of Amt VI. At this time the initial agreement was concluded with the Foreign Office for the diplomatically protected courier route for the mail of Amt VI. The arrangement come to was not altogether satisfactory to Schellenberg for although the mail could admittedly be sent in a separate green envelope under the Amt’s own seal this was only applicable in those countries where police attaches were established. Later this arrangement was extended to cover all countries without relation to the police attache system. Schellenberg mentions that the police attaches availed themselves unofficially of the opportunity to include their own reports in the Amt VI agents’ green envelopes, although this was really not permitted, in order to avoid the submission of their correspondence and reports to the mission chief prior to their despatch. This concession was probably granted largely on Luther’s responsibility and without the knowledge of Ribbentrop. The Henkedienst. A further matter that was the subject of discussion with Luther was that of the so-called Henkedienst, an intelligence service that Ribbentrop had set up for the exclusive use of the Foreign Office. This service derived its name from its original chief, a certain Gesandter Henke who remained its head until 1943 when, on its transference to Prague, he was temporarily succeeded by Gesandter [Erwin] Ettel and later by one Freiherr

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Marschall von Biberstein.23 Luther now agreed in the course of these discussions to use his influence with Ribbentrop to obtain recognition of Amt VI as the official source of intelligence for the Foreign Office in preference to the Henkedienst also assenting to endeavour to have the Henkedienst merged with Amt VI, but this proposed merger never came to fruition. The Subordination of Amt VII to Amt VI. At about this time Schellenberg found himself constrained to deal with a threatened encroachment in certain spheres of jurisdiction of Amt VI. This challenge came from the Director of Amt VII, an Amt which was really a registry or custodian of all kinds of impounded documents relating to masonry, the church, opposition groups, etc. used by Amt VII for its evaluation purposes. The Head of Amt VII was a certain S.S.Oberfuehrer [Franz Alfred] Six. This man was the Dean of the Faculty of Auslandswissenschaft at the Berlin University and later held ministerial rank as the Chief of the Kultur-politische Abteilung of the German Foreign Office.24 Six announced his intention of setting up a scientific intelligence section (Wissenschaftlicher Meldedienst) and Schellenberg seeing that this activity would cut across his own field of operation forced Six with Heydrich’s approval to accept a compromise virtually relegating Amt VII to a position subordinate to Amt VI. In future Six was to pursue his proposed activities with his scientific intelligence section but the evaluation of the results was to be undertaken by the “Auswertung” department of Amt VI. The Europaeische Standart [sic.] Electric Gesellschaft. Schellenberg’s investigation and organisation of counter-espionage during his employment with Gruppe IVE. had given him a close insight into the facilities for espionage offered by the larger industrial concerns. Chief amongst these was the Europaeische Standart [sic.] Electric Gesellschaft. This was a large American owned German holding company with interests and subsidiaries in many European countries. Within Germany the firm of Lorenz (radio and radio equipment) and Mixt and Genest (telephones) were subsidiaries of the German holding combine.25 After Germany’s declaration of war against the U.S.A. on 11th December 1941 the Reichspostministerium decided to take over the German holding company as enemy property with a view to liquidation. Schellenberg was strongly opposed to this decision on the grounds of its immense potential value as an espionage structure, quite apart from the fact that its liquidation would seriously curtail essential war production. Therefore in February 1942 he approached General [Fritz Walter] Thiele,26 Deputy Chief of Signal Communications in the O.K.W., as also the Reichswirtschafts Minister himself and with Heydrich’s backing obtained permission for the firms belonging to the combine to continue to function. The underlying motives for this action were twofold: (a) To set up at a later date Amt VI agents within the firms belonging to the combine, and

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(b) to use the fact of the preservation of the American controlled combine as a bargaining lever to establish contact with the U.S. Government through a certain [Gerhard Alois] Westrick (Rechtsanwalt and Rechtsberater and head of the German holding combine) and Colonel [Sosthenes] Behne [sic.] (head of the European department of the American controlling combine) also said to be a member of the American Intelligence Service.27 1942 March. Dismissal of Amt VI Dienststellen representatives. In March 1942 Schellenberg decided to dispense altogether with the service of Amt VI agents attached to Dienststellen within Germany. Their only functions had been to contact persons recently returned from abroad and report on information thereby obtained. The representatives concerned were mainly small tradesmen or employees of small industrial concerns and they were not even appointed in localities, such as in the neighbourhood of frontiers or railway termini where they would be likely to meet returning travellers. Schellenberg found that these agents had no comprehension or aptitude for intelligence work and they were so damaging to the reputation of the Amt that he took the decision to order their dismissal. This action brought about an increase in Schellenberg’s general unpopularity for the “Beauftragte” or agents considered themselves slighted and although they had not been particularly interested in their former work they were of the opinion that their status as old party members gave them a right to greater consideration. Heydrich however supported Schellenberg in this new move. In spite of his habitual indecision and independability [sic.], Schellenberg asserts that Heydrich was usually open to rational argument and this was the case in this particular incident. Schellenberg also at this time introduced the practice of recruiting and employing fewer but more efficient agents, and claims that thanks to careful selection, there was no decline in the standard of results. In the main Schellenberg met with nothing but opposition from the other Amtschefs, to whom, he admits his own attitude was undeniably uncompromising, but with the passing of time, the results of his reforms began to convince his colleagues of their merits. To fill in the gaps in the intelligence structure caused by the dismissal of the Amt VI “Beauftragte” at the “Dienststellen” Schellenberg planned a substitute arrangement whereby the help of all S.D.Dienststellen in Germany could be enlisted. He accordingly drafted a circular, intended for distribution to the Dienststellen, in which was explained the kind of information required. On the submission of the scheme in draft to Heydrich it called forth a strong protest from Mueller of Amt IV, who complained that Schellenberg was now trying to elevate Amt VI to the level of “a kind of general staff” by exploiting all others and usurping their jurisdiction. Because of the opposition it was not possible to proceed with the distribution of the circular, Heydrich refusing to come to any decision and it was not until the death of Heydrich in June of this year that official sanction for publication was forthcoming from Himmler.

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G.I.S. Conference in Prague. For some little time plans had been worked upon by Heydrich and Canaris for a conference to be held in May 1942 in Prague. The conference was necessitated by the frequent differences and duplication of effort occurring between the S.D. and the Abwehr. The assembled representatives of the S.D.Sicherheitspolizei and Amt Ausland/ Abwehr were addressed by both Heydrich and Canaris, the principle speakers of the meeting. Heydrich in his speech expressed the view that Amt VI was the most important department in the R.S.H.A. and that it was in no way to be regarded as a freak but as an Amt possessing equal status with the rest. Heydrich’s statement was intended as a rebuke to the critics, as hitherto the new Amt VI had been the subject of ridicule and it was also according to Schellenberg meant as a tacit expression of support of Schellenberg against Mueller. After the initial addresses by Canaris and Heydrich the conference broke up into its component services, each section holding consultations separately. Schellenberg now read a paper entitled “The Political Secret Intelligence Service and its working methods”, to a limited audience composed of representatives of the Sicherheitspolizei and the S.D. Increased financial provision for Amt VI*. The increased activities of Amt VI soon began to put a strain on the limited financial resources allotted to the department. The existing grant amounted to only some 150,000 Rm. per month, a sum which in view of the Amt’s enlarged scope had become insufficient. Schellenberg considered that it would be useless to approach the question through Amt II, the normal channel, as it operated on what appeared to him to be cumbersome “police principles” without any understanding of the requirements of the department under his charge. He therefore raised the question of an increase of the provision of funds with Heydrich and then negotiated over the heads of Amt II with the Reichswirtschaftsminister. In these negotiations Schellenberg dealt with [Walther] Funk, the Reichswirtschaftsminister himself, but more frequently he had to do with Staatssekretaer [Karl] Landfried.28 At first he obtained an increase of the grant to 200,000 Rm. and finally as much as 400,000 Rm. per month. Since Schellenberg had official backing no official protest could be raised against his unorthodox method of approach. 1942 May. Journey to the Hague. Towards the end of May 1942, Schellenberg made a journey to the Hague and remained there four or five days. Schellenberg had received a report emanating from Amt IV dealing with the Dutch Resistance Movement and referring to the movement of agents between Great Britain and Holland. Certain of these agents had been captured together *For further details regarding financial affairs of the R.S.H.A. see Appendix VII.

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with their W/T sets of ultra modern design and Schellenberg firstly wished to see these sets and secondly wanted to examine the whole question of the Resistance position from the angle of Amt VI hoping that as a result of his visit he might obtain an entry into a field hitherto the sole concern of Amt IV On arrival in the Hague Schellenberg at once placed himself in touch with the Befehlshaber [Wilhelm] Harster and his staff. Relations were cordial and Schellenberg was allowed to inspect the W/T sets and was given a resume of the situation with regard to the activities of the Allied agents. But when it came to discussions on co-operation Harster claimed that although he understood that such matters were logically of interest to Schellenberg he nevertheless was not in a position to keep Amt VI informed on the situation as he and his men were too occupied with “police matters”. Furthermore he regretted that he was unable to permit Amt VI to participate in their investigations as before this was allowed permission would have to be forthcoming from Mueller himself. While still in the Hague Schellenberg received the startling news of Heydrich’s death and without delay hastened back to Berlin.29 Some fourteen days after his return Schellenberg contacted Mueller with a view to obtaining permission to participate in the investigations in Holland, but was refused although it was agreed that any information that he might require would be passed to him. Schellenberg attributes this refusal to a conviction on Mueller’s part that police work was of paramount importance and a reluctance to concede any value to the work of Schellenberg. Consequences of Heydrich’s death. Heydrich’s ceremonial funeral obsequies at Prague prior to the burial in Berlin were attended by all the R.S.H.A. officers including Schellenberg. When the interment was over Himmler addressed the assembled Amt Chiefs on the consequences of Heydrich’s death. He announced that he himself would take over the leadership of the R.S.H.A. and urged them to continue their work as before. He went on to mention Schellenberg by name and informed all those present to work amicably with him. He then dismissed the other heads of the Amts and spoke to Schellenberg privately, saying that although Schellenberg was young, he considered him as diligent, trustworthy and incorruptible in money matters. It is emphasised by Schellenberg that the other heads of departments of the R.S.H.A. had represented him to Himmler as irresponsible, untrustworthy and not a Nazi of the old school but Himmler had ignored their intrigues. 1942 June. Negotiations with General Kousi. Sometime in June 1942 negotiations were opened between Jahnke and General Kousi, the Chinese envoy of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, with the object of establishing a compromise peace between China and Japan. The conversations were vigorously pursued for some three months on the basis of a possible mediation by Germany between the two countries which Kousi put forward would be agreeable to the Generalissimo. This information Schellenberg passed to Himmler, but the latter refused to take any action as first he believed that it was a matter for Hitler’s personal consideration and

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secondly he acknowledged that it was a question exclusively within the jurisdiction of Ribbentrop. In the meantime Jahnke had kept in touch with Kousi who was in turn in radio contact with Chiang Kai-Shek. Schellenberg believes that Himmler discussed the question with Ribbentrop and he himself was seen by the latter with the net result that the offer was not taken too seriously on the German side. Ribbentrop did however hint that before Germany made any move at all in the matter she must first of all receive a more concrete proposal from the Generalissimo. This he appeared unable to do and Schellenberg admits the possibility that in the end Chiang Kai-Shek turned from Germany and sought to transact the matter through the medium of Russia, though with what result he does not know. Schellenberg is of the opinion the Japanese were well aware of the whole project.30 1942 July. Visit to the Iberian Peninsula. In July 1942 Schellenberg decided to visit Portugal and Spain for two main reasons: (a) He wished to get in touch with his intelligence representatives in these countries, and (b) He wished to avail himself of Canaris’ offer to inspect the work of the K.Os. in the peninsula. He accordingly flew from Germany direct to Portugal and on arrival at Lisbon called upon the German Ambassador [Oswald] von Huene-Hoyningen.31 He also contacted his Amt VI representative Stubaf [Adolf] Nassenstein as well as the police attache Ostubaf [Erich] Schroeder. Meeting with Plinio y Salgado. Both Nassenstein and Schroeder had been in touch for some time with a Brazilian exile living in Portugal of the name of Plinio y Salgado whom they now introduced to Schellenberg. Salgado was alleged to have a fairly large political following in Brazil where his greatest political opponent [Getúlio] Vargas was at that time in power. Salgado hoped with the indirect help of Germany to eventually oust Vargas and return himself to Brazil as President. Simultaneously with his negotiations with the Germans Salgado, who was violently anticommunistic, had also contacted the Italians but had failed to obtain any sympathy from Mussolini. Schellenberg’s main interest in Salgado was in the contacts he had in Brazil which he believed, properly harnessed and exploited, could be used as sources of information on South America for the Germans but he took care to impress upon him that the establishment of such an Intelligence Service would be of the utmost assistance to him in the furtherance of his political plans. On his side Salgado was interested in the project and even more so when Schellenberg promised the necessary funds for building up the Intelligence Organisation together with the technical support which he might require in W/T matters. Nevertheless the scheme did not prosper. Salgado continually held out the most rosy prospects, but beyond a few isolated reports from Brazil brought to Lisbon by couriers in neutral ships nothing of intelligence interest was forthcoming, nor were W/T communications ever established. Salgado’s secretary [Hermes Lins] Albuquerque was

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also known to Nassenstein, acting as an agent and running some sort of cover business financed with German funds.32 Sojourn in Spain. After eight days in Lisbon Schellenberg flew to Madrid. On his arrival he contacted Winzer, the Police Attache, as well as the Amt VI representative Stubaf Kraus. Misunderstandings had arisen between these two men and Schellenberg did his best to smooth out the differences between them and he further endeavoured to improve relations between Winzer and a certain [Hans] Thomsen, Head of the Ausland Organisation in Spain. He then paid a visit to the German Ambassador Herr [Eberhard] von Stohrer 33 with whom he discussed various political matters. Von Stohrer informed Schellenberg that [Francisco] Franco was in no position to afford German military aid and he also spoke of the deterioration in the food position in Spain, urging Schellenberg to press for relief from Germany. After a few days Schellenberg met Admiral Canaris whom [sic.] he believes had come to Spain for discussions with the Spanish General Staff regarding Spain’s inability to furnish Germany with military assistance and to attend the Spanish and Portuguese K.O. Conference. Among the questions which were discussed at that meeting, which occurred at a dinner party, were: (a) The political situation in Spain (b) Secret Service questions common to both, and (c) The Straits observation post, (Meeresengebeobachtungsstelle), which had been set up on Spanish territory by Canaris to report on Allied shipping movements through the Straits. Schellenberg states the Straits observation post had operated since 1939–1940 but only very shortly prior to July 1942 had it been equipped with the new infra-red apparatus.34 Conference of the Spanish and Portuguese K.Os. On the day following this conversation the conference took place at the German Embassy in Madrid of the Lisbon and Madrid K.Os. To the best of Schellenberg’s recollection the following were present in addition to Canaris and himself:– From K.O.Madrid Kapitan z.S.

Leissner @ Lenz @ [Wilhelm]

Sommer (?) K.O.Leiter

Oberstlt.

Kiekebusch

Leiter I

Major von

Rohrscheidt

III F.

Hauptmann

Helmers

Leiter II

Sonderf.

Kuehlentahl [Kuehlenthal]

I.H.

From K.O.Lisbon

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Oberstlt.

Kraemer

Major

Schreiber

75

Schellenberg attended the conference in the capacity of a spectator and took no part in its deliberations. He states that the following matters amongst others came under discussion:– (a) Working methods of the K.Os. (b) Current cases. (c) Wehrmacht complaints regarding meteorological reports from the Iberian Peninsula for the use of the Luftwaffe in France. Schellenberg was unimpressed with what he saw of the working methods of the K.Os. and with the results achieved but formed a good opinion of [Karl Erich] Kuehlentahl’s capabilities. Kraemer appeared to be mainly interested in an agent said to have been installed with a radio set in Liverpool but otherwise the cases seemed to be antiquated. Conversation with Prince Max von Hohenlohe. Schellenberg is of the opinion, although he is unable to be definite on this point, that he had a meeting with Prince Max von Hohenlohe during this visit to Madrid. Schellenberg’s connection with Hohenlohe dated back to the beginning of 1942 when a meeting between the two men had resulted from a telephone call Schellenberg had received from Hohenlohe in Berlin. At this conversation Hohenlohe had indicated to Schellenberg a memorandum that he had written on the general political situation in Europe and as the views which it expressed, in substance the withdrawal by Germany from the war coincided with Schellenberg’s own beliefs, a common understanding was established. Hereafter contact had been maintained between Schellenberg and Hohenlohe, who, although normally resident at Schloss Rodenkirch in the Sudetenland, was a frequent traveller between Madrid, Berne, Berlin and Paris. After a week’s stay in Madrid, Schellenberg returned to Berlin. 1942 July 21st. Promotion. 35

On July 21st 1942 Schellenberg was promoted, on Himmler’s orders, to the rank of Standartenfuehrer, thus carrying into effect the intentions of Heydrich, who had already put forward this promotion before his death. By this action Himmler also emphasised his own approval of Schellenberg. From June 1942 until January 1943 Himmler continued to direct the R.S.H.A. but contented himself with allowing Schellenberg a free hand in developing Amt VI along his own lines. Meetings were held every five or six weeks between the two men for the discussion of questions of policy affecting Amt VI, Schellenberg taking the opportunity during these conversations to outline in great detail his plans for a reliable Intelligence Service abroad. Development of VI Wi and VI Kult.

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On his return from Portugal, Schellenberg remained for a while in Berlin, working mainly on the development of VI Wi and VI Kult. This entailed visits to the various Reich Ministries, negotiations to obtain co-operation lasting over a period of about six months. These negotiations created many difficulties occasioned by the inefficiency and incompetency of staff and lack of officers capable of representing Schellenberg’s interests with the Ministries.36 1942 July. Preliminary Peace Feelers. In July 1942 Schellenberg conceived the idea of establishing contact with Sir Samuel Hoare in Spain37 with a view to attempting a preliminary peace feeler. At this time Schellenberg had come in touch with a certain [Karl] Lindemann, President of the Nord Deutscher [sic.] Lloyd, Deputy Head of the International Chamber of Commerce and Head of one of the largest and oldest established firms trading with the Far East. At an interview in Schellenberg’s office the two men discovered they shared a great many political opinions. Lindemann was well known in Switzerland and there had a valuable contact, a certain Fritz Klein. Klein was a German refugee who had left the Reich in 1936. He was also a friend of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, had business relations with Foster and Dolles [sic.],38 the American representatives, and in Schellenberg’s estimation was the type of man who would appeal to England and America. As had already been mentioned Schellenberg was in touch with Prince Hohenlohe and he now arranged to bring Hohenlohe and Lindemann together in order that they might discuss the subject of a compromise peace with the Allies and at the same time inform Schellenberg as to the position. After speaking to each of them separately he arranged an informal meeting but on the day that this was to take place he was called away by Himmler and he therefore delegated Dr. Paeffgen who was partly informed on the matter to take his place. The object of the conversation was to see if Hohenlohe should attempt to obtain an interview with Sir Samuel Hoare with whom he was already in social contact, but after discussions they came to the conclusion that the internal political situation was not at the moment propitious and that the matter should be left in abeyance for the time being. It was not until the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943 that the question was once again reopened. Hunting Party at Nauen. Not long before his death Heydrich had arranged one of the hunting parties that he was so fond of giving and this had not been cancelled. Schellenberg had received an invitation and Admiral Canaris was also amongst the guests. While waiting at the butts for the game to be driven over them a discussion arose between the two men on the organisation of the Foreign Intelligence Service. Schellenberg put forward certain suggestions for expansion but Canaris disagreed with his arguments, contending, that the information available through the present military and political channels was sufficient and any other service would be super-fluous. Schellenberg states that the argument was amicable and aroused no ill-feeling on either side and in fact was the cause of much amusement when they found that in their preoccupation they had forgotten the game that had been laboriously driven towards them for some three hours.

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1942 August. Zhitomir. In August 1942 Schellenberg was summoned to Zhitomir, a town in the Ukraine to the South West of Kiev, for his periodic consultation with Himmler. Himmler in conformity with his usual practice, never to be far distant from the Fuehrer, had established his H.Q. at this place as it was close to Hitler and the General Staff at Berdichev on the Eastern Front. For some time Schellenberg in his efforts at expansion of Amt VI had had difficulty in recruiting staff especially youngish men suitable for the specialist work of the department. He now in his conversation with Himmler outlined the present organisation of Amt VI and gave a picture of the establishment to date, suggesting at the same time that he should be permitted to recruit from among Amt IV personnel, of course realising fully that if his proposal was acceded to that it would do little less than cripple Amt IV Himmler listened sympathetically to this proposition and even agreed in part but in the end did little to materially assist him. In actual fact Schellenberg did not require the Amt IV personnel for intelligence work but in order that he might use their administrative and police experience in the various Amt VI sub-sections dealing with documents, filing and administrative matters. Further Peace Feelers. The conversation then turned on the political situation and the state of the war in general. Schellenberg who for some time had not hidden his opinion from Himmler, once again stressed the importance of getting Germany out of the war, for now that America had entered hostilities there was no longer any hope, in his view, of eventual success. Himmler followed him carefully and appeared to be sympathetic. In Schellenberg’s opinion it was Ribbentrop who used his influence with Hitler for a continuation of the war, while Himmler vacillatingly favoured its termination. Schellenberg went on to put forward more concrete proposals and suggested that he wished to establish contact with the Western Allies through Switzerland naming Cable, the British Consul-General in that country [in Zurich], as a likely person to contact. For this purpose Amt VI’s Swiss Referat had the following links with Cable: (a) Strohmeyer

Stuttgart manufacturer

(b) Wanner

a German national who was the honorary Swedish Consul in Stuttgart

(c) Stoffel

Swiss hotelier.

Himmler showed interest in the plan but would not believe that it could be carried out with success. He was much afraid lest any attempt to come to terms would be construed abroad as evidence of Germany’s weakness and used as propaganda against her. Nevertheless he gave Schellenberg permission to develop this contact. Accordingly Schellenberg continued his efforts and at the end of July, or beginning of August 1943, succeeded in approaching Cable and putting him in touch with Himmler. Himmler, however, passed this link on to Ribbentrop with the result that Hitler issued an order forbidding all intelligence personnel from making any contacts whatever with political personalities. Schellenberg regarded this as a paralysing blow to his own plans.

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Kranefuss and Freundeskreis. Another matter that Schellenberg raised with Himmler while at Zhitomir was the question of [Fritz] Kranefuss and the Freundeskreis. Kranefuss was the founder of the Freundeskreis,39 a circle of influential German industrialists.* Shortly after Heydrich’s death in June 1942 Kranefuss approached Schellenberg with the intimation that he and *For further information regarding Kranefuss and the Freundeskreis see Appendix XVI.

his friends had noticed his work and were following his career with interest and that there was now no reason why they should not welcome co-operation or not be willing to assist him where they could, although they did not wish to do so without the express permission of Himmler. Relations between Heydrich and Kranefuss had been very strained and Schellenberg was aware that during Heydrich’s lifetime Kranefuss had kept very much in the background. Schellenberg had the feeling that the real object of making this proposal was to curry favour with Himmler and that helping him was of minor importance. However Kranefuss was in a position to furnish Amt VI with valuable industrial information and although Schellenberg did not like the man he decided to make use of him. He also wished to make use of the Freundeskreis for the purposes of the Amt but Kranefuss was reluctant to introduce him to any of its members, and in point of fact Schellenberg never succeeded in establishing such contacts. The position was explained by Schellenberg to Himmler and he received permission to co-operate with Kranefuss. Havel Institute and Unternehmung Zeppelin. As a result of his conversations with Himmler at this period at Zhitomir, Schellenberg also made preliminary arrangements for the establishment of the Havel Institute and Unternehmung Zeppelin. The frequent attacks by Russian partisan bands on German convoys in which even members of Himmler’s own staff had been killed had suggested to Himmler the institution of German partisan groups and reconnaissance units on the same lines as the Russian [sic.]. He forthwith ordered Schellenberg to set up a similar organisation but was told by him that this was impossible unless the groups could be fully trained and enjoy W/T communications. As a result of Schellenberg’s arguments Himmler sanctioned the setting up of the organisation known as the Havel Institute for W/T training under Sturmbann-fuehrer Sieppen. The Unternehmung Zeppelin for the organisation of the German partisans was also later established and Schellenberg was instructed to recruit staff from Amt I for the purpose. The “Unternehmung” was placed under the aegis of VI.C. and Himmler decided that the cover name should be Zeppelin.40

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Obersturmbannfuehrer Schaefer. Himmler also while at Zhitomir instructed Schellenberg to get in touch with Obersturmbannfuehrer [Max] Schaefer, who had been associated with the Lhassa and Himalaya expedition, and take him on as an assistant. Schaefer was preparing a post-war expedition and Himmler’s intention was to arrange for the inclusion in it of Amt VI agents. The intended expedition was to operate in India, which owing to its ties with Britain was dealt with by Gruppe VI.D. (Paeffgen) Schaefer being therefore attached to this section. It was purposed that the agents of VI.D. within the expedition would eventually be required to gather information of a political nature in India. Dr. Kersten. While he was at Zhitomir Schellenberg’s health, never too robust, once again showed signs of deterioration and Himmler put him in touch with his own osteopath masseur Dr. [Felix] Kersten.41 This was the first time that Schellenberg actually made the acquaintance of Kersten although the name had been familiar to him since 1940 through Mueller who, in common with most of Himmler’s entourage, had the worst opinion of him. Kersten was a German who at some time not very far distant had taken Finnish nationality and had contrived either through a persuasive tongue or ability as a doctor to build up an international practice even at one time becoming the personal physician to the Queen of Holland. In 1940 he had returned to Germany and had been enabled through the money he had earned to buy Gut Harzwalde [sic.], a property in the neighbourhood of his birthplace in the Mark. At the time that Schellenberg was first attended by Kersten the latter already had a strong hold over Himmler who was convinced that he was dependent on his treatment for his affliction, believed by Schellenberg to be cancer of the bowel, as he was the only person who could relieve him of pain. Kersten had obtained from Himmler the promise of a large sum of money said by [Dr Rudolf] Brandt, Himmler’s personal secretary, to have been 100,000 Rm., to be paid for successful treatment. Whether this sum was actually paid is not clear but it is certain that Kersten did actually receive various large payments from Himmler. Because of Kersten’s close relations with Himmler and his large circle of patients and acquaintances he wielded a certain amount of power, being in a position to intercede on behalf of those threatened with confiscations or internment, whom he helped according to Schellenberg without monetary reward. He was also the recipient of information obtained from numerous contacts abroad and in Germany, made through his practice, which he passed when it suited him to Himmler and later also to Schellenberg. Schellenberg was suffering from a severe liver and gall bladder trouble and was becoming really anxious as he was continually losing weight.42 Himmler already suggested all kinds of cures, none of them of any avail, but after Schellenberg’s first treatment from Kersten he already felt better and when he had been visited by him four of five times the pain that he had been suffering without intermission left him for the first time. So great was the improvement in fact that Schellenberg like Himmler became dependent on the treatment.

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But this was not Schellenberg’s only interest in Kersten. At this second meeting he realised that he held similar political opinions to his own and very soon a tacit agreement grew up between them not only mutually to protect each other against the machinations of their enemies but also to influence Himmler for their own purposes.43 Under the circumstances it was only natural that both concealed and open attacks should be made on Kersten and although he was mostly able to defend himself when openly assailed by direct appeals to Himmler, he turned to Schellenberg for assistance to ward off the subversive attacks of Mueller and later Kaltenbrunner. Schellenberg’s dealings with Kersten will be dealt with in those parts of the report in which they chronologically fall.* 1942 Sept. Visit to Paris. In the course of September 1942 Schellenberg travelled to Paris on a four day visit in order to meet [René] Bousquet, Chief of the French Police.44 Through telephone intercepts Bousquet was known to the Germans to be in close contact with the Deuxieme Bureau and it was Schellenberg’s intention to attempt to establish greater co-operation with them in return for German financial assistance. Bousquet, however, was not very encouraging although he did not actually refuse Schellenberg’s request and Schellenberg was also unsuccessful in his second aim of smoothing a way for an eventual understanding between Dr. Knochen, the Befehlshaber [commander] of the S.S. in Paris and Bousquet for reasons which are not fully known to him. 1942 end Sept. Imprisonment of Luther. Since co-operation had begun between Amt VI and the Foreign Office Schellenberg’s relations with Luther had continued to improve.45 This was not due so much to personal friendship but to the fact that mutual assistance was beneficial to the work of both parties, though this did nevertheless create a bond of confidence between the two men. Furthermore Schellenberg with his reports, kept Luther informed on foreign matters and in this manner considerably influenced his junior colleagues. Luther had been a trustee of Ribbentrop’s estate some time before coming to the Foreign Office and now increasing tension was accumulating between them owing to Ribbentrop’s extravagant mode of living. On Ribbentrop’s side the fear was growing that Luther was becoming too strong for him to cope with. Luther now decided to make a determined attack on Ribbentrop in light of the tension existing between Himmler and Ribbentrop known to him through Schellenberg. Having discussed the matter with Schellenberg beforehand, he sent one of his officials to him with the accusation that Ribbentrop was no longer capable of holding office and that he, Schellenberg, should intervene with Himmler with a view to getting him removed. Schellenberg describes this attempt of Luther’s to remove in this manner a minister in office, as a tremendous undertaking. Moreover, Luther, in his opinion had made the *For further information regarding Kersten see Appendix XVII.

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mistake of initiating his attack too quickly, for although Schellenberg declares that Luther could rely on his support, he, Schellenberg, had not had sufficient time to prepare the path with Himmler. Nevertheless despite these considerations Schellenberg believed that Himmler would make use of this unique opportunity for the removal of Ribbentrop, since Luther had collected sufficient evidence to show that Ribbentrop was corrupt and not responsible for his actions. Schellenberg therefore one evening approached Himmler in his Berlin office. The interview, however, from the very start did not prosper. Himmler was nervous and irritable and what made matters even worse shortly after Schellenberg had begun to put his case before Himmler, they were joined by Obergruf. [Karl] Wolff, Chief of Himmler’s personal staff and liaison officer to Hitler. Wolff urged Himmler to take no part in what he termed Luther’s treachery and protested further that Himmler could not lend himself to such an affair on account of his ostensible friendship for Ribbentrop and also because Hitler’s attitude in such circumstances was a foregone conclusion. At first Himmler sided with Schellenberg against Ribbentrop but as the conversation progressed he began to waver and finally came round to “dear old Wolff’s” point of view, from, according to Schellenberg, sheer fright that Wolff would on his own initiative carry the whole business to Hitler. Himmler then ordered Schellenberg to prepare a report on the incident to pass to Mueller who was then to telephone Himmler. The matter eventually reached Hitler’s ears having been probably disclosed to Ribbentrop by Himmler and in consequence Luther was imprisoned.46 1942 Sept. Meeting with Masson. At about this time Schellenberg had his first meeting with Oberstbrigadier [Roger] Masson,47 known to him as Head of the Swiss Intelligence Service and as acting as liaison officer between the Swiss General Staff and the Swiss Foreign Office. Masson was also the outstanding political advisor to General [Henri] Guisan G.I.C. Swiss fighting forces.48 Preparations for Schellenberg’s meeting with Masson were made by a certain Hauptsturmf [Hans Wilhelm] Eggen,49 working for the S.S. Fuehrungshauptamt on economic matters, who was in contact with Masson through a Swiss lawyer named [Dr Paul] Meyer50 attached to the Swiss General Staff. The initiative for the conversations came from Masson who wished to restore good neighbourly relations which had been steadily deteriorating. Masson further desired a cessation of the useless and fruitless German intelligence activities against Switzerland which had been responsible for numerous arrests of Germans by the Swiss Police and which were antagonising public opinion on both sides. The two met in the German town on the Swiss border named Waldshut between Schaffhausen and Constance. Discussions proceeded on the above questions and it was agreed to check the mutual hate campaign of the Press of both countries and in particular to restrain the fiery utterances of Herr [Paul Karl] Schmidt, Public Relations Officer of the German Foreign Office.51 These conversations were considered by Schellenberg as of some importance as he regarded Switzerland together with Sweden as an important launching platform for the peace feelers he was planning. Schellenberg held further conversations with Masson and these are dealt with as they arise.*

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1942 October. Association with Langbehn. On his return to Berlin from Zhitomir where he had remained some two weeks, Schellenberg continued his acquaintance with Kersten and was soon in a position to confirm his original belief that he would be able to exert an influence over Himmler in his favour. Shortly after his return to Berlin, Kersten mentioned to Schellenberg a certain [Dr Carl] Langbehn, a well known lawyer in Berlin whose work took him frequently to Sweden in connection with industrial interests there. Langbehn had many contacts amongst the intelligentsia in Berlin and in Kersten’s view possessed ideas in close affinity to Schellenberg’s own regarding Germany’s destiny. Schellenberg agreed to meet Langbehn and an introduction was effected at a dinner at which Schellenberg was able to convince himself that Langbehn’s opinions corresponded with his own. In the ensuing months Schellenberg frequently met Langbehn and was instrumental in obtaining for him travel facilities such as visas etc. in connection with his journeys to Sweden and Switzerland. At the beginning of July 1944, Langbehn, who moved in circles where the opposition to Hitler started which culminated in the July plot, revealed frankly to Schellenberg plans which he and his associates had evolved for Hitler’s overthrow. In substance these plans were as follows:– Himmler was to effect an agreement with the Wehrmacht to enable Hitler either to be forcibly overthrown or abducted by force to some place in the neighbourhood of Obersalzberg near Berchtesgaden. Potitz [sic.],52 a Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance, was to be set up as leader of a new party. Simultaneously peace feelers were to be put out to the Allies through the intermediary of Langbehn and a certain Jakob Wallenberg, a Swedish banker.53 Schellenberg was expected under the plan to exert his influence with Himmler in such a manner as to harden his wavering resolve to take effective measures to deal with Hitler. Schellenberg however did not consider it an auspicious time to take the matter up with Himmler, although in March of the following year 1943, when a parallel internal resistance movement was focussed in a certain Frl. [Erna] Hanfstaengl in Munich with the same objects in view, he combined the two resistance groups and disclosed the whole matter to Himmler.Himmler at this time did not dismiss the suggestion and in fact received it with serious consideration henceforth according to Schellenberg having at the back of his mind the general tenor of this plot. In April or May 1943 Langbehn was accused of being an agent employed by the British and arrested and in spite of repeated interventions by Kersten on Schellenberg’s initiative in both their interests, remained in prison for over a year, being subsequently shot sometime after the July 20th 1944 incident. 1942 October. Visit of Swiss Chief of Police to Germany. In the middle of October 1942, on his own initiative, [Dr Heinrich] Rothmund, Head of Swiss Fremden Polizei, visited Berlin for discussions with the German Foreign Office. *For further information regarding the Swiss Intelligence service see Appendix XII.

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The reasons for his visit to Germany were to improve relations between the two countries, particularly as regards passport and visa arrangements in order to facilitate business exchange between Germany and Switzerland and to arrange for a mutual exchange of political prisoners. Rothmund was not well satisfied with his visit and his treatment by the Foreign Office left much to be desired. Schellenberg himself received him with every courtesy at the same time holding himself aloof from any direct negotiations as he understood Rothmund’s position in Switzerland to be one of rivalry with Masson, his own link in that country. 1942 end Oct. Technical discussions with General Feligiebel [sic.]. Through the medium of General Thiele, Schellenberg now commenced discussions with General [Fritz Erich] Feligiebel [Fellgiebel], Head of the Signal’s Section of the Communication Department of the O.K.W.54 The matters under discussion were as follows:– (1) The sharing of all relevant Allied messages with Amt VI which the O.K.W. had succeeded in intercepting and deciphering. (Messages required by Amt VI for purposes of evaluation). (2) Technical+support for Amt VI from the O.K.W. Although General Feligiebel [sic.] had formerly refused to cooperate with the S.S. he agreed to Schellenberg’s request. Discussions with Staatssekretaer Koerner. In continuation of his policy of widening the basis of co-operation between Amt VI and the other state departments Schellenberg also opened conversations with Staatssekretaer [Paul] Koerner, Goering’s deputy. Koerner was Head of the Forschungsamt and had under his charge the following departments:– 1. Telephone monitoring 2. Codes and cyphers 3. Analysis, registry of documents. Schellenberg’s eventual but unavowed aim was to absorb into his own organisation Amt Ausland, the department dealing with foreign matters in the above three spheres and thus bring them directly under control of Amt VI. It soon became apparent however that the time for direct approach to this question was not yet ripe. Schellenberg therefore contented himself with seeking only close co-operation. In the course of these conversations it was agreed that a close liaison should be set up between the two departments and that all reports and material in the possession of the Forschungsamt Ausland should be made directly and immediately available to Amt VI.

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The Auslands Organisation. Restriction of Intelligence Activities. By this time Schellenberg had become aware of what he considered as the damaging activities of the intelligence representatives abroad of the Auslands Organisation (A.O.).55 These representatives in addition to their normal functions were intermeddling in the intelligence field, sending their reports direct to [Martin] Bormann56 through their leader [Ernst Wilhelm] Bohle57 and going even so far as to demand that all Amt VI agents should register themselves abroad with the A.O. With the intention of restraining these activities Schellenberg obtained permission to address the yearly Berlin conference of the A.O. presided over by Bohle and Bormann and attended by members of the A.O. stationed abroad. Schellenberg’s discourse was on the significance of the Geheime Meldedienst, permission to address the assembly being granted because of Bohle’s wish to ingratiate himself with Himmler. At the meeting Schellenberg took the opportunity of urging a complete ban on any participation by the A.O. in independent intelligence matters. Immediately after the conference Schellenberg, Bohle and the most important A.O. representatives without Bormann travelled to Himmler’s Feldkommandostelle at Loetzen, East Prussia. Himmler then instructed Bohle and his colleagues as to the precise scope of their party political activities but nevertheless granted them permission to indulge in intelligence work provided that it were undertaken in conformity with the wishes of Amt VI. The arrested Swedes. Sometime in April 1942 the arrest took place of seven Swedish subjects living in Warsaw who were mainly the representatives in Poland of large Swedish industrial firms and banks. These men were accused of consistently passing on information received from the Polish Resistance Circles to the Polish Resistance Organisation in Stockholm, for ultimate transmission to Britain. Of their names Schellenberg recalls the following: Consul General

Hersloe [Carl Herslow]

Director

Heggborg [Sigfrid Haeggberg]

Director

Widen. [Tore Widen]

Towards the end of October 1942 a certain General Director [Axel] Brandin of the Swedish Match Company approached Schellenberg on Kersten’s advice with the view of securing the freedom of these Swedes.58 As a result of this interview Schellenberg conferred with Justizrat Dix, council for the accused, and was successful in arranging an improvement in their prison diet.59 Shortly afterwards Schellenberg approached Himmler, putting forward the farreaching international consequences, bearing on the relations between Sweden and Germany, that might arise from an adverse verdict on these men. With these arguments he succeeded in obtaining Himmler’s agreement to the mitigation or abrogation of any sentence which might be passed on the defendants. Continuing his efforts Schellenberg then succeeded in advancing the date of the trial, at which two of the prisoners were

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acquitted and five condemned to death, this last sentence being commuted later to lifelong imprisonment. Subsequently, on Schellenberg’s intervention, the five men condemned were transferred from the dreaded Alexanderplatz prison and not long before Christmas 1944, Schellenberg prevailed upon Himmler to effect their release.60 In these negotiations Langbehn was also involved as an intermediary and demanded 80,000 Krs for his services from the Swedes. 1942 Nov. The Influence of Dr. Hitter. In the course of November 1942 Schellenberg was introduced to a certain Dr. Hitter by Prof. de Crinis [Director of the Neurological Department of the Charité Hospital in Berlin].61 Hitter, a German by birth, had formerly followed the profession of lawyer and economist in Hamburg but late in life had abandoned this career and transferred his energies to the field of medicine taking his degree at the age of 48. He then became a famous German specialist in what was termed “Tiefen Psychologie” applying the results of his psychological researches to the study of the character of the German nation. At the time when Hitter came to the notice of Schellenberg he was working as a psychoanalyst under Dr. de Crinis at the Charité Hospital in Berlin. According to Schellenberg the character and philosophy of Hitter exerted a profound mental influence on his own philosophical outlook and judgment. As an explanation of his philosophical theories, he attributes to him the creation of what he calls “a scientific system for the discovery of the fundamental sources and motives of faults in the German character” by which Hitter was enabled to advance remedies for “the rebirth of the Christian soul in the German people”. Schellenberg conceived the scheme of using Hitter for the furtherance of his peace plans as the latter was said to be on good terms with the late Archbishop Temple [William Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury] as well as Prof. [Carl Gustav] Jung in Zurich. After considerable difficulty, owing to Dr. Hitter’s indispensability at the hospital, he procured for him a visa and he set out in April 1943, ostensibly to establish contact with Dr. Temple. But little came of this attempt, in fact on reaching the “outside world” Hitter appears to have revised his conception of the international situation, sending back to Schellenberg through an intermediary, a certain “Dauffeld” [Hans-Christian Daufeldt], a message of doubtful philosophical content, to the effect that the only solution for Germany lay in the overthrow of Hitler.62 1942 November. Further discussions with Hohenlohe. Since his first meeting with Hohenlohe at the beginning of the year and his subsequent discussions with him regarding peace proposals Schellenberg had continued to keep in touch and in November 1942 the question of making contact with Sir Samuel Hoare was once more raised. With Schellenberg’s assistance, Hohenlohe who was at this time general agent for the Skoda works in West Europe, had secured exemption from military service for his new secretary, one Spitzi [Reinhard Spitzy]. Schellenberg introduced Spitzi [sic.] to his family and together with Hohenlohe discussions were carried on at his home with the object of initiating peace contacts in Spain in the immediate future.

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Schellenberg urged Hohenlohe to approach Sir Samuel Hoare but he complained that his brief was too vague and that it should be endorsed with Himmler’s full support. Schellenberg promised to take the matter up with Himmler as soon as possible but suggested that in the meantime Hohenlohe and Spitzi [sic.] should continue their efforts in Spain.63 Hohenlohe and Spitzi [sic.] thereupon left for Spain and the former at once established contact with Sir Samuel Hoare and also with General [Windam W.] Torr, the British Military Attache in Madrid. He had moreover already been in contact with the Swiss Foreign Minister in Berne, at that time [Marcel] Pilet-Golaz, with a view to starting peace discussions through Vatican channels and had arranged to visit the Swiss Minister again shortly. In the meantime Spitzi [sic.] on his own initiative was in touch with the U.S. Military Attache, one Col. Rousseau in Lisbon and the latter’s assistant Col. Demarest.64 Schellenberg states that he felt justified in pursuing these attempts because of Himmler’s attitude in their discussions at Zhitomir but as he still put off raising the subject with Himmler again and therefore could not give Hohenlohe the desired support all these efforts came to nothing. 1942 November. Geheimrat Kreuter. Another acquaintance with whom Schellenberg had dealings at this time was Geheimrat Kreuter. Kreuter had in the past effected some considerable financial transactions for Germany, shortly after the last war, securing for the Ruhr industry a Dutch Government loan of some 400,000,000 Dutch Guilders, the undertaking going under the name of Trede Fina. Out of motives of friendship and also since he thought Kreuter would be of use to him because of his important foreign contacts* Schellenberg agreed to assist Kreuter to transfer the greater part of the funds pertaining to this loan to an unblocked and freely negotiable French exchange account in Free French francs in France. Permission for this currency exchange was difficult to obtain as Kreuter was heartily disliked by Goering who through the medium of the Forschungsamt trumped up a charge of espionage. Schellenberg, however, was able to brush aside these allegations and to then suggest an arrangement with Kreuter** which he purposed to use as a bargaining weapon, whereby Schellenberg would be permitted to place some ten or so young Germans for training in the Galeries Lafayette. This arrangement never went further than the suggestion but it sufficed to obtain the Minister Funks [sic.] approval for the transfer of the funds thereby fulfilling its main object. As regards Kreuter, he was arrested by the Staatspolizei at the end of 1944 on the suspicion of espionage on behalf of America but Schellenberg guaranteed his bona fides and secured his release. *Kreuter is said by Schellenberg to have had relations with the important United States firm of Attorneys Dill & Read [Dillon Read & Co.] and the U.S. Admiralty Chief, Admiral Forestall [James Vincent Forrestal]. **Schellenberg states that this arrangement appeared to him as very desirable as Germany was responsible for the administration of France and it would be of advantage if young men could be trained in this way in order that they might be used for administrational purposes and as V-men.

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1942 Dec. Consequences of the Allied Landing in North Africa. In the course of the previous month the Allied landing had taken place on the North African coast and [Joseph] Goebbels in difficulties with his propaganda turned to Schellenberg and Canaris for an explanation, accusing them of failing to foresee and to inform the Reich authorities of the impending attack. Schellenberg was more or less able to parry these allegations on the grounds that he was not responsible for matters concerning the military sphere but Canaris was in a more difficult position and was obliged to support particularly abusive verbal attacks from Goebbels. After this affair, according to Schellenberg, Hitler’s confidence in Canaris was completely destroyed. 1942 Mid Dec. Further meeting with Masson. At about the middle of December Dr. Meyer made an arrangement whereby a further meeting was convened between Schellenberg and Masson at Schloss Wolfsberg, a castle lying on the Swiss side of Lake Constance. Masson only visited the Schloss for one day although Schellenberg was there for three and during this time conversations proceeded along the same lines as at their previous discussions, Schellenberg reiterating his belief that there should be some way of contacting the Western Powers through Masson. Masson agreed to assist Schellenberg in his peace efforts but no agreement was reached on collaboration of the German/Swiss Intelligence Services. Schellenberg undertook on his side to do everything in his power to maintain Switzerland’s neutrality in as far as any German threat was concerned. Schellenberg succeeded in carrying out most of Masson’s requests. He had already been able to restrain the German Press campaign against Switzerland65 and before the following Christmas Day was able to set [sic.] across the Swiss frontier the Swiss Consul in Stuttgart who was alleged to have had in his possession construction plans of the West Wall and in consequence was likely to receive the death sentence for espionage. Schellenberg considered that the deliverance of the Swiss Consul which he had been able to accomplish without the assistance of the Foreign Office or the Staatspolizei was evidence of German “good will” and as such an important bargaining factor.66 1943 Jan. Visit of Turkish officials to Berlin. At about this period Stubaf [Ludwig C.] Moyzisch of VI.C. and Stubaf Wolf of Amt IV and VI extended an invitation to the Police President of Istanbul, Pepyli, together with a certain Korkut, a Chief of section in the Turkish Secret Service (believed to be dealing with German affairs) to visit Berlin. The invitation was sent as part of Schellenberg’s general principle of improving relations with foreign police officials with a view to facilitating the work of Amt VI. To give his visitors a good impression of German might and influence, Schellenberg arranged for them to be taken on a three weeks tour of the Reich and occupied territories, inspecting coastal defences and other military fortifications. Pepyli was known to Schellenberg as an anti-Communist and he planned to secure his help in common intelligence activities against Russia. A secondary motive for the invitation was the improvement of facilities for Amt VI work in Turkey.

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The immediate results arising out of this visit can be tabulated as follows: 1. The Police President undertook to report the results of his visit to the Chief of the Turkish Intelligence Service. 2. He undertook to suggest on his return to Turkey the exchange of Intelligence material, particularly in regard to the Caucasus. 3. He announced he would be sending his son to Germany for his further education. The German Foreign Office were [sic.] kept closely informed regarding these Turkish visitors and Schellenberg states that the guiding principle behind their dealings with the Turks was, of course, the preservation of Turkish neutrality. 1943 Jan. Appointment of Kaltenbrunner as Head of the R.S.H.A. In January 1943 an event occurred which brought decisive changes in Schellenberg’s career. On the 31st of this month Kaltenbrunner was appointed by Himmler Head of the R.S.H.A. Kaltenbrunner’s career up to the time he took over the control of the R.S.H.A. had not been one of unbroken success. When he was appointed to this position Kaltenbrunner was 40 years of age and had approached the S.S. through the medium of the law, having served as lawyer at the Landsgericht at Linz and later in the practice of his father, Dr. Hugo Kaltenbrunner. In 1932 he joined the S.S. became Head of the “Juristen Bund” at Linz and was arrested in January 1934 together with most of the other Austrian Nazis. Not long after his release, four months later, he was expelled from the bar for his former political activities and devoted himself to collecting and selling stamps. But after the Anschluss in March 1938 his rise from mediocrity was unbroken. He was promoted from the rank of Hauptsturmfuehrer to that of Obersturmfuehrer and appointed State Secretary without port-folio and was later in his capacity as Sekretaer des Sicherheitswesens instrumental in integrating the Austrian police force into [the] Police Organisation of the German Reich. Immediately prior to taking over the R.S.H.A. he held the position of H.S.S. Pf for Austria. There is little doubt that, at least on Schellenberg’s side, there was from the very beginning a strong feeling of enmity between the two men. Kaltenbrunner for his part accuses Schellenberg of being insatiably ambitious and inordinately jealous of his position which he charges him with coveting for himself, nevertheless he states that relations between them were correct if cool. The introduction of Kaltenbrunner took place at an assembly of all the Amt Chiefs of the R.S.H.A. and was made by Himmler himself who in his introductory speech specially commended Schellenberg and the work of Amt VI. From the very beginning this appointment brought about a deterioration in Schellenberg’s position. At the outset Kaltenbrunner took every step to rebuff Schellenberg and in fact by April 1943 had gone so far as to attempt to have him removed from Amt VI. All documents and reports of importance had to be submitted to Kaltenbrunner and signed by him and all important decisions and authorisations were taken by Kaltenbrunner personally. Moreover, Schellenberg’s own relations with Himmler suffered in consequence, for he was deprived, anyway at the outset, of the direct access to Himmler that he had hitherto enjoyed.

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During the first three months after he had taken over his new command, that is to say between February and April 1943, Kaltenbrunner, evidently, in pursuance of a policy of surrounding himself with his own Austrian friends introduced into various positions in the Amt numbers of his former associates of which the following names have been given by Schellenberg as typical instances:– 1. Wanneck [Wilhelm Waneck]. Hptstmfr later Obstbnfr as Gruppenleiter VI.A. 2. [Werner] Goettsch. Stmbnfr, formerly Schellenberg’s liaison officer to the Propaganda Ministry appointed to special duties. 3. Hoettl [Wilhelm Höttl]. Stmbnfr—appointed to special duties. 4. [Otto] Skorzeny. Stmbnfr-Gruppenleiter VI.S. In consequence of these appointments Schellenberg’s own position in Amt VI was noticeably weakened. 1943 March. Frl. Hanfstaengl. In the course of March 1943 Schellenberg in consequence of a suggestion by Himmler made the acquaintance of a certain Frl. Hanfstaengl. This woman owned a shop in Munich and was the sister of the notorious Putzi Hanfstaengl, former member of Hitler’s intimate circle of friends who had flown to Roosevelt in 1934.67 Because of her brother’s exploits Frl. Hanfstaengl had received a great deal of attention from Hitler and at one time there were rumours of a possible marriage. Furthermore, she claimed to be on familiar terms with Randolph Churchill and was also well acquainted with Unity Mitford68 but what was more important she was acquainted with Himmler’s wife who mentioned to her husband her suitability to undertake peace talks in likely circles. At his meeting with Hanfstaengl Schellenberg learnt particulars of her peace plans which can be summarised as follows: 1. To prevail upon Himmler to forcibly abduct Hitler, with the aid of the Waffen S.S. to Obersalzberg, where the Fuehrer was to be held secretly under S.S. detention though ostensibly and outwardly still in control of the reins of Government. The De Facto Government was to be in the hands of a Council of Twelve, under the leadership of Himmler, of which Schellenberg recalls the following names: (a) General Direktor [Hermann] Schmitz (I.G.Farben) (b) Staatssekretaer Popitz 2. When the above dispositions had been attended to Frl. Hanfstaengl would herself proceed to Paris, open an art shop as cover and attempt to establish contact with persons of influence in England, such as for instance Randolph Churchill. Following this meeting Frl. Hanfstaengl travelled twice to Paris in July and September 1943 and succeeded in working up her French connections, amongst them a certain Mme Lussac and a former commandant of the French Police (name unknown) who had been taken into custody under security measures and recently released. Schellenberg had frequent conversations with Frl. Hanfstaengl during the whole of 1943 and because of currency and travel restrictions advanced her a sum of 500,000 French francs by way of a loan for the purpose of establishing her art shop in Paris.

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Schellenberg also saw her four times in Berlin but so far as he is aware she did not succeed in establishing contact through her French connections with persons in the United Kingdom. Schellenberg comments that under other circumstances he would probably not have employed this woman for she had a somewhat hysterical temperament but since her employment was virtually at Himmler’s instigation the chance was too good to be missed. As will later be described this link, towards the beginning of 1944, became embarrassing for Himmler and was dropped as it came to the ears of Mueller. German threats to Switzerland. In the spring of 1943 a series of negotiations took place between Schellenberg and certain of the Swiss leading authorities in order to avert an attack on Switzerland from the German side. At this time German/Swiss relations had considerably deteriorated due to the assumption on the German side that under certain circumstances Switzerland would be forced to abandon her neutrality and throw in her lot with the Western Powers. Schellenberg did in fact know from Himmler through hints that he had let drop that party circles in Germany were trying to influence Hitler to effect a preventative occupation of Switzerland and that these circles were strengthened by influential support from certain quarters of the German Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht. Schellenberg at once took steps to inform Masson through his intermediary [Hans Wilhelm] Eggen of the potential danger but discovered that Masson was already aware of the position from other sources. Schellenberg then discussed the question thoroughly with Himmler and placed before him a proposal calculated to meet the emergency, namely that he, Schellenberg, should induce some responsible Swiss authority to issue a reassuring statement of Swiss intentions as regards their neutrality, not only in so far as Germany was concerned but also vis a vis the Western Powers. Himmler reacted favourably to this suggestion and Schellenberg thereupon resumed contact with Masson through Eggen, putting forward this suggestion. 1943 March. Meeting with General Guisan in Berne, Biklen [sic.] and Arosa. In March 1943, by arrangement with Masson, Schellenberg proceeded to Berne in Switzerland, where he met General Guisan, G.I.C. Swiss Armed Forces. The meeting took place on March 17th 1943 and Schellenberg outlined to the General his original proposal to Masson. Two days later on March 19th the matter was further discussed at Berlin and on March 21st at Arosa General Guisan handed to Schellenberg a signed and secret declaration setting out that the purpose of the Swiss Army was to preserve the neutrality of Switzerland where ever [sic.] this should entail fighting either in the North, South, East or West. Reciprocal German guarantee. With this document Schellenberg was able to convince Himmler of the genuine intentions of Switzerland to remain neutral and it was agreed by both men that it should be insisted on that Ribbentrop should produce a reciprocal German guarantee relating to the

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preservation of Swiss neutrality by Germany. But according to Schellenberg jealousy had been aroused at the Foreign Office by his success and it was not until three months had gone by that Ribbentrop drafted a reply. To show the feelings that had been raised in diplomatic circles by this affair Schellenberg quotes the action of the German Ambassador [Minister] in Berne, [Otto] Koecher, who went so far as to suggest to the Swiss that Schellenberg had subsequent to his conversations with Guisan expressed the opinion in Germany that suitable precautionary action should be taken against the Swiss. Because of this allegation Masson felt himself obliged to despatch an emissary to Schellenberg in order to be reassured. Furthermore the note produced by Ribbentrop, although it did in effect agree to guarantee Swiss neutrality was couched in such highly offensive and patronising terms that it was suppressed on Himmler’s instructions and another substituted. In the meantime, again on Himmler’s instructions, Schellenberg had given a verbal assurance to Masson regarding Swiss neutrality. The new note substituted for that received from Ribbentrop, so constituted as to be politically more suitable to the circumstances, was delivered without Ribbentrop being aware of the subterfuge. 1943 May. Kaltenbrunner takes over Police Attaches.* Since the death of Heydrich it had never been clearly defined under whose authority the Police Attaches stood although for all practical purposes they had been answerable to Mueller of Amt IV. But upon the occasion of a conference of Police Attaches in May 1943, not attended by Schellenberg, Kaltenbrunner announced that he was taking over all Police Attaches through his intermediary a certain Dr. [Karl] Zindel. Difficulties with Kaltenbrunner. In April 1943 Schellenberg’s difficulties with Kaltenbrunner which up to then had only found expression in a tacit mutual distrust, came to a head. At a conference followed by a dinner Kaltenbrunner took the opportunity of informing Schellenberg that he was dissatisfied with his work at Amt VI and that he was not making his task any easier by his, Schellenberg’s, direct contact with Himmler over his head. Furthermore, Kaltenbrunner accused him of the attempted gratification of his own personal ambitions and unwarranted interference with the work of his subordinates Goettsch, Wanneck [sic.] and Hoettl, who were in point of fact, according to Schellenberg, Kaltenbrunner’s protegees. He added that he had reported adversely on Schellenberg to Himmler and that it would be in the interest of both parties if Schellenberg and he were to go their own separate ways. To this Schellenberg replied that if Kaltenbrunner desired officially to dispense with his services he would be only too glad to resign. Although at the dinner there appeared to be nothing intrinsically wrong with the food, Schellenberg fell ill *For information regarding the work of the police attaches see Appendix IX.

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immediately afterwards and despite the fact that he made a reasonably speedy recovery does not rule out the possibility that Kaltenbrunner may have attempted to poison him. A similar discussion to that quoted above took place a little later but nothing definite was decided about Schellenberg’s resignation. Thereafter, however, although Kaltenbrunner did not dare directly to dismiss Schellenberg he made every effort to make his position untenable. In pursuance of these tactics Kaltenbrunner set up his old associate Skorzeny in charge of a new Gruppe of Amt VI, the function of which was the training of personnel for sabotage and similar undertakings, established under the designation of Gruppe VI.S. Schellenberg’s position then became anomalous, as Skorzeny dealt directly with Kaltenbrunner and he himself although technically his superior, was ignored. Schellenberg did however to a certain extent succeed in offsetting these arrangements of Kaltenbrunner as he acquired two staunch supporters of influence who were also highly receptive to his own political outlook. Their names were: Obergruf [Hans] Juettner, a member of the Waffen S.S. and Head of the S.S.Fuehrungshauptamt, and Obergruf [Gottlob] Berger,

Chef des S.S.Hauptamtes.

Schellenberg states that he could not rely upon Himmler’s support at this time as the latter was extremely undecided in his own mind and he attributes his retention in office entirely to the efforts of Juettner and Berger. 1943 May. Resumed Peace Feelers in Lisbon. As a consequence of his earlier conversation with Himmler on the matter of Frl. Hanfstaengl, Schellenberg believed himself to be in a position at this time to authorise Hohenlohe’s assistant Spitzi [sic.] and a certain Preiski [Breisky] to renew their peace feelers with the American Military Attache in Lisbon. Legationsrat Preiski [sic.] was an Attache at the German Embassy in Lisbon who had been secretly recruited by Schellenberg, not long previously, for reporting political developments. Schellenberg stresses that his difficulties [sic.] in all his endeavours to make contacts for the initiation of peace discussions was the danger of a leakage of information to the foreign press which might have had tremendous repercussions in Germany. Discussions with Ribbentrop regarding U.S.A. In the same month Schellenberg was invited to Ribbentrop’s Austrian residence, Schloss Fuschl for discussions in connection with America. Ribbentrop opened this conversation by asking Schellenberg what contacts he had, if any, with the U.S.A. and on receiving an ironical reply to the effect that Schellenberg had not deemed it necessary to occupy himself with this field in view of Ribbentrop’s former large staff in America, he went on to disclose that he was planning a propaganda campaign in connection with the forthcoming presidential election in America. Ribbentrop then proposed that they should pool their endeavours and that Dr. Naegerle, an expert on America formerly connected with the “Berliner Boersen Zeitung” whose competence is conceded by Schellenberg,

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should co-operate with Schellenberg’s Gruppenleiter Dr. Paeffgen of the relevant Amt VI Section, namely VI. D. Ribbentrop asked that Amt VI should furnish him with the following information:i) On the general political situation in America, and ii) Specific information regarding the effects on the U.S. population, particularly minorities of Ribbentrop’s indirect radio propaganda. (The indirect propaganda referred to was, for instance, broadcasts in Polish and Irish languages.) Ribbentrop further suggested that Schellenberg should be responsible for organising and carrying out the operational side of this project to be accomplished by sending personnel trained by Amt VI in submarines to the U.S.A. All expenses for these undertakings were to be met by Ribbentrop. Implementing Ribbentrop’s proposals. Immediately after this meeting Schellenberg instructed Dr. Paeffgen to take charge of the scheme and he set to work to organise a mission to America. Paeffgen selected for the task six persons fairly recently returned to Germany from the U.S.A. and arranged they should be trained in W/T and S/W at his villa in Berlin. They were also given careful instruction in cover background but at no time received any sabotage training. At the completion of their training these agents were to be landed in America by submarine and to take up their former U.S. employments. For the purpose of communicating with Germany they were equipped with two radio sets with which to get in touch with Hamburg and were to remain in America until the end of the war. Schellenberg cannot recollect any of the names of these agents but mentions their leader as having close contact with the U.S. War Ministry. By way of remuneration they were to be provided with 100,000 U.S. $ in paper currency. A certain Admiral [Eberhardt] Godt was entrusted with the provision of a large submarine of Germany’s then latest type. The intention was that the submarine should make two journeys, first of all to convey four of the trainees to America and then return for the remaining two. The mission of the trainees was to report on the subjects indicated by Ribbentrop to Schellenberg at their conversation at Schloss Fuschl. The training of the men commenced in June 1943 and was completed by April 1944. In May 1944 a large submarine set out from an Atlantic harbour with four men aboard and was presumed sunk as no further information regarding it was received by the German Admiralty. As a consequence of this loss, in July 1944 a small submarine set forth probably from a port in Norway and succeeded in setting the remaining two men ashore to the North of New York and returning to Germany some six weeks after her departure. But the expedition was doomed to failure for some three or four months later these two men were arrested by the American authorities just as they had installed their radio set but before they had actually been in communication with Hamburg. News of this event reached Germany owing to the publicity in the American press given to the trial, at which it was erroneously assumed that the expedition had as its object the purpose of sabotage, whereas, in point of fact it was only intended for the collection of political information.69

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A third expedition was planned in 1945 but was not carried out owing to the war situation at that time. 1943 June. Schellenberg’s journey to Sweden—Folkets Dagblad and 7 Swedes. Shortly before June 1943 Schellenberg had discussions with the press section of the Foreign Office in Berlin, who desired to increase the political activities of the Swedish Fascist newspaper “Folkets Dagblad” which as already related, was to some extent subsidised by Schellenberg. It was now proposed that owing to Schellenberg’s difficulties in obtaining Swedish currency, the Foreign Office should contribute 65% of an increased subsidy while Amt VI should supply the balance. Schellenberg therefore journeyed to Sweden in order to settle the final points of this transaction at the German Embassy in Stockholm, which he succeeded in doing. During his visit to Stockholm Schellenberg also visited General Direktor Brandin of the Swedish Match Company [sic.] and discussed the progress that he had made in assisting the seven Swedes who were awaiting trial and the conversation then led to an intimate exchange of opinion on the unfavourable position in which Germany found herself and Brandin presented Schellenberg with a book written by a Swiss author vividly presenting the might and power of Russia. On his return to Germany Schellenberg showed this book to Himmler who had several thousand copies reprinted. 1943 July. Fall of Italy. Detailed reports had for some time been furnished by Amt VI forecasting the imminent collapse of Italy but when the event actually materialised, according to Schellenberg, the high command was taken by surprise. This was largely due to the fact that Ribbentrop had contemptuously disregarded these reports and had chosen to rely on the more reassuring estimation of the position which [Hans-Georg von] Mackensen,70 the German Ambassador in Italy had supplied. Schellenberg visits Turkey. At the time of Italy’s collapse Schellenberg decided to visit Turkey for the following reasons: (i) He wished to return the visit to Germany in January 1943 of the Turkish Police President, Pepyli, with a view to further discussions and also with the object of holding conversations with the Chief of the Turkish Intelligence Service, [Nacy] Perkel, on common intelligence objectives as directed against Russia with particular regard to the Caucasus. (ii) In order to reassure Turkey, at the request and in agreement with the Foreign Office, that Germany would not suffer Bulgaria to indulge in national ambitions likely to prove harmful to Turkish Thrace—a matter of which Turkey always went in fear. (iii) With the intention of counter-balancing the blow suffered by Germany through the collapse of Italy, he intended to reassure Turkey of Germany’s strength and cause if possible Turkish political feudalism to swing in Germany’s favour.

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(iv) For the purpose of endeavouring to arrange at the request of the Commercial Section of the Foreign Office continued Turkish deliveries of chrome to Germany. On Schellenberg’s arrival in Turkey he journeyed first of all to [Franz] von Papen’s summer residence in the neighbourhood of Istanbul and informed him fully of the purposes of his visit to Turkey. Von Papen showed no apparent objection to Schellenberg’s visit and even asked him on his return to Germany to inform the Foreign Office and Himmler that he proposed to use as a bargaining lever with Turkey the promise that, on the event of a favourable outcome of the war, Turkey might be offered greater influence over and better treatment for her minorities in the Crimea, Tartary and the Ukraine. At the same time von Papen announced his intention of offering the Dodecanese Islands to Turkey at the end of the war, with the intention of offsetting the collapse of Italy. Papen’s purpose in requesting Schellenberg to convey this information was that if it were routed through Himmler any objection by Ribbentrop might be circumvented. Schellenberg then travelled to Ankara where he had conversations on matters concerning Amt VI with his representatives Moyzisch and Fast. On his return journey he called on Perkel, head of the Turkish Intelligence Service and pointed out their common intelligence interests in the Russian field. Perkel’s reaction to his suggestions were extremely favourable and after a few days he ratified his agreement to cooperate, combined German-Turkish activities eventuating later in Istanbul. So full and effective in fact was this cooperation that Schellenberg affirms that after severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1944 the Turkish Intelligence Service was still desirous of maintaining contact with Schellenberg’s Amt, so as to be ready for further common efforts in the event of a change in the German regime. He adds furthermore that the Turkish Intelligence Service was still in W/T contact with the G.I.S. even after they no longer had direct relations. The remaining purposes set out above were also dealt with during these initial conversations with Perkel. On his return journey Schellenberg called on Pepyli in Istanbul and found him almost embarrassingly cooperative, for so effusive was Pepyli’s hospitality and so indiscreetly was it manifested that a large party he gave in Schellenberg’s honour on a steamer in the Golden Horn caused Pepyli to be transferred shortly afterwards to another post. In connection with the united efforts of the Turkish and German Intelligence Services, Schellenberg recalls, later in 1944, reading decyphered extracts of W/T traffic passing between the Turkish Embassy Moscow and their Foreign Office in Ankara. These, in consequence of the severance of diplomatic relations dealt with Russia’s accusation of German-Turkish intelligence activities, which however were not admitted by the Turks. Schellenberg spent fourteen days in Turkey before returning to Germany. Liberation of Mussolini. Shortly after Schellenberg’s return from Turkey in the last few days of July 1943 Schellenberg received a telephone message from Kaltenbrunner to the effect that Hitler had decided that a mission was to be despatched to liberate Mussolini. Two names were put forward by Kaltenbrunner as possible leaders of the expedition, Goettsch or Skorzeny. Schellenberg replied that he did not consider Goettsch as a suitable choice owing to the state of his health and in fact when the suggestion was put to Goettsch he

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turned it down for that reason. Kaltenbrunner then informed Schellenberg that Skorzeny had been chosen as a leader of the expedition and that he was to be supplied with two machines from Hitler’s own Kurierstaffel and thirty to thirty-five men.71 The plans for the project were then discussed by Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny and placed before Hitler who gave his approval. Two days later Schellenberg attended at the Rangsdorf airfield for the start of the expedition. Political contacts banned by Hitler for Intelligence Personnel. Two cases were contributory causes to the ban now placed by Hitler on political discussions:– The Cable case and the Garrit case. Details of Schellenberg’s dealings with the British Consul-General Cable have already been touched upon and therefore will not be gone into here but the facts of the Garrit case were as follows. Sometime previously to this time it had come to Schellenberg’s ears through a certain Brettschneider, a Hamburg industrialist that one Garrit (or Guerrit) a British subject believed to be correspondent of the “Times” in Berne had quite unofficially and entirely on his own initiative put forward the suggestion that some German plenipotentiary should open peace conversations with an equally accredited British representative. Schellenberg reported on both these cases to Himmler but the latter, according to Schellenberg, developed cold feet and passed the reports, as they stood, without further editing over to Ribbentrop. It was quite clear from the documents in their original form that Amt VI were [sic.] in fact intermeddling with matters appertaining to the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, which fact Ribbentrop lost no time in bringing to Hitler’s notice, with the result that Hitler flew into a violent rage and issued an order to the effect that henceforward there was to be a complete prohibition on the initiation of any political contacts or talks with neutral countries by the Intelligence Services lest they should be interpreted by foreign countries as an indication of German weakness. Any contravention of this edict was to meet with severe punishment. 1943 August. Deterioration in relations with Himmler. Following his conversations with Kaltenbrunner regarding his position, Schellenberg, as already chronicled, experienced increased difficulties in his work in the Amt and now in the course of August 1943 his relations with Himmler considerably deteriorated. For one reason Kaltenbrunner was sufficiently in the saddle, considerably to influence Himmler against Schellenberg, who was now able through the media of Kersten and Himmler’s adjutant, Brandt, to discover the specific grounds upon which Kaltenbrunner’s accusations were based. These can be summarised under four headings as follows: 1.

Report on Russia.

3.

Skorzeny.

2.

Turkish visit

4.

Personnel.

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1. The first of these difficulties arose in connection with a report on Russia produced by Amt VI in conjunction with Fremde Heere Ost. This document was the result of an elaborate investigation on the entire Russian war potentialities covering man power, industrial output, food problems and morale both civil and military. Such information as it contained was derived from German Intelligence sources in Russia through VI.C.Z., the methodical interrogation of Russian P.o.Ws [sic.] and the results of research by the Wansee institute [Wannsee Institut]. On this material Schellenberg was responsible for the compilation of a report about the middle of 1943 which he had presented to Himmler with the intention of giving him a clear and true picture of the very tense situation in which the German Reich found itself in its fight against the vast Russian forces. On this document Kaltenbrunner had made a most unfavourable commentary, disagreeing entirely with its warning and somewhat defeatist tone. Because of Kaltenbrunner’s disparaging remarks and influence Himmler had returned the report to Schellenberg with a written remark on the front page threatening to throw all the responsible authors and contributors into a concentration camp because of their defeatist and Russophile attitude. Schellenberg states that he and his collaborators were spared imprisonment only owing to the intervention of Brandt, who secured for Schellenberg an interview with Himmler at which he succeeded in clearing himself of the charges. 2. Criticisms were also levelled by Kaltenbrunner regarding the report submitted by Schellenberg on his Turkish visit. He was accused by Kaltenbrunner of exceeding the scope of his office even to such an extent as having posed to the Turks as the Chief of the German Intelligence Service. 3. A further reason was the increased prestige of Skorzeny following on his successful rescue of Mussolini which had greatly heightened his popularity with Hitler and Himmler. Because of this Himmler was now wavering whether he should not henceforth support Skorzeny in Amt VI in preference to Schellenberg. 4. The final cause for dissatisfaction was Schellenberg’s continual demand for fresh personnel. As an example of the friction caused by his efforts to recruit new personnel he quotes the case of a certain Hubert.* Schellenberg submitted to Himmler a request through Kaltenbrunner for the services of this man whom he required in his Far Eastern Referat because of his qualifications in Asiatic languages. Himmler treated this request with heavy Teutonic sarcasm, suggesting that as Huebert [sic.] was serving on the Eastern Front that he should arrange an armistice in order that Schellenberg’s demands for personnel might be acceded to. Nevertheless Schellenberg’s position as chief of Amt VI was preserved, though only with some difficulty, through the diligent efforts on his behalf made by Brandt, Kersten, Berger and Juettner. Wulff the Astrologer. During all this time Kersten had expended every effort to influence Himmler in Schellenberg’s favour. Moreover he had evolved the idea of introducing Himmler to a *Schellenberg is uncertain as to the spelling of this name and suggests that it may be Humbert or Hunker.

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Hamburg Astrologer, a certain Wulff with a view to imbueing Himmler with his and Schellenberg’s political beliefs. But the introduction of this man to Himmler could not be done openly and in fact required to be subtly handled as since the Hess affair astrology was in very bad odour. Nevertheless by the end of 1943 the seeds that Kersten had sewn bore fruit and Himmler sought a secret interview with [Wilhelm] Wulff. At first Himmler endeavoured to arrange this interview through one of his adjutants, Suchenek [Major Willy Suchanek?], but this man’s clumsy approach made Wulff nervous and unwilling to meet Himmler. To overcome this impasse Schellenberg then took over the negotiations himself and succeeded in introducing Wulff ostensibly as a professor of Sanskrit who could advise Himmler on Indian matters. In point of fact Wulff who Schellenberg describes as “100% anti-Nazi” did indeed possess a knowledge of Sanskrit which he used in connection with his astrological researches. This meeting actually took place in March 1944 and will be described in its proper place. Peace discussions with German C.G. of Tangier. Schellenberg had as [has?] already been seen attempted a number of peace feelers through neutral countries all of which had been abortive. How he intended to encompass his design and what his eventual intentions were is not at first sight very clear and he explains in fact that he was caught up in a vicious circle, for, in the first place he was not likely to arrive very far with his negotiations unless he had Himmler’s backing and in the second place Himmler’s consent was not to be expected unless some reasonable line of negotiation with possibilities attached could be put up to him by Schellenberg. Schellenberg felt that if he could obtain a definite Allied offer or have a reasonable prospect of such eventuating he had the possibility of enlisting Himmler’s consent. As will be seen later Schellenberg negotiated at the end of October or the beginning of November 1943 with the American [Abram Stevens] Hewitt in Stockholm and although these discussions presented Schellenberg with reasonable hope, in his opinion, of a deal with the Allies, his efforts owing to Himmler’s vacillating character were entirely repudiated, much to his embarrassment. At this time, the late summer of 1943, Schellenberg opened discussions in Berlin with [Kurt] Rieth, the German Consul General in Tangier, a man of considerable position who had large interests in oil and many connections with England and even more with America. Rieth put forward the view that Germany should withdraw from the war and in order to attain this end negotiations should be undertaken as soon as possible, particularly with America, in whose interest some form of a compromise peace might be. It was agreed between Rieth and Schellenberg that Rieth should explore the potential possibilities of such a compromise but at the same time he was adjured to proceed with extreme caution as Schellenberg was hindered by the recent ban on such political activities. These conversations were prima-facie dangerous owing to Rieth’s post being directly subordinate to Ribbentrop, the actual instigator of Hitler’s intervention, but in practice difficulties were unlikely to arise owing to Rieth’s dislike for Ribbentrop. Rieth’s negotiations did not result in anything concrete as he apparently experienced difficulty in the discussions he undertook.72

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1943 September. Closer co-operation with the Abwehr. By September 1943 more changes in the higher strata of the Abwehr command had taken place as follows:— Leiter Abwehr I Oberst [Georg] Hansen replaced Oberst [Hans] Piekenbrock. Leiter Abwehr II Oberst [Wessel Freiherr von] Freytag-Loringhoven replaced Oberst [Erwin] Lahousen [von Vivremont]. Leiter Abwehr III Oberst von Bentevegni [Franz-Eccard von Bentivegni]—no change. The two retiring officers were promoted and sent to the Eastern Front and their successors agreed to work with Schellenberg and to carry out close co-operation between the two services. The Trial of the seven Swedes. The case of the seven Swedes, already mentioned in these pages, is dealt with in some detail because of its bearing on Schellenberg’s future relations with Sweden. In July or August the case came up for hearing, Schellenberg having succeeded in advancing the date of the trial. The Volksgericht [Volksgerichtshof] then condemned five of the Swedes to death and acquitted two of them although these last were not actually released from custody. Schellenberg then succeeded in getting Himmler to secure from Hitler a pardon for the five Swedes in so far as the death penalty was concerned and a commutation of the sentence to one of life imprisonment, his success being due in no small measure to a letter sent by the King of Sweden to Hitler appealing for clemency. In making his request Himmler put forward the old argument advanced by Schellenberg of the possible repercussions in Germano-Swedish relations. In point of fact, however, the verdict did not awake much response in Sweden since a possible outcry in the Swedish Press had been foreseen by Schellenberg and already allowed for in his negotiations with Brandin. 1943 September. Visit of the directors Brandin and Mueller to Berlin. In September 1943, the directors Brandin and Mueller [Alvar Moeller], both members of the Swedish Match Co. [sic.], arrived in Berlin, and were taken by Schellenberg to visit Himmler at the latter’s HQ. at Loetzen in East Prussia. The two directors urged Himmler to release all the condemned men but were told that they should be grateful that their necks had been spared and that he could do nothing more at present on their behalf although he would keep the matter in mind for such future action that might be possible. Himmler did however consent to release the two acquitted Swedes and at once implemented his promise. On return to Berlin Schellenberg showed Brandin a full report of the trial and evidence in connection with the case from which Brandin could see for himself the effectual guilt of the accused. Schellenberg states that Brandin claimed to have no anterior knowledge of their guilt and also describes Brandin’s behaviour towards him as being even more friendly than before.

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Schellenberg’s relations with the Grand Mufti. Somewhere around the period September 1943 rumours had arisen that the Americans were experimenting with new rocket projectiles in North Africa and Himmler suggested that the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem should be asked to select an Arab emissary to be sent to Tangier, in order to obtain information regarding the truth of the story. At the time of Italy’s collapse in July 1943 the Grand Mufti had been resident in Rome and Schellenberg had arranged through Dr. [Helmut] Hass and [Dr Wilhelm (Willi)] Gröbl, his representatives in that town, for the Mufti’s escape by car to Germany. Schellenberg had then made use of him for intelligence questions in connections with his Abt. C.3. but soon learnt that the Mufti was unreliable and sly and what is more, in pursuance of his own ends, was playing one department off against another. However the Mufti now selected an Arab who received the cover name “Reed”* from Amt VI and duly travelled to Tangier in the course of September 1943 under diplomatic cover. On arrival in Tangier Reed contacted various Arab connections, one of these being a certain Arab Chieftain named Torres, and in due course was able to send back information showing the untruthfulness of the story. Also in the late summer of 1943 Obgruf Berger had been occupied in getting together a Bosnian division and had in the course of his task encountered religious difficulties for the solution of which he called upon the services of the Mufti. According to Schellenberg the Mufti was represented to Himmler by Berger as a man of great influence and far reaching importance. 1943 October. Conversations with Mihailov and the Tsilew-IMRO Movement [sic.].** Through his Bulgarian representative Stubaf [Emil] Koob, Schellenberg now came in close contact with a certain Dr. Tsilew. Tsilew was secretly working in Bulgaria as a deputy leader of the IMRO movement under its leader Mihailov, who was a Bulgarian immigrant at the time living in Zagreb from where he was able more or less to openly operate. The IMRO movement which has been described as a radical Bulgarian illegal nationalistic organisation whose main object was the acquisition for Bulgaria of the Macedonian territories, was of interest to Schellenberg as he wished to use it for his own intelligence purposes. In October 1943 at Koob’s request Tsilew travelled to Berlin to initiate conversations with Schellenberg for the above reasons and a week later after the initial discussions Mihailov himself arrived and the following matters were discussed:– 1. The utilisation of IMRO for Amt VI political intelligence purposes. 2. The setting up of an I-Netz in Bulgaria. 3. The organisation of independent Macedonian partisan groups for the purpose of combating the ever rising communist influence in Greece (E.L.A.S.). *The real name of this Arab is not known to Schellenberg. **For further information regarding the Grand Mufti see Appendix V.

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Although 80,000 dollars were contributed by Amt VI to Mihailov and Tsilew, the material results of the arrangements made at the conference were poor, with the exception of the Macedonian partisan set-up who did achieve some good results against the communists in Greece.* Meetings with Bismarck and Wallenberg. In the course of October 1943 Gottfried [Graf] von Bismarck, a nephew of the former German Chancellor, paid a visit to Schellenberg in Amt VI. They met again shortly afterwards at a dinner when Bismarck forcibly expressed his disgust at the state of the existing regime and even went so far as to ask Schellenberg whether he had not an S.S. man available for the purpose of liquidating Goering. Schellenberg comments that the selection of Goering for this summary treatment had no significance other than that he was at this time more in the public eye than other prominent Nazi leaders. Schellenberg replied that it was better to plan things slowly through the medium of someone who could act with authority in the inner German circles, such as Himmler, and then went on to outline his own efforts in this direction. Not long after this conversation Schellenberg met for the first time at von Bismarck’s home at Potsdam the Swedish banker Jakob [sic.] Wallenberg, already referred to as Langbehn’s link with England in Sweden. Schellenberg’s last visit to Switzerland. In spite of the note that Schellenberg had sent to Oberst Brigadier Masson in substitution for Ribbentrop’s original draft, relating to a German guarantee to Swiss neutrality, Himmler now urged Schellenberg to visit Switzerland and reiterate the German guarantee personally to Masson. Himmler’s purpose in making this suggestion was to endeavour to improve relations between the two countries. Schellenberg stresses the strategic importance of Switzerland at this particular period, having regard to Italy’s collapse, and suggests his visit to Switzerland was made even more necessary by Kaltenbrunner’s political blunders which once again occasioned uneasiness in the Swiss. Schellenberg therefore left for Wolfsberg in Switzerland and there spent three days during one of which he conferred with Masson. At this meeting Schellenberg informed Masson of Germany’s desire to preserve Swiss neutrality and particularly stressed the fact that he had obtained a special confirmation from Himmler on this particular point. 1943 October. Setting up of the I-netze. In October 1943 Schellenberg gave a general order to his Landergruppenleiters [sic.] to set up in the German occupied countries and the Balkans a wireless communication system for the purpose of transmitting political and other intelligence in the event of any of the countries concerned being overrun by Allied Forces. The plan was inspired by Germany’s experiences after the Allied landings in Italy and the system was exclusively intended to function behind the Allied lines. The whole I-netze system was to be set up *For further information regarding the I-Netz in Bulgaria see Appendix XXI.

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gradually and therefore would not involve a large outlay of money at any one particular time. Schellenberg did not trouble to set up a similar organisation in neutral countries other than the Balkans as he did not consider these to be primarily threatened by Allied invasion.* Kaltenbrunner’s particular interest in the Balkans led Schellenberg in November 1943 to hold a conference for Hauptbeauftragte for those territories, at Vienna, at which the details of the organisation of the I-netze system was [sic.] discussed. Kersten’s emigration to Sweden. For some time previous to this date Kersten had been agitating to be allowed to leave Germany in order to settle in Sweden. He believed, not without foundation, that Germany was likely to be in serious difficulties before long and it was his intention to leave the country before these eventuated. But Himmler, because of his reliance on the treatment that he was receiving from Kersten, refused at first to grant him permission to leave the country and it was not until Kersten placed him before the alternative of either receiving further regular treatments or not receiving any at all that Himmler unwillingly acceded to his wishes. In accordance with this arrangement Kersten made his first visit to Sweden in the Autumn of 1943, having agreed to return to Germany every four months to attend to Himmler. Permission to reside in Sweden, visa and preliminary permit to practise, were obtained with the help of Swedish Industrialists and later when these matters had been settled Kersten returned to Germany to collect his wife and children. In his efforts to leave the country Kersten had been fully supported by Schellenberg who had interceded with Himmler on his behalf. 1943 October. Peace conversations with Hewitt. By the end of October 1943 Germany’s relations with Sweden had considerably deteriorated and Schellenberg decided to visit that country in order to obtain a first hand impression of the position for himself. Schellenberg therefore left for Stockholm and on his arrival put himself in the hands of Kersten for treatment, Kersten having by that time already taken up residence in that city. The two men discussed family matters and also Germany’s position which was deemed by Kersten to be even worse than before. The conversation then turned on peace proposals and Kersten urged Schellenberg to get in touch with an American named Hewitt.73 Hewitt was a former patient of Kersten who once again had returned to him for treatment. He had been sent by [Franklin D.] Roosevelt as his European observer to Stockholm and it was believed that he had been charged with a special study of the German situation. It was also said that he had been formerly married to a Vanderbilt, was now married to a Haghesson and had influence with Mrs. [Eleanor] Roosevelt. All these considerations and their possible implications made it very tempting to *A fully written description of the set up and the results of Schellenberg’s I-netze system will be found in Appendices XXI and XXII.

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Schellenberg to open discussions with Hewitt who was apparently willing to meet him. But Hitler’s ban on conversations of this nature was still in force and there were also other dangers to take into consideration such as the possibility of a leakage to the Press, as this contact was unknown to him, and furthermore Himmler’s express wish that Kersten should not be used for intelligence purposes in case he should be brought in a compromising situation and Himmler should lose his services. Nevertheless, Schellenberg went to visit Hewitt at the latter’s hotel in Stockholm and opened discussions quite frankly on the general situation. Hewitt’s views briefly summarised, consisted in the transfer of as many Wehrmacht troops as possible to the East in order to stem the Russians and at the same time the conclusion of a compromise peace with the Western Powers. Hewitt admitted at once that he had no authority to make proposals but he suggested that he would return by air to the U.S.A. for instructions and if his plan met with approval he would endeavour to return to Lisbon for further discussions. The second meeting between Schellenberg and Hewitt took place at [August] Finke’s house some three days later. This time it was arranged that if Hewitt’s plan was acceptable to the U.S. authorities he would have inserted either in the Svenska Dagbladet or the Stockholm Tidningen the following announcement for eight consecutive days between February 1st and 15th 1944: “For sale, valuable gold fish aquarium for 1,524 Kr.”. It was also agreed that should the announcement not appear, that this should be taken as an indication that the plan on Hewitt’s side had not materialised. The considerable time lag between the date of Schellenberg’s meeting and the date of the proposed newspaper announcement was caused by the length of time required by Hewitt to return to America as he would be unable to reveal the true purpose of his journey and no special facilities would be available. In the event of Hewitt’s plan being acceptable, and this announcement inserted in the newspaper, it was arranged that Hewitt should communicate secretly with Schellenberg through either Preisky [sic.] or Shroeder [sic.] at the German Embassy in Lisbon. For this purpose Hewitt was to employ the cover name of Siegel and Schellenberg that of Brown. Lastly it was arranged that Schellenberg should now return to Germany and broach the matter to Himmler. After Schellenberg’s suggestions were endorsed by Himmler he would inform Hewitt in Stockholm through Finke and Kersten in order to strengthen Hewitt in his subsequent negotiations with the U.S. authorities.74 Schellenberg then returned to Germany and saw Himmler at the Hotel Vier Jahreszeiten, Munich, either just before or subsequent to the party celebrations in that town on November 9th 1943. But the moment Schellenberg had chosen proved most unpropitious as Himmler was in a very nervous frame of mind and entirely occupied with the party celebrations. Although not turning down the plan completely, he stated that he would have to discuss the matter with Kaltenbrunner, which he actually did on the same day. As a result Schellenberg was reprimanded for exceeding the scope of his authority, told that his acts were tantamount to high treason and informed that there was a grave danger that the matter might leak out to the Press. Schellenberg was now ordered to drop the negotiations entirely and places the blame for this decision on Kaltenbrunner. Schellenberg heard indirectly through Kersten that Hewitt’s departure from Stockholm had been continuously delayed and that further, after he had succeeded in returning to

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America he had fallen into disfavour on account of this proposal. In any event, the agreed announcement did not appear in the Stockholm newspaper. Schellenberg confesses that this case was a bitter disappointment to him and that he felt a special bitterness against Himmler, who, although holding all the cards in his hands had not had the courage of his convictions. Serum from Turkey. At about this time the Germans had received information that the Russians were experimenting with bacilli for the injection of German cattle. In November 1943 instructions were given to Schellenberg by Himmler to obtain a serum from Turkey to stop the harmful effects that were likely to result from the use of the bacilli and Schellenberg delegated this task to Moyzisch, one of his representatives, who successfully carried out the mission. 1943 November. Journey to Sweden. Although Schellenberg had only visited Sweden in the previous month certain events that had now materialised made it necessary for him, this time on Himmler’s instructions, to journey to Stockholm. Germany’s relations with Sweden instead of improving had deteriorated, even to a greater extent than in the previous month, in fact to such a point had this gone that trade relations between the two countries were about to be broken off and the delivery of ball bearings, one of the most important Swedish exports to Germany had already ceased. Furthermore the deportation to Germany of the interned Norwegian students had caused great animosity against Germany in Sweden. As an excuse for the journey Himmler had provided Schellenberg with an inscribed porcelain plate which was to be presented to Brandin, of the Swedish Match Company [sic.]. On his arrival in Stockholm Schellenberg visited directors Brandin and Moeller as well as the Swedish banker, Wallenberg and informed these men of the position with regard to the five imprisoned Swedes and further assured them that Himmler had decided not to proceed with any further deportations of Norwegian students to Germany and had even agreed to 500 of them being returned. In the course of these conversations Wallenberg expressed the opinion that no compromise peace was possible and that only the removal of Hitler would bring the war to an end.concerned by the recent Norwegian deportations and arrests and asking for this matter to be dealt with. Schellenberg also advanced the suggestion that he might be able to advise Himmler that such arrests were contrary to “Germanisches Recht”, in its wider sense *With regard to the five imprisoned Swedes Schellenberg now suggested to Brandin and Moeller that they should together draft a letter to Himmler, purporting to come from Swedish industrialists, pointing out that they had been successful in moderating the campaign against Germany in the Swedish Press, but they were now very *Schellenberg is uncertain whether or not he paid a further visit to Stockholm in the course of the end of Jan or the beginning of Feb 1944 for the purpose of explaining the progress that he had made in the matter of the release of the five imprisoned Swedes.

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embracing Nordic countries. However, neither of these efforts met, at a later date with any success with Himmler. On this visit Schellenberg paid a courtesy call on [Hans] Thomsen, at that time German Minister to Sweden, who received him coldly. Schellenberg then learnt that Thomsen had received a telegram from Ribbentrop sent with the deliberate purpose of conveying the impression that Schellenberg was charged with an important mission to the exclusion of Thomsen, thus putting Thomsen in a humiliating position. Schellenberg was able, however, to give an explanation to Thomsen of the true state of affairs and to restore their mutual working confidence in one another. On his last visit to Sweden at the end of November 1943 Schellenberg had received from Wallenberg a list of some twelve notable Scandinavians whose release was sought. Schellenberg was now in a position to be able to inform Wallenberg that these men had been released. Among their number were included Prof. Seib, a Dane, and Bishop Berggraf [Eivind Berggrav, Bishop of Oslo].75 Unternehmung Zeppelin Conference.* The war situation in Germany at this time was going from bad to worse and in no sector was this more noticeable than on the Russian Front. Here new problems were raised or old ones made more acute, one of these being the treatment and utilisation of Russian prisoners of war in connection with the Unternehmung Zeppelin. In January 1944 a conference was called in Breslau of the chief officials of this organisation for the purpose of discussing current political matters and the handling of Russian prisoners of war. Schellenberg, in a speech to the delegates urged that the previous policy on mass agent undertakings should be abandoned and a programme consisting of the employment of fewer but carefully chosen individual Soviet prisoners of war should be substituted. This suggestion of Schellenberg’s was accepted and it was also laid down that for the proper supervision and control of these men, German agents were to be attached to each particular group of Russians selected. 1944 Jan end. Dismissal of Canaris. Since the failure of the Abwehr in December 1942 to give warning to the Higher Command of the imminent landings in North Africa Canaris’ position had been one of extreme delicacy. Some nine months later, actually in September 1944, changes in the personnel in control of the Abwehr had taken place but despite this effort at reorganisation, at the end of Jan 1944 Hitler ordered the dismissal of Canaris. The vacant post was then given to Himmler who delegated the actual performance of the work of taking over the Abwehr to Kaltenbrunner. Unified German Intelligence Service. Following up Canaris’ dismissal Hitler verbally ordered in February 1944 the *For further information regarding the Unternehmung Zeppelin see Appendix III.

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establishment of a unified German Intelligence Service. Kaltenbrunner, as Himmler’s deputy was charged with the preparations of the necessary plans and for this purpose Mueller and Schellenberg were summoned to Posen where Himmler was holding a meeting of the Regierungspraesidenten. Mueller brought to this meeting his assistant, Standartenfuehrer [Walter] Huppenkothen and Schellenberg on his part took Standartenfuehrer [Dr Martin] Sandberger. At this meeting it was agreed as follows:– 1. That a unified Intelligence Service was to be set up. 2. Himmler was to be in charge thereof. 3. That Himmler and Keitel should discuss the fusion into this service of Amt Ausland and Abwehr O.K.W. Kaltenbrunner after this conference left for Berlin to discuss the matter further with Generals [Wilhelm] Keitel and Jodel [Alfred Jodl] and on Feb 12th 1944 Hitler signed a written order directing the setting up of a unified Intelligence service.76 On Feb 20th 1944 General Keitel delegated to General [August] Winter, head of the Wehrmacht Zentral Amt the supervision of the fusion of Amt Ausland Abwehr with the remainder of the Geheime Meldedienst. 1944 March. The setting up of Amt Mil. At the beginning of March 1944, a conference took place at Lager Zeppelin near Zossen. Representing the Abwehr were the following:– Admiral [Leopold] Bürkner

Oberst von Bentevegni

Oberst [Georg] Hansen

Oberst Heinrich

Oberst Freytag Loringhoven

Representing the S.D. were:– Kaltenbrunner

Huppenkothen

Mueller

Schellenberg

The meeting took place under the presidency of General Winter. For the purpose of effecting the fusion of both services Kaltenbrunner and Mueller favoured the incorporation of Abwehr I and II into Amt VI and Abwehr III into Amt IV. Schellenberg, however, at the meeting opposed this, for he did not wish to assume added responsibility for military matters formerly within the jurisdiction of the Abwehr. He advocated instead the formation of a new department known as the Amt Mil to work side by side with Amt VI within the framework of the R.S.H.A. In taking this step Schellenberg was strongly supported by Hansen and the other members of the Abwehr, as by so doing he was preserving the traditional military jurisdiction of the former Abwehr. Kaltenbrunner and Mueller were greatly displeased with Schellenberg’s suggestion and as a result Schellenberg was later summoned before Himmler to give an explanation for this step; but on his explaining that under the system he proposed, Amt VI would not be responsible for information on purely military matters, such as, for example, the

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responsibility for warnings of military landings, Himmler saw the wisdom of this step which he then agreed to. At about this period, Schellenberg had a series of discussions with Oberst Hansen and Freytag Loringhoven. Although as above stated he at first wished to avoid responsibilites in the military sector, his ultimate aim was still one of complete fusion. He now advocated the appointment of Oberst Hansen as Amtschef of the Mil Amt with whom complete agreement was reached on all matters. They even went so far as to agree that each should deputise for the other, in case of absence and that this principle should be extended further down to the level of the new re-organised structure. Freytag Loringhoven was not so immediately concerned as he was on the point of retiring from the Abwehr. At the same time as these decisions were taken discussions were proceeding between Keitel and Himmler concerning other details relating to the fusion. 1944 March. Relations with German Foreign Office. The relations of Amt VI with the German Foreign Office were extremely bad at this time, a certain Standartenfuehrer [Vortragender Legationsrat Horst] Wagner had been appointed as Luther’s successor as liaison officer between Ribbentrop and Himmler in the Intelligence field, but this man was a complete failure and unable to withstand the strong cross-currents and intrigues around him and this resulted finally in liaison with the Foreign Office completely breaking down. 1944 March. Prophesies of the Astrologer Wulff and his meeting with Himmler. Under the circumstances which have already been related in March 1944 Wulff, the Astrologer, arrived in Berlin for a meeting with Himmler. While awaiting this interview Wulff had worked out the horoscopes of Hitler and Himmler and these had been passed on to Schellenberg for perusal. As regards Hitler, Wulff predicted endangerment to his life in the period around July 20th 1944 as well as a subsequent illness in November 1944. He furthermore foretold Hitler’s demise before May 7th 1945 but stated that the cause of death would never be discovered, though it would be due in point of fact to alkalies (alkaloid). For Himmler little was foretold, except that the year 1945 was going to be an important one for him. Schellenberg commented that no doubt Wulff was well aware of the real prognostication but deemed it wiser to suppress this for the time being. Schellenberg’s own horoscope had not at this time been prepared by Wulff but was given later as follows:– 1. Danger for Schellenberg round about July 20th 1944. 2. Important events in 1945. 3. His imprisonment in April or May 1945 with threat of extreme danger. 4. If nothing materialised then, position might improve in 1947 or 1948. After reading through the two first mentioned horoscopes, Schellenberg advised Wulff to keep the following three points in mind in his relations with Himmler. 1. The strength of Schellenberg’s position.

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2. His influence over Himmler. 3. That Himmler had to end the war and liquidate Hitler. At this meeting with Wulff which occurred during the next two days Himmler showed the greatest interest in Wulff’s forecasts. Thereafter, Schellenberg claims to have had little difficulty in off-setting Kaltenbrunner’s influence on Himmler which he attributes entirely to the work of Wulff. Although Himmler did not normally meet Wulff, the latter supplied him with regular horoscope readings through either his adjutant [Dr Rudolf] Brandt or Schellenberg. Later in the closing days of the Third Reich, Himmler seldom took any steps without first consulting his horoscope reading beforehand. Further discussions with Hansen. The month of April 1944 was occupied with further conferences with Himmler and the officials concerned with the working out of the final details of the fusion of the two Intelligence Services. At this time Schellenberg’s relations with Hansen were extremely good and he felt that neither of them would have wished to put their own men into the fused intelligence service at the expense of the other. 1944 April. Frau Chanel and Frau Lombardi. In April 1944 Staatsrat Schiebe [Walter Schieber], [Albert] Speer’s right hand man and one Rittmeister [Theodor] Momm mentioned to Schellenberg the existence of a certain Frau Chanel,773 a French subject and proprietress of the noted perfume factory. This woman was referred to as a person who knew Churchill sufficiently to undertake political negotiations with him, as an enemy of Russia and as desirous of helping France and Germany whose destinies she believed to be closely linked together. At about this time Schellenberg urged that Chanel should be brought to Berlin and she arrived in that city accompanied by a friend, a certain Herr [Hans] von Dincklage.* Schellenberg made Chanel’s acquaintance in the presence of Dincklage, Schieber and Momm when it was agreed that:– 1. A certain Frau Lombardi, a former British subject of good family then married to an Italian, should be released from internment in Italy and sent to Madrid as an intermediary. Frau Lombardi was an old friend of Frau Chanel and had been interned with her husband for some political reasons connected with the latter and possibly [Marshall Pietro] Badoglio. 2. Lombardi’s task would be to hand over a letter written by Chanel to the British Embassy officials in Madrid for onward transmission to Churchill.78 3. Dincklage was to act as link between Lombardi in Madrid, Chanel in Paris, and Schellenberg in Berlin. Accordingly a week later Lombardi was freed and sent by air to Madrid. On her arrival in that city, however, instead of carrying out the part that had been assigned to her she denounced all and sundry as German agents to the British authorities. With Schellenberg’s permission Lombardi had also received a letter from Chanel through Spitzi [sic.], Hohenlohe’s assistant, urging her

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*It is believed by Schellenberg that Dincklage may have had some working connection with the Abwehr but this he is unable to confirm.

to see Churchill on her return to England. The result of this however was not only was Chanel denounced as a German agent but also Spitzi [sic.]. In view of this obvious failure, contact was immediately dropped with Chanel and Lombardi and Schellenberg does not know whether any communication was subsequently handed to Churchill through this woman. Mil Amt conference in Salzburg. On or about the 10th May 1944, an agreement was signed between Keitel and Himmler embodying the principal arrangements for the organisation, administration and jurisdiction of the new Mil Amt to be formed out of the old Amt Abwehr and Amt Ausland. This was followed two days later by a conference of the Mil Amt in Salzburg with Himmler in the chair. The conference lasted officially two days and was addressed by Kaltenbrunner, Mueller, [Eugen] Steimle, Paeffgen and Schellenberg on the functions of their various departments and on the second day by Himmler and Keitel, the former making a general speech on the duties of the new intelligence services and the latter addressing the assembly at the Kameradschaftsabend [comrades’ social meeting] on the historical aspects of the German Intelligence Service. After the conference was over Schellenberg and Hansen stayed in Salzburg for a couple of days in order to confer with Himmler on various matters connected with the fusion. One of the outcomes of these discussions was a directive by Himmler for the introduction of a new American filing system known as the Hollerith in which the cards were punched to facilitate speedy mechanical reference and apparently used previously with success in the Waffen S.S. and in both Mil Amt and Amt VI. At this conference Hansen urged that the two services should work together in the same establishment and asked Himmler to take over the O.K.H. the large Zeppelin camp near Zossen. To this Himmler gave his consent and in the same month both Amts moved to this new location, Himmler announcing however that this move was only temporary and giving orders for a permanent camp to be constructed at Waldburg near Fuerstenwalde on the Oder some seventy kilometers to the South East of Berlin. In the course of the following June owing to the withdrawal of the German forces on the Eastern Front the Zeppelin camp was required once more for the use of the O.K.H. and a temporary move had to be made by Amt Mil to Belinde in the neighbourhood of Zossen and of Amt VI to premises in the Berkaerstrasse, Berlin. On September 1st 1944, however, the camps were once more re-united at their permanent base at Waldburg although skeleton staffs were still maintained at Belinde and in the Berkaerstrasse. Hansen was informed by Himmler in the course of these talks that he stood a pretty good chance of being promoted to a Major General.

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1944 May. Further treatment from Kersten. After these discussions with Himmler and Hansen Schellenberg remained on in the district for a further eight days receiving medical treatment from Kersten at Koenigsee. Kersten had, at this time returned to Gemany in order to make arrangements for his family’s removal to Sweden. Reports of invasion. While at Koenigsee the question of the reports regarding the prospects of invasion which had already arisen some time previously, became more acute. These reports had been received from various sources, for instance through Amt VI and Amt Mil channels in France, Spain and Portugal and were now becoming of increasing interest to the High Command who considered the possibilities of invasion as more probable. It now became vital to reconsider the evaluation and distribution of this information which as and when received was circulated to the appropriate Fremde Heere departments concerned, as well as the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab [general staff], Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab [air force command], Seekriegsleitung [admiralty] and Himmler. If a report was of particular importance, the latter passed it at once to Hitler. Schellenberg’s stay at Koenigsee gave him the time to talk over the whole matter with Himmler and to convince him of the probability of invasion at any time. Frl. Hanfstaengl Another subject discussed with Himmler at Salzburg was the continued employment for peace overtures of Frl. Hanfstaengl who by then had returned from Paris to Munich. Himmler informed Schellenberg that Mueller had had her watched and had deemed her an undesirable subject for further employment on account of the dangerous social circles in which she moved. Although Schellenberg produced contrary arguments for some half hour, these were without success and she was henceforward dropped. During this particular conversation Schellenberg raised the points recorded from Wulff’s horoscope readings for Himmler, and in particular the question of concluding peace with the Allies and liquidating Hitler. Himmler wavered and asked Schellenberg exactly how much importance could be attached to Wulff’s prophecies. Schellenberg took the opportunity of pouring a little oil on the flames but Himmler found himself still unable to come to a definite decision. A further matter under discussion at this meeting was the question of Poland’s future about which Himmler sought Schellenberg’s advice. Himmler was toying with the idea of setting up a new and independent Polish state. Schellenberg counselled that the Polish problem could not be treated separately, but should rather form a part of any peace negotiations to be conducted by Germany, with either the Western Allies or Russia. Himmler, on receiving this advice immediately changed the subject and urged Schellenberg not to mention such ideas to anyone as they were far too premature.

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Himmler receives Japanese representatives.* It would appear that at this period the Japanese realised that Himmler was the real and effective power in Germany and in consequence came to the decision to make a courtesy and informative call upon him. The Japanese representatives at this meeting at Salzburg were:— Admiral Abe, Japanese representative for the Axis Three Power Pact. General [sic.] [Mitsuhiko] Komatsu, Japanese Military Attache in Berlin. General [sic.] Kojima, Japanese Naval Attache in Berlin. These men were accompanied by Japanese officials of lesser standing. The Japanese spent the whole day at Salzburg as Himmler’s guests but it was not until the evening that discussions became more detailed when the following questions were dealt with:– 1. The projection of joint Intelligence activities in South America. Tentative suggestions for joint action were put out by Himmler as Admiral Abe was well acquainted with the U.S.A. The idea was not however received enthusiastically. 2. It was disclosed by the Japanese that they were hoping to use the American Negro problem for their own ends. 3. The eventual solution of the China incident. The Japanese plan being the complete union of the two countries. 4. Conditions on the Home Front. The Japanese confessing that they wished to learn more of Germany’s emergency measures. Schellenberg spent most of the evening closeted with Admiral Kojima whom he considered the most intelligent of the trio. This Japanese who, was a believer in a German, Russian, Japanese alliance, maintained contact with Schellenberg in the months that followed.79 Further arrangements for fusion. Schellenberg now returned to Berlin, where for the rest of the month he was occupied with the more detailed steps concerning the fusion of the two Intelligence Services. Until then, the amalgamation had only been carried out in the higher levels by an organisational agreement between Himmler and Keitel, and it was now necessary to implement the arrangements that had been made in lower sections. Schellenberg now settled all the outstanding details in this respect, arranging for the reports from Amt Mil to go to Amt VI and vice versa and also for the incorporation of the former Abwehr I Wi in Amt VI Wi. 1944 June. Problems of Amalgamation During the month of June Schellenberg was fully occupied with the transference of Amt VI and Amt Mil to the new camp Zeppelin at Zossen. Amongst other arrangements he *For further information regarding collaboration with the Japanese see Appendix IV.

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made at this time were those designed, contrary to his usual practice, to increase the amenities of social life in the officers’ mess. He also caused these social activities to be extended to the Amtschefs of Amt I and Amt II in an attempt to bring them to a more cooperative frame of mind. At the same time he worked together with Hansen on mutual problems endeavouring, for instance to obtain an increased allocation for the I-Netze of the combined services in France now of supreme importance. Staff problems raised by the withdrawal of the Frontaufklaerung from the immediate control of Mil Amt were also dealt with. I-Netze.* At this stage of the campaign it was found that the provisions made by Amt VI with regard to the organisation of the I-Netze in France were wholly unsatisfactory. The same could also be said of the Abwehr Netze which was [sic.] so defectively designed that when once the Allied break through had been effected there was no further organisation to meet German needs. Schellenberg earnestly counselled Hansen to remedy this state of affairs but little was done to bring about an improvement and when he himself took the matter in hand it was already too late. Frontaufklaerung. One of the provisions of the Himmler-Keitel agreement had been the transfer of the Frontaufklaerung from the old Abwehr to the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab under Oberst von Susskind-Schwendi [Hugo Freiherr von Suesskind-Schwendi]. This raised enormous problems for which its commander had little or no understanding. The cream of Intelligence personnel material was by then fully employed in Frontaufklaerung work to the detriment of the remaining organisation, and although Amt Mil were still enabled to give “strategic directions” to the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab for the employment of the Frontaufklaerung the practical results of this arrangement were not satisfactory. Moreover in the Russian field where the Frontaufklaerung had been conspicuously successful the whole organisation had been at one fell swoop taken beyond the direct control of the new Geheime Meldedienst. In addition there remained the somewhat anomalous position that Mil Amt E and G remained responsible for the provision of technical equipment such as W/T necessities, forged papers etc. and training but at the same time Mil D remained responsible for equipment pertaining to sabotage and also propaganda. Disputes about the Division of III F The department of III F originally concerned with espionage matters had in the first place been run by Oberst [Joachim] Rohleder. With the discontinuance of the Abwehr as an independent organisation a new home had to be found. Mueller made every effort to incorporate it exclusively within the framework of Amt IV, while Hansen and Rohleder, backed by Schellenberg wanted to place it either preferably under the exclusive control of *Detailed information has been given in Appendix No XXI. regarding the formation of the I-Netze.

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the Mil Amt or if a compromise were necessary, divided between Mil Amt and Amt VI. At the end of May or beginning of June 1944, Hansen conducted extremely stormy negotiations with Mueller regarding this division, the dispute being considerably acerbated by the affair known as the Jepsen case. Jepsen was a German Abwehr agent in Portugal who had been forcibly abducted from that country to Berlin at a certain Kuebart’s instigation, possibly working under Hansen’s orders, for purposes directly connected with the prestige of the old Abwehr. Mueller had demanded that he be handed into the custody of Amt IV, but had been refused by Hansen on the grounds that the Jepsen question was entirely a military matter over which Amt IV had no jurisdiction. As a result relations between Hansen and Mueller became exceedingly strained and were not such as to facilitate a ready agreement on the division of III F. Between June and October 1944 Rohleder ranged himself alongside Mueller in these arguments and the two strove once again for III F to be taken over by Amt IV. Schellenberg managed to defeat this in some measure, however, and by October 1944 Kaltenbrunner definitely decided to replace the foreign section of III F with an entirely new section to be called VI Z while the inland section and radio play backs connected with it were transferred to Amt IV 1944 June. First intimation of the July plot. At the beginning of June 1944 Kaltenbrunner commenced what is stigmatised by Schellenberg as a clumsy attempt to make bad blood between him and Hansen. The two men however got on well together and the attempt to antagonise them did not succeed and only indirectly resulted in them agreeing to aim finally at the removal of the Geheime Meldedienst from the R.S.H.A. frame-work with the intention of setting it up as a separate ministry. Since their close association Schellenberg and Hansen had taken frequent walks together discussing current problems. On one of these occasions at the beginning of June Hansen spoke of great changes which would be taking place shortly in the German hierarchy since the whole Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab was no longer capable of controlling the military situation effectively. Hansen raised the question from a security angle of the foreign workers in Germany, then asked what Himmler’s real attitude to Keitel was. He further asked as to whether Schellenberg’s own peace proposals had received Himmler’s approval, and as to the strength and reliability of the Ordnungspolizei. Towards the end of this particular discussion Hansen urged Schellenberg to remain calm in the near future when a better intelligence service would be set up, with the possibility of Schellenberg being appointed Ambassador in London. From this conversation Schellenberg was able to deduce for himself that some coup was being planned by the Wehrmacht apparently directed not against Himmler but against Hitler and the Wehrmachtsführungsstab. On receiving this information Schellenberg was careful to maintain a diplomatic silence. Later when thinking over what he had heard Schellenberg was reminded of a conversation he had had with General Thiele80 the previous year. Schellenberg points out in this connection that his relations with Thiele had been fairly intimate, Thiele visiting him at his office weekly and discussing the situation frankly.

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Thiele on the occasion referred to had asked Schellenberg what he would do to remedy Germany’s position. Schellenberg replied that if he were in a position of command he would shorten the front. He went on to explain that he would eliminate unnecessary commitments such as in Norway, the Balkans and Italy with a view to creating a stronger front against Russia believing that if the Russian line was held other theatres would be easier to deal with. Thiele replied that this suggestion had already formed the basis of many arguments within the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab but to get Keitel to agree to such an arrangement was hopeless. He then went on to enquire as to “Heini’s” (Himmler’s) opinion in these matters but Schellenberg replied that he appeared to be without great knowledge of them. After his conversation with Thiele, Schellenberg took steps to preserve for himself a way out in the event of anything miscarrying. He prepared a short memorandum mentioning that certain higher Wehrmacht officials were discontented with the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab without mentioning any names. This memorandum was placed before Kaltenbrunner and initialled by him without comment. Conference with Skorzeny re night fighter. In the beginning of June 1944 Schellenberg while on leave in the neighbourhood of Berlin, was awakened one night in the early hours of the morning and summoned by telephone to attend a conference, without delay, which Skorzeny was holding on the instructions of the Fuehrer and Kaltenbrunner. The conference was held in a small inn near Wannsee and took place under the chairmanship of Skorzeny. Many high ranking Luftwaffe officers and technicians, including the German Air Attache from Berne, were present. Apparently shortly beforehand one of the latest German night fighters on the secret list [Messerschmidt ME-110], equipped with secret short wave night fighting apparatus together with a device for lateral firing from the wings, had made a forced but undamaged landing at Duebendorf near Zuerich. Schellenberg learnt to his dismay that Skorzeny, with the approval of Hitler and Kaltenbrunner, was planning a parachute raid on the Swiss air field, where the machine was located, with a view to destroying this secret aircraft. Schellenberg with some difficulty and with the support of the German Air Attache from Berne succeeded at this meeting in substituting for this plan, another, consisting of direct negotiations with the Swiss Government. After various discussions continued through the medium of Eggen, the Swiss Military Attache in Berlin, Burkhardt [Peter L.Burckhardt], and Oberst Brigadier [Karl von] Wattenwyl of the Technical Department of the Swiss War Office, it was agreed some four or five weeks later, that the Swiss would destroy the aircraft in the presence of German witnesses. In consideration for this, with Goering’s permission, six Messerschmidt 109s were delivered to Switzerland, a cheque from the Swiss authorities for 3,000,000 Swiss francs being received through Eggen by Schellenberg in payment thereof. This sum Schellenberg forwarded through the normal channels to Goering, but alleges that the money did not reach the ministry concerned but was pocketed by Goering himself. The plane was in fact destroyed in the presence of Eggen and a German technical officer and although neither Eggen nor Schellenberg were convinced that the Swiss had

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not acquired the secret of the apparatus incorporated in the plane they considered it of greater importance to have succeeded in preserving good relations with Switzerland than to have risked a possible rupture in diplomatic relations. Schellenberg states that he only just succeeded in averting this disaster, for Skorzeny’s enterprise was planned for the day following that of the conference.81 Visit of Hungarian Intelligence Service members. Some time in June 1944, the deputation of the Hungarian Espionage Intelligence Service (General Staff) arrived in Berlin and were formally received by Hansen. From Amt Mil, Kuebart of Mil B and [Werner] Ohletz of Mil C, took part in discussions with the Hungarians for the furtherance of mutual intelligence activities against Russia in the military sphere. Schellenberg attended various social functions in connection with the visit of the Hungarians and was also present when Hoettl and Paeffgen discussed with them the running of an agent in England, called “Nero”, who was feeding back by W/T to Lisbon information on general political matters as well as the effects of V.1.* 82 Activities in July 1944. In July 1944, Schellenberg mainly occupied himself with the further development of the newly organised and united intelligence structure and made arrangements with Hansen whereby he might be able to draw on the normal Wehrmacht pool of officers for recruitment and training for his Political Intelligence Service. 1944 July 20th. The “Putsch of July 20th”. As has previously been chronicled, Schellenberg, in his conversation with Thiele and Hansen had already received indirect if somewhat confused warning of a possible coup de main by certain military elements in the Reich. Nevertheless on July 20th the day chosen for the attentat on Hitler and the attempted seizure of power Schellenberg claims that he was in ignorance of the plan, and that his first indication that trouble was astir came to him about 1400 or 1500 hours in the afternoon, when he noticed unusual unrest in the Berlin streets bordering on the neighbourhood of his office in the Berkaerstrasse. The commotion in the streets had also alarmed the Gruppenleiter of Amt VI and these men then came to Schellenberg in search of information and were told by him that there appeared to be a Wehrmacht “Putsch” in operation, an assumption that was soon confirmed by Steimle who told Schellenberg that he had learnt from a tank commander that there was in fact a Wehrmacht “Putsch” and that all streets were controlled. At about 1800 hours Schellenberg received a telephone call from General Thiele who appeared to be very excited. Thiele first enquired whether Schellenberg was still in his *Details of the running of the agent ‘Nero’ are not known to Schellenberg. He believes however that this man was a Spaniard or Portuguese merchant and that he was either recruited or loaned by the Hungarian Military Attache in Lisbon and that the reports on the damage caused by V.1. were of rather a general nature.

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office and then hardly waiting for a reply blurted out that “everything had gone wrong”. This telephone conversation seriously alarmed Schellenberg and fearing to be compromised he took the precautionary measure of ringing Mueller of Amt IV informing him that he had just heard from Thiele that there was a tremendous uproar in the Bendlerstrasse where firing was taking place. But he received small reassurance from Mueller who replied ironically, “Fancy that, from your friend Thiele”. Next came information that a tank detachment was advancing down the Berkaerstrasse. This caused Schellenberg to give orders for all gates to be guarded and the female staff to leave the building. To safeguard himself Schellenberg then spoke to Skorzeny who was in the building and instructed him to telephone his own special department in Oranienberg and advise them to call a state of emergency. Not long afterwards, Thiele again telephoned, asking Schellenberg in apparent desperation, what he should do, as the Army officers in the building were firing from the windows and he could not leave the building as every exit was blocked. Schellenberg advised him to make out a pass for himself and at about 1900 hours Thiele arrived at the Berkaerstrasse completely exhausted, and bewildered by his experiences and scarcely able to credit the news, that the Berkaerstrasse had received by radio, to the effect that Hitler was still alive. Schellenberg did his best to revive Thiele with food and brandy, set him on his road home and promised to let him know immediately if the news that Hitler was still alive should prove to be true. Thiele’s confusion regarding the death of Hitler had arisen through Stauffenberg having wrongly announced this event, thereby setting in motion the Berlin “Putsch” under General [Generaloberst Friedrich] Fromm the Commander of the Ersatzheer. Fromm had later discovered his mistake and in order to clear himself ordered the shooting out of hand of seven high ranking officers including [Claus Graf Schenk von] Stauffenberg, General [Generaloberst Ludwig] Beck and General [Friedrich] Olbricht. At about 2300 hours that night, Schellenberg learnt that Kaltenbrunner had flown to Himmler at the Fuehrer’s Hauptquartier returning with him to Berlin. Skorzeny together with Himmler and Gruppenleiter [Reichskriminaldirektor Arthur] Nebe,* chief of the Criminal Police and Amtschef V, proceeded to Berkaerstrasse where they arrested General Fromm leaving Skorzeny in charge. Not long afterwards Thiele telephoned tactlessly announcing that everything had quietened down and that Himmler had been appointed commander in chief of the Ersatzheer, naively adding that he thought this would be “a good thing for them both”, whereupon Schellenberg alarmed by Thiele’s lack of caution replaced the receiver. 1944 July 21st. Events of days following the “Putsch”. At noon on the following day Himmler addressed the Wehrkreise Kommandanture [sic.] and department chiefs of the OKW at the cinema hall in the Bendlerstrasse. His speech was general in nature; he expressed his gratitude to the Wehrmacht for putting their own house in order so swiftly, gave a general talk on morale and wound up with a reference to Russia as being their primary enemy saying that they would go on fighting against her to *Nebe was later executed with [Wolf Heinrich] Graf [von] Helldorf, Chief of the Berlin Police for their implication in the plot.

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the last. Schellenberg either before or after this meeting, visited Thiele in the Bendlerstrasse in order to strengthen his, Thiele’s, position and at the same time introduced him to Obergruppenfuehrer Juettner, whom Himmler had just chosen to be his deputy commander of the Ersatzheer. He likewise for the same purpose introduced Thiele to Himmler. In the course of the next two days Thiele was appointed by Hitler his chief of signals and communications in succession to General Fellgiebel, who had been arrested for complicity in the plot.83 Still with the intention of strengthening Thiele’s position Schellenberg introduced him to Kaltenbrunner but all his efforts proved of no avail for on July 24th Mueller and Kaltenbrunner caused Thiele to be arrested. 1944 July 25th. Some days after the attempt on Hitler’s life, on July 25th, Mueller requested Schellenberg to summon Hansen and Engelhorn from the Abwehr establishment at Belinde. On their arrival at the Berkaerstrasse Schellenberg turned over Engelhorn to Steimle while he himself spent a couple of hours alone with Hansen. Hansen gave every appearance of composure telling Schellenberg that he had played no greater part in the attempted rising than Schellenberg himself, and that he believed no charge could be brought against him. In the meantime Steimle took Engelhorn to Mueller, by whom he was arrested for having given the order to place the Belinde camp near Zossen in a state of siege. Following this Schellenberg accompanied Hansen to Mueller who allowed Schellenberg to depart saying that he was convinced that he had nothing to do with the plot. Alone with Hansen, Mueller announced that he had documentary proof of his guilt, producing in support of this contention a notebook found in Olbricht’s possession implicating Hansen, whereupon Hansen confessed his complicity and was arrested. After Schellenberg had returned to his office he was ordered by Mueller to search Hansen’s rooms at Zossen for incriminating material. With the aid of two officials Schellenberg carried out the search that night, bringing to light a notebook with entries corresponding to those found in the book in Olbricht’s possession but otherwise nothing except certain material showing Hansen as possessing a somewhat dubious moral character. Schellenberg takes over Amt Mil. On July 28th, Kaltenbrunner provisionally put Schellenberg in charge of Amt Mil, his appointment being confirmed by General Keitel. 1944 July. Arrest of Canaris. At the end of July 1944 Schellenberg felt considerable uneasiness as to his own position. Thiele, [Gottfried Graf von] Bismarck and Hansen had all been arrested and what was even more dangerous [General Fritz] Lindemann, with whom Schellenberg had discussed Hitler’s liquidation in 1943, was also imprisoned. Schellenberg therefore was greatly alarmed when once [sic.] Sunday at the beginning of August Mueller gave him instructions by telephone to arrest Canaris.

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1944 August. Schellenberg’s first reaction was that this action was not one that should be properly undertaken by him, but because of the somewhat threatening tone in which it was couched he considered it advisable to comply with Mueller’s request. As in the case when he was ordered to search Hansen’s rooms, he felt that he himself was in some way suspect and would in consequence have to act very carefully. Schellenberg received orders to take Canaris under arrest to the premises of the Sipo School at Fuerstenberg in Mecklenburg where other suspected high ranking officers were in “honourable detention”. Taking with him a former member of the Lehrregiment, Brandenburg, a certain Hauptsturmbannfuehrer von Foelkesam [Adrian Baron von Foelkersam], he drove to Canaris’s house at Zehlendorf in the Betazielestrasse. On their arrival Canaris was engaged with two visitors but these at once took their departure and Schellenberg was shown in. Foelkesam [sic.] remained in the hall of the house, affording Schellenberg an opportunity to converse alone with Canaris. Canaris professed to have no reason for concern although he pressed Schellenberg for information as to whether “that petty General Staff official, Hansen, had not been taking notes again in his niggling manner”. He then asked whether he, Schellenberg, had had anything to do with the affair or whether Himmler had played any part in connection with it, to which Schellenberg gave his assurance that this was not the case. They then drove to the Sipo School at Fuerstenberg, confining their conversation en route to mundane matters in the presence of the driver and Foelkesam [sic.]. Before leaving Canaris at Fuerstenberg, the latter requested Schellenberg to seek an interview for him with Himmler. To this Schellenberg answered that he would do all that lay in his power. Some fortnight or three weeks later, Schellenberg did in fact have an opportunity to raise this matter with Himmler who answered that he wanted to help Canaris as far as he could, and that he would talk it over with Kaltenbrunner. What consequently transpired is not exactly known to Schellenberg and certainly effected no amelioration in Canaris’ position, who continued to remain under detention. He did not however appear as a defendant in the proceedings later instituted by the Volksgericht [Volksgerichtshof], and in so far as Schellenberg is aware his case remained undecided. Schellenberg later understood that some documentary and incriminating evidence implicating him to some extent was found in Canaris’ safe.84 Intercession on behalf of Bismarck. At the same time as his intercession for Canaris with Himmler, Schellenberg also asked for clemency to be shown to Bismarck. [Alvar] Moeller, of the Swedish Match Company [sic.], had been almost continually in contact with Schellenberg urging him to make every effort to secure Bismarck’s release. Moeller put forward the view that an adverse verdict in his case would have a very grave effect abroad. Schellenberg suggested to Himmler that a direct appeal by letter to Hitler should be made by Bismarck’s mother or grandmother but was counselled by Himmler to wait until he himself had spoken to Hitler. Some short time later, after a number of further discussions with Schellenberg, Himmler agreed that the letter could be sent by

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Bismarck’s grandmother and also summoned [Dr Roland] Freisler, the notorious president of the Volksgericht [Volksgerichtshof], and told him that Bismarck must be acquitted. In due course Bismarck although deeply involved in the attempted “Putsch” was acquitted by the Volksgerichtshof in spite of Kaltenbrunner’s and Mueller’s efforts to bring about a conviction. Afterwards Bismarck was permitted by Himmler to return to his estates.85 1944 August. Amt Mil. In August 1944, after being assigned the task of taking over Amt Mil, Schellenberg called all his section leaders together and gave them an address announcing his new appointment, and dealing with the difficulties caused by the absence of Hansen, Kuebart and Freytag-Loringhoven participants in the affair of July 20th.* Schellenberg now set himself to deal with current Amt Mil administrational problems. In the first place expenses and allowances in Amt Mil claimed his attention; secondly training problems and particularly the recruitment of fresh officers for this Amt. Unfortunately Oberstlt. [Max?] Huebner, the official in Amt Mil concerned with personnel, had been transferred to Amt I which led to immediate difficulties. To remedy this position Schellenberg now had discussions with the heads of the relevant personnel branches of the three Wehrmacht sections, among these being General Lienarts and Oberst Kienitz [General Werner Kienitz?] of the Army, and Admirals Doenitz and [Wilhelm] Schulz of the Navy, with a view to recruiting fresh officers from these sources. Another question to be considered was whether or not the organisation of the KOs and indeed the whole of Amt Mil itself should remain without change. Kaltenbrunner was in favour of the division between Amt VI and Amt Mil being abolished but Schellenberg was successful in arranging for the existing position in the former organisation to be continued for the time being. Renewed Attempts to Improve Relations with the Foreign Office. Towards the end of 1944 Schellenberg renewed his attempts to secure better relations between Amt Mil and Amt VI on the one hand, and the German Foreign Office on the other. To this end he had discussions with Staatssekretaer [Adolf Baron] Steengracht [von Moyland] and Standartenfuehrer [Vortragender Legationsrat Horst] Wagner, liaison officer between Himmler and the Foreign Office, both of whom made every effort to assist Schellenberg in establishing a better understanding between the departments, but were prevented from arriving at any tangible result through Ribbentrop’s obstructive attitude. Schellenberg, therefore, resolved to appeal to Himmler and accordingly he and Wagner visited Himmler at Loetzen in East Prussia to discuss the position in relation to Ribbentrop. But although Himmler was sympathetic and even endeavoured to get in touch with Ribbentrop by telephone in order to smooth out the existing difficulties, he *By this time it had been learnt by Schellenberg that Freytag-Loringhoven was probably the person responsible for supplying the explosive in connection with the attempt on Hitler’s life and that he had subsequently shot himself.

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was curtly told on each occasion that Ribbentrop was absent. This considerably angered Himmler who vented most of his wrath on the unfortunate Wagner. Differences on Rumanian policy. Schellenberg remained in East Prussia for ten days and during this time the question arose of the policy to be pursued in Rumania where events were so shaping themselves that it was feared in Germany that a separate peace with Russia would be concluded.* Further Balkan difficulties. Apart from the trouble that had arisen regarding the position in Rumania in the course of Schellenberg’s visit to East Prussia, further difficulties had also occurred in the shape of a disagreement between Ogruf Berger, Chief of the S.S. Hauptamt and [Dr Hermann] Neubacher, the special German Minister for Balkan Affairs. The dispute between these two men involved the question of whether or not the Chetniks should be armed by the Germans, Neubacher being in favour of their receiving arms and Berger opposing it, Neubacher accusing Berger of being under the influence of the Croat leader Poglavenek. In this connection it should be recalled that Berger’s contacts were mostly in Bosnia, a district populated by the Croats, where he was engaged in building up his Bosnian divisions. Neubacher on the other hand backed [Draja] Mihailovic, leader of the Chetniks. Schellenberg noticed that Himmler had little real understanding of Balkan affairs and felt impelled to propose as a solution that Himmler should summon to Berlin the Croat Poglavenek. Poglavenek’s visit to Berlin took place not long afterwards and as a result the Croats were armed by the Germans at the expense of the Chetniks. Complaints by Goebbels. In point of fact the defection from the Axis by Rumania had been foretold in Amt VI reports, to which neither Ribbentrop nor Hitler had paid much heed, preferring to rely on Ribbentrop’s sources of information and to give their support to the [Ion] Antonescu Regime, pursuing in fact the same policy that they had followed in the case of Italy. Goebbels, who had previously complained of total lack of warning by the German Intelligence Service concerning the Allied landing in North Africa now made a further complaint to Hitler in the same respect with regard to Rumania. This time Kaltenbrunner felt himself personally attacked and was able to refute Goebbels’ complaint in a report showing the dates of the Amt VI warnings which had been prepared for him by Schellenberg in conjunction with Amt VI E. The Egmont reports. By the end of August 1944, Schellenberg had set up a so-called Zentralauswertungsbuero immediately under the secretariat of Amt VI. This department analysed the already *For further information regarding Rumania see Appendix X.

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evaluated Amt VI sub-sectional reports and re-issued the digested material in the form of daily reports collated under the cover name of “Egmont” with a reasonably small distribution. Amongst those on the distribution lists were Himmler, Jodl, Fegelein (Hitler’s adjutant), Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg. Also a certain Dr. [Giselher] Wirsing of the Zentralbuero was commissioned by Schellenberg to survey the subject matter of these daily publications and to embody them in a series of bi-monthly reports with a somewhat wider circulation. Schellenberg’s unavowed purpose in issuing these reports was to win over to his political way of thinking the other ministerial branches who received copies. Ultimately he hoped to secure thereby a more speedy ending of the war and he claims that he did in effect, achieve a very fair measure of success, having regard to the conditions prevailing. Schellenberg claims that Himmler and the Ministries reactions were on the whole favourable although Kaltenbrunner took the opportunity during a time when Schellenberg was indisposed to allege to Steimle that he was using these reports to further his own treasonable objectives. What effect they had on the Bormann clique he is not aware although he presumes that they were read by Hitler. 1944 September. The Defection of Bulgaria. On September 8th 1944 Bulgaria declared war on Germany. Mihailov, who, as already related, had been commissioned by Amt VI to set up an I-Network, for which purpose he had been subsidised, failed completely. Not only did he fail in this task but also in establishing, at German behest, a Bulgarian Opposition Party for which latter purpose Mihailov was to have received also a considerable sum. Because of Mihailov’s failure the entire I-network system in Bulgaria failed to function. Further Peace Feelers in Switzerland. In September 1944, Schellenberg commissioned Eggen to endeavour to contact Dulles, the American European Observer in Switzerland through Dr. Meyer, Eggen’s intermediary. Dr. Meyer established contact with Dulles’ own intermediary, an American economic delegate, of the name or probably cover name of Loofborough.86 Schellenberg’s purpose in this was to present Himmler with a further fait accompli as in the case of his earlier negotiations with Hewitt. But on perusing Eggen’s report on the conversations he had held, he saw immediately that Germany’s position had so deteriorated in the eyes of the Allies, that it would serve no useful purpose to continue the discussions with Dulles, without having a legitimately endorsed surrender offer available. Schellenberg mentions that this report influenced him later when he refused to participate in negotiations that were independently conducted by Wulff [SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff] with Dulles. Lectures by Schellenberg to the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab. In the same month of September 1944, Schellenberg commenced a series of political lectures in Zossen to the leading experts of the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab. He used as a base for these lectures material taken from the Egmont reports, his driving aim being an

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attempt to influence his audience in a policy of increased resistance on the Eastern Front, with a corresponding weakening of the Western line. General Winter, Deputy Chief of the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab was usually present at these lectures and although the audience, including the General, were highly receptive the latter had not the necessary power to influence his superior officers, Generals Keitel and Jodl. These lectures continued until March 1945. 1944 October. Frontaufklaerung. In the course of October 1944, Schellenberg in a series of discussions, took up with General Winter of the Wehrmachts Zentralamt, the question of transfer to Amt Mil of the Frontaufklaerungsorganisation. As previously explained the existing system functioned badly in practice the nexus between Amt Mil and Frontaufklaerung being too remote for efficiency. Schellenberg had been constantly urged, not only by his own officers, but also by those in the Frontaufklaerung itself, to endeavour to clarify the position. General Winter was in the main sympathetic and agreed that steps should be taken to transfer Frontaufklaerung to Amt Mil, provided that discipline, dispositions and immediate administration remained directly subordinated to the Ics of the Armies and FAK Leitstellen, to the Army groups. Although this difference at first sight might not appear to make much difference to the existing procedure, Schellenberg claims that it had enabled him in practice to draw on the Frontaufklaerung personnel direct for the purpose of Amt VI and Amt Mil. In December 1944, General Keitel issued the necessary order authorising this. Meeting between Musy and Himmler. Some time in October 1944 there came to Germany by invitation of Himmler but probably initially on his own initiative, an elderly Swiss politician named Musy. [JeanMarie] Musy was an Altbundesrat in the Swiss Government, a leading figure in Swiss political life, a Catholic Conservative and a strong opponent of Communism of over seventy years of age. Musy arrived at Berlin accompanied by his younger son, Benoit, and was met by Schellenberg together with a member of his staff, one Hauptsturmfuehrer [Franz] Goering. While Benoit and Goering remained in Berlin, Schellenberg travelled with Musy to Breslau where they were to join Himmler in his special train which was proceeding from that city to Vienna. During the journey to Breslau Schellenberg was able to convince himself that he and Musy were in fundamental agreement and he came to the conclusion that Musy might well exercise a beneficial influence upon Himmler. The talks in the train between Musy and Himmler proceeded excellently, helped by Schellenberg. Musy’s main concern was for the future of the Jews in Germany and he had been empowered to act on behalf of the Joint Jewish Rabbis’ Organisation of America and Canada by their representative in Switzerland, one [Rabbi] Dr. [Isaac] Sternbuch. It was agreed during this conversation that all Jews interned in Germany should be sent to Switzerland for transport by the Swiss Government to America. In addition, Himmler permitted certain specific individuals to be released from German internment. Himmler for his part laid down the condition that a considerable sum of money in Swiss

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Francs should be paid to the German Government. His motive in this was his desire to be in a position to refute internal allegations of humanitarianism by being able to state that he had acquired Swiss funds with which to purchase war material abroad. It was further arranged that payment be made in instalments so much being given for each train load of released internees. By the following February 1945, the first train load of some 1,200 released Jews was taken across the Swiss frontier. Thereafter owing to certain publications in the American Press, Hitler issued a complete ban on the future transfer of Jews in conformity with these arrangements and no further consignments were delivered. After his first visit to Germany in October 1944, Musy had paid some seven or eight further visits, in the course of which the minutest details of the arrangements were settled. In these discussions it had been agreed that the Joint Rabbis Organisation should deposit in a Swiss bank two million Swiss Francs to be transferred later to the German Government and that the matter should be favourably publicised in the American Press. Schellenberg succeeded in persuading Himmler of the greater importance of outside world propaganda than inner political considerations, prevailing upon him to donate the two million Swiss Francs to the International Red Cross in addition to such further sums as might become available. The favourable publicity in America and certain reports that came from Spain had however the precise opposite effect from that intended and led Hitler to impose his ban as already described.* This interdiction on the part of Hitler was of far reaching effect, for not only did it categorically forbid any Germans under threat of death from helping any Jews to leave Germany but also threatened with the same punishment any who should extend assistance to British or American PoWs. After the discussion with Musy, Himmler requested Schellenberg to maintain contact with Musy and assist him with the competent state police officials in the freeing of individual Jews and Frenchmen which had been agreed upon. Schellenberg thereupon approached Mueller with the request that he might concern himself personally with the individual prisoners but was refused on the grounds that he was not a member of the Gestapo. He was allowed however to get in touch with the prisoners through the police departments concerned and in this manner was able to improve in a number of cases, the conditions under which they lived. Schellenberg refuses further peace proposals. By November 1944, Schellenberg’s difficulties in the administration of the newly united Geheime Meldedienst had become considerably augmented. Difficulties arose in all departments brought on by the effects of Allied bombing, to such an extent in fact was the dislocation of all activities that it became even difficult to keep body and soul together. At about this period three of his political advisers, namely Justizrat [Gerhard Alois] *The Spanish report referred to was a decoded W/T message from a De Gaulle station in Spain to Paris in which it was stated that Musy on behalf of Himmler had had dealings with Jewish organisations, whereby in exchange for the assurances of asylum being afforded to 200 Nazi leaders the Jews in Germany would be allowed to emigrate to America via Switzerland.

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Westrick of the Standard Electric,87 Geheimrat Kreuter of Trede Fina,88 and Lindemann, President of the N.D.L.,89 being aware of Schellenberg’s political views, asked whether they might not negotiate on his behalf with Dulles in Switzerland. But Schellenberg refused to avail himself of this offer for he had seen from the previous report of Eggen mentioned above that unless he had some concrete offer for Dulles such contact would be completely useless. Visit by Schellenberg to Himmler at Triberg. Following the events of July 20th 1944 Himmler’s direct contact with Hitler and entourage had been considerably curtailed, and in September of that year he took over command of the German Army Group Oberrhein. In December 1944 Schellenberg, who had been continually pressing Himmler to effect the release of the five imprisoned Swedes was summoned to Himmler’s headquarters at Triberg in the Black Forest to discuss this question. Schellenberg took this opportunity of taking with him a military summary on the activities of the German armies in the East which had been prepared by Fremde Heere Ost from all available resources such as Frontaufklaerung, radio intelligence, P.O.W. interrogation and general evaluation. When Schellenberg met Himmler he drew his attention to certain statements it contained concerning a prospective Russian offensive in the Baranov bridge-head where the Russians had assembled a heavy concentration of artillery. This intelligence summary suggested that immediate military solution of the situation would be for a German attack to be made at this point. Schellenberg considered that this military strategical proposal would provide him with an excellent opportunity of introducing once again to Himmler his original scheme for strengthening the Eastern and withdrawing troops from the Western Front, and possibly even arouse in Himmler a desire to take a positive step to effect a compromise with the Western Powers. Once again as always, Himmler vacillated, however, saying that Hitler had not the sense to embark on such a compromise and that this type of proposal could only be put to him in a systematic way, and after careful personal approach. Schellenberg again pressed the subject which Himmler immediately changed, saying that he could do nothing for the time being. Later he suggested that one solution of the difficulty would be the death of Hitler as foretold by Wulff the astrologer which might come about in a natural way. At the same time it appeared to Schellenberg that inwardly Himmler seemed to have at last decided that it would be for him and him alone to take the action that was necessary to secure Hitler’s destruction. At this meeting the question of the five Swedes came up for discussion but although Himmler approved that they should be given their freedom, he took no immediate steps during Schellenberg’s stay in Triberg. Frontaufklaerung. With the dissolution of the old Abwehr II its jurisdiction in sabotage matters in so far as the Frontaufklaerung [front-line reconnaissance] was concerned devolved upon Mil Amt

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D under Skorzeny, who acquired this position by virtue of the duties that were entrusted to him in Amt VI S. Although training and administration of FAK II Verbaende were carried out by Mil D the selection of personnel was covered by Mil F under Oberst [Georg] Buntrock. Mil F only, and not Mil D, had the necessary guiding links with Ic of the Army for the employment of the FAKs. Skorzeny was making every effort backed by Kaltenbrunner to place Mil F and Ic under the jurisdiction of Mil D. Schellenberg however prevailed upon Himmler to prevent this arrangement and he gave orders that for the future Mil F alone was to be concerned with Frontaufklaerung Verbaende I, II and III and that Mil D was to restrict itself in future to matters of sabotage derived from Abwehr II. The order for this partition was made out during Schellenberg’s one week’s stay at Himmler’s headquarters at Triberg. Bibelforscher. On a visit that Schellenberg paid to Kersten’s estate in 1943 he observed that all the staff were dressed in convicts clothing. On enquiry he found that these people were members of a religious pacifist sect known as the Bibelforschers. With Himmler’s assistance Schellenberg obtained the release of a member of this fraternity and employed him with conspicuous success in his own household. Kersten’s interest in the employment of the Bibelforscher was a matter of annoyance and suspicion to Mueller and Obgfr. [Oswald] Pohl of Amt IV who accused him of attempting in this way to set up an organisation for the purpose of passing information abroad from the Bibelforschers in concentrating camps. These suspicions were intensified when Kersten took one of his female Bibelforscher with him to Stockholm leaving another in charge of his estate with the ultimate intention that she also should proceed in due course to Stockholm. Later when Kersten visited Germany in 1944 he wished to take yet a third Bibelforscher back with him to Stockholm. For this purpose he approached Himmler, putting forward the suggestion that the humane treatment of the Bibelforscher in Germany might have an excellent propaganda value abroad. This argument carried considerable weight with Himmler and during Schellenberg’s stay at Triberg he telephoned Kaltenbrunner outlining a plan for more humane treatment of these people and at the same time suggesting that Kersten and Schellenberg should be received to discuss the question. As a result of this conversation shortly before Christmas 1944 Schellenberg and Kersten had a conversation with Kaltenbrunner who received them at first very coldly. But after a short time Kaltenbrunner agreed to back the plan and to arrange the necessary details with Mueller and even gave permission for Kersten to take his protegee to Sweden. Schellenberg adds that these negotiations with Kaltenbrunner were handled with subtlety and adroitness by Kersten. Schellenberg secures further releases. On his arrival in Germany the previous month Kersten had gone through with Schellenberg a list of persons whom he wished to assist in some manner or release from German hands. During his stay at Triberg Schellenberg was successful in obtaining from

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Himmler the release or mitigation of punishment in seven or eight of these cases. Amongst this number was a certain Count Arco von Valley* and a certain German Oberst Stoeltzel, both participants in the July plot. Very shortly after Schellenberg’s return to Berlin he heard that his efforts to secure the final release of the five Swedes imprisoned for espionage had also been successful and Director Moeller of the Swedish Match Company [sic.] returned with his countrymen to Sweden before Christmas in 1944. Before leaving Moeller made the offer to Schellenberg that he and his wife and family should accompany the party back to Sweden, but his offer was not accepted by Schellenberg. 1945 January. Berger’s hunting party. In the beginning of January 1945 Schellenberg arranged with Obergruppenfuehrer Berger that he, Schellenberg, should be invited to a hunting party given by Berger, together with Dr. Froellicher [Hans Frölicher], the Swiss Ambassador [Minister] in Berlin, and Burckhardt, the Swiss Military Attache. Schellenberg’s intention in making this suggestion was that these two men who were already known to him should make the acquaintance of Berger. At the hunting party they discussed various means of assisting British and American prisoners of war which Froellicher [sic.] desired to arrange through the medium of the Red Cross. It was also arranged at this time, for Swiss internees to be concentrated in a camp suitably placed in South Germany so as to enable them to be more readily assembled for their later transference to Switzerland. It was therefore agreed that certain specific Swiss nationals should be freed and it was as a result of this conversation that the first aeroplane flew shortly afterwards from Switzerland to Germany with Red Cross supplies. Not long after this meeting Froellicher [sic.] with the assistance of Schellenberg transferred himself to the South of Germany on account of the Allied air raids on Berlin.90 1945 12th January. Musy again visits Himmler. In the previous month Musy had visited Germany in order to bring about the evacuation of Jews from the Reich. On or about January 12th 1945 Musy returned to Germany by car and accompanied by Schellenberg was driven by his son, Benoit, to Wildbad in the Black Forest for further conversations with Himmler. A rough outline of the decisions come to in these negotiations with Himmler has already been given but it may be mentioned here that at this particular meeting the following arrangements were made:– 1. That in so far as Himmler was concerned Musy should be the sole Swiss delegate in matters effecting the release of Jews in Germany. 2. That the Jews should be transferred to Switzerland in exchange for a fixed sum for each train load. *Count von Valley was Wallenberg’s brother-in-law.

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3. That instead of applying the money received in this manner for the purchase of war materials for Germany the proceeds of this traffic should instead be held in trust by Musy for the use of the International Red Cross. Furthermore Schellenberg had received from Musy a list of miscellaneous requests relating to the release and care of prisoners of war. This list he passed over to Himmler who agreed to the suggestions it contained.91 At the close of this meeting on about January 12th 1945 Schellenberg and Musy drove to Constance from where the latter returned to Switzerland in order to put the necessary arrangements into effect in Zurich for the internment of the Jewish refugees. Schellenberg then returned in Musy’s car to Berlin where Musy’s son, Benoit, desired to pick up four important Jewish refugees, the release of whom had been permitted by Himmler. Working agreement with the German Foreign Office. Although Hitler, when ordering the establishment of a unified German Intelligence Service had intended to include the Intelligence Department of the German Foreign Office, the specific mention of this department had been omitted in the written agreement signed by Hitler on February 12th 1944. Up to this period Schellenberg had been negotiating with the German Foreign Office with a view to once more restoring a working agreement in place of the bad relations hitherto existing between the two departments. After a conference lasting some eight days with Staatssekretaer Stengracht [sic.] an agreement was reached whereby the Foreign Office agreed to recognise a unified Amt VI and Amt Mil as possessing exclusive powers of control over political, military, economic and technical intelligence matters. The agreement also contained provisions for the interchange of reports and for the proper briefing by the Foreign Office of work for the Geheime Meldedienst and although the agreement was far from perfect it did at least constitute for the first time the basic principles of reasonable cooperation.92 1945 January. Promotion to Major General of the Waffen S.S. As has already been mentioned in the beginning of this report, Schellenberg, on taking up employment in 1938 with the Ministry of the Interior (Innenministerium) had received the rank of “Regierungsassessor”. This rank and that of “Oberregierungsrat” to which he was later promoted were civil ranks and paid as such. On Schellenberg’s further promotion to “Ministerialdirigent” at the end of 1944, Himmler, on Kaltenbrunner’s suggestion, but against Schellenberg’s express wishes, appointed Schellenberg Major General of the Police. According to Schellenberg he continually requested Himmler to transfer him back to the Ministry of the Interior but this Himmler was unwilling to do and in fact on January 30th 1945 appointed him Major General of the Waffen S.S. thus giving him a definite rank in the armed forces.

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Relations with Admiral Kojima. Towards the end of January 1945 Schellenberg renewed his relations with Admiral Kojima at the latter’s instigation. Kojima stated his regrets that he had not approached Schellenberg the previous year, since he had been commissioned by naval circles on the Japanese Imperial Council to negotiate with the German Foreign Office, with a view to establishing a Germano-Russo-Japanese alliance. He revealed that the Imperial Council was prepared to hand over Manchuria and Korea to Russia in payment for their cooperation. Schellenberg states that he was not particularly receptive, but considered the information useful as a bargaining factor with the Western Allies. He did not however make direct use of this information, though he did later reveal the particulars of these discussions to General Director Hoeller [Moeller?], Count [Folke] Bernadotte and Vannamann [Brigadier General Arthur Vanaman]. Schellenberg mentions that up to the middle of March 1945 he dined with Kojima regularly about twice a month. What ulterior motive Kojima had in relation to himself he is unaware but suggests because of the close intelligence relations between Russia and Japan that Kojima intended to use him for joint Russo-Japanese purposes in some manner or another.93 1945 February. Evacuation of Amt VI from Berlin. So bad was the war situation in February 1945 that Schellenberg decided on his own initiative and responsibility to evacuate those sections of Amt Mil and Amt VI housed in the Berkaerstrasse, Berlin and at Waldberg, near Fuerstenwalde, a/d Oder. To avoid charges of defeatism Schellenberg was obliged to carry out the evacuation of these departments secretly and this caused not only untold difficulties but also involved a great strain. The site chosen for the evacuation was Burg Lauenstein (cover-name Wiburg) near Saalfeld in Thuringen. The evacuation in spite of difficulties was carried through successfully.94 Proposed repatriation of British officers. Schellenberg, with Ogruf Berger’s connivance had had in mind for some time a plan of releasing and repatriating twenty British officers from prisoner of war camps in Germany. This scheme was devised in order that a true picture of the situation in Germany might be brought before the Allied Governments, it being intended that the situation as it existed, would be explained to the officers before their release. Dr. Paeffgen had even gone so far as to choose the British officers considered the most suitable for this task when Kaltenbrunner who had become aware of the plan approached Hitler. The plan had already been introduced to Hitler by Berger in such a manner as to suggest that the British officer prisoners of war had aided their German guards in escaping from the Russians on the Eastern Front. Kaltenbrunner did not divulge all the information in his possession as too many were involved but nevertheless completely

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discredited the fantastic story that had been put forward by Berger causing Hitler to state that the whole thing was nonsensical and to impose his veto. Schellenberg’s illness. In the midst of all these troubles Schellenberg fell ill with pneumonia. Kaltenbrunner immediately took the opportunity of trying to have Schellenberg removed from his position in the R.S.H.A. claiming, as already stated, that he was using his “Egmont” reports for his own traitorous purposes. To offset this move Schellenberg enlisted the aid of Dr. Brandt and Berger as a counter influence with Himmler. At this time also Schellenberg once again attempted to make peace proposals through Switzerland and with this aim in view he sent for a certain [Henry] Goverts, a Hamburg book publisher, said to have many connections with England. He requested Goverts who apparently knew the U.S. European observer, Dulles, in Switzerland, to make a definite offer of peace in Schellenberg’s name. By so doing Schellenberg hoped he would be able to present Himmler with another fait accompli and believed that in the midst of Germany’s turmoil Himmler would be more likely to endorse this offer. Once again however he was unsuccessful as he never saw Goverts again although he did learn later, when in Stockholm, through Kersten, that Goverts had only reached Liechtenstein and had never crossed the Swiss frontier.95

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS PRECEDING CAPITULATION 1945 10th February. Schellenberg returned to work on or about February 10th 1945 and once again took up his current routine duties, concerning himself chiefly with matters arising out of the recent evacuation. Events leading up to and the arrival of Bernadotte.96 Not long before the resumption of his duties, Schellenberg received a visit from Geheimrat [Horst] Wagner, the personal representative of Ribbentrop,97 announcing that he had received information from the German Minister in Sweden, [Hans] Thomsen,98 of Count Bernadotte’s intended visit to Germany for the purpose of discussing humanitarian questions connected with the Red Cross. Schellenberg’s previous activities in respect of the freeing of the condemned Swedes and other such cases had led Ribbentrop erroneously to believe that Schellenberg might be the instigator of this visit. Schellenberg explained to Wagner that he knew nothing of the proposed journey and then notified Kaltenbrunner and Himmler of the expected arrival of Bernadotte exaggerating for his own purposes the political importance of the visit and informing them of Bernadotte’s particular wish for an audience with Himmler.

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Himmler who was at this time commanding the Army Group Weichsel and was with his staff at Prenzlau, agreed that he was interested in the arrival of Bernadotte and a possible meeting but was angry that the information had come through Legation channels and therefore through the Foreign Office as this would force him to treat the matter officially and to report it to Hitler. He then, as he had no alternative but to inform Hitler, instructed Kaltenbrunner, who, at this time was in daily consultation at the Chancellery, to choose a suitable moment to approach Hitler in the matter. But Kaltenbrunner probably in order not to receive a personal refusal requested Gruppenleiter Fegelein to ask Hitler for him, with the result that Hitler forbade the meeting with the words, “One can do nothing in this war with such fools.”99 In the meantime however Bernadotte had arrived in Berlin, and Schellenberg wishing at all costs to bring about a meeting with Himmler telephoned the latter urging him earnestly not to disregard this gesture of friendship which would be of assistance in solving certain technical questions and might well be politically interesting. After a great deal of vacillation, Himmler agreed to the following alternative proposal: Schellenberg should suggest to [Horst] Wagner and Kaltenbrunner to Ribbentrop that Ribbentrop should receive Bernadotte without Hitler being informed in advance and without of course disclosing to Ribbentrop Hitler’s former refusal. If Ribbentrop agreed to receive him Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg would meet him afterwards. In this manner Himmler would have gained time and it could be seen later how matters worked themselves out. Schellenberg’s reasons for so urgently pressing for this meeting were his secretly held beliefs that the visit of Bernadotte could be used to bring to fruition his long cherished plans of arranging a compromise peace or at least in some way of getting Germany out of the war. It appeared to Schellenberg that a community of interests existed between the two countries in as far as it was, at this stage of the conflict, to the advantage of Germany that Sweden should act as an intermediary in arranging a compromise peace and to the interest of Sweden that peace should once more be established in the northern zone.100 Bernadotte approached Schellenberg through the medium of the Swedish Legation, and although it had been intended that his first meeting should be with Ribbentrop events so shaped themselves that he first had an interview with Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg and later in the same morning an interview with Ribbentrop. In the discussion that took place between Kaltenbrunner, Schellenberg and Bernadotte, Schellenberg took very little part as he did not wish to antagonise Kaltenbrunner by pushing himself forward. Schellenberg also immediately after Bernadotte’s departure praised what he termed Kaltenbrunner’s diplomacy and the splendid way he had conducted the discussion, so influencing him that he telephoned Himmler strongly supporting Bernadotte’s request, that had been proffered again at the end of the interview for a meeting with Himmler. Sometime afterwards Bernadotte told Schellenberg that at his meeting with Ribbentrop later the same morning Ribbentrop had been extremely voluble and had scarcely given him the possibility of speaking. Bernadotte also said that Ribbentrop had given his interpretation of the political situation and had said, that in his opinion, if the Western Powers did not have consideration for Germany, she would lapse into Bolshevism. Furthermore, Ribbentrop had also made allusions to his attempts to get into

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conversation with the Western Powers through his own private channels in Stockholm, apparently, according to Schellenberg, referring to the so-called “Hesse action” which will be touched on later. 1945 17th Feb. Bernadotte’s first interview with Himmler. The meeting between Bernadotte and Himmler took place on 17th February 1945 at Hohenlychen. During the journey to Himmler’s H.Q., Schellenberg had the opportunity of not only discussing the progress of the war and his own attitude to Sweden, but the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of Himmler which would be useful to Bernadotte at the coming interview. He also during this conversation counselled Bernadotte to abandon his original idea of suggesting that the Danish and Norwegian prisoners should be interned in Sweden for the remainder of hostilities, as such a project had little chance of acceptance, and recommended that a compromise consisting of the proposal that a central camp for these prisoners should be established in central Germany, might be substituted. Himmler, with whom Schellenberg had the opportunity of speaking immediately after the interview confessed himself very satisfied with his discussion with the Count and asked Schellenberg to remain in close contact with Bernadotte in order that he might keep his eye on the execution of the arrangements which had been agreed to, as he knew that they would meet with opposition from Kaltenbrunner and Mueller and under certain circumstances from Ribbentrop. Schellenberg was also entrusted by Himmler with the task of informing Ribbentrop of the matters discussed and of acquainting him with the decisions reached so that Ribbentrop could pass the information to Hitler and in this manner cover Himmler. Kaltenbrunner’s objections to carrying into effect Bernadotte’s plan. Schellenberg now informed Kaltenbrunner and Mueller of the results of the conversation between Bernadotte and Himmler, namely that Danish and Norwegian prisoners should be collected from the various camps distributed throughout Germany and concentrated at camp Neuengamme under the surveillance of the Swedish Red Cross. Kaltenbrunner as had been expected immediately, on hearing the proposed plan, expressed his dissatisfaction, accusing Schellenberg of unduly influencing Himmler and telling him that the proposed plan was a Utopian dream which could not be carried into effect. The charges regarding the impracticability of the project, resolved themselves into two main points namely:– 1. The impossibility at this stage of the war to supply German lorries and petrol required for the removal of the Norwegian and Danish prisoners. 2. The over-crowded condition of Camp Neuengamme. The first objection raised by Kaltenbrunner concerning the use of German lorries and petrol was countered by Schellenberg by a proposal that the Swedish Red Cross should supply both and a further criticism proffered by Mueller that the refugees on the roads could not be expected to watch the Swedish Red Cross lorries driving past them with prisoners, was met by the proposal [of Schellenberg] that the transportation should take place by night, and that furthermore Schellenberg himself would supply personnel from

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his own department for the observance of the agreement. As regards the overcrowding of Camp Neuengamme it was agreed that this should be remedied as far as possible by Schellenberg’s officials.101 All these modifications from the original project were accepted by all parties and incorporated in the scheme when it was carried into effect. Schellenberg asserts that the introduction of personnel loyal to him was of primary importance for the working of the scheme, for the transportation of the Danish, Norwegian, and even Polish and Jewish prisoners brought about so much uncertainty in the issuing of orders that many instructions which were given by Kaltenbrunner and other officers, purporting to be those of the Reichsfuehrer, were not acted upon. Also because of this arrangement the Swedish Red Cross’ rights to visit camps, the issuing of visas and other arrangements were considerably facilitated.102 1945 February end. Schellenberg’s proposals for capitulation to the Western Powers. At the end of February 1945 Schellenberg visited Himmler at his H.Q. with Army Group Vistula and in a conversation with him, after a military conference between Himmler and his Generals, once again raised the question of Germany’s position in the war. Schellenberg put forward the view that the break up of the German Reich was practically inevitable and earnestly urged that Himmler should use the good offices of Sweden through Bernadotte, who was then still in Germany at Schloss Friedrichsruh engaged in Swedish Red Cross work, to bring about German capitulation to the Western Powers. For this purpose, he suggested that Bernadotte should fly to Eisenhower and convey an offer from Himmler personally. Schellenberg also stressed the necessity of Himmler giving up his command in the field —to which Schellenberg suggests he had been relegated through the machinations of Hitler’s entourage, in order that he might be kept away from Hitler—and undertake peace preparations of his own with or without the use of violence. After an excited discussion Himmler gave in to Schellenberg’s insistence, authorising him with the fullest powers to approach the Count with the suggestion that he had put forward. But on the succeeding day Himmler telephoned Schellenberg and withdrew permission for Bernadotte to act on his behalf, and only authorised Schellenberg to approach Bernadotte with the proposal that “circumstances permitting” he [Bernadotte] should fly to General [Dwight D.] Eisenhower on his own initiative.103 Schellenberg suggests that Himmler’s action in withdrawing authorisation was induced by the so-called “Hesse Action” in Stockholm.104 This affair was an attempt by Ribbentrop to instigate peace conversations through the medium of his so-called English expert [Fritz] Hesse with certain Anglo-American circles.* It is interesting to record that Schellenberg has stated that during the many and long discussions with Himmler in which he warned him that he would be held responsible before history for having endangered the whole existence of the German people by his *Note According to the Swedish version of this incident the attempted peace conversations in the Hesse action, were clumsily handled, Hesse speaking with a second or third Secretary of Sir Victor Mallet and endeavouring to contact [Hillel] Storch by the intermediary of Schellenberg’s V-man Dr. [Peter] Kleist. The affair was seized on by the world press and considered extremely discreditable to Germany.

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hesitant attitude and blindness, that [sic.] Himmler always defended himself by invoking his loyalty to the Fuehrer, saying that he had built up the SS on the principle of loyalty and that he was not now in a position to abandon this conception of duty as otherwise he would destroy his own principles. To Himmler’s often reiterated sentence, “So you are demanding that I should set aside the Fuehrer”, Schellenberg asserts that he feared to state openly what was in his mind because of his fear of being himself removed especially on account of the strong influence of Kaltenbrunner, Fegelein and Skorzeny who possessed direct entry to Hitler. 1945 February. Himmler’s illness. At the end of February the position on the front was very fluid and unstabilised and Himmler because of the constant strain of the military situation and the increasing difficulties in internal affairs in Germany,105 fell ill, causing Schellenberg to telephone to Stockholm for Kersten. His condition responded to Kersten’s treatment and by March he was sufficiently recovered to take over his normal duties. 1945 March. Discussions with Himmler. Schellenberg was at this time in daily telephonic communication with Himmler without the knowledge of Kaltenbrunner and Himmler’s entourage discussing questions arising out of Bernadotte’s visit and matters concerning Germany’s position. But after Himmler’s recuperation from his illness it became increasingly difficult to discuss with him the various problems concerning capitulation or the overthrow of Hitler. Schellenberg particularly quotes a conversation he had with Himmler about this time. He states that he was giving details of his discussions with the Japanese Admiral Kojima when the talk turned to the subject of Hitler and Wulff. Schellenberg told Himmler that in the opinion of Wulff the decisive battles would be fought out in central and southern Germany unless capitulation was agreed to beforehand. Himmler, who was standing at the time when this opinion was imparted to him, turned white and had to sit down. When he had somewhat recovered he asked that he might personally speak to Wulff but Schellenberg in what he terms “his spiritual distress” told him that what he asked would in no way change the situation and everything depended on him and what action he took. Discussions with Bernadotte. After long discussions between Schellenberg and Bernadotte it was agreed that if Himmler finally brought himself to make any movement in the direction, so constantly advocated by Schellenberg, that is, to take matters into his own hands, Schellenberg should immediately inform Bernadotte. Furthermore it was planned that Schellenberg should fly with Bernadotte to Eisenhower and it was also arranged that should the Reich be split in half, as seemed likely at this time, that Himmler if possible should fly to the south with Schellenberg from where Schellenberg would still be able to contact Bernadotte via the Swedish Legation in Switzerland. But all these arrangements came to nothing as Himmler continued to vacillate and in the end refused to make any move.

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1945 March. Second and third visit by Bernadotte to Himmler. In about the middle of March two more visits were paid by Bernadotte to Himmler. The first of these conversations was exclusively concerned with arrangements to be made by the Swedish Red Cross with regard to the agreement already come to and the second dealt mainly with the position and the possible evacuation to a neutral country of the King of the Belgians. At the urgent request of Bernadotte this latter question was once more raised with Himmler by Schellenberg at the beginning of April with the result that Kaltenbrunner, at that time in the southern region of Germany, was ordered to take King Leopold without delay to the Swiss Frontier there to deliver him to the Swiss authorities. Schellenberg states that Kaltenbrunner appeared not to wish to comply with this order and he is not certain whether he carried it out in the end or not.106 Kersten returns to Stockholm. At this same time Kersten who had travelled to Germany to attend Himmler received a letter to take back with him to Stockholm for delivery to Storch a member of the Jewish World Congress which Schellenberg believes contained certain assurances that various camps which were being overrun in the Allied advance would not be evacuated. In actual fact it was only later after many negotiations that this promise, repeatedly given in respect of the evacuation of these camps, were [sic.] carried into effect. Proposal of a four day truce for evacuation of Jews and other foreigners. Hitler’s comprehensive ban on the evacuation of those Jews remaining in the German Reich was promulgated at the end of March or beginning of April. This act of intolerance came as a severe blow to the ageing Altbundespraesident Musy who on receiving the news shed tears of anger and frustration. Nevertheless despite his disappointment, after conferring with Schellenberg he was determined to make one final effort to save the Jews and foreign prisoners. With this end in view Schellenberg at Musy’s request approached Himmler and suggested that a proposal should be made to the Western Powers that a four day truce be called, when the Jews and other foreigners could be conducted through the lines as a gesture of German goodwill. It was believed that if this project, with which Berger, Head of the P.O.W. administration was associated, was agreed to, that it might lead beyond the rescue of the prisoners to a compromise perhaps of far reaching effect. Furthermore, it was intended that this proposal should not pass through the Press but should be seriously made through official channels. But Himmler, according to Schellenberg, although obviously agreeing did not have the courage to present it to Hitler. The evacuation of the camps. Although Himmler was unwilling to accede to the plan outlined above he nevertheless agreed to Musy’s proposal that no further camps, which in view of the rapidly deteriorating military situation, could be expected to be overrun, should be evacuated. In

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coming to the decision he was also greatly influenced by Kersten who had continually urged him from Stockholm to take this course. On April 7th 1945 Schellenberg informed Musy that it was Himmler’s express wish that this decision should be transmitted without delay to General Eisenhower. That same day Musy started back for Switzerland and three or four days later informed Schellenberg that Washington had received the report and reacted favourably. Himmler had also given Musy, despite Hitler’s ban, permission for certain Jews to be evacuated from Buchenwald* but Musy junior who had been deputed to undertake this task reported to Schellenberg in disgust, that on arrival at the camp, he saw obvious signs of evacuation. On making enquiries Schellenberg discovered that Himmler, through intrigues, was once more completely discredited with Hitler and that counter-orders had been given by Kaltenbrunner to evacuate the camps. When informed of the position Himmler made energetic protestations but it was only sometime later, as will be seen, that these orders were carried out. Apart from these questions of the evacuation of the camp Musy with Schellenberg’s assistance, made efforts to have the French Ministers [Edouard] Herriot and Renault107 and the relations of General [Henri] Giraud released but only succeeded in the latter case after six weeks systematic pressure on Himmler.108 1945 Mid March. Intercession on behalf of the Jews by Dr. Burckhardt. About the middle of March 1945 Dr. [Carl Jacob] Burckhardt, President of the International Red Cross in Switzerland, intimated his wish to be accorded an interview with Himmler regarding the question of a more generous attitude being shown to political prisoners of French or Polish nationality as well as those of the Jewish faith. Schellenberg approached Himmler with suggestions for a meeting but Himmler was unwilling to come to a decision and eventually asked Kaltenbrunner to broach the matter to Hitler who immediately categorically refused permission. It was then decided in order to cover Himmler that Burckhardt should meet Kaltenbrunner and when this was agreed upon a letter was drafted by Schellenberg at Kaltenbrunner’s request, inviting Burckhardt for an interview. After this conversation Burckhardt declared himself satisfied, returned to Switzerland and sent a long letter confirming the arrangements come to and making concrete suggestions for future procedure in the exchange of prisoners of all nationalities according to category and urgency. On receipt of this letter Kaltenbrunner objected that it was too concretely formulated and declared himself prepared, in order to save appearances only, to allow the International Red Cross, with Himmler’s permission, to take a certain number of French prisoners from Ravensbrueck. Kaltenbrunner also delayed replying to Burckhardt and at last despite all efforts this attempt to place the conditions governing the prisoners on a more humanitarian basis, failed.

*The names of two of these Jews given by Schellenberg are Bernard Bemberg and Bernheim de Villiers.

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Bernadotte’s efforts on behalf of the Jews; fourth visit to Himmler. Although Bernadotte’s mission was only in connection with the Danish and Norwegian questions he also intervened with Himmler in matters regarding the Jews in order to improve their conditions. He had already skilfully evacuated the Danish Jews and then when this was accomplished turned his attention to the release from German captivity of the other Jewish elements. In these negotiations the discussion that took place at the end of March or beginning of April was of particular importance. After a conversation in which all the details were discussed Himmler promised Bernadotte that on the approach of the Allies the camps were not to be evacuated and would be handed over in good order, in particular Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald and Theresienstadt as also the camps situated in southern Germany. Schellenberg points out that this finally and irrevocably brought the long discussions to an end and was probably the cause of saving, although not all, many thousands of lives. Due to this agreement between the Count and Himmler it was now possible for Schellenberg to set in motion the release of the Jewish and other women from Ravensbrueck, full powers to act as he thought fit having been given to him by Himmler. Hitler’s health. In many of his conversations with Himmler at this time Schellenberg raised the question of Hitler’s continued power and authority in the light of his deteriorating physical condition. Himmler replied that Hitler’s energy was undiminished in spite of the completely unnatural life he led—turning night into day and sleeping at most three or four hours—and that his continuous activity and constant outbursts of fury completely exhausted his entourage and created an unbearable atmosphere. He also said that he thought it possible that perhaps the attempt of July 20th had, after all, injured Hitler’s health, particularly his head. He particularly stressed the constant stoop, the pale visage, and severe trembling of his left arm and also the operation which had to be resorted to in November on Hitler’s ear, obviously the results of the concussion of the brain that he had received at that time. In November Hitler had spent eight days in bed. In the beginning of April Schellenberg brought up the question of Hitler’s health with his friend, de Crinis, who has already been mentioned in this report, and received the answer that he, de Crinis, believed that Hitler’s completely crippled movements, very noticeable in news pictures, were possible signs of Parkinson’s disease. In order that Himmler should be advised of de Crinis’ views Schellenberg arranged a meeting between Himmler and de Crinis who brought with him Reichsgesundheitsfuehrer (Reich Health Leader) [Dr Leonardo] Conti to whom, Schellenberg heard afterwards, Himmler listened with great interest and considerable understanding.109 1945 April 13th. The vacillations of Himmler. Several days after the conversations chronicled above Schellenberg was called to Wustrow, near Magdeburg, where Himmler had set up his H.Q. During the visit Schellenberg accompanied Himmler on a walk into the surrounding woods where they had a significant discussion on the Jewish question and Hitler’s condition. Schellenberg urged that Himmler should accede to the wishes of Kersten who was pressing for

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Himmler to agree to him and Storch visiting Germany for the purpose of opening conversations on the problem of the Jewish Refugees. The visit had in fact been proposed sometime previously at a time when Himmler had not considered himself in a position to give any definite answer. Schellenberg pointed out that both out of consideration for Kersten and because a definite solution had to be come to that [sic.] the date of the proposed interview could be put off no longer. According to Schellenberg, Himmler’s vacillating attitude was brought about by his recognition that such a meeting would constitute an act, which if it came to the knowledge of his party colleagues and Hitler, must have dangerous consequences. Nevertheless he agreed to receive Storch and even [Norbert] Masur,* the Jewish World Congress *Masur has been variously spelt by Schellenberg Massour, Maseur.

1. Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1933. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

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2. Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1934. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

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3. Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1937. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

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4. Walter Schellenberg, passport photograph, 1938. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

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5. Sigismund Payne Best. From After the Battle (London).

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6. Richard Stevens. From After the Battle (London).

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7. Heinrich Himmler, 1938. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 183-R 99621.

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8. Folke Count Bernadotte. Courtesy of Friedrich Reinhardt AG, Basel.

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9. Reinhard Heydrich, 1940. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 183-R 98683.

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10. Wilhelm Canaris. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 146–79/13/43.

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11. Joachim von Ribbentrop, 1938. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 102–18086.

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12. Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Courtesy of Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 183-R 64933.

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13. Walter Schellenberg, date uncertain. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

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14. Walter Schellenberg, during the Nuremberg trials. Courtesy of Der Spiegel, Hamburg.

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15. The parole of Walter Schellenberg, 1950. Courtesy of the National Archives, College Park, MD.

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representative in Sweden, with the proviso that his acceptance of these interviews was not discovered by Kaltenbrunner as he would be then delivered into his hands. Of this discussion in Wustrow Schellenberg has said in his own words, “Himmler was in great mental distress. Even openly he had been almost completely thrown over by the Fuehrer. Hitler had ordered, at Fegelein’s suggestion, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler to take off their arm bands as a dishonouring punishment.* He said that I was the only one besides, perhaps Standartenfuehrer [Rudolf] Brandt, that he could completely trust. What should he do? He could not kill Hitler, could not poison or arrest him in the Chancellery as the whole military machine would then come to a stand still. I explained that all this was of no importance, he had only two possibilities, either go to Hitler and openly inform him of all that had happened during the last years and to persuade him to resign. Himmler retorted that would be completely impossible, Hitler would get into one of his rages and shoot him out of hand. I replied, ‘Therefore one must protect oneself from this. You have enough high SS leaders, who are in a position to prepare and carry out such surprise arrests, and if there’s no other way, the doctors must intervene’.”110 The discussion lasted an hour and a half and at the end Himmler was still unable to bring himself to come to any decision regarding his future actions. He did however call a conference, with a view to going into the question regarding Hitler’s health, which was attended by Professor de Crinis, Professor [Theodor] Morell, Hitler’s physician, Dr. [Ludwig] Stumpfegger, a second doctor, an SS Fuehrer and Bormann. Later Schellenberg was informed by de Crinis that Stumpfegger had shown himself to be of a different opinion from de Crinis although he had to admit the truth of certain of his arguments. The only outcome of the conversation between the various doctors was an agreement on the use of certain medicines for Hitler which were to be prepared at the de Crinis laboratory, which however Schellenberg believes were never fetched. Schellenberg arranges meeting between Graf Schwerin von Krosigk and Himmler. In the days following the discussion with Himmler at Wustrow Germany’s position deteriorated rapidly confirming Schellenberg in his most pessimistic predictions and causing him to make a further attempt to influence Himmler in his decisions. Through a trustworthy colleague, Obstlt. von Dewitz, Schellenberg approached Reichsfinanzminister [Johann Ludwig (Lutz)] Graf Schwerin von Krosigk with the intention of bringing him together with Himmler with whom he had had a quarrel earlier in the year. Conversations with von Krosigk had convinced Schellenberg that he was in general agreement with him on the policy to be pursued with regard to a termination of the war and he therefore spoke to Himmler and succeeded in arranging a meeting between the two men. *According to Schellenberg the removal of the arm bands of the Leibstandarte was carried out to discredit Himmler in Hitler’s eyes.

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1945 April 19th. Meeting between Himmler and von Krosigk. The interview between Himmler and von Krosigk was arranged to take place at von Krosigk’s house in the Grunewald, Berlin, following a luncheon attended by Himmler, Obersturmbannfuehrer [Werner] Grothmann, Berger, Brandt and Schellenberg. At this luncheon differences originating in discussions on the general situation arose between Himmler and the other members of the party outside Schellenberg, which so affected Himmler that he became irritated and at one point wished to cancel the meeting with von Krosigk. Himmler accompanied by Schellenberg nevertheless then left for von Krosigk’s house where von Krosigk and Reichsarbeitsminister [Franz] Seldte were awaiting them. On arrival Schellenberg withdrew with Seldte leaving Himmler and von Krosigk to discuss matters alone. Although Schellenberg was not present at this conversation he was later informed by von Krosigk that he had urged Himmler to bring the war to a speedy end and to take the control of the situation in his own hands. In the meantime exchanges of opinion had taken place between Schellenberg and Seldte who put forward the opinion that Himmler should take over the reins of power in the state, force Hitler on his birthday to broadcast a manifesto to the German people stating that a general election would be held, form a second party and abolish the People’s Courts. At the termination of these conversations Himmler and Schellenberg left for Hohenlychen, von Krosigk professing himself to Schellenberg satisfied with the discussions and pressing him to continue his efforts to influence Himmler along the lines agreed between them. It is believed by Schellenberg that von Krosigk on the day following this visit wrote a letter to Himmler confirming his proposals and once again pressing him to take decisive action. Arrival of Masur and Kersten. That same evening Schellenberg returned with Himmler to Hohenlychen where it was found that the military report gave a very depressing picture of the situation and Schellenberg counselled Himmler not to travel to Berlin for Hitler’s birthday celebrations due to take place the following day. Himmler however, who was in repeated telephone communication with Fegelein at the Reich Chancellery, regarding military and other questions, did not wish to omit appearing at this function. During the evening the report came in that Masur and Kersten had arrived at the Tempelhof air field and left for Kersten’s Hartzwalde estate. As Count Bernadotte was also expected in Berlin at this time and there was danger that the appointments could clash, Himmler asked Schellenberg to drive to Hartzwalde to commence preliminary discussions with Masur and to arrange with him for a suitable time for a meeting with Himmler. After supper had been eaten Schellenberg raised the question of sending Berger to South Germany secretly believing that Berger would to some extent act as a foil to Kaltenbrunner then in this area. In making this suggestion Schellenberg was also actuated by his fear for his own family who were in South Germany and therefore in the power of Kaltenbrunner in whom he had no shadow of trust. But Himmler failed to agree to this

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step and even went so far as to praise Kaltenbrunner for his past services, farsightedness and sagacity. 1945 April 20th. Preliminary discussions with Masur. After Schellenberg’s arrival in the early hours of the morning he had the opportunity of exchanging a few words with Kersten who was annoyed over Himmler’s inability to make up his mind and who expressed the view that the coming interview could be of little use excepting as a sign of Himmler’s “goodwill”. The next morning Schellenberg found Masur in nervous condition, bombing had been taking place in the vicinity during the early morning and also he was anxious that his departure from Berlin should not be delayed any later than the following Monday. He stated in fact that any postponement by Himmler of their meeting would mean that he would regretfully have to depart without accomplishing his mission. Schellenberg on his side explained to Masur at length the reasons for the breakdown of the arrangements made with Musy for the evacuation of the Jews and also gave him general information on conditions in Germany. In the afternoon of the same day a telephone message came through from the Swedish Legation advising Schellenberg of Bernadotte’s proposed departure from Berlin the following day and asking that an interview with Himmler might be arranged without delay. In order to avoid further postponements Schellenberg therefore arranged for Bernadotte to be taken to Hohenlychen where Himmler was then operating and was supposed to meet him. Discussions with Himmler preparatory to meetings with Masur and Bernadotte. Schellenberg now drove at 1700 hours to Schloss Ziethen at Wustrow to confer with Himmler. But although Brandt made every possible effort to hasten Himmler’s departure from the Reich Chancellery Himmler did not arrive at his destination until 2330 hours having been delayed by an air raid. Schellenberg then wasted no time in putting the situation before him explaining the position regarding Bernadotte and Masur and once more earnestly urging him to use the channel now open through Bernadotte to put an end to the war. But Himmler again had doubts, his uncertainty being now centred around his meeting with Masur. Finally Himmler decided to drive to Hartzwalde and from there on the same night to Hohenlychen where he intended to breakfast with the Count at 0600 hours. This having been decided on, he went on to outline to Schellenberg what he intended to say to Masur. The proposed address to the Jewish Congressional representative consisted essentially of a chronological summary of events coupled with an attempt at skilful justification. But Schellenberg pointed out that it was late in the day for vindicatory eloquence and it would be much better not to speak of the past but instead to determine shortly and precisely what had to be done to save those who could still be saved. Furthermore, Schellenberg suggested he should accentuate in his conversations with Masur that in the measures he intended to take he was putting himself in open contradiction and disobedience to Hitler making amends in this manner for his own personal conduct. At

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the end of this conversation Himmler intimated to Schellenberg that he would think over this advice. 1945 April 21st. Meeting with Masur. At 0115 hours with a driver, Brandt and Schellenberg, Himmler left Wustrow for Hartzwalde arriving there at 0230 hours despite low flying aircraft which had held the party up in a wood for a short time. After the customary greetings on arrival, the conference began; Himmler, Masur, Kersten, and Schellenberg taking part. Himmler opened the discussion. He said in substance that he himself wished to solve the question of the Jews by their banishment from the Reich but he was unable to carry his wishes into effect firstly because of world opposition and secondly because of dissentions [sic.] in their own ranks. Viewed as a whole, Schellenberg states, Himmler’s dissertation was an attempt to justify what Schellenberg terms as “the cosmic outcome of the event”. After Himmler had been speaking for about three quarters of an hour Masur said in reply that these explanations had been very interesting but they did nothing to alter the actual situation and that he was principally there in order to obtain the following assurances:— 1. That no more Jews should be allowed to be put to death, which he had heard had already been ordered by Himmler. 2. That the present number of Jews which was certainly not accurately known and disputable, were, whatever happened, to be kept in the camps and no longer evacuated. 3. That all camps in which there were still Jews should be catalogued and made known. To these points raised by Masur, Hitler [Himmler?] then agreed saying that he had already given orders to this effect and it was also arranged that the decision come to at the conference should be confirmed in writing. The conference now became general and as only unimportant matters were being discussed and time was short, if Himmler was to keep his appointment with Bernadotte, Schellenberg pressed for departure for Hohenlychen which actually took place at 0430 hours. Fifth discussion between Bernadotte and Himmler. Himmler and Schellenberg arrived punctually in Hohenlychen at 0600 hours and were immediately able to join Bernadotte at breakfast. Schellenberg states that from the very beginning of this conversation Himmler avoided a frank discussion of principles and confined himself to generalities. Amongst other things he made an offer to Bernadotte for permission to transport the women internees from Camp Ravensbrueck to Sweden. It is made clear by Schellenberg that this proposal had already been agreed to by Hitler as it had been placed before him by Himmler as not only a humanitarian act but in the circumstances a gesture against Russia. Sometime previously Prince Radziwil* in Geneva had passed to Schellenberg through Musy junior a list of Polish women interned *The Polish Prince Radziwil was personally unknown to Schellenberg but he believes that he had been allowed to emigrate in 1941 through the intervention of Goering and had taken a leading part in the Polish Resistance Movement from London.

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in this camp whose release he asked for. Apart from these Polish women Radziwil at this time had also requested the freeing of General Bor, the Polish Resistance Leader, and on April 24th 1945 Schellenberg was able with Himmler’s consent to give the order to the prison camp Kaltnow in Czechoslovakia for Bor to be conducted to the Swiss Frontier and handed over to the Swiss authorities.111 Bernadotte on the termination of the interview expressed his thanks for the offer regarding the Polish women and asked whether it would not be possible to transport the Danish and Norwegian prisoners as well to Sweden. Himmler declared that he was not in a position to authorise this but agreed that in the case of the camp being overrun no evacuation would take place. Departure of Bernadotte. Count Bernadotte then took his departure from Himmler accompanied by Schellenberg who remained with him as far as Warin in Mecklenburg. Before parting from Schellenberg Bernadotte summed up the situation in the words, “The Reichsfuehrer does not see the real situation any more. I cannot help him any more, for, for that, he would have had to have taken things in the Reich entirely into his own hands after my first visit. I can hardly allow him any more chances and you, my dear Schellenberg, would be more sensible to think of yourself.” Return to Hohenlychen. After his leave taking from Bernadotte, Schellenberg returned to Hohenlychen, slept for two hours and was called by Himmler who at 1230 hours was still in bed. Himmler complained that his health was not good and Schellenberg states that the picture he presented was of a soul torn by unrest and dissatisfaction. Then, and at lunch the military situation was discussed and Schellenberg repeated what he had told Himmler so often before that he alone could act but this time, Schellenberg added, he could see no way out for Germany. Journey to Wustrow. Schellenberg had convinced Himmler that it would be a mistake to drive to Berlin and the two men left for Wustrow at 1600 hours. Because of the numberless movements of troops and endless columns of refugees on all the arterial roads from Berlin to Mecklenburg Himmler’s car progressed with difficulty. At Loewenberg the congestion was so bad that they could no longer proceed and Schellenberg suggested that a company of their escort should be detached to clear the road, not only to allow them to continue their journey but also to enable the troops to move on. Just before Wustrow low flying aircraft were seen but these were attacking the troops behind. The condemnation of Prof. Dr. Brandt. On their return to Wustrow, Berger and a certain von Horff were awaiting them, Berger having been ordered to report to Himmler in order to receive instructions before leaving

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for the South in Himmler’s aircraft, which arrangement despite Himmler’s former refusal, had eventually been decided upon. In his conversations with Schellenberg, Himmler now appeared to regret that he had not taken a stronger line with Kaltenbrunner and prevented him from continually nullifying his orders particularly in the Musy affair. Schellenberg also raised the matter of what he termed as Hitler’s senseless attitude and Kaltenbrunner’s influence concerning the evacuation of prison camps, whereupon Himmler became restless and said, “Schellenberg, now don’t you start too. Hitler has been furious for days that Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen were not evacuated a hundred percent.” Information now came through by telephone from Fegelein to the effect that Hitler and Goebbels were angered with Berger for not remaining in Berlin as he was required in the case of Gruppenfuehrer Prof. Dr. [Karl] Brandt, Hitler’s former physician, who had been condemned to death because he purposely let his wife and family fall into the hands of the Americans at Thuringia. From the conversation overheard between Berger and Himmler, Schellenberg drew the conclusion that the sentence was the outcome of intrigues in Hitler’s closest circles, Eva Braun and Fegelein’s wife being implicated. Berger’s presence at the execution had been deemed necessary because of Bormann’s apparent desire to place the responsibility for this action at the door of Himmler or the SS.112 Himmler made every effort to hinder the carrying out of the sentence by raising difficulties, such as mendaciously signalling Berger’s departure for the South, hoping that such action would bring about a postponement. To protect Brandt from air raids Himmler had also had him moved to Schwerin. Shortly after Schellenberg had retired for the night he was again called by Himmler who wished once more to discuss the general situation in Germany. Himmler began by suggesting the line of action he would take if power were in his hands and went on to make vague hints about the removal of Hitler. He also asked Schellenberg if he had any proposals to make regarding the name for a second party whereupon Schellenberg suggested “Nationale Sammlungspartei” (National Coalition).113 At about 0430 hours Schellenberg was able to retire to bed. 1945 April 22nd. Dissentions [sic.] on military decisions. On the following morning, Sunday, Himmler breakfasted with Dr. Brandt and Schellenberg and announced that over night the military situation had further deteriorated and that four SS divisions under Obergruppenfuehrer [Felix] Steiner had been thrown into a suicide attack on the Russian flank. Although Himmler was still convinced of the necessity for this order of the Fuehrer’s [sic.] Schellenberg joined Grothmann, Himmler’s military adjutant, in condemning it as the cause of unnecessary bloodshed. The Vannamann [sic.] case. This same morning Schellenberg solicited Berger’s interest in General Vannamann [Vanaman] from whom he was without news since his departure for Switzerland, in view of his, Berger’s, imminent journey to the South of Germany. General Vannamann [sic.] was a former American Air Attache in Berlin who it was believed by Schellenberg had been shot down during the battles in Normandy. At the end

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of 1944 when Schellenberg was searching for contacts with the Western Powers in order to bring about peace discussions he had planned to send Vannamann [sic.] back to America for the purpose of opening negotiations, but the project was never consummated. When in January/February the proposal for the release of British officer PoWs, already dealt with in this report, was projected the question of utilising Vannamann [sic.] came once more under review, especially as in the meantime Vannamann [sic.] had shown himself zealous in his co-operation with the Red Cross. When approached Vannamann [sic.] declared himself willing to fly to Roosevelt in order to speed up assistance for Anglo-American PoWs and at the same time agreed to take to America a formal capitulation offer from Himmler which Schellenberg hoped to obtain. It was urged by Berger that Vannamann [sic.] should undertake his mission without Himmler’s permission but Schellenberg hesitated to take this course. Nevertheless Schellenberg broached the matter to Vannamann [sic.] and arranged that he should proceed to Constance with a view to later crossing the Swiss frontier and there await Himmler’s offer of capitulation which would be forwarded to the address of a certain Lange in this town. On his own responsibility Schellenberg then made preparations for Vannamann [sic.] to cross over into Switzerland. For this purpose he sent Eggen to Switzerland who with the assistance of Masson and the American Military Attache in Berne, General Legge [Brigadier General Barnwell R.Legge or 520 in OSS documents], made the necessary arrangements. At about the middle of March or the beginning of April Vannamann [sic.] and a companion, an American Air Force Colonel, left in civilian clothes in Schellenberg’s last reserve car accompanied by an escort who were in W/T contact with Schellenberg. But it was not until the 24th April 1945, after the break-up of the German Reich was far advanced and after they had been waiting for some time in Constance, that he gave permission for Vannamann [sic.] and his companion to cross over into Switzerland, as the capitulation statement had not been forthcoming from Himmler. Later Schellenberg received information from Col. Rayens in Stockholm that Vannamann [sic.] and his companion had arrived safely in America.114 Departure from Wustrow. At about 1200 hours Himmler together with Schellenberg left Wustrow for Hohenlychen their departure having been hastened by the report that a spear head of Russian tanks were operating in the neighbourhood of Loewenburg [Löwenberg]-Kremen [Kremmen]. Wehrmacht columns, guns, tanks and low flying aircraft delayed the journey and it was found necessary to drive in a northerly direction from Wustrow to Mecklenburg and then strike off eastwards in order to reach Hohenlychen. Himmler authorises capitulation offer. After a very late lunch at Hohenlychen at which Berger’s journey and Lorenz’s* affairs *Schellenberg states the Lorenz referred to is Obergruppenführer Lorenz, leader of the so-called Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and President of the Interstate Unions.

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were discussed Himmler intimated to Schellenberg that he wished him to remain behind after the meal and when they were alone he said: “I almost think, Schellenberg, that you are right. I must act in some way or other. What do you suggest?”. Schellenberg answered that it was now too late for the arrangements made with Vannaman [sic.] to be carried out but there remained still one possibility namely to discuss the situation completely openly with Bernadotte who Schellenberg states was even more accurately informed regarding the position than Himmler knew. Schellenberg went on to say that he was not certain whether he could reach Bernadotte in Germany or Denmark but since as far as he could remember Bernadotte had intended to remain in Luebeck, circumstances permitting, until Monday he might still be there. Himmler thereupon stated that he was now prepared to request the Count officially, in his, Himmler’s, name to carry a declaration of capitulation to the Western Powers. Schellenberg immediately prepared for departure and drove at about 1630 hours for Luebeck. Once again aerial activity, road blocks and so forth delayed the journey and Schellenberg did not arrive until night in Luebeck where he soon ascertained that the Count was not in the neighbourhood but at Apenrade in Denmark. After a comparatively short search Schellenberg succeeded in speaking to the Count by telephone and requested him to receive him in Flensburg. The meeting was arranged for the next day, 23rd April at 1500 hours at the Swedish Consulate in that town. 1945 April 23rd. Capitulation discussions with Bernadotte. After three hours rest Schellenberg telephoned Himmler informing him of his appointment with Bernadotte and then drove on to Flensburg. Here he arrived at 1300 hours and was met by Chiron, Attache at the Swedish Consulate in Flensburg, who conducted him to the Swedish Consul, Petersen, with whom he lunched. At 1500 hours Bernadotte arrived at Flensburg and Schellenberg immediately placed the position before him and outlined Himmler’s intentions. The Count considered that it was no longer necessary for him to meet Himmler at Luebeck as the terms of capitulation could be drafted in a letter addressed to Eisenhower. But Schellenberg replied that such a course was not possible as Hitler might still be alive and he pressed the Count to accompany him to Luebeck if only for a short discussion with Himmler. This arrangement was then agreed to by Bernadotte. Schellenberg now telephoned to the Sonderzug Steiermark* for the purpose of making an appointment with Himmler, but was obliged to content himself with Brandt’s promise that the message would be passed on, as Himmler was not then available. At 1800 hours Brandt rang up with the information that Himmler would meet the Count together with Schellenberg at Luebeck at 2200 hours. *The Sonderzug Steiermark was a special train used for the transport of Himmler and his whole staff, mostly in Germany and the occupied countries. It was particularly well equipped being furnished with telephone, teleprint and other apparatus by the aid of which it was possible to communicate with all parts. Himmler always referred to the train as Sonderzug Steiermark, his exact location being camouflaged in this way.

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Capitulation discussions between Himmler and Bernadotte. At about 1900 hours after a brief snack Bernadotte together with Schellenberg left Flensburg arriving at the Swedish Consulate at Luebeck at 2100 hours. Leaving Bernadotte at the Consulate Schellenberg then went to the Hotel Danziger Hof where General [Alfred] Wuennenberg of the Ordnungspolizei had set up his H.Q. and where Himmler intended to stay. After a short wait Schellenberg was ordered to present himself to Himmler and gave him a brief report of his conversation with Bernadotte, doing his best at the same time to strengthen him in his resolve to present an offer of capitulation to the Allies. Himmler and Schellenberg then drove to the Swedish Consulate where Bernadotte awaited them. Soon after the formal greetings were over an air raid was carried out on a neighbouring air field and the party were obliged to take cover in a shelter where they remained for an hour. The alarm having passed the discussions commenced with the aid of candles, the electric light having failed in the town. Himmler then delivered a long discourse on the military and political situation of the Reich followed by a more or less honest and accurate account of the whole situation which he terminated with the words: “We Germans must declare ourselves as beaten by the Western Allies. That is what I request you, through the Swedish Government to convey to General Eisenhower so that any further senseless fighting and unnecessary bloodshed may be spared. To the Russians it is impossible for us Germans, and above all for me, to capitulate. We will continue to fight there until the Western Allied front has, so to speak, relieved the fighting on the German front (i.e. taken over from us).”* 115 Himmler also declared that he had the authority to make these declarations to the Count for further transmission, as at this stage it could only be a question of one or two, or at the most three days before Hitler gave up his great life in this dramatic struggle. He also said that it was a consolation that Hitler should fall fighting against Bolshevism, the fight against which, he had dedicated his life. Count Bernadotte replied that he, on his side was prepared to pass on Himmler’s proposal, indicating that it was for him and certainly also for the Swedish Government a matter of first importance that the entire Northern Sector should be saved from senseless destruction. The form in which the declaration of capitulation should be handed to the Western Powers next came up for discussion and in the end after long deliberation, the original plan, in which Bernadotte should, without using official channels, fly to General Eisenhower and give Himmler’s declaration direct, was reverted to. It was also agreed that Himmler should write a letter to [Christian] Guenther, the Swedish Foreign Minister, in which it should be requested that he should give his sympathetic support to the proposals entrusted to Count Bernadotte.116 These arrangements having been come to, Himmler then discussed briefly with Schellenberg the form the letter to the Swedish Foreign Minister should take at the same time drafting it himself by the light of a candle on note-paper which had been hurriedly obtained. *This somewhat ambiguous statement has been quoted in Schellenberg’s own words.

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The Count then declared himself prepared to fly to Stockholm with Himmler’s letter on the following day, April 24th, and it was agreed that Schellenberg should accompany him as far as Flensburg, or Apenrade, in order to constitute a connecting link in case of questions or adjustments and to organise a rapid line of communication with Himmler for transmission of all necessary news. At 0130 hours Himmler and Schellenberg took a cordial departure from Bernadotte. 1945 April 24th. Himmler’s anxiety. The discussions with Bernadotte having terminated, Himmler and Schellenberg returned to General Wuennenberg’s quarters where they remained for half an hour talking over the decisions that had just been taken. This half hour Schellenberg states helped to lighten Himmler’s anxiety that what he had just done was in any way disloyal to the “Deutsche Volk”. His agitation after the meeting had in fact been very noticeable. Never a good driver, the driving of his large car between the Consulate and General Wuennenberg’s quarters because of his nervous condition, was unusually bad. So much so was this the case that he succeeded in thoroughly frightening one of Schellenberg’s men who was acting as guide and also in lodging one of the four wheels of the car off the drive before starting, delaying their departure for a quarter of an hour. Bernadotte’s departure. After Himmler had left for his HQ at about 0230 hours, Schellenberg returned to the Danziger Hof to arrange a few things, from where he left to pick up the Count at 0500 hours from the Swedish Consulate for the journey to Flensburg. When they came to the German Danish Frontier Schellenberg took leave of Bernadotte who said he hoped shortly to send news through the Attache Chiron or Count Lewenhaupt, Counsellor at the Swedish Legation, Lewenhaupt having been attached to Schellenberg to assist him to organise communications between Bernadotte and Himmler. Schellenberg then returned with Chiron to Flensburg where he rested for a few hours at the Swedish Consul Peterson’s house and in the afternoon of the same day left for Froeslev to organise the necessary telephone communications. This place was convenient for this purpose as it could be reached by telephone by Lewenhaupt at Padborg-Apenrade from where messages could be relayed over the Wehrmacht line to Flensburg. 1945 April 25th. Instructions to Dr. Best regarding Danish and Norwegian internees. On the day following the events chronicled above Schellenberg instructed Standartenfuehrer Bevensiepen to meet him in Flensburg in order to inform him of the special authority he had received in writing from Himmler, in which it was stated that Schellenberg had full powers to issue orders which were to be obeyed without question and also that all Danish and Norwegian internees were to be transferred to Sweden. On Bevensiepen’s arrival Schellenberg ordered him to proceed to Copenhagen to open

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discussions with Dr. Best, the Reichsbevollmaechtigter in Denmark and particularly to see that no further death sentences were carried out. 1945 April 26th. Messages regarding capitulation. On the 26th April Schellenberg received a message from Lewenhaupt to the effect that negotiations were not proceeding well, mainly because Himmler was unacceptable to the Western Powers as a person with whom discussions could be undertaken. This message was not passed on by Schellenberg to Himmler. In the late afternoon of the same day, Schellenberg received a visit from Oberstlt. [Eckhardt] von Dewitz who had received a W/T message from the Frontaufklaerungschef Oberst [Georg] Buntrock stating that a Frontaufklaerung Kommando had made contact with an American recce [sic.] party and were requesting permission to enter into an arrangement to work together with them. It was agreed that the report was of great interest and a further exact account would be required. But although enquiries were made no further information reach[ed] Schellenberg. In the night of 26/27 April 1945 a message arrived stating that the Count was to be expected at Odense airport from Copenhagen on the next day. 1945 April 27th. Bernadotte reports Allied refusal to negotiate with Himmler. At 1100 hours on the following day Schellenberg drove with Lewenhaupt to Odense aerodrome where he awaited the arrival of Bernadotte’s plane, which because of the delay in starting caused by bad weather, did not land until 1600 hours. Over a rapid breakfast at Apenrade where they had driven from the airport, Schellenberg and Bernadotte discussed the negative results of his negotiations.117 Bernadotte reported that the difficulties which had arisen were due to the fact that Himmler, because of his political reputation, was unacceptable to the Allies as a person with whom negotiations could be opened. He went on to state however that speaking in the capacity of a private representative for Denmark and Norway he had good grounds for believing that the Swedish Government were interested that the whole of this Northern Sector including Denmark and Norway should be spared the destruction that continued fighting would bring about. Through the negative results of the peace offer and the aggravating circumstances that the World press had got wind of the affair and had taken the matter up, Schellenberg believed that his position with Himmler had become extremely delicate, he was therefore relieved when Bernadotte intimated his wish to accompany him to Himmler for further conversations. With this end in view, it was then arranged to leave for Luebeck at 0400 hours on the following morning. Schellenberg now returned to Flensburg and endeavoured to ring up Himmler but only succeeded in speaking to Brandt through whom Himmler gave a flat refusal to further conversations with Bernadotte and the order that Schellenberg should report to Himmler alone.

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1945 April 28th. Schellenberg and Wulff visit Himmler at Luebeck. The message from Brandt advising Schellenberg of Himmler’s refusal to see Bernadotte had been given at 0100 hours and Schellenberg, not wishing to disturb Bernadotte so early in the morning, drove from Flensburg to Apenrade where he arrived at 0400 hours. There he explained personally that Bernadotte was not to accompany him as Himmler was too near the front, Brandt having in fact stated that it would be necessary to go further south than Luebeck to reach Himmler’s H.Q. The coming interview with Himmler after the failure of Bernadotte’s mission raised considerable misgivings in Schellenberg as he believed that he was now so discredited with Himmler that under certain circumstances he would even reckon with liquidation. In his dilemma he resorted to once again using the services of Wulff, the astrologer, knowing that Himmler had a deep regard for his opinions and hoping that an astrological session might absorb some of the bitterness and disappointment occasioned by the Allied refusal to negotiate. Schellenberg’s discussions with Himmler on the failure of Bernadotte’s mission. Schellenberg waited at the Danziger Hof in Luebeck until he was called at 2000 hours to Wuennenberg’s H.Q. to report to Himmler. In the discussions that followed Schellenberg gave his account of the conversations with Bernadotte and the unofficial advice of the Swedish Government with regard to the northern sector which Bernadotte had transmitted. The conversation then passed on to the various questions arising out of the Allied refusal to negotiate, namely, Himmler’s bitter disappointment, the disclosures to the World Press, Himmler’s fear that his letter to the Foreign Minister, Guenther, might also be published, possible consequences with Hitler and his Schellenberg’s, responsibility as moving spirit in what was seemingly so fatal a step. Nevertheless despite all these discordant factors and the position created by the refusal of the Western Powers to open discussions, Schellenberg, with the assistance of Wulff was successful in convincing Himmler of the futility of continuing resistance to the end in Denmark and Norway and the great harm useless destruction in these countries would do to what remained of Germany’s reputation. These proposals were in fact put forward so persuasively that in the end Himmler withdrew to think the matter over. After an hour’s deliberation Himmler at 0300 hours returned to Schellenberg and gave him authority to continue discussions with the Count, in the first place for the suspension of the military occupation in Norway and the consequent internment of the German troops in Sweden for the duration of the war. Himmler also declared himself prepared to accept a similar solution in Denmark but wished to reserve action until a later date, nevertheless authorising Schellenberg to brief Best on these lines. Finally Himmler stated that he was prepared to nominate Schellenberg his “Sonderbevollmaechtigter” to negotiate with the Swedish Government for a peaceful solution to the position in the Northern Sector. Schellenberg states that at this time Himmler had no longer any doubts that within the next day or two he would be in a position, as Hitler’s successor, to make

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these decisions. At the end of the meeting Schellenberg at once set off for Apenrade for a discussion with Bernadotte within the limits of his authority. 1945 April 29th. Meeting with Bernadotte at Apenrade. Schellenberg arrived in Apenrade between 1100 and 1200 hours on the 29th April 1945 and lunched with Bernadotte at the house of Amtmann Thomsen. The two men then discussed the question regarding the action to be taken in the northern area and Bernadotte arranged a meeting for the following day between Schellenberg and representatives of the Swedish Government at which he himself was to be present. Bernadotte and Schellenberg left Apenrade at 1700 hours and reached Hotel d’Angleterre at Copenhagen at 2330 hours. Before departure Schellenberg had received from Thomsen a number of requests for the suspension of sentences, release of Danish policemen etc. all of which he dealt with in Copenhagen on the following day. 1945 April 30th. Discussions with representatives of the Swedish Government. The morning after Schellenberg’s arrival in Copenhagen he went first to make himself known to Best to inform him of the powers that had been invested in him by Himmler, the decision to abandon the military occupation of the northern sector without fighting and Himmler’s succession to Hitler, finding him as he had expected willing to co-operate. At midday conversations then took place between Schellenberg, von Post of the Swedish Government and Bernadotte, the delegates, Oesstroem and Major von Horn, members of the Swedish Commission not taking part in the discussions. At this conference the Swedish Government asked that the German Government place clear and definite proposals before them as regards Norway and possibly Denmark. After this meeting the Swedish Ambassador to Denmark, von Dardel gave a luncheon for the delegates to which Best was also invited. Immediately after the luncheon Schellenberg started back for Luebeck with the intention of reporting to Himmler the results of his conversation with the representatives of the Swedish Government and obtaining instructions that would enable the plan regarding the northern sector, which had been agreed to in principle, to be carried into execution. The ferry between Korsoer and Niborg was delayed two hours for his passage enabling him to drive the same night to Flensburg where he held a short telephone conversation with Himmler. 1945 May 1st. Schellenberg’s dismissal from Amt VI by Kaltenbrunner. On his arrival at Flensburg at 0400 hours, Schellenberg found awaiting his Stubaf Dr. Wirsing, one of the members of his Amt, who had flown in a night fighter from Munich, as the representative of Schellenberg’s closest associates, to inform him that Kaltenbrunner had relieved him of all his appointments in the R.S.H.A. replacing him with Ostubaf [Wilhelm] Waneck and Ostubaf Skorzeny respectively in the political and military section of the Amt. On receipt of this information Schellenberg arranged that Dr.

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Wirsing should accompany him to Himmler so that he could return to the southern sector armed with the necessary orders from Himmler. Schellenberg then set out for Luebeck where on arrival at 0400 hours an adjutant of Himmler had been detailed to escort him to Himmler’s new quarters at Kalkhorst by [sic.] Travemuende. Once again on the road he was obliged to traverse, extreme congestion prevailed, retreating troops from the Mecklenburg district and particularly from Schwerin so encumbering the route that the speed of the car was very often reduced to a walking pace. Grossadmiral Doenitz takes over the Government of the Reich. On Schellenberg’s arrival at Kalkhorst he was informed that Himmler was still in bed not having gone to rest until 0300 hours in the morning. He therefore at once contacted Brandt who told him that Hitler’s successor was not Himmler as had been expected but Grossadmiral Doenitz. Brandt also said that already during the night the first meeting between Doenitz and Himmler had taken place at Ploen when Himmler in accordance with Schellenberg’s original suggestion had managed to prevail upon Doenitz to dismiss Ribbentrop and to install von Krosigk as Foreign Minister. But this partial tactical success had done nothing to relieve Himmler’s depression for in Doenitz’s purely military circles Himmler’s political dealings with the Western Powers found little if any understanding and in fact Schellenberg states that Himmler was actually toying with the idea of resigning or committing suicide. After half an hour’s rest Schellenberg received a message from Himmler inviting him to join him at breakfast at 0900 hours in order to report on his conversations with von Post, Best and Bernadotte. Schellenberg found Himmler very nervous and distraught and in such a frame of mind that he admitted that he was no longer able to deal with the situation. He told Schellenberg that the dismissal of Ribbentrop and the appointment of von Krosigk was the only thing he had been able to accomplish and he wished therefore Schellenberg to accompany him to Doenitz so that he could be appointed von Krosigk’s immediate assistant and suggested that at the same time it would be as well if Schellenberg would put forward to the new Government his ideas with regard to policy to be carried out in Norway and Denmark. Himmler also considered that Schellenberg should remain permanently with von Krosigk and Doenitz and that another should be sent to Sweden to carry on any negotiations with the Swedish Government should it be possible to prevail upon the Government to abandon the northern sector without further hostilities. Visit of Himmler and Schellenberg to Doenitz. It was therefore decided after long discussion that Schellenberg should accompany Himmler to Ploen to meet Doenitz. After a drive made difficult by encumbered roads and dive bomber attacks they reached Ploen at 1400 hours where Schellenberg spoke to von Krosigk and greeted Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl but these officers were so preoccupied with the military situation that there was no possibility of opening discussions. In the afternoon Schellenberg again went over the immediate political questions with Himmler stressing the necessity for a rapid solution to the problem of the northern sector. Both Schellenberg and Himmler were of the opinion that von Krosigk shared their views,

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but they believed that Doenitz, Keitel and Jodl were under no circumstances at this time prepared to discontinue the struggle in Norway. On the other hand Schellenberg had promised von Post to return to Copenhagen with a decision and it was clear that any long delay in Ploen would mean so much loss of time that the negotiations with the Swedish Government would hardly be possible. It was therefore agreed that Himmler should continue to press von Krosigk with a view to obtaining a solution to the problem of the northern sector as already envisaged and that Schellenberg should return to Copenhagen to explain to von Post the changed general situation and give assurance of continued agreement in principle despite the altered conditions. In the meantime Generaloberst [Franz] Boehme, Reichskommissar [Josef] Terboven, Generaloberst Brindemann and Reichsbevollmaechtigter Best had been ordered to meet Doenitz, to discuss Himmler’s proposals for the northern sector, but it was thought by Schellenberg and Himmler that as no definite decision was to be expected from the Admiral before the conference had taken place that the interval should be used as had been intended in informing von Post in Copenhagen of the new position. Schellenberg drafts memorandum for submission to von Krosigk. Therefore, in conformity with this decision Schellenberg left Ploen at 1500 hours for Flensburg, where he arrived at 1900 hours. At Flensburg Schellenberg together with Wirsing set about drafting a report on the general situation which he intended to submit to von Krosigk as his first task in collaboration with him. This document was primarily intended to demonstrate that the results of any political bargaining with the Western Powers would depend on the internal political measures adopted by the new Government and it also contained the suggestion that Doenitz should dissolve the Nazi Party, the Gestapo and the SD and announce this action by radio. By this time Schellenberg was suffering from fatigue, and having instructed Wirsing as to the lines on which the report was to be written he left the work in his hands and retired to rest for a few hours. Schellenberg’s dismissal by Kaltenbrunner, probably, Schellenberg states, because of the general situation, had not been taken with great seriousness by Himmler and it was agreed that Wirsing should fly back to the southern sector on the next night, outwardly submitting to higher authority, while actually remaining loyal to Schellenberg. Having snatched a few hours sleep Schellenberg drove the same night to Froeslev where he telephoned Best who had expressed the wish to meet him at 0700 hours the next day, before his interview with Doenitz, in order to receive the latest news regarding the situation. This interview, however, failed to materialise owing to a misunderstanding with regard to the time schedule of the ferry between Korsoer and Niborg. During Schellenberg’s last visit to Denmark Bernadotte had placed his personal Red Cross car at his disposal, thereby not only giving excellent cover in his journeys to and fro, but considerably facilitating his movements by enabling him to pass without difficulty the military and other control posts.

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1945 May 2nd. Schellenberg explains the position to von Post and Oesstroem. On arrival at Copenhagen at 1300 hours Schellenberg telephoned to von Dardel who arranged a meeting with von Post and Oesstroem for that afternoon at 1600 hours. At this conference Schellenberg gave a general description of the altered situation under the new Government and stated that for the present Doenitz had taken over the military and civil command of Denmark and Norway, but that he had good ground for believing that the plan he had put forward had the support of the Foreign Minister von Krosigk and Himmler so that its execution was still possible. Von Post replied that Sweden was naturally greatly interested in a bloodless settlement in the Northern Sector but admitted that he did not think that he could any longer undertake anything binding as the general situation was so greatly altered owing to the changed Government and the passage of time, that it was now necessary to reckon with a total capitulation within the next few days, in which case, any partial solution in Denmark and Norway was no longer of interest to Sweden. Nevertheless he suggested pursuing the old plan and as soon as time and circumstances permitted he hoped that a definite proposal might be handed to him. It was also agreed as the time factor was of importance that Schellenberg should return to Ploen as rapidly as practicable and if possible give a provisional report by telephone, the following telephonic code being arranged for this purpose: Message

Meaning

I should be glad to see the gentleman again.

German Government’s definite proposal for Norway.

and please tell them this.

(If included in the message above,) the offer is extended to Denmark.

The discussions in Copenhagen had been conducted in the strictest secrecy and von Post and Oesstroem now intimated that they could for reasons of security no longer remain in Denmark. 1945 May 3rd. Return to Ploen. Removal of seat of Government to Marineschule Muerwick. That same night Schellenberg started on the return to Ploen by way of Padborg where he only arrived at 0400 hours, having been delayed by a dive bomber attack, the first that he experienced in Denmark. From Padborg he continued his journey to Flensburg collected Wirsing’s draft of the report he had produced for him and drove on to Ploen. The journey to Ploen Schellenberg has described as the most difficult and dangerous he has ever undertaken. Over a comparatively short route of ninety kilometres he experienced more than a dozen dive bomber attacks while traversing roads jammed with the vehicles of retreating columns of motorised troops partly immobilised through damage and shortage of petrol. Burnt out lorries, corpse strewn streets, and exploding tanks and ammunition trucks added to the confusion and machine gun fire often obliged Schellenberg to lie prone by the side of the road and in the fields. Search parties had been despatched in

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search of his car and the frontier police at Kuppenmuehle near Flensburg, where he was obliged to cross the boundary between the two countries, had been informed of the government’s change of location, but it was not until his arrival at Ploen that he was told that the seat of the Goverment was now at the Marineschule at Muerwick. On receipt of this information, as he considered that his mission permitted no delay, he once again took to the road starting back through the congested route the way he had come. At 1700 hours Schellenberg arrived in Muerwick and presented himself to von Krosigk and Himmler, and gave them an account of his deliberations with the representatives of the Swedish Government. In a comparatively short time it was then agreed that in spite of the unfavourable course of events it was important under the circumstances to abandon Denmark and Norway without resistance the negotiations to be carried out if possible through the intermediary of Sweden. This decision having been arrived at Schellenberg was then granted a long interview with von Krosigk at which von Krosigk intimated that he would have liked Schellenberg to remain with him and take over the position of his first assistant (Mitarbeiter) but he considered it important that Schellenberg should first arrange the question of the Northern Sector as discussed with the Swedish Government, as action in this matter could not be delayed pending general capitulation. Schellenberg states that the failure at this time to accept total capitulation was due to the situation on the Boemisch-Maehrischen [Bohemian-Moravian] sector of the Eastern Front where the army group under the command of General Feldmarschall [Ferdinand] Schroener [Schörner] and General Oberst [Lothar] Rendulic comprising a million men equipped with ammunition and provisions for several weeks were not only still intact but also more than holding their own. It was also arranged at this conversation with von Krosigk that apart from Schellenberg’s mission regarding the Northern Sector which was primarily concerned with the task of arranging proposals for Denmark he was to be entrusted with the task of arranging a meeting with General Eisenhower either for himself or a member of the German Government, alternatively through the Swedish Government or the Swedish Red Cross. The intention of von Krosigk and the Government was that Schellenberg, through open negotiations with the Swedish Government should be permitted to do everything in his power to alleviate the difficult position of the German Reich and mitigate subsequent distress while continuing at the same time to endeavour to prise open what Schellenberg terms Eisenhower’s “firmly shut door”. Together with von Krosigk and Staatsminister Funk, who had come from Prague, Schellenberg then discussed the Czechoslovakian problem but this question was not at that time sufficiently developed for von Krosigk to make a decision. With regard to the question of Denmark, von Krosigk now believed it would be wiser to immediately include Denmark in the negotiations then being carried out by Admiral [Hans-Georg] Friedeburg with General [Field Marshal] [Bernard L.] Montgomery over North Western Germany. He asked Schellenberg to include this question in his forthcoming discussions with Doenitz as he contended that the military circles which surrounded the head of the Government were quite without understanding of the political aspects of the Northern Sector as part of the general situation in the whole German Reich.

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Interview with Doenitz. At 2000 hours Schellenberg was received by Doenitz and he commenced to place his views before him regarding the northern area. Schellenberg states that Doenitz’s military advisers had obviously pointed out the favourable strategical position, not only of the Army, particularly the troops under Generaloberst Boehme, but also of the Navy, in this sector, with the result that Doenitz would not at first consider the abandoning of Norway and the internment of German troops in Sweden for the duration of the war. In the discussions that followed Schellenberg called attention to the political significance of a surrender in the northern zone and the advantages of the enlistment of the goodwill of Sweden which such action might be expected to occasion. To this Doenitz enquired precisely what immediate gains such action would have for Germany. Schellenberg then went on to explain that in the present circumstances any immediate gain was difficult to prove but that the eventual results of such a policy would be the saving of what remained of the reputation of the Reich and the sparing of the German people from further destruction. He also contended that Sweden, when it came to the political bargaining between the Powers in the near future was the only neutral to whom even a broken Germany was of importance. In the end the discussion was adjourned without any decision being come to. Von Krosigk, Keitel, Jodl and Schellenberg then took supper together when the same topics dealt with at Schellenberg’s interview with Doenitz once more came under discussion. Keitel and Jodl gave it as their opinion that Schellenberg should not go to Sweden but remain with von Krosigk to advise him on foreign affairs but Schellenberg still stressed the importance of a rapid solution to the northern question. Schellenberg then endeavoured to prevail upon von Krosigk to influence Doenitz to agree to the carrying out of his suggestions regarding the dissolution of the Nazi Party, Gestapo etc. proposals for which had been set out in the draft of the report prepared by Wirsing. Up to this time although it had been agreed by von Krosigk that Schellenberg should be empowered by the German Government to negotiate with the Swedish Government and possibly with the Western Powers, the exact capacity in which he was to travel to Stockholm had not been decided. Various suggestions were now put forward, that for instance the appointment should be made as “Botschafter” (envoy), “Sonderbevollmaechtigter” (plenipotentiary extraordinary), “Beauftragter” (delegate), but it was in the end decided by Schellenberg in whose hands the decision was eventually left and [sic.] he should be named “Gesandter” (minister). In order that the necessary formalities for this appointment should be arranged the State Secretaries von Steengracht and Hencke were called to von Krosigk that same night and asked to prepare the plenary powers and form of appointment in this rank. This having been done von Krosigk together with Schellenberg once more opened discussions with Doenitz who delayed his final decision until the morning as he wished to think the matter over. Schellenberg now reported to Himmler whom he found ruefully disposed regarding his own past inaction but vaguely hopeful about Schellenberg’s mission.

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1945 May 4th. Schellenberg is appointed as Gesandter with plenary powers. The following morning Doenitz consented to Schellenberg’s appointment as “Gesandter” and signed a document conferring plenary powers to negotiate with the Swedish Government, at 0930 hours. Schellenberg thereupon took leave of von Krosigk and left for Copenhagen at noon. Arrival at Copenhagen and demonstrations in Dagmarhaus. The stretch of road to Hadersleben in Denmark traversed by Schellenberg in his journey to Copenhagen was subject to heavy dive bomber attack and it was not until 1800 hours that he was able to reach his destination. On arrival he endeavoured to contact Best with the intention of giving him instructions and informing him of the mission with which he had been instructed. News however had got about of the imminent capitulation of Germany causing large crowds to gather in the Rathausplatz at Dagmarhaus where Schellenberg awaited Best in order to go with him to the Swedish Ambassador, von Dardel. Schellenberg had specially driven from Muerwick by [sic.] Padborg in order to request Best to communicate the prearranged telephone code message to von Dardel but it was now clear to Schellenberg that this message had evidently not reached Stockholm. Schellenberg felt therefore that he was unable to afford the loss of any more time by waiting for Best who was obviously delayed by the confusion in the town. After some argument with the S.S. guard he prevailed upon them to make a way through the wire that surrounded the Rathausplatz and allow him to set off for the Embassy in Bernadotte’s car. But before he had gone far the car was recognised by the crowd, wild demonstrations so delaying its progress that Schellenberg’s efforts to reach the Swedish Embassy took over an hour and a half. At the Swedish Embassy, where von Dardel was awaiting him, crowds had also assembled singing the Danish and Swedish National Anthems and it was not until these dispersed, his conversations in the meantime with von Dardel having been finished, that he was able to make his way to the Hotel d’Angleterre for a few hours rest. 1945 May 5th. Negotiations with von Post and State Secretary Boheman. On the following day, that is the morning of 5th May 1945, Schellenberg left Copenhagen in Bernadotte’s Danish Red Cross plane for Malmoe where he arrived at 0715 hours. Ten minutes later he took his seat in a Swedish military plane already awaiting him which landed him in Broma in Sweden two hours later. From Broma he was escorted by Oesstroem to Bernadotte’s house where discussions immediately commenced with von Post and State Secretary [Erik] Boheman. The conversation started by Schellenberg showing his credentials and written authority to negotiate with the Swedish Government and by his giving von Post and Boheman of the Swedish Foreign Office details of his mission and the views of the

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German Government. After exhaustive discussions the Swedish delegates decided first of all, before going any further, to discuss the whole situation with the representatives of the Western Powers, then present in Stockholm. As a provisional reply to these enquiries the Swedish Government received the information that in certain circumstances a special mission set up by General Eisenhower, could be sent to Stockholm to discuss the existing problems. 1945 May 6th. Capitulation discussions with Generaloberst Boehme’s staff. The day following these events brought no change in the Swedish attitude and it was suggested that Schellenberg should demonstrate his full authority by obtaining from Generaloberst Boehme an undertaking to implement the results of the negotiations with the Swedish Government. In order to waste as little time as possible Schellenberg arranged to send Thomsen, the German Minister to Sweden, to the Norwegian frontier to discuss with Generals Boehme or [Hermann] Hoelter the surrender in Norway and the internment of German troops in Sweden. A Swedish bomber was placed at Thomsen’s disposal in which on the morning of 6th May 1945 he flew to the Norwegian border and met Boehme’s Chief of Staff. At lunch Thomsen telephoned to Stockholm and explained that he had in fact been successful in opening discussions with the Chief of Staff but that this officer’s attitude was other than he had expected. He also declared his intention of returning to Stockholm forthwith to discuss the matter with Schellenberg as he considered it impossible to deal with the questions involved on the telephone. A conference was then held between Rieckert [Arvid Richert], Swedish Minister to Germany, von Post, Bernadotte and Schellenberg at which this new development was discussed. Rieckert [sic.] suggested that Doenitz should be approached and informed that Boehme had not yet been notified of Schellenberg’s plenary powers. After a general discussion Schellenberg’s suggestion that a message should be sent by telegraph was over-ruled and it was arranged that Doenitz should be reached by telephone. But when communication was eventually established over Oslo the line was so bad that conversation was hardly possible. Later however Schellenberg was able to speak to von Krosigk and learnt that events had moved very rapidly over night, Germany having declared total capitulation. Von Krosigk further said that negotiations were still being carried on and he adjured Schellenberg to be careful not to cause any trouble with the Anglo-Americans as the Norwegian question had been included in negotiations. He added that should the Swedish Government still be interested they should themselves approach the Western Allies. The Swedish delegates declared on receiving this news that there was no longer any possibility of further action as quite evidently the Norwegian problem as well as the Danish question had become part of the general capitulation negotiations. They also stated that it was further now only possible to wait and see whether the Western Allies intended to approach the Swedish Government regarding the internment of the German fighting forces. At the request of the British Military Attache Schellenberg transmitted through von Post and General Uthmann a notification of the Western Allies to Generaloberst Boehme

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that he should make direct contact with England by W/T short wave. From this action Schellenberg understood that the Western Powers especially England did not wish to use the medium of the Swedish Government to carry out capitulation negotiations but preferred to deal directly with the German Government. The further plan therefore requesting the Swedish Government to arrange a meeting for von Krosigk or Schellenberg with General Eisenhower fell through. 1945 May 9th. Last telephone conversation with Germany. In Schellenberg’s last telephone conversation with Flensburg on the 9th May 1945 he was given to understand that the active participation of the Swedish Red Cross for the possible internment of German troops in Norway was exclusively a question for the Swedish Red Cross and the British Military Authorities to settle. 1945 May 8th–15th. Stay in Bernadotte’s house. The discussions with the Swedish Government having been brought to an end by the final capitulation of Germany, Schellenberg accepted the offer of Count Bernadotte to remain at his home near Stockholm as his guest. The constant journeys and negotiations had been for him both bodily and mentally exhausting and he was glad of this opportunity for recuperation. After Schellenberg had recovered somewhat from his fatigue he consulted Count Bernadotte and certain of his Swedish friends, with a view to coming to a decision regarding his future plans. After long discussions it was resolved that Schellenberg should remain for the time being in Sweden and should endeavor later to obtain work in the German Administration for the British Military Government, should the British wish to employ him, such an employment being intended to be subsequent to his having voluntarily given information regarding his previous intelligence work. Schellenberg also during this period made the acquaintance of Eckeberg, the President of the Swedish Royal Court of Justice, Dr. Nordwall, Dr. Frickman and other members of the Swedish Red Cross. 1945 May 15th–June 10th. Schellenberg moves to Saltjoe-Duvnaes and writes an autobiographical summary of events immediately preceding capitulation. In the course of one of his conversations with Bernadotte about this time, Bernadotte informed Schellenberg that he was engaged in writing an account of his mission to Germany, with the intention of putting on record the events leading up to capitulation and he suggested that Schellenberg should undertake on his side a similar task. Bernadotte believed that a work of this kind would be difficult to produce later if it were necessary to depend upon the memory for the chronological sequence of events and he therefore proposed to Schellenberg that he should set down on paper a description of the happenings in which Schellenberg was concerned during the last few weeks in Germany, while the facts were still fresh in his memory.

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Owing to the curiosity of the Press, Schellenberg was seldom able to leave the house and he was of the opinion that an occupation of this nature would relieve the tedium of his forced inactivity and at the same time be good for his state of mind. Furthermore Schellenberg could now count on the assistance of his secretary and her fiance, Hauptsturmfuhrer [Franz] Goering,* both at this time in Sweden, to assist him not only on [sic.] the actual work but [also] in recalling the exact order of events. He therefore came to the decision that he would employ himself in this way and in order to avail himself of the services of his secretary and Goering moved from Bernadotte’s house to the house belonging to Rittmeister Angarkrona, head of the Red Cross Delegation, at Saltjoe-Duvnaes, where they were quartered, together with other members of his staff. It was Schellenberg’s original intention to produce a rough outline from which his book could be afterwards elaborated but he abandoned this idea when he saw the necessity of voluntarily surrendering to the Americans or the British, writing instead a short autobiographical summary of events. Copies of this summary were distributed as follows: one copy to Bernadotte; one copy to Guenther, the Swedish Foreign Minister (who originally read Bernadotte’s copy); one copy to Storch; two copies taken by Schellenberg in his luggage to Frankfurt. Since Goering had taken part in many of the events dealt with by Schellenberg in his summary, Schellenberg asked him to write an eye witness account, in order to supplement and confirm certain parts of his story, this document being added to Schellenberg’s own account.118 Apart from occupying himself with the dictation of his story Schellenberg also at this time received medical treatment from Kersten and met a number of his friends amongst these being General Directors Brandin and Moeller. He also had several conversations with Masur and made the personal acquaintance of Storch. At the beginning of June Moeller approached Schellenberg with the suggestion that he could place the information in his possession voluntarily at the disposal of the Western Powers. Schellenberg agreed to this proposal and a meeting was arranged with Col. Rayens, the American Military Attache, at Bernadotte’s home when Schellenberg gave certain information. Some time later a second meeting with Col. Rayens took place at the same address and it was then suggested, after Schellenberg had given a brief account of his activities, that he should submit to interrogation, Col. Rayens intimating that he would consult with the higher authorities as to the best plan to be pursued. After a few days, that is to say on or about June 8th, Schellenberg was informed by Bernadotte that arrangements had been made for him to fly on the 16th or 17th of the same month to Frankfurt-on-Main in order to place himself at the disposal of the American authorities. *Goering, originally of Amt IV, had been placed by Schellenberg in charge of the transport of the Poles and Jews and later, with the assistance of Bernadotte, had been brought to Sweden.

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1945 June 10th–June 17th. Departure from Sweden. On the 10th June 1945 Schellenberg vacated Saltjoe-Duvnaes and returned to Bernadotte’s house, the members of his staff finding quarters in the boarding house used by members of the German Embassy at Trosa. At about this time articles appeared in the Swedish paper “Aftenbladet” giving certain information regarding Schellenberg and although the Swedish Foreign Office were able to stop them by issuing an official publication, Schellenberg came to the conclusion he would leave Bernadotte’s house in order to spare him any unpleasantness. He therefore left for Trosa where the rest of his staff were living but in a short time his whereabouts were discovered by the Press reporters who, he states, besieged his room, day and night, obliging him to return to Bernadotte’s house. There he remained until the last few days before his departure when he went to a nearby hotel, the Bernadotte family being absent. 1945 June 17th. On the morning of the 17th June Schellenberg in company with Col. Rayens and Count Bernadotte flew in an American Dakota to Frankfurt a/Main where he was taken charge of by the Allied authorities.

CONCLUSIONS The sincerity of Schellenberg’s efforts to draw Germany out of the war and effect a compromise peace with the Western Allies at the expense of Russia appears to be established beyond doubt. He certainly seems to have foreseen Germany’s inevitable downfall at a considerably earlier date than most of his associates, and to have taken action accordingly in a manner indicating undeniable courage. His demeanour at this camp [Camp 020] has not produced any evidence of outstanding genius as appears to have been generally attributed to him. On the contrary his incoherency and incapability of producing lucid verbal or written statements have rendered him a more difficult subject to interrogate than other subjects of inferior education and of humbler status. His “legal training” when examined is found to have led him into the realm of political theory rather than practice. It is true that he introduced a number of common sense and patently needed reforms into the German Intelligence System, yet his abilities even such as they are, aided by a capacity for intrigue, made him more than a match for his colleagues in the corrupt German Intelligence Service. With a full knowledge of what is at stake, it seems almost certain that Schellenberg has told the truth while under interrogation in his own interest, but the truthful facts he tells are undoubtedly somewhat naturally so presented as to place himself in the best possible light. In so far as he is capable thereof he appears to have co-operated in a bonafide manner throughout interrogation.

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While assessing his veracity and integrity account had to be taken of the fact that Schellenberg had no scruples in using his voluntary membership of the S.D. to gratify his own ambitions, and there is no indication that he has done other than condoned the National Socialist system for a considerable period. A remarkable feature of his career is the strange friendship Himmler “the schoolmaster” adduced for him in 1939, at a time when Schellenberg was still a comparatively unknown and unimportant figure. His rapid rise to power thereafter is undoubtedly mainly due to this friendship. In striking the balance, the scales hang considerably in his favour. He played an important role in averting hostilities between Germany and Switzerland and Sweden, and did much to assist nationals of both the latter two countries. His peace efforts with the Western Allies are already sufficiently recorded and it should be borne in mind that his decision to leave Neutral Sweden on June 17th 1945 and surrender himself for interrogation by the Allies was an entirely voluntary one. The conclusions and estimation of reliability of information given above are those of the Interrogating officer. H C Harrison [signature] Squadron Leader R.A.F.119

APPENDICES

Appendix I. Amt IV/Gruppe IV.E Organisation and Cases SCHELLENBERG’S OBSERVATIONS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT AND ORGANISATION OF GRUPPE IV. E. Immediately antecedent to the creation of Gruppe IV.E. the Geheime Staatspolizeiamt consisted of:– Abteilung I

–

Administration of Law Personnel, etc.

Abteilung II

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The State Police.

Abteilung III

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Counter-espionage Department. Abwehr Abteilung.

Abteilung II had been most powerfully developed in the Prussian State Police but it also existed in almost all the former individual State Police Services. From the stand-point of organisation and personnel, Abteilung III was a self-contained Department which maintained its own separate existence alongside the actual State Police (Abteilung II). It also enjoyed great secrecy in the exercise of its functions, all documents dealt with, for instance, were secret or top secret (Geheim oder Geheime Reichssachen) and access to the section’s offices was only permitted on the production of a special permit, etc. This special position was also held by Abteilung III units in the various Staatspolizeistellen, which themselves, also maintained different methods of working such as indexing, filing, etc., according to which Landespolizei [regional police] they belonged, i.e. Bavaria, Wuertemberg, Saxony, etc. It was intended after the creation of the R.S.H.A. that Abteilung III should be amalgamated with Abteilung II and form a new Amt IV. In practice this reorganisation encountered little difficulty at the Central Executive but was not easily carried out at the subordinate Dienststellen, on account of the complete disparity in working conditions. Because of these circumstances it was agreed, at the proposal of Schellenberg, that the existing Abteilung III should be fitted as a self-contained independent part into Amt IV under the name of Gruppe IV E. without however for the time being altering the organisational form of the subordinate Dienststellen. It was only in the course of time that the old divisions into Referate were altered, six Referate (VI.E. 1–6) being provided for in its final form. The functions of these were as follows:– Referat IV.E.1. Direction. This was [three unreadable words] matters of principle, in particular with questions of Munitions and industrial security, Factory Police (organising, training, financing and direction), Counter-Espionage representation, Alien Control (Radio broadcasters etc) the current handling of security regulations, etc. (on a Reich level), organisational questions of administration (forms, filing systems, etc).

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Referat IV.E.2. This concerned itself with counter-espionage activities. It dealt with publications in technical periodicals, statements on production, statistics, balance sheets, the examination of the international relations of business concerns and large firms, patent laws licence and exchange agreements, and the examination of the activities of information bureaux, etc. This form of counter-espionage had been hitherto unknown in Germany since espionage in this sphere had not been previously envisaged. The remainder of the Referate were divided according to enemy countries, as follows:— E.3. France, etc. E.4. America and England. E.5. Poland, Russia and Japan. E.6. Balkan countries (including Czechoslovakia). COUNTER-ESPIONAGE CASES DEALT WITH BY AMT IV (GRUPPE iv E) IN THE PERIOD AUGUST 1939–JUNE 1941 ON WHICH SCHELLENBERG HAD GIVEN INFORMATION I. Jugoslavia. In mid-1940 reports were received from a V-man, (name unknown to Schellenberg), employed by the German Military Attache in Belgrade, to the effect that the Jugoslavian General Staff had for a considerable time been receiving reliable and detailed reports on Germany’s military and economic plans, in addition to current events concerning persons in Hitler’s immediate entourage. Extracts of these reports were sent by this agent. As this V-man had access only to the Military Attache section in the Belgrade Embassy, suspicion directed itself to the Jugoslavian Military Attache in Berlin, Colonel Vauchnik. Vauchnik was kept under observation until early April 1941, when it was ascertained that he had warned his government three days beforehand of a pending air attack on Belgrade, which was to herald the invasion of Jugoslavia. He was then placed under arrest on General Keitel’s orders, notwithstanding his diplomatic immunity. His case was handled jointly by Regierungsrat Dr. Schmitz of Amt IV E/6, and Bentivegni of Amt Abwehr, interrogations taking place in Berlin in a locality unknown to Schellenberg. From these interrogations it was established that Vauchnik acquired his information from three main sources: a) From society women and women of the “demi-monde”. Of these, only some 4 or 5 consciously and wilfully supplied information. (Schellenberg claims to be unable to recollect any of their names.) b) From conversation with technical officers attached to the Luftwaffe. c) From persons working in the aircraft industry. (Schellenberg similarly claims that he is unable to recollect any names of individuals referred to at (b) and (c) above.) No subsequent action was taken against Vauchnik, although Mueller favoured such a course. This case was of great interest to Schellenberg in that it gave him an insight into

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the possibilities of what he describes as “social espionage”; and it was largely due to him that Vauchnik shortly afterwards was sent to Istria. Here he worked to Dr. Schmitz, reporting on developments in Italo-Jugoslavian relations, sending his written reports to a V-Man of Schmitz, (name unknown), stationed at Klagenfurt. Vauchnik received no remuneration for this work beyond expenses, but seemed grateful firstly that no action had been taken against him, and secondly that no action was taken against the daughter of a small inkeeper whom he intended to marry. (There was no evidence that Vauchnik had used this girl for espionage purposes.) In view of the revelations deriving from this case, Schellenberg organised a system providing for the cover of telephone calls and movements of the whole Diplomatic Corps in Berlin. Simultaneously he penetrated with informants society circles in Berlin and other larger cities of Germany. In Berlin, for example, he employed some 8–10 people of this kind, some of them being personal acquaintances of his own. Although he alleges difficulty in recalling their names, he does remember the following:— Zoellner

–

son-in-law of the owner of a large cement firm.

Telschow

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Proprietor of the Kaiserhof Hotel in Berlin.

Bilke, Manfred

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authority on economics.

Frau v.Dirksen Hensel, Frank

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Director of Central European Travel Bureau.

Bochow, Hans

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broadcaster.

Dombrowski, Iwan

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head clerk of Schenker & Co., Exporters.

v.Soltikow

–

author.

[Michael Graf]

Schellenberg states that after a short time he delegated to his Personal Referent the task of finding suitable informants. II. Russia Even before Schellenberg’s advance to Amt IV, the German Intelligence had regarded the whole of Russia’s diplomatic and commercial representation in Germany as a potential espionage structure. At some time before Schellenberg’s coming into office one individual case (details of which are unknown to him), had pointed to the Russian Handelsvertretung (Commercial Agency) in Berlin, and investigations in this field were instituted. In 1940, therefore, Schellenberg took the opportunity of leasing private premises with large front windows, immediately opposite to the Handelsvertretung, in order that a constant check could be maintained on all visitors to that building. Photographs of such visitors were taken with telescopic lenses, and by this means it was possible to identify several Russian couriers and to rate certain regular visitors as suspect. During Schellenberg’s period of office a number of small groups of agents were discovered; but arrests were made in a very few instances only, as Schellenberg held to

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the view that more was to be gained from secret observation of their activity than from overt action against them. It was established that the majority of these agents acting on behalf of Russia were drawn from the large numbers of Volksdeutsche repatriated to Germany. So-called Umsiedlungskommissionen [resettlement commissions] were set up to investigate the position, and the findings ascertained beyond doubt that numbers of these repatriates were working for their former country of residence. In many cases the individuals chosen by the Russian Intelligence proved to have been found through advertisements which such individuals had inserted in newspapers seeking financial aid through business credits or mortgages of real property. Those who possessed sound local knowledge of conditions in East Prussia and the Ruhr were particularly acceptable to the Russians. After the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the premises of the Russian Handelsvertretung in Berlin were searched, and further documentary evidence of espionage activity is alleged to have been discovered. Schellenberg mentions two specific cases discovered through the observation post opposite the Handelsvertretung: a) Neporoszny Case A Russian courier, Neporoszny, was identified, together with a German associate of his, whom Neporoszny had appointed nominee buyer of a hotel property near the Stettiner Bahnhof, Berlin, intended for some undisclosed use by the Russian Intelligence Service. Kriminaldirektor Kubitzki [SS-Obersturmbannführer Josef Kubitzky] of Amt IV E/5 succeeded in ‘turning round’ the German nominee at an early stage in these negotiations. The case, however, came to nothing, for Neporoszny suddenly disappeared for no apparent reason. Schellenberg states that it is possible that he had become aware of the interest taken by the Amt in his transactions with his nominee. Neporoszny himself was never seen by Schellenberg, who was only shown his photograph in a suspects album by Kubitzki [sic.]. b) Russian Espionage Centre in Leipzig Printing Press A woman, (name unknown), employed in a Leipzig printing press was seen to visit the Russian Handelsvertretung regularly, and her conduct was sufficiently suspicious to warrant arrest. This arrest did not, however, prove of any assistance in the investigation of the espionage group which worked under cover of the printing press, as its security precautions were excellent. Investigation, in fact, was still in progress at the time of Schellenberg’s transfer to Amt VI. c) Russian Consulate in Danzig Agents acting on behalf of the Russian Intelligence Service were found to have been engaged in observation of German military movements and dispositions in the Eastern Provinces, making their reports under cover of legitimate visits to the Russian Consulate

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in Danzig. Of seven persons arrested, four were Ost-Umsiedler (repatriates to the Eastern Provinces), and three were Reichsdeutsche from the same area. Kubitzki [sic.] and later his successor, Dr. Renau, worked on these cases. (This Dr. Renau should not be confused with the Dr. Renau [Dr. Heinz Rennau] who assisted Schellenberg at a later date in his peace negotiations with Sweden.) III. Poland Most of the agents working for the Polish Intelligence were recruited from the Polish Minority in the Eastern Provinces, as well as from the Ruhr. Two specific cases are mentioned by Schellenberg. a) Foreman in DEMAG Armaments Factory. Dortmund This was an outstanding case of espionage on behalf of Poland in the immediate pre-war period. It was discovered that a foreman, (name unknown), of Polish descent in the DEMAG Armament Works in Dortmund had for a number of years been passing to the Polish Intelligence designs and blueprints of a confidential nature. This information seemed to have been transmitted through the Polish Consulate, to which his wife and son had entry. b) Documents found in Polish Intelligence Service Offices After the collapse of Poland in 1939, documents were found in offices formerly occupied by the Polish Intelligence Service in Warsaw, disclosing their espionage links in the Reich. These documents were passsed to Auswertung Ost (founded by Canaris) in Berlin, but examination of them was carried out in co-operation with Amt IV E (Kubitzki [sic.] and Renau). As a result, some 200 cases of anti-German espionage on the part of Reichsdeutsche were discovered. IV. Switzerland The chief centres of Swiss espionage were the Consulates in Cologne, Vienna and Stuttgart. Two cases within Schellenberg’s direct knowledge were the following:– a) Three Swiss Consular Officials in Stuttgart About the middle of 1941, three Swiss consular officials in Stuttgart were arrested on suspicion of espionage, and the very half-hearted protest made by the Swiss Government was taken as a tacit admission of their guilt. Since the autumn of 1940, Schellenberg had been in touch with Masson, Chief of the Swiss Intelligence Service, with whom he was trying to resolve problematical points in the relations between the two countries. One of the questions raised was the mutual exchange of internees. Switzerland had at that time about 100 German agents in detention, Germany a much smaller number of Swiss, and at Masson’s request Schellenberg secured the release of one of the three officials mentioned

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above. He remembers this agent’s name as Waebli or Waetli [sic.], and states that he had the impression that he was one of Masson’s own men. b) [Herbert] Kappler The second case, one of special interest, was that of Kappler an official of the Swiss Consulate in Berlin. This man first came under suspicion through his habit of asking numerous questions about matters which did not concern him, and also because of certain contacts who were considered suspect. A German agent, Soltikow, was accordingly appointed to watch him. Soltikow, Schellenberg states, had at one time worked with Rohleder of III F, but after a quarrel with Rohleder had transferred to IV E. At some time in the pre-war period Soltikow had been in England, and had recorded his experiences in a book entitled: ‘Wie Ich ver Scotland Yard Geflogen Bin’ [sic.]; but whether or not he was engaged in espionage during this visit Schellenberg does not know. The possibility that Soltikow was himself in the pay of England was recognised. Schellenberg himself held the view that he was, and that his method of diverting suspicion from himself was to make vague accusations of complicity with Switzerland against others, such as Ambassador [Walther] Hewel, liaison official between Ribbentrop and Hitler, and [Paul Otto] Schmidt, Hitler’s interpreter. When ordered to produce proof, he was never able to do so, but covered this fact by making fresh, but equally insubstantial accusations in another quarter. The outcome of this unusual case is unknown to Schellenberg, as it was still in progress when he left IV E. V. Turkey Counter-espionage in the Turkish sphere was dealt with by IV E 5, in particular by Dr. Schmitz, and this section held the view that the Turkish Intelligence Service concentrated mainly on economic and political matters, and was less interested in military espionage. The chief centres of the Turkish Intelligence Service were the places of diplomatic representation in Vienna, Hamburg and Berlin, and the close observation made of these buildings and their staffs resulted in a list drawn up by IV E 5 of suspect persons. In this connection three employees of the Turkish Consulate in Vienna were arrested there on suspicion of espionage in 1940 or 1941, and consequently handed over to their country of origin. In addition, four Turkish students in Berlin, already on the list of suspects, were arrested by way of reprisal for the arrest of Germans in Turkey, but as there was no concrete evidence against them they were soon released. Cavoure. A more important case was that of Cavoure (phonetic spelling), a Turkish dentist practising in Berlin, who was very seriously suspected of being engaged in espionage. A woman member of Schellenberg’s ‘society espionage’ informants named Frau Erna Schroeder, had become friendly with Cavoure, and reported him to Amt IV. The Amt soon came to believe that Cavoure was probably the centre point of Turkish Intelligence

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in Germany, for to him came not only suspect members of the Turkish Legation in Berlin, but Turkish Nationals from all parts of Germany. His practice was also a very exclusive one and included such well-informed men as, for instance, the Reichswirtschaftsminister Funk. In view of the accumulation of suspicions, Cavoure’s mail and telephone were kept under strict check; an attempt was also made to investigate his considerable wealth but it was not possible to assess his means as he had invested extensively in real property. At the time of Schellenberg’s departure from Amt IV no arrest had been made and the case against Cavoure was merely in preparation. Night Club on Kurfürstendamm Schellenberg states that the Turkish Intelligence Service also ran a night-club on the Kurfürstendamm, which had been opened during the war for the express purpose of espionage. It was a very third-rate type of establishment and notice was first drawn to it by reports from the civil police who had it under observation as being morally undesirable. Amt IV soon became convinced that this club was in fact a meeting-place for couriers, and that the proprietor of the club forwarded intelligence material from these couriers elsewhere, but it was never possible to establish how he did this. Eventually it was considered best to close the night-club on the grounds of contravention of normal police regulations relating to the running of such premises. The proprietor was imprisoned for a very short time, then released, and kept under strict observation. He did not return to Turkey. VI. France (IV E 3—Dr. Fischer) Fabri In 1939, even before the outbreak of war, a French officer named Fabri was arrested in Duesseldorf just as he was posting into a letter-box letters containing espionage matter. This particular letter-box had been watched for some time as Fabri habitually made use of it, thus considerably facilitating Amt IV’s check. Fabri had concerned himself only with the Western districts of Germany and his espionage was of a purely military nature; he specialised in troop locations and movements, reports on which he compiled from a large number of letters written by various members of the armed forces to other agents with whom he was connected. After his arrest and interrogation some of his sub-agents came to light, and it was seen that they were mostly Germans; owing to the fact that the material was derived from letters from soldiers, Fabri’s sub-agents did not range among the “higher strata of society”. Rhineland Group Schellenberg further states that a series of espionage cases in the Rhineland—some dating back as far as the occupation of the Rhineland—is worthy of attention. The group of agents concerned—Germans, and many of them former members of the Separatist movement—had made a special point of having links with school-teachers in the

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Rhineland. The only agent Schellenberg remembers was called Lennartz. Unfortunately Schellenberg does not recall such details as the specific purpose for which teachers were contacted, but states that measures taken by Amt IV against this group were satisfactory. VII. Japan (IV E 6—Kubitzky and Renau) When Schellenberg joined Amt IV, no counter-espionage measures of any kind had been undertaken against that country, in view of its being a friendly power. It became evident, however, that the Japanese Intelligence Service was tremendously active throughout Germany, working sometimes openly and sometimes under the greatest secrecy. It was interested in every possible aspect of espionage—political, economic, military etc.—and recruited agents from every sphere—foreigners, Communists, members of Resistance movements, etc., and also Germans both in ministries and in the commercial world. One of its aims was to have agents in key positions where reports could posses in consequence greater reliability. Schellenberg is unable to explain exactly how the Japanese managed to contact, recruit or place these key men. At all events Japanese espionage activity increased steadily as time went on. Schellenberg believes that the chief and paymaster was formerly one Sakumo at the Japanese Legation, but does not know who took over after Sakumo left. Japanese Import Firm One of the first cases to come to light was that of a Japanese Import firm in Berlin which was engaged in espionage against Germany. Such firm was in contact with a German major of the reserve attached to the Air Ministry, who received considerable sums of money from it. Other agents were a German in the Ministry of Economics and also five business men, all of whom appeared to have received considerable sums of money from the Japanese for no apparent consideration. In Schellenberg’s time these seven Germans had not been arrested, but they were under very close observation and the whole case, although still in initial stages, was being gone into. (Schellenberg can supply no names in this connection.) Kunzcewinzc The more concrete case of Kunzcewinzc occurred in the beginning of 1941, at the time when the Germans were preparing their invasion of Russia, and indeed the case was concerned mainly with information of these preparations. Military Abwehr IIIF (Leiter [Chief]—Oberst Rohleder) employed an agent at the Warsaw centre of the Polish Resistance Movement, and this agent occasionally forwarded useful reports. It was he who reported that two ex-Polish officers were about to travel as intelligence couriers between Berlin and Warsaw, and he furnished descriptions of the Poles concerned. A check control of railway trains enabled Amt IV to pick up Kunzcewinzc (phonetic spelling) and to follow him to his flat, where he resided under cover as an employee in the Manchurian Legation, sometimes using the flat as a meeting place with his associates.The following day Kunzcewinzc met a Polish woman in the Tiergarten, and just as he was handing her a small parcel, the police arrested him.

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Both Kunzcewinzc and the woman (employed as a cook in the Manchurian Legation in Berlin) were unable to show that they possessed valid Manchurian passports, as was also a third Pole who had also been acting as a courier and who was arrested as a result of statements made by Kunzcewinzc and the woman. They were held under arrest, however, for the small parcel which Kunzcewinzc had attempted to pass to the woman was found to contain a clothes-brush and a tube of toothpaste, in which were concealed micro-films which, on enlargement, produced three volumes of documentary matter on the position, movements and origin of the German Forces in occupied Poland—valuable material at that period, namely the beginning of 1941. This incident caused profound alarm in Japanese official circles in Berlin, but although they intervened, they never received any official information on the case. They did not take the matter up officially through the Foreign Office. The case was still being investigated when Schellenberg left Amt IV, and he does not know how it eventually ended. To the best of his knowledge, however, statements and inquiries produced the following picture:– The Japanese so used the Polish Resistance Movement as to profit thereby themselves. Kunzcewinzc was a member of this movement, but gave the Japanese access to the information in the possession of the Polish Resistance in return for which the Japanese issued him with a valid Manchurian passport (probably Diplomatic) thus enabling him to travel unmolested between Warsaw and Berlin, and providing the Polish Resistance with a diplomatically protected courier. The same facilities were afforded to the other two Poles already mentioned, the cook and a man whose name Schellenberg does not recall, who worked in unison with Kunzcewinzc. In addition, the Japanese facilitated the onward transmission of Polish Intelligence material. Such material would be brought by the Poles to the Manchurian Legation in Berlin, and the Japanese, after taking copies for their own use, would convey it through the cover medium of their own Manchurian courier mail both to Stockholm and Rome. In Stockholm it was delivered to the Japanese Military Attache, [Makoto] Onodera, from whence it was forwarded by a certain Polish Intelligence liaison officer called Piotr to the centre of the Polish resistance movement in Stockholm. However, despite attempted investigations, the Germans never succeeded in finding out any details about this Resistance centre or about the subsequent uses to which material was put. In Rome the Intelligence material was passed to the Jesuit General [Vladimir] Ledochowski, and at the time it was assumed that it was required for the Vatican Intelligence Service, but here again nothing definite was established. Kunzcewinzc had made the Warsaw-Berlin trip as a courier on several occasions, calling habitually at the same cover address in Warsaw where he received the material. The chief of an important section of the Polish Resistance Movement was a certain Polish professor, and it was in his excellently equipped technical laboratory that the microfilms were produced. This professor had also made the trip to Berlin two or three times without being caught by the train control check. Search for him in Warsaw by the agents of Abwehr IIIF was without result, and it was believed that the Japanese had warned him of his impending arrest. In addition to Kubitzky of Amt IVE, the Kunzcewinzc case was handled on behalf of the Abwehr (IIIF) by Oberst Rohleder himself.120 Later on Schellenberg came to suspect that the Japanese bartered material such as mentioned above for other intelligence material from the Russians, and by 1944 he had

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become firmly convinced of the existence of a much closer relationship between these two Intelligence Services. VIII. Italy (IV E 5—Schmitz) Counter-espionage in this sphere was only in its initial stages. Waiters’ Union It was early discovered, however, that one of the means by which the Italian Intelligence Service obtained information was through the Italian Waiters’ Union which functioned throughout Germany within the frame-work of the Fascist party. It was assumed but not proved that the waiters were paid for their services from Italy. Amt IV had not yet discovered who exactly was running this organisation from the Italian end, nor yet how the waiters sent their reports. No active steps were taken against them in order that further observation of them might continue unhindered. Baron Luigi Parilli This was an Italian who in 1940–41 was under observation by Amt IV, since his mysterious activities in and travels between Paris, The Hague and Munich rendered him prima-facie suspect; in the files of all three cities he was reported as suspect by several intelligence sources. He occupied himself with the purchase of raw material and with foreign exchange, and the intricate nature of these transactions was the first ground of a report on him to the authorities. He was always very well recommended and vouched for by the Italian Legations and Consulates, but his activities appeared to afford him a perfect opportunity to engage in espionage, as he returned periodically to Italy, where he was presumed to be in touch with and report to his Government. Moreover, Parilli was very skilful at entertaining influential people and thereby placing them under a social obligation to him. He then used them to further his already multifarious connections with the German authorities. In spite of the fact that he was suspect in the Head Office, the local Dienststellen and their Leiters (Knochen in Paris and Harster in The Hague) rendered him every possible assistance. Parilli on one or two occasions showed a desire to meet Schellenberg, but the latter did not reciprocate in this respect. Investigation of the case of Parilli produced little results, but confirmation of existing suspicions took place accidentally in the following way:– One day in 1941 a certain Lt. Col. [Gerhard] Bassenge of the O.K.W. asked Schellenberg’s assistance on behalf of his sister, who wished to marry a man named Boss, the son of an Italian industrialist in Milan. The father was opposed to the marriage, and had bribed the Italian authorities to withhold their consent to it. Schellenberg was able to assist Fraulein Bassenge in getting married, and later learned from her that her husband’s sister was the wife of Luigi Parilli, who Fraulein Bassenge admitted, worked not only for the Italian Intelligence Service but also simultaneously for the Americans. The last time Schellenberg heard of Parilli was in the spring of 1945 when he learned that in connection with peace feelers from the German side, Parilli had been the intermediary who put Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff, Commander-in-Chief of the German

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Military administration in Italy, into contact with an American called Dulles, who had for some years been U.S. European Political observer in Switzerland. IX. Sweden. (IV E 4—Dr. Schammbacher [Schambacher]) Close observation was kept by Amt IV on the Swedish Legation in Berlin and in particular on three or four Swedish Legation officials, and the following picture of Swedish Intelligence activity emerged. It was believed that the head of the Swedish espionage system in Germany was the chief representative of the Swedish Aerotransport A.B. He was in contact with Rositta Serrano, a Chilean variety singer, who was suspected of being engaged in espionage on behalf of some country unknown. This woman had a large circle of social acquaintances, and it was believed that she both assisted other foreign agents and gave information to the above-mentioned representative of Swedish Aerotransport. Moreover, it was further suspected that a certain Graf Roosen, a Swedish pilot of this airline, was a courier of Rositta’s, and it was suggested to Schellenberg that Roosen should be arrested on some minor pretext simply to give the police an excuse for searching him to ascertain whether he carried on his person “his courier’s pass as a member of the Swedish Secret Service”. Roosen, however, had been an acquaintance of Goering since the days when the latter lived in Sweden and for this reason Amt IV did not dare to order his arrest. X. Anglo-American Espionage Schellenberg has mentioned a number of firms or individuals who were suspected of espionage on behalf of Britain and America. These were in outline, as follows: Rosenkranz (IV E 2) A former Director of the Reichsstelle for Mineral Oils, and had in this connection been in contact with two German directors of the Shell A.G. in Germany who were considered suspect. Other of his business acquaintances were not entirely clear of suspicion either, for which reasons Rosenkranz was kept under observation. No definite proof of implication in espionage could be established against him. Woolworths (IV E 2) Suspect firstly because it was an American firm and also because one American director in Berlin had come to the notice of one Dienststelle through prima-facie suspicious actions. A watch was therefore kept on the 5 or 6 American directors at Woolworth’s head office, on other American personnel throughout Germany, and on various German directors. Schellenberg believes that after America’s entry into the war this matter was reviewed more thoroughly but does not know the results.

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The Schimmelpfeng Information Bureau (IVE 2) This firm had been very well known in Germany for many years as an international information service with branches in Sweden, Switzerland, etc. and at the time when Schellenberg began his service with Amt IV E, there was still no control on the activities of this firm. It thus presented a ready-made and indeed “legitimate” espionage channel to any neutral country, via which information could be gleaned, particularly in economic matters. Schellenberg himself arranged to have this firm watched, and its potentialities decided him later [sic.] to make use of it for Amt VI purposes. Winter of Opel Ltd. (IVE 2) Winter was suspect because of his business association with General Motors and because of statements he had made and “measures” he had taken. He was watched, and later arrested, but soon released for lack of evidence; he was not prosecuted. Jauch & Huebner (IVE 2) This case was running at the beginning of Schellenberg’s service with Amt IV. Jauch & Huebner was a Hamburg insurance firm with very extensive connections, which enabled Huebner to acquire information on such matters as the raw material situation, etc., and other matters incidentally important in economic espionage. The firm had a branch in Sweden and it was believed that Huebner prepared reports on such matters and sent them there, though whether with guilty intent or for bona-fide business purposes was not established in Schellenberg’s time with Amt IV. He assumes that Huebner’s guilt must have been established later as he was arrested in 1943 or 1944. Hanau. Gas-mask manufacturers. Berlin (IVE 2) In the spring of 1941 Amt IV investigated an allegation made by anonymous letter that the owner of this firm had sold particulars of its manufacturing patent to England via Sweden. By the time Schellenberg left the Amt the case was in progress of investigation but nothing had yet been established against the proprietor in question. Kirchholtess (IVE 5 or IVE 3) Kirchholtess [Johannes Kirchholtes], previously an envoy to various foreign countries but dismissed by Ribbentrop, was a shrewd man with a large circle of social acquaintances who had come to the notice of some of Schellenberg’s “society espionage” informants. He was suspected of sending information to Sweden for Allied purposes by means of the foreign representatives with whom he had contact. Nothing was proven against him.

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Rhoderich Dietze (IVE 4) It was discovered that Dietze, a member of the Propaganda Ministry, had possessed British nationality as late as 1938, and that when he became a naturalised German subject in 1939 some difficulty arose in connection with his former British passport, Dietze claiming that he had lost it. The suspicions thus aroused were never confirmed, however, as Dietze was a close contact and protege of Goebbels, and it was therefore considered too dangerous to arrest him. Steengracht (IVE 3) Steengracht [Adolf Baron Steengracht von Moyland]121 was a member of the German Foreign Office and suspicions against him implicated his wife. After the German invasion of the Low Countries, a slip was found on some Belgian attache or official which showed that at some time prior to the invasion a telephone call had been received from the Belgian Military Attache in Berlin, giving warning of the impending attack. There was no actual record of the text of the call, but Amt IV set about tracing the circumstances of it, and found that at the time it had been made, the Belgian Military Attache had been in the company of Frau Steengracht. There was, however, also the possibility that some member of the Papal Nunciatur in Berlin might have been responsible for the betrayal of the information, as having also been in telephone contact with the Belgian Military Attache at about this time. Thus the case remained open and nothing definite was undertaken against Steengracht or his wife. Dr. Chaul (IVE 3) This Egyptian was a specialist in internal complaints, and suspicions concerning him rested partly on some remarks he had made in conversation and partly on the fact that he, a foreigner, had attended Hitler once during the war. Furthermore his mode of life was generally suspicious. Chaul’s mail and telephone were put under check, but Schellenberg knows nothing further of the outcome of the case.

Appendix II. Schellenberg’s Observations on the Organisation of Amt VI and the Mil. Amt The organisation of these two Aemter was flexible and was continually subject to change. Finally it became necessary to co-ordinate the supply of W/T and technical equipment for both Aemter under the personal direction of Boening, in view of the increasing shortage. In the so-called “Laendergruppen” of Amt VI, individual countries were allotted to Referate. In the Mil. Amt the departments were divided into an “Erfassungsgruppe (collecting group)”, sub-divided by countries, and an “Auswertungsgruppe (evaluation group)”, subdivided by subjects. I. Zentralbuero. Through the Zentralbuero Schellenberg planned to work gradually towards the setting up of an independent evaluation department (“Auswertungsamt”) to exist side by side with a unified collection department (“Erfassungsamt”). When it was formed it was organised as an independent Gruppe, divided into individual Referate. However, Schellenberg intentionally left the final form of organisation completely open, in order not to hinder his plans for the development of the Buero. The current division was as follows: 1. Daily Reports (Tagesmeldungen). The reports of the specialist Gruppen were mostly received at night by teleprinter and were thoroughly evaluated, collated and divided into political, military, economic and technical reports by personnel allocated by each specialist Gruppe for this purpose. There was also a supervised registry. Originally Schellenberg looked on the Daily Reports as a kind of experiment, since the value of the information in question had not as a rule been finally assessed. He had started by submitting them to Himmler, at the latter’s command, and then found himself obliged to send them to the army and other political leaders as well. With this he was not entirely in agreement, since the distribution list could no longer be controlled and the fact that the reports had not been checked by a final evaluation department was a great danger. The army leaders, however, insisted on having them, as in this way they saw many extremely interesting reports which they would not otherwise have obtained. The fact that the W/T service of the two Aemter was alone able to fulfil all demands, whereas most army and government departments were faced with technical difficulties of communications, was a finally decisive factor.

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2. “Querschnittsbetrachtung” (Cross-sectional survey). The specialist Gruppen of Amt VI devoted themselves to reporting on the political situation in various countries. This did not include an economic or military-political survey. Moreover, the evaluation sections were not in a position to report on the wider reactions and political balance of power. Schellenberg therefore decided that all such decoded messages should be dealt with as a whole by the Zentralbuero, which was the sole department where a kind of general political review, either according to areas or easily recognisable political trends, could be compiled. This review made its appearance nearly every day, and provided a very concise and general picture of the contents of V.N. [sic.] material. The result was sent to the individual Gruppenleiter, partly to give them a certain grasp of the general situation, and partly to give them a standard on which their own work of evaluation could be based. Schellenberg had a woman assistant for this work and towards the end he also appointed Dr. Schueddekopf to this department. 3. Short Reports from Radio and Press Passed down to the Referents for their information. 4. Comprehensive Political Special Reports So-called “Egmont” reports.122 “Referat Kleinkriegsplanung (Planning of Partisan Resistance)”. Schellenberg maintains that he had no knowledge of such a Referat, which could not have been established without his sanction in writing. At the end of their stay in Berlin Oberfeldrichter Dr. Schoen, a colleague of Sanderberger [Sandberger?] in the Zentralbuero, made a few rather confused remarks to him on this subject. Schellenberg reminded him that this had nothing to do with the work of the Zentralbuero, and considers it quite impossible that the relatively junior Dr. Schoen would thereafter have dared to found such a Referat. (Note: the existence of the Referat Kleinkriegsplanung in the Zentralbuero has been reported in the interrogation of Schueddekopf of the Zentralbuero.)123 II. Gruppe VI A and Abt. Mil. A. Both departments were linked at the head in personnel and were, in practice, very extensively and deliberately fused together. Outwardly a conscious division was maintained, partly because there was an agreement with the O.K.W. to retain the name “Mil.” and partly because certain financial matters, currency etc., and above all matters of

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personnel, could be better decided by the Wehrmacht than in Amt VI. Both departments were divided into Referate, and Gruppe VI A also included Abt. VI Kult. Originally VI Kult and VI Wi worked in close unison as a pair, but when owing to its expansion VI Wi acquired too great a jurisdiction and, as a result of its fusion with I Wi of the Abwehr, changed its aims, it became necessary to separate them. (a) Abt. VI Kult. The functions of Abt. VI Kult were to investigate all possibilities which the home territory offered in its various facets, and to offer to the other Gruppen persons or organisations suitable for their work. The Abteilung had in each Ministry a Liaison officer, who was responsible for passing on information of interest to the Ministry. At the same time VI Kult was able to collect valuable intelligence in the home territory and transmit it to its own specialist Gruppen. There was a special arrangement with the Foreign Office. Schellenberg’s conception of the true functions of VI Kult was based on his belief that the German Meldedienst worked for the benefit of the German home territory, and that it was consequently the duty of the government departments to place at its disposal such means of help as they possessed both in personnel and organisation. Besides this, he considered that it was quite immaterial whether the information was obtained from within the Reich or from abroad, so long as it was passed to the right quarter. Schellenberg also believed that it was a mistake to relegate this work to the Gruppen concerned with foreign affairs, and it was for this reason that he founded departments without inflexibly stereotyped spheres of jurisdiction. In the solution of this problem he aimed at incurring the least expense. He wished the inland administrations of the existing home departments to harness and employ all their own connections for this purpose, whilst the Ministry of Economics (which, together with the Ministry of Food, came within the jurisdiction of VI Wi) was to set up and consolidate its own links on the economic side. During several interviews which Schellenberg had with the various Reichsminister he attempted to win them over to his way of thinking and to obtain their permission to allow such a set-up to function in their own Ministries. Even though he was not successful in every respect in obtaining positive results he did progress to a stage where VI Kult and VI Wi justified their existence. Such activity within the Reich was quite independent of Amt III and Amt IV It was Ribbentrop who brushed Schellenberg’s suggestions aside longest and who, in 1942, after the latter had addressed him for several hours about his ideas for an intelligence service, replied that he considered the plan ridiculous. He added that with five or six good contacts in the world better results would be attained than with Schellenberg’s complicated suggestion. However, the latter did succeed in putting across his ideas in 1945. The collaboration of VI Kult with the Ministry of Education is well illustrated by the following examples. The liaison officer might report that a Professor had returned from a six months stay in Spain on research work and it would be possible for him to supply information on specific questions, that a scientist going abroad would be suitable for briefing, or that a chair in a foreign university was vacant and a brief was required for the

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prospective candidate. The allocation of missions always presented difficulties, as the specialist Abteilungen, owing to shortage of personnel, did not always tackle this question with the necessary energy. The consequence was that VI Kult took upon itself not only to act as a passive serving instrument, but also to work abroad with its own separate links. Schellenberg, however, always banned such attempts when he discovered them. Co-operation with other Ministries was on similar lines, but this only gained ground slowly, as the personnel of the Reich administrative departments had not sufficient understanding for the importance of the Dienst [intelligence service]. On the other hand Schellenberg admits that the Dienst, for its part, could not supply these departments with the reports they required, which would have been possible had it been properly organised. Co-operation with the Ministry of Propaganda presented great difficulties, as Goebbels, owing to his prejudice against Canaris and the Abwehr, did not favour the new form of the Dienst. Moreover, VI Kult always had to deal separately with the head of the Reich Press responsible for the foreign Journalists especially in connection with the cooperation of the DNB, Trans Ozean and Europa Press news agencies, and as a result was in perpetual conflict with the foreign department of the Ministry of Propaganda. Of the great number of further possibilities which the home country, in its many “spheres of life”, offered as possible links for a Geheim Meldedienst, the Academy for German Law is worthy of mention. This penetration of the home country with the help of the Reich administration led to encroachment on Amt III territory. This fact, and the ever-present possibility that various Mitarbeiter in the administration and other institutions had originally been and/or still were agents of Amt III, led sometimes to minor difficulties, although most of them much preferred working for the Geheim Meldedienst rather than for Amt III. The working aims of Amt VI were completely different and had developed as far as possible under Schellenberg’s leadership, having succeeded in throwing off the many chains of the Party [NSDAP] and its Weltanschauung [ideology]. It was a set up with its face turned rather to external than internal events, being completely indifferent whether anybody belonged to the Party, did this or that, or went to Church. This freedom of Amt VI, acquired with difficulty, conferred upon VI Kult important advantages over Amt III in all its work, especially when it was a question of recruiting new Mitarbeiter. The recruitment of these permanent Mitarbeiter was one of the main objects of the work, since in their positions of responsibility they were to be the mainstay of Schellenberg’s educative scheme, in that they were to instruct younger people within their social and working circles to the real meaning of the Geheim Meldedienst. They also had the task of persuading intelligent persons of character to enter into closer cooperation. The Mitarbeiter included Dr. Sandberger, Stubaf. Carstenns and Dr. Schindowski. VI Kult also ran its own agents. The work of VI Kult in its sphere of jurisdiction never developed very far. Above all the personnel necessary for work of such a wide scope were lacking both in quality and quantity.

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Liaison Officers with the Reich Administration: Foreign Office.

SS-Stubaf. Dr. Roeder, a member of VI Kult.

Between the Foreign Office and Amt VI.

Gesandschaftsrat v. Cossel.

Ministry of Propaganda.

Stubaf. Ulenberg, a member of VI Kult.

Ministry of Education.

Ministerialrat Dr. Scuria.

Ministry of Transport.

Oberregierungsrat Dr. Keller (personal Referent to Staatssekretär Gansenmueller).

Reichspostministerium (Ministry of Ministerialdirektor Koehn (The Minister’s First Referent). Post). Ministry of Labour.

An Oberregierungsrat, whose name Schellenberg can no longer recollect.

Ministry of Justice.

Here Schellenberg had a personal link with the Minister himself.

Co-operation with the Auslandsorganisation. This was supposed to take place, but in reality there was a continuous battle against Gauleiter Bohle’s arrogance and the Party clique behind him, closely connected with Bormann’s entourage. It was the constant desire of the Party with the assistance of the Auslandsorganisation, to establish their own Auslandsnachrichtendienst, in spite of existing clear agreements. The situation eased somewhat after Hitler’s decree of February 12th, 1944, concerning the creation of one united Nachrichtendienst [intelligence service], but such attempts never quite ceased. Schellenberg considered that it was a stroke of fortune that Bormann never seriously tried to hinder the building up of this Dienst: he was really too stupid to do so. In so far as the Auslandsorganisation offered any possibility it was used, otherwise it was held at arm’s length. A certain Standartenfuehrer Schnauss of the Auslandsorganisation was appointed liaison officer to VI Kult. The sources of information of VI Kult all found their origin in the links as set out above. Usually they consisted of travellers’ or agents’ reports, either based on specific missions or of a more general character. (b) VI A 3. The work of this Referat, viz. the recruitment of personnel, was most important, but it was still in its initial stages of development. It dealt with the Personnel Departments of the three divisions of the Wehrmacht, the Waffen S.S. and Amt I. Letters signed by Himmler were first sent to Doenitz, Keitel and Goering in February, 1945, in which reference was made to the difficult question of personnel in the Meldedienst (staff too old). At the same time memoranda concerning the establishment were despatched. (These letters had been held up for three months by Kaltenbrunner.)

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(c) VI A 4. On Schellenberg’s instructions the training Referate were particularly well developed. In this Sandberger was especially competent and everything that Canaris had neglected for years was now made good in both Aemter. Before long courses of instruction in all departments (especially courses for Frontaufklaerung and selective courses) were under way and preparations had been made for courses for I c officers in divisions and later for all Military Attaches. III. Gruppe VI B. (a) Referate. The task of the Referate was to supply political intelligence with the assistance of the various intelligence organisations existing in the individual countries over which they had jurisdiction. No actual espionage work was carried out against Belgium and Holland, but these countries were important as bases for operations elsewhere. In the neutral countries their own Referate sent out their own agents, and where necessary contact was maintained with other Dienststellen. All this work was directed by the “Erfasser”. The Referate maintained their own registries and their own supplies of currency. The Evaluators, (“Sichter” or “Auswerter”) assessed reports which came in, evaluated them according to a scheme tested in practice, and suggested how they could be best used. The results were passed in the form of special or collective reports to various Dienststellen of their own department. (b) Unternehmen “Walter”. This was a school for agents organised after the retreat in France by [Hermann] Bickler, Hubing and [Anton] Nossek in co-operation with [Jacques] Doriot, Darnant [Joseph Darnand?] and others, for the supply of intelligence from France. It was under the direct command of VI B. IV. Gruppe VI C. The whole of this Gruppe was primarily occupied with obtaining intelligence about and from Russia. In the Balkans and in Sweden it therefore made repeated attempts to develop its own channels for the collection of intelligence (“Erfassungsorgane”), despite the opposition of the competent “Laendergruppen”. V. Gruppe VI D. The peculiarity of VI D lay in the fact that it was essentially an evaluatory Gruppe, since in the countries where it should have possessed organisations in the Field for the collection of intelligence these were completely lacking, with the exception of South America, Sweden and Finland. For work against South America the Gruppe had a strong Aussenstelle in Spain under [Karl] Arnold and a weak one in Portugal under Nassenstein.

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Norway and Denmark were only used as bases for operations elsewhere and for these countries, as well as the U.S.A. and Great Britain, VI D was very dependent on material supplied by other Gruppen. This was always scanty and rarely offered the possibility of any continuity of work. VI. Gruppe VI E. In the field, in addition to “Ehrenamtliche [unpaid] Mitarbeiter” in the individual countries, special Dienststellen were maintained by this Gruppe as long as the position allowed. Staybehind Organisation. A special task was allotted to the field organisations in addition to the collection of political intelligence, viz. the construction of a so-called staybehind [sic.] organisation. After the German withdrawal from the Balkans this proved to be a failure, and a rapid attempt was therefore made to find and train suitable agents among the Balkan refugees arriving in Germany. This was likewise unsuccessful. VII. Gruppe VI F. 1. VI FH The Havelinstitut was organised on the instructions of Himmler himself in 1942, when he realised that Schellenberg was not in a position to set up an adequate W/T organisation for Amt VI owing to “red tape”. His order came years too late, and in consequence the Havelinstitut was formed in the middle of the war from specialists recruited with difficulty through newspaper advertisements. There was therefore no esprit de corps, and a couple of years later the results of this casual method of recruitment (espionage, embezzlement etc.) made themselves felt. Leiter I of the Havelinstitut was later in charge of the newly founded “Entwicklungsabteilung (development section)”. His successor was SS-Stubaf. d. Waffen SS [Günter] Faross. 2. The rest of VI F was nothing more than a large supply organisation, engaged in satisfying the technical requirements (forged documents etc.) of the other Gruppen. VIII. Gruppe VI G. The functions of this Gruppe were to bear out, elaborate or test the results of the work of the active Nachrichtendienst by scientific investigation. As far as possible the bodies of scientists who carried out this work (institutes, societies or individuals) had to do so without themselves knowing the purpose. The Gruppe was therefore secretly a financial supporter of several scientific institutes and so-called “Publication Houses”, linked together in a Reichskuratorium, which was in reality directed by VI G. Great importance was attached to the use of ingenuity in the allocation of particular scientific assignments, e.g. 27 treatises were written on the “Oil Venture in the Caucasus”, from none of which

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could the real purpose of the assignment from an operational standpoint have been deduced. The Gruppe also turned its attention to the development of cartography for the use of the Nachrichtendienst. As an illustration of the necessity of an organisation like VI G Schellenberg quotes the difference in meaning which arises when Japanese characters are transposed into English ones. The Gruppe was divided into a number of Referate, and Schellenberg had planned to form a further Referat to study occult matters. (Note: the interrogation of [Hauptsturmführer] Dr. [Wilfried] Krallert revealed that the information of an “Institut fuer Okkultismus” had been planned.) In addition he envisaged the creation of a Central Registry in which all information about the top-ranking personalities in each important country would have been methodically assembled. Hstuf. Dr. Karamse was the permanent deputy of Gruppenleiter VI G. IX. Gruppe VI Wi. The original Gruppe VI Wi covered the same ground in the realm of economics as VI Kult in that of culture, viz., the exploitation of the home front. The taking over of I Wi and I T/L altered not only the scope of the work but the aims envisaged. VI Wi began a systematic “Erfassungsdienst (collection of intelligence)”, which involved taking over much of the work of the Mil. Amt. Later there was little possibility of developing this field of activity, as the re-organisation caused too much controversy. The evaluation section, however, was well organised. Conjointly there grew up an increasingly close collaboration with the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Ministry of Economics), Ruestungsministerium (Ministry of Armaments) and the Feldwirtschaftsamt (Ministry of Economic Warfare), and it was deemed advisable to unite all these separate “Auswertungsstellen (evaluation departments)” for such they at least claimed to be, under VI Wi. Intelligence material automatically coming the way of large firms and business concerns was, as far as possible collected and passed to the appropriate evaluation department. These firms etc. also provided good natural cover for an intelligence organisation of “ehrenamtliche” as well as full time agents. VI/Wi [sic.] was therefore required to place agents of other Gruppen in these concerns. This was, more or less perforce, a perpetual source of friction between VI Wi and the Gruppen concerned. As the personnel they produced frequently failed to satisfy the training requirements of the firms in question VI Wi was given the task of providing long-term training for its own personnel, with a view to their taking on this work. In addition, VI Wi had the task of interesting leading industrialists personally in the affairs of the Dienst on a higher plane. A kind of social pooling of interests—a Wirtschaftsklub [business club]—was envisaged. The evaluation of press and literature was meant to be kept entirely separate from the other work, and for this purpose a large scientifically-run institute, in combination with the organisations already existing (research on world economics in Hamburg, and study of world markets and trade in Kiel)124 was to have been set up in VI G, expressly for the requirements of VI Wi.

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VI Wi/T. The “Abteilung Technik” was fully occupied with reconstruction, its legacy from I T/L having proved quite unworkable. The chief difficulty was to find the right people, i.e. persons with sufficient technical knowledge who were at the same time adequately trained from an intelligence point of view. Otherwise it too worked on the same principles as VI/Wi [sic.], i.e. with separate sections for the collection and evaluation of intelligence.

Appendix III. Amt VI and Russia. I. Amt VI Work against Russia. 1. Forward intelligence against Russia was based mainly on the activities of F.A. I, II and III and of the “Unternehmen [Operation] Zeppelin” of Gruppe VI CZ. Wally I (F.A.Leitstelle I Ost. under Lt. Col. [Hermann] Baun) was highly organised. Its operations, both in their conception and execution, were much better planned and yielded far better results than the work of VI CZ. Wally I also undertook so-called “deep penetrations” and had Meldekoepfe [signal-communication heads i.e. sources] far inside Russia. Unternehmen Zeppelin125 was formed in an attempt to make the greatest possible use of Russian prisoners-of-war for purposes of the Meldedienst. The aim was to secure maximum results through mass deployment, full allowance being made for a great number of “duds”. So-called “Aussenkommandos” selected from newly captured Russians those who seemed best suited for future training owing to their experience and personal aptitude. At these Aussenkommandos the Russians were subjected to strict military routine, with the object of maintaining discipline and morale, and given special training in W/T and intelligence work, on the results of which a continuous sifting was based. In most cases the best among them reached a so-called “Final Camp”, where an effort was made to win their moral support and to inculcate Nazi ideology. In Schellenberg’s view, however, the decisive factor remained the human and personal tie with the man who had trained them. Those who had been earmarked for future use returned, well-equipped and in separate groups, to the Hauptkommandos, from where they were dropped by parachute or smuggled through the enemy lines. All were equipped with W/T sets. The whole enterprise entailed the employment of great numbers of men, and later this mass deployment was dropped. The officers of Amt VI CZ chiefly responsible for the “Unternehmen Zeppelin” were the late Dr. [Heinz] Graefe, Dr [Erich] Hengelhaupt, Dr [Hermann] Lumm, Dr Schindowski, Dr [Oswald] Krauss, Dr [Rudolf] Roeder and Standartenfuehrer Dr [Walter H.] Rapp. The work of “Wally” and “Zeppelin”, the methodical interrogation of the prisoners-ofwar (for which there existed a highly organised “special camp” system, with scientists etc.) and the widespread W/T monitoring and decyphering service formed the main sources of both military and political intelligence. 2. To these must be added the scientific and methodical basic research work of the Wannsee Institute and the assistants attached to it (Professors [Theodor] Oberlaender, [Michael] Achmeteli and [Erich] Koch, Dr. [Gerhard Willy] Teich and others of VI C and VI G). In addition, Mil. Amt C and Amt VI C (in a minor way also Amt VI E) penetrated Russia from Berlin (Vlassov—see following paragraph and Appendix) Prague, Stettin, Stockholm, Sofia, Belgrade, Bucharest, Helsinki and Istanbul. For this work the Kdos.

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Meldegebiete had special experts. In many cases, however, there were no clear demarcation lines between the different fields in which the latter worked. The intelligence regarding Russia coming from both the Kdo. Meldegebiet China and from Japan was also sometimes very interesting. The agreement concluded between Standartenfuehrer Dr. Rapp and Vlassov regarding intelligence work was that the latter and his staff were to have a completely free hand as to how, where and with whom they worked in Russia, Amt VI was to provide all technical and material support, and any intelligence resulting was to go to both sides. Schellenberg personally was certain that Vlassov, whom he regarded as trustworthy, already had intelligence contacts in Russia before the conclusion of this agreement. On the other hand, according to reports from “Wally I”, his organisation was riddled with NKVD agents. With the consent of Schellenberg, Rapp also approached Amt Chef IV and was allowed to have contact with imprisoned Poles (Bor etc.) and Russians, with a view to using them for the Geheim Meldedienst. Amt IV was completely uninterested in such possibilities, and Rapp never explained the whole plan to him. The matter never went beyond the preparatory stage as far as the Poles were concerned and Schellenberg states that the only occasion on which he discussed the Russian aspect with Rapp was when the undertaking was being planned. The Russians were to be used primarily for W/T deception work. 3. The following worked with Amt VI against Russia: In Roumania. Moruzov (now dead), Christescu and latterly a Roumanian Jew run by Rohleder. Members of the Roumanian General Staff also co-operated very fully. In Turkey. Considerable support was received from the Turkish Secret Service who supplied Caucasians, Georgians, etc. who were smuggled into Russia by the Germans through the Caucasus. The German firm of Emden Soehne (?) helped in these ventures. [Ludwig] Moyczisch [Moyzisch]126 in Ankara, backed by Walter, the Counsellor of the German Embassy, maintained contact with the Turkish Secret Service. The German agents, Fast and Duplitzer, and the journalist Wolf in Istanbul, also co-operated in espionage directed against Russia. A woman journalist, Frau Crous, representing D.N.B. in Ankara and also involved in the Levantine Intelligence organisation covering the Mediterranean (Symbol “Remo”) also assisted in this work. She was in touch with a man called Wagner. In Finland. Kapitaen Cellarius of Amt VI maintained contact with the Finnish General Staff. In Bulgaria. Eross worked in the same direction in Sofia. The Bulgarian General Staff, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the architect Sevov and the Chief of Police, Colonel Popov (?) were close collaborators against Russia. In Hungary. Support, though weak, was accorded by the Hungarian General Staff and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The only name Schellenberg can recollect is that of a Staff Officer called Usjazi (?). Miscellaneous. Kedia, Tschenkeli, Kauder [Richard Klatt], [Anton] Turkul, two or three Poles in Gotenhafen (run by Kapitaen Wiebe), a man in Switzerland associating with the communist leader Nicole, and a German refugee journalist in Spain who was in touch with Red Spaniards and received his intelligence via Switzerland. Kleist and Klaus also used Poles for anti-Russian intelligence work.

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4. After the evacuation of the Balkans there were no Nachrichtenstellen there able to work against Russia. In Turkey too, as well as in Finland, the service petered out. In fact, the work against Russia as described above deteriorated to such an extent that plans were considered to establish as quickly as possible new connections through Vlassov and to send “agents provocateurs” directed against [General Walther von] Seydlitz.127 The Ukrainian Freedom Movement (the UPA) also offered good possibilities. Towards the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945 as a result of diminishing morale the reliable Russian “human material” at the disposal of “Wally” and the “Zeppelin” was exhausted, and in March, 1945, it was decided, with the approval of the Army General Staff, to pick from the Wehrmacht 1,000 Russian-speaking Germans or Volksdeutsche for their work. The selection and training of these men had already begun by the end of March and beginning of April. II. Russian Activities against Germany. 1. Russian Secret Service. The communist idea of world revolution, the eternal human problem of “poor and rich” and the opposition to the existing regime in Germany, provided a well prepared soil for Russian intelligence work. Many German prisoners-of-war placed themselves at the disposal of the Russian Secret Service, especially after Stalingrad and the formation of the Seydlitz Committee [Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach], and in addition the Russians were able to draw their agents from amongst their own prisoners-of-war in Germany and German occupied territory, the numerous emigrants (Caucasians, Georgians, Ukrainians etc.) and nationals of neutral states (especially the Balkan countries) and of Allied nations (e.g. the Poles). The Russians made use in a wide measure of agents dropped by parachute. 2. Russian Deception. The Bureau of Colonel Wagner supplied reports from Stockholm about Russia which were regarded by Amt VI as deception material. The Japanese too frequently gave [Dr Karl-Heinz] Kraemer in Stockholm material which betrayed its Russian origin. Wagner’s reports could be traced back to a member of the Russian Legation in Stockholm called Semenov [Semyonov], and as a result of the ensuing W/T monitoring by Amt VI specialists in the Wannsee Institut it was revealed that a central office in Moscow was engaged in large scale deception work. In tactical deception the Russians were very strong. Every Russian Army order carried an appendix referring to deception. Numbers of Russian divisions were repeatedly changed. The systematic control exercised through the card index of the “Fremde Heere” department, however, mostly caused such deception to be recognised in its initial stages. The same applied to tank numbers. During the invasion of Poland and the Baltic States, as well as the Finnish war, the Germans came to the conclusion that Russian deceptions as to troops and equipment was [sic.] the greatest that had ever been practised. Schellenberg asserts that the Russians always published in Moscow two editions of periodicals, maps, armament figures, etc. One very limited edition, which was only

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destined for staff officers, high Government Officials etc. gave the true facts, whilst the other, which was given general distribution contained smoke material. Schellenberg cited the case of a Russian Major Kalugin, who landed with his fighter plane on a German field aerodrome at the beginning of April, 1945. Schellenberg was immediately consulted, as the Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab [air force command] could not agree about this man, who claimed to have deserted in order to have an opportunity of speaking on the German radio. He said that the struggle was not for Germany but for Europe and that the Western Powers should be made to realise this. The latter should encourage anti-Bolshevist forces in Russia—otherwise the war would continue after the defeat of Germany. It was finally established that the Russian Major’s mission had as its only object the deception of the Germans regarding the date of the Russian attack on Berlin. He said that the attack was due in ten days time, whereas in reality it started the following day. III. German C.E. Activities against Russia. Here Schellenberg was unable to offer many concrete details. He only knew that the Gestapo was using captured W/T sets to transmit smoke material to the Russians on a large scale.

Appendix IV. Amt VI—Collaboration with the Japanese. I. Collaboration with Japanese Officers in Berlin. 1. VI C 4 dealt with Japan, the principal officers being Dr. Classen, Dr. Kirfel, Dr. Leo and Dr. [Walter] Weirauch. For a long time Weirauch collaborated with Dr. Leo and maintained numerous connections with Japanese, as well as with Germans who knew Japan, but he was mentally not up to this task, and was therefore later transferred to political intelligence work. Dr. Wirsing was another collaborator of Amt VI with the Japanese Intelligence Service. He worked on the political side of general intelligence regarding Japan, whilst Lt. Col. Freund covered the field of counter-espionage. Schellenberg maintains that the Japanese Section of Amt VI and the Mil Amt. worked in reality against Japan. Kdo. Meldegebiet China worked mainly against Russia and Japan. 2. The Japanese officers who figured prominently in the collaboration between the Japanese Intelligence Service and Amt VI were as follows:— 1) Oshima.128 2) Kawahara. First Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy. An inscrutable and difficult man who was the real political observer representing Tokyo. 3) Komatsu. Major General. Japanese Military Attache. A typical army officer who dealt with everything in a crude and military way and was blindly devoted to Oshima. His assistants were:– a) Otani. An able intelligence officer, and in Schellenberg’s view one of the best the Japanese had in Germany. Has a good command of Russian and was the expert for Russia. b) Lt. Col. Higuti. A Samurai type, very serious and fanatical. He sought close contact with Schellenberg, who always switched him over to Freund, whom he knew well, or to Ohletz. He collaborated closely with Nambiar,129 the lieutenant in Germany of Subhandra Bose,130 and is believed to have worked a great deal with Poles and Ukrainians. He was very intelligent, knew the Indian question thoroughly, and had lived four years in Moscow. Schellenberg considers that there was more in him than appeared on the surface. c) Nishi. As far as Schellenberg remembers he was Komatsu’s third assistant and played a particularly important role. When Komatsu last called on Schellenberg he asked for the closest collaboration and suggested on behalf of the Japanese General Staff that all Japanese Military Attaches abroad should assume contact with Amt VI representatives, and should also co-operate in W/T matters. This offer, however, was never put into practice.

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Komatsu also requested precise details concerning preparations for underground work and guerilla warfare, adding that it was the intention to start this earlier in Japan than in Germany. 4) Admiral Kojima. Japanese Naval Attache. From 1934 (?) to 1937 or 1938 was Assistant Naval Attache, and returned to Germany in 1944 as Naval Attache. In Schellenberg’s opinion he was the most active and also the most capable Japanese in Berlin. He possessed a great knowledge of the leading German personalities and knew many details of what went on behind the scenes. He had good collaborators, but Schellenberg considers that he must in addition have run well-informed German “Zutraeger” [informers] and agents. (In this connection Schellenberg maintains that the extent to which German Counter-Espionage seemed completely disinterested in work against the Japanese was truly alarming. It was always argued that Japan was a good ally.) 5) Admiral Abe. Head of the Japanese Military Mission within the terms of the Tripartite Pact, and an old trained intelligence officer. He had spent many years in the U.S.A., had studied there and acquired a great deal of knowledge in many spheres. Schellenberg describes him as cold-blooded, cunning and a Japanese chauvinist who looked down on German ways of life in a superior and slightly ironical manner. His functions amongst the Japanese military representatives were of particular importance, and he was obviously generally recognised as their “doyen”. 3. Official and unofficial parties were frequently arranged with the Japanese who had a great number of representatives in Berlin. (Here Schellenberg himself a teetotaller, remarks that the Japanese, especially Oshima and Komatsu, were tremendous drinkers, the exceptions being in most cases the intelligent ones and those who really did the work.)* At a party given by Himmler in the summer of 1944, at which at least seventeen high Japanese officers were present, Schellenberg had an interesting conversation with Abe, who constantly returned to the subject of South America and the possibility of German-Japanese collaboration there. Schellenberg left this question completely open. Himmler’s counter question regarding Japanese work in the U.S.A. found no response

*As an illustration of German relations with the Japanese, Schellenberg described the following episode, which took place at a dinner party at Oshima’s house at which, apart from Higuti, all the Japanese present were diplomats. An inordinately large amount of alcohol had been consumed, and Oshima and Kaltenbrunner began a violent argument; finally, they both made endless speeches. Hawahara and a very intelligent Japanese Legation Counsellor who was very different from the rest, were reserved and were not happy about the way things were going. Later, another Legation Counsellor of a pronounced Mongolian type, who as he later found out was the Japanese Embassy expert on Russia, sat down near Schellenberg in an ostentatious manner and pointed out that it was not right of him not to drink alcohol, but that the other Germans made up for his deficiency in this respect. The Japanese then gulped down two or three glasses of whisky and asked Schellenberg if it was correct that his policy always had rather a pro-British orientation and why he had no weak spot for Russia instead. The latter retorted that he himself had not asked the Japanese about his own attitude towards Russia, whereupon the latter rose and poured a whole glass of whisky over Schellenberg’s face. Schellenberg found himself in a very embarrassing situation as the other Japanese seized the culprit and dragged him out of the room by his ears and hair.

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with Abe, although in the discussion that followed he showed that he was particularly well informed about this country. He remarked that neither the negroes [sic.] nor the Japanese nationals who had emigrated to the U.S.A. were suitable for intelligence or sabotage work. 4. As a result of this party, Schellenberg asked Himmler to pick for him from the Wehrmacht and the SS, ten to fifteen keen young officers who, after a short general training and without being given any intelligence missions, could proceed to Japan in order to get acquainted with the country, its inhabitants and its language. This request was refused, and when some time later ten young naval officers were at last supposed to be going to Japan, the Naval Staff and Doenitz did not allow them to receive a short political training by Amt VI experts. II. Contacts with Japanese Intelligence Officers Abroad. There was no official co-operation between the Geheim Meldedienst and the Japanese Intelligence Officers abroad, although the following contacts were maintained. Turkey. Between Moyzisch in Ankara and Baron Aoki, a young Japanese. An agreement had been made to pool their W/T services in the event of Turkey breaking off diplomatic relations with either country, but this was never put into practice. Sweden. Between [Karl-Heinz] Kraemer in Stockholm and Onodera. Switzerland. Between [Kapitän zur See Hans] Meisner in Berne and Okamoto who must have had at his disposal an immense amount of foreign currency, as he twice tried to bribe Meisner with huge sums of money. In addition, Sakai, an intelligence officer working with Kojima who had obviously been specially picked, was in contact with Eggen on economic matters. Apart fom retrieving his financial position (he had, it seems lost a great deal of money in Hungary and France, and later founded a firm for which the Japanese had to find the money), Eggen achieved good relations based on mutual trust, with Sakai. The latter must have had good contacts with the Russians or known how to approach them, and it was planned that he and Eggen should together meet a Russian spokesman, a professor at one of the Swiss universities with a name something like Orlowski, at Okamoto’s house in Berne. This meeting never took place, as Okamoto fell gravely ill. Eggen always maintained that the Japanese, i.e. Sakai and Kojima (see para [sic.] IV below) in particular, were aiming at winning Schellenberg over for collaboration with the Russians. No plans were made for the secret services of Germany and Japan to work abroad after the defeat of Germany. III. Work in Japan. 1. In Japan itself the Geheim Meldedienst was not strongly represented. The Police Attache, Oberst der Polizei [Josef] Meisinger, had no qualifications whatsoever for his job (he was formerly an expert on homosexuality, Jewish property and kindred subjects)

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and was only appointed because he had to be given a lucrative position. He was in close touch with Mueller and they frequently had telephone conversations, needing no code as they both had the same broad Munich dialect unintelligible to outsiders. 2. Meisinger’s only importance to Schellenberg lay in the fact that he also maintained contact with a young Amt VI representative in Tokyo, a certain Dr. Coehmen or Kohmen, also with Huber in Shanghai and a third man in Bangkok, whose reports he was able to send by diplomatic W/T channels to Berlin. 3. In 1943 a new chief of the Auslands Organisation Japan, Spahn, who had been trained by VI C, proceeded to Japan. As far as Schellenberg remembers, he did little work for Amt VI, and he is unable to say to what extent he was useful to the Auslands Organisation. 4. Towards the end it was planned to send Kirfel and the new Military Attache [Air Force] Major General [Ulrich] Kessler, to Japan, but this could not be realised owing to the heavy cargo which the three submarines detailed for this work were carrying—they had the engineers for the V-weapons on board and guns, torpedoes, etc. to carry out the orders to attack enemy shipping en route which Doenitz and Meisel always insisted on giving. Schellenberg believes that two of the above-mentioned engineers had been roped in for Amt VI work by Dr. Rapp. It was then arranged that Kessler, who had been put into the picture by Ohletz and his officers, should work as far as possible for Mil. C. IV. Kojima’s Criticism of German Policy, etc. 1. Kojima recognised very clearly the mistakes in German policy. In the course of many conversations he had with Schellenberg on this subject, he declared that the German military authorities regarded everything only from a narrow military viewpoint, e.g. Admiral Meisel could see no further than his U-boats. He fully realised all the deficiencies in the German leadership and had no use whatsoever for Ribbentrop, whom he accused of confusing foreign policy with propaganda. One day in January or February, 1945, he confided to Schellenberg that he considered the whole German state machinery, also the military leadership of the Reich, to be over-organised; in the separate departments everything worked very well indeed, but there was no proper co-ordination of the whole. Hitler had concentrated everything in his own hands, and needed a Reich General Staff and a Reich Cabinet. Co-operation with Japan had not taken place to an extent rendered imperative by the war either in the political, military or even the economic fields. 2. He stated that his main object after his return to Germany had been to bring about a compromise peace between Germany and Russia. In this he was backed by Japanese naval opinion, which regarded a block composed of Germany, Russia and Japan as a desirable goal. Japan had even been prepared to give up parts of Manchukuo and other territories, and to bring about a complete change in her policy vis-a-vis China. It was a long time before he had been able to convince Oshima of the necessity of thinking on these lines, as the latter had been a devoted follower of Hitler’s ideas. Hitler and Ribbentrop, however, instead of working through Berlin, had reacted by sounding Tokyo in an entirely superficial way through Ambassador [Heinrich Georg] Stahmer who, as a result of the questions which he was asked to put officially to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, caused the whole course of events to take a false turn. Kojima sincerely

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regretted that he had had to wait until February, 1945, to discuss this matter with Schellenberg, as he thought that if he had been in contact with him in 1944 things would have gone better. He added that the same applied to the contact between Sakai and Eggen (see para. 11). 3. Kojima also referred to disagreements between the Army and the Navy in Japan. The Navy wanted a quick termination of the war in China and a moderate peaceful and purely Asiatic co-operation with that country as well as a close alliance with Russia, which in Kojima’s view was quite natural, since Russia needed a naval power in tune with Russian policy in the Pacific. He was therefore of the opinion that it was essential that a more intelligent and less conservative Japanese Ambassador should be despatched to Moscow, Matsuoko being too old for his job. On the other hand, the Japanese Army, he contended, always wanted to show off and therefore prolong the war in China. (Schellenberg mentioned that this divergence of views was also noticeable in the relations between Komatsu and Kojima, who kept their visits to him secret from each other. As an illustration, he quotes the fact that in April, 1945, Kojima spoke to him quite openly of a three days’ “secret” visit of Onodera to Berlin. Kojima had assumed that Komatsu had visited Schellenberg secretly together with Onodera, and some three days later when Komatsu called alone he was very surprised when Schellenberg wanted to know if Onodera had had a good time in Berlin.

Appendix V. Amt VI—Activities against Persia, Palestine and India. The Gruppe of Amt VI responsible for penetrating the above countries was Gruppe VI C, under Dr. Graefe. On the latter’s death in January, 1944, Stubaf. Schuback took charge of this work. I. Operations against Palestine—the Grand Mufti. [Mohammed Emir] El Husseini, Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, was a close collaborator of Amt VI and, like his adjutant, Dr. Jandalli, a very expensive one. His journey to Germany had been arranged by Moyzisch, the Amt VI representative in Ankara and, disguised by means of bandages round his head, he had been brought by plane from Ankara by Schmidt, head of the Press Department of the Ministry of Propaganda.* At the beginning of his stay in Germany he was looked after by the former German Minister in Teheran, von [sic.] Ettel. Later one of his most important advisers was killed in an air raid. He had a staff of collaborators of between twenty and thirty men, and about the same number of Arabs trained under his personal supervision for intelligence work in a school near the Hague, later going to a final training school in Berlin. Parachute and sabotage training was given in Skorzeny’s establishments in Friedenthal and near Belgrade. Two parachutages were made in Palestine, one in the autumn and the other in the winter of 1944, when both Arabs and German Palestinians were dropped, with the object of preparing the way for other parachutists and encouraging incitement to revolt and sabotage. The Grand Mufti also had agents in Turkey and supervised the Mullah school in Dresden, where the priests were trained for later use with the Mohammedan minorities in Russia and which also served the purpose of supplying new priests to the Turkish and Bosnian forces. In addition, an Arab agent of his was smuggled to Africa and back via Tangiers and Spain, where he used a German service passport, at the beginning of 1944. Schellenberg added that it was important for the Germans to have the Mufti’s support because of the Mohammedan sects (Bosnians and Albanians) in the Balkans. Originally, Dr. Graefe was the liaison officer with the Mufti, but later Stubaf. Matsiak was delegated for this work, as there were too many individual items to be dealt with. Stubaf. Beissner was also appointed liaison officer for a period during Graefe’s time, but * This incident probably refers to Rashid el Gailani and not to the Grand Mufti whose name in this connection it would seem has been given in error by Schellenberg.

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he was a ne’er-do-well, dissipated and unreliable, and was removed from the Amt. In 1944, Hstuf. Dittges was the officially appointed liaison officer for many months. The Mufti’s competitor in Berlin for the favours of the Nazi orientalists was Rashid el Gailani, who was looked after by [Fritz] Grobba, former German Minister [1932–1939] in Bagdad. Parachute Operations in Palestine in 1944. Towards the end of 1943, a German national who had returned from Haifa and whose name Schellenberg can no longer recollect was employed as case officer. He was in contact with other refugees returning to Germany from Palestine, and it was he who repeatedly drew attention to the fact that there were numerous Germans from Palestine in the Lehrregiment Brandenburg, where they were completely wasting their knowledge of the country and language and were being killed off senselessly in the regular actions undertaken by the regiment. After ceaseless effort these reports finally led to the four remaining Germans from Palestine, of whom there had originally been twenty, being transferred to Amt VI for operational work. Schellenberg is unable to remember their names. Ostubaf. Tschierchky [Karl Tschierschky?], who was Gruppenleiter VI C for a time after Graefe’s death, was intensely interested in the preparation of the parachute operation itself. Besides the final training of the two Germans and the two Arabians [sic.] who were to be dropped, he conducted the continual negotiations with the Mufti, who was obviously anxious to do everything he could to prove his enthusiasm for the operation. Hstuf. Dittges, as liaison officer to the Mufti was of course also concerned with the parachute operation and knew the whole plan. Many difficulties arose when it came to preparing the actual operation. A permit for fuel for the Liberator which was to be used had to be granted by Goering, one aircraft was found to be faulty and a spare part had first of all to be fitted up from another captured machine, and perpetual delays were caused by the constant lack of raw materials. Meanwhile time was pressing, as the airfield in the vicinity of Athens from which the Liberator was to take off was threatened. The surmounting of these difficulties involved a lot of work, which it would have been impossible to accomplish had not a higher Dienststelle been able to intervene. A short time after the operation took place, Tschierchky was dismissed on grounds of inefficiency. His successor, Staf. Rapp, again made good contact with the Mufti, who always set great value on these close personal ties. The Mufti was already agitating for a second parachutage, in spite of the fact that the first mission had not reported either by W/T or other means. II. Other Personalities Concerned with the Arab Operations. Gruppe VI C dealt with the Arab Problem, above all in conjunction with the whole Islamic question, from the scientific point of view. Here Haft. De. Olzecha, the director of the Turkmenischen Institut, played a leading role. He was also the founder of the Mullah school in Dresden (see above). [Roman] Gamotha had once reported that the Secret Service could make use of the activities of the Mullahs in the Orient, and

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Schellenberg therefore pushed ahead with these plans. It was Olzecha’s duty to examine this question thoroughly, with the help of all the experience he had gained at the school. A Turk, the V-Mann Kemal Ori, also came into the picture; he was a follower of the old Caliphate idea and, as a member of a secret sect in Turkey, had fled to Germany. Duplitzer in Istanbul was the main link with the head of the sect. Schellenberg later forbade this contact, as it was of very little value from an intelligence point of view and he considered that it did not justify the political risk involved with regard to Turkey. Ori was a religious fanatic and was eventually interned on these grounds, as he tried to spread his ideas everywhere. Schellenberg believes that he was later sent mainly to Albania in connection with the Mullah question, but does not know what eventually became of him. A Dr. Kieram, from Jahnke’s office, worked on the Arabian question for a time, but never achieved anything. In addition, Frau Crous, a DNB reporter in Belgrade, who had previously been stationed in Istanbul, was very interested in Arabian questions, and, with the help of Arabian collaborators, sometimes sent in quite valuable reports. Most of the work in Ankara was almost entirely concerned with the Arabian problem, and was handled by Schuback’s office. Schellenberg believes that in the last weeks of the war Rapp had to put Schuback on to intelligence work against Russia, however, as no messages were being received from Russian-occupied Germany; this was incomprehensible to the High Command, which still refused to admit the already existing chaos. III. Operations against Persia. Until his death, Graefe, together with Schuback, dealt with Persia, and Moyzisch in Ankara must also have been connected with Persia at that period. After the return of Gamotha to Germany from Persia in the summer of 1943 most of the work was gradually transferred to him. Later on this mainly consisted in preparing a new operation which, however, he continually managed to postpone for various reasons. The Iranian-German, Staisch, who had returned from Iran with Gamotha, did similar work. From the very detailed report which Gamotha submitted after his return, two things of particular importance to the Intelligence Service emerged; that the next operation would have to take place in the Northern sector of Persia and that the Mullahs, who had helped him on various occasions, obviously ran an efficient Intelligence service which to all intents and purposes stretched to India. He also reported that after his arrival in Turkey, the Turkish Secret Service which had always regarded him as an Abwehr agent and never as a journalist, had made several attempts to send him back to Persia with military assignments. Gamotha’s Career and Character. Gamotha came of a good middle-class Viennese family and as a student entered the SS, where he was made a member of the so-called SS-Mannschaftshaeuser, an organisation of Himmler’s [sic.] which helped gifted young students, according to their qualifications and the strength of the recommendations they had received, in order to develop as far as possible their talents and characters. The old Amt VI had once recruited some twelve to fifteen men from these SS-Mannschaftshaeuser. These men, who had not been

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psychologically prepared for the work and had completely false ideas about the character of the Intelligence Service, were sent abroad with a lot of money and no character or intelligence test, and proved quite unsuitable. Most of their efforts, and they themselves could not be reproached for this, automatically came to nothing. Jost, who was in no position to train them properly was chiefly to blame. All were discharged from the Service, mostly in unpleasant circumstances, with the exception of Reichel in Vichy (later killed in action with the Waffen-SS), who was about the best; Koeln (?) [sic.] in Tokyo, who was weak; and Mayer and Gamotha, who worked in Teheran with cover as reporters for the Trans-Ozean Press Agency. Gamotha, and particularly Mayer, were the typical products of this system. They had been given no guidance and it was impossible to retain a hold over them abroad. In the end they became overbearing and did not respond to the attempts that were later made to train them. Their reports were scanty and consisted mostly of a colossal muddle of meaningless messages. All reminders were without avail. In addition, they borrowed large sums of money from all and sundry. Schellenberg dropped a hint to Graefe to recall them both, even after Mayer had begun to send in good military reports, but before this could be carried into effect, Persia was occupied and the Germans were expelled. (In this connection Schellenberg mentioned that there must have been many difficulties between Gamotha and Mayer on the one hand and the German Ambassador on the other, as Ettel did not carry out his responsibilities, particularly in the matter of the evacuation of German women and children. These accusations against Ettel also came from other quarters; there was no investigation, however, as he was Landesgruppenleiter of the Auslands Organisation and was thus protected by Bohle. Schellenberg personally took no interest in the case, although charges against Ettel were repeatedly brought to his notice.) First of all he and Mayer, on whose hands [sic.] a considerable reward had been placed, were hidden in a cave by a devoted Persian, and all Mayer’s very extensive network of agents managed to find shelter. They later went to Teheran. There followed large-scale waves of arrests amongst the whole group of agents, who had formed an opposition movement with plans to overthrow the regime. According to Gamotha, this was due to betrayal by an Iranian family with whom Mayer was friendly. He made very serious accusations against Mayer, indicating that he had heavily compromised them all by putting himself completely in the hands of this Iranian, whose daughter was his mistress and on whom he completely depended. Mayer justified himself by stating that the Iranian’s wife had been German. In spite of all warnings Mayer became so involved with this family, that in the end they knew full details of his activities. Subsequently, the ground became too hot for Gamotha in Teheran, and he decided on flight with Staisch. After many adventures they reached Turkey, where they were interned until the German Ambassador secured their release. Schellenberg first met Gamotha only after his return and did not receive a very favourable first impression, which he later put down to Gamotha’s bad malaria. He appeared to be of weak character, having a soft-speaking voice which was in complete contrast to his vanity and energy. He was undisciplined and in matters of jurisdiction often imprudent and insubordinate, but very gifted. In addition, he was all out for money, and was continually offended at not being treated with enough respect and given sufficient decorations. For example, he had annoyed Schellenberg intensely when, after his return, on the one hand he told him personally that he expected to receive the

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Ritterkreuz from Hitler and on the other he could not even wait until Himmler had been fully informed about his return before giving a comprehensive report to the press, which also gave him a lot of publicity over the wireless. This annoyed Himmler, and with reason. Schellenberg nevertheless used his influence to secure the award of the Iron Cross, 1st Class (Staisch received the 2nd Class) which he considered he deserved, as after careful investigation it was established beyond all doubt that he was not a double agent. He was also lavishly rewarded with money. This was not enough for him, however, and he applied unsuccessfully for a marriage allowance. Moreover, he quite shamelessly accused Wolf, Schuback and others of taking articles of value from the courier luggage of a Persian V-Mann. Later, his closest Viennese friends (Goettsch and Waneck), who through Kaltenbrunner had secured his entrée into Viennese society, thus placing him in a position to alienate himself more and more from Gruppe VI C intrigued against him and so blackened his character that he was arrested. He was accused of having had shady dealings with various Persians and also of obtaining his new flat from seized Jewish property by underhand methods. He was released again, but the proceedings against him continued. Finally Schellenberg had no time to bother himself individually with the case. IV. Amt VI Activities against India. Gruppe VI C dealt with espionage in India and military intelligence was covered by MIL C. Prior to 1942 Stubaf. Daufeldt, who also dealt with matters pertaining to England, was employed on this work. He was succeeded by Graefe who in his turn was replaced in 1943 by Stubaf. Schuback, who continued until the end of the war. As far as espionage is concerned, the German Foreign Office had W/T contact via Kabul with Silbas [Subhas?] Chandra Bose, a leader of one of the Indian Freedom Movements in Northern India. The Amt VI Meldekopf in Northern India (Delhi?) was commanded by an Indian who had W/T contact with [Adam von] Trott zu Solz of the Foreign Ministry of Berlin, who looked after Bose before the latter went to Japan by submarine. Earlier Oberst [Georg Alexander] Hansen of Eins Heer [Abwehr I] had briefed a certain Hauptmann Kirn (real name unknown) of MIL C and D to fly to Northern India from Southern Greece in the summer of 1944, accompanied by two Indians and two Germans. His mission was to establish contact with the Indian Freedom Movements and set up an Intelligence Service there, which would have used the above-mentioned Foreign Office channels of communications. When Hansen was arrested as a result of the events of the 20th July, 1944, Schellenberg himself took over and was greatly interested in the accomplishment of this mission. The plan was not carried out, however, for two reasons; firstly owing to jealousy on the part of [Wilhelm] Keppler in the Foreign Office, who claimed that it was very likely that the Russians were in a position to decipher either incoming or outgoing W/T transmissions with Kabul, and possibly also those from Kabul with Northern India and vice versa. He also claimed that the new project might endanger existing Foreign Office connections with Northern India. Secondly, the unfavourable course of the war made the scheme impracticable.

Appendix VI. Amt VI—Post-Defeat Plans. The sudden deterioration of the military situation of Germany in the last months before defeat did not, according to Schellenberg, allow German leadership to develop any post defeat plans. Schellenberg maintains that the whole working method of the National Socialist system prevented any such premeditated schemes taking shape. Every intelligent man saw the end coming. Nobody was allowed, however, to allude to it, as the policy of despair (“Katastrophen Politik”) pursued by the leaders that is “If we must die, then let the whole people die”, punished every precautionary or protective measure in an exemplary way as defeatism. For this reason Schellenberg could broach this subject only very late in the day and only in the shape of private discussions with chiefs of departments and sections. As late as February 1945 he brought this subject up at a meeting of all department chiefs and gave them the task of submitting to him in two weeks time purely personal ideas regarding this question and merely in the shape of suggestions. He had defined the subject very carefully and had taken great care in the formulation of his statement. Notwithstanding this fact the result was a discussion which proved anything but agreeable to Schellenberg. The gist of this discussion was: “So this is the position which is responsible for the Amt VI chief nursing such ideas.” Schellenberg is convinced that Wanneck [sic.] and Skorzeny reported in this sense to Kaltenbrunner who tackled him a few days later in harsh words about this statement. Schellenberg replied evasively by pointing to technical preparatory work. Skorzeny brought this subject up again by telling Schellenberg in a rather condescending manner that the SS “Jagdverbaende” (North, East, South and West) were all being concentrated in the Alps and were there fighting as Maquis. All who could join would have to place themselves under his orders, everything else was rubbish. He and Kaltenbrunner were absolutely agreed on that. Skorzeny obviously meant what he said and acted accordingly. Schellenberg subsequently took no notice of him and gave him up as hopeless. The continual measures concerning the evacuation, the technical possibilities etc., did not allow Schellenberg sufficient time to treat the problem mentioned with the department chiefs. He discussed it on various occasions with Dr. Sandberger and Lt. Col. Ohletz. The progressive break up of the Reich showed that a disappearance into civilian clothes and corresponding civilian professions, if necessary even in an extreme way (clergymen, monks, etc.), was the only thing one could advise others to do. It amounted to an endeavour to save “human substance”. The question how a working Intelligence Service could be built up on such a basis, remained completely open and unexplained. Nothing was said about a possibility of contact with foreign countries, the real centre of gravity of secret service work. Schellenberg is of the firm conviction that apart from the measures for the evacuation which had by then degenerated into flight, nothing systematically planned was done for post war work.

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Of great importance in this connection were Schellenberg’s discussions with Major General von [sic.] Gehlen [Reinhard Gehlen]. Gehlen was until February 1945 “Chief Fremde Heere Ost”. He was an excellent general staff officer who employed [enjoyed?] all round esteem. He possibly possessed the greatest understanding amongst the members of the “Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab” for the “Geheime Meldedienst”. He was Schellenberg’s strongest supporter within the army. This was shown by the acceptance of Schellenberg’s suggestion that all military attaches and I.c.s. of the Wehrmacht were to pass through the school of the “Geheime Meldedienst”. The preparations for this were complete when Gehlen was deprived of his post because he failed to form a correct estimate of the attack by the XI Ukrainian army from the direction of Berlin as well as Pomerania. Hitler had one of his usual attacks of rage and Kaltenbrunner was delighted when he was able, addressing himself to Schellenberg to declare in the course of a lunch party: “This little sausage of von [sic.] Gehlen now has got to go West too—he probably relied too much on your poor intelligence service. Don’t forget I don’t dream of courting one day reproaches by the Fuehrer owing to your reports. In that case you would be most speedily dismissed.” Schellenberg describes this particular performance as one of the many attacks of Kaltenbrunner against him. Major General von [sic.] Gehlen in March 1945 asked Schellenberg for a quiet talk in private. One evening he spent three hours with Schellenberg. In the course of this talk Gehlen estimated that military resistance would last another two months. Then the end had to be counted with. Gehlen said that preparations had to be made for this case. The only man with the necessary imagination and energy to undertake this task was Himmler. Himmler should, as Commander of the Home Army, authorise Schellenberg to build up, together with Gehlen and the best general staff officers, a resistance movement and army on the lines of the Polish resistance. Gehlen said that the army had the fullest confidence in Schellenberg as an organiser and he, Gehlen, and his best general staff officers, as well as many whom Schellenberg did not yet know, would put themselves voluntarily under Schellenberg’s command. Gehlen added that he would now pretend that he was taking four weeks holiday, but in reality he was going to “Frankenstrupp” (a cover name standing for a prepared evacuation quarter of the OKW) in order to prepare his plan quietly. He had already asked for a comprehensive survey regarding the Polish resistance army. Gehlen requested Schellenberg to prepare the same on his side. The evening ended with Schellenberg’s assurance that he would think it all over thoroughly and then secure the decision of Himmler. Schellenberg promised Gehlen strictest secrecy. Gehlen attached above all great importance to Kaltenbrunner not being put into the picture. Schellenberg discussed the matter with Dr. Rapp and asked for a report on the whole issue. Not more than ten days after Schellenberg’s talk with Gehlen Rapp brought with him an excellent survey of the whole structure of the Polish resistance army, together with Gehlen’s request to transmit as soon as possible, preferably by the same courier, the written consent of Himmler. The courier explained orally that as [Heinz] Guderian was no longer chief of the OKH and as Wenk [Walther Wenck] was his successor, it would be a good thing if Himmler initiated Wenk into the plan. Schellenberg explained the whole plan to Himmler who declined it abruptly. He said verbatim to Schellenberg: “This is complete nonsense, if I should discuss this plan with Wenk I am the first defeatist of the Third Reich. This fact would be served boiling hot to

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the Fuehrer. You need not tell this to your Gehlen. You need only explain to him that I strictly refuse to accept the plan. Besides—it is typical of the high class general staff officer to sit in Frankenstrupp nursing post war plans instead of fighting.” Schellenberg quickly changed the subject otherwise he thought Himmler would not have stopped talking and no-one could have predicted what orders Himmler might have given inspired by a momentary mood. Schellenberg informed Gehlen and Dr. Rapp of the negative attitude of Himmler. As far as Schellenberg knows no further development occurred.131 As a further illustration of how difficult it was to raise the subject of post defeat plans, Schellenberg furnished the following example: A circular order of the general staff of the army dated February 1945 and marked “Only for General Staff officers” again drew attention to the severe penalties for defeatism. Three general staff officers were quoted by name who had been shot for this crime. In one of the cases the victim had pointed out that the material superiority of the Western powers was so great that a bad end was in sight. What Schellenberg said about post defeat plans in general applies also to the rule which might have been assigned to economic and cultural questions in schemes of this nature. He admits the possibility that there took place within Section VI Wi and VI Kult very detailed talks on these subjects and that plans were discussed with the chiefs of these sections. These plans concerned, however, the “Homeland” and as far as Schellenberg knows nothing concrete resulted from these talks.

Appendix VII. Financial Affairs of the RSHA and Amt VI. A. The Forging of Foreign Currencies:–132 Schellenberg gave a detailed account of the fabrication of many millions of English £5 and £10 notes by Gruppe VI F. When he took over Amt VI there existed already a wellequipped special department in VI F for the falsification of pound notes. Apart from this, Amt VI faked passports, rubber stamps, various currencies, fingerprints, ration cards and postal stamps. This department also dealt with microphotography and secret inks under an expert Dr. Tauboeck. It was also equipped with a photo-copying section. According to Schellenberg, the results were very bad, though after about one and a half years the results improved and the stocks increased. The fake English money was intended to be used in the first instance for propaganda purposes against England, where it was planned to dump it in the course of a mass flight of German planes. It was used for intelligence purposes only in a limited measure. Until the end of 1943 the amounts thus put into circulation were small. Sums up to £1,000 were for instance handed over for distribution to small agents who were not always told that the notes were forgeries. An attempt was made in Portugal to dump between £20,000 and £30,000. Nassenstein was in charge of this transaction but he only succeeded in getting rid of part of this money, and his deal led to “disagreements with the Bank he used”. In 1943 faked notes were mainly £10 notes. In 1944 Kaltenbrunner took over the administration of the forged Bank of England notes, the amount of which had in the meantime risen to many millions. Kaltenbrunner charged a [Friedrich/Frederico] Schwend @ Wendig [sic.] with the distribution of faked pound notes on a huge scale. Schellenberg says that at that time only faked English currency was available, as the forgery of dollar notes was more difficult. At the end of March 1945 the first fake 10 (?) or 20 (?) [sic.] dollar note was ready as an experiment. Wendig was no newcomer to the business as he had previously been incriminated in, or punished for, dealings in illicit Foreign Exchange. He worked closely with Wanneck [sic.], Dr. Hoettl and Scheidler. The exact figures which he brought into circulation are unknown to Schellenberg, who calls him “one of the greatest crooks and imposters” because he disposed of the false pound notes almost exclusively in the territories occupied by Germany. This led at the end to even the German Reichsbank buying notes. Zeidler of VI Wi was ordered by Schellenberg systematically to oppose Kaltenbrunner’s plan to buy art treasures in Italy with faked money. Schellenberg says that he succeeded in thwarting this plan by interfering against it (with the support of Himmler). Wendig seems to have had a wide organisation of distributing agents, and his deals enabled him to satisfy Kaltenbrunner’s most luxurious wishes and also to enable Goettsch, Wanneck [sic.] and Hoettl to share in the proceeds. The forging of pound notes must also have occurred, to a more limited extent, in [Fritz] Todt’s day. The first person to be associated in this matter was one Lengling, who

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was in touch with Greek business persons. At the end of 1943 Mueller Amtschef IV had a Greek, named Nikopopoulous, a notorious trafficker in arms and currency, arrested, and Lengling was so deeply implicated with the Greek that Mueller also had the former arrested in 1944. Kaltenbrunner then gave orders that Scheidler was to take charge of the proceeds from the sale of forged notes and that future orders for stocks could only be authorised by Spacil. Thereafter Kaltenbrunner alone was responsible for giving orders to Spacil for the manufacture of forged pound notes. Scheidler received roughly an equivalent of 300,000 RM, in gold and currency. The sale of less valuable currency, obtained through the proceeds of selling the falsified notes, amounted to roughly the equivalent of 750,000 RM. A deal through Moyzisch in Turkey, who was remunerated in Turkish £s on the proceeds of money derived from the sale of falsified pound notes, resulted in some £90,000 being credited to the Amt VI-Turkey budget. Scheidler instituted various other deals in which he received foreign currency against the proceeds realised by the sale of falsified notes. These deals were made in conjunction with Fast in Turkey, Nassenstein in Portugal, Arnold in Spain and with a Dutchman, name unknown, who had worked in Monaco. B. Amt VI Financial Arrangements: The Oberregierungsrat Dr. Joerges was in charge of foreign currency business for Mil Amt and Amt VI. He arranged matters with Amt II and the other Departments concerned—the Board of Trade, the 4 Year Plan and the Reichsbank. He had always been in the Mil Amt and had come from the Abwehr. His assistant in Amt VI was Amtsrat Wiesinger, whose chief responsibility was payments and other bank business (Kassengeschaft). Wiesinger’s secretary was Strehle. The foreign exchange expert was Polizeirat Pfeiler, a great bureaucrat. He was himself responsible for the foreign exchange for Police Attaches, the money being furnished by Amt II. This averaged about 80,000 RM a month in foreign currency and was administered by the Attaché Group and Pfeiler. Schellenberg had nothing to do with these matters. On Kaltenbrunner’s orders, Spazil [Josef Spacil] Amtschef II had taken over the entire financial administration of the Abwehr. Amt VI and Mil Amt were, however, soon able to exclude Amt II from the financial administration and Amt II had to content itself with the role of procuring money and inspection of accounts. Owing to his experience and connections, Joerges had to be used for procuring the foreign currency. This was a satisfactory solution for Amt VI and Mil Amt. The winding up of 20/25 firms connected with the Abwehr was carried out by Spazil [sic.] and Kaltenbrunner; they were mostly small shady concerns whose winding up had already been planned by Oberst Hansen. One particularly shady concern mentioned by Hansen was a carpet firm in Paris, “Orient”, which was engaged in intelligence work. Most of the concerns originated with I Wi and Schellenberg thinks that they gave an opportunity to some of the older Officers of the Abwehr to carry on the peace-time trades. Spazil [sic.], Kaltenbrunner, Dr. Joerges and the former member of I Wi, Lt. Col. Focke (later Leiter of Kommando Meldegebiet Cologne) are the best sources on these shady affairs. In order to get the picture of the entire administration of Amt VI and Mil Amt, Kaltenbrunner ordered Spazil [sic.] to place in the administration section, VI A, one of

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his best friends, Hastuf Schuler. He had the right to look into all matters and was considered by Spazil [sic.] as a kind of permanent inspectorate. Dr. Sandberger, however, as the acting Gruppenleiter, soon had him provided with urgent work so that the real administration was not imperilled by this measure caused by mistrust. (Kaltenbrunner and Spazil [sic.] feared Schellenberg’s actual efforts at that time to make the two Aemter selfsufficient.) C. Kaltenbrunner’s Arrangements for Financial Allocations: Amt II, which was run by Kaltenbrunner’s friend Spacil, regularly received large remittances from the Reichsbank for RSHA services. Kaltenbrunner and Spacil were thus able to allocate amounts to the various departments within the RSHA, as and when it suited their convenience. Monthly remittances were made by Amt II to Amt VI, and the Mil Amt, and the expenditure of these two departments was controlled by Hptstuf Schuler, of Amt II, who was temporarily attached to Schellenberg’s staff for this purpose. Schellenberg estimates that Amt VI and the Mil Amt were allocated the following annual amounts through Amt II. Mil Amt

8,000,000 RM.

Amt VI

4,000,000 RM.

These sums represent the amounts which the two departments could draw in foreign currency for their requirements. Schellenberg estimates that this total of 12,000,000 RM. (in currency) was allocated to foreign countries as follows: Spain

4 million

Portugal

1 1/2–2 million

Sweden

1 1/2 million

Switzerland 1 million Turkey

1 million

Argentine

100,000 U.S. dollars, despatched by a sailing boat early in 1944. 100,000 U.S. dollars, ditto at the end of 1944 or early in 1945.

U.S.A.

100,000 U.S. dollars plus 28 lb. weight of gold, despatched by U-boat autumn 1944. 50,000 U.S. dollars, despatched by U-boat towards the end of 1944 or early in 1945. The U-boat carrying the first amount failed to return. The second U-boat returned after putting agents ashore with the money, but, according to Schellenberg, a report was put out in U.S. broadcast that the agents had been picked up. Both amounts were dropped by parachute from a plane in 1944 and 1945 respectively [sic.].

Iran

5,000 gold coins 3,000 gold coins

Palestine

3,000 gold coins plus 3 gold bars

Dropped by parachute from a plane 1944.

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bullion

The remaining currency at the disposal of Amt VI was distributed to the F.A.I.s for their work in Russia, the Balkans, Italy, France and Belgium; and also to various RSHA services in Germany which required it for work in different foreign countries. D. Schellenberg’s Disposal of Personal Funds: As Chef Amt VI Schellenberg claims that he personally always had at his disposal 29,000 dollars and 30,000 Swiss frs. He states that both these amounts were taken to Sweden independently by his secretary, who informed him that she had brought these two sums with her after their arrival there. Schellenberg immediately ordered 1,000 U.S. dollars to be paid to Herr Musy, with instructions that this amount should be taken to Switzerland by Musy and held by him for assisting any other Germans, and, in particular, Schellenberg’s family. The remaining 28,000 dollars were handed over to Count Bernadotte by Schellenberg and were confiscated by the Swedish authorities. As regards the 30,000 Swiss francs, this sum was placed at the disposal of Count Bernadotte, as head of the Swedish Red Cross, with the proviso that this money was to be used to help needy Germans and, in particular, Schellenberg’s family. On Count Bernadotte’s suggestion, three months’ salary was paid out from this fund to Schellenberg and his first secretary, Frl. Schienke, her female assistant Erdmann, Hastuf Fritz [Franz] Goering, Ostubaf Dr. [Heinz] Rennau and his wife and daughter, who were members of his staff and had arrived in Sweden with Schellenberg. After this payment had been effected a balance of 14,000 Swiss francs plus 3,000 Swedish Kr. (which had already been exchanged) was given over to the care of Count Bernadotte under the proviso already mentioned above. E. Arrangements Made by Kaltenbrunner for Transfer of his Personal Funds to Switzerland: Under the orders from Kaltenbrunner, Oberregierungsrat Joerges, transferred, on instructions given by Schellenberg, a sum of 185,000 Dutch Gulden in bonds to a neutral account in Switzerland, possibly the Zuricher Bank, on behalf of Kaltenbrunner. The paying-in receipt was passed to Scheidler, Kaltenbrunner’s adjutant. Kaltenbrunner then had dealings with Seyss-Inquart and Ohlendorf concerning the transfer of further sums from Holland. Schellenberg learnt this from Kirchfeld of the Reichswirtschafts Ministerium. These sums, however, were transferred to the Reich as it was impossible to get them to Switzerland. It may be that Kaltenbrunner carried out further transactions with Dr. Hoffman, a Rechtsanwalt from Vienna, who was in contact with Doktor [sic.] Barwirsch, a Swiss lawyer from Davos. Both these men were actively concerned in business matters.

Appendix VIII. Amt VI—Penetration of German Industry: The advantages to the “Geheim-Meldedienst” resulting from close collaboration between Amt VI Wi and German economic life at home and abroad, were not lost on Schellenberg. He well knew that the Abwehr had always made use of the agencies abroad of powerful German industrial enterprises as cover for its own activities. Whilst this arrangement was mostly done locally, that is as the result of private relationship between representatives of German business undertakings and Abwehr officers, Schellenberg’s plans envisaged the systematic penetration of German “Wirtschaft” with both the spirit and the flesh of his “Geheim-Meldedienst”. This is best seen in his attempt to make use of the services of I.G.Farben. Schellenberg’s efforts to penetrate the I.G.Farben for his own purposes may serve as a characteristic example of the methods he employed. Relations between Amt VI and the I.G.Farben were not precisely defined. Schellenberg himself was anxiously endeavouring to get a clear picture of the whole organisation of the I.G.Farben for he knew that the Economic Section of the I.G.Farben had its own Intelligence Service which was said to be very good. The Director of this Economic Section of the I.G.Farben, Dr. Ilkner [Max Ilgner], who was married to a Swedish woman, was above all very well informed about the situation in the Balkans. Co-operation between Amt VI and I.G.Farben was effected in three stages. Schellenberg knew that minor officials of the Amt VI as well as a few officers of the Mil Amt had personal contacts with individual directors of the I.G.Farben. The members of the Board of Directors of this concern were on the other hand rather suspicious, for they always confused Amt VI with Amt III. All of them were afraid of the “S.D.Inland”, and also of the Gestapo and it was only when they realised that Amt VI dealt with intelligence from abroad that they became more confident. In the end quite a few of the minor employees of the I.G.Farben abroad were working for the Amt VI. Schellenberg says that he had no practical proof of this, but that he felt so sure about it that he advised the department chiefs of VI Wi to continue cooperation with the lower ranks of the I.G.Farben. He made it clear however that no efforts should be made by them to approach the leading officials of this enterprise because he felt that such approaches might undermine the separate plans which he nursed himself of engaging I.G.Farben in the Intelligence work of Amt VI. Schellenberg’s own plan was to effect co-operation from the top downwards, that is in conjunction with the six or seven leading chiefs of the I.G.Farben. He purposely did not choose the medium of Dr. Ilkner [sic.], head of the Economic Department of the I.G.Farben, though he knew him to be a relative of the general manager of I.G. Farben, Dr. [Hermann] Schmitz, Heidelberg. He did not choose the channel of Ilkner [sic.] because the latter was a man who would have immediately tried to exploit all the economic and personal advantages which collaboration with Amt VI would have brought

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him. He would also, after having discussed the matter with Schellenberg, have told all and sundry that he had been in conference with say Hitler or Himmler. Ilkner’s [sic.] own I.G.Farben colleagues took the same view of him and for this reason Schellenberg never tried to make his personal acquaintance. Ilkner [sic.], on the other hand, made several efforts to meet Schellenberg by inviting him to lunch. Schellenberg chose instead the medium of Dr. [Heinrich] Buetefisch who had his general office in Berlin. Schellenberg discussed quite frankly his plans with Dr. Buetefisch. The latter was of the opinion that the Economic Department of the I.G.Farben would be the right quarter to collaborate with Amt VI. On the other hand he shared Schellenberg’s reservations about Ilkner [sic.]. He also understood that the I.G.Farben as a “state within the State” were regarded by the economic chiefs of the German Government with a certain amount of apprehension, (these economic chiefs were Funk and Ohlendorf who apart from being chief of Amt III, he was at the same time Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Economic affairs) [sic.]. As Schellenberg was known as a man who without any regard to National Socialist principles, sought practical co-operation where he could find it, he had to be very guarded in this respect. Schellenberg achieved full understanding with Buetefisch on all these points. They agreed that Buetefisch should introduce to Schellenberg the director of the sale organisation of I.G.Farben abroad. This foreign sales organisation was in the hands of the firm of Bayer, well known for the sale of aspirin, pyramidon and many other chemical preparations. They had representatives in every country abroad. The Director of Bayer called [Wilhelm Rudolf] Mann came from Cologne. Schellenberg had two long discussions with Mann in the course of which many practical problems concerning forward intelligence were gone into. Mann was not over enthusiastic about Schellenberg’s plan. He submitted that there existed too many organisations which approached him on the matter. He also said that too many men lacking intelligence were in charge of these questions. In principle Mann declared himself ready as a German to collaborate in this domain. At the same time he asked Schellenberg first to co-ordinate all these questions under one single management. Mann also wanted to see affected by such reforms the different sections of the Abwehr which as he knew were not pulling in one single direction, but were representing conflicting interests.133 This situation confirmed Schellenberg in his view that he had to find the line to Schmitz of Heidelberg via Buetefisch. In the course of a later discussion with Buetefisch, both Schellenberg and Buetefisch agreed that it was necessary to introduce Schellenberg to Schmitz for the purpose of discussing those problems. Buetefisch was all the more convinced of the necessity for such a meeting, as not long before Lt.Col. Focke of the Abwehr had given rather a strange lecture to the assembled directorate of the I.G.Farben. This lecture, owing to the rather confused thoughts of the lecturer, made a bad impression on the assembled I.G.Farben Directors and did not leave them with a conviction that intelligence matters were left in the best possible hands. Schellenberg discussed with Buetefisch what was preferable, to meet Dr. Schmitz alone or to give a lecture to the assembled Board of Directors of I.G.Farben. It was decided that it was more practicable to limit the first discussion to Schellenberg and Schmitz. These problems were ventilated by Buetefisch with Schmitz and most certainly also with the Board of Directors of I.G.Farben. The meeting with Schmitz was fixed for the end of 1944, but it never took place. Correspondence on the subject has, however, passed between Schellenberg and Schmitz. As indicated earlier there certainly existed

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contacts between Prof. Dr. Schmied and the directors and sub-directors of I.G.Farben, who therefore collaborated with Amt VI in the manner in which Schellenberg himself envisaged collaboration with the Board of Directors of this undertaking. Schmied’s main contact was Ilkner [sic.]. Zeidler had actually roped in as collaborators one or two of the officials of the Economic Department of I.G.Farben. He succeeded in making use of Amt VI of the intelligence at the disposal of the I.G.Farben Economic Department [sic.]. As a proof of his argument that penetration of business concerns offers better prospects for information on intelligence than the old-fashioned employment of professional agents, Schellenberg told a story of how Buecking with fifteen agents watching the Lisbon port was not able to establish what the local I.G.Farben representative found out without difficulty from his friend the director of the port.

Appendix IX. The Work of the Police Attachés. The Police Attachés were all united in an “Attaché Group”. This group was under the immediate orders of Kaltenbrunner and was commanded by SS Standartenfuehrer Dr. Zinder. These Police Attachés were from Schellenberg’s point of view of little importance regarding Amt VI or Mil Amt work because they were “marked” officers bearing the onus of Gestapo activities and therefore in most cases automatically shunned by the other members of the mission. In the whole scheme they were however important to Schellenberg because the representatives of Amt VI had been by an arrangement with the German Foreign Office conceded the right to use the special so-called green envelope of the courier post which enjoyed diplomatic rights. In this arrangement it was stated that the Police Attaché is responsible to his chief of mission regarding the activity of all agents and representatives of the Reichsfuehrer SS in every country. The Police Attachés, and above all Mueller, tried to drive [derive?] from the above mentioned stipulation a right to act as superiors. They never succeeded in this, though it led to continuous internal fights and intrigues. The attaches themselves were all officials who had originated from the police career, as well as personal protegees of Mueller who were given good jobs as awards for special deeds or for other reasons. Not one of these Police Attachés was suited in the sense of a really far sighted political intelligence service. The only really bright ones were Winzer whose intelligence was, however, out-weighed by grave deficiencies of character, and Dr. Hoffmann, a legal man who did not originate from the Police. Schellenberg in order to secure influence on these Police Attachés, succeeded in obtaining the exclusive authority for the allocation of foreign exchange. This right proved to be an important counterweight against Mueller’s influence. Schellenberg in the end only use [d] the Police Attaches as letter boxes and as a postal service. Gradually they themselves tried to join Schellenberg’s work which he says “became increasingly successful”.

Appendix X. Horia Sima and Roumania [sic.]. Horia Sima was the successor of Codreanu. The old Amt VI under Jost, according to the instructions of Heydrich, pursued the policy of the “Iron Guard” and supported this party up to open revolt. A special role was played in this by von Bolschwingh [Otto von Bolschwingh?] and Geiszler. The whole thing ended very badly and Ribbentrop used the incident in order to bring Himmler and Heydrich into a difficult position with Hitler. Outwardly Himmler took severe measures against the ringleaders in order to restore his position with Hitler. Horia Sima and 300 members of the Iron Guard were arrested “for their own protection” in Roumania and put in “protective custody” in Germany. Either at the end of 1943 or the beginning of 1944 Horia Sima escaped, but Müller did not immediately report the flight as he hoped in the meantime to apprehend Sima by means of the comprehensive measures he had taken for this purpose. Ribbentrop heard of the incident and used the disappearance of Sima in order to undermine Himmler’s position with Hitler. A huge scandal followed, and the result was a deep crisis in the relationship between Hitler and Himmler. It is said that Hitler abused Himmler in the grossest manner, being of the firm opinion that Sima had fled with the consent of Himmler. After about ten days Sima was arrested in Italy, where the conditions of his detention were made more rigorous. Schellenberg says that the change in Roumania in 1944 came as a surprise though the symptoms recorded by his Intelligence Service were so numerous and serious that an intelligent “Fuehrung” ought to have reacted. A report by the chief of the Roumanian Secret Service, Christescu, was particularly alarming. He had repeatedly invited Schellenberg to visit him and tried to add weight to this invitation by showing keenness in rendering services, but Ribbentrop and the reports of [Manfred Freiherr] von Killinger who, as Schellenberg put it, “was certainly not quite normal”, frustrated all warnings.134 Himmler never showed any inclination to expose himself regarding Roumania. Schellenberg was even officially forbidden to “work” in Roumania (the same veto existed for Italy and Japan). Before the change in Roumania Schellenberg had reorganised the counter-espionage service in the Ploesti oil region, for which purpose he had to get the special permission of Himmler. Immediately after the beginning of the disorders in Roumania, Schellenberg and “Volksgruppenfuehrer” Andreas Schmidt who was “by chance” in Berlin, were summoned before Himmler. Horia Sima had immediately been released. Schellenberg met him, together with Schmidt, at a dinner party given by Himmler. Sima made a timid, weakly and sickly impression and did not strike Schellenberg as a particularly impressive personality. It was decided that Sima should immediately form a counter government and start a resistance movement together with Schmidt. For this purpose use should be made of the remaining adherents of the “Iron Guard” as well as the “Volks” Germans in the “Volks”

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group of Schmidt. Both Sima and Schmidt were instantly sent to Budapest by plane. Amt VI and Mil Amt were to supply technical support for W/T, money and training. Schellenberg says that in order to understand how this worked in practice the following must be considered. 1. Schmidt and Wanneck [sic.] were sworn enemies. 2. Wanneck [sic.] claimed political leadership vis a vis Skorzeny, and last but not least 3. Horia Sima hoped to make special arrangements with the German Foreign Office (Minister Altenburg and Professor Six135) with military quarters in Vienna, and above all with the Mil Amt. Schellenberg eventually summoned Sima who appeared accompanied by a Legation Counsellor of the German Foreign Office and informed him in an unmistakable way that he had to apply to Wanneck [sic.] in all questions relating to the “Geheime Meldedienst” and so on. According to Schellenberg this step at least had the result that all intelligence measures undertaken by air were in future controlled by one single quarter. Schmidt then flew to Roumania. His plane, however, crashed and he continued his journey on foot, established contact with all his men and reported one day that he would return by Roumanian plane. According to W/T messages sent by the “Hauptbeauftragter” [Roland] Gunne, Schmidt’s plane was shot down, and it was alleged that the ground staff had betrayed his flight. Schmidt was said to be only wounded. It was reported of Gunne during the last phase that he had entered into close contact with the British Intelligence Service. So far as Schellenberg remembers ten of Sima’s men were dropped by parachute. He does not know what has become of Sima himself.

Appendix XI. Schellenberg’s Relations with the Swedish Intelligence Service. SCHELLENBERG’S CONNECTIONS WITH THE CHIEF OF THE SWEDISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AND HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN BERLIN:– In Sweden Schellenberg only knew of the chief of the Swedish Secret Police, Commissioner Lundquist.136 He had with him a fairly close personal contact and during his various stays in Sweden met him regularly. Their conversations were always of a general political nature, and Schellenberg never received any political or military information from him. He always refused the collaboration which Schellenberg strove after—collaboration arising from his experiences and knowledge of Russia on the basis of a common anti-Communist attitude. He himself was particularly interested in the Japanese Information Service, apparently in order to be able to maintain a better check on its activities in Sweden. As far as the Mil Amt is concerned Canaris, and above all Wagner137 also must have been in contact with the Swedish Secret Service. Rohleder and Freund also had contacts. Schellenberg recalls a conference which Rohleder and possibly Freund had in Copenhagen in 1944 with some Swedish officers, at which it was discussed whether it might not be possible to build up a common organisation in the Baltic area, to include Esthonia and Sweden; the results were to have been for the benefit of both services. The discussions did not achieve any result. In Berlin Schellenberg discussed with the Swedish Ambassador Riechert [Arvid Richert] mainly the question of the concentration of Danish and Norwegian internees in Neuengamme, and considered the possibilities of saving those under arrest by interning them in Sweden for the duration of the war. In addition Schellenberg spoke very frankly to him about the situation, and initiated him into his plans regarding the cessation of the war. At that time Riechert [sic.] already knew about Schellenberg’s close contact with Graf Bernadotte. At another meeting, they spoke in detail about the fight which Schellenberg was carrying on for the release of Riechert’s [sic.] countrymen who were condemned to death. He was naturally very pleased at having found Schellenberg so ready to help. Much time was taken up with the discussion of German-Swedish relations, which were growing increasingly difficult, with the rupture of economic relations, and above all with the cessation of ball-bearing deliveries and the possibility which was bound up with this, of the rupture of relations; a rupture which, as Schellenberg had heard from Himmler, was being seriously considered from the German side as well.

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Schellenberg used all available means, and gave Himmler his formal promise to do everything possible, in order to avoid this, and above all to consider Sweden’s interests in the Norway question, to give way in the student internee question and to bring to an end the criminal policies of Terboven. Himmler helped in part, but Kaltenbrunner was obstructive, always referring to a possible military action by Sweden against Norway, in which connection he constantly alluded to the fact of several thousand Norwegians having received military training in Sweden. All these points Schellenberg reviewed in the course of a long conversation, in the presence of General Director Moeller, who arranged this evening meeting. They also spoke in detail and quite frankly about Ribbentrop about whom Riechert [sic.] had considerable complaints to make, not only on account of his policy against Sweden, but also because of the quite impossible way in which Ribbentrop treated the representatives of foreign countries. There can be no doubt that Riechert [sic.] was convinced that in Schellenberg he had found a silent helper. Riechert [sic.] had won his ideas on the release of internees, granting visas, etc., in which Schellenberg supported him to the best of his ability.

Appendix XII. Schellenberg’s Relations with the Swiss Intelligence Service. Schellenberg knew Oberst [Roger] Masson personally. He considers that there was a certain mutual sympathy on both sides which had gradually developed through their political discussions. Perhaps on Masson’s part it was due to the fact that he considered Schellenberg was a real friend of Switzerland. All these discussions took place prior to 1944. At that time Schellenberg wanted to bring about a short [sort?] of regular interchange of information with Masson, but they gave up this idea as he could not carry it out. He certainly wanted to give Schellenberg more and more important help in the political field, for at that time Schellenberg was already considering preparations towards bringing the war to an end. Masson and his colleague, Dr. [Paul] Meyer, were the contacts with whose help Schellenberg hoped to bridge the gap either to the British or American military attache, as soon as he should have made progress enough in Germany. Above all he hoped to get into contact with [Allen] Dulles. (It was for this reason that he was annoyed over the case of [Karl] Wolff (Italy) for telling Himmler that he had no real contacts, although Eggen, on his instructions had twice had secret dealings with an emissary of Dulles through the intermediary of Meyer. The American was called Loofborough [Frederick R.Loofbourow]. [Karl] Lindemann had also planned contact with Dulles, Westrich [Gerhard Alois Westrick?] and [Maximilian Egon Prince von] Hohenlohe. Schellenberg was always consciously aiming at representing the contact with Masson as an important political contact, and at doing all he could to fill Masson with a sense of his own importance. During his personal talks with Masson in 1943 they did discuss military matters, but such questions were raised in the course of general conversation, and Schellenberg is still quite sure that he was convinced at that time that an invasion against the Atlantic Wall with the front as long as it was was scarcely feasible. Concurrently the following development occurred. Eggen, through whom Schellenberg had obtained all these Swiss connections, enjoyed Dr. Meyer’s confidence. They had met one another in the course of business. In civilian life Meyer was a solicitor and author with the pen name of Schwertenbach. Meyer received commission from these business transactions. The business mainly comprised the purchase of large wooden barracks in Switzerland for Germany. From the confidential interchanges Eggen was in a position to learn much from Meyer in the course of conversation. Eggen used the knowledge so obtained as if it were his own for the purpose of talks with a certain Swiss intelligence officer name[d] [Paul] Holzach. According to Eggen himself, Holzach was associated with him (Eggen) in a firm in Zurich, carrying on business under the name of “Interkommers” [Interkommerz AG]. This firm had close

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business contacts with Eggen’s own firm in Berlin, the Warenvertriebs GmbH. Interkommers carried on far reaching business, details of which Schellenberg did not know, but which, for example, took Holzach as far afield as Hungary. According to what Eggen told Schellenberg, Holzach then went on, in the course of their nightly conversations, to give him facts of a political and military nature. Later, when a suitable occasion arose, he casually brought up pieces of information, which he had so acquired, when engaging Masson in conversation, and from the latter’s reaction, whether it was evasive, reserved or if he avoided the subject, he was able to make a further revision of his own information. At least this was what Eggen told Schellenberg when he frequently questioned him on the subject, but there were time [s] when Schellenberg did not altogether trust him, particularly as regards his co-operation with Holzach. In discussion on political matters, Masson was, according to Eggen, always very affable. He was above all willing to give Schellenberg a picture of the situation, with the result that Schellenberg’s own intentions towards a German surrender (well known to Masson) were strengthened. Eggen’s actual sources of information were therefore in the main Holzach and Meyer, and Eggen’s playing off one against the other of these two undoubtedly played an important part. In all questions regarding German-Swiss relations, Masson was particularly interested and forthcoming. In the difficult political questions in 1943 Schellenberg particularly stressed Masson’s name in his reports on his negotiations so as to strengthen them. Masson’s cover name in these political reports was “Senner I”. Schellenberg called Meyer “Senner II”, and later on Holzach “Senner III”. When Eggen later, in 1944, returned from a trip to Switzerland (up to the invasion of 1944 he had visited Switzerland at least two or three times) and told tales of a complete muddle in political and, to a much lesser degree, military affairs, he had first of all to commit everything to writing, which he found very difficult owing to his lack of ability in this direction. Then the inconsistencies had to be cleared up, and finally Schellenberg usually had to dictate the report himself. According to the importance Schellenberg attached to the contents of the report, (always taking his own political views into consideration), it developed into his handing in military information, which Eggen periodically furnished to the higher authorities under Masson’s name, in order to make a greater impression. Schellenberg had to be very careful in his account not to portray Masson in a false light, for he had always refused to allow himself to be known as co-operating with Schellenberg in military matters. Before the invasion Eggen had told Schellenberg details of military information which were too vague to permit of effective military evaluation. As far as Schellenberg can remember they were as follows. That the invasion would definitely take place. That the forces already deployed for the purpose in England amounted to two million. That they had large numbers of special troop carrying gliders. That on the coast there had been exercises in which naval and airborne landing troops had participated. That the invasion plan envisaged the BelgoDutch coast. The dates which Eggen predicted for invasion were three times patently wrong without Schellenberg being able to prove such mistakes as intentional. (In all these reports he had to reckon for this.)

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Eggen had made an arrangement with Meyer—Schellenberg does not remember exactly when—that as soon as Meyer heard anything more detailed as to the invasion date, he should at once telephone him in the Warenvertrieb Firm in Berlin, using a code word. This arrangement did not achieve any result. Schellenberg does not remember any further details concerning military reports. Schellenberg gave an amount up to 50,000 Swiss francs to Eggen to be passed on secretly to Meyer. Eggen changed this sum into Reichmarks as a payment from the Warenvertrieb firm to the Amt. Meyer was aware that Schellenberg had arranged this for his (Meyer’s) own profit. In answer to repeated requests Schellenberg enabled Eggen, on behalf of Holzach to despatch two large boxes containing valuable clocks and watches to an address in Spain. He assumes the [that?] Holzach made a substantial profit from this transaction. Schellenberg’s contact with Masson concerned above all questions of Swiss subjects arrested in Germany, the increasing Press campaign in both countries (especially the periodical “IPA”138 published in Germany) and of the Swiss National Socialist restoration movements. Masson believed that he could solve these issues between the two countries, with greater chances of success, in an indirect way. Schellenberg says that he shared this opinion as he did not think highly of the work of the German Foreign Office in these questions. He hoped to render Masson valuable help in all problems of interest to Switzerland. This connection was in Schellenberg’s view of particular importance in 1943, when he succeeded with the help of Masson and General [Henri] Guisan in nipping in the bud an invasion against Switzerland. Schellenberg positively knew from Himmler that party circles in Germany tried to influence Hitler to effect a preventive occupation of a Switzerland joining all the same the Western Powers, especially after the landing of these powers in Anzio. These circles which were also joined by influential quarters of the German Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht, brought forward the argument that Switzerland in the case of an Allied landing in Genoa was forced to abandon her neutrality and would thereby become a particular menace. Schellenberg discussed this question in detail with Himmler. He tried to convince him of his firm belief that Switzerland would never agree to abandon her neutrality. Schellenberg at this juncture again assumed contact with Masson in order to enlighten him of the situation existing vis a vis Switzerland. They both agreed to eliminate all difficulties by a statement on the part of Masson about the maintenance of Swiss neutrality. Schellenberg hoped thereby to put a stop to the agitation against Switzerland. As he noticed that his proposal was not considered sufficient in Berlin, he secured the same statement from General Guisan. With this statement Schellenberg was able to convince Himmler of the genuine intentions of Switzerland to remain neutral to such an extent that Himmler became an outspoken partisan of his (Schellenberg’s) standpoint and strongly fought all opposition against Schellenberg’s policy. Later, reproaches against Switzerland especially during the increasing deterioration of the economic situation, could be met in the same way. Schellenberg says that regarding the Swiss problem he found an ally also in the Minister of Economics, [Walther] Funk. Schellenberg emphasises that at no time did Masson ever discuss with him intelligence questions. He admits that he tried to broach this subject, but was always given the cold shoulder by Masson.

Appendix XIII. The Vlassov Movement. (Note: For details of [Andrey Andreyevich] Vlassov’s co-operation with Gruppe VI C on intelligence work see Appendix III) 1. The following officers were concerned in the Vlassov affair: (1) In the SS Hauptamt: Obergruppenf. Berger Oberfuehrer Kroeger

Chief Political

Stubafuehrer Arlt

Direction and Relief

(2) In the R.S.H.A.: Obergruppenf. Kaltenbrunner Gruppenfuehrer Mueller Gruppenfuehrer Ohlendorf. Mueller’s work included keeping a watch on the activities of Vlassov, who had his own jurisdiction, in the Russian P.O.W. camps as well as in the works and factories. Ohlendorf and a large staff of collaborators (all of whom, like Kroeger, were Balts and were great personal friends) co-operated in the closest possible manner with Vlassov and his staff, and dealt with the whole complex from the political point of view. The chief task of Amt III was to supply regular information. (3) In the OKH:

(4) In the Foreign Office:

General in command of the Russian Volunteer Units (the first officer to hold this appointment was General Koestring, who was later succeeded by another General). It was planned to raise fighting divisions. Ribbentrop Six [Gustav] Hilger

2. Prince [Anton] Turkul agreed with Vlassov in the military but not in the political field, and could therefore be used to watch over Vlassov’s political moves. He was very reticent in his judgment of Vlassov. Schilenkov and Truchin were gravely suspected by Lt. Col. [Adolf] Baun. 3. Schellenberg’s introduction to Vlassov was arranged by Kroeger and Staf. Rapp, after the latter had concluded an agreement with Vlassov regarding intelligence work. He made use of the manifesto issued by the Vlassov movement in order to found a “Union of European Peoples” on the basis of national liberty of movement. This measure,

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Schellenberg believed, was urgently necessary, as the question of foreign workers consisting of racial minorities who were infiltrating into the reduced tip of the Reich in an increasing degree from the South East and also the South and West developed into a growing political problem which was almost inevitably driven towards Vlassov. He maintains that his solution solved the Russian problem of national minorities (Ukrainians, Caucasians, Georgians etc.) without difficulties. 4. Schellenberg considers the Vlassov enterprise abortive both from the political and military point of view, because it came two years too late. He maintains that from the point of view of domestic policy it could, if well managed, have been a factor making for order, as a rallying point in the shape of relief for three to four million Russians.

Appendix XIV. Rote Kapelle. Schellenberg thinks that the Russian Intelligence Service must have worked during the war with good success against Germany and cites as proof the case of the “Rote Kapelle”. This was the name of a wide-spread Russian espionage organisation working in Berlin from the end of 1942 until the middle of 1943. Schellenberg’s knowledge comes from two sources. One day, probably still in the autumn of 1942, he had to report to Himmler with Canaris. They reported separately, Schellenberg following Canaris. Immediately after Schellenberg had entered the room, Himmler gave him the following orders: “As soon as you return to Berlin tell Mueller that I found the report on the espionage case, ‘Rote Kapelle’ very interesting, but I hate people who deck themselves out in borrowed plumage.” The case had been revealed by Abwehr III in Brussels, but Mueller, however, had not even considered it necessary to make a passing mention of the co-operation of the Abwehr. All copies of the report had to be withdrawn and correspondingly amended. Schellenberg passed Himmler’s instructions on to Mueller by telephone and requested him at the same time to send him a copy of the report, as he was naturally strongly interested in these matters. This Mueller did without delay. It was an interim report at that time. Schellenberg read it through rapidly as soon as he received it, and then passed it on personally to the individual Gruppenleiter, intending to work through it quietly after his return, but in fact, never had the time to do so. For this reason he remembers relatively few details and may be mixing things which he heard in conversation and things which he read. The most active man in the whole organisation was a Luftwaffe Major, [Harro] Schulze-Boysen, who worked in a high position in Ic of the Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab. His wife was a foreigner and fully initiated in the illegal activity of her husband.139 She was herself, as a typical intellectually-emancipated woman, a spiritual impulse in her husband’s handiwork. Schulze-Boysen was likewise decidedly an intellectual, and his spiritual attitude must have been a fanatical idealistic Nihilism, which was linked simultaneously with a deep hatred of the regime ruling in Germany. (He rejected everything except the Communist ideal of the state.) Schulze-Boysen’s energy went so far that he, dressed in uniform, and with levelled pistol, compelled his adherents— industrial workers from the Northern quarter of Berlin—to discharge their duty of posting up Communist placards. The close collaborators grouped around Schulze-Boysen had the same attitude of mind. Chief amongst these, was an Oberregierungsrat in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, who was likewise married to a foreigner, who exercised a decisive influence on the whole activity.140 The husband himself had a most important position in the Ministry, Schellenberg thinks in the planning of distribution and supply of raw materials. He has completely forgotten the name. In the Luftfahrt-ministerium

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(Technical Division), there was an elderly regular Colonel, whom Schellenberg believes to be called Mueller, [who] was likewise an extremely fanatical adherent of the Boysen circle. He too, thanks to his position in the service, had a deep insight into most secret proceedings of the German Luftwaffe. In the Foreign Office, a Legationsrat [Rudolf von] Scheliha belonged to the organisation; he had a special position in the Foreign Office, in that he was a centre of social activity amongst the younger circles of the Foreign Office. Precisely thanks to these connections with persons from the most diverse sections, he is certain to have been well informed about almost all current questions in the Foreign Office. He is said to have been pressed into this activity by the Russian Secret Service, because of an affair with a woman in Warsaw.141 In addition, a minor official of the Foreign Office belonged to the Boysen circle, but he was not very important, and Schellenberg cannot remember his name. In the afore-mentioned report, Schellenberg estimates that about forty other names were quoted of people who, so far as he remembers, did not belong to the more intimate circles of the Boysen group, but who were all influenced by him. Schellenberg does not think they held important positions in their various careers. They were all convinced opponents of the regime and fanatical Communists. Boysen and his more intimate circle of collaborators were not working for reward, but from clear conviction. Schellenberg thinks there was a wireless link with Moscow. He cannot remember in what form information was regularly passed over, and what particular topics of information were sought after and passed on to Moscow. Schellenberg assumes that there was not very much in the report on this subject, as he would otherwise certainly be able to remember some detail or other. The Boysen circle, in contrast to the figure of forty quoted in the report, must certainly have expanded considerably. Schellenberg once heard of there being a hundred and fifty persons. It is possible, however, that even those who were merely suspected were included in this figure. An Agent of Amt VI, the journalist Lemmer, was under suspicion and was put under surveillance. Schellenberg does not know what connection Kommissar [Heinz] Pannwitz had with the Rote Kapelle. He knows that Pannwitz, expecially in recent times, is said to have played a very important part in W/T play-back by his skilful work.142

Appendix XV. Jahnke and the Jahnkeburo. Schellenberg first got to know [Kurt] Jahnke143 in 1941, through [Sturmbannführer HansChristian] Daufeldt, who preceded Paeffgen in Gruppe VI D. At that time Jahnke already had done a little work in conjunction with Amt VI, and was very displeased with everything. He had no direct dealings with the old Amt, but considered it completely useless. Canaris and his organisation he treated as being not serious enough in intention and too overrated; Heydrich and Mueller were against him and attempted to have him arrested after having already closed down his office which he directed under a Herr von Pfeffer [Franz Pfeffer von Salomon], the Intelligence chief of Rudolf Hess. Ribbentrop once mentioned him as the biggest swindler in the Intelligence Service who had ever lived in Germany—his estate in Pomerania and any other fortune that he possessed originated from a corrupt Intelligence Service. (Ribbentrop, very wisely, refrained from mentioning that at one time he had paid particularly high sums to Jahnke. Schellenberg once questioned Jahnke about his connection with Ribbentrop; he replied that there was very little to say about the matter. Ribbentrop was mortally offended when, during the Polish crisis, at the outbreak of war, Jahnke had wanted to avert the war with England, and had used every conceivable means to bring an English Intelligence man to Hitler through Hess and Himmler. Otherwise he considered Ribbentrop an idiot, and was unconcerned what the latter thought of him.) Although Schellenberg was not quite sure of Jahnke at that time he nevertheless kept very close touch with him, as according to everything that he heard about him and what he could otherwise find out, he should have had great experience of the Intelligence Service. Schellenberg checked up on him everywhere, and found out that he had once been received by Heydrich. Thereby all his records were guarded by the Staatspolizei, although Mueller secretly attempted to have him arrested for high treason. Jahnke received a fixed monthly salary of 2,000 RM from Schellenberg, and also all special concessions, e.g. petrol, which had been rationed on account of the war. Jahnke led a very secluded life, mostly on his estate in Pomerania, particularly after his Berlin villa had been completely destroyed in an air raid. He had a very wide circle of acquaintances, of which Schellenberg could keep no check, all of which he had however collected for his own purposes. Markus [Carl Marcus] his secretary dealt with all his office work and was also drawn in to deal with the V-men. The first difficulty arose when Markus [sic.] had been recalled to the Lehrregiment Brandenburg from the Abwehr, and Schellenberg had to arrange for his military release. He was supposed to be taking a state law exam and was continually receiving leave for study. This however could not be extended indefinitely owing to strict regulations. Schellenberg did not personally intervene further, as he was no longer convinced of the value of this cooperation and no other reasons existed for an extension.

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Markus [sic.] was sent to the Western Front and was reported missing, but was probably captured.144 Jahnke was entirely subordinate to Schellenberg. He maintained slight contact with Dr. Schueddekopf of VI D whom he had recommended for his office. He very seldom gave the names of his collaborators. The few whom he mentioned were, as far as Schellenberg can remember, Herr Telschow who owned a large cafe in Berlin, had a Swiss wife with whom he often went to Switzerland, and is also supposed to have had contacts in England. In Frankfurt there were three diamond dealers, one called Viehmann. Schellenberg cannot remember the two other names. There was also a Turk called Dr. Kieram and a Dr. Adams from the Ministry of Culture. Amongst the circle of his acquaintance there were several journalists, whom he had got to know through his friend, [Wilhelm] von Ritgen (Deutsche National Blatt) [Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro, DNB]. The contact with a Herr Cassel, who was a Jew, was more of a friendly nature. Jahnke explained to Schellenberg that Cassel had business contacts with the Japanese so that he could live undisturbed beside his family in Berlin. This involved not a little danger for Schellenberg because of the Hitler decree. Besides this, Jahnke had direct contact with a Jap who worked for him but whose name he never disclosed. Before Schellenberg’s time von Pegrov was one of his agents.145 Of Jahnke’s early life Schellenberg knows that about 1908 he went overseas and worked with the American frontier police and the customs service. He is supposed to have made a big fortune there in smuggling dead Chinese in soldered zinc coffins, thereby winning the friendship of many Chinese whose highest aim it was to bury their relations in their own country. Later he went to China himself and made friends with the Chinese family Soong. Jahnke also had contact with a Chinese general Coue in Switzerland, who is then supposed to have been called to London, but Schellenberg is not certain about the matter. Jahnke certainly was helpful in every way in facilitating Coue’s journey through Vichy to Lisbon. Schellenberg does not know whether the indirect help which he gave through Paris was ever used as Jahnke later lost contact. At that time Jahnke wanted to bring about a settlement between Japan and China. Germany was to act as mediator—the suggestion came from Coue. Ribbentrop refused contact with the Japs in this connection, demanding first of all substantial backing on the part of the Chinese. Owing to lengthy delay (Jahnke had no Swiss visa) the whole plan came to nothing. It was evident that in the end Coue had not received a satisfactory answer from Chiang Kai-Shek, who wanted the Japs to put forward their intentions; at the same time it was divulged that an approach had been made to Russia. Jahnke is supposed to have worked in Mexico and North America from 1914–1918 for the military Intelligence Service.146 Later he was in contact with [Hans] von Seeckt and [Alexander] von Falkenhausen. Before he went with Pfeffer to Hess he worked for Canaris, and again later on, until they finally quarrelled. Jahnke was of the opinion that the full value of a Secret Service always depended on the number and the standard of Double Agents. He hated Hitler and nearly all Nazis. He called Himmler stupid because first of all he was deceived by Ribbentrop, and then

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completely underestimated and could not understand the meaning of a Secret Service, almost like any ordinary average German. He called it the “Deutsche Käseglocke”. When Pomerania was occupied by the Russians Jahnke could no longer be found. Schellenberg assumes that he is dead.147

Appendix XVI. Kranefuss and the Freundeskreis. Schellenberg has been able to give little information regarding the origin and foundation of the Freundeskreis but states that it was composed of a circle of influential business men and was founded by a certain Kranefuss who was connected with the banking profession and was believed to be under the protection of Obergruppenfuehrer [Karl] Wolff. Schellenberg’s knowledge of Kranefuss dates back to 1941 at which time he was often mentioned by Heydrich, who spoke of him in a disparaging manner. Relations between Kranefuss and Heydrich were known in fact to be considerably strained and it was even believed that Kranefuss was in physical fear of Heydrich. The reasons for this estrangement were never clear to Schellenberg although he believes that differences had arisen between them concerning a woman. In the latter half of 1942 Kranefuss was again brought to Schellenberg’s notice. At this time Schellenberg was particularly struck by certain general political reports on Spain and Portugal received from Himmler which he learned through Himmler’s secretary came from Kranefuss. These led Schellenberg to make enquiries regarding Kranefuss from Dr. Brandt. Shortly after Heydrich’s death in June 1942 Schellenberg first came in personal contact with Kranefuss who approached him and intimated that he and his friends had been watching Schellenberg’s career with interest and now that Heydrich was dead there was no longer any reason why they should not cooperate, he on his side being willing to give Schellenberg all the assistance that lay in his power. Schellenberg thereupon made enquiries with Amt VI and especially Dr. Brandt, and was informed that Kranefuss had already been intriguing with a certain Sebastian who was employed in Amt VI and that it would be as well to cultivate his acquaintance because of his connection with the Freundeskreis and in order to neutralise any influence he might have with Himmler. Schellenberg believed that Kranefuss’ motive in approaching him was to further curry favour with Himmler and that he had no real interest in giving him personally any assistance. Nevertheless he believed that Kranefuss would be in a position to supply him with important industrial information and through the Freundeskreis would be of use to him in intelligence work in connection with Amt VI. Schellenberg himself did not like Kranefuss and was supported in his unfavourable opinion by Diehn, head of an industrial chemical concern and Lindemann, president of the North German Lloyd who both charged Kranefuss with being sycophantic and counselled Schellenberg not to be too closely associated with him. According to Schellenberg several members of the Freundeskreis had formerly given financial support to the S.S. but it is not certain whether they had continued to do so later. This financial support had as its motive the belief that in this matter Himmler could be placated and any arbitrary action by the Gestapo or members of the party (Gauleiter, Gau-economic advisers, etc.) either against themselves or members of the concerns they represented, might be avoided.

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Schellenberg’s most important contact with [the] Freundeskreis was Lindemann who as the head of several important firms was always extremely well politically informed. Schellenberg had several long political discussions with Lindemann and used the information thus obtained in reports to Himmler. Some time in 1943 Schellenberg brought Lindemann in touch with Hohenlohe in the hope that their connections abroad would enable them to establish contact with the U.S. or Britain, in the case of Lindemann through [Sir Victor] Mallet in Stockholm and in that of Hohenlohe through Sir Samuel Hoare. Schellenberg at no time discussed plans for espionage with Lindemann as he professed not to be interested in espionage or in the Geheime Meldedienst as an aid to the further prosecution of the war. Nevertheless Lindemann had a useful contact in Switzerland called Fritz Klein, who was, or had been, in touch with Chiang Kai- Shek, and also in Stockholm with the president of the International Chamber of Commerce in that city. Apart from Lindemann and Kranefuss, Schellenberg also remembers the following names of members of the Freundeskreis: [August] Diehn, [August] Rosterg, Sachs, Buetefisch, [Franz] Hayler. During Heydrich’s lifetime Kranefuss and Ohlendorf, Gruppenführer Amt III, were not on good terms, Ohlendorf even going so far as to supply information against Kranefuss and the Freundeskreis and accusing Kranefuss of using Himmler’s name for the furtherance of his own personal and economic ends. During the last few years however they made up their differences and cooperated closely in economic matters, the intimacy between them increasing with the growth of the disagreement between the Reich Economic Ministry and the Reich Armaments Ministry (i.e. [Walther] Funk versus [Albert] Speer, [Karl] Landfried versus [Hans] Kehrl, until Landfried was replaced by Ohlendorf and Hayler). In these disagreements Kranefuss balanced between Ohlendorf and Kehrl inclining however towards Ohlendorf as the latter’s position was considerably stronger than Kehrl’s owing to his dual function as chief of the S.D. Inland. Schellenberg states that owing to motives of jealousy, Ohlendorf thwarted all his attempts to undertake intelligence work through the big industrial concerns. Schellenberg quotes as an example the case of the General Electric which Ohlendorf wished taken over by the Germans and nationalised in the same manner as Unilever. Other cases quoted by Schellenberg are those of Kali (Neumann), I.G.Farben ([Heinrich]Buetefisch), Conti-Oel (Fischer), Zusker ([Herbert] Backe), Siemens (Lyschen [Friedrich Lüschen]). Terrestahl and Otto Wolf (Kirschfeld). Kranefuss modelled his attitude on that of Ohlendorf, but after Schellenberg had been successful in establishing Kirschfeld as successor to the former Secretary of State, von Jackwitz, as Chief of the Foreign Trade Department in the Reich Economic Ministry, Ohlendorf, Kranefuss and also Kehrl became more careful in their actions, Kehrl even approaching Schellenberg with the suggestion of regular cooperation. As far as Schellenberg remembers Kranefuss, during the last year of the war was given a position with the Reich Economic Ministry in which he dealt with civilian air raid damage claims. Finally Schellenberg states that Kranefuss was always very reluctant to introduce him to any members of the Freundeskreis and in effect Schellenberg never succeeded in establishing such contact or using them for the purposes of Amt VI.

Appendix XVII. Kersten, Himmler’s Osteopath Masseur. Certain aspects of Schellenberg’s association with Kersten have already been dealt with, but in the chronological pattern necessarily followed in the report some facts of intelligence interest have perforce had to be omitted. It is intended, therefore, to present here the information concerning Kersten which has been given by Schellenberg even although, in order to conserve continuity, it is necessary to recapitulate information that has already appeared elsewhere. Schellenberg’s first meeting with Kersten. In August 1942 Schellenberg was summoned to Zhitomir, where, at that time Himmler had set up his H.Q. in order that he might take part in yet another of the discussions on general questions which they were in the habit of holding. Schellenberg’s health, never robust, at this time again caused him anxiety and Himmler who had been in the practice of suggesting cures, none of which had been of much avail, now suggested to Schellenberg that he should consult his own osteopath masseur, Dr. Kersten. Although Schellenberg had not previously made the acquaintance of Kersten he had already heard him spoken of in disparaging terms by Mueller of Amt IV, who in conformity with most of Himmler’s entourage was strongly opposed to him. It was therefore with mixed feelings that Schellenberg approached their first meeting. Schellenberg receives medical treatment from Kersten. Up to this time Schellenberg had been continually losing weight but from the first treatment by Kersten he already sensed an improvement and after his fifth visit, the pain, without which he had not been for a long time, subsided. So great was the improvement in fact that Schellenberg soon found himself dependent on the treatment. As a patient Schellenberg was grateful for what Kersten had done for him but this was not the only bond between them, for even at their first meeting the two men evinced a liking for one another and before long were on terms of confidence. General particulars regarding Kersten. Schellenberg states that Kersten was a German who had taken Finnish nationality some time before the war. He had also been a successful practising physician, had been at one time personal physician to the Queen of Holland and had a large international practice. Some time in 1940 he returned to Germany and after suffering two weeks internment recommenced to practice and was enabled from the fortune that he had already made to buy Gut Hartzwalde an estate in the neighbourhood of his birthplace in the Mark.

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Kersten’s medical treatment of Himmler. When Kersten began to treat Himmler is not clear but not long after he took over his case—according to Schellenberg Himmler was suffering from cancer of the bowel—he was so successful in bringing about an improvement that Himmler soon became dependent upon the treatment. Kersten’s visit to Rome. So successful in fact was Kersten’s handling of the case that Himmler was continuallly in fear of losing his services and even had him accompany him on some of his journeys. At the end of 1942 Kersten went with Himmler to Rome where he treated a number of the leading political Italian figures of that time including [Count Galeazzo] Ciano.148 Kersten’s departure for Sweden. In 1943 Kersten began to fear that Germany’s position had become so weakened that she was likely to lose the war. He therefore approached Himmler with the request that he and his family should emigrate to Sweden. This plan however made no appeal to Himmler who, even after Schellenberg had given his full support, refused to grant him permission and it was only after Kersten had put before him the alternative of acceding to his wishes or receiving no further treatment that he was allowed to leave. Kersten’s first journey to Sweden made, as regards visa preliminary permit to practice etc., with the aid of certain Swedish industrialists, took place in the autumn of 1943, it having been previously arranged with Himmler that he should return to Germany every four months to give him medical attention. Himmler’s payments to Kersten. When Kersten had originally taken over Himmler’s case an agreement had been come to whereby a large sum of money, stated by Dr. [Rudolf] Brandt, Himmler’s adjutant, to be in the neighbourhood of 100,000 RM., and also a large piece of forest land in the Hartzwalde, were to be given to Kersten for successful treatment as well as in consideration for an American contract which Kersten said he had refused. How much of this money was paid is not known but when Kersten decided to leave for Sweden he induced Himmler not only to allow him to take his furniture to Stockholm but to pay him 50,000 Kr. The first instalment of this sum which amounted to 12,000 Kr. was paid through Finke’s secretary and the balance in two further sums through Schellenberg in 1944 on his visits to Stockholm. Kersten’s influence with Himmler. Kersten’s position as personal physician and masseur to Himmler put him on a more intimate footing with Himmler than would have otherwise been the case and enabled him to obtain assistance for his large number of friends and acquaintances. Through his wide circle of patients and acquaintances Kersten was, in fact, the recipient of numerous requests for mediation on the part of people who had fallen into disfavour with the

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authorities. His privileged position enabled Kersten in many cases to furnish the required assistance, his services being given according to Schellenberg, without remuneration. Schellenberg’s own association with Kersten, was from the begining on a cordial basis, and it was not long before a tacit agreement grew up between them that they should mutually assist each other by influencing Himmler in each other’s favour. Kersten’s close relations with Himmler caused jealousy in certain members of Himmler’s entourage and made him the object of open and subversive attacks which Schellenberg did his best to offset in his conversations with Himmler. Kersten’s support for Schellenberg in peace negotiations. Kersten shared Schellenberg’s views as regards the necessity of Germany ending the war at the earliest possible moment and also believed that this could be best accomplished by Himmler taking power forcibly into his own hand and deposing Hitler. Kersten’s main consideration in this was more material than political as he was afraid, should the outcome of the war be disadvantageous to Germany, that he would lose his estates but whatever the reasons he used his influence to support Schellenberg in his policy of an early termination of the war. In this connection can be quoted the case of Rechtsanwalt Langbehn whom Kersten introduced and who was implicated in subversive activities against the ruling Nazi regime. Without going into all the details of this affair, which has been fully dealt with in the report, it can be said that according to Schellenberg, this case was used by Mueller, albeit unsuccessfully, to involve Schellenberg and possibly Kersten in an espionage charge in connection with England. Another case which was started at the instigation of Kersten was that of [Abram Stevens] Hewitt whom he introduced to Schellenberg some time in the winter of 1943. This affair has also been dealt with in the report and will not now, therefore, be gone into further. Kersten’s “intelligence” activities. It cannot be said that Kersten took part in intelligence activities in the accepted meaning of the term. He had no official or for that matter even unofficial standing in any intelligence service nor did he regularly for idealistic or monetary motives occupy himself with intelligence work. Yet because of his wide circle of patients and acquaintances he was in a position to obtain information on military and other matters from abroad and on account of his peculiarly close association with Himmler and other high ranking Nazi officers was enabled, and actually did, pass information on to the higher Nazi authorities. The first case that can be mentioned in this connection is that of a woman named Mrs. Kou. Shortly after Schellenberg made Kersten’s acquaintance he related that amongst his former friends was a Chinese woman whom he would like to have married. After Kersten’s second stay in Stockholm he told Schellenberg that once again he had met this woman who was then married and named Mrs. Kou. He further claimed to be on intimate terms with this woman, and stated that she was continually travelling between Chungking, Moscow and London. Kersten also mentioned that she had direct entry to Stalin and was on particularly close terms with the Chinese Military Attache in Moscow.

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Kersten then went on to relate that Mrs. Kou had informed him that a major Russian offensive concentrated on the centre and the North of the Eastern Front would shortly take place. This story because of its source and the general circumstances appeared fantastic to Schellenberg although he could not dismiss it out of hand. A short time later Himmler asked Schellenberg whether he had heard the Russian story from Kersten and what he intended to do about it. Schellenberg suggested that Kersten should be questioned with a view to giving precise details, particularly in relation to the figures that he had quoted. Kersten had, when he had given the information to Schellenberg, produced a minute scrap of paper from which he had read out the alleged figures of the divisions which were said to be held in readiness. When approached for further details he claimed to have destroyed the paper and as Schellenberg had made no notes, he had no alternative but to reconstruct the figures from memory. Schellenberg then passed the information on to the General Staff who considered it interesting as a confirmatory report on many points of the information already in their possession. On a later occasion Schellenberg questioned Kersten on some information he had given to Finke to the effect that the Russians were forming a new army of two million men, formerly occupied as industrial workers, who had been replaced by two million Chinese workmen from Chungking. Kersten gave after some hesitation Mrs. Kou and a certain Graffmann as being his sources for this story, which when passed on to the Fremde Heere Ost of the General Staff and Schellenberg’s own department, was dismissed as deception material. As has already been related Kersten at the end of 1942 accompanied Himmler to Rome. While there he met a Finnish woman he had formerly known whom he claimed at this time was a friend of the Pope. Kersten stated that this person had told him that in the Pope’s opinion the Russians had enormous reserves of men and that Germany would never win the war. This information had been passed on to Himmler who according to Schellenberg believed in the genuineness of the contact. Schellenberg also mentions that some time in 1944 he asked Kersten to find out, if possible, whether there was anything in the rumour that Stalin was ill. Some time later Kersten let Schellenberg know through his secretary that the rumour was ill founded. Furthermore at the time of the Yalta Conference, Kersten brought Himmler personally information that the Russians acting on behalf of the Japanese had offered Roosevelt at Yalta a secret compromise for ending the Far Eastern war. He also stated that the English representatives at the conference were not informed of the offer and that Roosevelt had recognised that under certain circumstances the proposals could be of use. Kersten also at this time supplied information to the effect that six million Chinese were employed in the Russian armament industry giving as his source his Chinese contact. Schellenberg was of the opinion that this information was not reliable but Himmler apparently did not hold the same view as he ordered Kaltenbrunner to discuss the matter with Ribbentrop and Hitler. Some days later Kaltenbrunner informed Schellenberg that Hitler and Ribbentrop had found the information interesting but refused to give it credulance.

Appendix XVIII. “Irrefuhrung” (Deception):— This subject was dealt with in Amt VI by a special department created by Schellenberg called “Mil. i” which was placed under Kapitaen von Bechtolsheim. During the months before the invasion the interest of the “Geheime Meldedienst” centred quite naturally on the enemy plans connected with the impending invasion. In co-operation with the different General Staffs, Schellenberg arranged for all reports concerning invasion (derived from agents, the Press, the deciphering department, W/T double agents and other sources) to be entered graphically in special charts. (Schellenberg believes that these double agents were British agents under German control, but admits the possibility that they may also have been German agents under British control without the Germans being aware thereof. Reports from such agents were received formerly via III F of the old Abwehrstelle and later Amt IV.) Schellenberg made arrangements that invasion reports from the various sources indicated in the Field Report should be recorded “plastically” on a map. The dates for such invasions were indicated thereon by way of reference to specific coloured localities in order that invasion dates should be more readily perceived by a glance at this map. In addition to such colours, against each particular locality wherein invasion was predicted circles were placed, showing the source of each particular report. At first these findings only raised the question of how to tighten the control and the direction of all Amt VI and Mil Amt connections. Schellenberg made this very question the subject of constant instructions to all department chiefs. At the same time Schellenberg asked himself the obvious question what was being done on the German side for the methodical deception of the enemy? The answer was disappointing. He says that neither on the political nor the military, not to mention the economic, field could any traces of deception be found. In the political and economic sector the non-existence of deception efforts was plainly due to the existing disorganisation resulting from the dualism—State and Party. In the Wehrmacht the fundamental cause was the absence of a “Reich General Staff”. There existed, it is true, a Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab. This institution was, however, in reality only an assistant of Hitler on that theatre of war for which he had at that moment a special interest. In the end the chief of the General Staff of the Army (OKH), i.e. [Heinz] Guderian and later Wenk [Walther Wenck], was responsible for the Eastern front, [Alfred] Jodl as chief of the Wehrmachts-fuehrungsstab was responsible for the Western Front, and his deputy General Winter (not General Winter of the WZA, i.e. Wehrmachts-zentralamt, righthand man of [Wilhelm] Keitel) for Italy and partly the southeastern front. The Luftwaffenfuehrungsstab worked entirely independently. The Navy of course did the same. There was no real working contact between the different departments, for instance Fremde Heere Ost West, Fremde Luftwaffen Ost West, Fremde Marinen (3 Seekriegsleitung). The interpretation of the intelligence was undertaken completely

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separately. There was no general direction. A new army making its first appearance, say, in the Russian war theatre remained therefore confined to the knowledge of the department Fremde Heere Ost. This was essentially the reason why no independently conceived operative deception plans were put into action before major military operations. This represented the operative strategical side of the problem. A systematic scheme for the distribution machinery also did not exist. The entire German “Meldedienst” had not made use of this important instrument. For the purpose of building up and cultivating this essential branch, Schellenberg created a new department called “Mil i”. Apart from this measure, the I.a.s. M.H. and Luft were given in their service orders strict instructions to co-operate in close touch with their General Staffs regarding the plans of far-sighted operative deception. The chief of the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab also issued, at the suggestion of Schellenberg, a detailed order by which he created within the Wehrmachts-fuehrungsstab a department for operative deception to which the chiefs of the Wehrmachts sections had to submit their proposals. A general staff officer with the rank of Major became chief of Mil. i. His job was to see to it, in co-operation with the three I.as. of the Mil Amt and especially with the counter-espionage section (VI.Z), that all possible channels of the Geheim-Meldedienst should be examined for the purpose of using them in a deception plan worked out by or in conjunction with the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab. At the same time Mil. i was given the task of registering all technical military material released for W/T playing back purposes. The execution of the whole plan was still completely in its infancy. The different departments showed little enthusiasm for co-operation as they were very reluctant to offer and release their high grade connections for the purpose of deception. Co-operation with the counter-espionage section was more simple and more readily secured as this section in most cases had closer contact with the enemy’s services. Schellenberg attached vis-à-vis the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab the greatest importance to the closest check on the troop movements, train and lorry transports, necessary for deception. This check was effected by means of photographic reconnaissance from the air. For the purpose of deception on a grand scale, W/T playing back by double agents was also made use of. This was called “Funkspiele”, which meant the continuation of W/T contact by enemy W/T agents captured by the police of Abwehr III. This was done under the supposition that the taking over of the W/T intercourse had not been noticed by the enemy. This was a particularly developed branch of Amt IV. After long negotiations Mil. i had received the right to take part in using the existing W/T contacts in order to perform its own deception. Apart from this, open and coded W/T messages (which it was assumed the enemy would be able to read) were worked out and transmitted by the armies in the field, by the Navy or other quarters. All this work had, however, only begun. The former Abteilung III of the Amt Ausland and the Abwehr understood by “Irrefuhrung” merely long drawn out wrangles with some Waffenpruefamt (arms testing department) or a technical Luftwaffen section, regarding the release of some equipment in order to give a counter-espionage agent “playing material” for the opposite side. The first large-scale operative deception task executed in co-operation with the Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab was to fake the transfer of four or five divisions in the sector Weser-Arnheim-Ems, whilst in reality only one division was withdrawn. On the other hand, Schellenberg was rather sceptical about an effort made to convince the

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Japanese Intelligence Service by means of British Intelligence from Lisbon and Stockholm of the importance of the war in China. Buerkner’s methods were even more primitive. He invited the chiefs of the Japanese I.S. to his house in Berlin, got drunk with them, and then told them that the war in China was important.

Appendix XIX. Werewolf. Schellenberg does not remember the exact date, but thinks it was in the late autumn of 1944 when Himmler, in the form of a long statement made in the presence of Schellenberg, Obergruppenfuehrer Pruetzmann, Skorzeny and he believes also of Kaltenbrunner, declared for the first time that he had selected Pruetzmann as the chief of a new organisation called “Werewolf” after the title of the book by Leons [Hermann Löns].149 He said that his organisation was completely independent and would be built up in the manner of the “Gauleitungen”. Pruetzmann would form the organisation in close collaboration with the Gauleiters. The RSHA, especially Skorzeny, would have to provide the fullest support regarding technical needs and training. Pruetzmann would have to be aided above all in respect of W/T needs. (He had planned to set up a central transmitting station in caves in the Kyffhaeuser, a mountain in Thuringia, and was to be assisted by officers of the Ordnungspolizei. Schellenberg does not know if the station actually operated.) Kaltenbrunner and Skorzeny were not satisfied with this decision and sabotaged Pruetzmann’s work from the very beginning by pleading ignorance or being evasive when he addressed queries to them or made requests. Schellenberg says that the whole question left him completely cold, especially as Obergruppenfuehrer Berger began to interfere in it. Berger maintained close relations with Pruetzmann and tried to assume the command over the Werewolf when the possibility arose that Pruetzmann was being sent to Croatia as HSS u. PF or even as Wehrmacht commander (in the same manner as Wolff in Italy). As Pruetzmann started his job without personnel he picked from everywhere particularly reliable SS leaders “Prpo” [Orpo?] and members of the Wehrmacht. Kaltenbrunner provided for Pruetzmann, Obersturm-bannfuehrer Tschier [s] chky (he was for a while in charge of VI.C but had been handed over by Schellenberg owing to incapability). Pruetzmann who in the end did not get to Agram, Tschier [s] chky and the rest of the staff had a special train and began “wildly to organise”. Schellenberg gathered this from the continuous complaints of Lt. Colonel Boening and Major Poretschkin (VI.F and Mil. E) who in accordance with the instructions received from Himmler had to help with the provision of W/T installation and training. Soon Schellenberg ceased co-operation in this field. The reasons given for this cessation of co-operation were first that Amt VI had no W/T installations which they could spare, and second that according to a report made by Lt. Col. Boening from Wiesbaden the boys who had arrived there for a W/T training course were “raw” to such an extent that they had to be sent home again by the officer in charge. Thereupon Pruetzmann attached himself technically entirely to the Orpo and to the Wehrmacht and as far as Schellenberg remembers his departments had nothing more to do with Pruetzmann. Schellenberg does not know how far Skorzeny and his “Jagdverbaende” were still meant to co-operate with the Werewolf. Skorzeny worked completely

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independently in direct control with Kaltenbrunner. Schellenberg is convinced that the collaboration between Skorzeny and Pruetzmann was not very good as Skorzeny planned establishing a sort of Werewolf organisation of his own with his SS “Jagdverbaende”. Besides Tschier [s] chky and Skorzeny were personal enemies. Schellenberg does not think that Pruetzmann was able to build up a large and strong organisation. Pruetzmann himself was a desperado and always boasted having played as a young man a part in the Ruhr and Rhineland struggle. The little Schellenberg has seen of the organisation of Pruetzmann, Tschier [s] chky and their large staff corresponded, as he says, to their mental capacity; it was weak. Schellenberg maintains that in April 1945 he reproached Himmler severely regarding the Werewolf, calling this enterprise “criminal and stupid”. He thinks that his reproaches lead to contradictory orders being issued. The whole Werewolf organisation was built up, how it was to function and how it did in fact function [sic.]. One name Schellenberg remembers, that of SS Standartenfuehrer Knolle, formerly in The Hague, who was responsible for the Hamburg area. In the end Pruetzmann began to pick out his men from the Army Groups as well as the armies. He also started to establish depots for material. This was reported to Schellenberg by Colonel Buntrock, chief of reconnaissance at the front. Schellenberg says that he did not trouble to oppose these activities of Pruetzmann for the disorder whithin the so-called “retreat organisation” had become uncontrollable in the course of the last months. At the end everything was compressed as in an accordion: Party, Hitler Youth, D.A.F., N.S.V., Stapo, SD., Klein Kampf Verbaende of the Wehrmacht Werewolf, SS Jagdverbaende— everything upside down and everybody solely responsible for everything. On top of it was added the Volkssturm. Schellenberg is of the opinion that Pruetzmann was most active within and in connection with the Hitler Jugend. Schellenberg does not know with whom Pruetzmann collaborated there. His official title was General Inspector for special Abwehr.

Appendix XX. Deciphering. The deciphering department of the OKW under Colonel Kettler supplied daily great quantities of deciphered messages which were called ever since the time of Ludendorff “V.N.” (Verlaessliche Nachrichten). They were printed on thin white paper and carried a broad red edge. Schellenberg had established relations with the deciphering department of the OKW in 1942, because he wanted to exploit the experiences of the Wehrmacht both in “W/T Abwehr” as also in the development of German coding “methods” for his own use. Schellenberg made very early contact with General Fellgiebel, chief of the Wehrmachtnachrichtenverbindungen (in the OKW) as well as General Thiele, department chief under Fellgiebel. Both these men were killed in connection with the July plot. Schellenberg’s relations with Thiele were very good. They had come close to one another through their joint work in the Board of Directors of the Standard Electric company (the former American Holding company).150 Thiele after the arrest of Fellgiebel had become Fellgiebel’s successor. In this capacity he wanted to bring a long discussed plan to fruition, i.e. unite all deciphering services of the Reich in one hand and to put them at the exclusive disposal of the Geheim-Meldedienst for systematic interpretation and use. Apart from the German Foreign Office which possessed an extensive deciphering service, the Forschungsamt was above all the organisation which had not only an extensive—one could almost say 100%—telephone monitoring service, but also a very large deciphering department. It also monitored normal broadcast services. (This was done too by the Foreign Office, the Propaganda Ministry and the OKW.) The Forschungsamt also embraced an extensive press and publication interpretation department as well as one of the best existing archives. Schellenberg maintains that apart from the obvious reasons of saving personnel and other grounds of economy the Amt Ausland together with the deciphering department of the Forschungsamt, was really a domain of the Geheim-Meldedienst. Schellenberg also saw that there was no need for the telephone monitoring service to be independent, but that it really belonged to the domain of Amt IV. Since 1942 Schellenberg insisted that Himmler should speak with Goering who had reserved the Forschungsamt for himself as his purely personal field of work and to insist that he (Schellenberg) should take the Forschungsamt over. Himmler also refused this. He declared that Goering would never do it as he believed that he would thereby make him (Himmler) and the SS too strong. Another very strange argument was added to this: Himmler said Goering should bear vis a vis Himmler the responsibility for all telephone monitoring, for if he Himmler, would do this Hitler might suddenly conceive the idea that his own telephone conversations were overheard. Schellenberg thereupon acted independently. He needed the results both of the Forschungsamt as a whole and of the work of the deciphering department of the OKW. At the beginning of 1943 Schellenberg had come to a working agreement with Secretary

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of State [Paul] Koerner and at the end of 1944 Koerner was prepared to concede to Schellenberg the Forschungsamt with the exception of the telephone monitoring, which since the middle of 1944 belonged to Amt IV. Sandberger and Rapp began in February 1945 to take the Forschungsamt over. Owing to the general development of the situation, however, this move did not take practical shape. After the arrest of Thiele, a general, whose name Schellenberg has forgotten, was appointed chief of the Wehrmachtsnachrichtenverbindungen. A general called Gimmler was put in charge of the Amtsgruppe (deciphering and W/T Abwehr). Colonel Kettler during the time when Thiele was in prison had continued to seek close contact with Schellenberg. Schellenberg put Kettler in touch with Dr. Schmitz who entered and remained in close relationship with him. Kettler modelled his evacuation measures on those of Schellenberg because he had always thought, just as Himmler had done, that Schellenberg by taking over the Forschungsamt would acquire decisive influence over the deciphering department. The evacuation measure of this very important department did not run smoothly however. The much needed material remained for weeks packed in cases owing to the increasing deterioration of the transport situation and became in the end completely dislocated. The first new working quarters of this department must have been for a short while in the neighbourhood of Halle. Schellenberg does not know where Kettler proceeded from there. Schellenberg’s men were in any case ordered to keep in close touch with Kettler. Schellenberg maintains that he has never seen deciphered British messages. He has learnt that the last successful deciphering was that of British messages which went by W/T from Cairo to London. After that a coding machine was introduced in Cairo which abruptly prevented all further deciphering. General Thiele had continuously asked Schellenberg to provide him with an English code machine or an English diplomatic or military attache code still in use, but Schellenberg never succeeded in getting these. Schellenberg believes that the results of the W/T monitoring service of the army in the field were only sent to the Interpretation departments of the general staffs. Schellenberg does not know if Kettler had anything to do with this, though he is sure that Gimmler had. Schellenberg received copies of these results. Amt VI and Mil only obtained the results from radio intercepts, the so-called VN material. Schellenberg does not know whether there was in addition a successful postal intercept system regarding the Polish Resistance Movement. He never saw anything that would confirm its existence. If so, only letters of Polish workers would have been intercepted and this would certainly have achieved little result. No question ever arose of having a “transit post” (Transitpost). The VN achieved good results on knowledge of the information possessed by the Poles and on the very comprehensive and skilled work of the Polish Service. It is impossible for Schellenberg to say whether and what conclusions could be drawn regarding the organisation of the Service from the various reports themselves, as he was always only interested in their contents. Freund once told him that he, together with Amt IV was trying to unravel a Polish line from Germany to Switzerland in VN material shown as operating under the cover number 596. Schellenberg does not know whether this went off successfully or not. As far as Schellenberg can remember attempts in this direction had been made for some time before Freund told him about it. Schellenberg does not think that a clear picture of the structure of the Polish Intelligence Service could

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have been obtained from VN sources either as to extent or nature of its activities. Amt IV was concerned with the VN material relating to the Polish Resistance Movement, derived directly from the OKW.

Appendix XXI. The I-Netze in Occupied Territories. I. AMT VI LAENDERGRUPPEN 1. General. When at the end of 1942 Schellenberg first began to turn his attention to plans for building up and developing the I-Netze, not only did he meet with rebuffs on all sides, but he was even in danger of getting into a dangerous position and being stigmatised as a defeatist, especially as he was already known as something of a pessimist. At that time Amt VI had no Dienststellen of its own in the Reich or the occupied territories, and as a result, was dependent on its own activities and also on the goodwill of each BdS and IdS. The latter, however, did nothing but harm by leaving traces of their work, usually from ill-will or a total lack of comprehension of the nature of the work. Therefore, Schellenberg adopted the principle, in the occupied territories at least, of allotting to each BdS one or two men from the Amt itself. This measure was inadequate in almost every way, because for the most part Schellenberg was unable to transfer personnel who knew the language of the country in question, or who were otherwise sufficiently qualified, without making a serious drain on the Amt headquarters itself. In the course of time he was able to improve the personnel aspect in very slight measure only. Naturally no great things could be asked of an instrument so insignificant as regards both strength and quality and which, in comparison with the Abwehr, had to deal with the inherently more difficult task of political intelligence. When, therefore, in addition to the routine work, i.e. the utilising of these territories for obtaining information and V-personnel, the question of preparing I-Netze arose, Schellenberg adopted a measure to cover his own responsibility. In 1943 he brought into operation an order making all BdS responsible for the building up of I-Netze in their own areas. In practice the situation was not altered in the slightest, but nevertheless he had provided himself with a formal cover which he could always use with perfect legitimacy when criticism and serious accusations came to be made. I-Netze were planned by the Amt VI Laendergruppen for the following occupied territories: France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, the Baltic States, the Balkans, the Protectorate, Slovakia and Italy. In these territories the I-Netze were also known as Rueckzug-Netze (R-Netze). 2. France. By far the strongest VI-Stelle in any occupied territory was the Dienststelle in Paris, as the task of supplying political information on France devolved upon it as well. There were about five or six Sachbearbeiter and several assistants, but in spite of constant

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lectures and severe reprimands it proved absolutely impossible to achieve reliable I-links. One day the story would be that the V-men had gone sour, the next that the W/T operator had dropped out or the right apparatus had not been installed—the blame for the failure of the I-links was always laid on the W/T department. There was, however, a deeper reason—the senseless attitude adopted by Staf. Knochen, who said more than once that if Paris had to be evacuated I-Netze would be an incubus. This was in fact the attitude of the whole Dienststelle, and was a very comforting one for them in excusing their inefficiency. An exchange of personnel, which was already indicated for other reasons, was out of the question because of the weakening of the Amt already referred to. Since Schellenberg had no real confidence in the Paris Dienststelle from the very start, he had, as early as 1942, sent Dr. Freise ([Eugen] Steimle’s predecessor) to Strasbourg to try to set up an R-Netz there independent of Paris, as his predecessor, Oberregrat Schneider, and in particular Freise, were complete failures. Schellenberg had in fact to dismiss Freise from the Amt as a disciplinary measure. Other attempts in Metz where Schellenberg used a younger man, Stubaf. Fanelsa, were also completely unsuccessful. Later, after the evacuation of Paris, an attempt was made to retrieve the position through the Leitstelle Walter, which tried liaison with the Doriot and Darnand groups. This effort also failed; an aircraft carrying the most important W/T agents crashed after the take-off and burst into flames. Another aircraft mistook its course and then at a second attempt was unable to land. Leitstelle Walter failed to furnish one reliable link. Hstuf. Besekow of Gruppe VI S set up a sabotage organisation in Paris in co-operation with Dienststelle IV there. The sum of money at their disposal amounted to 500,000 francs. A French agent who returned after an absence of three months stated that his group had established contact with the ‘White Maquis’ and had at many places in Paris resisted openly until exterminated. The report of this agent was never confirmed. 3. Belgium and Holland. In Belgium and Holland the outlook was the same as in France. No detailed presentation of the position is necessary, as the same conditions prevailed as in France. In these territories too, it proved impossible to set up a single I-link. Here also efforts were later made to build up W/T links with agents picked from the political groups in Germany, such as [Leon] Degrelle and V.d. Wiele, but the training took too long and none of the links came to anything. In Belgium also, Besekow set up a sabotage and R-Netz. Schellenberg estimates the expenditure at 200,000/250,000 Belgian francs. No reports on its activities were ever received. 4. Denmark. There was only one representative of Amt VI in Denmark—Stubaf. Carstenn—who was incapable of carrying out the normal work, to say nothing of building up an R-Netz into the bargain. Dr. Paeffgen (VI D) therefore proposed that Amt VI should give up the idea of an R-Netz in Denmark unless special opportunities revealed themselves in the course of the other work. Schellenberg, however, never heard anything of actual preparations— allocation of W/T apparatus etc.

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5. Norway. In Norway the position was exactly the same as in France, and Schellenberg, therefore decided to send Hstuf. Groenheim, the VI D Referent for Sweden, there (he believes that this was in mid-1944). Groenheim had the additional mission of establishing an R-Netz. Towards the end of the war Paeffgen told Schellenberg that the work, including the establishment of the R-Netz, was progressing well, and that they would soon be able to count on two or three provisional W/T links. No remittances for a special I-fund were sent to Norway. 6. Finland. Here Bross had succeeded in establishing for VI D at least one W/T link which later produced good results. The name of the man concerned, who was resident in Helsinki, is unknown to Schellenberg, and he remembers only that he was not an ordinary hireling agent, but a personal and confidential contact of Bross. Cellarius on the other hand had not succeeded in setting up one single reliable link for the Abwehr, although he had a reputation for efficiency, and Ohletz originally refused to have him in the Mil. Amt. Later Cellarius and Bross were bracketed together in the Sonderkdo. Nord. Cellarius’ old system of communications, which was linked up again within that of Bross, proved of more value in this joint work. It was thus possible to arrange a successful meeting between a supply U-boat and a Finnish fishing boat off the Finnish coast and there were good prospects that the Intelligence Service would be able to gain a fresh foothold in Finland. The aim visualised was the running of an information service with the help of a national resistance movement against Russia. It was proposed to press on with this work by making an increased use of aircraft for parachuting agents, and especially by bringing Finns to Germany for training. A certain Oberst Heelaanen, who was the leader-designate of a national resistance movement, played a prominent part. It had been proposed that, with the help of the Kdo. Nord he could be (or was shortly to be) sent back again to Finland for purposes of penetration. Schellenberg believes that it is probable, however, that he in fact escaped with the U-boat. No great provision had been made for money for the I-Netz in Finland. Schellenberg considers that Cellarius may have had a sum of money at his disposal from some earlier time, but adds that it cannot have amounted to much of [for?] Ohletz would have been certain to mention it at some point. 7. The Balkans. There were no permanent representatives of Amt VI in the Balkans. Schellenberg tried to have the work done through VI CZ, but in practice this proved to be impossible, for VI CZ’s Kdo. Nord was fully occupied in preparing its operations against Russia. In the course of its general mission of building up resistance movements, VI S then tried to form a resistance and R-Netz with part of a Kdo. of Jagdverband Ost, under the leadership of Stubaf. Dr. Pechau in the area of Heeresgruppe Kurland. To the best of Schellenberg’s knowledge, all the action taken remained tentative, for the psychological moment for such things was long past. He believes it was probable that VI S availed itself

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in these efforts of the established depots of FAK II but is unable to say to what extent. The special method of the Jagdverbaende was usually to base their activities on the armed Aufklaerung and Kommando operations in order also to form centres of resistance (i.e. in the non-political sense) in this way. Schellenberg added that the importance of any operations of this kind which Pechau may have attempted in the Kurland area would have been only local. (a) Roumania. Large-scale preparations had been made by VI E, but of all this only one W/T link was eventually established. The personnel were recruited entirely from the German elements in the population, whose status in the country was, from the Roumanian point of view, that of Roumanian nationals. The lack of internal agreement in the leadership of the (German) Group, and the pronounced enmity between the leader of the Group, Andreas Schmidt, and Kaltenbrunner, which VI E (Wanneck [sic.]) was perpetually aggravating, gave rise to disunity and differences of opinion in the ranks of the members who were working for the German Secret Service. All this wrangling, which eventually came to affect the home life of individuals, caused a slackening in security and was doubtless one of the causes leading to the collapse of the whole preparatory structure. The only agent who was later able to maintain W/T communications was one run by Hstuf. Gunne, a Volksdeutscher and a very well-trained Intelligence Officer with a circle of contacts embracing every stratum of the Roumanian population. For a time he was in charge of the Erdoelschutzkommando Ploesti (also on behalf of the Mil. Amt) and at the same time was entrusted with the preparations for sabotage, and in the nature of an I-mission, although circumstances did not allow him to carry this out. At a later date Gunne made contact with Schmidt, who had been parachuted, but unfortunately, in spite of the situation, old differences broke out again. Eventually, Schellenberg came to have grave doubts about Gunne’s channel, because he reported that he had got into touch again with some old contacts, which could not have been true. In the course of time the I-funds increased to about $300,000, including a considerable amount in Lei and also several thousand gold pieces. This sum was quite sufficient for the scope of the network which had been erected, especially as the most important contacts worked against reimbursement of their expenses only. (b) Bulgaria. The principal contacts of VI E for an I-Netz were to have been provided by the IMRO movement. Against Schellenberg’s will, Mihailov and his representative, Dr. Tsilev, received $80,000 towards this but when Bulgaria was evacuated the whole I-Netz which was represented on paper was immobilised [sic.]. VI E defended themselves by saying that the Russians had received information at an early stage by some treachery. However that may be, there was no means of clearing up the case as Kob, the man chiefly concerned, was shot by partisans, and Dr. Hoffman (Political Attache) had disappeared. Later a party of Bulgarians who were parachuted in an attempt to contact the I-Netz were arrested by the Russians.

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(c) Croatia. Here the preparation of the I-Netz was begun at the right time. Reliable Croats had been carefully trained, but they were swayed to such an extent by the unsettled state of internal politics in their country, and the deterioration of morale that eventually, perhaps not from ill-will but more from fear, they neglected their work and the trial traffic, which had until then been conducted normally, was discontinued. The area covered by the I-Netz had extended right down the coast but with the falling-off of the W/T agents it too collapsed. There had been two W/T stations. The amount of the I-funds was small. (d) Serbia. In Serbia there were no preparations for an I-Netz: the Rexists had failed completely. (e) Albania. Here a former Austrian “k.u.k.” officer, who had been living in Albania for many years, was installed as a W/T agent. His name was something like Matterna, and Schellenberg is unable to say whether he is identical with a man of that name who was formerly in Skoplje. Neither does he know whether this link actually worked. The I-fund amounted to 800 gold pieces. (f) Greece. Three W/T agents had been installed in Greece, but only one actually reported. After three or four weeks, he too ceased working for some unknown reason. Schellenberg estimates the I-fund for Greece at a very low figure—about $20,000 or 30,000 and 4/5,000 gold pieces. This sum included the funds to be placed at the disposal of “Dienststelle 3000”. This was a sabotage and R-Netz established by a Stubaf of VI S which in time proved unreliable and was taken over by the VI E representative, reorganised by him, and for the most part, in so far as it was usable at all, incorporated into the above-mentioned organisation. 8. Occupied Russian Territory. Here only Frontaufklaerung operated, and the Laendergruppe of Amt VI had no kind of organisation dealing with R-Netze. 9. Italy. In Italy serious and timely efforts were made to construct an I-Netz, but here again no success was achieved. Twelve report centres with five W/T agents were set up, all of which were to let themselves be overrun in the event of a collapse. The organisation was concentrated principally in Rome, and to a lesser degree in Naples. The greatest difficulty lay in finding people who could be used as W/T operators, since a perfect knowledge of the language was essential. After the Nettuno landing a frantic speeding-up of preparation began. The men selected for W/T work were almost all

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from the Southern Tirol, because they were considered more reliable. The greatest difficulties began in training, for the W/T instructors declared that they could not carry out the proper training of a man without previous knowledge in seven or eight months. Furthermore, the personnel available for training was inadequate both in numbers and in language qualifications. On the technical side too, circumstances were unfavourable to the particular characteristics of W/T conditions in Italy; sometimes the available apparatus was not strong enough for the distance over the Alps and back, and sometimes conditions for reception were exceptionally difficult and laid a great strain on the W/T operators. It may be, therefore, that the actual technical deficiencies and difficulties contributed decisively to the failure of the I-Netz. (This led Schellenberg to take a more pronounced interest than hitherto in the technical development of the agents’ W/T organisation.) The Mil. Amt achieved more success, for their personnel was adequate in numbers; Amt VI, on the other hand, had only one or two men at their disposal for the technical and welfare side of the training of ten Italians, and had no reserves to draw on. In succession the following men were installed in Italy to undertake the construction of the I-Netz: Dr. Hoettl, Dr. Hammer, Kappler (and Dr. Hass), and finally Dr. [Klaus] Huegel (and in the last weeks Canaris as well). They were also commissioned to supply political intelligence. Political intelligence work in Italy was strictly forbidden until the time of the fall of [Pietro] Badoglio and the King, but this was nevertheless carried on surreptitiously. It was only when their fall could no longer be prevented that recognition was given to this activity. Those chiefly responsible in point of time for the construction of the R-Netz were Hoettl and Kappler. VI B wanted to prosecute the latter for neglect of duty, but Schellenberg refused to sanction this as he considered that nothing was ever gained by it in such matters. Instead he removed him altogether from the Amt. In the main the reporting centres had been supported by the Roman aristocracy and some members of the Secret Police. Within the Vatican City an independent working group was to be built up through the medium of one of Kappler’s men, a secretary working in the Vatican library. A colony of Greek monks, whose Prior had been recruited, was to be used as well; in return, certain moneys which he was unable to collect in Belgium and which he required for his colony in that country were to be collected for him. Nothing came of this affair, however, as permission for the establishment of the colony was not given in time. Schellenberg also mentions Hstuf. Grobl [Wilhelm Gröbl], who worked under Hoettl, together with Wendig, the currency smuggler. Grobl [sic.] is said to have been shot by partisans when travelling with Wendig in Italy. The latter fled, leaving him severely wounded, and later he was reported killed, although the facts were not perfectly clear. He had established a W/T operator and a female agent on an estate in Southern Italy which belonged to Wendig, but nothing ever came of this. For this organisation on the estate Groebl had received a sum in pounds which Schellenberg estimates at between £10,000 and £15,000. He also worked with an old Abwehr agent (who had quarrelled with Canaris) called Kapitaen Mallinkrodt, who was supposed to assist him by running a mobile W/T station on a yacht sailing in the Bay of Trieste. Once Mallinkrodt gave an unfortunate piece of false information about an enemy landing on the islands outside the [sic.] Split, however, and Schellenberg considers that this probably led to his dismissal.

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A W/T operator and set were sent to Naples and maintained contact from there, but he must have been killed in the confusion of the fighting. As regards VI S, Kappler on one occasion tried to make an attack with three Italians on an alleged HQ near Naples. They left by sea to carry out this mission, but it was never confirmed that it actually took place. The employment of these Italians, however, resulted in VI S sending the Stubaf. mentioned in para. 7(f) above from Greece to Italy to select further trainees. New offices were set up at some expense, but out of ten Italians chosen for training and sent to Germany, some deserted and the remainder were so unreliable that training could not be continued and they were put on to other work. Schellenberg does not know if the VI S representative in Italy made use of possible training facilities in Italy itself. In any case, as far as he knows, no R-Netz was established in this area. Schellenberg can no longer remember the amount of money spent, the greater part of which was paid out in Lira, the supply of which did not call forth so much criticism as it was a so-called “low currency”. In addition a sum of about £50,000 (forged) had been prepared for Rome, and Schellenberg assumes that it was issued before the fall of the city. 10. Slovakia and the Protectorate. Here efforts to set up an R-Network were begun so late that no link could be established in these areas. 11. Hungary. In Hungary again nothing was done until the last moment. It was possible to set up one link in Budapest, but later traffic ceased, either because it was destroyed during the final stages of the fighting or for other reasons. Schellenberg is unable to furnish any details, e.g. the name of the key-man of the link, but thinks it probable that he was a member of the Hungarian Arrow Cross Party.

II. THE MIL. AMT When the Abwehr was taken over the following re-organisation was already partially in progress. A distinction was being made between Nahaufklaerung and Fernaufklaerung. Nahaufklaerung was to be carried out by Frontaufklaerungsverbaende and Fernaufklaerung by the Kdo. Meldegebiete in the Reich and in neutral countries, which were then about to be re-formed and were to provide information on or from enemy countries. This splitting of the former organisational unit was quite uncoordinated in operation, from the point of view of personnel as well as that of work, and after a few months the form was again altered. Just at the time of the invasion, however, the work was placed on a very precarious footing, for orders invariably contradicted each other or cancelled each other out. Thus, for example, the greater part of the activity of Alst. Paris was taken over by Frontleitstellen I-III West, which naturally worked on different principles, dictated by the nature of their own work. This led to great difficulty, especially in the running of the W/T links, for the Leitstellen with their Leitfunkstellen

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had to remain mobile, since they were usually stationed in the neighbourhood of the Heeresgruppe. 1. Belgium, Holland and France. In the Mil. Amt the usual term employed to cover these countries was “Westraum”. A radical organisational error was made in the planning of the R-Netze, with fatal results. The reason was to be found either in the prevailing arrogant attitude of the officers concerned, or their fear of being stigmatised as a defeatist. The whole network of agents was spread along the hinterland of the Atlantic Wall and, so to speak, clung on to it. Schellenberg often asked the Fremde Heere West Abteilung what the reason for this was, and always received the same answer from the officers, “But anything else was defeatism”. A great number of the agents themselves or their equipment, were lost in the fighting or in bombing attacks. It was never possible to rearrange their disposition, nor was it ever attempted for the personnel were all established in a community. When the breakthrough at Avranches came, making it increasingly necessary for the High Command to be supplied with tactical and, when possible, operational intelligence, especially from the centre of the country, it was impossible to meet these vital demands. Although the responsibility for the planning of the R-Netze organisation was not his, Schellenberg had to submit to numerous reproaches on this account. A consequence which was far worse, however, was that a sort of hysteria attended every attempt now made to remedy this defect, and this made any constructive work impossible. Schellenberg remembers a review map which he had prepared for a conference with Jodl and on which twenty-eight links functioning in the Westraum were marked. The geographical lay-out was just as described above and much the same as in the Suedraum where, however, it was slightly better, as the network stretched as far as Lyons. Schellenberg also remembers some details of a statement which he had drawn up to give himself a general idea of how many links it had been attempted to set up in the R-Netze and how many had actually been established. He cannot guarantee the accuracy of the figures given below, and states that there may be discrepancies of about twenty or thirty, but that at least the general picture is exact enough. The period referred to is about the autumn of 1944: I Heer:

About 180 links attempted, of which 12 were established.

I Luft:

About 126 links attempted, of which 7 were established.

I Marine:

About 14 links attempted, of which 5 were established.

By February 1945, when the above-mentioned map was probably drawn up, the functioning links had been increased by four, but a considerable number must also have failed. Schellenberg is unable to supply any information on the reliability of the individual links, individual adjustments, failures and new enterprises. Ultimately greater importance came to be attached to agents’ reports, for air reconnaissance failed completely. Schellenberg quotes as an example the case of an individual V-Mann, Careel, who worked in Antwerp and whose normal reporting activity was completely switched over to the observation of V 1 results. A second V-Mann who worked with him met with some accident or was arrested.

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On the technical W/T side all these lines of communication with the West were, at least in the last half year, linked with Kdo. Meldegebiet Wiesbaden. The FAK-II-Verbaende worked hard on the establishment of depots in the whole of the Westraum. Schellenberg once saw a comprehensive supply map, but no details, apart from regional disposition, could be gathered from it. 2. Denmark. Fernaufklaerung and Frontaufklaerung worked together on the preparation of an R-Netz in Denmark. At the time of the last stand in January 1945, seven W/T links in all were ready. Schellenberg recollects another review map which showed that the greater part of them were situated on the Eastern side of Jutland, for it was assumed that in the event of an invasion the attack would be made from the West. 3. Norway. In Norway there were six or seven links, dispersed over the whole country. Here again it was endeavoured to keep to the East of the country as far as possible, in order to avoid possible battle movements which were expected to come from the West. 4. Finland (See part I, para 6.). 5. The Baltic States and Occupied Territory in Russia. In these territories only the Frontaufklaerung was concerned with the preparation of an RNetz. The Dienststellen were Wally I (FAK I), Wally II (FAK II) and Wally III (FAK III). The main activity was carried on by Verbaende I and II. The Frontaufklaerung as a whole in the East worked in the closest co-operation with the General Staff of the Fremde Heere Ost Abteilung, and during the time that it was separated from the Dienst it was in fact directly under this Abteilung. The Leiter of the most important Stelle, Wally I, a certain Oberstlt. [Hermann] Baun, welcomed this, as it had always been his ambition to be independent and he considered that to have a central control was a bureaucratic arrangement. Baun himself was in conference with Schellenberg more than once but on these occasions they did not go into details about the R-Netze. In broad outline Schellenberg understood from him that in all the larger territorial districts, especially in the Baltic States, an adequate network had been set up. In general the results of the information could also be said to be adequate. Frequently, too, Schellenberg discussed this question with the head of Fremde Heere Ost (General Gehlen), and he certainly seemed to think that results in the Autumn of 1944 were satisfactory. The results of the common effort of the whole Meldedienst in covering the Baranov offensive also were still very good, but then a marked falling-off set in, and this included the R-Netze as well. Events then followed each other too rapidly and there was a further falling-off, due to the fact that W/T receiving units were perpetually being moved and as a result contact was lost with agents equipped with W/T. Money did not play a decisive role in the East, since adequate funds were always available.

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Mil. C and Mil. F had their hands full with recapturing defaulters. The activities of the FAK II Verbaende were chiefly directed towards the Ukraine (UPA) and the Baltic States. Here, however, it was chiefly a question of new enterprises based on supply depots established earlier. For Polish territory Kdo. Meldegebiet Breslau had set up a smaller R-Netz with four or five links. Schellenberg is unable to say whether this worked successfully during the subsequent retreat, but mentions that Ohletz, who praised the efficiency of Oberst Wiese, Leiter at the time, told him repeatedly that the group of agents was very well established. It was only in November 1944, that Kdo. Meldegebiet Prague began selecting some Vpersonnel, who started training in December. It had been impossible to begin this earlier for psychological reasons, for there was no understanding whatsoever in high places of this type of work. 6. Slovakia. Schellenberg is unable to say whether eventually an intact R-Netz existed in Slovakia, which was treated as a Meldekopf outpost of Vienna. As in the occupied Balkan territories, the FAK-Verbaende were chiefly responsible for the planning of the R-Netz. FAK-Stelle SO was latterly situated in Vienna, and worked in co-operation with the Meldegebiet. 7. Balkans. Schellenberg has no detailed knowledge of the organisation, and especially the actual capacities of the R-Netze, particularly in Greece, Serbia, Albania and Croatia. Results, however, were not particularly good, or he would have noticed it from the reports received. He considers that their work was probably average, serving principally the needs of the fighting forces in areas near the Front. During the work of preparation, Schellenberg personally had nothing to do with the I-Netze of the Mil. Amt, and so can say nothing either of the money position or about personnel. He could only supply the following information:— Roumania. Eventually only two or three links actually functioned, and these as time went on fell away because of lack of support. Bulgaria.

According to Ohletz, numerous links did not materialise at all, and of the five or six which did report two eventually came to be regarded as unreliable.

Appendix XXII. The I-Netze in Neutral Countries. No concrete post-war plans were prepared by Amt VI for Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In the first three countries there existed so-called “I-Netze”, supplied with money and technical equipment, which were only to enter into action if relations with the country in question were severed or if an invasion took place. These were not connected with any kind of post-war organisation. Schellenberg stated that he had made no such arrangements, neither had he given any instructions to Dienststellen in neutral countries on procedure in the event of a German defeat. It did not occur to him to do so, for it seemed quite unthinkable that any German could continue to work in a neutral country, since even in the last stages of the war this was already practically impossible. His sole activity in connection with post-war plans had been repeated endeavours to make provision for the maintenance of sufficient personnel and material for use against Russia in the event of a German defeat and he had given very clear instructions to this effect, principally to VI C and MIL C. He believes that he also talked this over with Dr. Sandberger. As regards Spain, Schellenberg mentioned the following incident, which he considers might possibly be misinterpreted by someone without information to the contrary as preparation for a post-war organisation whereas it was in reality no more than an attempt to avoid the strict extradition measures. He had once discussed with Kleyenstueber a suggestion he had made to the effect that the Spanish General Staff might be induced to recruit, as Spanish officers, officers who had been in Spain at the time of the Legion Kondor [Condor] and were well-known to the Spanish military authorities. Schellenberg gave him permission to try this, but he doubts whether he achieved any success, for he never heard anything further either from him or from Steimle. Organisation of the I-Netze. The procedure followed was the same in each country. Personnel who were prepared to undertake such work, as far as possible nationals of the country in question or other neutrals who would be able to stay there after the Germans had withdrawn, had to be recruited, usually with the proviso that they would not have to do anything prejudicial to the interests of their country. Once found, and after being vetted as far as possible, these people were trained. At the conclusion of their training there were usually no other preparations, i.e. they were given no practical experience but were held in reserve for the I-Netze. As the V-Personnel organisation was extended a proportionate sum of money was set aside for subsequent expenditure on personnel and material in order that, in the event of an invasion, the straightened circumstances of the Reich would not lead to a position where men were available but not funds.

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Schellenberg added that it was obviously essential for the I-Netze to have an efficient head station, quite apart from the necessity of a W/T receiving station which would be in uninterrupted communication with the head station. The preparation of the I-Netze did not produce good results, and for the first time it became obvious on how slight a foundation the German Intelligence Service stood. It lacked experience, established points of contact, and above all the intelligent, trained personnel necessary for difficult work of this kind. The most serious defect of all, however, was the lack of constant control, i.e. organised supervision by experienced personnel. In effect then all these I-Netze failed just where they should have held. This applied chiefly to Amt VI, whereas the Mil. Amt achieved better results. There too, however, the same defects were in evidence and the difficulties inherent in the work were the same. Most of the failures resulted from the haphazard selection of personnel and inadequate training, and the deterioration of V-Personnel who, too seldom utilized and too well supplied with money, gradually lost interest in their work and so for the most part became unreliable in every respect. Often too they betrayed themselves to the C.E. service in their country of residence by living beyond their normal income or came under enemy observation, in the latter case providing material for double-agents. Portugal. Here the Amt VI position was especially bad. Von Foerster, [Hans] Vollbrecht’s predecessor, had achieved no more in this province than did his successor. Schellenberg believes that Nassenstein had secured the services of the Brazilian, Albuquerque, who ran a firm with capital supplied by the Service. Schroeder himself intended to stay in Portugal, on the strength of his police connections and with a false passport, and hoped to retire to a small estate in the country. Schellenberg is not aware whether he recruited anyone, and if so, whom, for the I-Netze. Schellenberg frequently discussed with Steimle the chaotic state of their VI-Dienst in Portugal, with special reference to the position at headquarters. Neither of them could offer any solution, and Schellenberg stated that he could not throw the whole blame on Steimle, for the root of the trouble lay in the stupidity of the general attitude in Germany to the Service, combined with the totally inadequate policy regarding personnel. As an illustration of the difficulties with which he had to contend Schellenberg added that, in spite of all his efforts, he was unable to dismiss Nassenstein at the time of his wife’s suicide, although this was an obvious necessity, neither was he able to do anything about Vollbrecht, who was a complete failure. The Mil. Amt had more personnel to work with and therefore more results to show. There too, however, conditions were equally bad, if not in many respects actually worse. The chief cause of this was that there was no-one who understood the real meaning of development by systematic training, but the reasons went still deeper—the German Intelligence Service had no tradition behind it, i.e. there was no-one who had been ‘brought up to it’. Schellenberg considers that had it been built up with more wisdom it would not have kept breaking down under the military sledgehammer. In Portugal the Mil. Amt had several I-links which maintained a regular, though very infrequent, trial W/T traffic. Schellenberg was unable to say how many of these links there were, but he puts the number at ten or twelve at the utmost.

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Neither does he know the size of the total budget for Amt VI and the Mil. Amt. He remembers only one particularly favourable transaction with the Reichswirtschaftsministerium—the successful purchase of escudos to the equivalent of RM. 5,000,000 at a rate of exchange favourable to the mark out of an erroneously accredited sum which was in danger of being frozen. This sum, which was allocated for the I-funds, was obtained purely by chance from a source not normally tapped, and had nothing to do with the normal currency position. (Note: This sum may have been in pesetas and the incident may refer to Spain—Schellenberg is uncertain on the point.) Spain. Most of the preparatory work for the I-Netz in Spain of Amt VI had been done by [Johannes] Bernhardt’s organisation with its economic undertaking “Sofindus” which was controlled by the Reichswirtschaftsministerium and the Four Year Plan, and by [Eugen] Mosig. Thanks to the extensive business transactions which he was constantly carrying on with high Spanish authorities and commercial circles, in the interests of the Reich, Bernhardt and especially Mosig, also six or seven commercial assistants trained by the Service, had a good field for the recruitment of personnel and the seizure of opportunities. Since the Sofindus concern commanded large resources of pesetas it had been possible to make the following arrangement through the appropriate department of the Reichswirtschaftsministerium directly: each month a payment of RM. 50,000 was made to the RWM in Berlin, and the equivalent in pesetas was placed to the credit of Amt VI on a special account with Sofindus in Madrid. The money accumulated in this manner was intended primarily for I-funds. This practice was in force from the end of 1943 onwards. Schellenberg cannot remember how much had been accumulated for I-funds by the Mil.Amt, but according to an estimate made by Joerges it must have been sufficient for the Service to have existed on it in Spain for several months without any new allocation. Thus Schellenberg puts the sum at about 2,500,000 or 3,000,000 pesetas.151 The number of I-links set up by the Mil.Amt was comparatively very high. As well as Mil.B, however, VI Wi also was especially concerned. On one occasion Steimle put the total number of links to Schellenberg as forty-five, of which the greater part were equipped with W/T. The number of links belonging to VI Wi was comparatively high— over twenty—which displeased Steimle, who had no real faith in the work of this Gruppe. Details of the key-men in these links are not in Schellenberg’s possession, but he assumes that they were all Spaniards. Turkey. It was chiefly the task of Moyzisch to try to establish a link for VI C, with the assistance of his principal Turkish V-Mann, a liaison agent with the Turkish Intelligence Service whose name Schellenberg is unable to remember. Neither Moyzisch nor Fast had any success with the preparative work, although this cannot have been due to shortage of funds, since as far as Schellenberg remembers the money position was always good. The proceeds of the exchange of counterfeit money against the Turkish pound in the Cicero case were in the region of Ltq. [sic.] 90,000—the sum which was eventually sent to

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Moyzisch. Only one link materialised out of the Wolf network—that of the Roumanian Major Urlitzianu (spelling phonetic—cover name Uhu), with whom W/T contact was maintained for a short time. Schellenberg is unable to remember whether Urlitzianu could not continue because of the expiry of his diplomatic passport or whether the W/T contact could not be maintained after the German evacuation of the Balkans because the distances were too great. Urlitzianu had helped the Germans because of his great attachment to a secretary of Wolf, whom he wanted to marry at all costs and who was allowed to maintain contact with him after her recall to Germany. He was in Germany at one stage and was able to make his training an excuse to visit her. Schellenberg also remembers that a certain Swiss was selected, he believes by Schuback, especially for work if relations were broken off between Germany and Turkey, so that should W/T communications fail a channel would still be open by mail to Switzerland. He believes that there were some difficulties about money arrangements, for while the Swiss was supposed to be reliable at the same time no-one was willing to trust him with large sums of money. Eventually, however, he was attached to Wolf in Turkey. Later Schellenberg lost sight of the case altogether, and so cannot say whether things went according to plan or not. Even in internment Wolf maintained W/T communication with Berlin, and ultimately sent a message to say that he was asking for permission to stay in Turkey, where there was a possibility of his being able to continue working after all, with the help of his good police connections. The permission was granted. Schellenberg’s knowledge of the I-Netz of the Mil.Amt is based only on occasional remarks made by Ohletz, who kept making reference to the fact that the I-Netz was in all probability blown as a result of the Vermehren case. Of the six links prepared three, and later even five, continued to function as time went on. According to Ohletz three of them were so suspect that he suppressed their messages for the most part, or classed them as “not definite, confirmation required” and passed them on as such. Schellenberg is unable to remember what means were at Pfeiffer’s disposal for developing this network, and he does not recollect having seen any documents on this subject. As the agents of the I-links were all Turks there was always the possibility that they had contacted their own police and were being used by the latter as double agents, even if the Vermehren case had done no harm. Sweden. Amt VI considered that the political movement connected with the newspaper “Folkets Dagblad” might be used for the I-Netz. Three or four Swedes had been sent to Berlin for training, and a W/T station had been prepared in a week-end cottage somewhere near Stockholm. As far as possible the whole movement was to be used to provide information. The total I-funds, as far as Schellenberg remembers, were very meagre—at most 15,000 to 20,000 Kroner. Sometimes they were very short of Kroner altogether, at others they counted on being able to procure some quickly in case of need. Finke, however, was recalled for political reasons, and in the meantime the Swedish police closed down on his preparations. Others were never set afoot. As far as Schellenberg knows no preparations for an I-Netz were ever made by the Mil.Amt. Intelligence work against Sweden was only begun in the last few months of the

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war. Hitherto it had been strictly forbidden for political reasons, and Schellenberg asked the Wehrmachts-fuehrungsstab to send him the order in writing. He was able to induce Jodl to refuse a request made by the Wehrmacht Commander of Norway, asking for authorisation for FAK work against Sweden, as he considered that this involved too great a risk, for political reasons.

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Appendix XXIII. Miscellaneous Personalities. Note: Schellenberg provided a large amount of information on personalities, some of which has been omitted from the list given below, as it was either already well-known or too vague to be of any value. 1. Arnold, Karl (Madrid). Had formerly lived in South America. On his return to Germany was trained by Dr. Paeffgen personally and became the specialist for the whole courier service to that continent. He directed and supervised all “Postanlaufstellen (post-boxes)”, had established a good organisation in Spanish ports, and was always described by Paeffgen as a reliable and painstaking worker. It was due to him that Amt VI received its courier mail to the end. He had built up his own network of agents and ran his own lines, mostly to the Argentine and Brazil. He also provided good reports about the United Kingdom and was in contact with an elderly woman secretary of the United States Embassy in Madrid. About 38 years of age. Formerly an export merchant. 2. Curth. Journalist. Run by a Referat of Gruppe VI B as an ordinary V-Mann, Curth came to Schellenberg’s notice through the large amount of foreign currency which he expended, without producing information which in any way justified this. The Referat, however, emphasised his importance and especially his indispensability as, with his passport as a permanent courier of the Auswaertiges Amt, he was able to travel over the whole Western area and moreover procured contacts with England direct through Lisbon. Schellenberg therefore arranged to see him personally on his next visit to Berlin, and received an unfavourable impression; he spoke too much about his important contacts, adding that he also worked for the Hen [c] ke-Dienst of the Auswaertiges Amt, as well as for the Auslandsabtg. of the Propagandaministerium and (Schellenberg believes) for the Consul-General in Zurich. From all these Stellen he received considerable amounts of foreign currency. As Schellenberg had nothing definite against him, however, he lulled him into a sense of security and declared himself in complete agreement with his work. Meanwhile he had official enquiries made in his home town (Dusseldorf) from which it appeared that he had already been in trouble with the authorities on account of his Communistic activities and did not enjoy a good reputation. Investigation made in Marseilles also proved unfavourable and revealed heavy money expenditure, expensive lady friends whom he gave out to be his “Mitarbeiter”, and suspected homosexuality. Finally, Schellenberg received from the Auswaertiges Amt a report giving the names of

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the members of the so-called emigre governments in London, with the note that supplementary information could be sent from London but that it would cost a large amount of money, and it was established that Curth had delivered the same material to Amt VI and the Propagandaministerium, giving another source. This would be about the end of 1942 or early 1943, and Schellenberg then proposed that Curth be arrested and an investigation made on the basis of the evidence available of the supply of false information. This was done, but Curth was able to escape before the investigation in Paris began, and Schellenberg never heard anything further of him. He learnt subsequently, however, that Curth must have delivered to the Auswaertiges Amt an enormous amount of information which was probably enemy smoke material. 3. Doenhoff, Graf. Doenhoff was regarded as the successor of Daufeldt in Switzerland. He enjoyed diplomatic immunity through his position of Consul, and Schellenberg believes that he succeeded in establishing himself in Zurich. This only became possible because in this case Amt VI for once really had the complete support of the Auswaertiges Amt, since Doenhoff was a close friend of Steengracht. Schellenberg himself only met him when he was leaving Berlin, after he had been trained by Steimle and Paeffgen. He gave him a fairly exact notion of his political ideas and asked him to work roughly on those lines. Doenhoff was very surprised as he had never suspected Schellenberg would speak so openly. The latter is unable to say whether he actually did anything in Switzerland or even whether he got there all right. The only report he remembers from Doenhoff was one he submitted during his training on the impossible methods employed by the Gestapo and Kripo in the conduct of interrogations of escaped and recaptured British prisoners of war and the bad behaviour of the guard units. Schellenberg immediately submitted this report to Obergruf. Berger, head of the P.O.W.’s Department, who promised investigation and remedy, and also informed Himmler. The latter at once demanded a report from Berger, as suggested by Schellenberg, in order to keep a check on him. 4. Finke, August. Practically no intelligence reports of value were received from Finke in Sweden, and Paeffgen was continually complaining about the deficiency of his information and had demanded his recall on several occasions. He was frequently summoned to Berlin and severely reprimanded, but this had no effect. Sweden was one of the most important outposts for espionage against Russia, America and England, and in this respect Finke failed completely. His information was so general and the sources so vague that its value could only be taken collectively. Two or three times he sent several useful messages about convoy trains, but Schellenberg is unable to recall any outstanding reports about his political area. However, his reports about the internal position in Sweden, Swedish/ Finnish relations and the detailed observation of German/Swedish economic conditions, as a factor in itself as well as in relation to the Western powers, were always good and timely. These successes were essentially due to the co-operation of a large number of honorary assistants whom he had recruited as time went on, and above all to the active collaboration of the Swedish circle centred on the

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newspaper “Folkets Dagblad”, which he financed with money from his own Ministry and from the Auswaertiges Amt. Schellenberg believes that the sum was 12,000 Kroner monthly. This Swedish circle had connections throughout the country and also in Communist and Trade Union circles. Schellenberg repeatedly advised that an attempt should be made to use this channel to obtain information on Russia, and apparently Finke eventually began to work on this in earnest. He collaborated with Dr. Kleist on the question of making contact with the Russians and introduced to him a certain Rall (?Raul or some similar name), a platinum dealer who claimed to know Stalin personally and had lived for many years in Russia. It is said, however, that Kleist made no use of this contact. In addition, Finke knew nearly all the German journalists and had countless Germans who, with the help of their Swedish acquaintances, acted as informants; the material they provided, however, was merely of a general nature. His agents included:— (a) Johannsson. His principal assistant and editor of the “Folkets Dagblad”. (b) Penzlin. His most important collaborator amongst the German journalists. (c) Knyphausen. [Armgard] Graefin v. Employed as a paid agent at the end of 1943 and in 1944. She obtained information from the society circles in which she moved, and was particularly in contact with the family of the Swede Grafman through whom she secured reports concerning American and English circles in Stockholm. Grafman himself was a member of the Swedish Intelligence Service, and must have had a great deal of money, as he kept a large house and entertained lavishly. The Graefin was separated from her husband, who was said to be in Finland. (d) Bauersfeld. (e) Von Gienand [von Gienanth]. (f) Von Gossler. Leiter of the Railway Personnel Head Office. (g) Von der Goltz. Banker. He also had on hand a renegade Russian, formerly a well-known Bolshevik, who had lived for a long time in Germany and was latterly employed in the Japanese Embassy in Stockholm as translator. From time to time he supplied information about Japan, but nothing of value, and Schellenberg believes him to be a Russian agent. Finke had no genuine contact in any other Embassy, neither did he ever succeed in sending any really important document or report. Towards the end of his stay in Sweden he was on good terms with [Dr Werner] Dankwort, Counsellor of the German Embassy [sic.], and they discussed in detail the form in which Finke should best organise a stay-behind organisation in Sweden for the Auswaertiges Amt. Dankwort offered Finke an amount of up to 500,000 Kroner, but nothing ever came of these plans. After Finke’s expulsion from Sweden, Kaltenbrunner wanted to send him to Zagreb, but Schellenberg protested that this would waste his thorough knowledge and good connections in the North and arranged that he should be attached as an Ober.Reg.Rat to Best’s staff in Copenhagen, from where he was to try to renew contact with Sweden. Finke accordingly went to Copenhagen in February or March 1943, using the name Schilling (or Schillings).

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5. Freund, Oberst.Lt. Gruppenleiter VI Z, who formerly worked under Rohleder and dealt with questions affecting the Balkans. He was an expert on counter-espionage, and Schellenberg chose him for this work because he was less obstinate and argumentative than Rohleder. He collaborated closely with Dr. Schmidt of the Secretariat, who also made use of him for counter-espionage work at home, and was a valuable colleague vis-à-vis Amt IV, i.e. against Mueller. The latter nursed a plan to take over the whole of counter-espionage as a Stapo domain, and to hand over this work to the Police Attaches abroad. Schellenberg does not know much about Freund’s work before he joined VI Z, where he was a newcomer, but considers that he must have been specially successful in the Balkans, where he knew all the lines, and that he must have been very efficient, since he was recommended by everybody. Other special territories of his were Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. In Switzerland he worked particularly on the solution of the ‘Agent 509’ case, and he maintained close contact with Fritz Cramer in Portugal and with Rohrscheidt in Spain. In the latter country he worked against John and Ledebur. He also dealt with an interesting case in Turkey (which was reported by Leverkuehn), where a very good agent worked, who was known to the British Intelligence Service as ‘Professor’. In Istanbul he dealt with another big case, which concerned the Austrian Freedom Movement and had ramifications in Vienna and the former Semperit Works there. 6. Goering, Hstuf. Fritz [Franz]. Schellenberg took Goering on his personal staff in 1944 on the recommendation of Frl. [Marie Luise] Schienke, his secretary. Goering, though married, was hoping to be divorced from his wife and to marry Schienke. He was then about 40 years of age and had previously worked in Amt IV. Schellenberg did not use him for intelligence work: his chief duty was to look after important guests, such as Musy, in the villa in which he lived.152 He did, however, on occasion exploit Goering’s former contact with Amt IV to facilitate liaison, and his friendship with Basinski, a hotel owner, with a view to using the hotel business for purposes of the G.I.S. 7. Hawel [Hewel, Walther]. Hawel [sic.] had lived in the Dutch East Indies as a merchant, and with his experience of the world thus gained had made a great impression on Hitler and Ribbentrop. Schellenberg, who had made his acquaintance through Spitzi [sic.], made various attempts to use him for his own purposes, as he knew that he had Hitler’s ear, and at the beginning of 1944 had a long discussion with him, arranged through Spitzi [sic.]. Schellenberg outlined his difficulties in the sphere of foreign politics and with Ribbentrop, told him that the German treatment of the occupied territories would make almost any form of foreign politics impossible, and asked him if he could influence Hitler towards changing this policy. Hawel [sic.] replied that Hitler was no ordinary man but a genius who saw things quite differently, and in this specific matter Hitler’s view was that the occupied territories could not be treated in a democratic fashion but merely as

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potential sources of war material. Schellenberg suggested that this view might be changed but Hawel [sic.] retorted that he agreed with Hitler, and that in any case the latter regarded himself to such an extent as a historic figure that any of his political utterances must be considered as totally binding and not open to question. Schellenberg realised that he would not get any further with Hawel [sic.], since he was completely under Hitler’s spell. At one time, Mueller suspected him of espionage; this was in connection with some W/T message which could only have been known to someone in Hitler’s immediate entourage, and circumstances might have pointed to Hawel [sic.]. However, nothing came of this matter. After Schellenberg’s failure to interest Hawel [sic.] in his affairs the latter for a time drew closer to Kaltenbrunner. The reason for this was that Kaltenbrunner had managed to bring him back into the Fuehrer’s favour again following a period when he had fallen into disfavour through not having invited Eva Braun to his wedding at the beginning of 1944. Schellenberg had nothing further to do with Hawel [sic.] after the middle of 1944.153 8. Kaulbach, Oberst i.G. Before leaving in the Spring of 1944 to take up his appointment as Military Attaché in Lisbon, Kaulbach paid the routine official visit to Schellenberg, who expounded to him his ideas on the role Military Attaches might play in the G.I.S. He was very responsive and promised to assist with practical suggestions for the implementation of Schellenberg’s theories. Between the Spring and Autumn of 1944 he sent him a report on the general political situation in Portugal, and on his return to Germany in the Autumn of 1944 he suggested at a further meeting that the Military Attaches should control the I.S. abroad. Schellenberg did not see him again, nor did he receive further reports. 9. Klatt, Richard @. Kanders (or Kauders) (Source “Max”). Budapest. This agent [Richard Kauders, cover name Klatt] was run by Vienna (Oberst Wiese) and worked in the first instance for military intelligence. His reports on Russian Army matters were good and were classed as “important to the Wehrmacht (Heereswichtig)”, and the General Staff “Fremde Heere Ost” thought highly of him. On air matters they were weak, and on political questions sometimes good and sometimes bad. He was half-Jewish, and the case was very complicated owing to Hitler’s strict order that no Jews must be employed on intelligence work. One of his personal enemies was Oberst Wagner (Delius), formerly a Sofia lawyer, in Stuttgart, who alleged that he was working either for the Russians or for the British. Klatt ran his organisation very successfully: he had the advantage of working with Ast. Vienna, which supplied deception and play-back material. Finally he became too independent and started working with Hoettl and Wanneck [sic.]. At that time Schellenberg asked Oberst.Lt. Ohletz, the head of Mil. C to have a look at his “shop” in Budapest, which was suspected of covering all sorts of Black Market (exchange and other) illicit deals, but after spending five days on investigations Ohletz could not find anything suspicious. Then Schellenberg, who had to act quickly before Klatt’s collaboration with Hoettl and Wanneck [sic.] became too close to prevent successful investigations, summoned Oberst Wiese from Vienna and asked him to

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investigate. The latter found out that the men who in reality provided intelligence for Klatt’s racket were a Slovak lawyer and Prince Turkul. The latter had a White Russian line to Moscow. These lines also led to Istanbul and Bratislava. Wiese arrested Klatt together with twenty-eight small agents, who formed a motley crowd, containing all sorts of nationalities and even a Gestapo man from Vienna. After only a few days it was possible to resume work through Klatt’s organisation, however, and although for the first week the intelligence declined in value it gradually improved and in the end became excellent. Schellenberg transferred Turkul (see below) to Berlin to serve as a watch on Vlassov. 10. Kleist, Dr. Bruno [Peter Kleist?]. and Klaus. Dr. Bruno Kleist was used as an expert on Russian affairs by Ribbentrop, Kaltenbrunner, Schellenberg and Oberst Wagner in Stockholm. Officially he was a Ministerialrat in the Ostministerium. When he was threatened with being called up Schellenberg arranged that he should join the Waffen SS and then had him posted to the Auswaertiges Amt. He had worked for Schellenberg since 1943, but his close connection with Ribbentrop went back at least to 1939, when he was with Hilger in Moscow. He was a member of the early Ribbentrop Bureau in company with such men as Gardemann and Gottfriedsen. He had with him in Stockholm as his chief agent and assistant a Baltic Jew named [Edgar] Klaus, who received large sums of money from Oberst Wagner and, through Kleist, from Ribbentrop. In 1944 Klaus transmitted to Wagner some sort of peace offer from the Russians. The latter sent it by W/T or cable to Canaris who, being in this respect politically naive, passed it directly to Keitel, who gave it to Hitler. The latter enquired about the source, and on hearing that he was a Jew immediately issued his celebrated order that Jews were no longer to be employed in the G.I.S.Klaus’ chief Russian contact was Semenov [Vladimir S.Semyonov] in the Russian Embassy in Stockholm. He frequently visited his house and had talks with him. His other Russian contact was Andreyev, who was a diplomatic courier who travelled between London and Moscow. Schellenberg had absolutely no confidence in Klaus’ military and political reports, and never met or wanted to meet him. He maintains that Ribbentrop trusted this obviously unreliable man purely from prejudice and because he wanted to come to terms with the Russians. Both Kleist and Hilger gave advice on Russian questions to the Unternehmen Zeppelin of Amt VI and particularly to Hengelhaupt. Hilger was much less helpful than Kleist and was generally not popular. Schellenberg himself claimed to have maintained contact with the latter in order to be informed of peace negotiations with the East. Amt VI’s other adviser on Russian matters was Graf Schulenburg, whom Schellenberg knew well but regarded as an ordinary official with no initiative.154 11. Kraemer, Karl Heinz (Stockholm). Formerly a Hamburg lawyer. Schellenberg heard his name for the first time from Daufeldt, for whom he had occasionally worked. He was impressed by his political reports on the U.K. and the U.S.A. for the Mil.Amt, and therefore sought closer contact with him. He sent good reports on the situation in the British Foreign Office and the

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views of the “Conservative Opposition within the Inner Circle” (Anderson), Dr. Paeffgen and Schuddenkopf [Schueddekopf] were very critical of him, alleging that he took his reports from the British Press or the S.I.S. On the other hand Dr. Wirsing, one of Schellenberg’s most able collaborators and the head of the Zentralbuero, with whom he collaborated in the political domain, thought a great deal of him. He needed a great deal of money, and in Schellenberg’s view this was the reason why he was regarded with suspicion for a long time. He was first run by Kleyenstueber and later by Oberst. Lt. von Dewitz, who was formerly in the Luftwaffefuehrungsstab and there had differences of opinion with the Ic, Oberst Wodarg. The latter’s opposition to Dewitz transferred itself to Kraemer; and he ordered his chiefs of sections to compile a comprehensive memorandum alleging that Kraemer’s reports represented conscious deception by the enemy or fraud. This memorandum, comprising nearly eighty pages, was given to Mueller by Wodarg, without consulting Schellenberg, with a request to start proceedings for espionage against Kraemer. Mueller put two of his best specialists on the job, and a dispute began between him and Schellenberg. There were a number of weak points in Kraemer’s military reports, e.g. he had reported British aircraft factories which, according to the evidence of British prisoners-of-war, did not exist at all. Another mystery was the time factor in the transmission of his reports. Often, for instance, counter enquiries referring to some remote place in England were answered within ten hours. Finally, after many discussions and negotiations, Schellenberg was himself obliged to summon Kraemer to Berlin. Mueller’s plan was to arrest him, but Schellenberg prevented this by telling him that in a personal talk with Kraemer he had succeeded in clearing up the most doubtful issues and that for technical reasons he could not renounce his collaboration. In reality he was important to Schellenberg because of his political reports, and the latter allowed him to leave Germany again. During their conversation he had declared that he would not reveal the names of his collaborators unless Schellenberg was prepared to dispense with his service in the future, but at the same time he offered plausible explanations for his cooperation with Swedish friends. The only thing he revealed was that some of his friends were in the Swedish Foreign Office. He was forbidden to have direct contact with the Luftwaffefuehrungsstab or other service departments, in order to give no loophole for Schellenberg to be reproached with the fact that he secured at the source important material for a possible exchange of intelligence undertaken by him. It was Kraemer’s portrayal of events which confirmed Schellenberg in his intention to do everything in Germany itself in the question of the Jews and Church policy to prepare the way for the creation of a Western bloc of states under the leadership of Britain, of which later a crippled Germany would form part. Schellenberg assumed that there must be contact between the “Conservative Opposition in England”, the Vatican and a Conservative group in France under Bidault, which could be exploited by a purged Germany and in this way the basis created for a compromise. All this happened in 1944. 12. Krueger. [Bernhard] Krueger was a former member of the Dienststelle Ribbentrop, and Schellenberg believes that he was with Ribbentrop in the U.K. He was not a member of

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the SS but was a former Hamburg lawyer, about 37 years old, and had not been called up because he was blind in one eye. He had worked with Daufeldt in VI D, and one day came to Schellenberg with an offer to work for VI Wi, telling him that he hated Ribbentrop, which predisposed him in his favour. His suggestion was that he should work in a Czech sugar firm and use this concern to build up an I-Service with connections in Switzerland. Permission and approval were obtained from the Reichswirtschaftsministerium, but Schellenberg does not know whether the scheme was successful. He saw Krueger for the second time in 1944, when he visited him from Prague and told him that he had Swiss friends who could provide written proofs of Ribbentrop’s financial deals in Switzerland, but had made the condition that four Czechs who were in prison in Bratislava should be freed. Schellenberg approved of the deal and got in contact with the Stapostelle at Bratislava, who maintained that only one of the four was in the prison and agreed to release him. These negotiations took place in January/February 1945, and Schellenberg does not know the outcome. Krueger had meanwhile received a letter from a Swiss, a director of a firm engaged in the sugar business, suggesting a meeting in Bodensee [sic.]. Schellenberg approved of this meeting but did not hear from him again. Krueger spoke good English and was closely connected with Dietze, who worked in the Propagandaministerium. He was also a close friend of Steengracht of the Auswaertiges Amt, who had helped him and who sympathised with him in his dislike of Ribbentrop. 13. Koenen, Dr. An Amt VI representative in Tokyo. He was a young lawyer, aged about 32, who had gone to Japan in 1940 to study; he came from a pool of students provided by the SS Mannschaftshaeuser. In Japan where he held some nominal post in the Embassy he spent money and led an easy life. He produced no results of any kind and all attempts to make him do any real work for Amt VI failed. He had little or no contact with [Josef] Meisinger. 14. Matsu Endo, Lt. Col. Schellenberg believes that Matsu Endo worked for Ohletz and Freund in connection with the Mil. Amt. He never himself met him and does not believe him to have been important. 15. Mihailov, Ivan. This Bulgarian from Macedonia was the leader of the IMRO movement, and lived for many years as an emigré. His propaganda chief was Dr. Tsilev in Sofia. Kaltenbrunner and Wanneck [sic.] had made much ado about him and had overwhelmed him with money and commissions. It was planned:— 1) To raise a Macedonian Volunteer Corps to fight against the Greeks in the event of a German retreat. Two thousand men were equipped. 2) To make certain concessions to Bulgaria in Albania.

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3) To use Mihailov as a factor to maintain order and an instrument through which pressure could be exercised in that field of domestic policy. From the political aspect this plan was wholly contrary to the ideas of Kaltenbrunner, a friend of Dr. Neubacher. It led to endless friction, quarrels and difficulties with the Heeresgruppe Sud-Ost etc. From the Intelligence point of view the whole thing was worthless. It cost a great deal of money, and there was reason to assume that Ante Pavelic, the Poglavenik in Zagreb, in whose house Mihailov had lived for many years, received his share of the proceeds. It remained, however, a pet plan of the “Balkan specialists”. 16. Mihailovic, Drahas [sic.] There were numerous intelligence links with Mihailovic. The main lines led to the Ic of the Heeresgruppe Sud-Ost and to the staff of the Minister Dr. Neubacher, who had with him officers of the military I.S. (e.g. Kapitaen Dr. Lange, Dr. Haesker (?) and many others), as well as Hstuf. Dr. [Theodor] Wuehrer, the liaison officer of Gruppe VI E.Haesker even claims to have maintained his own W/T personnel at the headquarters of Mihailovic. Military and political opinion as to the importance of Mihailovic differed considerably, and sometimes the former prevailed and sometimes that of Neubacher. In addition an important role was played by the Commander of the Sipo and by the HSSuPF, who had views and contacts of their own. Schellenberg believes, however, that Neubacher had the best connections. Neubacher was of the firm opinion that he could enter into contact with the British regarding the solution of the Mihailovic questions. The whole issue became pressing in the course of the last months, because he intended to provide arms for about 40,000 volunteers of Mihailovic, in order to win his movement over to Germany and to use it as a fighting unit against Russia and Tito. This plan had failed repeatedly owing to the strong resistance of the Wehrmacht, which had no confidence in Mihailovic and his organisation, though it was increasingly inclined towards the opinion that he was pursuing not so much a pro-Communist as a pro-British policy. The Wehrmacht categorically refused to arm his troops, maintaining that it did not want to set up an adversary on its flank and in its rear. Dr. Wuehrer sent via Wanneck [sic.] numerous reports against Dr. Haesker, alleging that he was dishonest, had a firm financial hold over Neubacher and had used his own position in order to feather his own nest. He maintained that Haesker’s frequent trips to Switzerland ought to be watched. Schellenberg adds that it was a fact that when Haesker was in Switzerland in March incoming W/T messages could not be deciphered because he had not handed over the code. 17. Petrow, Rittmeister von (T. 100). A high grade professional intelligence agent who came from the Jahnke Bureau, with which Schellenberg believes he maintained his connection to the end. Prior to this he is alleged to have worked for many years for the Japanese Intelligence Service. Through a Jagdschuetz company [sic.] he had succeeded in obtaining direct contact with Heydrich and his Adjutant, a Major Pomme and received from that source a salary which continued

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to be paid to him even when he was with Knochen, under whom he worked in Paris for two or three years. Schellenberg had the impression that in Paris he lived well and led Knochen by the nose. He paid one visit to Spain on a mission for Knochen. Some time in 1941 he paid a visit to Rome, where he visited an old V-Mann who was alleged to have some connection with the American I.S. The Italian Police intervened and arrested this agent. An awkward situation then arose for Schellenberg, because the Amt VI representative in Rome, Dr. Groebel [sic.], was involved, and SD espionage in Italy had been forbidden by Hitler. Consequently Schellenberg sacked Groebel [sic.]. Petrow frequently visited Schellenberg bringing political information, the last occasion being in the late summer of 1944, shortly before he left for Switzerland, where he was going, after having first made various short visits, principally for reasons of his own safety. He was to undertake a mission for Kaltenbrunner, to whom he had been introduced by Scheidler and who for a long time told everybody that Petrow was working for him in Switzerland. From remarks which Scheidler accidentally let fall, Schellenberg gathered he must have had a large sum of money paid out to him for the execution of this mission. As he had no means of communication of his own from Switzerland to Germany, however, he relied in Switzerland on Daufeldt, who had to forward his post to Kaltenbrunner. Finally a directive was issued that a monthly salary of, Schellenberg believes, 3,000 Francs be paid to Petrow through this channel. Schellenberg does not know whether Scheidler himself ordered this salary direct, or whether the amount was later charged to Amt VI. To Steimle’s great regret, Daufeldt forwarded all Petrow’s letters direct to Kaltenbrunner. This resulted in a position where often quite unimportant, indeed frequently false or misleading reports from Petrow were immediately made use of by Kaltenbrunner, who was later unwilling for reasons of prestige, to issue an amended version. Finally Kaltenbrunner came rather seriously to grief over one of Petrow’s reports, and decided that if he returned he must be called severely to account. Petrow played off Kaltenbrunner and Schellenberg against each other. Formerly Petrow had brought quite good political reviews, but his reports from Switzerland latterly smacked of deception material. Schellenberg had the impression that he was a double agent (although possibly not a conscious one), but had no idea for whom he was primarily working, if for anyone. Whenever he was pressed about his sources and connections he became reticent. Schellenberg had repeatedly commissioned VI Z to make an investigation in Switzerland, but there was never any result. He had a wide circle of acquaintances, and his principal sources were mostly South American diplomats. A typical Petrow report was 25 pages long and was based on gossip heard in Switzerland or France. He possessed a Chilean passport and a very rich Jewish-Swiss mistress, Fastnacht, who lived on his estate near Berlin, and speaks French, German, Russian and probably Spanish. 18. Renau, Dr. Dr. Renau [Dr Rennau], a typical civil servant who had worked in Amt IV, first in the Grenzpolizei and then in Spionage-Abwehr, was seconded to assist Schellenberg in his negotiations with Count Bernadotte, after the former had asked Himmler to tell Kaltenbrunner to appoint an Amt IV man with full powers to arrange releases of prisoners which had been agreed with Bernadotte. Renau [sic.] was particularly helpful

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and co-operative throughout the negotiations and had established friendly relations with the Danish Minister, Dr. Waass. With his wife and daughter he escaped to Sweden in Schellenberg’s party, as a result of Bernadotte’s appreciation of his helpfulness. Mueller knew of his appointment, but had no further contact with him: he certainly did not know in advance of his official escape to Sweden. 19. Salgado, Plinio y and Albuquerque (Lisbon). Salgado’s co-operation with the G.I.S. was essentially political: he was to supply political intelligence from Brazil in return for assistance in his ambition to overthrow the existing government and become Head of State himself. Albuquerque, his secretary, on the other hand, worked for Nassenstein. His reports covered various fields and Schellenberg considers it likely that they included shipping information. He saw them both in Lisbon in 1941 or 1942. 20. Schwarz v.Berck. Schellenberg was introduced to Schwarz v.Berck by Steimle at the beginning of 1944, or possibly the end of 1943. Berck wished to further the co-operation between Amt VI and the Propagandaministerium, i.e. he wanted to receive political reports, as his Minister was continually complaining of the scanty information supplied by the Auswaertiges Amt. As at that time his stock stood very high with Goebbels on account of his political articles in the “Reich”, Schellenberg permitted Steimle to give him now and again several items of information direct at the Propagandaministerium, and not through the liaison officer of Amt VI. In return Goebbels was at last to cancel his refusal to allow foreign journalists to work for the I.S. Furthermore, the intelligence channels of Amt VI would be placed at the disposal of the Propagandaministerium for the launching of secret propaganda. (Here Schellenberg remarks that for anyone who knew the internal conditions the fact that the Propagandaministerium desired this form of collaboration was nothing but proof of the rivalry which existed between its Auslandsabtl. and the Kulturabt. of the Auswaertiges Amt.) Steimle’s co-operation with v. Berck did not last very long, nor was it very intensive; the latter showed too clearly that he required the information in the first instance for his journalistic articles. In the last half year, if not for longer, Steimle made no mention of the name to Schellenberg, who knows nothing of v.Berck’s journey to Spain, possibly on the orders of Amt VI: he cannot believe that Steimle would have instigated such a mission without informing him. He himself saw him only once, or at the most twice, after their initial meeting, and had done so in order to put a stop to the complaints which Goebbels was always making against Canaris and himself. He considers that v. Berck was never interesting from an intelligence point of view, and that only in the internal political game was he of a certain importance. He was a very close personal friend of Mueller, and in the last year was the advocate of a whispering campaign in Germany to the effect that an alliance with Russia and the formation of a Soviet Germany would be advantageous. He very skilfully explained away the danger of the above by saying that it was only to make an impression on the Western powers. In effect, however, this propaganda worked out in the main pro-Soviet.

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21. Sonnenhol. [Adolf] Sonnenhol was a Legationsrat in the Auswaertiges Amt and a member of the SS; as such, he worked for some considerable time for Amt VI in an honorary capacity. He was a personal friend of Steimle, who was able to recruit him for co-operation in a particularly binding form. Sonnenhol, who was concerned almost exclusively with Western affairs, was a connoisseur of the French situation, and as such very useful to Steimle. Therefore, when he went to Switzerland he made an agreement with Steimle that he would make him privy to his reports to the Auswaertiges Amt. In special cases, in which it seemed certain that they would not fall on very receptive ground in the Auswaertiges Amt he would give the reports only to him. Such more or less was the agreement according to Steimle, and Schellenberg believes that he once mentioned that he received both written and verbal reports from Sonnenhol. One day Schellenberg heard from Legationsrat Reichel (or Reichle) in the Auswaertiges Amt that Sonnenhol was sending very interesting reports from Switzerland, from where good links might be worked up with France, via government circles. Unfortunately these reports were all pigeon-holed in the Auswaertiges Amt, and it was said that nothing could come of them. One of the reasons for this was possibly that it appeared from them that in France, as in other foreign countries, further developments in the SS organisation were being followed with great interest, since in its position of power the SS might one day even dissolve the Party and attempt to make peace with the Western powers. Schellenberg informed Steimle of the position and asked him to get into contact personally with Reichel, whom he knew well and who might possibly be able to get this report for Amt VI; moreover, Schellenberg hinted that he was very displeased with Sonnenhol, and asked Steimle to tell him to come to Berlin, since he was particularly interested in these questions of high politics. Schellenberg also gave Reichel, who was going to Switzerland at that time with his tacit consent, the mission of ordering Sonnenhol to Berlin. Reichel, who had an especially good contact with the Swiss Embassy in Berlin and also knew leading Swiss industrialists, was in addition to endeavour to get into touch with English circles, since Schellenberg hoped, by the time he had established such contact, to have got so far as to be able to offer a cessation of hostilities by Germany. He heard no more from Reichel, however, nor did he have any further contact with Sonnenhol. 22. Turkul, Prince. Schellenberg last saw Prince [Anton] Turkul about the time the Vlassov Committee was formed. He did so at the instigation of Ohletz, the Abteilungschef of Mil. C, who was working on the Klatt [Kaunders] affair(see No. 9 above), of which Turkul was one of the chief figures. The object was to thank him personally for all he had done, thus encouraging him to continue to work despite the increasingly difficult political position, and to give him the opportunity he desired of discussing the Vlassov problem with Schellenberg. The conference, at which Turkul was accompanied by his Adjutant, was rather long and dealt in detail with the problem of Bolshevism. Turkul enumerated the mistakes made against the Russians, above all in the Occupied areas, and pointed out the changes in internal policy inaugurated by Stalin, i.e. the trend towards nationalism and the encouragement of religion. Vlassov, he maintained, had not followed these developments within Russia but, like the Russian P.O.W.’s in Germany, had remained

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true to the Bolshevistic creed of 1941. To this he convincingly traced back fundamental mistakes in the manifesto which Vlassov had proclaimed in Prague, viz. the failure to mention the Church question and the use of the phrase “The Russian peoples” instead of “Russia”: owing to these defects the Vlassov movement no longer had any influence in Russia, and thus did not fulfil the purpose for which it had been formed. He added that it was not necessary to start such a large movement and give Vlassov concessions in domestic politics (independent tribunals), which were not without danger, merely to influence the Russian P.O.W.’s in Germany. Turkul asked Schellenberg to submit his views to the right quarters and to try to arrange for him to be included in the joint action with a position of responsibility, preferably that of an independent divisional General with a seat on and a voice in the Committee. He further suggested that the old proved White Russian officers, who were fighting in closed formation in the Balkans, should be disbanded and ranged alongside the new divisions to be formed as security elements. In parts these ideas seemed sound to Schellenberg who promised him full support and in addition told him that he would be specially grateful if he would keep him posted concerning his views on the Vlassov affair. Turkul fully understood what he meant by that. Schellenberg informed Obergruf. Berger of his discussion, and the latter promised to consider all aspects in detail with his colleagues. Turkul expressed his opinions to Vlassov, both in Berlin and in Prague, with complete frankness, but they were unable to arrive at any real compromise between their divergent views. During the last months of the war Turkul lived either in Salzburg itself or in the neighbourhood, in quarters procured for him by Mil. C. After some considerable time had elapsed Schellenberg received a letter from him in which he asked for permission to form a division with all the Russians who had proved themselves loyal to him, in order to fight Bolshevism (which was apparently not yet dead!) to the bitter end. Schellenberg instructed Ohletz to reply with a polite gesture, and never heard anything further from him. 23. Tassigny, General de Lattre de. In February, 1945, an SS-Obergruppenfuehrer who had a command on the Upper Rhine front (possibly Hausser) sent a courier with a dispatch to Himmler, stating that two or three SS men had had contact with some French political representatives who had suggested that discussions could be arranged with General [Jean-Marie Gabriel] de Lattre de Tassigny with a view to the formation of a Western bloc. Himmler forwarded this despatch to Schellenberg for comment and action. The latter found out that the SS men concerned were in fact members of an SD Dienststelle near Loerrach on the SouthWestern part of the front and forwarded the despatch to Steimle with an angry covering note pointing out that it was typical of the disorganisation of Amt VI in the South that such despatches should reach the Amtschef by such indirect route. He received no answer from Steimle. Schellenberg remembers having heard the General’s name mentioned in the winter of 1944 as connected with some similar alleged peace negotiations. Bickler was in charge of the alleged liaison at this time.

Notes NOTES TO PREFACE 1. Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1961) takes the view that Germany’s foreign policy in World War I was aggressive and expansionist. The so-called Fischer thesis produced vicious attacks on its author and the question of Germany’s aims in World War I continues to be debated. Translation Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: W.W.Norton, 1967). 2. The ‘Historikerstreit’ put those who continued to be concerned with fascism and the holocaust against those who would rather deposit the Nazi era in the drawers of history and expect the rest of the world to do the same and accept Germany into the family of nations. The fierce battle in Germany over Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 1996) was probably not the final act of that conflict. 3. German intelligence records are in the holdings of the German Military Archive in Freiburg, the Political Archive of the German Foreign Office in Berlin, and the National Archives in College Park, MD. The destruction of certain German intelligence records at the end of World War II may be considered regrettable, but the remaining holdings have turned out to be quite sufficient to reconstruct most policies and events. 4. On Canaris we have at least two recommendable earlier studies: André Brissaud, Canaris: The Biography of Admiral Canaris (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974) and Heinz Höhne, Canaris: Patriot im Zwielicht (Munich: Bertelsmann, 1976). Both authors, however, were not able to see the later released intelligence records in Washington, DC/College Park, MD. 5. Walter Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London: André Deutsch, 1956); Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956). The American edition was later republished as Hitler’s Secret Service (New York: Pyramid, 1958). 6. Walter Schellenberg, Memoiren (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959). 7. Some of the material has surfaced in other archives. The more recently released intelligence records in the Public Record Office contain some of the documents. 8. (Transl.)—I was not very successful in my search for a greater number of untranslated interrogation texts from Camp 020 or the London War Room, but a close examination of the German interrogation texts from Nuremberg and the English translations showed few discrepancies. Generally, Schellenberg’s responses to questions in German sound slightly more forward or colloquially blunt than in the English translations. 9. For a highly interesting, if somewhat general British review of German intelligence in World War II see ‘The German Intelligence Service and the War’, marked Top Secret, PRO, CAB 154/105. The top sheet is initialled ‘HRTR 1945’. I am grateful to Ralph Erskine who first pointed out to me this PRO document. Lord Dacre confirmed that the initials are his (Hugh R.Trevor-Roper) and that the handwritten comments in the text are most probably from him. I have since located a copy of the same document in NA, RG 319, IRR, IS, Box 5, but the title sheet is missing and the conclusions of the report are not included. 10. Aside from an obvious specific British interest in such events as the Venlo Incident or the German plans for Edward VIII, indications are that the interrogations were quite thorough and that the ‘Final Report’ represents a realistic and correct summary of the interrogations. In this context I was able to check the handwritten comments by an American intelligence

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officer (or Robert M.W.Kempner?) in a copy of the ‘Final Report’ in the OSS records. NA, RG 226, E 171, Box 10.

NOTES TO PART I 1. Attorneys and defence-counsels for Walter Schellenberg, Dr. Fritz Riediger and Kurt Mintzel to the Judge Advocate General, EUCOM, Heidelberg, Nuremberg 18 May 1949, National Archives, College Park, MD (NA), RG 466, Entry (E) 53, Box 30. 2. The 21 defendants were Gottlob Berger, Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, Richard Walther Darré, Otto Dietrich, Otto von Erdmannsdorf, Hans Kehrl, Wilhelm Keppler, Paul Koerner, Hans Heinrich Lammers, Otto Meissner, Paul Pleiger, Emil Puhl, Karl Rasche, Karl Ritter, Walter Schellenberg, Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk, Gustav Adolf Steengracht von Moyland, Wilhelm Stuckart, Edmund Veesenmayer, Ernst von Weizsaecker and Ernst Woermann [all sic.]. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10. Nuernberg October 1946–April 1949. Volume XII. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.), pp. 1, 9–12. 3. Ibid., p. 2. 4. Major Harry A.Richards to Commanding General, Headquarter European Command, Nuremberg Headquarters Justice Prison, 26 May 1949, NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. 5. ‘Preliminary Report on External Assets of Walter Schellenberg’ by E.E.Minskoff, Chief, Individuals, External Assets Branch, NA, RG 407 (formerly RG 94), E 368, Box 1044. 6. Schellenberg’s father was Guido Franz Bernhard Schellenberg, born 30 October 1867, in Metz. According to ‘Nazi Party membership Records Luxembourg’, NA, RG 319, IRR-IS, Box 11, the ‘music dealer’ Guido Schellenberg entered the Nazi party on 1 December 1937 and was given the membership number 4789597. See also ‘SS-Ahnentafel von Schellenberg, Friedrich, Walter’, Berlin Document Center (BDC), Microfilm, NA. At the end of the 1920s Schellenberg Senior owned the Hof-Pianoforte- und Musikalienhandlung B.Schellenberg in Saarbrücken. There were affiliate stores in Luxembourg. At least two of Walter Schellenberg’s brothers took over the family business. Georg Wenzel, ed., Deutscher Wirtschaftsführer (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1929), p. 1939. 7. In Schellenberg’s own words:

‘Lebenslauf. Am 16.1.1910 wurde ich als siebtes Kind des Klavierfabrikanten Guido Schellenberg und seiner Ehefrau Lydia geb. Riedel zu Saarbrücken geboren. Mit sechs Jahren begann meine Schulausbildung. Ich besuchte 4 Jahre die Volksschule u. 9 Jahre lang die Oberrealschule in Saarbrücken. Im Jahre 1929 bestand ich das Abiturientenexamen. AnschlieBend studierte ich 5 Semester Rechts- u. Staatswissenschaften in Marburg a./L. Zu Beginn des 1. Semesters trat ich in das Corps Guestphalia ein. Weitere 3 Semester studierte ich in Bonn. Am 18.3.1933 bestand ich am Oberlandesgericht in Düsseldorf das Referendarexamen. Im März 1933 trat ich in die SS u. im April in die Partei ein. Meine Referendarausbildung erhielt ich am Amtsgericht in Sinzig a./Ahr, am Land. u. Amtsgericht sowie bei der Staatsanwaltschaft in Bonn, bei der Staatspolizeistelle Frankfurt a/M, dem Geheimen-Staatspolizeiamt u. beim Oberlandesgericht in Düsseldorf. Am 8. XII. 1936 bestand ich die groBe juristische Staatsprüfung mit ‘befriedigend’. BDC, Microfilm, NA.

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8. While Schellenberg, in his handwritten curriculum vitae, gives March 1933 as the date for his entry into the SS, the typed career sheet in the same personnel file has 1 April 1933, as the date for his becoming an ‘SS-Anwärter’ (candidate) and 10 January 1934, as the date for his becoming an ‘SS-Mann’ (SS man, i.e. fullfledged member). BDC, Microfilm, NA. 9. Walter Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs. Edited and translated by Louis Hagen. Introduction by Alan Bullock (London: André Deutsch, 1956), p. 21. The later German edition of Walter Schellenberg, Memoiren. Herausgegeben von Gita Petersen (Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959) offers quite a different text, but the content is very similar. Concerning the ‘higher level’ reputation of the SS cf. Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head (New York: Ballantine, 1989, 1st edn. 1966), pp. 150–1. 10. ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography, compiled during his stay in Stockholm, June 1945’, NA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, Field Station Files. This document, formerly secret and now declassified, is a copy produced from another copy of a translation in the War Room in London on 14 August 1945. Thirty-five pages of the same document are now available in Public Record Office, Kew/London (PRO), KV 2/97. 11. See below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘Early Life’. Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, p. 243. Albert in 1933 apparently maintained an SD office in Frankfurt. He had joined the SS in 1932 and headed the so-called Group West (Gruppe West) which stretched all the way into the Saar region. George C.Browder, ‘Die Anfänge des SD: Dokumente aus der Organisationsgeschichte des Sicherheitsdienstes des Reichsführers SS’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1979), p. 303. ‘Preliminary Report on External Assets of Walter Schellenberg’, by E.E.Minskoff, NA, RG 407 (formerly RG 94), E 368, Box 1044. 12. Cf. below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, ‘Early Life’. Here the impression is given that Schellenberg was to take over the law practice of the family friend. According to other sources, the Düsseldorf lawyer, who wanted Schellenberg to take over his law office, was ‘ein älterer Bundesbruder’ (an ‘old boy’ of his fraternity). Statement under oath by Heinz Amthor, fellow SD-officer of Schellenberg, Staatsarchiv Nuremberg (SAN), Rep 501, S-3. Cf. Schellenberg interrogation, SAN, S-45c, where ‘Justizrat Bartholomaeus in Düsseldorf’ is named. 13. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 28. 14. ‘Walter Schellenberg’, US Army Military History Institute, Department of the Army, Carlisle Barracks, PA, (USAMHI), The William J.Donovan Papers, Box 87B: ‘In Berlin during 1937 I worked again on questions on Reich Reform and on legal subjects such as the relationship of the promotion and pension rights of the SS to the civil service rights, the relationship of the SS to the armed forces etc.’ 15. Interrogation Report No. 15, 9 July 1945, Secret, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 617. 16. Heinrich Mueller, born 1900 in Munich, was last seen in Berlin during the final days of the war. It had been thought that he had perished, but his supposed grave was opened and its contents were said not to have been the remains of Mueller. It has been suggested that he went to the USSR, but there has been no reliable evidence as to his whereabouts after World War II. Cf. Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Heinrich Himmler (London: Heinemann, 1965), pp. 157, 266. Cf. ‘Müller’, Der Spiegel, Vol. 21, No. 48 (20 November 1967), p. 148. 17. Allied intelligence in December 1944 reported that Department IV E then had a number of subsections concerned with frontier controls and counter-espionage activities in different parts of the world. ‘Revision Notes No. 2 on The German Intelligence Services’, 25 December 1944, Top Secret, NA, RG 319, IRR-IS, Box 5. 18. Hoettl during interrogation: ‘…as far as his [Schellenberg’s] personal life is concerned, he was utterly beyond reproach. His manner of life was almost that of an ascetic. He neither drank nor smoked, and worked twenty hours straight for days on end.’ Interrogation Report No. 15, 9 July 1945, Secret, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 617.

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19. Walter Schellenberg, ‘Reorganisation des Sicherheitsdienstes des Reichsfuehrers SS im Hinblick auf eine organisatorische und personelle Angleichung mit der Sicherheitspolizei’, 24 February 1939, Bundesarchiv Berlin (BAB), R58/826. 20. The Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA) was officially created or named in the autumn of 1939, but its organisational antecedents are the Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei and other previously existing offices. Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, has been able to put together better than most others the pieces of the structural puzzle. 21. The more general question of Schellenberg at times being or acting as ‘deputy to Mueller, chief of Amt IV, was brought up by the prosecution in Nuremberg, but, fortunately for Schellenberg, the court found that ‘the record discloses that Mueller had no regular deputy’. US Military Tribunals, Nuremberg, Case 11, NA, RG 466, E 55, Box 6. Text published in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 14 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 666. 22. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 22–4. Here on p. 23: ‘It was June 30, 1934.’ Cf. Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 29. ‘It was the 29th of June 1934’ (Transl.) H.B.Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (Hamburg: Claassen & Goverts, 1947), pp. 246–7: ‘The 30th of June produces the first visible catastrophy of the politician Adolf Hitler, the power-political resignation of the army is introduced and followed by the inevitable elimination of the middle class.’ (Transl.) 23. For the social revolutionary content of National Socialism see the still significant study by David Schoenbaum, Hitler’s Social Revolution (Garden City: Doubleday, 1967, 1st edn 1966). 24. For detail see Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 106–44. The exact date of death is given as 1 July by Höhne, as 2 July by Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Heinrich Himmler, p. 44. Cf. Henry A.Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (London: Bloomsbury, 1996), pp. 67–8. 25. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 24. 26. Much of Schellenberg’s earlier work seems to have been in connection with spying or informing on individuals. If his memoirs are to be believed, he received his instructions from a professor of surgery at the university in Bonn who served as a go-between for the head office of the SD in Berlin. Ibid. Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 29–30. 27. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 25. In the German edition Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 31, we are told that he completed this intelligence assignment ‘apparently satisfactorily’. (Transl.) 28. See below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’. Schellenberg later recalled that he may have saved Himmler’s life by pulling him from the unsecured door of the plane. Himmler had been leaning against it during the flight to Vienna and after the incident said to Schellenberg that he’d be pleased to make good for it some day. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 51. 29. Ibid., pp. 50–2. 30. Jacques Delarue, The Gestapo (New York: Paragon House, 1987, 1st edn Paris, 1962), pp. 163–4. André Brissaud, The SD Story (Zürich: Neue Diana Press, 1975), pp. 187–8. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 50–1. Cf. Major Helmuth Groscurth to Lieutenant Oster, 1 November 1938, in Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers 1938–1940 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970), pp. 355–6. 31. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 52. 32. Sir Nevile Henderson, Failure of a Mission (New York: G.P.Putnam’s Sons, 1940), p. 127. 33. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 52–3. Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 54–5. 34. For details of the murder, committed by Otto Planetta and others, see Gerhard L.Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 101–4. Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 53 (Transl.).

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35. ‘Beförderungsvorschlag’ from SS-Oberführer Wilhelm Albert to the Chief of the Sicherheitshauptamt Berlin, 7 July 1938. ‘Dienstlaufbahn’, entry 10 for 1 August 1938. BDC, Microfilm, NA. 36. F.H.Hinsley and others, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 1 (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1979), pp. 47–8, states that ‘Group Captain M G Christie…was not as has been claimed, employed by the SIS.’ Christie had served as Air Attaché in Berlin, but ‘was now a private citizen’. According to Christopher Andrew, Secret Service (London: Heinemann, 1985), pp. 382–3, Group Captain Malcolm Christie, MC, DSO, was Germaneducated, had served as a pilot in World War I and had been Air Attaché in Berlin from 1927 to 1930. He had ‘a house on the Dutch-German border which he used as base for his undercover work’. Christie was well introduced into Nazi society and had contacts with Hermann Göring and Erhard Milch. 37. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 55. The German memoirs offer the same information. 38. Ibid., pp. 56–7. Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 58. 39. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 68–78. 40. Ibid., pp. 78–81. Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 76–8. 41. One of the most significant detractors to this day remains Lord Dacre who once wrote of him: ‘Among the universally parochial minds of the S.S., Schellenberg, its youngest general, enjoyed an undeserved reputation.’ H.R.Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (London: Macmillan, 1947), p. 27. 42. For instance Dr. Herbert Mehlhorn, a fellow SS leader somewhat his senior and for a time one of his chiefs in the SD Hauptamt. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 68. 43. Andrew, Secret Service, p. 434. See the very general and short description under the heading ‘1939 Nov The Venlo Incident’. 44. For instance John A.Waller, The Unseen War in Europe (New York: Random House, 1996), pp. 105–6: ‘Following the German invasion of Poland… Chamberlain had become desperate to find some formula for peace… Britain was vulnerable to epic trickery. Enter the consummate intriguer Walter Schellenberg of the SD with an imaginative deception operation.’ Günther Deschner, Reinhard Heydrich (Esslingen: Bechtle, 1977), p. 157. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 82. 45. S.Payne Best, The Venlo Incident (London: Hutchinson, 1950), p. 7. 46. Anthony Read and David Fisher, Colonel Z (New York: Viking, 1985), pp. 201–29. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 380–2. 47. Best, The Venlo Incident, p. 7. Callum A.MacDonald, ‘The Venlo Affair’, European Studies Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1978), p. 446. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 82–3. 48. Lieutenant Walter Schulze-Bernett, with the Abwehr since 1935, in 1973 in an article ‘Der Grenzzwischenfall bei Venlo/Holland’ for Die Nachhut, Nos. 23/24 (15 May 1973), a kind of newsletter for former Abwehr members, wrote that Johannes Travaglio was with Abwehr I/Luft at the time (p. 1). Various sources also spell the name Traviglio. Cf. MacDonald, ‘The Venlo Affair’, pp. 446–7. In ‘It Happened Here: The Venlo Incident’, After the Battle, No. 11 (1976), p. 35, only ‘a Luftwaffe officer Major Solms’ is mentioned. 49. MacDonald, ‘The Venlo Affair’, p. 448. 50. Ibid. 51. Ulrich Schlie, Kein Friede mit Deutschland (Munich: Langen Müller/Herbig, 1994), pp. 102–4. 52. MacDonald, ‘The Venlo Affair’, pp. 451–2, writes of a meeting on 20 October 1939, in Dinxperlo, Holland, and claims (pp. 462–3) that the meeting at Zutphen, Holland, on 21 October 1939, described in some detail in Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 94– 6, may not have taken place: ‘Schellenberg is obviously confusing his own activities with those of Salisch and Christensen’ Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, p. 323, accepts Schellenberg’s memoirs and the date of 21 October 1939.

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53. Schulze-Bernett, ‘Der Grenzzwischenfall bei Venlo/Holland’, p. 3, reports that this meeting took place in Dinxperlo on 19 October 1939. As participants he identifies a Captain von Seydewitz or Seidlitz who, in fact, was the SS Sturmbannführer von Salisch, a Lieutenant Grosch (cover name for another SS man), Mr Franz Fischer, Major Stevens, Captain Best and the Dutch Lieutenant Dirk Klop. 54. According to Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 85, ‘Lieutenant Coppens’ attended the Arnhem meeting on 21 October. According to MacDonald, ‘The Venlo Affair’, p. 452, Coppens was none other than Lieutenant Klop, a Dutch officer assigned to accompany the British intelligence men. Schulze-Bernett, ‘Der Grenzzwischenfall bei Venlo/Holland’, p. 3, refers to Klop’s cover name as ‘Captain Copper’. SSHauptsturmführer Bernhard Christensen later claimed that the kidnapping was decided after the British agents tried to back out of a meeting on 9 November to be held in Düsseldorf. Testimony of SS-Hauptsturmführer Walther Mueller, 17 January 1948, SAN, NG 4690. 55. Schellenberg’s cover name, in the respective sources and publications, is given as Schemmel or Schaemmel. Even the English and German editions of the Schellenberg memoirs offer different spellings. 56. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 86, speaks of ‘my best friend, Professor Max de Crinis, of Berlin University, and Director of the Psychiatric Department of the famous Charité Hospital’. 57. Ibid., p. 90. 58. Ibid., p. 91. 59. Andrew, Secret Service, pp. 436–7. 60. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol. 1, p. 57. 61. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 91–3, gives 7 November and the afternoon of 8 November. 62. Ibid., pp. 91–5. Schellenberg’s report of a conversation late on 8 November, causes one to wonder whether the kidnapping was not planned prior to the assassination attempt in Munich. While Schellenberg does not divulge the name of the SS leader he talked to, it would seem more than likely that it was Alfred Naujocks. It was Naujocks who led the illegal charge across the Dutch-German border at Venlo the next day. MacDonald, ‘The Venlo Affair’, p. 457, in fact, clearly states that ‘at some stage between 5 and 7 October, Heydrich issued orders for the kidnapping of Best and Stevens’. 63. Published accounts of historical interest include the personal view of Walter Schellenberg in Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 82–110; the equally personal memoirs of Captain S.Payne Best, The Venlo Incident; ‘The Venlo Incident’, After the Battle, No. 11 (1976); MacDonald, ‘The Venlo Affair’; Anthony Read and David Fisher, Colonel Z (New York: Viking, 1985); and Schulze-Bernett, ‘Der Grenzzwischenfall bei Venlo/Holland’. On the basis of the documentary evidence I am unable to agree with Peter Padfield’s view: ‘Debate continues about the real purpose of the “Venlo-Incident”—since Schellenberg was a compulsive liar and his post-war account is patently false’, as expressed in his Hess (London: Papermac/Macmillan, 1993), p. 111. Incidentally, we are fortunate to have not one but two accounts from Schellenberg, namely his memoirs published posthumously and evidently at least partially edited by other persons and secondly his testimony under oath at Nuremberg. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 12 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, n.d.), pp. 1232–41. 64. Jan Frederik Lemmens was Best’s chauffeur. Following interrogations in Germany he was released and became a member of the Dutch resistance. Read and Fisher, Colonel Z, pp. 220–1, 225. 65. Dr Walter Behrends, stationed at the ‘evangelical hospital’ in Düsseldorf, examined a seriously wounded man without papers but dressed in a Dutch (label) coat. In December 1939 Behrends was called to Berlin and there ordered by Schellenberg not to talk about the

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incident. When interrogated on 6 February 1948, Behrends seemed to think that the patient who died the same evening in the constant presence of police was Dirk Klop. SAN, NG4671. 66. Andrew, Secret Service, p. 439. 67. The sources differ on whether Schellenberg participated in the interrogations. According to ‘Information obtained from Schellenberg on the Venlo Incident’, Top Secret, PRO, KV 2/98, he did not interrogate but merely read all interrogation reports. According to a report dated 20 August 1945, Camp 020, Secret, PRO, KV 2/97, ‘Schellenberg denied the use of drugs during the interrogations. He stated that he himself interrogated Best and Stevens in German on some four or five occasions, but their chief interrogators were Dr. Schambacher and Dr. Klemens.’ 68. ‘Information obtained from Schellenberg on the Venlo Incident’, Top Secret, PRO, KV 2/98. Cf. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 12, pp. 1238–9. 69. Lord Dacre is quoted without source in Read and Fisher, Colonel Z, pp. 222–3. 70. Schellenberg during testimony in Nuremberg:

I should like to say that the German intention of attacking the West by violating the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands, was an accepted fact at the time, and that anything which might have established the cooperation of the British and Dutch intelligence services could be of no significance for the carrying out of these actions, because Hitler…stated in his speech that the neutrality of Belgium and Holland was without any significance for him whatsoever. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 12, p. 1241.

For a clear picture of Germany’s expansive determination at this point see Gerhard L.Weinberg, A World at Arms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 92–5. 71. Cf. Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide (London: The Bodley Head, 1991), p. 82. 72. See below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, sections ‘1939 Nov Divorce’ and ‘1939 Nov Work with Gruppe IV E’. For the award ceremony with Adolf Hitler presenting the medals, see Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 101. 73. The two months with the OKW were given to him as a compensation for the active front service he had asked for. ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘Request for active service’. 74. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 121–2:

Another device which did great damage was a small and apparently innocuous pamphlet… Printed in French and described as being the prophecies of Nostradamus—many of whose prophecies were actually included—the pamphlet predicted terrible destruction from “flying fire-machines”. 75. Cf. in this context the ‘Publishers’ Note’ in Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 127, emphasizing that all such reports, as reprinted in the Schellenberg memoirs, are to be considered ‘wholly without foundation’. Waller, The Unseen War in Europe, p. 168.

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76. Cf. Gwynne Thomas, King Pawn or Black Knight? (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1995), p. 211: ‘Hitler was driven by the idea of returning the Duke of Windsor to the throne’. C.Amort, I.M.Jedlicka, On l’appelait A-54 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1966), p. 130. Bernd Martin, Friedensinitiativen und Machtpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg 1939–1942 (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1974), p. 322. Erich Kordt, Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1947), p. 82. 77. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 129–30. 78. Testimony of Schellenberg, Nuremberg, 10 and 14 January 1946, NA, RG 238, E 7A, Box 18. 79. Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich (IFZ), ED 90/6. (Transl.) The second sentence does not appear in either the German or the British editions of the memoirs. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 139. 80. IFZ, ED 90/6. Cf. slightly more urgent Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 139. 81. Ibid., p. 141. 82. IFZ, ED 90/6. In Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 143, the comment about the promotion has been dropped.—What became of papers in Germany relating to Edward VIII is a question periodically cropping up in the respective literature. In most versions of the recovery of such papers Anthony Blunt plays some part. Cf. Anthony Cave Brown, ‘C’ (New York: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 682–3. Barrie Penrose, Simon Freeman, Conspiracy of Silence (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1987), pp. 297–8. John Costello, Mask of Treachery (London: Pan, 1989), ch. 16. 83. Sean Russell has been treated repeatedly in the respective literature on Ireland, the IRA and World War II. For Ryan see especially Sean Cronin, Frank Ryan (Dublin: Repsol, 1980). 84. R.M.Smyllie, ‘Unneutral Neutral Eire’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2 (January 1946), p. 322: ‘[de Valera] took the view that it was the Government’s duty to steer an even course between the Scylla of the old “Ascendany” and the Charybdis of the I.R.A.’ 85. Cf. reported interview of Major General Erwin Lahousen, late 1945, in Nuremberg, unidentified Irish newspaper clipping, Military Archives, Dublin: ‘The second part [of ‘Operation Dove’] provided for collaboration with the I.R.A. and to lay the political groundwork for an uprising in Ireland, that was to take place simultaneously with the planned invasion of Britain.’ Also clipping, Irish Times, 15 December 1945. On Ribbentrop’s reaction to Edward VIII giving up the throne, see John Weitz, Hitler’s Diplomat (London: Phoenix, 1997, 1st edn 1992), pp. 118–19. Concerning Ribbentrop’s feelings about England cf. Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (London: Transworld/Bantam, 1992), p. 286. 86. John R Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1989, 1st edn 1975), p. 80. Veesenmayer, born 1904 in Bad Kissingen, only joined the Foreign Office in March 1944 as the Nazi representative for Hungary. He was tried and sentenced (to 20 years) with Schellenberg in the Wilhelmstrasse Case in Nuremberg. According to Theo Tschuy, Dangerous Diplomacy (Grand Rapids/ Cambridge: William B.Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 215–17, Veesenmayer was released in 1954, ‘returned to his wholesale perfume business and became a rich and well-respected citizen of Cologne’. Auswärtiges Amt Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 522. Sentence, 14 April 1949, Count IV, Case XI, NA, RG 466, E 55, Box 8. Cf. below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘1941 spring’ where the interrogators have gained the impression that Schellenberg did not see Heydrich ‘for several months’ after the unsuccessful assignment in Spain. 87. Peter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957) in spite of newer publications remains a very relevant study of ‘the projected invasion of England in 1940’ (title page). For the German intentions in Ireland see the well-balanced study of Robert Fisk, In Time of War (London: André Deutsch, 1983), especially chapter 7. 88. The Irish feared both a German and a British invasion. The Germans did not wish to provide an inducement for the British to invade Ireland. Cf. Weizsäcker to Hempel, 24 June 1940,

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cited by Horst Dickel, Die deutsche Aussenpolitik und die irische Frage von 1932 bis 1944 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983), p. 123. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich, p. 105. 89. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 124. The Black Book (Sonderfahndungsliste G.B.), ‘Introduction’ by Terry Charman (London: Imperial War Museum, 1989). See also Walter Schellenberg, Invasion 1940: The Nazi Invasion Plan for Britain, ‘Introduction’ by John Erikson (London: St Ermin’s Press, 2001). Although Schellenberg is named as the author on the title page of this publication, the ‘Introduction’ contains no information concerning the authorship. Nigel West (Rupert Allason) in his ‘Preface’, however, correctly states: ‘Precisely who wrote the whole of this report remains unclear to this day’ The publication offers an English translation of the handbook, but the lists of offices, firms, newspapers, associations and the like compiled by Schellenberg’s staff have been omitted. They are fortunately included in Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. published by the Imperial War Museum. Cf. Nigel West, MI5 (New York: Stein and Day, 1982), pp. 104–5. 90. Egbert Kieser, Hitler on the Doorstep (London: Arms and Armour, 1997, 1st edn 1987), p. 251. Rudolf Ströbinger, A-54 (Munich: List, 1965/66), p. 168, states that it was Six who prepared the Sonderfahndungsliste G.B. 91. C.Amort and I.M.Jedlicka, The Canaris File (London: Allan Wingate, 1970, 1st edn 1966), pp. 84–6. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 125. 92. Concerning difficulties related to marrying his partially Polish second wife see below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘1940 Oct 10th. Remarriage’. 93. IFZ, ED 90/6. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 184. 94. On Otto Strasser’s often confused ideas see Kurt Singer, ‘Einstein And The German Don Quixote Otto Strasser’, Aufbau, Vol. 65, No. 4, (19 February 1999), pp. 11–12. Also Patrick Moreau, ‘Otto Strasser-Nationaler Sozialismus versus Nationalsozialismus’, Ronald Smelser and Rainer Zitelmann, (eds), Die Braune Elite I (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994), pp. 286–98. 95. The British Government has yet to release documents related to the flight. On the intelligence aspects of the flight cf. John Costello, Ten Days That Saved the West (London: Bantam, 1991), p. 139. Research so far has not discovered reliable evidence linking Jahnke to the Hess flight. 96. Occasional hints from this investigation have not helped to clarify matters. Cf. Rainer F.Schmidt, Rudolf Hess (Munich: Econ Ullstein List, 2000), p. 147. 97. IFZ, ED 90/6. (Transl.) Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 202. Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 161. 98. Heinz Jost, born 1904, studied Law and was a lawyer prior to becoming police director in Worms and Giessen, joined the NSDAP in 1928 and the SA in 1932. Changed to the SS in 1934. SAN, Rep. 502, J37. Cf. Friedrich Wilhelm, Die Polizei im NS-Staat (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997), p. 125. 99. ‘Source: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl, chief referent Group VI E’, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 617. See below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘Dismissal of Jost’. Heinz Jost later became commander of Einsatzgruppe A, succeeding Walter Stahlecker. 100. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 234. It is surprising that Schellenberg appears to have been disturbed by signs of corruption which seem petty when compared with the personal enrichment of Germany’s traditional army generals. Cf. N.J.W.Goda, ‘Black Marks: Hitler’s Bribery of his Senior Officers during World War II’, Journal of Modern History, 72 (2), (2000), pp. 413–52. 101. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 237–40. 102. Cf. ‘Source: SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Wilhelm Hoettl’, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 617. 103. Wilhelm Canaris, born 1887 in Aplerbeck, Westphalia, joined the Imperial German Navy in 1905 and had intelligence assignments during World War I. He was a young officer on the

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German cruiser Dresden in 1914 when the Kaiser decided to side with the Mexican dictator Victoriano Huerta who soon fled from his country—on board the Dresden. 104. Protection should not be confused with friendship or a master-pupil relationship. Wilhelm Waneck during interrogation made this very clear. Statement under oath, 21 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-3. 105. ‘Unconditional surrender’ was officially announced as an Allied policy at Casablanca in January 1943, but in fact had been adopted much earlier as a consequence of persecutions and atrocities committed by the Germans. Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 433, 438. 106. Among the informative studies are Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz (Frauenfeld: Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitschrift/Huber, 1982); Pierre-Th. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1990, 1st edn 1989); Edgar Bonjour, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität, Vols 4–5 (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1970); Jon Kimche, Spying for Peace (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961). Cf. below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, ‘Appendix XII: Schellenberg’s Relations with the Swiss Intelligence Service’. 107. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, pp. 74–5. 108. Hans-Christian Daufeldt, born 1908 in Kappeln, studied Economics at Kiel, joined the NSDAP in 1932, attended an SS police school, and eventually ended up with the Reichssicherheitshauptamt. His study of English in Germany and studies in London 1936–37 supposedly led to a good knowledge of English and made him useful for Department VI. After relatively unsuccessful tours of duty in Hamburg and Scandinavia, he was collecting information on the United States and in that context took Karl von Wiegand on a trip through Germany. His assignment in Switzerland was under the cover of consular work in Geneva and Lausanne. The OSS opinion of Daufeldt was: ‘It is felt that the subject is a low caliber agent of the RSHA… His only desire throughout his career seems to have been a desire for luxurious living with a minimum of work… His rank of Obersturmbannfuehrer is a result of long service in the SS and not in line with his abilities.’ Albert M.Grant, SCI, Munich, to CO X-2 Germany, 26 July 1945, NA, RG 226, E 108A, Box 287. Schellenberg examination, Nuremberg, 13 December 1946, SAN, S-45b: ‘Daufeldt was the biggest failure I know.’ (Transl.) 109. About Oberstbrigadier Roger Masson and his line to Schellenberg, as well as the other involved persons, see especially Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin and Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz. Hans Wilhelm Eggen, born 1912 in Wennigsen near Hannover, studied Law in Tübingen and Berlin and joined NSDAP and SS in 1933. His business, real and cover, was the Warenvertriebs GmbH, and besides dealing in wooden huts, as later recounted in Nuremberg, he had other business interests, some involving arms. With Dr. Paul Meyer he organised a trading firm Interkommerz AG. Statement by Hans Wilhelm Eggen, 7 July 1948, SAN, NG 5498. Ibid., p. 79. 110. About the discussion on how information moved along the line cf. Schellenberg examination, Nuremberg, 13 December 1946, SAN, S-45b. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, pp. 27–8. See also Paul E.Meyer’s statement under oath, Zürich, 10 May 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. 111. Much of the aggressive noise was created by Internationale Presse-Agentur (IPA) which distributed Nazi views in Switzerland and elsewhere. After first steps by Eggen, Schellenberg succeeded in silencing the operation. Cf. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, pp. 202–3. 112. Cf. Waller, The Unseen War in Europe, p. 305, on the role of Hans Bernd Gisevius in Switzerland and British concerns that the Germans might attempt a repeat performance of Venlo. Also Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 370–1. 113. See opening statement of defense before the Military Tribunal, Case 11, SAN, Rep. 501, S2. 114. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 372.

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115. Masson has been criticized and investigated and various attempts have been made to malign his view of events and his motivations. Christopher Andrew’s enticing news that ‘the Z organisation’s most valuable source in Switzerland was probably Dansey’s friend, Colonel Roger Masson, the Swiss intelligence chief’ should tempt historians to give Masson a second look. Secret Service, p. 381. 116. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, pp. 315–17, demonstrates that Masson was interested in an intelligence line to Germany already prior to the capture of the Charité documents. 117. For a detailed report on the meetings with Masson from Schellenberg’s perspective see ‘Translation of Schellenberg’s Report-96a’, PRO, KV 2/98. This report emphasizes Ribbentrop’s opposition to Schellenberg’s attempts ‘to produce a binding German pledge, that Swiss territory would never be violated’. In contrast, according to Schellenberg, Heinrich Himmler had signalled his support of assurances to Switzerland. 118. Statement under oath, Colonel-Brigadier R.Masson, 10 May 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. On Vanaman see also A.Read and D.Fisher, The Fall of Berlin (New York: Da Capo, 1995, 1st edn 1992), pp. 289–90 (without naming sources). Masson lists ten particular services Schellenberg delivered for Switzerland and the Allies: Suppression of the IPA; visas for various Swiss; [item 3 is missing here]; liberation of a Swiss named M.Cramer from prison in Fresnes; liberation of a number of American and British officers, such as the American Army Air Force General Arthur W.Vanaman, and their delivery to Switzerland; removal from the Legation in Bern to Spain of Ernst Sigismund Freiherr von Bibra who was seeen as an enemy of Switzerland; prevention of the worst in the Duebendorf case (possible German military intervention in relation to German plane landed there); liberation of 13 persons of the family of General Henri Giraud; liberation of various personalities, such as ‘president [Edouard] Herriot’, Paul Reynaud and ‘600 femmes françaises detenues au camp de Ravensbrueck’; and prevention of German preventive (military) actions against Switzerland. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, p. 325, reports that shortly after Schellenberg’s death in 1952 Masson was visited by a priest who had attended to Schellenberg. Referring to the confidential nature of confessions, the priest said he knew ‘what Schellenberg had all done for Switzerland’. (Transl.) As Braunschweig correctly surmises, the full scope of Schellenberg’s motivations will probably remain a matter of conjecture. 119. Colonel Chas. E.Rayens, Assistant Military Attaché to Major General Clayton Bissell, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Stockholm, 30 May 1945, PRO, KV 2/94. Colonel Edward M.Fickett to Assistant Chief of Staff, 8 January 1946, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195. 120. According to Henry Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), p. 47, Germany nevertheless always considered an Allied attack in Scandinavia a probability and kept troop contingents in reserve for such an eventuality. 121. Alexandra M.Kollontay had been both a Bolshevist revolutionary and a feminist. Politically she had stayed a Germanophobe even during the years of Soviet-German rapprochement. One of her counsellors, Vladimir S.Semyonov, attended to most matters concerning relations with Germany. Her memoirs Ich habe viele Leben gehabt…(Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1980) offer no information on her tour of duty in Sweden. Isabel de Palencia, Alexandra Kollontay (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1947) is a biography lacking most of the international context. Vojtech Mastny, ‘Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II’, American Historical Review, Vol. 77, No. 5 (December, 1972), p. 1371. 122. Otto Köcher, born 1884 in the Alsace, was sent to Bern in 1937 where he served as Minister until the end of the war. Auswärtiges Amt, Sonderdruck zu den Serien A bis E, p. 462. His Legation became the switchboard for numerous often uncoordinated intelligence operations. Willi Gautschi, General Henri Guisan (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1989), p. 514, correctly underlines the competitive activities of Abwehr, Schellenberg’s Amt VI and the Gestapo.

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123. The German Ambassador to the United States, Hans-Heinrich Dieckhoff, served from May 1937 to November 1938 when he did not return after a visit to Berlin. Hugh R.Wilson was the American Ambassador in Berlin, recalled ‘for consultations’ in 1938. It was Dr. Hans Thomsen who as Charge d’Affaires on 11 December 1941, delivered Germany’s declaration of war to the State Department. James V.Compton, The Swastika and the Eagle (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 52–3. Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 232, 259. 124. On Allied sentiments in this direction even prior to Casablanca see Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 438–9. When Adam von Trott zu Solz came to Sweden as a representative of parts of the German resistance, he too spoke for ‘modification of the unconditional surrender stance’. Giles MacDonogh, A Good German (Woodstock: Overlook, 1992), p. 280. 125. ‘Translation of Statement handed in by Schellenberg on 20.8.45’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. Also PRO, KV 2/97. See below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘1941 Visit to Sweden and meeting with Wagner and Neumann’. 126. The Japanese maintained a strong intelligence network in Stockholm. Apparent chief representative was the Military Attaché, General Makoto Onodera. 127. During a post-war interrogation Schellenberg told Robert M.W.Kempner that his plan had been to move to Sweden after the war and that he regretted that this now seemed impossible. Interrogation, 13 November 1947, SAN, S-45c. 128. Cf. Louis Kilzer, Hitler’s Traitor (Novato: Presidio, 2000), p. 10. 129. ‘Statement by Schellenberg on his relations with the Swedish Intelligence Service’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 130. Peter Kleist, Zwischen Hitler und Stalin 1939–1945 (Bonn: Athenäum, 1950). Bruno Peter Kleist in some publications is referred to as Bruno Kleist. Born 1904 in Marienwerder, he studied Law and joined the NSDAP in 1933 and the SS in 1938. Ingeborg Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens (Berlin: Siedler, 1986), p. 108. 131. Denham, Inside the Nazi Ring, p. 46. See also US reports on Kleist and Klaus in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1943, Vol.: General (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1963). Of considerable interest are Allied thoughts concerning the possible recruitment of ‘Deserting German Officials in Sweden’ such as Peter Ernst Riedel. SAINT (DH/001) to SAINT (BB/001), 26 January 1945, NA, RG 226, E 214, Box 1. 132. Schellenberg generally distrusted the German counterespionage organisation in Sweden and would have replaced it had the war lasted longer. ‘Report on Interrogating Walter Schellenberg 27th June-12th July 1945’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. Documents in PRO, FO 371 indicate that London was generally informed on Kleist’s activities. 133. In the summer of 1945 US intelligence considered ‘using’ Edgar Klaus, but was reticent because of his past activities. Correspondence between SAINT stations, June-August 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 28. For exemplary research on Edgar Klaus see Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, passim. Fleischhauer (p. 30) also shows that the agent’s name is Klaus although even German records spell it Claus or Clauss. See also SAINT JJ to SAINT LIMIT, 18 October 1945, and related papers, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 28. 134. Translation of Statement handed in by Schellenberg on 21 July 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 26. Testimony of Walter Schellenberg taken at Hersbruck, 8 May 1946, NA, WW II War Crimes Records, E 7A, Box 18. On ‘Countess Armgard Innhausen zu Knyphausen’ SAINT London to SAINT Washington, 13 November 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 28. 135. Memorandum, 31 August 1945, Secret, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. Testimony of Walter Schellenberg taken at Hersbruck, 8 May 1946, WW II War Crimes Records, E 7A, Box 18. 136. Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 27th June–12th July 1945, paragraph 73: Russian Deception, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 137. Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, passim.

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138. Statement under oath by Alvar Moeller, 22 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. 139. Cf. below the short, probably British description in ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘The arrested Swedes’. There also the names of the Swedish businessmen. One of the Swedes, Carl Herslow, had been Military Attaché in Berlin and Warsaw simultaneously from 1926 to 1928 before taking over the STAB operations in Warsaw. 140. Cf. Achim Besgen, Der stille Befehl (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960), p. 36. 141. Statement under oath by Alvar Moeller, 22 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. 142. On the trial in the Volksgerichtshof see also statement under oath by Carl Herslow, 20 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Herslow was one of the four sentenced to death. 143. See also below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, Appendix XI. 144. Schellenberg telephoned Thierack in the presence of Alvar Moeller. Declaration under oath by Alvar Moeller, 22 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Interrogation Report, Maria Luise Wilhelmine Schienke [sic.], PRO, KV 2/99: ‘Dr Thierack …was very instrumental in assisting Schellenberg in this matter.’ Schellenberg, quite contrary to most Nazi leaders, continued to be a member of the Corps Guestphalia. Naturally, he did not explain his decision for membership in his various interrogations and memoirs of the immediate postwar period, but it seems to support the thesis that he was not a very typical member of the Nazi elite. 145. Colonel Chas. E.Rayens to Major General Clayton Bissell, 30 May 1945, PRO, KV 2/94. ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography’, Secret, NA, RG 226, OSS, Box 2. 146. Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, p. 124, reports that Edgar Klaus tried to use his connections in Germany, reaching all the way to Under Secretary Friedrich Gaus in the Foreign Office, in order to trade the STAB Swedes for a residence permit for himself from the Swedish government (in order to continue his intelligence operations more easily). 147. Jacob Wallenberg knew Schellenberg personally since the latter’s visit to Stockholm in December 1943. Statement under oath by Jacob Wallenberg, SAN, Rep. 501, S-3. 148. In February 1945, with meat becoming scarce in Germany, the ‘Reichskommissar für Seeschiffahrt’ (Reich Commissary for Ocean Shipping) actually proposed trading imprisoned Danish policemen for Danish pigs. For every week of unsabotaged hog shipments to Germany he suggested to release 50 Danish policemen from Neuengamme. Typed message to Foreign Office, 9 February 1945, NA, RG 226, E 123, Box 4. 149. Arvid Richert also requested Schellenberg to intervene on behalf of the Swedish Honorary Consul Otto Schniewind in Munich who had been arrested. Confirmation by Arvid Richert who met Schellenberg in the house of Alvar Moeller in Berlin-Wannsee. SAN, Rep. 501, S3. 150. Statement under oath by Gottfried Count von Bismarck, Schönau, 19 February 1948; Statement under oath by Jacob Wallenberg; both SAN, Rep. 501, S-3. Wallenberg also specifically recalls that he asked Schellenberg to intercede on behalf of his brother-in-law, the Austrian ‘Count Arco auf Valley’ and two Norwegian shipping company operators named Wilhelm Klavenes and Arne Bjoern-Hansen who were held in prisons or concentration camps. 151. James Srodes, Allen Dulles (Washington, DC: Regnery/Eagle, 1999), p. 335, suggests that Schellenberg had ‘ambitious talks with British officials in Sweden’. To date the records have not revealed meaningful evidence in that direction. 152. Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre), The Last Days of Hitler, p. 7. See there comparison of Hitler and Himmler. 153. Regarding Schellenberg’s knowledge of and connection with the operations of the Einsatzgruppen following the German armies in the campaigns in Eastern Europe, see below. Also NA, RG 466, E 55, Box 6.

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154. While the assassination attempt has hardly been touched on in Schellenberg’s memoirs, he was interrogated quite thoroughly after the war. See detailed information below in ‘The Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’ beginning with ‘1944 July 20th. The Putsch of July 20th’. 155. Schellenberg neither attended a foreign university nor ever worked in another country. Occasional suggestions that he was (also) working for British intelligence appear to be baseless. 156. Cf. below Ibid., section ‘1944 July 20th. The Putsch of July 20th’. 157. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 409. Regrettably, the relations between the two men are not covered adequately in most treatments of Canaris. A notable exception is André Brissaud, Canaris (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974) which offers a great number of thoughtful insights. 158. See for instance Michael Burleigh, Ethics and Extermination (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 191. 159. Dr Jean-Marie Musy in his statement under oath speaks of connections to Rabbi Dr. Isaak Sternbuch who is said to have represented ‘the Executive Committee of the Union of Rabbis of the United States of America’. SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Internal Memorandum, Captain Oughton to Lieutenant-Colonel Stimson, Camp 020, 8 August 1945, PRO, KV 2/96, refers to Sternbuch as ‘representative’ for the ‘Joint Jewish Rabbis Organisation of America and Canada’. 160. Statement under oath by Dr. Jean-Marie Musy, 8 May 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Neal H.Petersen, (ed.), From Hitler’s Doorstep (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 601, identifies Ross McClelland as ‘the Quaker representative in Switzerland’ doing work at the US Legation for the ‘War Refugee Board’. 161. Statement under oath by Dr. Jean-Marie Musy, 8 May 1948. Schellenberg’s adjutant Franz Goering went personally to Theresienstadt to supervise the loading of the 1,200 inmates. The second transport to Switzerland was scheduled from Bergen-Belsen, but did not leave, according to Goering, because Kaltenbrunner ordered SS-Obersturmbannführer Kurt Becher to get Saly Mayer to organise negative reports on Musy’s activities in the press outside Germany. According to Goering, Becher and Saly Mayer were allowed to continue their own transports as ‘Kompensationsgeschäft’. Saly Mayer was ‘the Joint Distribution Committee representative in Switzerland’. David S.Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews (New York: Pantheon, 1985), p. 245. Statement under oath by Franz Goering, 24 February 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. On Saly Mayer the well-researched article by Yehuda Bauer, ‘The Negotiations between Saly Mayer and the Representatives of the S.S. in 1944–1945’, Yad Vashem, (ed.), Rescue Attempts during the Holocaust (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1977), pp. 5–45. 162. Statement under oath by Dr. Jean-Marie Musy, 8 May 1948, (Transl.), SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. 163. Cf. Swedish Cabinet to Swedish Minister in Berlin, Arvid Richert, 10 February 1945: ‘1,500 Jews have already arrived Switzerland and 1,200 more are on way after intervention from Councillor Musy’, reproduced in Steven Koblik, The Stones Cry Out (New York: Holocaust Library, 1988), p. 278. Schellenberg later stated that Hitler personally stopped the transports and punished those further involved in such transports with the death penalty. Internal Memorandum, Captain Oughton to Lieutenant-Colonel Stimson, Camp 020, 8 August 1945, PRO, KV 2/96. 164. Among those mentioned in the respective records are ‘61 illegal Jews’ from Theresienstadt, a niece of Charles de Gaulle, members of the Rottenberg family, and a nephew of the Papal Nuncio in Bern. Statement under oath by Dr. Jean-Marie Musy, 8 May 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4 (Transl.):

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I would like to add that among the activities to save single Jews, Schellenberg has brought about especially the liberation of 61 illegal Jews from the camp Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia who were also taken to Switzerland. 165. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 431. Statement under oath by Dr. Jean-Marie Musy, 8 May 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. 166.

When he arrived at Buchenwald… Mr. [Benoit] Musy was horrified by the treatment of the inmates who were put into marching columns during his presence. He described how the camp inmates were driven to greater speed while forming the columns by the guards hitting them over the head with clubs. It was a horrible picture, he related, to see [how] these people, on whose faces death had already inscribed his mark, were driven to the road.

So recorded by Franz Goering who accompanied Musy on most of his travels through Germany assuring some degree of personal safety for the Swiss visitor and assisting in the often very difficult negotiations with Nazi officials. ‘Walter Schellenberg’, USAMHI, William H.Donovan Papers, Box 87 B. 167. Ibid. Franz Goering’s report: ‘Himmler had decided on the release of the socalled “guinea pigs”.’ Statement under oath by Franz Goering, 24 February 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Even half a century later it is difficult to read the eyewitness reports of the Ravensbrück women without emotional reactions. Cf. such reports in Sigrid Jacobeit, (ed.), ‘Ich grüβe Euch als freier Mensch’ (Oranienburg: Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten, 1995). 168. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 430–1. Internal Memorandum, Captain Oughton to Lieutenant-Colonel Stimson, Camp 020, 8 August 1945, PRO, KV 2/96. 169. Schellenberg not only had to be on guard against treacherous snares layed out by these men at the top, but jealousies at other levels could turn into deathly traps at any moment. See in this connection the statement of former ‘Standartenführer der Waffen-SS der Reserve’ Kurt Becher to Norbert G. Barr, 24 March 1948, about his negotiations with Dr. Rudolf (Rezsö) Kasztner in Hungary, later continued in Switzerland in the presence of Saly Mayer. SAN, NG-5230. Cf. Hilel Storch to Schellenberg, 12 June 1945, PRO, KV 2/98, thanking him for, ‘…the saving of unhappy human beings in their dark hours.’ 170. Interrogation Report on SS-Obergruppenführer Otto Ohlendorf, Chief of Amt III, RSHA (surrendered Flensburg, 21 May 1945): ‘The RSHA in Schwerin 22–25 Apr 45… He [Himmler] especially forbade him to interfere in any way with Amt VI (Schellenberg)’ PRO, WO 208/3619. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 439. 171. Details in Sven Svenson, Folke Bernadotte: Ein Kämpfer für Freiheit und Frieden (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, n.d.), pp. 107–10. Norman G.Finkelstein, Die Holocaust-Industrie (Munich: Piper, 2001), p. 204, FN 65, names Yehoshua Cohen as ‘Bernadottes eigentlichen Mörder’ (‘Bernadotte’s real murderer’) and refers the reader to Elie Wiesel,…und das Meer wird nicht voll: Autobiographie 1969–1996 (Berlin: Siedler, 1999), p. 93, where Wiesel names Cohen as ‘a former member of the Stern gang with legendary “terrorist” past’. (Transl.) 172. See especially Lord Dacre of Glanton, ‘Sideways into S.I.S.’, Hayden B.Peake and Samuel Halpern, (eds), In the Name of Intelligence (Washington, DC: NIBC, 1994), pp. 251–7. He

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began his work with the Radio Security Service (RSS) which was part of MI8. As of 1941 RSS was transferred to MI6. 173. Lord Dacre (Hugh R.Trevor-Roper) personally interrogated Walter Schellenberg and apparently formed a very negative opinion of him. Hugh Trevor-Roper to Count Folke Bernadotte, 22 April 1947, SAN, Rep. 501, S-7. 174. The Swedish first edition carried the title Slutet; the British edition is entitled The Fall of the Curtain; and the American edition has the title The Curtain Falls. All editions appeared in 1945. A German version of the letters between Count Bernadotte and Hugh Trevor-Roper is found in SAN, Rep. 501, S-7. Trevor-Roper considered the matter important enough to be pursued even after Bernadotte’s death. H.R.Trevor-Roper, ‘Introduction’ to Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs 1940–1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1956). Felix Kersten, Totenkopf und Treue: Heinrich Himmler ohne Uniform (Hamburg: Robert Mölich, 1952) does not have that introduction. 175. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 433. Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, pp. 234–5. It should be added that the Norwegian representative in Stockholm, Niels Christian Ditleff, was one of the most active proponents of Swedish intervention on behalf of the inmates in German camps. Steven Koblik, ‘No Truck with Himmler’, Scandia, Vol. 51, Nos 1–2 (1985), p. 174. 176. For published versions of Schellenberg’s memories of his dealings with Count Bernadotte see Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 433–61. Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 353–73. See also below the largely British summary of interrogations of Schellenberg right after the war ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’ beginning with ‘Peace Negotiations Preceding Capitulation’. Personal aspects can be found in the somewhat touching account of Sven Svenson, Folke Bernadotte: Ein Kämpfer für Freiheit und Frieden. 177. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 434. 178. Bernadotte first had a meeting with the chief of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, but detailed plans apparently were not touched upon. Ibid. 179. According to Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, p. 95, this first meeting with Himmler was on 12 February 1945; according to Ralph Hewins, Count Folke Bernadotte (London: Hutchinson, n.d.), p. 117, it was on 19 February 1945. 180. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 437. 181. Hillel (also often spelled Hilel or Gilel) Storch was a refugee from the German-occupied Baltic area. He was financially secure and had been instrumental in organising the Swedish branch of the World Jewish Congress. From the beginning he became known for his neverceasing efforts to rescue Jews from the Germans. Koblik, The Stones Cry Out, p. 50. Norbert Masur, report, 23 April 1945, identifies Storch as representing ‘the World Jewish Congress Relief and Rehabilitation Department in Stockholm’. PRO, FO 188/526. Louis de Jong, ‘Hat Felix Kersten das niederländische Volk gerettet?’, Hans Rothfels, Theodor Eschenburg, (eds), Zwei Legenden aus dem Dritten Reich (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1974), p. 138, recognizes Kersten’s significant part in the rescue operation. 182. Cf. Ian Kershaw, Hitler. 1936–45: Nemesis (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2000), p. 818, on Himmler: ‘He harboured the notable illusion that the enemy might overlook his part in monstrous crimes against humanity’. Affidavit by Hans-Wilhelm Eggen, 19 March 1948, SAN, NG 5229. 183. OSS Bern to OSS, 5 April 1945, NA, RG 226, E 210, Box 364. Józef Garliński, The Swiss Corridor (London: J.M.Dent, 1981), p. 194. 184. Norbert Masur, report, 23 April 1945, PRO, FO 188/526. Masur following his return from Berlin reported on his activities to the British Legation. For details from a British perspective HM Minister Stockholm to Foreign Office, 24 April 1945, Draft (signature unreadable but probably Mallet), Ibid. 185. Koblik, “No Truck with Himmler”, p. 189. 186. Hillel Storch to Walter Schellenberg, Stockholm, 12 June 1945, PRO, KV 2/98.

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187. Some of the fortunate ones loaded onto a train by Benoit Musy and Franz Goering even refused to get on because they were certain that it was another death trip to Auschwitz. 188. Gerald Fleming, ‘Die Herkunft des “Bernadotte-Briefs” an Himmler vom 10. März 1945’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October, 1978), p. 586. (Transl.): ‘Take all the Jews you want.’ 189. Affidavit by Count Folke Bernadotte af Wisborg, Stockholm, 19 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Himmler first agreed to release Danish and Norwegian inmates to be brought to a central camp, then permitted the release of Swedish wives of German men who had died in action. Later he agreed to let old and sick persons and mothers go back to Norway. Again later Himmler allowed the transport of all remaining inmates from the concentration camp Neuengamme to Denmark. 190. Count Bernadotte, Ibid., speaks of ‘about 20,000 inmates transported to Sweden’ and apparently smaller numbers to Denmark. Franz Goering (statement under oath, 24 February 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4) went himself to Ravensbrück, Theresienstadt and Neuengamme and accompanied transports into Denmark. He mentions for Ravensbrück alone 9,000 Polish, 1,500 French, some 3,000 Jewish and other women and girls from diverse countries. He supervised also the transport of 450 Jewish females from Malchow and some 1,500 women of various nationalities from Neubrandenburg. Ulrike Jensen, ‘“Es war schön nicht zu frieren.” Die Aktion “Bernadotte” und das “Skandinavierlager” des Konzentrationslagers Neuengamme’, Kriegsende und Befreiung, Vol. 2, Detlef Garbe (ed.) (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995), pp. 32, 34, speaks of 20,937 people having been evacuated from German concentration camps by the Bernadotte operation. 191. All data and quotes in this paragraph from ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography’, NA, RG 226, OSS, Box 2. 192. Ibid. Documents of the Allied rejections in PRO, FO 371/46784. 193. Richard Wires, The Cicero Spy Affair (Westport: Praeger, 1999), p. 179, does not name the source for his statement that ‘Schellenberg had been sure he would be reinstated when Himmler succeeded Hitler.’ There is no evidence that Schellenberg could have entertained such thoughts on 1 May. 194. Johann Ludwig (Lutz) Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, born 1887 in Rathmannsdorf, Anhalt, was Finance Minister from 1932 to 1945 and officially served as Foreign Minister from 3 May to 23 May 1945. 195. Karl Doenitz, Memoirs (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997, 1st edn 1990), pp. 456–7. Reimer Hansen, Das Ende des Dritten Reiches (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1966), p. 144. 196. ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography’, NA, RG 226, OSS, Box 2. 197. Two documents signed by Grand Admiral Dönitz, 4 May 1945. Both in USAMHI, William J.Donovan Papers, Box 87B. 198. ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 199. Final days of travel and negotiations are described in Ibid. and in ‘My Last Mission’, the last chapter of The Schellenberg Memoirs. See also below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, beginning with ‘1945 May 4th. Schellenberg is appointed as Gesandter with plenary powers’. Evidently the officers writing the ‘Final Report’ for the closing sections simply copied from ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography’ rather than using minutes taken during interviews of Schellenberg in Stockholm. 200. See below closing paragraphs of ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’. How anyone could have thought that Schellenberg might work for the British Military Government in Germany, as indicated there, remains an enigma. Schellenberg’s idea that he might later practice law in Sweden seems less unrealistic in view of his contacts in that country. Cf. interrogation by Robert M.W.Kempner, 13 November 1947, SAN, S45c: ‘I believe that my Swedish friends would help me. I have studied international private

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law and could go to Sweden because I had contacts with the Swedish match people.’ The possibility of considering him for a role in reconstructing an intelligence organisation comparable to the American dealings with General Reinhard Gehlen, would not have been mentioned in the ‘Final Report’. 201. The document has been known to specialists for some time and is occasionally not quite correctly referred to as ‘Trosa Memorandum’. The Russian intelligence officer Sergei Kondraschew has published this document in Russian, in National Archives, Nos. 2–3 (1997). 202. The German typed text is signed in ink by Walter Schellenberg on p. 96. There are at least two different English translations. The more frequently found English text is entitled ‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography, compiled during his stay in Stockholm, June 1945’ and consists of 35 legal size pages. The first page has the typed note: ‘Copied in War Room. Date 14.8.45.’ The once ‘Secret’ document has been declassified by the National Archives. Someone on p. 1 acknowledged receipt: ‘Rec’d Sthlm. 27. Sep. 1945’. One location is NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. The other translation is typed on U.S. size 8½ x 11 paper and consists of 71 pages text plus a page with the title ‘Walter Schellenberg’. One location is USAMHI, The William J.Donovan Papers, Box 87B. A typed German text is held by IFZ, ED 90/7, entitled ‘W.Schellenberg: Memorandum (ca. 1945?)’. It is an old photocopy with each page showing Schellenberg’s (photocopied) paraph at bottom right. The information supplied in the IFZ finding guide that this is an ‘Ergänzung zu d. chronolog. Tagebuch-Aufz’n (Memoiren)’ [‘Addition to the chronological diary notes (Memoirs)’] is an error as the memoirs, according to other sources, had not been written yet when Schellenberg arrived in Stockholm. Several authors have referred to the so-called ‘Trosa Memorandum’, but the document has not been analysed in its historical context. 203. Schellenberg was accompanied in Sweden by six persons: Marie-Luise Schienke (often spelled Marieluise); her assistant Erdmann; Franz Goering; the former SS-Obersturmführer Heinz Rennau with wife and daughter. All were paid a three-month salary, probably from funds Schienke brought with her. SAINT LIMIT to SAINT JJI, 26 September 1945; Captain Oughton to Lieutenant-Colonel Stimson, Camp 020, 8 August 1945; Swedish unidentified document from 1945; all NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. Schienke was ‘secretly engaged to Franz Goering’ and had worked for Schellenberg since 1 June 1941. Interrogation Report, Maria Luise Wilhelmina Schienke [sic.], Secret, PRO, KV 2/99. 204. HM Chargé d’Affaires to Foreign Office, 22 June 1945, PRO, FO 188/487. Message is initialled ‘SC’. 205. He gave two copies to Count Bernadotte on 9 June and asked that one be passed on to Christian Günther. Also on 9 June 1945, he sent a copy to Hillel Storch. Schellenberg to Count Bernadotte, Trosa, 9 June 1945; both USAMHI, William J.Donovan Papers, Box 87B. 206. Labouchere, British Legation, Stockholm, to the Right Honourable Anthony Eden, 22 June 1945, Top Secret. This or another copy was given to the British War Crimes Executive (R.A.Clyde) by R.D.Scott, Foreign Office, 16 August 1945. Both documents PRO, FO 371/46749. Sergei Kondraschew, commenting the above-mentioned Russian publication, informs (p. 58) the reader that the USSR obtained a copy in Stockholm after Schellenberg gave the text to the Americans by way of Count Bernadotte. See also copy sent ‘at Captain Scott-Harston’s request’, Stimson to Ferguson, 11 September 1945, PRO, KV 2/98. 207. H.R. Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre), ‘Introduction’ to Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs 1940–1945 (London: Hutchinson, 1956), p. 17. Hugh Thomas, SS1: The Unlikely Death of Heinrich Himmler (London: Fourth Estate, 2001), p. 233. 208. For details see Trevor-Roper, ‘Introduction’ to Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs, pp. 9–21, favouring Kersten’s side in the disagreement. Schellenberg on 16 June 1945, handed in a written statement on Kersten to his Allied interrogators. It does not emphasize Kersten’s important role in the rescue efforts. NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 26. By far the most thoroughly researched publication on the entire context, including the supposed Nazi

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sympathies of Count Bernadotte, is Gerald Fleming, ‘Die Herkunft des “Bernadotte Briefs” an Himmler vom 10. März 1945’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 1978), pp. 571–600. Cf. negative comment on Count Bernadotte by John Loftus and Mark Aarons, The Secret War against the Jews (New York: St Martin’s Griffin, 1997, 1st edn 1994), p. 143. 209. Maycock to ACAS, ‘5/6/45’, PRO, FO 188/487. The ‘Air Chief’ is Sir Arthur Tedder. 210. From: ‘USFET Main from Sands from Sibert Signed Eisenhower Cite ETBGI’. To: ‘UK Base to CI War Room’. The writer of the message answered the Americans and reports: ‘Have replied he is in our custody and of highest CI interest.’ PRO, KV 2/96. 211. DSO Hut 3 to Section V, ‘signed H.P. 9/6 [1945]’, Secret; Colonel Chas. E. Rayens to Major General Clayton Bissell (War Department), Top Secret, Stockholm, 30 May 1945; both PRO, KV 2/94. Colonel Chas. E.Rayens to Military Air Attaché, Stockholm, 8 June 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 26. 212. Office Memorandum, H.Plummer to Colonel Knox Pruden, 29 December 1947, SAN, S45a. 213. ‘Allies May Get Himmler Aide’, New York Times, 18 June 1945, p. 7. 214. Telegram 1028, Hon to FO, 19 June 1945, PRO, FO 188/487. Schellenberg himself speaks of having ‘surrendered on 17 June 1945’. NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195. 215. ‘Ashcan’ was the name given by the Allies to a large hotel in Mondor Les Bains about 15 miles from Luxembourg, ‘surrounded by two rows of barbed wire’ and secured by ‘machine gun posts at each corner’. Memorandum by J.D.Beam after he, Cavendish Bentinck, and Major Keith of G-2 SHAEF had visited ‘Ashcan’ in the summer of 1945; SHAEF Forward to AGWAR, 28 May 1945; both PRO, FO 371/46778. 216. ‘Dustbin’ or Kransberg Castle, not far from Frankfurt, was a similar collection centre for leading Nazis, but with the majority coming from industry and finance. Major E.Tilley of G2 in June requested:

An attempt should be made to have both Schellenberg and Kersten extradited as two of the most obvious war criminals and to have them brought to Dustbin for an examination of their connections with industrial leaders and their plans for espionage through German industry. After a thorough examination they should be passed on to Ashcan for further treatment. Tilley, F.I.A.T., to Major P.M.Wilson, 23 June 1945, PRO, KV 2/94. 217. H.P.Milmo to Major (name removed), Secret, 9 June 1945, PRO, KV 2/94. H.P. Milmo is Sir Helenus Patrick Milmo, born 1908, the well-known barrister of the Middle Temple who was to become Judge of the High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench Division. 218. First interrogation of Walter Schellenberg at SHAEF on 27 June 1945, Source: U.35. PRO, KV 2/94. U.35. was probably Klop Ustinow. 219. Others from MI5 who handled and interrogated Schellenberg either in or near Frankfurt or in London and Camp 020, according to Lord Dacre (personal interview) included an American named Rory Cameron, Hugh Astor and Herbert Hart, later a well-known Professor of Law at Oxford University. Sir Stuart Newton Hampshire, born 1914, later became a Professor of Philosophy in Britain and the United States. Sir Stuart Hampshire (personal interview) remembers working, that is, interrogating Schellenberg at the SHAEF Headquarters in the I.G.Farben building in Frankfurt. Hampshire’s initials in the records are SH as well as SNH. He recalls having worked at the time with Kim Philby on the MI5 side and the ‘12th Army Group’ and Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew H.Berding, chief of X-2 in Germany, on the American side. 220. A decade later, Clinton Gallagher recalled that he interviewed Schellenberg ‘in 1945 in the Military Intelligence (MI) Interrogation Center at Oberursel’. Clinton Gallagher, review of

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Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth (New York: Harper, 1956), Studies in Intelligence (CIA journal), Vol. 1 (Fall, 1957), p. 121. 221. Na, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. The spelling indicates that this 37-page legal size paper report was typed by a British typist which does not necessarily mean that it was also written by MI5 men. (The records suggest that British, Americans and probably refugees from Nazi Germany serving in the Allied forces were among the interrogators.) It is possible, but not very likely, judging from the date, that the report was produced in the War Room in London or in Camp 020 from separate interrogation texts brought from Frankfurt. 222. ‘Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 27th June–12th July 1945’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 223. Memorandum (name unreadable) to B.I.W. Mr Milmo; ‘Authorization to Travel out of Germany’, 5 July 1945; both PRO, KV 2/95. Headquarters US Forces European Theater, Interrogation Center to AC of S, G-2, Hqs USFET, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195, states incorrectly that Schellenberg was ‘held by SHAEF until 7 June 45’. 224. ‘Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 27th June–12th July 1945’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 225. Besides the main camp there were a later ‘reserve’ camp at Huntercombe, referred to as Camp 020R and ‘forward’ camps at Diest in Belgium and at Bad Nenndorf in Germany. Oliver Hoare, (ed.), Camp 020: MI5 and the Nazi Spies (Richmond: Public Record Office, 2000), pp. 1–2. ‘The Official History of MI5’s Wartime Interrogation Centre’ (title page) is an official publication of Her Majesty’s Government, a fact to be kept in mind when using data and texts offered. Introducing Schellenberg, the publication (p. 22) informs:

As the Western Allies made the final push eastward into Germany, a vanguard of espionage directors, spymasters and intelligence officers were progressively picked up. The most notable of these characters were Walter Schellenburg [sic.] (p. 365), personal assistant to Himmler and later deputy head of the SD (successor to the Abwehr), and Ernst Kaltenbrünner [sic.]

Schellenberg, of course, was not picked up by any Allied troops but handed over to SHAEF by the Swedish Government (see above). 226. German intelligence had been able to crack the code used by the American Legation in Bern for correspondence with Washington. Naturally US intelligence was most interested in the details of this German operation and Schellenberg was questioned repeatedly on the topic. Testimony of Schellenberg, Nuremberg, 13 February 1946, taken by Captain Horace Mann, AUS, OUSCC, Confidential, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195. The captured German documents in the NA show that not all texts were fully deciphered and some texts were deciphered much later. Apparently German intelligence in 1943 and 1944 also was able to decrypt diplomatic messages from the US Department of State to the US Embassy in Moscow. NA, RG 457, NSA/CSS, Box 205. Schellenberg told his interrogators that he never saw decrypted British messages though there had been some earlier success in decoding British traffic from Cairo to London. ‘Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 27th June–12th July 1945’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 227. ‘History of the Counter Intelligence War Room March 1–November 1, 1945’, NA, RG 319, IRR-IS, Box 10. 228. Hoare, (ed.), Camp 020, pp. 105–31. The term ‘spies’ was probably used because apprehended foreign agents were strongly represented among the inmates in the early days of the camp.

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229. Interrogation of Schellenberg by Dr. R.M.W.Kempner, 13 November 1945, (Transl.), SAN, S-45c. It should be said that Schellenberg went through a physical examination at arrival and was found ‘apparently fit and free from infection’. ‘Certificate of Health’, 9 July 1945, signature unreadable, PRO, KV 2/95. 230. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, pp. 27–8: ‘He was in fact a very trivial character’. Cf. Trevor-Roper’s comments on Schellenberg in Trevor-Roper to Count Bernadotte, Christ Church, Oxford, 22 April 1947 (a German translation), SAN, Rep. 501, S-7, indicating that he thought Schellenberg incapable in foreign policy matters. 231. Colonel H.G.Sheen to Deputy Theater Judge Advocate, USFET, 29 August 1945, Confidential Secret, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195. ‘UK Group CC from D of I from Counter Intelligence Br Sgd Clay’ to ‘UK Base for CI War Room’, 29 August 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 26. 232. Director, War Room to Brigadier D.White, B.A.O.R., 3 September 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 26. 233. Counter Intelligence War Room London to USFET Main, 11 December 1945, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195. 234. Several messages in NA, RG 319, IRR-PS and RG 226, E 119A. 235. Thomas, SS-1, pp. 238–9, gives ‘mid-November’ as the date of departure. 236. SAINT London to SAINT Washington, 18 December 1945, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. J.J.Ferguson on 8 October 1945, writes to Section V.F., War Room: ‘Schellenberg…is due to leave Camp 020 next week’, PRO, KV 2/98. 237. J.Chenhalls, ‘Note’, 29 November 1945, PRO, KV 2/98, PF 600,561. H.C. Harrison to Lieutenant Burke, 28 December 1945, PRO, KV 2/99. The PRO has also recently released a copy of ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’. Because the ‘Final Report’ edited below is one of the various copies released by the US Government years ago, the copy in the PRO has not been checked for quality and completeness. 238. H.C.Harrison in his ‘Conclusion’ to the ‘Final Report’: ‘His demeanour at this camp has not produced any evidence of outstanding genius… On the contrary his incoherency and incapability of producing lucid verbal or written statements have rendered him a more difficult subject to interrogate than other subjects.’ 239. Cf. ‘Medical Certificate’ for Walter Schellenberg by D.Jahn, Professor for Internal Medicine and Chief of Municipal Hospital Nuremberg, 16 May 1949, RG 466, E 53, Box 30:

Mr. Walter Schellenberg, at present under stationary treatment in the hospital at Nuremberg is suffering from the affects of a Flexnerdiarrhoea (Flexner-Ruhr), contracted in the year 1940 and still manifest in the year 1948, which has caused a serious Colitis with constantly recurrent inflammatory waves. 240. The records show that interrogations were not only held in Nuremberg, but also in towns nearby such as Hersbruck. It is not unlikely that occasionally he may have stayed outside the cell block while he was still a witness rather than a defendant. 241. Interrogations connected with the trials in Nuremberg appear to have taken place in the presence of a third person and a stenographer. The minutes of these interrogations in most cases are actual question-and-answer texts. The minutes or reports of the MI5 interrogations often do not contain questions and answers and occasionally do not mention the names of the interrogator and others present. Indications are that Schellenberg was still visited and interrogated by intelligence people even in Nuremberg. 242. Cf. Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof, Vol. 4 (Nuremberg: Internationaler Militärgerichtshof, 1947), p. 324. 243. Cf. Kaltenbrunner about Schellenberg, 11 April 1946, Ibid., p. 311.

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244. Roy A.Martin, Inside Nuremberg (Shippensburg: White Mane, 2000), pp. 78–9. 245. Even in late 1947 Schellenberg seems to think that the trial will be over for him soon. Interrogation by Dr. R.M.W.Kempner, Nuremberg, 13 November 1947, SAN, S-45c. 246. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 15 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 105. 247. ‘Statement from the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Powers’, Ibid., p. 108. The different legal opinions concerning individual and collective guilt surfacing at the trial cannot be discussed here. 248. Ibid., Vol. 12, pp. 20–34. Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 418. 249. Ibid., Vol. 12, pp. 34–5, 419. The reason was the Court felt that the accusations under Counts One, Three, Four, Five, Six and Seven ‘formed a part of said common plan and conspiracy’. Military Tribunals, Case No. 11 (Nuremberg: Office of Military Government for Germany, 1948), p. 26. NA, RG 466, E 55, Box 8. 250. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 12, p. 35. 251. Ibid., Vol. 12, p. 38. 252. Ibid., Vol. 12, pp. 43–7. 253. Statement under oath by Walter Schellenberg, signed 26 November 1945, SAN, Rep. 502, PS-3710. (Transl.) 254. Helmut Krausnick and Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), pp. 127–8. Eugene Davidson, The Trial of the Germans (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997, 1st edn 1966), p. 316. 255. Cf. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 128, 136, call Schellenberg’s testimony ‘nicht tendenzfrei’ (tendential) and refer to his supposed desire to place responsibility for the actions of the Einsatzgruppen with the Army. 256. Krausnick and Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, p. 127, try to show that Schellenberg’s dates—and therefore his statements—are unreliable. Cf. however Richard Breitman’s treatment of the same context in The Architect of Genocide (London: The Bodley Head, 1981). 257. Cf. Christopher R.Browning, ‘The Euphoria of Victory and the Final Solution: SummerFall 1941’, German Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (October 1994), pp. 476–7. 258. ‘Schellenberg’ (summary), NA, RG 466, E 55, Box 6. One would tend to agree with Richard Breitman, Official Secrets (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 1999, 1st edn 1998), p. 255, who found that Schellenberg ‘was in a position to have good information about the planning of the Final Solution’. 259. See below ‘Final Report on the Case of Walter Friedrich Schellenberg’, section ‘Havel Institute and Unternehmung Zeppelin’. 260. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 13, p. 574. 261. Ibid., Vol. 14, p. 668. 262. Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 585. 263. Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 592. 264. Ibid., Vol. 13, p. 594. 265. Schellenberg certainly did not volunteer for the Einsatzgruppen. During interrogation, Otto Ohlendorff also strongly suggested that Schellenberg had been assigned a series of difficult administrative tasks and therefore was just not available. Interrogation, 2 December 1946, SAN, S-45b. The often discussed question of Schellenberg’s connection with the so-called Endlösung (Final Solution) is a similar matter. Schellenberg probably does not bear personal responsibility, but it is difficult to believe that he was not fully informed. In this context a document signed by Schellenberg on 20 May 1941, and using the term Final Solution has been at the centre of the discussion. Breitman, Official Secrets, pp. 227, 255. See also

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Richard Breitman, ‘Plans for the Final Solution in Early 1941’, German Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 3 (October, 1994), p. 489. 266. ‘Schellenberg’ (summary), NA, RG 466, E 55, Box 6. 267. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 12, p. 50. 268. Interrogation by Dr. R.M.W.Kempner, 13 November 1947, SAN, S-45c. 269. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 12, p. 62. 270. ‘14 April 1949-M-EM-l-l, Court IV, Case XI, NA, RG 466, E 55, Box 8.’ Extract from press cutting, The Times, 21 May 1949, PRO, KV 2/99. 271. Folke Bernadotte ‘Instead of Arms’, NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. Affidavit by Count Folke Bernadotte, 19 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Cf. F.Bernadotte to Hugh Trevor-Roper, 17 April 1947, SAN, Rep. 501, S-7. Count Bernadotte also contacted General Lucius D.Clay on behalf of Schellenberg. 272. Statement under oath by Roger Masson, 10 May 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. General Henri Guisan, Commander-in-Chief of the Swiss Army, added to Masson’s statement in handwriting: ‘Je confirme l’exactitude de la présente declaration, notamment en ce qui concerne les services rendus a la Suisse par W.Schellenberg.’ Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, p. 479. 273. Affidavit Dr. Jean-Marie Musy, 8 May 1948, NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. Also as statement under oath, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. Cf. Statement under oath by Benoit Musy, 8 May 1948, Ibid. 274. Sternbuch to Nuremberg Court, 17 November 1948, NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. 275. Statement under oath by Jacob Wallenberg, SAN, Rep. 501, S-3. Statement under oath by Egon Freiherr von Ritter, 21 February 1948, Ibid. Statement under oath by Axel Brandin, 22 April 1948, Ibid. See also correspondence of Dr. Werner Otto von Hentig for the Kirchliches Aussenamt der Ev. Kirche in Deutschland (Leitung: Dr. Martin Niemöller), NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. Attestation’ by General Henri Giraud, 4 June 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. ‘Des rabbins interviennent en faveur de Schellenberg’, La Suisse, 15 December 1948, copy of clipping, NA, RG 84, E 3223, Box 83. 276. As we know that Schellenberg was under guard, held prisoner or kept in a guarded hospital room until the early summer of 1950, repeated suggestions that in the post-war period he worked for one of the Allies are surprising. False reports of this nature are all the more astonishing when they come from officials. Cf. Alexander G.Hardy (Associate Counsel at Nuremberg), Hitler’s Secret Weapon (New York: Vantage, 1967), p. 142: ‘Schellenberg had been successful in remaining free after the war and, in fact, had established himself as a confidential advisor to the American Occupation Forces.’ 277. Medical Affidavit, Professor D.Jahn, Vorstand Allgemeines Städtisches Krankenhaus, 16 May 1949, referring to a Flexner-diarrhoea in 1940, still diagnosed in 1948 and connected to a ‘serious Colitis’. Report by Dr. Frank V. Sander, Prison Physician, 17 October 1948, mentioning ‘severe liver cell damage’ and stating that ‘prognosis of recovery and/or life expectancy cannot be made’. On 12 December 1949, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard W.Pullen certified that Schellenberg’s ‘condition is serious’ and that he will be ill ‘for a considerable period’. On 23 February 1950, a report from Mr S.H.Souter, Jr, states that Schellenberg needs no guards because he ‘is bedridden and offers no escape risk’. All documents NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. 278. Cf. ‘Character Sketch of Schellenberg’, Dr. Wilhelm Höttl, 12 July 1945, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 617. Interrogation Report, Marie Luise Schienke, Secret, PRO, KV 2/99. 279. ‘Müller: Bekir Nakoschiri’, Der Spiegel, Vol. 21, No. 48 (20 November 1967), p. 148: ‘Abwehrauslandschef Schellenberg—starb 1952 im Zuchthaus’. 280. ‘Physical Condition of Walter Schellenberg’, Report by S.H.Souter, Jr, 23 February 1950, and other medical documents. NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30.

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281. Full pardon text: ‘Order’, ‘dated Frankfurt-am-Main, March 27, 1950’, signed by John J.McCloy, United States High Commissioner for Germany, Ibid. 282. Major Joseph J.Kapral/Captain C.P.Thompson to Legal Division, Office of Military Government for Germany, Mr Souter, Prisons Branch, 3 June 1949: ‘… prisoner has not been committed to Landsberg prison…’. 283. Dr Bremer to Mr S.H.Souter, Jr, Iburg, 3 June 1950. Chirurgische Klinik (Dr Gerhard Wendel) to S.H.Souter, Jr, Office of General Counsel, 14 May 1950. All documents show that Schellenberg was generally bed-ridden and physically extremely weak. All NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. Thomas, SS-1, p. 245, erroneously reports: ‘…he was released in June 1951… He immediately sought sanctuary [in Switzerland]…’. 284. Alan Bullock, ‘Introduction’ to Schellenberg, The Labyrinth, pp. XIV–XVIII. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, pp. 324–5. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, pp. 134–5. 285. Klaus Harpprecht, ‘Vorwort’ for Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 7–20. André Brissaud, The Nazi Secret Service (New York: W.W.Norton, 1974), pp. 15–23. 286. Originally Schellenberg had entered an understanding with the Swiss publisher Scherz. After his death the memoirs were first published by André Deutsch in London. In contrast to Thorsten J.Querg, ‘Spionage und Terror—Das Amt VI des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes 1939–1945’, PhD Dissertation, Berlin, 1997, p. 361, the records do not show that Schellenberg earned some wealth with the memoirs. 287. ‘Note’, J.Chenhalls, 29 November 1945, PRO, KV 2/98, PF 600,561. 288. An incomplete photographic reproduction of the document has been published as ‘Excerpts from the Final Report on the Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, Chief of Amt VI RSHA, in: John Mendelsohn, (ed.), Covert Warfare: Intelligence, Counterintelligence, and Military Deception During the World War II Era, Vol. 13 (New York/London: Garland Publishing, 1989).

NOTES TO PART II 1. According to Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 20, he began his studies at Bonn in 1929. He switched to Law after two years of Medicine. His father and he thought Law to be a good background for a career in business or in the Foreign Service. 2. The Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) or National Socialist German Workers Party. 3. Schellenberg 1945:

After my Referendar examination on March 18, 1933, further state help for my studies depended on my party affiliations. That was the main reason for my joining the party and the SS in June of 1933. That I chose the SS was not the result of political reasoning. I did it, because the majority of my fellow students also joined the SS and not the SA. We liked their uniform better.

‘Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography’, The William J. Donovan Papers, USAMHI, Carlisle Barracks. Copies of the typed original German text, occasionally referred to as the ‘Trosa Memorandum’, are available in various archives, such as the Public

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Record Office, London, and the National Archives, College Park, MD. The memorandum at least partially was written when Schellenberg stayed in Trosa, not far from Stockholm in 1945. 4. Wilhelm Albert took over from Dr. August Simon, Düsseldorf, and set up office in Frankfurt. The electrical engineer had joined the SS in 1932. George C. Browder, ‘Die Anfänge des SD’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 27, No. 2 (April 1979), pp. 302–3. 5. ‘Anschluss’ refers to the German takeover of Austria or, more precisely, to the various negotiations and manipulations leading to the entry of German troops into Austria in March, the so-called reunification of Austria and Germany, and the plebiscite of 4 April 1938, in favour of ‘Anschluss’. 6. Reichsführer SS was the title used at the time. 7. Refers to documents related to the murder of Engelbert DollfuB. 8. The marriage with Käthe Kortekamp, according to documents in the Schellenberg files in the Berlin Document Center, took place on 25 May 1938. According to these sources, she was born in Bonn on 17 June 1907, received a basic education, and was trained as a tailoress. BDC, Microfilm, NA. 9. Reinhard Heydrich’s wife was Lina Heydrich, whose memoirs were published as Leben mit einem Kriegsverbrecher (Pfaffenhofen: W.Ludwig, 1976). 10. Concerning Heydrich’s negative reaction to his wife’s connection to Schellenberg and the consequences for the latter see also Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 36–9. 11. Werner Best (born 1903) had studied Law, joined the NSDAP in 1930, came to the Geheime Staatspolizeiamt (secret state police office) in Berlin in 1935, and became second man in charge of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in 1939. See Ulrich Herbert, Werner Best— Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft (Berlin: Willmuth Arenhövel, 1997). 12. Cf. chapter VII, ‘The Venlo Incident’ in Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 82, and the chapter ‘Der Venlo-Zwischenfall’ in Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 79–89. See also Schellenberg’s testimony in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 12, pp. 1232–42. The kidnapping actually took place on Thursday, 9 November 1939. The location of the event is just across the border in Holland. Photo of the Backus Café, where the meetings took place, and a map of the area in ‘The Venlo Incident’, After the Battle, p. 35. 13. Assassination attempt, Munich, 8 November 1939. Georg Elser confessed, but the authorities tried to link British Intelligence and Otto Strasser to the event. L. Gruchmann (ed.), Autobiographie eines Attentäters (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970). A.Hoch, ‘Das Attentat auf Hitler im Münchner Bürgerbräukeller, 1939’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 17 (1969), pp. 383–413. 14. For details on this marriage see David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies (New York: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 256–7. Heydrich, Leben mit einem Kriegsverbrecher, p. 76. 15. The singular ‘Vertrauensmann’ or ‘V-Mann’ might be translated as confidential agent or operative. The term can be found in the respective German documents already prior to World War I. 16. According to green handwritten insertions in Schellenberg Report, NA, RG 226, Wash-X-2PTS-45–49, Box 10: ‘Police Attaché, Head of G.I.S. (S.D.) in Madrid, Spain+had agents working in Portugal (1940).’ Interrogation Report No. 38, NA, RG 319, IRR-IS, Box 12, File XE 003920, Secret, names ‘Kriminalrat SS Sturmbannfuehrer Winzer’ as SD-chief from 1941 to 1944. 17. Cf. the version in Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 108–17. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 127–32. Schellenberg later claimed that during his interrogations in 1945 he learned that British intelligence was unaware of his stay in Portugal. Schellenberg,

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Memoiren, p. 118. John Weitz, Hitler’s Diplomat (London: Phoenix/Orion Books, 1997 [1992]), p. 235. 18. According to the Schellenberg files, BDC, she spelled her name Irene Grosse-Schönepauck and was born on 8 February 1919. See there also her ‘SS-Ahnentafel’ (table showing ancestors). BDC, Microfilm, NA. Schellenberg writes in his memoirs that he approched Heydrich asking him to intercede for him with Himmler in the matter of being permitted to marry a woman of Polish descent. Heydrich succeeded in obtaining Himmler’s permission. Papers that later fell into Schellenberg’s hands showed that the Polish in-laws were being watched by the Gestapo. Schellenberg assumed Heydrich had ordered this to have something in hand against him. Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 136. 19. In contrast to Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 227: ‘On June 22, 1941, the day our armies marched into Russia, after a conversation with Heydrich lasting hardly more than three minutes, I went to the building which housed AMT VI in order to take over my post as Acting Chief’, see Heydrich to Himmler, 8 September 1941, Schellenberg files, BDC, states that Schellenberg was ‘stellvertr. Chef des Amtes VI’ since 2 July 1941. 20. According to the Schellenberg files, BDC, Schellenberg was made SS-Obersturmbannführer on 1 September 1941. He was promoted to the next higher rank of SS-Standartenführer in the SD on 21 June 1942, and in the RSHA on 24 February 1943. 21. See Appendix XV ‘Jahnke and the Jahnkeburo’. Reinhard R.Doerries, ‘Tracing Kurt Jahnke: Aspects of the Study of German Intelligence’, Historians and Archivists, George O.Kent (ed.) (Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1991). 22. In 1943 August Finke was Schellenberg’s man installed in the trade department of the German Legation in Stockholm. Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, p. 154. During interrogation by Allied representatives in Nuremberg on 20 December 1945, Schellenberg divulged that Finke during his activities for Amt VI in Sweden used the cover name von Schilling. SAN, S-45a. 23. Presumably the Henke referred to here is Andor Hencke, born in Berlin 1895, who joined the Foreign Office in 1922 and was given the title (Amtsbezeichnung) Gesandter in August 1940. He was associated with the Informationsstelle III of the Foreign Office. According to Schellenberg’s testimony in Nuremberg on 28 December 1945, ‘The greatest number of its employees were established in German Missions, reported directly to Berlin independently of the Mission Chief concerned, and used for this purpose one of their own radio codes placed at their disposal.’ SAN, Rep. 502, S-45a. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 450. 24. According to the German Foreign Office, Franz Alfred Six, born 1909 in Mannheim, in April 1943 became chief of the Kulturpolitische Abteilung (Department of Cultural Politics) and, apparently simultaneously, was ‘Professor und Direktor der Auslandswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Berlin, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Auslandswissenschaft’. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 510. On Six, see Lutz, Hachmeister, Der Gegnerforscher (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1998). 25. Schellenberg was interrogated concerning IT&T operations in Europe on 12 February 1946, in Nuremberg by Captain Horace Hahn. NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195. Not surprisingly, the OSS also had connections to IT&T. Colonel Ellery C.Huntington, Jr, to General William J.Donovan, 9 August 1943, NA, RG 226, E 210, Box 364. Cf. SAN, Rep. 502, W 79. 26. Schellenberg lost an important and cooperating army SIGINT expert, when General Thiele on 4 September 1944, was executed following the assassination attempt of 20 July. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 393, 413. William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 1072. Heinrich Fraenkel/Roger Manvell, Der 20. Fuli (Frankfurt/Berlin: Ullstein, 1969), pp. 248–50. 27. Gerhard Alois Westrick until 1938 had been a partner in a law firm in Berlin with Heinrich F.Albert. Later in his own law firm the International Telephone & Telegraph Company was the most important client. Westrick is said to have been made European representative of

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IT&T at the beginning of World War II by Colonel Sosthenes Behn. Johannes Reiling, Deutschland: Safe for Democracy? (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1997), pp. 395–6. On Sosthenes Behn see comments in Charles Higham, Trading with the Enemy (New York: Dell, 1984). See also

Christopher Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast (NewYork: Grove, 1993), p. 53. Cf. G.A.Westrick to Allen Dulles, n.d. (April/May 1945), enclosure to Hansom to 110, 11 May 1945, NA, RG 226, E 210, Box 276: My dear Mr. Dulles… After my office in Berlin is completely destroyed and my home in Babelsberg in the hands of the Russians I found within the last minute with my family a lodging in the castle of Langenstein in Baden… I am glad that I succeeded against serious official resistances especially of the postministry to preserve the enterprises belonging to the Intern. Tel. and Tel. Co. from any pledging and attachment and I would be very happy, if I could at the earliest date render account of my activities to Colonel Behn. I therefore would be very much obliged, if you would inform Colonel Behn by cable about my being in Langenstein near Eigeltingen. Perhaps he could come to see me here, as you understand that I can’t travell [sic.] around. Needless to say, that I would welcome a talk with you as well, when and whereever [sic.] you think it advisable. I remain dear Mr. Dulles always yours very truly [signature unreadable]. 28. Walther Funk (1890–1960) held a number of influential positions. Since 1933 he served as Under-Secretary in the Propaganda Ministry. From 1938 to 1945 he was Reichswirtschaftsminister (Reich Minister of Economics). Since 1939 he was also simultaneously Reichsbankpräsident (President of the Reich [National] Bank). 29. Reinhard Heydrich died on 4 June 1942, after an attack on his car in Prague on 27 May 1942. Cf. Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 558–60. 30. Apparently Kurt Jahnke in June 1942 also contacted Chinese representatives in Switzerland such as Kwei Yung-chin. Hsi-Huey Liang, The Sino-German Connection (Assen/Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1978), p. 164. 31. Oswald Baron von Hoyningen gen. Huene, born 1885 in Switzerland, entered the German Foreign Office in 1921 and served as German Minister (Gesandter) in Lisbon from 1934 to 1944. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 455. 32. Concerning the cooperation of Salgado with the German Sicherheitsdienst see Stanley E.Hilton, Hitler’s Secret War in South America, 1939–1945 (New York: Ballantine, 1982), pp. 266–7. 33. Eberhard von Stohrer, born 1883 in Stuttgart, joined the German Foreign Office in 1909 and served as Ambassador in Madrid (office in Salamanca until 1939) from 1937 to 1943. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 515. 34. The British had certainly observed the German activities at the time. Cf. Memo by John H.Godfrey, 17 March 1942, stating that the Germans were constructing two stations, one in Spain and one in Africa hoping

to be able to spot and identify vessels passing between those points in the dark, by means of what appears to be a combination of R/D.F. and

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infra-red ray. This apparatus will also, probably, cover the entrance to the bay of Gibraltar… Before plans for the elimination of these two stations can be prepared, covering approval must be obtained from the Foreign Office and from ‘C’…

Other documents show that the Germans had difficulties with their installations in view of Spanish neutrality, but indications are that both German and British intelligence agents found ways to operate in Spain. PRO, ADM 223/485. 35. According to the Schellenberg files, this promotion took place on 21 June 1942. ‘Dienstlaufbahn’, entry for 21 June 1942. 36. VI Wi tried to exploit industrial channels. VI Kult used cultural channels such as artistic and academic persons for gathering political intelligence. RSHA Structure, NA, RG 319, IRRPS, Box 195. 37. Sir Samuel Hoare was the British Ambassador in Madrid. As a former MI1c station chief he was no stranger to intelligence. Secret Service, pp. 384, 463. 38. Presumably referring to John Foster Dulles and/or his brother Allen Welsh Dulles who was responsible for the OSS outpost in Berne. 39. The ‘Freundeskreis’ or ‘Freundeskreis Himmler’ grew out of the Keppler-Kreis, a group of businessmen who supported the National Socialists. Fritz Kranefuss was Wilhelm Keppler’s nephew. Henry A.Turner, Jr, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 244–6, 256, 433. 40. For Schellenberg’s own description of the Operation Zeppelin see The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 306–20. 41. About Dr. Felix Kersten see Achim Besgen, Der stille Befehl (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960). Kersten published his own memoirs Totenkopf und Treue (Hamburg: Robert Mölich, n.d. [1952]) and The Memoirs of Dr. Felix Kersten (Garden City: Doubleday, 1947). 42. In 1949 a medical expertise stated Schellenberg suffered since 1940 when he contracted a so-called Flexner-Ruhr (Flexner diarrhoea). This led to Colitis and a deterioration of his liver function. Medical affidavit of the Allgemeines Städtisches Krankenhaus Nuremberg, May 16, 1949, NA, RG 466, E 53, Box 30. 43. For Schellenberg’s own version of various aspects of his stay with Himmler and Kersten in Zhitomir see Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 346–57. 44. See Tom Bower, Klaus Barbie (London: Michael Joseph, 1984), p. 57, on Bousquet’s role in the increasing rounding up and deportations of Jews in France. 45. Martin Luther at this time held the position of Under Secretary in the Auswärtiges Amt. 46. On the Luther episode see Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 365–70. See also Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 589–90. 47. Curiously the controversial contacts between Schellenberg and important representatives of neutral Switzerland are not covered in Schellenberg’s The Schellenberg Memoirs, except for two meagre sentences on p. 372. 48. Jon Kimche, Spying for Peace: General Guisan and Swiss Neutrality (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961) is still informative. 49. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, pp. 79–81, offers a good summary on Eggen. 50. Meyer also called himself Dr. Paul Meyer-Schwertenbach and used the artist name Wolf Schwertenbach for his publications. Meyer also worked for Swiss intelligence under the name Dr. Ritzburg. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, p. 79. 51. Paul Karl Schmidt, since 1940, was Head of the Presseabteilung of the Foreign Office.

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52. Presumably Dr. Johannes Popitz, Prussian Finance Minister since 1933, actively involved in the German resistance, arrested in July 1944, and sentenced to death. 53. Schellenberg during a post-war interrogation mentioned his contacts to the Wallenbergs and expressed hope that his ‘Swedish friends’ might assist him in beginning a new career in legal work in Sweden. Interrogation of Schellenberg by Dr. R.M.W.Kempner, Nuremberg, 15 November 1947, SAN, S-45c. 54. General Fritz Erich Fellgiebel from 1939 to 1944 was head of the Nachrichtenverbindungswesen (communications) in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). After taking part in the rising against Hitler in 1944, he was arrested and sentenced to death. Gerhard Taddey, (ed.), Lexikon der deutschen Geschichte (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner, 1977), p. 339. 55. On background, organisation and activities of the Auslands-Organisation (AO) see especially Donald M.McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1977). 56. Martin Bormann, born 1900 in Halberstadt, by 1934 had advanced to Reichsleiter for Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s Stellvertreter. After Hess flew to Britain in May 1941, Bormann became chief of the Party Chancellery (Parteikanzlei) and was given the powers of a Reich Minister. As head of the Parteikanzlei he was the superior of the AO chief, Ernst Bohle. 57. Ernst Wilhelm Bohle was born in 1903 in Bradford, England, and received his early education in Capetown, South Africa. After university studies in Germany he was appointed chief of the AO by Rudolf Hess in May 1933. McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, pp. 45–8. 58. Schellenberg names Brandin in connection with the Wallenberg family during an interrogation by Robert Kempner but does not mention the group of Swedes in this connection. SAN, S-45c. 59. Dr Rudolf Dix, Finnish Consul General and lawyer. Statement under oath by Axel Brandin, 22 April 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-3. 60. Axel Brandin on 22 April 1948, declared under oath that in 1942 he was second in command at Svenska Taendsticks Aktiebolaget in Joenkoeping. Their Polish operation, MONZAP, was run by Lt.Ret. Carl Herslow and Tore Widen. Chief of Accounting was Stig Lagerberg. Reinhold Groenberg and Einar Gerge were engineers. In July 1942 all five were arrested for espionage and crimes against the German occupation forces in Poland. Almost simultaneously and for the same reason two directors of the Telefonaktiebolaget L.M.Ericsson, Sigfrid Haeggberg and Nils Berglind were arrested. SAN, Rep. 501, S-3; S45c. See also declaration under oath by Jacob Wallenberg, SAN, Rep. 501, S-3. 61. Professor Max de Crinis was close to or befriended with Schellenberg and had worked with him in the Venlo operation. See above. 62. Dr Hitter appears to be the neurologist ‘Dr med. et. phil. Wilhelm Bitter’, indeed previously concerned with international law and in the 1930s deciding to become a psychiatrist. For his version of the episode see statement under oath signed in Stuttgart, 24 May 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. 63. Reinhard Spitzy has published two volumes of memoirs: So haben wir das Reich verspielt (Munich: Langen Müller, 1994, revised and expanded edition, 1st edn 1986). The book was published in Britain as How We Squandered the Reich (Norwich: Michael Russell, 1997). So entkamen wir den Alliierten (Munich: Langen Müller, 1989). Spitzy’s view of the matter discussed here can be found in How We Squandered the Reich, pp. 331–3. Spitzy (p. 333) about Schellenberg: ‘Young, good-looking, and intelligent, he made a positive impression on me.’ 64. Cf. Spitzy, How We Squandered the Reich, pp. 335–6. Cf. statement under oath by Dr. Hubert von Breisky on 27 January 1948, in Lisbon, where the name is given as Theodor Russeau. SAN, Rep. 501, S-3.

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65. This probably refers to the propaganda of Franz Burri and his IPA or Internationale PresseAgentur. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, p. 81, suggests that Burri and his IPA were calmed down before Schellenberg met Masson. Schellenberg may have participated in restricting Burri, but Burri also had other enemies. 66. This most likely refers to the freeing of Dr. Ernst Mörgeli. Hans Rudolf Kurz, Nachrichtenzentrum Schweiz (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1972), p. 74. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, p. 81. 67. Ernst Franz Sedgwick Hanfstaengl, apparently of German-American background, prior to World War I had studied at Harvard University and worked in a New York art gallery owned by his family. He later denied that he had been expelled from the Harvard Club after toasting the German submarine commander who had sunk the passenger liner Lusitania. After the war he moved to Munich and threw his lot in with the Nazis. Hanfstaengl later published Hitler. The Missing Years (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1957) and Zwischen Weiβem und Braunem Haus (Munich: R.Piper, 1970). According to The New York Times of 17 June 1934, he arrived in New York on 16 June 1934. A large crowd of hostile demonstrators awaited him at the pier. See various documents and newspaper clippings in NA, RG 76, E 76, Box 9. 68. Anthony Cave Brown, The Secret Servant (London: Sphere, 1989, 1st edn 1988), p. 218, calls ‘Unity Valkyrie Mitford…an ardent Nazi’ who was said to have attempted suicide when England and Germany made war against each other. Hitler sent her back to Britain where she died some years later from the consequences of the attempted suicide. John Toland, Hitler (Ware: Wordsworth, 1997, 1st edn 1976), pp. 591, 611–12. 69. This presumably refers to the intelligence mission Unternehmen Elster of Erich Gimpel (cover name Edward George Green) and William Curtis Colepaugh (cover name William C.Caldwell) in 1944. The German agents were taken to the US by the submarine U 1230 and both were apprehended before beginning their espionage assignment. Interrogation of Schellenberg by Major Paul A.Neuland on 22 November 1945, SAN, S-45a. Erich Gimpel, Spion für Deutschland Aufgezeichnet von Will Berthold (Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1956). William Breuer, Hitler’s Undercover War (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1989), pp. 310–14. Günther W.Gellermann, Der andere Auftrag (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 1997), pp. 85–92. 70. Hans-Georg von Mackensen, born 1883 in Berlin, joined the Foreign Office in 1919, and was named Ambassador to Rome in 1938. He was recalled from there in August 1943. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 472. 71. Otto Skorzeny has published several volumes of memoirs. See for instance Geheimkommando Skorzeny (Hamburg: Hansa Verlag Josef Toth, 1950); Commando Extraordinary (New York: Ballantine, 1955). 72. Kurt Rieth, born 1881 in Antwerp, joined the Foreign Office in 1918, and was sent to Tangier in May 1942 to run the Consulate there temporarily. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 494. On his mission to the United States in 1941 see Nigel West, ‘Introduction’, British Security Coordination (London: St Ermin’s Press, 1998), pp. 153–4. 73. Statement by Schellenberg, 6 August 1945, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2: ‘I incurred considerable personal risk by having anything to do with such a conversation… I had no authorisation whatsoever for entering into conversation with a representative of a hostile power.’ 74. For more detail on the negotiations between Hewitt and Schellenberg see Ibid. Cf. Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, pp. 206–7. 75. Allen Welsh Dulles, Germany’s Underground (New York: Macmillan, 1947), p. 91: ‘the outstanding Norwegian hero, Bishop Berggrav’. 76. ‘Geheime Reichssache! Führerhauptquartier, den 12. Februar 1944. Ich befehle: 1.) Es ist ein einheitlicher deutscher geheimer Meldedienst zu schaffen. 2.) Mit der Führung dieses deutschen Meldedienstes beauftrage ich den Reichsführer SS …gez. Adolf Hitler.’ PA, AA,

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Abwehr 1942–44, Handakte Schellenberg. Cf. Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Geheime Kommandosache, 22 May 1944, BAMA, RH 2, 1537, and related documentation. 77. Coco Chanel (Gabrielle Chanel) and her involvement in what appears to have been a rather unprofessional German attempt to reach Churchill have been treated in several publications, most recently by Isabelle Fiemeyer, Coco Chanel: Un parfum mystère (Paris: Payot & Rivages, 1999), pp. 122–6. Fiemeyer reproduces the brief version of this operation from the allied report on Schellenberg edited here but is unable to add to the previously known skimpy details of the undertaking. Cf. Ulrich Schlie, (ed.), Albert Speer. “Alles, was ich weiβ” (Munich: F.A.Herbig, 1999), p. 193, FN 23. 78. Sir Samuel Hoare was the British Ambassador in Spain at the time. While Operation Modellhut, as it was called, appears to have had no results, the episode has become a source of less than persuasive speculations concerning Coco Chanel and Walter Schellenberg. 79. From the interrogations of Schellenberg the impression was gained that ‘Admiral Abe, chief of military mission in Germany was an old and trained intelligence officer and was recognized by others as Senior Chief’. The Japanese Naval Attaché, Admiral Kojima, had been in Berlin in the 1930s and returned 1944. He told Schellenberg that ‘his main object since return to Germany had been to bring about compromise peace between Germany and Russia’. Major General and Military Attaché Komatsu and his assistants Otani and Higuti, according to Schellenberg, maintained good contacts with Amt VI. From SHAEF, 5 July 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 26. 80. Generalleutnant Fritz Walter Thiele played a significant role in the attempted overthrow of July 1944 and was sentenced to death. Joachim Fest, Plotting Hitler’s Death (London: Phoenix, 1997), pp. 261–3, 313. Peter Padfield, Himmler (London: Papermac, 1995), pp. 504–5, 508. 81. In May 1948 Roger Masson wrote an affidavit on behalf of Walter Schellenberg who was being tried by the American Military Tribunal, Case 11, in Nuremberg. The avoidance of an SS landing at Duebendorf, according to Masson, was one of ten advantages gained by Switzerland and the Allies through the good services of Schellenberg. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, p. 133, FN 353. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, pp. 296–7. 82. See also SHAEF FORWARD to War Room, 5 July 1945, NA, RG 226, E 119A, Box 28: ‘two Hungarians introduced by Hungarian General Staff under diplomatic civet and who were in W.T. contact with London (source was also called ‘Nero’)’. 83. General Fritz Erich Fellgiebel was connected to the resistance and played an active role on 20 July. He was sentenced to death by the Volksgerichtshof on 10 August 1944, and executed. 84. Adrian Baron von Foelkersam was an experienced and decorated officer of the ‘LehrRegiment “Brandenburg” zbV’ who had later come to the Sicherheitsdienst. Julius Mader, Hitler’s Spionagegenerale sagen aus (Berlin-East: Verlag der Nation, 1972), p. 139. Helmuth Spaeter, Die Brandenburger (Munich: Walther Angerer, 1982), pp. 200–1. About the arrest of Canaris by Schellenberg see also Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 409–11. André Brissaud, Canaris (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974), pp. 322–4. Karl Heinz Abshagen, Canaris (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1955), p. 375. Heinz Höhne, Canaris (Munich: Wilhelm Goldmann, 1978, 1st edn 1976), pp. 543–4 (here, however, called Baron von Völkersam). 85.

Gottfried von Bismarck—whose life I had occasion to save through my intervention with Himmler in the beginning of 1945, allegedly took part in the events of July 20. Himmler first refused to intervene. But I was able to convince him after using these arguments of my Swedish friends, with whom von Bismarck had good connections, as warning:

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‘The death of a descendent of the great Bismarck would create as bad an impression against Germany in England, as the V-weapons.’ Himmler was deeply impressed by the importance attached abroad to the fate of von Bismarck and apparently discussed the matter at length with Hitler. Against all expectation, von Bismarck was acquitted… My discussions with Himmler at the time made it possible that he was not kept in custody, but only ordered to stay on his estate.—In this case I also advised the Bismarck family through the intermediary of Swedish friends.

Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg, Amtschef VI, Autobiography, USAMHI, William J.Donovan Papers, Box 87b. 86. Frederick R.Loofbourow was stationed as American Commercial Attaché in Zurich and worked with the OSS as 493. In September 1944 he transferred to the OSS. Neal H.Petersen, (ed.), From Hitler’s Doorstep: The Wartime Intelligence Reports of Allen Dulles, 1942–1945 (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 625. 87. Concerning an earlier mission of Gerhard Alois Westrick to the United States see Johannes Reiling, Deutschland: Safe for Democracy?, pp. 396–400. The firm referred to, according to Reiling, is the Standard Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft AG, owned by International Telephone & Telegraph Company. Until 1938, Westrick had been partner of Heinrich Albert in a Berlin law firm. (Albert, in turn, had been very closely linked to German intelligence operations in the neutral United States from 1914 to 1917.) During interrogation in Nuremberg, Schellenberg stated that ‘the Reich Postal Minister tried time and again to dissolve I.T.&T.… and especially the Standard Electric as an enemy favored enterprise’. Westrick apparently did all in his power to protect the firm, if for ‘egotistical reasons, that is to preserve his own property’, as Schellenberg put it. Schellenberg Testimony, 12 February 1946, SAN, S-45b. Cf. Higham, Trading with the Enemy, pp. 132–3: ‘Following the assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944 Behn’s German empire very nearly was confiscated by Postminister Wilhelm Ohnesorge, but Schellenberg took a great risk and protected it once more.’ 88. When questioned after the war, Schellenberg named Lindemann, Prince Hohenlohe, Westrick and Kreuter as persons with whom he was able to discuss as early as 1943 the necessity of overthrowing or even killing Hitler. Interrogation, 13 January 1947, SAN, Rep. 502, S-45c. 89. This appears to have been ‘Karl Lindemann…director of the Dresdner Bank and the HAPAG shipping combine and simultaneously chairman of HAPAG’s ostensible competitor, the North German Lloyd steamship company’. Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast, pp. 53, 327. 90. Hans Frölicher apparently cultivated good connections in Germany to such a degree that some of his Swiss contemporaries, such as Alfred Ernst of the Nachrichten- und Sicherheitsdienst des Armeestabs, reacted negatively. On 19 April 1942, he wrote to Masson (Strictly Confidential): ‘…it is to be assumed that, as usual, he will represent not the Swiss but the German viewpoint’ (transl.). Quoted in Pierre-Th. Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin (Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1990, first 1989), pp. 217, 423–4. 91. For further details of the Schellenberg/Musy negotiations and persons concerned see various interrogations and related reports such as Internal Memorandum from Capt. Oughton to Lt. Col. Stimson, Camp 020, 8 August 1945, PRO, KV 2/96. 92. This agreement belongs to the more general context of the creation of a single or unified German intelligence service, one of Schellenberg’s more significant professional goals.

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Concerning the background to the agreement see Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 280 (where the wrong date of 4 December 1944, is given for Hitler’s decree for a unified intelligence service) and Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 209 (where the wrong date of 12 April 1944, is given for Hitler’s decree). More rewarding is von Grote to Ribbentrop and others, 11 March 1944, PA, Inland II g, Vol. 17b. Grote proposes cooperation by the Foreign Office in order to obtain cooperation from the SD. 93. For Japanese views of Russia cf. ‘Brig Gen Makoto Onodera, Imperial Military Attache, Stockholm’, from Major Paul Kubala, Seventh Army Interrogation Center, 28 May 1945, NA, RG 226, E 108A, Box 287. 94. Cf. ‘Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg 27th June–12th July 1945’, NA, RG 226, Records of the OSS, Box 91: ‘Regarding the present abode of Amt VI files, Schellenberg stated that Amt VI was first transferred to Burg Lauenstein near Probstzella then to Marquardstein near Munich.’ 95. Henry Goverts was connected with the German resistance and helped Hans Bernd Gisevius to escape from Germany. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, Vol. 2, p. 367. Joseph E.Persico, Piercing the Reich (New York: Ballantine, 1979), p. 193. 96. The following text appears almost literally in Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 433–4. 97. Horst Wagner, born 1906 in Poznan, was very close to the Reichsminister des Auswärtigen (Foreign Minister) Joachim von Ribbentrop and since May 1943 was the ‘alleinige Verbindungsführer des Auswärtigen Amts zum Reichsführer SS’ (chief official for liaison between the Foreign Office and Heinrich Himmler). Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 523. 98. Hans Thomsen, born 1891 in Hamburg, joined the Foreign Office in 1919 and was named Gesandter 1. Klasse (Minister) in Stockholm on 1 January 1943. He took up his position there on 24 February 1943. Thomsen’s predecessor had been Victor Prinz zu Wied, born 1877 in Neuwied and with the Foreign Office since 1905, who had represented Nazi Germany in Sweden since 1933. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A-E, pp. 519, 526. The false identification of Hans Thomsen as ‘the Swedish Ambassador, Amtman Thomsen’ in Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 433, has been corrected in the first German edition Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 353. 99. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 434: ‘One cannot accomplish anything with this sort of nonsense in a total war.’ Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 354, contains the same sentence. 100. Concerning peace, Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 434: ‘[Sweden] would have a special interest in the pacification of Northern Europe.’ The German edition Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 354, does not mention this aspect. 101. This curious proposal is missing in the otherwise comparable text in Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 436. 102. While this last sentence is missing in The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 436, and in the German Memoiren, p. 355, the German edition reports: ‘In this way about 13,000 Danish and Norwegian prisoners could be transported to Neuengamme and there be attended to by the Swedish Red Cross.’ (Transl.) The English edition more emphatically states (p. 436): ‘Thus, the intervention of my own faithful personnel saved many lives.’ 103. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 437: ‘I suggested that he should ask Count Bernadotte to fly to General Eisenhower and transmit to him his offer of capitulation.’ 104. Dr Fritz Hesse, Memo, 10 June 1943, PA, AA, Inland IIa, Im AA beschäftigte Angehörige der SS, R 100311, shows that Hesse was active in matters concerning Britain and used the British SS-officer Thomas Cooper for propaganda undertakings. According to Andrew, Secret Service, p. 384, Dick White of MI5 knew Hesse and was able to use him as a source. 105. Himmler lacked any kind of military experience. Concerning his increasing troubles on the military and on the political side, see Padfield, Himmler, pp. 566–9.

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106. Telegram 9099 of 21 April 1945, in Petersen, From Hitler’s Doorstep, p. 508: ‘King Leopold near Salzburg’. 107. The interrogators may not have understood the context. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 432: ‘I tried also to secure the release of another former French Minister, Paul Reynaud, but this attempt also failed because of Kaltenbrunner’s opposition.’ See also Braunschweig, Geheimer Draht nach Berlin, p. 297. 108. Indications are that Masson was particularly interested in the release of the family of General Giraud because the latter had been his teacher at the École supérieure de guerre in Paris. Ibid., p. 470. Allen Dulles, according to this source, on 5 April, commented on the release: ‘Schellenberg is obviously attempting to buy immunity as he has just delivered Gen. Giraud’s Family to Masson who repatriated them to France…’. 109. Dr Leonardo Conti informed on the SA leader Walter Stennes and rose to high rank within the SS. He committed suicide in his cell in Nuremberg. Höhne, The Order of the Death’s Head, pp. 75, 655. 110. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 439–40: ‘That is just what you must protect yourself against—you still have enough higher SS leaders, and you are still in a strong enough position to arrest him. If there is no other way, then the doctors will have to intervene.’ 111. General Bor is a kind of cover name of General Tadeusz Komorowski who on 1 August 1944, led the Polish uprising against the German occupation forces in Warsaw. He and his troops held out against the superior German forces under the SS leader Erich von dem BachZelewski for 63 days. John Toland, The Last 100 Days (London: Phoenix, 1996, 1st edn 1965), pp. 45–6. According to Mark M.Boatner III, The Biographical Dictionary of World War II (Novato: Presidio, 1999, 1st edn 1996), p. 288, General Bor was liberated at Innsbruck by US forces in May 1945. 112. Brandt was sentenced to death by a group of Nazi leaders in Berlin in April 1945. Himmler appears to have intervened and saved Brandt from this execution. Having survived the war, Brandt was sentenced to death and hanged after the so-called Doctors’ Trial in Nuremberg. 113. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 447: ‘I suggested National Unity Party’ In the German edition Memoiren, p. 361, no name of the new party is given. 114. Concerning the liberation efforts for Vanaman, cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 447–8. See also ‘Testimony of Walter Schellenberg’, Nuremberg, 12 February 1946, taken by Captain Horace Hahn. XE 001752, NA, RG 319, IRR-PS, Box 195. Colonel Rayens, Assistant Military Attaché in Stockholm, later was to play a significant role in arranging the delivery of Schellenberg from Stockholm to Frankfurt. SAINT, London, to SAINT, Stockholm, 24 July 1945, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 115. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 449–50. 116. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 450, where the direct approach to General Eisenhower mentioned here is not described as the final decision. 117. Cf. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, p. 452. 118. ‘Annexe written by Hauptsturmfuehrer Goering’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. 119. ‘S/Ldr H.C.Harrison’ is not further identified, but he was evidently connected with the writing and ‘the editing’ of the 118-page report on Schellenberg. Squadron Leader H.C.Harrison to Lieutenant Burke, 28 December 1945, PRO, KV 2/99. Note from J.Chenhalls, 29 November 1945, PRO, KV 2/98. 120. On the Kunzcewincz case see also ‘Report on Interrogation of Walter Schellenberg, 27th June–12th July 1945’, NA, RG 226, E 125A, Box 2. Colonel Rohleder was in charge of Canaris’ Abwehrabteilung IIIF since 1938. IIIF’s main task was counterespionage against foreign intelligence services. Gert Buchheit, Der deutsche Geheimdienst (Munich: List, 1966), p. 110. Schellenberg, Memoiren, p. 329. 121. Joined the German Foreign Office in 1938, member of the Personal Staff of the Foreign Minister since 1941, Staatssekretär of the Foreign Office since 1943. Sentenced 1949 in the

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‘Wilhelmstrassen-Prozeß’ in Nuremberg. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 513. 122. Wilhelm Höttl during interrogation confirmed that these reports were written ‘by the wellknown journalist SS Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. Giselher Wirsing… who had been called to Amt VI by Schellenberg.’ XE 000882, NA, RG 319, IRR, Box 617. 123. Cf. SAINT London to SAINT Washington, 13 November 1945, reports on interrogations of Schueddekopf, NA, RG 226, Field Station files, Box 28:

Referat Kleinkriegsplanung (Resistance Movement). This Referat was formed at the beginning of 1945 at the instigation of Dr. Schoen. PW states that he was informed by Dr. Schoen that the latter had on or about 5 Apr of this year had a talk with representatives of the Werwolf movement (SS-Ogruf Pruetzmann) and of the SS-Jagdverbände (Ostubaf Skorzeny). PW believes that representatives of the OKW were also present at the meeting. 124. Predecessor institutions to the HWWA-Institut für Weltwirtschaftsforschung and the Institut für Weltwirtschaft an der Universität Kiel. 125. Concerning Operation Zeppelin cf. Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 241–7. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs, pp. 306–20. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 13, pp. 573–96. IFZ, ED 90/5. ‘“Zeppelin” plante die Ermordung Stalins’, Der Spiegel, Vol. 21, No. 30 (17 July 1967), pp. 42–9. 126. Ludwig Moyzisch was the SD-man in Turkey to whom Elyesa Bazna, the clever valet of the British Ambassador Sir Hughe Montgomery Knatchbull-Hugessen, delivered British documents from 1943 on. Cave Brown, Bodyguard of Lies, pp. 391–405. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, pp. 340–6. See also Elyesa Bazna, I Was Cicero (New York: Dell, 1964). L.C.Moyzisch, Operation Cicero (London: Allan Wingate, 1950). On Cicero’s information for Moyzisch see Persico, Piercing the Reich, p. 90. 127. General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach was captured at Stalingrad and headed the Bund deutscher Offiziere (Association of German Officers), which merged with the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (National Committee Free Germany). The officers cooperated with the USSR, calling for the overthrow of Hitler and an end to the war. 128. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 872, refers to Oshima as ‘the fiery and hottempered Japanese ambassador, General Hiroshi Oshima, who had often impressed this observer as more Nazi than the Nazis’. 129. Presumably A.C.N.Nambiar who ran the Zentrale Freies Indien (Central Office Free India) in Berlin following the departure of Bose to Japan. Nambiar later became India’s first ambassador to Bonn. Rudolf Hartog, Im Zeichen des Tigers (Herford: Busse Seewald, 1991), p. 85. 130. Presumably Subhas Chandra Bose who ‘hoped that a German victory in the war would bring independence to his country’. Gerhard L.Weinberg, A World at Arms, pp. 231–2. 131. Concerning the contacts between Schellenberg and Gehlen see also Gehlen’s later published version in Reinhard Gehlen, The Service (New York: World Publishing/Times Mirror, 1972), p. III. Cf. Mary Ellen Reese, General Reinhard Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1990), pp. 17–18. Charles Whiting, Gehlen: Germany’s Master Spy (New York: Ballantine, 1972), pp. 68–9. 132. On this see Walter Hagen, Unternehmen Bernhard (Wels/Starnberg: Verlag Welsermühl, 1955). 133. Wilhelm Rudolf Mann, according to Henry A.Turner, Jr, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 235, 292, was the only

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I.G.Farben manager who joined the Nazi party before 1933. He joined in December 1931 but withdrew again from the party in late 1932. 134. Manfred Freiherr von Killinger was appointed Minister (Gesandter) in Bucharest in December 1940 and took over the office in January 1941. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 461. 135. Probably Dr. Günther Altenburg who since 1943 was a member of the Personal Staff of the Foreign Minister and since autumn 1944 first served as chief of the ‘Dienststelle Gesandter Altenburg in Vienna’ and from December 1944 ran the ‘Dienststelle des Auswärtigen Amts für Bulgarien und Rumänien’. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 411. Franz Alfred Six, chief of the ‘Kulturpolitische Abteilung’ of the Foreign Office since April 1943. Ibid. 136. Probably Martin Lundquist who, according to Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, pp. 52, 54, sympathized with Germany and helped Canaris and Hans Wagner, chief of the ‘Abwehrstelle’ Stockholm. 137. Colonel Hans Wagner officially worked under the Military Attaché Bruno von Uthmann and used the cover name Dr. Neumann. Ibid. 138. IPA most likely refers to Internationale Presse-Agentur, an agency run from Germany and Austria by the Swiss National Socialist Franz Burri. Burri belonged to a group of Nazi sympathizers organised 1941 in Stuttgart as Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland. Fuhrer, Spionage gegen die Schweiz, pp. 81, 130. Garliński, The Swiss Corridor, pp. 104–6. 139. This information may be the result of the confusion of Schellenberg’s interrogators, for Harro Schulze-Boysen’s wife since 26 July 1936, was Libertas (called Libs) Haas-Heye, daughter of Wilhelm Haas-Heye, who operated an art school in Berlin, and granddaughter of Philipp Prince zu Eulenburg und Hertefeld. Heinz Höhne, Kennwort: Direktor (Frankfurt: S.Fischer, 1970), pp. 137–8. See also Heinz Höhne, Codeword. Direktor (New York: Berkley Medallion, 1972), pp. 164–5. The foreign wife mentioned here may be the wife of Arvid Harnack, another leading member of Rote Kapelle. See below. 140. This refers to Arvid Harnack who, as an Oberregierungsrat, was employed in the Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Reich Ministry of Economics) and married in 1926 to Mildred Fish, an American born and raised in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. See curriculum vitae in Eberhard Brüning (ed.), Mildred Harnack-Fish, Variationen über das Thema Amerika (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1988), pp. 142–3. 141. Cf. Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, pp. 310–11, who suggests that Scheliha may have thought that he spied for London rather than Moscow. For a more complete treatment, see Ulrich Sahm, Rudolf von Scheliha (Munich: C.H.Beck, 1990). 142. On Heinz Pannwitz see Höhne, Kennwort: Direktor, p. 260, where he is identified as SSHauptsturmführer and member of the Confessional Church (Bekennende Kirche). 143. For the background of Kurt Jahnke see Reinhard R.Doerries, ‘Tracing Kurt Jahnke: Aspects of the Study of German Intelligence’, Historians and Archivists, George O.Kent (ed.) (Fairfax: George Mason University Press, 1991), pp. 27–44. 144. In fact, Carl Marcus in late 1944 gave himself up to the French, managed to contact the British, and was taken to Britain for debriefing. Although many of Marcus’ activities remain in the dark, see now the revealing essay by Ulrich Schlie, ‘Carl Marcus (1911–1989) und das Jahnke-Büro im Fadenkreuz angloamerikanischer Dienste im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, Reinhard R.Doerries, (ed.), Diplomaten und Agenten (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C.Winter, 2001), pp. 85–111. 145. There is a lack of reliable information on Jahnkes collaborators and agents. In part this may be the consequence of a rapid change of employers from the 1920s to the 1940s. 146. Concerning Kurt Jahnkes intelligence activities in the United States and Mexico during World War I see Reinhard R.Doerries, Imperial Challenge (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 186–8. Reinhard R.Doerries, ‘Die Tätigkeit deutscher Agenten in den USA während des Ersten Weltkrieges und ihr Einfluss auf die diplomatischen

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Beziehungen zwischen Washington und Berlin’, Doerries, (ed.), Diplomaten und Agenten, pp. 29–48. 147. This was confirmed by Sergei Kondraschew who in 1995 in the course of an academic conference in Tutzing informed me that Jahnke was captured by Soviet combat troops in 1945 and executed some time later following interrogation. 148. Count Galeazzo Ciano had married Edda Mussolini, the daughter of Benito Mussolini, and in 1936, at the age of 33, had become Italy’s Foreign Minister. 149. Hermann Löns’ novel Der Wehrwolf (1910) treats a historical context from the period of the Thirty Years War. 150. Concerning Standard Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft and International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation see Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast, pp. 323–4. 151. Sofindus (Sociedád Financiera Industrial) was one of several firms in Spain receiving funds from Germany, involved in transactions for the Germans, and at times earning foreign currency for Nazi undertakings: Adam Lebor, Hitler’s Secret Bankers (London: Pocket Books, 1977), pp. 89–92. On Bernhardt’s role during the Spanish Civil War, cf. Höhne, Canaris, pp. 222–4. Gerhard L. Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting3. World War II, 1937–1939 (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1994; 1st edn, 1980), p. 152. 152. Schellenberg relied heavily on Goering for assistance in freeing a great number of inmates and prisoners during the final period of the Nazis. Cf. Testimony under oath by Franz Goering, signed Hamburg, 24 February 1948, SAN, Rep. 501, S-4. 153. Hewel (1904–45), an early supporter of Hitler, joined the German Foreign Office in 1938 and became ‘Representative of the Foreign Minister with the Führer’ in 1940. Auswärtiges Amt, Ergänzungsband zu den Serien A bis E, p. 452. E.Syring, ‘Walther Hewel: Ribbentrops Mann beim ‘Führer”’, in R.Smelser, E.Syring and R.Zitelmann (eds) Die Braune Elite II (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993), pp. 150–65. 154. Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1955), p. 372, describes a ‘deeply secret connection’ between Peter Kleist and ‘an intermediary of Russian diplomacy, named Klauss’ who had ‘secretive connections’ to Russian intelligence (Transl.). The impression transmitted by Ritter is clearly that Klaus was a Russian agent. Cf. Foreign Office to British Embassy, Moscow, 20 August 1944, PRO, FO 371/39088: ‘We have received a report…that Ribbentrop recently sent an emissary named Bruno von Kleist to Stockholm in order to enter into negotiations for concluding peace with U.S.S.R.’ See Vojtech Mastny, ‘Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War IF, American Historical Review, Vol. 77, No. 5 (December 1972), pp. 1365–88, for a relevant analysis. Cf. Michael Bloch, Ribbentrop (London: Transworld/Bantam, 1992), pp. 386–7. On Klaus see especially Fleischhauer, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens, passim.

Bibliography Note: The following list of titles is limited to publications related to Walter Schellenberg and useful for a better understanding of his professional career. Full references to the respective archival records and other publications are offered in the footnotes. Amort, C. and I.M.Jedlicka, The Canaris File. London: Allan Wingate, 1970. (Translated from French edition, translated from Czech.) Bernadotte, Folke, The Fall of the Curtain. London: Cassell, 1945. (Translated from Swedish.) Besgen, Achim, Der stille Befehl. Munich: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1960. Best, S.Payne, The Venlo Incident. London: Hutchinson, 1950. Bonjour, Edgar, Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität, Vols 5, 8. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1970, 1975. Braunschweig, Pierre-Th., Geheimer Draht nach Berlin. Zürich: Verlag Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 1989. Brissaud, André, Canaris. New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1974. (Translated from French.) Brissaud, André, The Nazi Secret Service. New York: W.W.Norton, 1974. (Translated from French.) Browder, George C., Foundations of the Nazi Police State. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1990. Costello, John, Ten Days That Saved the West. London: Bantam/ Transworld, 1991. (US edition: Ten Days to Destiny.) Fink, Jürg, Die Schweiz aus der Sicht des Dritten Reiches 1933–1945. Zürich: Schulthess Polygraphischer Verlag, 1985. Fleischhauer, Ingeborg, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens. Berlin: Siedler, 1986. Fleming, Gerald, ‘Die Herkunft des “Bernadotte-Briefes” an Himmler vom 10. März 1945’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 26 (No. 4, 1978). Fuhrer, Hans Rudolf, Spionage gegen die Schweiz. Frauenfeld: Huber, 1982. Guisan, Henri, Bericht an die Bundesversammlung über den Aktivdienst 1939–1945. No publication data [Bern, Foreword dated March 1946]. Hagen, Walter, Unternehmen Bernhard. Wels: Welsermühl, 1955. (Walter Hagen is Wilhelm Hoettl.) Hewins, Ralph, Count Folke Bernadotte. London: Hutchinson, n.d. [Foreword dated December, 1948]. Höhne, Heinz, The Order of the Death’s Head. New York: Ballantine, 1989 (first published 1966). (Translated from German.) Hoettl, Wilhelm, The Secret Front. London: Phoenix, 2000 (first published 1953). Imperial War Museum, The Black Book (Sonderfahndungsliste G.B.). Facsimile Reprint Series, Number 2. London: Imperial War Museum, 1989. Jensen-Lorenz, Ulrike, ‘Dänische Häftlinge im KZ Neuengamme 1944/45: Die Aktion Bernadotte und das Skandinavierlager’. Universität Hamburg, Master’s Thesis, 1996. Kahn, David, Hitler’s Spies. New York: Macmillan, 1978. Kersten, Felix, The Kersten Memoirs, 1940–1945. London: Hutchinson, 1956. (Translated from the German edition, but containing some other texts by the author.) Kersten, Felix, Totenkopf und Treue. Hamburg: Robert Mölich, n.d. [Foreword by Kersten dated June 1952]. Koblik, Steven, The Stones Cry Out. New York: Holocaust Library, 1988.

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MacDonald, Callum A., ‘The Venlo Affair’, European Studies Review, Vol. 8 (No. 4, 1978). Manvell, Roger and Heinrich Fraenkel, Heinrich Himmler. London: Heinemann, 1965. Padfield, Peter, Himmler. London: Papermac/Macmillan, 1995 (first pubished 1990). Schellenberg, Walter, Aufzeichnungen. Wiesbaden/Munich: Limes Verlag Niedermayer und Schlüter, 1979. (Includes an appendix with original and translated documents and opinions.) Schellenberg, Walter, Hitler’s Secret Service. New York: Pyramid Books/Pyramid Communications, 1958 and 1974. (Later edition of The Labyrinth.) Schellenberg, Walter, Invasion 1940. London: St Ermin’s Press, 2000. (This book was not written or published by Walter Schellenberg.) Schellenberg, Walter, The Labyrinth. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956. Schellenberg, Walter, Memoiren. Cologne: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959. Schellenberg, Walter, The Schellenberg Memoirs. London: André Deutsch, 1956. Trevor-Roper, H.R., The Last Days of Hitler. London: Macmillan, 1947. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vols. 12–13. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, n.d. and 1952. Wyman, David S., The Abandonment of the fews. New York: Pantheon/ Random House, 1985 (first published 1984).

Index Not all names in the documents could be identified or completed with certainty, but all except Heinrich Himmler, Adolf Hitler, Walter Schellenberg and the RSHA/SS groupings are listed.

A 54 (see Thümmel, Paul) Abe, Katsuo, 142, 238–9, 365 AB L.M. Ericsson, 28 Abwehr, 21, 22, 29, 32, 77, 79, 89, 93, 97–8, 100, 136–7, 139–40, 143–4, 150, 159–60, 217, 225, 246, 248–9, 256, 259, 261, 266, 274, 277–8, 289, 291, 295, 298, 301, 305–6, 368, 370 Achmeteli, Michael, 233 Adams, 278 Aftenbladet, 202 “Agent 509”, 321 Albert, Heinrich F., 360, 366 Albert, Wilhelm, 4, 69–73, 335, 337, 358 Albuquerque, Hermes Lins, 97, 313, 329 Allason, Rupert (see West, Nigel) Allgemeine Electricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG), 82 Altenburg, Günther, 265, 370 Anderson, 324 Andrew, Christopher, 10, 13, 343 Andreyew, 323 Angarkrona (Ankakrona), 201 Antonescu, Ion, 154 Aoki, 240 Arco von (auf) Valley, Count, 161, 347 Arlt, 272 Arnold, Karl, 229, 255, 317 Arnoldsson, Hans, 34 Arrow Cross Party, 306 Astor, Hugh, 353 Auschwitz (Concentration Camp), 52, 350 Auslander Organisation (see Auslandsorganisation) Auslands Organisation (see Auslandsorganisation) Auslandsorganisation (A.O.), 108–9, 227, 241, 247, 362–3 Bach-Zelewski, Erich von dem, 368 Backe, Herbert (Zusker), 282 Badoglio, Pietro, 139, 304 Bank of England, 254 Bartholomäus (Bartholomaeus), Alfred, 335

Index

321

Barwirsch, 258 Basinski, 321 Bassenge (Miss), 218 Bassenge, Gerhard, 218 Bauersfeldt (Bauersfeld), 27, 320 Baun, Adolf, 272 Baun, Hermann, 232, 308–9 Bazna, Elyesa (Elyeza), 314–15, 369 Bayer, 260–1 Becher, Kurt, 347–8 Bechtolsheim, von, 289 Beck, Ludwig, 149 Behn, Sosthenes (“Colonel Behn”), 92, 360–1, 366 Behrends, Walter, 339 Beissner, 244 Bemberg, Bernard, 172 Bentivegni, Franz-Eccard von, 127, 136, 209 Berding, Andrew H., 353 Bergen-Belsen (Concentration Camp), 173, 181, 347 Berger, Gottlob, 119, 126, 129, 153–4, 161, 164, 171, 176–7, 181–3, 272, 292, 318–19, 332, 334 Berggrav, Eivind, 135, 364 Berglind (also Berglund), Nils, 363 Berlin University, 91 Berliner Boersen Zeitung, 119 Bernadotte, Count Folke, XIII, 32, 35–44, 53, 60, 65–7, 163, 165–71, 173, 177–80, 183–91, 193, 197–202, 258, 267, 329, 349–50, 352, 357, 367 Bernhardt, Johannes F, 314, 371 Bernheim de Villiers, 172 Besekow, 300 Best, Sigismund Payne, 11–14, 75, 338–9 Best, Werner, 73–4, 187, 189–93, 197, 320, 359 Bevensiepen (Bovensiepen?), 187 “Bibelforscher” (see Jehova’s Witnesses) Bibra, Ernst Sigismund Freiherr von, 344 Bickler, Hermann, 228, 332 Bidault, Georges, 325 Bielstein, 83 Bilke, Manfred, 209 Bismarck (family), 152 Bismarck-Schönhausen, Gottfried Count von, 29, 130, 150, 152, 365–6 Bitter, Wilhelm (in the records also Dr. Hitter), 110–11, 363 Bjoern-Hansen, Arne, 347 Blum, R., 47 Blunt, Anthony, 340 Bocchini, Arturo, 72 Bochow, (Hans?), 210 Boening, Werner, 222, 293 Boheman, Erik, 198 Bohle, Ernst Wilhelm, 109, 227, 247, 334, 363 Böhme (Boehme), Franz, 192, 196, 198–9 Bolschwingh, Otto von, 264 Bor, General (name used for Komorowski, Tadeusz)

Index

322

Bormann, Martin, 109, 155, 175, 181, 227, 363 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 238, 248, 369 Boss, 218 Bousquet, René, 104, 362 Brandenburg (see Lehrregiment Brandenburg) Brandin, Axel, 28–9, 109, 121, 128, 134, 201, 363 Brandt, Karl (Hitler’s physician), 181, 368 Brandt, Rudolf (Himmler’s secretary), 34, 103, 124–6, 138, 164, 175–6, 178, 182, 184, 188, 191, 280, 285 Braun, Eva, 181, 322 Braunschweig, Pierre-Th., 344 Breisky, Hubert von, 119, 133, 363 Breitman, Richard, 356 Bremer (Iburg), 357 Brettschneider, 124 Brindemann, 192 Brissaud, André, 8, 55, 333, 347 Bross, 301 Brown (cover name of Schellenberg, Walter), 133 Buchenwald (Concentration Camp), 172–3, 181, 348 Buecking, 262 Bütefisch (Buetefisch), Heinrich, 260–1, 281–2 Bullock, Alan, XIV Bund der Schweizer in Grossdeutschland (BSG), 370 Bund deutscher Offiziere (Association of German Officers), 369 Buntrock, Georg, 159, 187, 293 Burckhardt, Carl Jacob, 172–3 Burckhardt, Peter L., 146–7, 161 Bürkner (Buerkner), Leopold, 136, 291 Burri, Franz, 363, 370 C (Sir Stewart Menzies), 361 Cable, Eric Grant, 101, 124 Caldwell, William C. (cover name of Colepaugh, William Curtis) Cameron, Rory, 353 Canaris, Constantin, 304 Canaris, Wilhelm, XIV, 8, 22, 32, 53, 79–81, 89, 93, 96–7, 100, 112, 136, 150–2, 212, 225, 228, 266, 274, 277, 279, 304–5, 323, 330, 333, 342, 347, 365, 368, 370 Careel, 308 Carstenn (Denmark) (Carstenns?), 300 Carstenns (Carstenn?), 226 Casement, Sir Roger, 17 Cassel, 278 Caucasian People’s Group, 82 Cavoure (spelling uncertain), 213–14 Cellarius, Alexander, 234, 301 Chamberlain, Neville, 337–8 Chanel, Coco (Chanel, Gabrielle), 139–40, 364–5 Charité Hospital (Berlin), 110, 338 Chaul, 221 Chiang Kai Shek, 95–6, 99, 279, 281

Index

323

Chiron, 184, 186 Christensen, Bernhard, 12, 338 Christescu, 233, 264 Christianson, William C, 53 Christie, Malcolm Graham, 9, 11–12, 337 Churchill, Randolph, 115 Churchill, Sir Winston, 115–16, 139–40, 364 Ciano, Count Galeazzo, 284, 371 Cicero (see Bazna, Elyesa) Classen, 237 Claus, Edgar (see Klaus, Edgar) Clauss, Edgar (see Klaus, Edgar) Clay, Lucius D., 357 Codreanu, 264 Coehmen (or Kohmen), 240, 246 Cohen, Yehoshua, 348–9 Colepaugh, William Curtis (false identity, Caldwell, William C), 364 Confessional Church (Bekennende Kirche), 370 Conti, Leonardo, 174, 368 Cooper, Thomas, 367 Coppens (see Klop, Dirk) Copper (see Klop, Dirk) Corps Guestphalia, 3, 335, 346 Cossel, Henning Hans von, 226 Coue, 278–9 Cramer, Fritz, 321 Cramer, M., 344 Crinis, Max de, 12–13, 110, 174–5, 338, 363 Crous (DNB), 234, 245 Curth, 317–18 Dacre, Lord (Trevor-Roper, Hugh R.), 14, 31, 35, 47, 333–4, 337, 339, 349, 353–4 Dankwort, Werner, 320 Dansey, Claude, 11, 343 Dardel, von, 190, 193, 197–8 Darnand, Joseph, 228, 299 Darré, Richard Walther, 334 Daufeldt, Hans-Christian, 23, 110–11, 248, 277, 318, 324–5, 328, 343 Degrelle, Léon, 300 Delarue, Jacques, 8 Delius (see Wagner, Stuttgart) DEMAG, 212 Demarest, 111 Deutsch, Andre, 358 Deutsche Lufthansa, 86 Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (DNB), 225, 234, 245, 278 Deuxieme Bureau, 104 Dewitz, Eckhardt von, 176, 187, 324 Dieckhoff, Hans-Heinrich, 344–5 Diehn, August, 281 Dietrich, Otto, 334

Index

324

Dietze, Rhoderich, 221, 326 Dillon Read & Co., 112 Dincklage, Hans von, 139 Dirksen, von (Mrs.), 209 Dittges, 244 Dittleff (Ditleff), Niels Christian, 349 Dix, Rudolf, 109, 363 DNB (see Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro) Doenhoff (Dönhoff), Count, 318–19 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 9 Dombrowski, Iwan, 210 Dönitz, Karl, 40–2, 60, 67, 152, 191–3, 195–7, 199, 227, 239, 241 Doriot, Jacques, 228, 299 Dresdner Bank, 366 Duggan, John P, 17 Duke of Windsor (see Edward VIII) Dulles, Allen Welsh, 25, 99, 155, 158, 164, 218, 268, 361–2, 368 Dulles, John Foster, 99, 362 Duplitzer, 234, 245 Eckeberg, 200 Edward VIII (Duke of Windsor), 15–17, 19, 20, 78, 334, 340–1 Eggen, Hans Wilhelm, 23, 106, 116–17, 146–7, 155, 158, 182, 240, 242, 268–70, 343 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 34–5, 37, 40, 168–70, 172, 184–5, 195, 198–9, 367–8 Elser, Georg, 359 Emden Soehne, 234 Endo, Matsu, 326 Engelhorn, 150 Erdmann, Christl, 258, 351 Erdmannsdorf, Otto von, 334 Ernst, Alfred, 366 Eross (Sofia), 234 Essener Nationalzeitung, 87 Ettel, Erwin, 90, 243, 247 Eulenburg und Hertefeld, Philipp Prince zu, 370 Europa Press, 225 Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, 357 F 479 (cover name of Fischer, Franz) Fabri, 214 Falkenhausen, Alexander von, 279 Fanelsa, 299 Faross, Günter, 229 Fast, 122, 234, 255, 314 Fastnacht, 328 Fegelein (Mrs.), 181 Fegelein, Hermann, 154, 165, 169, 175, 177, 181 Fellgiebel, Fritz Erich, 108, 149, 295, 362, 365 Finke, August, 27, 88, 132–3, 285, 287, 316, 319–20, 360 Fischer (IV.E.3), 214 Fischer (Conti-Öl), 282

Index

325

Fischer, Franz, 11, 338 Fischer, Fritz, XIV, 333 Fish, Mildred, 370 Fleischhauer, Ingeborg, 345 Fleming, Gerald, 352 Flick, 3 Focke, Albrecht, 256, 261 Foelkersam, Adrian Baron von, 151, 365 Foerster, von, 312 Folkets Dagblad, 87–8, 121, 315, 319 Forrestal, James Vincent, 112 Franco, Francisco, 97 Frank, Karl Hermann, 9 Franz (see Fischer, Franz) Free Corps (Freikorps), 4 Freise, Eugen, 299 Freisler, Roland, 152 Fremde Heere Ost, 124–5, 141, 158, 235, 251, 287, 290, 308–9, 322 Fremde Heere West, 141, 290, 307 Freund, Karl, 237–8, 266, 297, 320–1, 326 Freundeskreis Himmler, 101–2, 280–2, 362 Freytag-Loringhoven, Wessel Freiherr von, 127, 136–7, 152 Frickmann, 200 Friedeburg, Hans-Georg, 195 Frölicher, Hans, 161, 366 Fromm, Friedrich, 149 Funk, Walther, 92, 94, 112, 195, 214, 260, 271, 281–2, 361 Gailani, Rashid Ali el-(Rashid Ali al-Qilani), 243–4 Galeries Lafayette, 112 Gallagher, Clinton, 353 Gamotha, Roman, 245–8 Gansenmueller, 227 Gardemann, 323 Garrit (or Guerrit), 124 Gaulle, Charles de, 157, 348 Gaus, Friedrich, 346 Gebhardt, Karl, 36 Gehlen, Reinhard, 251–2, 309, 351, 369 Geiszler, 264 General Electric, 282 General Motors, 220 Genest, 91 Gerge, Einar, 363 Gienanth, Ulrich von, 320 Gimmler, 296–7 Gimpel, Erich (false identity Green, Edward G.), 364 Giraud, Henri, 33, 172, 344, 357, 368 Gisevius, Hans Bernd, 343, 367 Glücks, Richard, 34 Godt, Eberhard, 120

Index

326

Goebbels, Joseph, 65, 112, 154, 181, 221, 225, 329–30 Goering (Göring), Franz, 34, 39, 43, 156, 201, 258, 321, 347–8, 350–2, 371 Goering, Fritz, (see Goering, Franz) Goldhagen, Daniel Jonah, 333 Goltz, von der, 320 Göring, Hermann, 8, 12, 14, 16, 108, 112, 130, 147, 179, 219, 227, 244, 296, 337 Gossler, von, 320 Gottfriedsen, 323 Göttsch (Goettsch), Werner, 115, 118, 123, 248, 255 Gottstein, Reiner, 71 Goverts, Henry, 164–5, 367 Gräfe (Graefe), Heinz, 232–3, 244, 246–8 Graffman (Graffmann), Holger, 287 Grafman (identical with Graffman, Holger?), 320 Grand Mufti of Jerusalem (Mohammed Emir El Husseini/Haj Amin el-Husseini), 128–9, 243–5 Green, Edward George (cover name of Gimpel, Erich) Grobba, Fritz, 244 Groenberg, Reinhold, 363 Groenheim, 300 Gröbl (Groebl, Groebel), Wilhelm (Willy, Willi), 23, 128–9, 305, 328 Grosch (cover name of SS-man involved at Venlo), 338 Grosse-Schoenepauck (Schönepauck), Irene, 20, 78, 342, 359 Grote, von, 366 Grothmann, Werner Emil Heinrich, 176, 182 Guderian, Heinz, 252, 290 Guerrit (or Garrit), 124 Guisan, Henri, 24, 106, 117, 271, 357 Gunne, Roland, 265, 302 Günther (Guenther), Christian, 37, 43, 185–6, 189, 201, 352 Gustavus (Gustav) V, King of Sweden, 128 Haas-Heye, Libertas (Libs), 274, 370 Haas-Heye, Wilhelm, 370 Hacha, Emil, 9–10 Haeggberg, Sigfrid, 109, 363 Haesker, 327 Haghesson (family), 132 Hahn, Horace, 360, 368 Hamburg-Amerika Linie (HAPAG), 366 Hammer, 304 Hampshire, (Sir) Stuart Newton, 45, 353 Hanfstaengl, Ernst Franz (Putzi) Sedgwick, 115, 363–4 Hanfstaengl, Erna, 107, 115–16, 119, 141 Hansen, Georg Alexander, 127, 136–7, 139–41, 143–5, 147–8, 150–2, 248–9, 256 Hardy, Alexander G., 357 Harnack, Arvid, 370 Harpprecht, Klaus, XV, 55 Harrison, H.C., XV, 48, 56, 204, 355, 368 Harster, Wilhelm, 94, 218 Hart, Herbert, 353 Harvard Club, 363–4

Index

327

Hass, Helmut, 128–9, 304 Hausser, 332 Havel Institut (Institute), 102, 229 Hawahara (see Kawahara) Hawel (see Hewel, Walther) Hayler, Franz, 281–2 Heelaanen, 301 Heggborg (see Haeggberg, Sigfrid) Heinrich, 136 Helldorf, Wolf Heinrich Count von, 149 Helmers, 98 Hempel, Eduard, 17 Hencke, Andor, 90, 197, 317, 360 Henderson, Sir Nevile, 8 Hengelhaupt, Erich, 232–3, 324 Henlein, Konrad, 9 Hensel, Frank, 210 Hentig, Werner Otto von, 357 Herriot, Edouard, 172, 344 Hersloe (see Herslow, Carl) Herslow, Carl, 109, 346, 363 Hess, Rudolf, 20–1, 86, 277, 279, 342, 363 Hesse, Fritz, 167, 169, 367 Hewel, Walther, 213, 321–2, 371 Hewitt, Abram Stevens (in some records Abraham Steven), 126–7, 132–3, 286, 364 Heydrich, Lina, 73, 359 Heydrich, Reinhard, 5, 8–10, 12, 15–17, 20–2, 49–51, 62, 71, 73–5, 78, 80–1, 83–4, 86–7, 89, 91– 5, 98, 100–2, 264, 277, 280–1, 327, 339, 341, 359–61 Higuti, 238–9, 365 Hilger, Gustav, 272, 323–4 Himmler, Margarete (Marga), 115 Hitter (see Bitter, Wilhelm) Hoare, Sir Samuel, 99–100, 111, 281, 362, 365 Hoeller (Moeller?), 163 Hof-Pianoforte- und Musikalienhandlung B.Schellenberg, 334 Hoffman (identical with Hoffmann?), 258, 303 Hoffmann, 263 Hohenlohe-Langenburg, Max Egon Prince zu, 11, 98–100, 111, 119, 139, 268, 281, 366 Höhne, Heinz, 333, 336 Hölter (Hoelter), Hermann, 198 Holzach, Paul, 23, 269–70 Horff, von, 181 Horn, von, 190 Höttl (Hoettl), Wilhelm, 5, 21, 115, 118, 147, 255, 304–5, 322–3, 336, 342, 369 Hoyningen, gen. Huene, Oswald Baron von, 16, 96, 361 Huber (Shanghai), 240 Hubert, 125–6 Hubing, 228 Huebner (of Jauch & Huebner), 220 Huebner, Max, 152 Huegel, Klaus, 304 Huerta, Victoriano, 342

Index

328

“Hungarian Espionage Intelligence Service”, 147 Huppenkothen, Walter, 136–7 Husseini, Mohammed Emir El (Haj Amin el-Husseini) (see Grand Mufti of Jerusalem) HWWA-Institut für Weltwirtschaftsforschung, 231, 369 I.G.Farben, 259–62, 282, 353, 370 Ilgner, Max, 259–60 Ilkner (see Ilgner, Max) Imperial War Museum, 18 IMRO Movement, 129, 302, 326 Institut für Okkultismus, 230 Institut für Weltwirtschaft (University of Kiel), 231, 369 Inter-Kommerz (Interkommerz) AG, 269, 343 International Telephone & Telegraph (IT&T), 360–1, 366, 371 Internationale Presse-Agentur (IPA), 270–1, 343–4, 363, 370 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 17, 341 Iron Guard, 88, 264–5 Italian Intelligence Service, 217–18 Italian Waiters’ Union, 217–18 Jackwitz, von, 282 Jahn, D., 355, 357 Jahnke, Kurt, 20–1, 86–7, 95, 245, 277–9, 327, 342, 361, 370–1 Jandalli, 243 Japanese Intelligence Service, 215, 217, 237, 239, 266,291, 327 Jauch & Huebner, 220 Jehova’s Witnesses (International Bible Students Association), 65, 160 Jepsen, 144 Jodl, Alfred, 136, 154, 156, 192, 196, 290, 307, 316 Joerges, 255–6, 258, 314 Johannsson, 27, 87, 319 John (Spain), 321 Joint Jewish Rabbis Organization of America and Canada, 157, 347 Jost (Mrs.), 82–3 Jost, Heinz Maria Karl, 21, 23, 80–4, 88, 264, 342 Jung, Carl Gustav, 110 Jüttner (Juettner), Hans, 119, 126, 149 Kaltenbrunner, Ernst, 22, 32–5, 40, 49, 83, 104, 114–15, 118–19, 123–5, 130–1, 133, 136–8, 140, 145–6, 149–55, 159–60, 163–75, 177, 181, 190–1, 193, 227, 239, 248, 250–2, 254–8, 263, 267, 272, 288, 292–3, 302, 320, 322–3, 326, 328–9, 347, 349, 354, 368 Kaltenbrunner, Hugo, 114 Kalugin, 235 Kappler, Herbert, 212–13, 304–5 Kapral, Joseph J., 357 Karamse, 230 Kastl, Ludwig, 28 Kasztner, Rudolf (Rezsö), 348 Kauder, Richard (see Klatt, Richard) Kaulbach, 322 Kaunders (see Klatt, Richard)

Index

329

Kawahara, 237, 239 Kedia, 234 Kehrl, Hans Karl Friedrich Gustav, 282, 334 Keitel, Wilhelm, 136–7, 140, 143–6, 150, 156, 192, 196, 209, 227, 290, 323 Keller, 227 Kempner, Robert M.W., 47, 53, 334, 345, 362–3 Keppler, Wilhelm Karl, 249, 334, 362 Keppler Kreis (see Freundeskreis Himmler) Kersten (Mrs.), 131 Kersten, Felix, 28, 34, 37–9, 43–4, 54, 103–4, 106–7, 109, 124, 126, 131–3, 141, 160, 165, 170–2, 174, 176–8, 201, 283–8, 352–3, 362 Kessler, Ulrich, 241 Kettler, 296–7 Kiekebusch, 97 Kienitz, Werner, 152 Kieram, 245, 278 Killinger, Manfred Freiherr von, 264, 370 Kirchfeld, 258 Kirchholtes, Johannes, 220 Kirfel, 237, 241 Kirn, 248 Kirschfeld, 282 Klatt, Richard (Kauder, Richard), 234, 322–3, 331 Klaus, Edgar (Claus, Clauss), 27–8, 35, 234, 323, 345–6, 371 Klavenes, Wilhelm, 347 Klein, Fritz, 99, 281 Kleist, Bruno (see Kleist, Peter) Kleist, (Bruno) Peter, 26–7, 35, 169, 234, 319, 323–4, 345, 371 Klemens, 339 Kleyenstueber (Kleyenstüber), Ernst, 311, 324 Klop, Dirk, 13, 338–9 Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe Montgomery, 369 Knochen, Helmut Herbert, 11, 75, 104, 218, 299, 327 Knolle, 293 Knyphausen, Armgard Countess Innhausen zu (Countess zu Innhausen und Knypenhausen), 27, 319–20, 345 Kob, 303 Koblik, Steven, 38 Koch, Erich, 233 Köcher (Koecher), Otto, 25, 117, 344 Koehn, 227 Koeln (see Coehmen or Kohmen) Koenen, 326 Koerner, Paul, 108, 296, 334 Koestring, 272 Kohmen (Coehmen), 240, 246 Kojima, Hideo, 142–3, 163, 170, 238, 240–2, 365 Kollontay, Alexandra M., 344 Komatsu, Mitsuhiko, 142, 237–9, 242, 365 Komorowski, Tadeusz (Bor, General), 179–80, 233, 368 Kondraschew, Sergei, 351–2, 371 Koob, Emil, 129

Index

330

Korkut, 113 Kortekamp, Käthe, 14, 72, 359 Kou (Mrs.), 286–7 Kousi, 95 Krack, 74 Krallert, Wilfried, 230 Krämer (Kraemer), Karl-Heinz, 27, 98, 235, 240, 324–5 Kranefuss, Fritz, 101–2, 280–2, 362 Kraus, 97 Krausnick, Helmut, 356 Krauss, Oswald, 232–3 Kreuter, 111–12, 158, 366 Kroeger, 272–3 Krüger (Krueger), Bernhard, 325–6 Kubitzky, Josef, 211–12, 215, 217 Kuebart, Wilhelm, 144, 147, 152 Kuehlenthal (Kühlenthal, often misspelled), Karl Erich, 98 Kunzcewincz (or Kunczeviencz, various spellings in documents), 216–17, 368 Kwei Yung-chin, 361 Lafayette, Galeries (see Galeries Lafayette) Lagerberg, Stig, 363 Lahousen von Vivremont, Erwin, 8, 127 Lammers, Hans Heinrich, 334 Landfried, Karl, 94, 282 Lang, Eugen, 23 Langbehn, Carl, 28, 106–7, 110, 130, 286 Lange (Captain?), 327 Lange (Vanaman case), 182 Lattre de Tassigny, Jean-Marie Gabriel de, 332 Ledebur (Spain), 321 Ledochowski, Vladimir, 217 Legge, Barnwell R., 182–3 Legion Condor, 311 Lehrregiment Brandenburg [Lehrregiment “Brandenburg” zbV 800, later Division Brandenburg], 151, 244, 278, 365 Leissner, Wilhelm (cover name of Lenz, Gustav), 97 Lemmens, Jan Frederik, 13, 339 Lemmer, 276 Lengling, 255 Lennartz, 215 Lenz, Gustav (cover name of Leissner, Wilhelm) Leo, 237 Leopold III, King of Belgium, 171, 367 Leverkuehn, Paul, 321 Lewenhaupt, 186–7 Lienarts, 152 Lindemann, Fritz, 150 Lindemann, Karl, 99, 158, 268, 281, 366 Lombardi, Vera, 139–40 Löns, Hermann, 292, 371

Index

331

Loofbourow, Frederick R., 155, 268, 366 Lorenz, 183 Lorenz (probably C.Lorenz AG), 91 Ludendorff, Erich, 295 Lumm, Hermann, 232–3 Lundquist, Martin, 26, 88, 266, 370 Lüschen, Friedrich, 282 Lussac, 116 Luther, Martin, 89–90, 104–5, 137, 362 MacDonald, Callum A., 11, 339 Mackensen, Hans-Georg von, 121, 364 Mallet, Sir Victor A.L., 44, 169, 281 Mallinkrodt, 305 Manganiello, 72 Mann, Horace, 354 Mann, Wilhelm Rudolf, 260–1, 370 Marcus, Carl, 278, 370–1 Marmon, Franz, 71 Marschall von Biberstein, Freiherr, 90 Martini (cover name of Crinis, Max de) Masson, Roger, 23–5, 53–4, 106, 108, 112–13, 116–17, 130–1, 182, 212, 268–71, 343–4, 357, 365–6, 368 Masur, Norbert, 38–9, 66, 174, 176–9, 201, 350 Matsiak, 244 Matsuoko (ambassador), 242 Matterna (spelling uncertain), 303 Mayer (Trans Ozean), 246–7 Mayer, Saly, 347–8 McClelland, Roswell (Ross) D., 33, 347 McCloy, John J., XV, 54, 357 Mehlhorn, Georg Herbert, 5, 71, 337 Meisel, 241 Meisinger, Josef, 240, 326 Meisner, Hans, 240 Meissner, Otto, 334 Menzies, Sir Stewart (see C) Meyer, Paul E., 23, 106, 112, 155, 268–70, 343, 362 Meyer-Schwertenbach, Paul (see Meyer, Paul E.) Middle Temple, 353 Mihailov, 129–30, 155, 302–3, 326 Mihailovic, Draja (numerous spellings), 154, 327 Milch, Erhard, 337 Milmo, (Sir) Helenus Patrick, 45, 353 Mintzel, Kurt O., 334 Mitford, Unity Valkyrie, 115, 364 Mixt, 91 Moeller, Alvar (in the records often mistakenly Mueller), 28–9, 128, 134, 152, 161, 163, 201, 267, 346 Momm, Theodor, 139 Montgomery, Bernard L., 195

Index

332

MONZAP, 363 Morell, Theodor, 175 Mörgeli (Moergeli), Ernst, 113, 363 Moruzov (Morozow), 233 Mosig, Eugen, 314 Moyzisch, Ludwig C, 113, 134, 234, 240, 243, 246, 255, 314–15, 369 Mueller (Luftfahrtministerium), 275 Mueller, Walther, 338 Müller (Mueller), Heinrich, 5, 8, 22, 32, 35, 50, 71–2, 80, 84, 93–5, 103–4, 116, 118, 136–7, 140– 1, 144–5, 148, 150–2, 160, 167–8, 209, 240, 255, 263–4, 272, 274, 277, 283, 286, 320, 322, 324, 329–30, 336 Mufti (see Grand Mufti of Jerusalem) “Mullah school” (Dresden), 243–5 Mussolini, Benito, 8, 72, 96, 123, 125, 371 Mussolini, Edda, 371 Musy, Benoit, 33–5, 39, 156, 161–2, 179, 348, 350 Musy, Jean-Marie, 32–5, 38–9, 53, 156–8, 161–2, 171–2, 177, 181, 258, 321, 347–8, 366 Nabiar (see Nambiar, A.C.N.) Naegerle, 119 Nambiar, A.C.N., 238, 369 Nassenstein, Adolf, 96–7, 229, 254–5, 313, 329 National Socialist German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP), 4, 5, 7, 69, 71, 73, 76, 193, 196, 226–7, 281, 293, 358 National Unity Party (see Nationale Sammlungspartei) Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz, 23 Nationale Sammlungspartei (National Unity Party?), 181, 368 Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (National Committee Free Germany), 369 Naujocks, Alfred Hellmuth, 82, 339 Nebe, Arthur, 149 Nehlis, 69 Neporoszny, 211 “Nero” (agent in Britain), 147 Neubacher, Hermann, 153–4, 326–7 Neuengamme (Concentration Camp), 39, 168, 266, 346, 350, 367 Neumann (Kali), 282 Neumann, Dr. (cover name of Colonel Hans Wagner) Neumann, Hans-Hendrik, 75 Nicole, 234 Niemöller, Martin, 357 Nikopopoulous, 255 Nishi, 238 Nordwall, 200 North German Lloyd, 99, 158, 281, 366 Nossek, Anton, 228 Nostradamus, 15, 340 Oberländer (Oberlaender), Theodor, 233 Oesstroem, 190, 193–4, 198 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 360, 362 Ohlendorf, Otto, 258, 260, 272, 281–2, 356

Index

333

Ohletz, Werner, 147, 238, 241, 251, 301, 309–10, 315, 322–3, 326, 332 Ohnesorge, Wilhelm, 366 Okamoto (Berne), 240 Olbricht, Friedrich, 149–50 Olzecha, 245 Onodera, Makato, 217, 240, 242, 345, 367 Opel Ltd., 220 Ori, Kemal, 245 “Orient” (firm in Paris), 256 Orlowski, 240 Oshima, Hiroshi, 237, 239, 241, 369 Otani, 237, 365 Päffgen (Paeffgen), Theodor, 71, 99, 103, 119–20, 140, 147, 164, 277, 300, 317–19, 324 Pannwitz, Heinz, 276, 370 Papen, Franz von, 122, 247 Parilli, Luigi Baron, 218 Pavelic, Ante, 326 Pechau, 301–2 Pegrov, von, 278 Pentzlin (in the records also Penzlin), Heinz, 27, 319 Pepyli, 113–14, 122–3 Perkel, Nazy (Naci), 122–3 Petersen, Gita, XIV, 335 Peterson, 184, 186 Petrow, 327–8 Pfeffer von Salomon, Franz, 20–1, 86, 277, 279 Pfeiffer, 315 Pfeiler, 256 Philby, Kim, 353 Piekenbrock, Hans, 127 Pilet-Golaz, Marcel, 111 Piotr, 217 Pius XII, 287 Planetta, Otto, 71, 337 Pleiger, Paul, 334 Plinio y Salgado (Salgado, Plinio), 62, 96–7, 329, 361 Ploetz, Alfred, 71 Pohl, Oswald, 160 Polish Intelligence Service, 211–12, 297 Pomme, 327 Popitz, Johannes, 107, 115, 362 Popov, 234 Poretschkin, 293 Post, von, 67, 190–4, 198–99 Powers, 49 Prützmann (Pruetzmann), Hans, 292–4, 369 Puhl, Emil Johann Rudolf, 334 Pullen, Richard W., 357 Quakers, 347

Index

334

Radziwil, Prince, 179 Rall (Raoul?), 319 Rapp, Walter H., 232–3, 241, 245, 252, 273, 296 Rasche, Karl, 334 Ravensbrück (Concentration Camp), 33, 173, 179, 344, 348, 350 Rayens, Chas. E., 44, 47, 183, 201–2, 368 Red Cross, 33–6, 39, 41, 157, 161–2, 165, 167–8, 170, 172–3, 182, 193, 195, 198, 200–1, 258, 367 Reed (cover name of agent of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem), 129 Reich, Das, 329 Reichel, Eberhard, 246, 330–1 Reichsbank, 255–6 Renau, 211–12, 215 Renault, 172 Rendulic, Lothar, 195 Rennau, Heinz, 211, 258, 329, 351 Reynaud, Paul, 344, 368 Ribbentrop, Joachim von, 15–17, 20, 27–8, 40, 78, 80–1, 86, 88–90, 95, 101, 105, 117–22, 124, 127, 130, 135, 137, 153–4, 165–7, 169, 191, 213, 220, 225, 241, 264, 267, 272, 277, 279, 288, 321, 323, 325–6, 341, 344, 366–7, 371 Richert, Arvid, 29, 199, 266–7, 346 Riedel, Peter Ernst, 345 Riediger, Fritz, 334 Rieth, Kurt Heinrich, 127, 364 Ritgen, Wilhelm von, 278 Ritter, Gerhard, 371 Ritter, Karl, 334 Ritzburg (see Meyer, Paul E.) Robertson, T.A., 47 Röder, Rudolf, 232–3 Roeder, 226 Rohleder, Joachim, 144–5, 213, 216–17, 233, 266, 320, 368 Röhm, Ernst, 7 Rohrscheidt, von, 98, 321 Ronge, Max, 8 Roosen, Count, 219 Roosevelt, Eleanor, 132 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 25, 132, 182, 287 Rosenkranz, 219 Rossner, Hermann, 83 Rosterg, August, 281 Rote Kapelle, 68, 274–6, 370 Rothmund, Heinrich, 63, 107–8 Rottenberg (family), 348 Roumanian Secret Service, 264 Rousseau (in some records Russeau), Theodore, 111, 363 Russell, Sean, 17, 340 Russian Handelsvertretung (Berlin), 210–11 Russian Secret (Intelligence) Service, 210–11, 233, 235, 274–5 Ryan, Frank, 17, 340

Index

335

Sachs, 281 Sakai, 240, 242 Sakumo, 215 Salgado, Plinio (see Plinio y Salgado) Salisch, von, 12, 338 Sandberger, Martin Karl, 136–7, 223, 226, 228, 251, 256, 296, 311 Sander, Frank V., 357 Sanner, Wolfgang Adolf Egon, 82 Schaefer, Max, 63, 102–3 Schaemmel (see Schemmel) Schambacher, 219, 339 Scheidler, 255, 258, 328 Scheliha, Rudolf von, 275, 370 Schellenberg, Guido Franz Bernhard, 3, 334 Schellenberg, Lydia, née Riedel, 334 Schemmel (cover name of Schellenberg, Walter) Schenker & Co., 210 Scherz Verlag, 358 Schieber, Walter, 139 Schienke, Maria Luise Wilhelmine (also Marieluise), 43, 201, 258, 321, 346, 351 Schilenkov, 272 Schilling, von (cover name of Finke, August) Schimmelpfeng Information Bureau, 220 Schindowski, 226, 232–3 Schmidt, 320 Schmidt (Ministry of Propaganda), 243 Schmidt, Andreas, 265, 302 Schmidt, Paul Karl (Press Department, German Foreign Office), 106, 362 Schmidt, Paul Otto (interpreter), 213 Schmied, 261 Schmitz, 209, 213, 217, 296 Schmitz, Hermann, 115, 260–1 Schnauss, 227 Schneider, 299 Schniewind, Otto, 346 Schoen, 223–4, 369 Schoenbaum, David, 336 Schörner, Ferdinand, 195 Schreiber, 98 Schroeder, Erich, 96, 133, 313 Schroeder, Erna, 213 Schuback, 245–6, 248, 315 Schueddekopf, 223–4, 278, 324, 369 Schulenburg, Count, 324 Schuler, 256–7 Schulz, Wilhelm, 152 Schulze-Bernett, Walter, 338 Schulze-Boysen, Harro, 274–6, 370 Schulze-Boysen (Mrs.) (Libertas Haas-Heye), 274, 370 Schwarz v. Berck, 329–30 Schwend, Friedrich (Frederico; in CIA documents Frederick), 254–5, 305

Index

336

Schwerin von Krosigk, Johann Ludwig (Lutz) Count, 40–2, 66–7, 175–6, 191–2, 194–7, 199, 334, 350 Schwertenbach, Wolf (see Meyer, Paul E.) Scuria, 226 Sebastian, Karl, 280 Seeckt, Hans von, 279 Seib, 135 Seidlitz (cover name of Salisch, von) Seldte, Franz, 176 Semperit Works, 321 Semyonov, Vladimir S., 235, 323, 344 Senner I (German cover name for Masson, Roger) Senner II (German cover name for Meyer, Paul) Senner III (German cover name for Holzach, Paul) Serrano, Rositta, 219 Sevov, 234 Seydewitz, von (cover name of Salisch, von) Seydlitz-Kurzbach, Walther von, 234–5, 369 Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, 258 Sheen, H.G., 47 Shell A.G., 219 Siegel (cover name of Hewitt, Abram Stevens) Siemens, 282 Sieppen, Peter, 102 Sima, Horia, 264–5 Simon, August, 358 Six, Franz Alfred, 18, 91, 265, 272, 341, 360, 370 Skoda works, 111 Skorzeny, Otto, 115, 118–19, 123–5, 146–9, 159, 169, 191, 243, 250, 265, 292–3, 364, 369 Sofindus (Sociedád Financiera Industrial), 314, 371 Solms (cover name of Travaglio, Johannes) Soltikow, Michael Count von, 210, 212–13 Sommer, 97 Sonnenhol, Adolf Gustav, 330–1 Soong (family), 278 Souter, Jr., S.H., 257 Spacil, Josef, 255–7 Spahn, 240–1 Spazil (see Spacil, Josef) Speer, Albert, 139, 282 Spieker, Klaus, 11 Spitzy, Reinhard, 111, 119, 139–40, 321, 363 Stahlecker, Walter, 342 Stahmer, Heinrich Georg, 241–2 Staisch, 246–8 Stalin, Joseph, 286–7, 319, 331, 369 Standard Elektrizitäts-Gesellschaft, 91, 158, 295, 366, 371 Stauffenberg, Claus Graf Schenk von, 149 Steengracht (Baroness), 221 Steengracht von Moyland, Gustav Adolf Baron, 153, 162, 197, 221, 318, 326, 334 Steimle, Eugen, 140, 148, 150, 155, 299, 311, 313–14, 318, 328–32 Steiner, Felix, 182

Index

337

Stennes, Walter, 368 Sternbuch, Isaak (Isaac), 53, 157, 347 Stevens, Richard H., 11–14, 75, 338–9 Stockholm Tidningen, 132–3 Stoeltzel, 161 Stoffel, 101 Stohrer, Eberhard von, 16, 97, 361 Storch, Hillel (often spelled Hilel or Gilel), 37–9, 169, 171, 174, 201, 348–9, 352 Strasser, Gregor, 7, 20 Strasser, Otto, 20, 342 Strehle, 256 Strohmeyer, 101 Stuckart, Wilhelm, 334 Stumpfegger, Ludwig, 175 Suchanek (Suchenek?), Willy (Willi), 126 Suchenek (see Suchanek) Sudeten German Party (Sudetendeutsche Partei), 9 Süsskind (Suesskind)-Schwendi, Hugo Freiherr von, 144 Suhren, Fritz, 34 Svenska Dagbladet, 132–3 Svenska Taendsticks Aktiebolaget (STAB), 28, 109, 121, 128, 134, 152, 161, 346, 363 Swedish Aerotransport, 219 Swedish Fascist Party, 87 Swedish Intelligence Service, 88, 219, 266–7, 320, 345 Swedish Match Company (see Svenska Taendsticks Aktiebolaget) Swiss Intelligence Service, 23–5, 106, 113, 212, 268–71, 343–4, 357 “Swiss National Socialist restoration movements”, 271 Tauboeck, 254 Tedder, Sir Arthur, 44 Teich, Gerhard Willy, 233 Telefonaktiebolaget L.M.Ericsson, 363 Telschow, 209, 278 Temple, William (Archbishop of Canterbury), 110 Terboven, Josef, 192, 267 Terrestahl, 282 Theresienstadt (Concentration Camp), 173, 347–8, 350 Thiele, Fritz Walter, 91–2, 108, 145–6, 148–50, 295–7, 360, 365 Thierack, Otto Georg, 29, 227, 346 Thompson, C.P., 357 Thomsen, Hans, 25, 97, 135, 165, 198–9, 345, 367 Thomsen (Amtmann), 189–90, 367 Thümmel, Paul (A 54), 19 Times, The (London), 124 Tito, Josip Broz, 327 Todt, Fritz, 255 Torr, Windam W., 111 Torres, 129 Trans Ozean, 225, 246 Travaglio, Johannes, 11, 338 Traviglio (see Travaglio, Johannes)

Index

338

Trede Fina, 111, 158 Trevor-Roper, Hugh R. (see Dacre, Lord) Trott zu Solz, Adam von, 248, 345 Truchin, 272 Tschenkeli, 234 Tschierschky, Karl, 244–5, 292–3 Tsilew (in the records also Tsilev or Tsileff), Dimiter, 129–30, 303, 326 Turkish Secret (Intelligence) Service, 113, 122–3, 213–14, 234, 246, 314 Turkmenisches Institut, 245 Turkul, (Prince) Anton, 234, 272, 323, 331–2 U.35. (Klop Ustinov), 45 Uhu (cover name of Urlitzianu) Ukrainian Freedom Movement (UPA), 234 Ulenberg, 226 Unilever, 282 “Union of European Peoples”, 273 Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States of America and Canada, 53 Union of Rabbis of the United States of America, 347 Urlitzianu (spelling uncertain), 315 Usjazi (Ujszászy, István de?), 234 Ustinov, Klop (see U.35.) Uthmann, Bruno von, 27, 199, 370 Vaad Hahatzala Emergency Committee, 53 Valera, Eamon de, 17, 341 Vanaman, Arthur W., 163, 182–3, 344, 368 Vanderbilt (family), 132 Vargas, Getúlio, 96 Vauchnik (Vauhnik), Vladimir, 208–9 Veesenmayer, Edmund, 17, 334, 341 Vermehren, Erich, 315 Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, 304 Viehmann, 278 Vlasov, Andrey (Andrei) Andreyevich, 233–4, 272–3, 323, 331–2 Vlassov (see Vlasov, Andrey) Volksgerichtshof, 127–8, 151–2, 176, 365 Volkssturm, 293 Vollbrecht, Hans, 312–13 Vollheim, 81–2 Waass, 329 Waebli (or Waetli), 212 Waetli (or Waebli), 212 Wagner (contact of Mrs. Crous), 234 Wagner, Eduard (General), 50–1 Wagner, Hans (cover name Dr. Neumann), 27, 87–8, 235, 266, 323, 370 Wagner, Horst (Foreign Office), 137–8, 153, 165–6, 367 Wagner (Josef?), 86 Wagner, Otto (Delius) (Stuttgart), 322 Wallenberg (family), 29, 362–3

Index

339

Wallenberg, Jacob, 29, 35, 107, 130, 134–5, 161, 346–7, 363 Walter (France), 299 Walter (Turkey), 234 Waneck, Wilhelm Bruno, 115, 118, 191, 248, 250, 255, 265, 302, 322–3, 3 342 Wanner, 101 Wannsee Institut, 125, 235 Warenvertriebs GmbH, 269–70, 343 Wattenwyl, Karl von, 146–7 Weirauch, Walter, 237 Weizsäcker (Weizsaecker), Ernst Freiherr von, 3, 49, 334 Wenck, Walther, 252, 290 Wendig (see Schwend, Friedrich/Frederico) Wenk (see Wenck) Werewolf, 68, 292–4, 369 West, Nigel (Allason, Rupert), 341 Westrich (see Westrick, Gerhard Alois) Westrick, Gerhard Alois, 92, 158, 268, 360, 366 White, Sir Richard (“Dick”), 45, 367 Widen, Tore, 109, 363 Wiebe, 234 Wied, Victor Prinz zu, 367 Wiegand, Karl von, 343 Wiele, 300 Wiese, 309, 322–3 Wiesel, Elie, 349 Wiesinger, 256 Wilhelm II, (Emperor), 342 Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich, 356 Wilhelmina, Queen of The Netherlands, 103, 284 Wilson, Hugh R., 25, 345 Windsor, Duke of (see Edward VIII) Winter (of Opel/General Motors), 220 Winter (Wehrmachtsführungsstab), 290 Winter, August (Wehrmachtszentralamt), 136–7, 156 Winzer, Paul, 16, 78, 97, 263 Wirsing, Giselher, 154, 190–4, 196, 237, 324, 369 Wittinghof-Scheel, von, 83 Wodarg, 324 Woermann, Ernst, 334 Wolf, 113, 248, 315 Wolf (“journalist”, Istanbul), 234 Wolff, Karl, 25, 105, 155, 218, 268, 280, 292 Wolff, Otto, 282 Woolworth’s, 219 World Jewish Congress, 37–8, 43, 171, 174–5, 178, 349 Wossagk, 83 Wuehrer, Theodor, 327 Wuennenberg, Alfred, 185–6, 189 Wulff, Wilhelm, 126, 138, 141–2, 159, 170, 188–9 Z organisation, 11, 14, 343

Index

Zeidler, 255, 261 Zentrale Freies Indien, 369 Zindel, Karl, 118 Zinder, 263 Zoellner, 209 Züricher Bank, 258

340