Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union: Between Europeanisation and National Adaptation (New Perspectives in German Studies)

Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Between Europeanisation and National Adaptation

Alister Miskimmon

New Perspectives in German Studies General Editors: Michael Butler is Emeritus Professor of Modern German Literature at the University of Birmingham and Professor William E. Paterson OBE is Professor of European and German Politics at the University of Birmingham and Chairman of the German British Forum. Over the past twenty years the concept of German studies has undergone major transformation. The traditional mixture of language and literary studies, related very closely to the discipline as practised in German universities, has expanded to embrace history, politics, economics and cultural studies. The conventional boundaries between all these disciplines have become increasingly blurred, a process which has been accelerated markedly since German unification in 1989/90. New Perspectives in German Studies, developed in conjunction with the Institute for German Studies and the Department of German Studies at the University of Birmingham, has been designed to respond precisely to this trend of the interdisciplinary approach to the study of German and to cater for the growing interest in Germany in the context of European integration. The books in this series will focus on the modern period, from 1750 to the present day.

Titles include: Matthew M. C. Allen THE VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM PARADIGM Explaining Germany’s Comparative Advantage? Peter Bleses and Martin Seeleib-Kaiser THE DUAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE GERMAN WELFARE STATE Michael Butler and Robert Evans (editors) THE CHALLENGE OF GERMAN CULTURE Essays Presented to Wilfried van der Will Michael Butler, Malcolm Pender and Joy Charnley (editors) THE MAKING OF MODERN SWITZERLAND 1848–1998 Paul Cooke and Andrew Plowman (editors) GERMAN WRITERS AND THE POLITICS OF CULTURE Dealing with the Stasi Beverly Crawford POWER AND GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY Embedded Hegemony in Europe Wolf-Dieter Eberwein and Karl Kaiser (editors) GERMANY’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY Decision-Making in an Interdependent World Karl Christian Führer and Corey Ross (editors) MASS MEDIA, CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY GERMANY Jonathan Grix THE ROLE OF THE MASSES IN THE COLLAPSE OF THE GDR

Gunther Hellmann (editor) GERMANY’S EU POLICY IN ASYLUM AND DEFENCE De-Europeanization by Default? Dan Hough, Michael Koß and Jonathan Olsen THE LEFT PARTY IN CONTEMPORARY GERMAN POLITICS Margarete Kohlenbach WALTER BENJAMIN Self-Reference and Religiosity Charles Lees PARTY POLITICS IN GERMANY A Comparative Politics Approach Hanns W, Maull GERMANY’S UNCERTAIN POWER Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic Alister Miskimmon GERMANY AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Between Europeanisation and National Adaptation Christian Schweiger BRITAIN, GERMANY AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION James Sloam THE EUROPEAN POLICY OF THE GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS Interpreting a Changing World Ronald Speirs and John Breuilly (editors) GERMANY’S TWO UNIFICATIONS Anticipations, Experience, Responses Henning Tewes GERMANY, CIVILIAN POWER AND THE NEW EUROPE Enlarging Nato and the European Union Maiken Umbach GERMAN FEDERALISM Past, Present, Future Roger Woods GERMANY’S NEW RIGHT AS CULTURE AND POLITICS New Perspectives in German Studies Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–92430–4 hardcover Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–92434–7 paperback (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England.

Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union Between Europeanisation and National Adaptation

Alister Miskimmon Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

© Alister Miskimmon 2007 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–0–230–50652–7 hardback ISBN-10: 0–230–50652–6 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

For Emma

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Contents List of Tables and Figures

viii

List of Abbreviations and Terms

xii

Acknowledgements

xiv

Introduction

1

1 Germany, the European Community and the Challenges of the End of the Cold War

22

2 Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy

63

3 Learning to Lead: Germany, Kosovo and the Development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy

100

4 No Longer a ‘Reluctant Power’? Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP

145

Conclusion – Between Europeanisation and National Singularities

186

Notes

199

Select Bibliography

255

Index

262

vii

List of Tables and Figures List of Tables 1.1 Key norms shaping Germany’s approach to negotiations during the IGCPU 1.2 Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … foreign policy toward countries outside the EU? 1.3 Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … security and defence? 1.4 USIA (United States Information Agency): Some people say that NATO is still essential for our country’s security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country’s security. Which view is closer to your own? 1.5 USIA: In your opinion, what organisation should make the most important decisions about the security of Europe in the future: NATO, the EU, or some other organisation? 1.6 Germany influence on CFSP during the IGCPU 1.7 German adaptation resulting from CFSP 2.1 Party political positions on the development of CFSP during the IGC 1996/1997 2.2 Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … foreign policy toward countries outside the EU? viii

51

52

52

53

53 58 59 74

74

List of Tables and Figures ix

2.3

Eurobarometer 2: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … security and defence? 2.4 USIA: There have been a number of proposals for actions the EU could take in the next several years. For each of the following, please tell me whether you are strongly in favour, somewhat in favour, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed – or haven’t you heard enough about it to say: the development of a common European defence force? 2.5 USIA: Some people say that NATO is still essential for our country’s security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country’s security. Which view is closer to your own? 2.6 National positions on CFSP during the Amsterdam negotiations 2.7 The uploading of German preferences during the IGC 1996/1997 2.8 Adaptational pressures on German foreign policy 3.1 National positions on the development of ESDP, 1999 3.2 How important is NATO in relation to its task to secure the external security of its Member States? 3.3 Germany’s NATO Membership 3.4 How important for you is the presence of American troops in Germany as an expression of Euro-Atlantic partnership for security and stability in Europe? 3.5 Do you think that it is important for the EU to develop an independent security and defence policy from the USA? 3.6 Are you for or against that the EU is planning a rapid reaction force, a type of European army? 3.7 Should Germany participate in this European rapid reaction force? 3.8 The Two-level negotiation of the Fischer Plan 3.9 The down-loading dynamic of Europeanisation on German foreign policy 3.10 The up-loading dynamic of German foreign policy

75

75

76 83 96 97 118 119 119

120

120 120 120 132 138 140

x

List of Tables and Figures

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

4.7

4.8

4.9

4.10

4.11

4.12 4.13 C.1 C.2 C.3

German Defence Spending as per cent of GDP German Defence Budgets German armed forces personnel German overseas military deployments at time of EUFOR RD Congo mission in 2006 Current and past ESDP Missions Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries? Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defence and security policy among EU Member States? Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries? Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defence and security policy among EU Member States? Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries? Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defence and security policy among EU Member States? Downloading under the Grand Coalition German uploading in CFSP Overseas deployments of the Bunde (Correct as of March 2007 – http:www.bundeswehr.de) Mechanisms of policy uploading in CFSP German downloading

152 152 154 155 157

170

170

170

171

171

171 176 181 188 192 197

List of Tables and Figures xi

List of Figures I.1 I.2 I.3 3.1

The Foreign and Security Policy Europeanisation process The simplified German Foreign Policy process in Brussels Germany’s two-dimensional negotiation model in CFSP Variations in National Policy preferences regarding CFSP/ESDP

8 16 18 143

List of Abbreviations and Terms AA ABC AFSOUTH BMVg Bundesrat Bundessicherheitsrat Bundestag Bundeswehr CDU CFSP CJTF COREPER CP CSU EC EDC EMU ENP EP EPC ERRF ESDI ESDP ESDU EU EUFOR RD EUKOR EUMC EUMS FAWEU FDP FRG GDP

Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ministry) Atomic, Biological and Chemical Weapons Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces South Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Defence Ministry) Upper German House of Parliament BSR – The Federal Security Council Lower German House of Parliament German Armed Forces Christian Democratic Union Common Foreign and Security Policy Common Joint Task Force Committee of Permanent Representatives Conflict Prevention Christian Social Union European Community European Defence Community Economic and Monetary Union European Neighbourhood Policy European Parliament European Political Co-operation European Rapid Reaction Force European Security and Defence Identity European Security and Defence Policy European Security and Defence Union European Union European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo European Policy Co-ordination section in the German Foreign Ministry European Union Military Committee European Union Military Staff Forces Answerable to Western European Union Free Democratic Party Federal Republic of Germany Gross Domestic Product xii

List of Abbreviations and Terms xiii

IFOR IGC IGCPU IMF JACS KFOR MAPE NATO NRF OSCE PDS PPEWU PSC PU QMV RELEX RMA SACEUR SEA SFOR SPD TEU UK UN UNSAS UNSC WEU WMD

Implementation Force (NATO) Intergovernmental Conference Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union International Monetary Fund Joint Armaments Co-operation Structure Kosovo Force Multinational Advisory Police Element North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO Response Force Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Party of Democratic Socialism Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit Political Security Committee Political Union Qualified Majority Voting External Relations Revolution in Military Affairs Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO) Single European Act Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (NATO) Social Democratic Party of Germany Treaty on European Union United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United Nations UN Standby Arrangements System United Nations Security Council Western European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction

Acknowledgements There are a great many people to thank and acknowledge for their support in this project. First, Series Editor Prof. Willie Paterson for his guidance during this book project. Without his advice and support this book would not have been possible. During the initial stages of my research towards this book, I also greatly benefited from the advice of Prof. Lord Roper, Prof. Christopher Hill and Dr Kerry Longhurst for their comments on earlier versions of this work. I would like to thank Palgrave Macmillan’s anonymous reviewer for his/her very helpful and detailed comments on the text. I also wish to acknowledge the support of my colleagues in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Royal Holloway, University of London, in particular, Andrew Chadwick and James Sloam. Dan Hough also warrants my thanks for his encouragement during the many trying times of writing this book. I am also deeply indebted to number of organisations for their financial and logistical support for making this project possible. These include the Tercentenary Fund of the Swedish Riksbankens as part of the post-doctoral European Foreign and Security Policy Studies Programme of the Compagnia di San Paolo – Riksbankens Jubileumsfond – VolkswagenStiftung; the Konrad Adenauer Foundation for financial support during research fieldwork Berlin and Bonn; Frau Zanzig and the archive of the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin; the Central Research Fund of the University of London was generous in providing me with funds to carry out research interviews in Berlin. Emma Gittus deserves my deep thanks for the patience, above and beyond the call of duty, which she showed towards me throughout the process of writing this book. I must also thank my parents Irene and John for everything which they have done to support me.

xiv

Introduction

Germany’s foreign and security policy has come under intense international scrutiny since the end of the Cold War. The European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has been an important institution through which Germany has sought to meet the new foreign policy demands of the post-Cold War era. These pressures have revolved around how Germany can meet the demands of its closest allies, to play an increased role in crisis management and international affairs. This book outlines how successive German governments sought to manage post-Cold War adaptational pressures affecting Germany through the uploading of German preferences to the European and international level. In addition, the analysis outlined here highlights areas in German foreign policy which have come under increasing strain due to the demands placed on Germany stemming from the EU’s CFSP. The contention of this study is that policy adaptation within Germany has been limited due to four underlying reasons. First, Germany has been successful in influencing the development of CFSP to mirror its own national preferences with the overall aim of creating an institutional and normative fit between EU and German policy in order to reduce the adaptational pressures resulting from the development of CFSP. Second, Germany has been committed to the CFSP, but this has not had a dramatic impact on its domestic or European level policymaking process. Third, the development of CFSP has not witnessed a significant re-allocation of resources to enable Germany to play a more active role in EU foreign and security policy. Since unification, Germany has underperformed economically which greatly constrains the amount of money the Defence Ministry can expect from the federal budget. Finally, the scope of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) remains limited owing to the continued tensions of relations between 1

2

Germany and EU Foreign Policy

the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). As a result, ESDP is not significant enough to exert enough pressure on domestic structures to force root and branch Europeanisation of German foreign and security policy. Central to this book is an examination of how Germany has sought to influence the development of the CFSP/ESDP through its membership of the EU. Of equal significance is to assess the degree to which Germany’s involvement in the CFSP has encouraged policy-makers to reassess how foreign policy is made within Germany, in light of the highly institutionalised co-operation that takes place on the European level. The analysis that follows assesses the extent to which the EU has become a focus for German policy-makers in the post-Cold War international environment. Germany has undergone deep social and political changes since the fall of the Berlin Wall which have forced it to undergo considerable adaptation. Despite this, there remains a remarkable degree of continuity in German foreign policy, in the face of major new international challenges.1 This was certainly the case in foreign and security policy, where Germany has had to adapt to new international circumstances with the end of the East/West stand-off. This study investigates Germany’s role in the development of CFSP and questions the idea that German foreign and security policy has become Europeanised to the extent that German and EU foreign policy are increasingly considered the same. The growing relevance of the EU level in the foreign and security policies of the Member States since the early 1990s is the context for what follows. The concept of Europeanisation aims to assess the degree to which national policies and polities adapt to the development of policies on the EU level and explain the manner in which this occurs.2 This is a two-way process with Member States having a major impact on policy formation in a process of policy projection and reception.3 The development of European foreign and security policy has come a long way since European Political Co-operation (EPC) was established in 1970. The decisions taken since the British–French St. Malo Declaration (December 1998) have represented significant efforts to increase the level of foreign and security co-operation among the EU Member States. The growing institutional complexity of CFSP/ESDP has given the EU the potential to coordinate more effectively for future crisis management and conflict prevention. However, it is important to look at how the EU now offers a new ‘logic’ of foreign and security policy-making to that found at the national level. It is interesting to analyse the transformative influence of the EU in this field on national policies, in order to assess the

Introduction

3

current limits of integration of foreign and security policy-making. Vital to this are conceptions within French, British and German foreign policy elites of the future of ESDP. National views on the ‘Petersberg Tasks’4 impact on the future scope of the ESDP and the potential deployment of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The assessment of the extent of national adaptation to EU foreign and security policy also uncovers areas where future compromise and co-operation will prove most successful. An examination of national positions on ESDP will highlight the potential for the future emergence of a European Strategic Culture.5 This book examines Germany’s role in the CFSP of the EU. The unified Germany faces a dual-challenge in foreign and security policy and its membership of the EU. First, Germany must ensure that the EU’s CFSP continues to grow in effectiveness despite the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004. Second, Germany must develop a consistent, predictable and effective foreign and security policy as pressure from its main partners in the EU grow for it to play an increased role in military crisis management. This book assesses Germany’s involvement in the EU’s CFSP since its coming into force in 1993. What follows, traces Germany’s role in the development of the CFSP at the end of the Cold War to highlight instances where German influence is noticeable. Yet many of the CFSP’s main developments owe their inspiration or impetus to Franco–British co-operation. This is one of the paradoxes of Germany’s role in the CFSP. Germany has been able to influence incremental institutional development within the CFSP, but on questions of real substance and military capability it is often France and the United Kingdom who decisively shape policy.

Germany and the CFSP Much of the literature on Germany’s European policy has concentrated on other EU competencies or on studies analysing Germany’s foreign policy ambitions in wider European terms. Germany’s role and place in Europe is a recurrent theme due to the size, importance and strength of the German state.6 Studies by Bulmer and Paterson, as well as Katzenstein, have been influential in outlining the domestic basis of Germany’s European policy, and how it impacts on Germany’s ability to pursue its strategic goals.7 In general, surveys of German security policy have been dominated by considerations over the role of NATO, rather than the development of an EU capability. This was due to NATO’s Cold War centrality and the mainly diplomatic and declaratory nature of EPC/CFSP during its early development. However, there is now the need for greater

4

Germany and EU Foreign Policy

understanding of the development of Germany’s CFSP policy in light of recent moves towards creating an autonomous European military capability to take more responsibility within the Atlantic Alliance.8 Studies of German security policy within the EU have been primarily published in volumes outlining national stances to EPC/CFSP or within broader studies outlining the development of EPC/CFSP from a multilateral perspective.9 Two excellent studies by Uwe Schmalz and Axel Lüdeke on Germany and the CFSP outline the impact and influence of Germany on the development of CFSP during the 1990s.10 This study will attempt to situate Germany’s CFSP policy within its wider European goals thus addressing a lacuna in the present literature. This study will also add to the understanding of Germany’s bilateral relations between France and the United Kingdom, particularly in the field of security policy. Therefore, through the use of Europeanisation, we analyse both the domestic developments within Germany, and how they impact on Germany’s EU policy-making, and vice versa.

What is Europeanisation? Europeanisation as a concept has a varied and interesting history.11 For the purposes of this study, Europeanisation will point not only to the adaptational pressures which Member States face as part of the EU, but also to the gradual shift in the constitution of the architecture of European security institutions to reflect a greater European influence.12 Both these dynamics have played a major role in how Germany has adapted its foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War. The push by European states to increase their influence within European security institutions has been a key aspect in the reconstitution of security in post-Cold War Europe. Germany has been a part of this process. Germany has had to adapt to new realities that have been thrown up since the disappearance of the Soviet threat, both in terms of hard security in the form of NATO and in softer guises in the form of the EU and its stabilising influence on the continent. Germany has played an active part in debates surrounding the recalibration of security policy in Europe to meet new challenges. It is these two aspects of Europeanisation – stemming from EU membership and in terms of a recasting of the security bargains of the Cold War – that are relevant for this study.13

Europeanisation and CFSP Europeanisation represents the conceptual framework for this study.14 This study defines Europeanisation as, ‘the process of change at the

Introduction

5

domestic level (be it of policies, preferences or institutions) originated by the adaptation pressures generated by the European integration process; a process of change whose intensity and character depend on the “goodness of fit” of domestic institutions and adaptation pressures’.15 Pressures on domestic adaptation are therefore the result of the level of fit or misfit between European and national policies and institutions. The application of Europeanisation to the field of foreign policy has been limited to date.16 Europeanisation’s key strength is that it provides a template for examining the adaptational pressures on Member States of playing an active role in CFSP. Clearly, EU Member States are affected in an asymmetric fashion through their involvement in CFSP. This stems from their ability to shape the development of policy (power) and their domestic singularities in the realm of security policy (culture). Adaptation in this sense is understood as a process through which ‘actors maintain a balance between international needs and external demands’.17 Whilst conscious of the ‘second image reversed approach’, which explores ‘the extent to which the (domestic) structure itself derives from the exigencies of the international system’, it is important to note that to a large degree domestic and European policies are becoming mutually constitutive.18 I will define adaptation as a move by national actors towards a greater consistency with the EU foreign and security policy. Maladaptation will be interpreted as a retreat to national solutions to foreign policy challenges or the strategy of forging foreign policy partnerships outside of the CFSP/ESDP framework.19 This analysis of adaptation in German foreign and security policy will add to the substantial body of literature on German foreign policy analysis since the end of the Cold War and in particular, to debates within the field of international relations concerning Germany’s new foreign policy direction. The presence of domestic adaptation to European and wider multilateral commitments would suggest that Germany has not chosen a unilateralist and therefore realist path.20 However, maladaptation would suggest that Germany is trying to free itself from some of the multilateral institutional restrictions it relied on so heavily during the Cold War. Europeanisation fits neatly into the overall theme of the study because it is a useful tool to chart the domestic adaptation of German foreign and security policy elites and to assess the extent to which Germany has been able to influence the development of the CFSP during the 1990s. It also links in well with the two-level dynamics of Putnam’s two-level metaphor with the domestic and international levels being in a constant flux of change and adaptational pressures brought

6

Germany and EU Foreign Policy

about by institutionalised co-operation on the international level.21 Europeanisation seeks to explore the adaptational pressures that Member States come under as part of their involvement in the EU.22 Ladrech’s formulation of Europeanisation considered that the Europeanisation effect was ‘top-down’ in nature and therefore, the agency of Member States in the process was underplayed.23 Ladrech’s initial definition of Europeanisation was an, ‘Incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making’.24 This was primarily to counteract the tendency in the literature to concentrate on the role of Member States in European integration, that is, the extent to which they influenced integration, rather than the domestic impact of the institutionalisation of co-operation among the Member States.25 Therefore, it was the structure of the EU and its gravitational influence on regional politics that compelled Member States to reassess their domestic public administrations in light of this new force. This topdown dynamic has become one of the most hotly contested aspects of Europeanisation. For our purposes Europeanisation is viewed as a twoway process in which Member States actively participate in the constitutive rules and policies of the EU as well as being affected by the implications of such co-operation and integration.26 This can also be witnessed within German CFSP policy-making as an overall process of preference shaping and preference accommodation.27 This study balances both the uploading and downloading aspects of Europeanisation as according to Bomberg and Peterson, ‘European integration shapes domestic policies, politics and polities, but member states also “project themselves” by seeking to shape the trajectory of European integration in ways that suit national interests’.28 The bargaining/negotiating dynamics highlighted by Putnam have applicability in the analysis of Europeanisation within the field of European integration/the CFSP, most notably developed in the work of Andrew Moravcsik.29 However, policy adaptation within the EU has not emerged solely on the basis of hard intergovernmental bargaining.30 Rather, political debates within Germany have also acted in framing the realms of the possible in German security policy since the end of the Cold War. In addition, political capital and relationships built up over time between political leaders have deeply influenced the process of European integration. Despite this, a number of reasons for retaining a predominantly intergovernmentalist view of the military aspects of the CFSP have been outlined by Miskimmon and Paterson.31 The

Introduction

7

development of ESDP has principally been driven by co-operation within the Council. Whilst CFSP is by no means exclusively intergovernmental, co-operation in CFSP is laid down in the form of treaties and not in the form of hard and fast legislation.32 This reality has been further reinforced since the Treaty of Maastricht in the Pillar Structure of the treaties that precludes involvement of the European Court of Justice in holding Member States to account in foreign and security policy. The maintenance of mainly intergovernmental modes of co-operation in the ESDP is largely due to the persistence of jealously guarded sovereignty within most EU national governments in foreign affairs and defence matters and the stickiness of national conceptions of Member States’ place in the world. Key to Putnam’s initial formulation and Moravcsik’s application of the two-level game in the ‘metaphorical sense’33 is that policy is made on the national level before being negotiated within a multinational setting on the European level. This stance assumes that the European level has little or no impact on the domestic formulation of policy and has left Moravcsik open to criticism in some quarters.34 However, this study posits that the impact of European level discussions on CFSP has had a limited impact on Germany’s foreign and security policy and that Berlin and Bonn remain the prime loci of decision-making in German foreign, security and defence policy. Charting the Europeanisation of national, foreign and security policy is a less exact science as, for example, in the case of Europeanisation and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) or other communitarised aspects of European integration. One can point to a raft of legislation and commitments on the part of the Eurozone 13 that represent an unmistakable case of Europeanisation as it is commonly defined. There has been a clear adaptation of policy within the Eurozone 13 to allow for the introduction and maintenance of EMU which permeates Member States’ policy-making. The same cannot be said for foreign and security policy, as yet. Literature within this field presents Europeanisation in far less clear-cut terms, often equating Europeanisation with the perception that there is a growing willingness within the EU Member States to consider European solutions to foreign policy issues alongside, or instead of, operating through established transatlantic frameworks.35 Europeanisation has also been examined in relation to the growing European role in NATO during the 1990s.36 Therefore, CFSP represents a distinctive policy area within the EU in which the Member States continue to play the leading role in driving policy forward or setting limits on the extent to which they can join

8

Germany and EU Foreign Policy

forces in foreign and security policy matters. Progress on the major developments within EU foreign and security policy is on the basis of intergovernmental negotiation, normally within the framework of the Council or European Council meetings. It is in these fora that Germany’s ability to influence the debate and the development of the CFSP will be clearest – the so-called uploading of the process of Europeanisation. The ramifications of downloading policy from the EU level can play out over a much longer period as Member States seek to react to new policies or conditions (Figure I.1). This has been very evident in the development of German foreign and security policy under the adaptational pressures of unification and the end of the Cold War. Europeanisation does, however, encounter some difficulties in explaining the adaptation of Member State’s policy and polities within the CFSP. The EU is just one of several security policy actors within Europe which seek to maintain stability on the continent. The development of the CFSP has therefore, taken place within this highly institutionalised space. Isolating the EU-effect on national policy as a result can often prove problematical with developments within NATO playing a major role in the calculations of EU Member States in CFSP. In addition, in the case of Germany, distinguishing foreign and security policy adaptation which can be attributed to developments on the EU level can be difficult due to the fact that the German’s foreign and security policy was from

European Union – Common foreign and security policy

Downloading

Uploading

Domestic foreign and security policy

The CFSP policymaking environment Figure I.1

The Foreign and Security Policy Europeanisation process37

Introduction

9

its very conception on the basis of a European model in an attempt to regain international influence and respectability. Despite these difficulties in applying Europeanisation to CFSP, Smith has outlined four criteria to gauge national adaptation to European foreign and security policy co-operation that fit neatly into a top-down analysis of Europeanisation. Smith considers that analysing the levels of elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, the level of constitutional change and the extent of shifts in public opinion will determine the degree of foreign policy adaptation within a Member-State and subsequently the level of foreign and security policy co-operation that is possible on the EU level.38 Applying these criteria to this study of German foreign and security policy will highlight part of the Europeanisation dynamic impacting on Germany. However, Smith’s criteria do not extend to assessing the degree to which Germany has sought to impact on the decisions within the development of the CFSP. The bottom-up influence of Germany on the CFSP is perhaps more difficult to isolate in Germany’s case. Policies enter the Brussels process and become an amalgam of ideas and suggestions from the Member States. However, much has been written about the distinctive role Germany plays within the EU.39 This literature seldom concentrates on Germany’s role within the CFSP where Germany has had in-built structural weaknesses on the basis of the legacy of World War II (WWII) settlement and semi-sovereignty since the emergence of EPC in the 1970s. The process of Europeanisation does not always prescribe concrete templates for domestic adaptation to European developments as a large degree of flexibility is in evidence. Accordingly, Olsen states that European level developments do not dictate specific forms of institutional adaptation but leave considerable discretion to domestic actors and institutions. There are significant impacts, yet the actual ability of the European level to penetrate domestic institutions is not perfect, universal, or constant. Adaptation reflects variations in European pressure as well as domestic motivations and abilities to act. European signals are interpreted and modified through domestic traditions, institutions, identities and resources in ways that limit the degree of convergence and homogenization.40 However, the uploading of German preferences in foreign and security policy has been one of the key aims of German policy-makers in CFSP during the 1990s. Germany has consistently been vulnerable in foreign and security policy since WWII, either in terms of its position bordering

10 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

on the Soviet sphere of influence and its reliance on allied troops on its soil, or in terms of its heightened sensitivity to pursue a foreign policy that rejected national-socialist ideals. The well-documented multinational rationale of German foreign and security policy necessitated Germany following a policy of convincing allies of its policy ideas within multilateral contexts (NATO, European Community (EC)/EU, United Nations (UN), Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)/Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)).41 The explicit unilateral pursuit of foreign policy goals was rejected for a multilateral strategy in which Germany sought to leave its imprint on collective foreign and security policy-making.42 It is this aspect of German foreign and security policy-making within the CFSP, combined with an assessment of how German policy-making has adapted to the CFSP, that this study will focus on. Germany has sought to embed itself within a highly multilateral security environment in Europe since joining NATO in 1955. It has therefore been to a large extent Europeanised from the very beginning. However, Germany remains a distinctive actor in European and world affairs, despite the high-level of co-operation it pursues with its European and transatlantic partners in security policy. Any analysis of Germany’s CFSP policy must be framed within its wider international role as part of the Atlantic Alliance. Germany’s foreign policy behaviour cannot solely be explained with reference to either domestic or international factors.43 Each level is dependent in many ways on the other and thus, this study uncovers how the domestic and international aspects of German foreign and security policy-making interact, will best explain the nature of German CFSP policy-making.

Mechanisms of Europeanisation To date, most studies of Europeanisation and foreign policy have not focused on the mechanisms through which Europeanisation occurs.44 Without specifying how Europeanisation takes place it is difficult to pinpoint national inputs and EU adaptation pressures on Member States. This study outlines the mechanisms through which Germany was able to influence the development of CFSP in the1990s. In addition to this, the aim of this study is to isolate the ‘EU effect’ on German foreign and security policy in the decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall. By doing so, we will contribute to the literature not only on German and European foreign policy, but also in terms of how institutions and multilateral co-operation influences national policy preferences.

Introduction

11

As the EU does not yet have a concrete institutional model to serve as a focus of adaptation for Member States, adaptation to CFSP is looser than in other policy areas. Germany has been driven by what March and Olsen define as a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in its participation in CFSP where national patterns of behaviour have been established over time due to regular and institutionalised co-operation with its European partners.45 The following analysis of German foreign and security policy focuses on the following mechanisms of Europeanisation. In terms of preference accommodation, this study will consider four areas where Europeanisation may or may not be discernable, as outlined by Smith.46 The downloading effect – preference accommodation ‘Smith’s four criteria of – elite socialisation; bureaucratic reorganisation; shifts in public opinion on CFSP; constitutional/legislative changes. In addition to this, resource allocation will be analysed as another defining feature of domestic adaptation.’ Assessing the level of elite socialisation will be important in charting the development of security policy among policy-makers in Germany. We argue that if Europeanisation is likely to be significant then policy-makers will have to alter their focus on privileging transatlantic answers to foreign policy challenges and concentrate more on EU solutions. The degree to which German policy-makers alter their views will suggest the successful penetration of international – in this case EU – norms on domestic structures.47 An analysis of bureaucratic reorganisation uncovers institutional changes that have been necessitated by developments in CFSP, such as the creation of new bodies and changes in relative institutional power in the domestic policy-making process. The bureaucratic structure of CFSP policy-making in Germany has an influence on German policy. Pressure from the European level to alter the domestic foreign policymaking structures outlined below, it will be argued, has affected Germany’s CFSP policy. Shifts in public opinion can be overstated in assessing the calculations of foreign policy elites.48 Whilst German public opinion was supportive of developing EU foreign and security policy co-operation, it remained conservative on Germany’s role within CFSP, particularly when considering developing EU military capabilities for crisis management. Smith’s fourth area of adaptation, constitutional change, represents such a rare occurrence that this study will include legislative developments alongside constitutional developments to trace domestic adaptation in the German case. Finally, shifts in resource allocation are an

12 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

important component of domestic adaptation. The importance of budgetary constraints in post-unification Germany were significant in foreign policy-making, most notably in the reform of the Bundeswehr. In light of these constraints, significant resource allocation in favour of European foreign and security policy initiatives will signal domestic strategic adaptation. In terms of assessing Germany’s influence within the process of Europeanisation the following areas will be considered. The uploading effect – preference shaping ‘Agenda setting; example setting; ideational export; exaggerated multilateralism/institution building.’49 Formal and informal agenda-setting by German governments in CFSP will be analysed. Council Presidencies of both the EU and the Western European Union (WEU) allowed some scope for increased German influence in influencing debates on the development of CFSP.50 Germany has also been at the forefront of encouraging greater co-operation in foreign affairs. Acting as an example setter by committing to increased co-operation despite its rise in relative power since unification has been an important tool of influence. Ideational export, whether in terms of sophisticated institutional blueprints for CFSP or broad policy goals has been another way in which Germany has sought to influence the development of CFSP to ensure a good fit between national and European level developments. A vital component of ideational export is the influence of policy discourse in shaping the options open to policy-makers.51 Finally, the last gauge of Germany’s ability to influence the development of CFSP will be in its contribution to institution building and commitment to multilateral cooperation within the EU.

Characteristics of the German CFSP policy-making process German foreign policy-making takes place within a highly contested and institutionalised system in Europe. The development of German CFSP policy displays a number of singularities on the domestic and European levels which this section will explore. These singularities define Germany as a unique case within the CFSP policy-making process. They are also the process through which policy-making on the European level is filtered, and thus have a significant impact on the level of Europeanisation in evidence within German foreign and security

Introduction

13

policy elites. This section will deal first with domestic policy-making system before moving on to examine how Germany feeds in its ideas to the European level. The domestic level Key to the domestic CFSP policy-making process within Germany is the Auswärtiges Amt, the Federal Foreign Ministry. The Auswärtiges Amt’s (Auswärtiges Amt Foreign Ministry) centrality to the development of CFSP policy within Germany is such that it has been described as the ‘sponsoring ministry’ for CFSP.52 This was especially the case in the formative years of European foreign policy co-operation when Genscher presided over the AA.53 Germany has consistently sought to play the role of Musterknabe54 in the CFSP process, in continually seeking to advance the level of co-operation between the EU’s Member States in foreign and security policy. Foreign policy-making in Germany rests on three principles which define the relationship between the central institutions involved in framing Germany’s position on CFSP. In order of importance they are the Kanzlerprinzip (the principle of chancellor authority), the Ressortprinzip (the principle of ministerial authority) and the Kabinettsprinzip (the principle of cabinet responsibility).55 The Chancellor’s role in foreign policy is to define the general guidelines and principles of German policy, leaving the AA to concentrate on the details in line with the Ressortprinzip. Within the Chancellery, Abteilung 2 – Foreign Relations, Global Issues and External security, especially Gruppe 21, alongside Abteilung 5 – European policy, especially Gruppe 51 are the key departments in framing these broad guidelines for German foreign and security policy. Within the AA the job for co-ordinating German CFSP policy rests with the Politische Abteilung, especially the EU Koordination/ Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (EU Co-ordination/ Common Foreign and Security Policy) EU-Kor/GASP and Department 202 (Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik – European Security and Defence Policy) Referat 202 (ESVP) in close co-operation with the Europa-Abteilung.56 The Chancellor’s role in foreign and security policy is most visible in exercising his Richtlinienkompetenz, the broad framing-off policy guidelines. Whilst the Auswärtiges Amt co-ordinates day-to-day German CFSP policy and pursues its role as ‘sponsoring ministry’ in the policy process,57 the Kanzleramt maintains a keen interest and influence through its foreign and security policy Spiegelabteilungen,58 Abteilung 2

14 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

and 5. The result of placing CFSP policy-making within the AA has meant that policy is framed with a long-term vision in mind, rather than exposing it to the more politically motivated Kanzleramt. The role of the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Defence Ministry) (BMVg – Federal Defence Ministry) has increased in CFSP over the course of the 1990s, mostly due to the influence of the Planungsstab/Führungsstab III (Planning Staff and / Operational leadership III). However, the BMVg’s role must not be exaggerated within CFSP policy-making. The BMVg still remains a largely Atlanticist institution due to the Bundeswehr integration into NATO command structures. In addition, whilst the TEU envisaged defence might one day be part of the CFSP, it is still a long way from being the case, even with the introduction of the ESDP.59 Despite this, the development of the ERRF will demand greater Bundeswehr involvement and may raise the profile of the BMVg in policy-making terms. Finally, the Bundestag in terms of democratic oversight and the Bundestag’s constitutionally enshrined role in deciding on Bundeswehr deployment and the Finanzministerium (Finance Ministry) in terms of outlining budgetary constraints on defence issues have important roles to play, but the AA and the Kanzleramt have remained the dominant actors within the policymaking process. Much has been written about the European policy-making process in Germany.60 Key to most of these assessments is that Germany’s European policy is highly sectorised and that attempts at central co-ordination are thus resisted by the key actors in the policy-making process. This is in stark contrast to the highly co-ordinated nature of UK–EU policymaking.61 However, as the profile and importance of CFSP has risen since the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the stakes have become higher, the freedom afforded to the AA has lessened, with the Chancellery wishing to provide more firm guidelines within the foreign policy sphere, and the growing influence of the Finanzministerium (Finance Ministry) in budgetary matters. The input of the Kanzleramt in CFSP and ESDP has grown since the inauguration of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) – Bündnis ‘90/die Grünen government in September 1998. The creation of a Europa Abteilung (European Department) in the Kanzleramt bears testimony to this, as the Chancellor has sought to pursue more concrete strategic goals within CFSP/ESDP.62 The Kanzleramt is therefore, attempting to play a more shaping role in CFSP/ESDP, a role not only on the domestic level but also in terms of pushing policy on the European level. What has become more noticeable during the 1990s, is

Introduction

15

that the Kanzleramt has attempted to become more assertive in strategic CFSP policy, whilst the AA has attempted to maintain its role as CFSP sponsoring ministry through day-to-day operative control.63 In so doing, the CFSP/ESDP policy-making process within Germany is undergoing significant adaptation, as the profile and impact of EU foreign and security policy increases. This is one of the many adaptations that Germany has gone through during the 1990s as a result of its involvement in the CFSP process, the significance of which will be assessed throughout this study. The European level The European level in foreign and security policy-making has undergone immense adaptation during the 1990s, as the breadth and scope of CFSP has increased. The coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1 May 1999 introduced a whole new range of foreign policy institutions in which EU foreign and security policy is made, which were further added to with the advent of ESDP since the Cologne Summit in June 1999. National positions on CFSP have had to be filtered through these institutions, with the Political Security Committee (PSC) being of major importance. The institutional topography of CFSP has changed dramatically since the signing of the TEU affecting relationships between Member States and the European institutions in which CFSP policy is made. As this study will show, Germany has been faced with major international challenges since the end of the Cold War, many of which have sought to be addressed through the framework of the EU. What has taken place has been a two-way process of policy learning, especially with reference to the Aufbauphase (formative phase) of ESDP, through which Germany and the EU have sought to bring stability to Europe by substantial adaptation in foreign and security policy. As outlined above, the German position that is presented in Brussels to Germany’s EU partners on CFSP is formulated predominantly in Berlin.64 Whilst discussions between German officials and their partners in Brussels often produce positive results in terms of finding solutions to opposing views, the input of national capitals is privileged. Policy coordination before key meetings in Brussels is conducted between national capitals and not between civil servants in Permanent Representations and remains on a relatively ad hoc basis. Overall, the key aim of German diplomats in Brussels within the CFSP policy process is to attempt to triangulate the German national interest with a desire to seek compromises with its partners (where possible), in the express aim of achieving consensus at twenty-five (Figure I.2).65

16 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

German national interest

Compromise

Figure I.2

Consensus

The simplified German Foreign Policy process in Brussels

Until the attempted streamlining of decision-making procedures within CFSP in the aftermath of the emergence of a degree of consensus on the task at hand following the St. Malo agreement of December 1998, the CFSP policy-making system was dominated by a number of key actors.66 The Member States remain key to the policy-making process which is why this study seeks to highlight the role of Germany in an attempt to widen the understanding of national positions within the CFSP framework. Within Brussels the General Affairs Council, backed by the Council Secretariat and supported by the preparatory work of the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) undertook the lion’s share of policy-making in CFSP during the 1990s. Further to this as will be shown, the Commission’s role, and particularly that of DG E (Directorate General External Relations of the European Commission), has grown throughout the 1990s. This study will also concentrate on the role of the heads of government of the Member States and European Council in their roles of making the ‘big-decisions’ in CFSP at the Maastricht and Amsterdam summits and in formulating the EU’s position during the Kosovo war. German CFSP policy-making emerges predominantly from domestic institutions that have been forged by a compelling domestic political culture which has acted as a brake on the extent to which Germany has undergone a process of Europeanisation of its foreign and security policy.

Introduction

17

German diplomats in Brussels have less room to manoeuvre to reach compromises and seek out avenues for policy development than, for example, their British or French counterparts, owing to the prevalence of enduring German singularities in foreign and security policy.67

The structure of the book In order to research the two-level dynamics of Germany’s participation in the CFSP it will be important to study the following areas. First, on the German domestic level it will be essential to consider the wider strategic culture and the development of a Europeanist identity in the Federal Republic of Germany in order to place CFSP within wider German conceptions of security policy. An important issue to examine is how deep does the logic of an EU security entity run when the spotlight of IGCs and Council Presidencies is off Germany. Connected to this is, if Germany has incrementally moved towards a conception of the EU as the dominant arena for foreign and security policy in the 1990s, to what extent has this impacted on Germany foreign policy outside the EuroAtlantic area? Have German desires to build an EU security capability been founded on ideology or has it been operationalised within German security policy-making circles? Second, an analysis of the dominant elite groups representing the main views on EU security policy will be undertaken. This will involve looking at the main federal ministries involved in policy-making and also party political opinion as well as wider strands of public opinion. These fora will be analysed for their impact in influencing elite policy-making at Maastricht, Amsterdam, the German Council Presidency in the first half of 1999 and in the post 9/11 international environment. This will be essential to understand the construction of domestic ‘win-sets’ and how they constrained or empowered German positions in negotiating the CFSP. By looking at elites this research will focus on the ‘core elites’ involved in developing Germany’s security policy. Negotiations concerning the development of the CFSP at Maastricht, Amsterdam and during Germany’s Council Presidency in 1999 were conducted by a very limited number of actors, in contrast to other areas of German EU policy-making. In this way this study will be able to define the significance and singularities of the CFSP in Germany’s wider EU policy. Third, an analysis of Germany’s bargaining positions on the EU level will be considered to see to what extent Germany was able to forge winning coalitions around German conceptions of the future of EU foreign policy co-operation. Of central interest is, how Germany was able to

18 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

maintain an integrationist stance while still being able to reconcile the positions of France and the UK. In the words of one NATO official, ‘The Germans were spread-eagled between the French on one leg and the UK–US on the other. They wanted to please everyone and needed a third leg to do so.’68 While Germany was spread-eagled between the Atlanticist and Europeanist visions of European security, negotiations were further complicated with the inclusion of debates concerning Federalist and Intergovernmentalist perceptions (see Figure I.3).69 The essence of the two-level game played out by Germany in negotiating the major advances in CFSP is to ‘appeal to the internal consensus and shape a purposive agenda capable of mobilising that consensus, while simultaneously seeking to avoid any concrete positions potentially subject to domestic veto points.’70 Germany’s aim at multilateral cooperation in CFSP has been founded on bilateral endeavours, especially with France and the UK, in convincing them to adopt more integrationist security policies. To this end Germany’s ability in agenda-setting will be an important area to research in Berlin’s ability to influence the course of security policy without mirroring neorealist predictions that Germany’s pursuit of power would lead it to aim for greater autonomy of action and influence. Most importantly, this study will delve into how Germany has been able to create structures and use them in order to address the problems which have arisen involving the debates over Europeanism and Atlanticism, Federalism and Intergovernmentalism. Finally, an analysis of how Germany has shaped and adapted to the normative framework of the CFSP will be highlighted by the case study of the German European Council Presidency of 1999 and in the preparation of the EU’s mission to the Congo in 2006. Both periods saw Berlin placing a major imprint on the EU.

Atlanticism – NATO

Federalism

German policy

Intergovernmentalism

Europeanism – EU Figure I.3

Germany’s two-dimensional negotiation model in CFSP

Introduction

19

This research will employ four case studies involving German policymakers which had crucial impacts on the development of the CFSP. First, the negotiations leading to the TEU signed at Maastricht. Second, the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam. Third, the German Presidency of the European Council in the first half of 1999 which coincided with the bombing of Kosovo. This will also include the Stability Pact for southeast Europe as a case of heavy German involvement in a CFSP policy area. The final case study will examine the EU’s decision to support UN troops in the Congo during the Congolese elections of 2006. The reason for adopting case studies is because they can pinpoint key areas where German policy-makers have played a significant role in the CFSP process. This will also enable the tracing of the German CFSP policy-making process both on the national and the EU-level. A distinction can be made between case studies which can have illuminating effects on the study of policy-making. Decisions made at Maastricht and Amsterdam were largely reactive to the post-Cold War events affecting the EU and its foreign policy. At the heart of the decisions taken was what Hill has described as the ‘capability-expectations gap’, or the desire to make the EU’s position in the world equal to its economic strength and in doing so bring stability to the region.71 In contrast, the lessons of the Kosovo crisis and the post-St. Malo consensus in CFSP sparked off a new impetus for greater EU autonomy in regional crisis management and creating the conditions for European stability in a proactive rather than a reactive manner. Chapter 1 will examine West Germany’s role in the development of European Political Co-operation during the Cold War before looking at the formative period of the CFSP between 1990–1993, focusing on the negotiation of the TEU. This chapter will analyse the extent to which the end of the Cold War and the negotiation of the agreement on CFSP within the Treaty on EU exerted adaptational pressures on German foreign and security policy. Specifically it will focus on the normative framing of German foreign and security policy as a result of impulses emanating from the European Community. The end of the Cold War and the unification of Germany undoubtedly placed Germany under intense endogenous and exogenous pressures. What this chapter will show is that whilst the CFSP which emerged from the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (IGCPU) represented a significant step to formalise foreign and security policy co-operation within the EU, the impact of this new institution did not substantially affect the content or scope of German security policy. This can be explained by the nature of the CFSP as agreed upon at Maastricht which was broadly consistent with

20 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

norms and policies shaping German foreign and security policy at the beginning of the 1990s. This analysis will also highlight the intensely interwoven negotiations concerning the post-Cold War security order on which Germany sought to place its imprint. What emerged within Germany was a debate concerning not only the future direction of German foreign and security policy at a time of euphoria, but also the uncertainty, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The time frame looked at in Chapter 2 equates with an important period in the adaptation of German foreign and security policy. During the early to mid-1990s many of the old shibboleths of German foreign policy were cast off or reframed in order to adapt to new international and domestic circumstances. This chapter examines the uploading of German preferences to the European level in the sphere of the CFSP as well as, analysing the adaptational pressures on German foreign and security policy associated with the downloading of EU foreign and security policy to the domestic level. Once the initial euphoria of the end of the Cold War had waned, both NATO and the EU sought to reconfigure their roles in European security provision. What emerged was an evolving ‘negotiated order’, defined as ‘a constant, rule-governed, process of negotiation between actors which produces policy positions and international policy outcomes.’72 Germany sought to influence this emerging negotiated order in the field of CFSP to produce an outcome which was as close as possible to its national preferences. Chapter 2 focuses on German efforts to influence the development of the CFSP in the face of mounting pressure on the EU to play a more effective role in regional stability.73 Added to this, Germany’s foreign and security policy establishment was coming under increasing pressure to play a more active role in crisis management.74 By both committing to the EU and seeking to shape policy-making within the CFSP, Germany sought to reduce the adaptational pressures being exerted upon it. These adaptational pressures were endogenous and exogenous to the European integration process and focused on three central dynamics: pressure to make the EU a more credible international actor, pressure to increase the European voice within NATO and finally, pressure on Germany’s wider role in the world since unification. Chapter 3 focuses on an analysis of the German European Council Presidency during a time of intense international pressure on German foreign policy it provides an excellent opportunity to assess the adaptational pressures on Germany within the framework of the CFSP. What this chapter outlines is the German input to overcoming the adaptational pressures relating to institutional issues surrounding European burden

Introduction

21

sharing in foreign and security policy. This chapter outlines how Germany was able to influence debates over the future of the CFSP and to play a pivotal role in outlining a solution to the Kosovo crisis. In terms of the overall contention of this thesis, Germany’s ability to influence European level decisions in the sphere of foreign and security policy was vital in the definition of a CFSP which Germany could live with and contribute to. Within the concept of Europeanisation, Germany pursued a policy of uploading German preferences to the EU as it sought to cope with the downloading affects of German involvement in Operation Allied Force. As has often been witnessed in German foreign policy, Germany sought to intensify its multilateral ties as adaptational pressures on it grew more significant. Chapter 4 examines Germany’s role in the operationalisation of ESDP since 2003. This chapter deals with Germany’s growing role in the development of CFSP and the emergence of a more self-confident Germany willing to take on its leadership responsibilities in ESDP. I contend that despite Germany’s involvement in developing EU military capabilities, there remain significant limitations to the Europeanisation of Germany’s foreign and security policy. Chapter 4 focuses on Germany’s leadership of European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD) Congo in 2006, which highlights the growing leadership role which Germany is now playing in ESDP. The period addressed in Chapter 4 coincides with a time of great tension within the transatlantic alliance, due to different interpretations in the EU and NATO Member States over the threat posed by Iraq under Saddam Hussein’s regime. Given Germany’s traditional role as balancer of Atlanticism and Europeanism, the fall-out over the Iraq War threatened not only to unravel the German–US relationship, but it also threatened to undo the consensus within the EU on the form and scope of the ESDP. Chapter 4 contends that claims of a defining split in Germany–US relations since the 2003 Iraq invasion have been over-stated, due to efforts made by the Grand Coalition to work more closely with the United States than under the Red/Green government. The Conclusion sums-up the findings of this examination of German foreign and security policy within the EU. It outlines the extent and limitations of the Europeanisation of German foreign and security policy. In addition, in light of the Federal elections of September 2005, the conclusion makes an initial assessment of the new government’s policy on CFSP. Germany faces a dual-challenge as a result of its membership of the EU. Germany has not resolved how this challenge should be addressed.

1 Germany, the European Community and the Challenges of the End of the Cold War

Introduction This chapter analyses the extent to which the end of the Cold War and the negotiation of the agreement on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the Treaty on European Union (EU) exerted adaptational pressures on German foreign and security policy. It will demonstrate is that whilst the CFSP which emerged from the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union (IGCPU) represented a significant step to formalise foreign and security policy co-operation within the EU, the impact of this new institution did not substantially affect the content or scope of German security policy. This can be explained by the nature of the CFSP as agreed upon at Maastricht which was broadly consistent with norms and policies shaping German foreign and security policy at the beginning of the 1990s. This analysis will also highlight the intensely interwoven negotiations concerning the post-Cold War security order on which Germany sought to place its imprint. What emerged within Germany was not only a debate concerning the future direction of German foreign and security policy at a time of euphoria, but also uncertainty, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This chapter charts the impact of the development of a European Community (EC) foreign policy on Germany during the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War years. The development of foreign policy on the European level was of great help in enabling (West) Germany to become a more active player in world affairs. No other person embodies the German contribution to building EC foreign policy than Hans-Dietrich Genscher, foreign minister from 1974 to 1992. However, 22

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 23

European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the subsequent CFSP had only limited impact of German foreign and security policy during the period addressed in this chapter. The Cold War division with the accompanying primacy of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), reinforced a reluctance among EC Member States to consider farreaching co-operation in foreign and security policy. This ensured that Europeanisation remained a peripheral influence on German foreign policy. The EC foreign policy co-operation was therefore limited in scope and dominated by intergovernmentalism, thus placing limited demands on the Member States to adapt to European level co-operation. The impact of the decisions taken at Maastricht in terms of Europeanisation and German foreign and security policy were limited, as CFSP did not mark a considerable leap forward from the incremental development of EPC. As Smith states, ‘Rather than a decisive break from the past, the CFSP represented a natural, logical progression by both clarifying what had been achieved through EPC and building only a few truly innovative goals and procedures onto that mechanism’.1 Significant to Germany’s position on the CFSP negotiations during the IGCPU was the future of German foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era, and how to multilateralise Germany’s foreign and security policy in co-operation with Germany’s European and transatlantic partners. CFSP represented a reinforcement of existing levels of Europeanisation within Germany, rather than a significant deepening of commitments to EU foreign and security policy. Before assessing the importance of the EU in post-unification Germany’s foreign and security policy, it is essential to examine where CFSP emerged from and what West Germany’s role was in developing the foreign and security policy of the EC during the Cold War.

West Germany and European Political Co-operation West Germany benefited considerably through its involvement in the EPC. As a member of EPC, West Germany was able to address many of the deficiencies of its foreign policy. Yet, West Germany’s involvement in EPC did not require considerable Europeanisation of German foreign policy. EPC offered West Germany the opportunity to co-operate more closely with its EC partners on matters of shared foreign policy interest. EPC also fell within West German preferences for multilateral cooperation. The Federal Republic followed a course since 1949 of what Anderson describes as ‘exaggerated multilateralism’.2 This resulted in

24 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

West Germany becoming, ‘particularly interested in, and increasingly adept at, not clearly articulating distinctive national positions, but rather feeding its own special German concerns and priorities into a common approach’.3 Germany’s embedded Europeanism has been a distinctive feature of West German foreign policy since 1969 when the idea for EPC was proposed. The construction of West German interests and identity within multilateral institutions meant that ‘in the eyes of German political elites, institutional memberships were not merely instruments of policy but also normative frameworks of policy-making’.4 EPC provided Germany with an ‘alibi function’ which acted as a ‘means of deflecting external pressure, and cover shifts in national policy’.5 Through participation in EPC the FRG was able to widen the scope of its diplomacy, which had been traditionally weak resulting from the legacies of Nazi aggression. Due to the tense stand-off in the Cold War between the West and the Soviet bloc, EPC also provided the EC with an outlet to express their European interest rather than following the American line. Despite this, significant developments in EPC did not occur for fear of upsetting the delicate balance of the Cold War system. Ifestos has noted that the, ‘inability of Europeans significantly to influence the course of events and the nakedness of its exposure to external aggression was nowhere more keenly felt in the German Foreign Ministry’.6 Therefore EPC provided the West German government with an outlet and cover for the development of its foreign policy,7 whilst allowing the EC to develop as a diplomatic actor. In addition, the pursuit of German national interests within EPC prevented fears that Germany would pursue its own Sonderweg. The FRG was consistently at the forefront of endeavours to improve the foreign policy capabilities of the EC, notably with the Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1981. The most conspicuous aspect of Germany’s enthusiasm for EPC has been its framing of bilateral proposals rather than individual decisions, the so-called ‘leadership avoidance complex’, which stems from Germany’s singularities in foreign policy.8 This concern to avoid an overt leadership role during the Cold War led to the impression that, ‘Germany can come across and represent itself as a relatively insignificant country, shying away from political and military leadership, paying its moral dues etc., but then in very real terms still being an extremely influential country with great political and economic clout’.9 Germany’s relations with France and the United Kingdom have therefore been vital in German aims to advance security integration in the EU. EPC represented an important cog in the FRG ‘s foreign policy, as part of its overall strategy of pursuing its most important foreign policy goals.

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 25

Multilateralism was for West Germany its strategic enabler.10 European foreign policy co-ordination allowed the scope of West German foreign policy to be drastically increased without exposing the FRG to the challenges of unilateralism. EPC represented an opportunity for the EC to speak with a louder, if not common, voice on the world stage without demanding too much from its Member States. Western European Union (WEU) also presented an institution which could act as a bridge between the United States and Europe, keeping France involved in crucial discussions on European security, while at the same time calming British and West German fears of European decoupling from US security provisions. Whilst EPC was not the most effective arena for the discussion of major issues affecting the future of Germany, it did serve to deepen West Germany’s commitment to European integration, and ease fears of a German Sonderweg. EPC and NATO represented a two-pronged strategy by which West Germany could secure its territorial safety, while at the same time work towards bringing peace to Europe and ending the division of the German people. Whilst NATO represented ‘hard security’ provisions under the dominance of the United States, EPC represented a diplomatic and political forum for expressing Western Europe and Bonn’s foreign policy concerns – ‘soft security’ measures. Therefore, Bonn’s relationship with the United Kingdom and NATO was primarily concerned with hard security measures, while its relationship with France was primarily founded on political initiatives designed to work towards the common destiny of European integration. Bonn was in a considerably stronger position to influence the agenda within EPC than it was in NATO where the United Kingdom and the United States held sway. It was therefore necessary for German policy-makers to embed EPC in a long-term vision for an integrated Europe, within a decision-making process which demanded unanimity from all its Member States where Bonn could not be seen to ride roughshod over its partners. It is Bonn’s refusal to use security and defence policy as a vehicle to develop its power base during the Cold War along realist lines that distinguishes the FRG from France and the United Kingdom, which were generally more prestige and power-orientated in foreign policy during the Cold War.

The origins of European Political Co-operation The origins of multilateral security co-operation in Western Europe in the aftermath of World War II date back to the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948. The Brussels Treaty brought together the United Kingdom,

26 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to work towards economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence. The signatories were motivated by the need to stabilise post-war Western Europe and, in particular, ‘To take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression.’11 Originally based on a British proposal by Bevin early in 1948, the Brussels Treaty is significant in its aims to create greater cohesion within Europe and also in its hostile attitude towards German involvement. However, the conception that Germany was best kept at arms length in order to reintegrate it into the Western society of states had changed by 1954 with the signing of the Modified Brussels Treaty which brought Germany and Italy back into the international fold. The accession of the FRG to the WEU had much to do with the parallel development of the NATO. The institutionalisation of the United States’ role in European security with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949 presented Western Europe with a strong forum in which to integrate West Germany. The WEU Treaty of 1954 also placed restrictions on Germany’s ability to develop or possess Atomic, Biological, Chemical (ABC) weapons, something which the FRG agreed to but learned to resent, due to the brake on sovereignty which this represented. Over the course of the years German elites, particularly within the Defence Ministry, learned to consider WEU as a constant reminder of past aggression. Further attempts at giving the EC a cohesive foreign policy, notably the European Defence Community (EDC) of 27 May 1952, were unsuccessful, floundering on the reluctance of France to fully integrate matters of foreign and security policy unless they remained intergovernmental by nature.12 The signatories of the EDC Treaty (France, the FRG, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) aimed to, ‘set up amongst them a European Defence Community, supranational in character, comprising common institutions, common Armed Forces, and a common budget’.13 EDC represented a highly ambitious effort to pool the tools of war into a supranational body with the express aim of embedding the West German military into common forces. The scope and breadth of this federalist vision of security co-operation among the six Western European states with the aim of a truly common defence capability has yet to be mirrored in the CFSP of today. However, EDC failed to be ratified by the French Senate in 1954 which opposed sharing sovereignty over national defence and had misgivings about the integration of German units into a European defence structure. The enduring conflicts over aims for supranational structures meant that the formation of

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 27

consensus for EPC at the end of the 1960s was therefore undertaken under the backdrop of the intergovernmental versus integrationist debate.14 The Modified Brussels Treaty of 1954 was able to advance the cause of security integration by expounding a vision of intergovernmental security co-operation, but at the same time, very much shirking away from the deep commitments contained within the EDC Treaty. The successful ratification of the EDC treaty would have ensured that Europeanisation was most dominant adaptational pressure on German security and defence policy in the post-1949 period. The EDC treaty remains the most far-reaching proposal for European defence cooperation. In contrast, the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2007 commits EU Member States to mere co-operation on low-level crisis management operations, rather than the collective defence aspirations of the EDC. The failure of the EDC treaty established the primacy of NATO in Western Europe as the collective defence organisation, and provided a framework for West Germany’s remilitarisation in the face of the Soviet threat. With the failure of the EDC treaty and the integration of the West German military command into NATO structures, West German committed itself to the Washington Treaty and the military dominance of the United States in Western Europe. This chain of events has had long-term consequences not only for German security and defence policy, but also for that of the EU. The subsequent development of EPC was an attempt to raise the foreign policy profile of the EC without destabilising the precarious balance of Cold War Europe. Europeanisation of foreign and security policy in the way it is currently understood was unthinkable within the context of the Cold War. The centrality of transatlantic defence co-operation was vital for the security of Western Europe, despite the political tensions which were often associated with US–EC diplomacy. A significant step was made towards the development of an individual European foreign and security diplomacy in the publishing of the Harmel Report in December 1967, authored by Pierre Harmel, the Belgian Foreign Minister. This ‘Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance’ was an important step towards the recognition of Western European concerns over the direction of NATO security policy by committing the Alliance to pursuing détente in tandem with maintaining a strong military deterrence.15 For EC members, political and military efforts needed to go hand in hand in order to disperse tensions between the two rival blocs. For West Germany, in particular, the Harmel Report stressed the invalid nature of German division, part of the ‘unnatural barriers between Eastern and Western Europe, which are most clearly

28 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

and cruelly manifested in the division of Germany’.16 The necessity of a solution to the German Problem was key to the eventual rapprochement between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. With this linkage of German unification as a precondition for the end of the division of Europe, ‘the Alliance’s political programme thus furnished the framework for achieving both German and European unity’.17 The EC’s growing confidence in foreign policy had a significant bearing on the Hague summit communiqué of December 1969 which boldly proclaimed the intention of ‘paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and of making a contribution commensurate with its traditions and its mission’.18 The Luxembourg Report of 1970 and the Copenhagen Report of 1973 elaborated on the principles of EPC. EPC was not to take the form of an institution set in EC law, but rather signalled the willingness among the Member States to agree to attempt greater co-operation in the field of foreign policy. In the words of Ben Soetendorp, ‘The EPC was created to serve as an instrument for the exchange of information, consultation, harmonisation of views, co-ordination of positions and the taking of joint actions by the member states.’19 Building on the Harmel Report’s emphasis on the necessity to back military clout alongside political engagement with the East, EPC sought to offer the EC a more significant diplomatic role in the East/West conflict. The EPC was concerned primarily with political and economic aspects of security, rather than military security. By following this path EPC developed a niche for itself within the international system. Being unable and unwilling to compete with NATO’s dominance in ‘hard’ security matters the EC attempted to contribute to easing East–West tensions by adopting a positive negotiating stance in foreign affairs which was clearly evident in the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) negotiations in 1973. The EPC did not involve the setting up of new institutions in which matters of foreign policy could be coordinated, but rather it was developed using existing fora of communications. As there were no legal frameworks stating the scope of EPC, EC members were not bound legally to agree and co-operate with each other but rather to try and agree on matters pertaining to EPC.20 The establishment of EPC was part of a wider effort to ‘relaunch’ Europe.21 The Franco-German relationship was a major factor in the development of EPC. De Gaulle and Adenauer’s relationship was essential in providing the circumstances in which political co-operation could develop. The first three years saw little progress being made, with the main focus of attention falling on the CSCE. The negotiations

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 29

surrounding the CSCE served to help EPC become recognised in the Cold War environment, and enabled Western Europe to ease tensions which had developed with the United States. Events in the Middle East in 1973 forced the EC to develop consultation mechanisms with the Arab States. The Middle-East crisis of October 1973 also presented the EC with a chance to present a common front in foreign policy as part of a Euro-Arab dialogue, distinct from that from across the Atlantic. It was also important that the EC developed a coherent Middle-East policy due to its high dependency on Arab oil. In addition to this, the Ostpolitik served as a major impetus for EPC, in order to create a dynamic for greater consultation in security affairs. However, Tsakaloyannis states that, ‘in spite of some hopes in the early 1970s, the EC failed to elaborate a collective Ostpolitik, sharing the same goals, priorities and aspirations’.22 William Wallace states that, ‘Between 1974 and 1978 the network of consultations widened to cover most regions of the world and most international issues, but without achieving common attitudes or actions commensurate to the effort expended.’23 It is clear then that any normative base of EPC was slow to take hold in the formative years of the project. This lack of progress needed to be addressed in order to prevent the stagnation of the EPC process. The Tindemans Report of December 1975 proposed a radical overhaul of EPC and the EC as a whole. Its aim was to remove the divide between EPC and EC structures to create a common foreign policy.24 The Tindemans Report proved unacceptable to many because it called for the merging of EPC into the EC and its, ‘reference to “overlap” between Community competencies and EPC was exactly what most Member States wanted to avoid in their strict interpretation of the division between external relations and foreign policy co-ordination’.25 Member States’ determination to maintain the primacy of national sovereignty over external relations and foreign policy co-ordination was to prove impractical in the future course of EPC integration. The EPC can be characterised by its restraint in the international system. In the words of Giulio Andreotti, ‘Europe’s role in the world is one of moderation, a role in keeping with its tradition and culture. If this role is to be performed fully, Europe needs both the will and the courage to strengthen itself.’26 The niche which EPC established for itself in international affairs was of significant importance to West Germany, as it enabled it to make strides towards the solution of the German Problem through the bolstering of East – West dialogue. Germany’s support for EPC was nested within attempts to create a fully integrated EC, although Bonn’s strategic aims and objectives were often singularly

30 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

‘German’. In the eyes of German elites, the unification of Germany, whilst considered an internal affair, took on a new impetus with the Harmel Report, by opening up the possibility of improved relations with the Eastern bloc, and added a new impetus for Western Europe to develop its own, distinctive diplomatic voice.

Towards the Single European Act West Germany’s input into the development of EPC was most notable at the beginning of the 1980s. Foreign Minister Genscher was able to generate a move towards developing more substantial co-operation in foreign policy as previously was the case in the Single European Act (SEA). Genscher’s key role in this process was in setting the agenda for discussion through his partnership with Italian Foreign Minister Colombo. By outlining his determination to improve the quality and scope of EPC within the SEA, Genscher was able to have a substantial impact on the development of EC foreign and security policy, bringing it in from the cold, into the treaty structure. Whilst the institutional developments in EPC outlined in the SEA were not substantial, Genscher’s commitment to the cause of increasing Europe’s voice in international affairs under the structural constraints of the Cold War was indicative of West Germany’s commitment to forging greater multilateral co-operation with its European partners. At the beginning of the 1980s, Colombo and Genscher tabled a proposal for the deeper integration of the EC which was to become, albeit in a diluted form, the Stuttgart Declaration of 19 June 1983. The Genscher–Colombo initiative of 12 November 1981 ambitiously proposed the bringing of the EPC process into the main EC structure and to extend its remit to eventually include matters involving defence.27 The London Report of 1981 which proposed the setting up of a secretariat and made a commitment to closer consultation within EPC, the Genscher–Colombo initiative, and the Solemn Declaration of Stuttgart, were to lay the foundations and create the dynamic towards the negotiation of the SEA of 1986. The SEA established the parameters of EPC until the TEU was signed at Maastricht in December 1991.28 The London Report continued EPC’s tradition of maintaining loose co-ordination within the EC. It outlined that Member States should ‘maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which had made it possible to discuss in Political Co-operation certain important foreign policy questions bearing on the political aspects of security’.29 The Solemn Declaration made the important step of involving the Commission in the EPC more

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 31

closely, stating that ‘the Commission is fully associated with the work of European Political Co-operation and, where appropriate, with other activities within the framework of European Union’.30 Simon Nuttall’s criticism of the Solemn Declaration as, ‘EPC mutton dressed up as lamb’ was indicative of the lack of substantial progress made in EPC.31 The EC was caught between the belief that it should have an increased presence in the international system in order to protect its economic interests, and the concern not to upset the status quo which had developed out of the Cold War environment. However, security aspects of foreign policy began to gain more support in the early 1980s. According to Aybet, there were external and internal reasons for this development.32 The main external impetus was the EC’s realisation of its inability to react to crisis situations as, for example, in Afghanistan. In addition, there was concern among Germany’s leadership that EC integration was losing speed and needed to be rejuvenated. Finally, Kohl and Genscher were concerned over the deployment of Pershing and Cruise missiles on German soil and the pacifist demonstrations that had resulted from NATO’s ‘dual track’ decision of 1979. In the run-up to the Milan Summit in 1985, the United Kingdom presented a proposal to refine the workings of EPC in the style of the London Report of four years previous. The British draft, ‘a minor miracle of scissors-and-paste drafting’33 drew some influence from the Dooge Report’s paragraph on security co-operation, but generally presented nothing radically different to that which was already standard practice within EPC. It was into this void of policy initiative that the Franco–German draft took centre stage on the eve of the Milan Summit. While not differing radically from the British proposals it presented a grander vision for the future development of EPC.34 Member States declared in the SEA that ‘The external policies of the European Community and the policies agreed in European Co-operation must be consistent.’35 Further commitments were made to ‘endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy’, ‘inform and consult’, take full account of the positions of the other partners and give ‘due consideration to the desirability of adopting and implementing common European positions’.36 In order to support the ‘troika’, the SEA decided on the establishment of a small secretariat. Wyatt-Walter has described Title III of the SEA as, ‘little more than a legal codification of previously agreed incremental steps’.37 The success of the SEA was to include EPC in the treaty although there still remained limitations on the discussion of military security and defence within the process.

32 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

The limits of Europeanisation in West German EPC Policy West Germany’s role in influencing the development of EPC was significant, although the constraints of the Cold War limited West Germany’s influence in discussions on European security. Despite these constraints, West German governments were often able to influence discussions within EPC. Kohl, and particularly Genscher, consistently stressed the need for a stronger European voice in international affairs. Genscher played a lead role in developing inter-regional networks between most parts of the world and the EC.38 Genscher’s initiator role in spreading the EC’s global links was central to his overall foreign policy goal strategy of civilising world politics through the introduction of a new form of global politics.39 Through this policy of expanding the web of the EC foreign policy links on a global level, Genscher and Kohl were able to reinforce their domestic preferences for multilateral co-operation on the European level. Through the EC’s expanded global links, West Germany was also able to address some of the foreign policy challenges facing it, without having to resort to unilateral measures. West Germany was also able to gain important experience in international affairs, and most importantly regain international respectability, through its involvement in EPC, after the initial constraints of the immediate post-World War II era. Kohl and Genscher’s reluctance to take a lead role in EPC limited West Germany’s ability to set the agenda in EPC. Nevertheless, Genscher injected significant dynamism into EPC in the early 1980s which had an important bearing on discussions leading to the SEA. The reasons for the constraints on West Germany’s ability to conduct a more proactive foreign and security policy are mirrored in the constraints affecting EPC at this time, ● ●

●

●

Massive structural constraints resulting from the Cold War stand-off; Europe and Germany’s reliance on American support in hard security – especially under the conditions of American extended nuclear deterrence; The division of Germany and Europe necessitating responses in the form of conventional and nuclear deterrence which were open solely within the NATO framework; A commitment within West Germany to work within the NATO security framework to overcome the division of Europe.

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 33

These constraints prevented the EC from developing a more active foreign and security policy. There was therefore limited adaptation of West German foreign policy as a result of Europeanisation dynamics during the Cold War. Neither was there sufficiently strong adaptational pressures emanating from EPC due to its weak institutional base, nor a rationale for diverting West German foreign policy attention away from co-operation under NATO.

Challenges to Germany’s European and international position With the end of the Cold War, German foreign policy was faced with a radically different international context in which to conduct foreign and security policy. The speed at which the East–West stand-off came to an end and the pace at which events which led to German unification took place caught Europe by surprise.40 The end of the Cold war and the resultant unification of Germany, whilst freeing Germans from the tyranny of division, also confronted Germany with significant uncertainties about its future place in Europe.41 As in 1945 when Europe and Germany went through tremendous changes, Germany embarked on a process of deeper integration into the Western state system. One major difference, however, was that Kohl did not have to convince his people of the rationale of Westintegration as Adenauer had to – Germany’s positive experiences in advancing the course of European integration had impacted to such an extent on the German population, that no other course of action presented the same certainty as involvement in the EC and NATO. What factors explain the German commitment towards the development of the CFSP at Maastricht? A wide range of issues must be taken into account emanating from both the German domestic stage and through Germany’s involvement in negotiations leading towards the TEU. What is clear, however, is that in the face of the impact on Germany of unification, Germany displayed considerable continuity in its security policy, despite neorealist predictions concerning the impact of structural change in the international environment.42 According to Bach, Challenges to the future course of German involvement in the EU were undoubtedly thrown up by unification; the image of a united Germany fitting seamlessly into the scheme of an expanding union is powerful, and its power partially rests on minimising and concealing the challenges to the integration narrative, including any posed by

34 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

German unification itself, yet these challenges do exist, complicating the notion that the united Germany is merely an enlarged West Germany.43 The realist view that Germany would weaken its commitment to multilateralism now that it was reunified and aim for great power status has been most identified with Mearsheimer.44 However, the united Germany has not changed dramatically since unification, despite the changes in the European state system. In the words of Pond and Schoenbaum, ‘For all the tectonic change, it exhibited remarkable continuity’,45 which marked, ‘… evolution, not revolution in Bonn’s foreign policy’.46 German unification, the original guiding principle for Germany’s European policy no longer applied, but German commitment to the EU remained, ‘since Germany’s commitment to European integration had long outlived the context in which it had originally emerged’.47 In an attempt to shore up Germany’s commitment to the EU, Article 23 of Germany’s Basic Law was amended, ‘so that the Federal Republic, instead of being open “for other parts of Germany”, was now committed to the “realisation of a united Europe”’.48 Kohl’s decision to replace the D-Mark with the European single currency in the face of much reluctance in German public opinion was the price Germany had to pay in order to convince France of its commitment to the process of European integration.49 The most visible sign of Germany’s commitment to European integration and the tying of Germany’s power into a multilateral framework is Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Germany’s ability to evolve its policies to fit the European model and influence EU level institutions and policy-making accounts for the success which the EU has been for the German state. When noting the non-threatening aspect of such a policy Anderson asserts, ‘Germany projected its power softly, revealing a firm preference for normative and institutional over material interests, an ingrained support for multilateralism, and a greater inclination than its large European partners to delegate sovereignty to supranational institutions.’50 Anderson argues that pre-unification Germany was concerned with pursuing two main objectives as part of the EC – reintegrating West Germany into a collection of states and creating a stable international environment in which Bonn could rejuvenate West Germany. It is therefore the case that West Germany did not pursue European integration for material benefit alone.51 German unification was viewed as marking a sea-change which could dramatically alter Germany’s traditional role in Europe since

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 35

World War II. Germany faced a number of options regarding its future foreign policy orientation, but ultimately, Germany chose to frame its foreign and security policy within the institutions which had served it effectively during the Cold War.52 Germany also sought to avoid the harsh choices by refusing to commit solely to one foreign policy course, the ‘sowohl als auch Politik’.53 Germany concentrated on the ‘Wider Europe’ option from the mid-1990s, being a strong supporter of the NATO and EU enlargement process.54 During the immediate years after unification Germany failed to define its European policy other than by continually restating Germany’s commitment to further European integration. Linked to this, Marsh states that, ‘German foreign policy was, in fact, defined by the absence of German policy’.55 This lack of policy definition is extremely important for German CFSP policy. As we shall see, the Maastricht reforms focused on intuitional developments, rather than policy innovation on the European level. Instead of causing a reassessment of German foreign policy, the emergent CFSP offered a reinforced European context in which Germany could find its geopolitical feet after the upheavals of unification. Moving from a junior to a senior role in European integration since the Treaty of Rome, Germany has felt more at ease in stating its national interests.56 Thomas Pedersen has argued persuasively that Germany and France have operated a system of what he terms ‘co-operative hegemony’, where they have sought to co-ordinate their activities to force through their aims in European integration.57 Indeed, Germany has seldom attempted to unilaterally affect the course of European integration, preferring to consult European partners, primarily France, in the drafting of proposals. This process of bargaining and attempting to create consensus among a myriad of policy actors at the European level is mirrored in Germany’s domestic political system, where the Federal Government must take into account the views of the Länder and other institutional actors in making policy.58 EU policy-making procedures are mirrored in those of Germany, and which can be characterised the degree of institutional pluralism which exists in both systems. The high degree of co-ordination, or ‘institutional fusion’59 and the Harmonisierungbedürfnis (need for harmony)60 which exists between German domestic and EU level policy-making is a clear sign that, ‘Germany’s commitment to integration was more than a matter of material benefit. German political elites developed a robust attachment to the institutions of integration, incorporating a strong European identity in their diplomacy.’61 However, Bonn’s influence on the integration process is confounded to a certain degree by the fact that, ‘Germany’s

36 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

day to day European policy making is characterised by a weak horizontal co-ordination leading to a “bureaucratised policy-making” which lacks – with some exceptions during the Council presidency – strong political impetus.’62

Post-Cold War foreign policy challenges ‘For the first time (in history) we Germans are not a point of contention on the European agenda. Our unity has not been inflicted on anybody; it is the result of peaceful agreement.’63 Germany faced two key foreign policy challenges at the end of the Cold War. First, the Gulf War placed significant pressure on Kohl and Genscher regarding the use of Bundeswehr troops outside the NATO area. Second, the break-up of the former Yugoslavia placed enormous strains on the framework of EPC, and exposed German foreign policy singularities, a situation which German had sought to avoid since the end of World War II. Genscher and Kohl felt extremely vulnerable to foreign policy pressures emanating from the Gulf War and the continuing 2
4 negotiations on the unification of Germany.64 It was therefore Genscher’s intention to restate his restricted interpretation of the constitutional role of the Bundeswehr in military operations in order to follow a minimalist international role whilst German unification was being negotiated.65 Germany was left exposed by the Gulf War, because Germany refused to play its traditional role as committed partner within the NATO alliance by refusing to sanction the use of the Bundeswehr outside of the NATO area. Germany contributed to the war effort in a number of ways; on 16 August 1990, German minesweepers were sent to the Adriatic; by helping in the diplomatic effort to dispel Soviet concerns over the role of NATO troops in the Iraqi region; through Germany’s diplomatic condemnation of Saddam Hussein’s action; and through the traditional German foreign policy strategy of chequebook diplomacy in which Germany contributed around 25 billion Deutsche Marks to the military and humanitarian effort. The German position on the Gulf War signified a reticence to consider the deployment of Bundeswehr troops during the process of unification. However, Foreign Minister Genscher did recognise the new foreign policy pressures which the unified Germany would face. In a speech to the Bundestag Genscher declared, ‘The Federal Republic … expresses its preparedness, once the division of Germany has been overcome and the East-West conflict has been allayed, to assume its responsibilities for securing world peace

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 37

within the framework of the United Nations and on the basis of its charter’.66 The growth of the importance of the EU as a regional power since the end of the Cold War raised expectation levels regarding the role of Germany in helping ensure stability on the continent. With the end of the Cold War and the expected waning of American influence in Europe, Germany’s critical mass became more pronounced. However, Germany’s diplomacy, with the exception of events surrounding the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, continued to be based on multilateral solutions. Germany’s premature recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was, according to Crawford, due to the domestic pressures placed on the Bundesregierung by its population to recognise the two republics.67 Germany’s recognition fiasco did not fit with Germany’s view of CFSP as, ‘a useful mechanism to assert German foreign policy interests in a convenient multilateral setting so as to avoid impressions of unilateral assertiveness’.68 However, this was also a result of the weakness of EPC, which was unable to act effectively enough in a crisis situation, thus forcing Kohl and Genscher to take unilateral action. Some commentators have viewed the process of European integration as a German attempt to increase its sphere of influence, but the case of Yugoslavia has shown that the strengthening of the EU can only help to mitigate the power of Germany. Mitterrand’s decision to endorse the reunification of Germany after much deliberation must be seen in this light that ‘the only way to circumscribe Germany’s growing power was to embrace it. In the new situation, Paris could no longer maintain the illusion of previous decades that Germany would provide the brawn, France the brain, of Europe’.69

Negotiating CFSP during the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union Germany’s participation in the negotiation of CFSP during the IGCPU exhibited many aspects of ‘two-level gamesmanship’70 in which Germany sought to simultaneously reach agreement for proposals to develop EC foreign and security policy both among its EC partners and within a united Germany which was only beginning to come to terms with its past, present and future. A two-level approach uncovers the domestic and international conditions impacting on Germany’s bargaining positions in security policy and how it sought to reach consensus with France and the United Kingdom and gain support within the German polity. By utilising such an approach this will build upon work

38 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

on Germany and the negotiation of major advances in European integration.71 By nesting the debates and negotiations within the goal of creating Political Union (PU) in Europe and bringing security and stability to the whole of Europe, the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union/ Free Democratic Party (CDU/CSU/FDP) coalition sought to appeal to the international and domestic spheres to bring about a satisfactory agreement. Kohl was also able to nest the negotiations within the pressing issue of unification, which was vital in forging an agreement at Maastricht. However, in contrast to the negotiation of EMU which Dyson and Featherstone praise for its surprising degree of structure, despite the complexity of issues involved, the negotiation of CFSP lacked the same level of configuration, with Member States suggesting in some cases highly conflicting arguments and ideas, mirroring a ‘garbage can’ style negotiation.72 Helmut Kohl was confronted with the necessity of forging a satisfactory agreement with his European partners which would be acceptable on the German domestic level. Kohl employed a multidimensional negotiation strategy as a means to achieve this which involved the following aspects: On the European level Kohl involved himself in reasserting Germany’s commitment to European integration and the transatlantic alliance after unification among Germany’s major partners, namely France, United Kingdom and the United States. Kohl also had to strengthen the Franco-German partnership balanced with that of British–German and American–German relations as seen in the parallel negotiations surrounding the development of NATO and European integration. The German government also attempted to offer a vision of Europe which would inject dynamism to the process of European integration and give it new meaning in the post-Cold War era both within Germany and in Western Europe. This was also enabled by the influence of party grandees such as Dregger, Schäuble and Lamers who facilitated the debate both within Germany and through the Group of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament. On the domestic level, Kohl focused on winning the domestic debate in tandem with Genscher for the need to further integrate Germany into multilateral institutions, no longer under the conditions of formal ‘semi-sovereignty’, but with a potentially stronger, more powerful state, with greater demands placed on it to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. Kohl had to do this within the framework of the impending ratification debates which would follow the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and with an eye on the need to shore up his domestic political and electoral power base for the next Federal Election in 1994.

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 39

The key decisions taken at Maastricht regarding CFSP The aim of the CFSP as agreed upon at Maastricht involved two key issues. First, in broad geopolitical terms, the EC attempted to map out what Europe stood for in foreign and security policy in light of the end of the Cold War and sought to prevent the emergence of a security vacuum in central and eastern Europe with the end of communism.73 Article J.1.2 TEU stated that the objective of CFSP was to ‘safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union … to preserve peace and strengthen international security … (and) to develop consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and collective freedoms’. Second, the Member States aimed to institutionalise co-operation more effectively within the treaty structure and lay out provisions for further development of co-operation. Both of these aims corresponded with German preferences. Germany also wanted to frame the negotiations within broad aims which matched German preferences, rather than embark on a piece by piece negotiation of proposals set before the Member States. What is noticeable is that Kohl and Mitterrand sought to guide CFSP negotiations and find compromises to impasses. Smith states that ‘Following their initial letter, Kohl and Mitterrand actually contributed very little to the discussion about what the CFSP should involve.’74 This is characteristic of German policymaking in the sense that Kohl had his eyes firmly fixed on the treaty’s overall aims in light of German unification and CFSP was nested firmly within this.75 European integration was a means to reject Germany’s past in a conscious decision that ‘Modern Germany and European integration are part of the same historical trajectory that points away from Europe’s past.’76 However, Kohl and Mitterrand provided negotiations with strong political leadership as they tried to construct an agreement, without which the outcome of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would have been significantly less satisfactory.77 The decisions taken at Maastricht did not represent a substantial reworking of European foreign policy.78 What can be seen, therefore, is an attempt to codify institutional relationships within the EU and to define what had been achieved to date under EPC. The decisions taken at Maastricht must also been seen within the European context as a whole as a reaction to the end of the Cold War. No serious thought was given by the EC Member States to replacing the pre-eminence of NATO in the transatlantic security architecture, or to radically redefine the European security order.79 However, the most significant aspect of the provisions on CFSP was the explicit framing of foreign and security policy within the treaty structure.

40 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

The main decisions taken at Maastricht were as follows. First, it is important to note that the CFSP remained intergovernmental thanks largely due to the pillar structure of the TEU and the exclusion of the European Court of Justice from CFSP affairs as outlined in Art.L TEU, thus removing the threat of enforcing inconsistent capitalisation of Common Positions and Joint Actions on Member States.80 Without this formal enforcing mechanism the CFSP aimed to impose cohesion among Member States according to the principles outlined in Art.J.1.4 TEU that ‘The member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.’ This intergovernmental basis for co-operation has been a defining characteristic of CFSP since the signing of the TEU and to an extent has acted as a brake on root and branch Europeanisation within the foreign and security policies of Member States.81 Second, the EC outlined the basis of two key foreign and security policy mechanisms – Common Positions (Art. J.2 TEU) and Joint Actions (Art J.3 TEU) – by which to bolster the EU’s regional presence. Common positions were envisaged to outline common policies regarding third countries, foreign and security policy issues, or policies relating to a particular geographical area. The concept of the joint action took some precedence in Article 30 of the SEA and was to be taken on the basis of consultation within the Council and related to concrete steps taken to deal with foreign policy issues of common interest to the Member States.82 The framework of the joint action also opened up the possibility of taking decisions according to qualified majority voting (QMV) on the basis of achieving 54 votes within the Council and the votes being cast by at least eight Member States (Art. J.3.2 TEU). The position of WEU vis-à-vis the EC and NATO was also a major issue within the negotiations (J.4.2).83 The compromise which was worked out between the EC Member States was that the WEU would serve as a ‘bridge’ between the EC/EU and NATO.84 This was one of the most difficult aspects of the treaty provisions on CFSP to negotiate due to its linkage with discussions over the future of NATO and European security.85 What emerged was a compromise between France and the United Kingdom concerning the role of the WEU as an institution to build up the European voice within transatlantic security, rather than an alternative to NATO. This was a relatively satisfactory solution for Germany, which continued to favour mutually reinforcing measures between the EC/WEU and NATO. The future role of WEU was also signalled by the implications of Art. J.4.1 TEU which committed the EC to consider the eventual framing of defence provisions within the Union.

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 41

Finally, Article J included provisions to fully associate the European Commission with CFSP (Art.J.9), opening up the joint right of initiative to the Commission in CFSP affairs. The role of the Council was enforced under Art. J.8.3 as a forum to which all aspects of foreign and security policy could be referred. The tricky issue of the financing of CFSP was also dealt with under Art J.11 that opened up the opportunity to the Council of charging CFSP operational expenses to the community budget, in addition to the agreement to fund administrative cost through the EC budget. The chapter now turns to how Germany contributed to negotiations to reach agreement on the CFSP with its European partners. The following analysis uncovers the extent to which the final treaty provisions placed the united Germany under adaptational pressures and will uncover the development of the German position on the IGCPU. Debating Political Union and CFSP – Restating Germany’s multilateral credentials Germany’s role in the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty was personified in the role that Genscher played in German foreign and security policy during his time in office. Genscher’s talent, according to Peter Hort, was to ‘broker deals and moderate’ between the French and British positions.86 Kohl’s role was offering the strategic vision – Genscher’s constructing the agreement. This interplay between the two poles represented by France and the United Kingdom in foreign policy occupied the German government as they attempted to forge an acceptable agreement on CFSP at Maastricht.87 The joint letter by Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand of 18 April 1990 to Charles Haughey, the Irish Taoiseach, calling for the initiation of a parallel IGCPU to that of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), came in response to German and French concerns to balance the deep economic and monetary integration envisaged by the 12 with that of deeper political integration. The calls from the German side for greater political integration in the post-Cold War era were in many ways dominated by the concern to bolster the foreign policy role of the EC in the face of the beginnings of unrest in Yugoslavia and also in light of the Gulf War. For Genscher, the Gulf War showed clearly the limits of EPC, ‘I hope that those who hesitated in the past over creating Political Union will now support the Franco-German push for the speedy construction of Political Union.’88 In his first government declaration after unification, Kohl stated his aims for the immediate future of German foreign policy. Central to this

42 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

was the need for Germany to find a role to play in the West’s institutions. This was a concern of Helmut Kohl who stated, ‘For us Germans there are no niches in world politics, and Germany should not be able to evade its responsibilities’.89 For Kohl, the whole of Germany, ‘now had the chance to find its internal balance, its middle’, and to play a part with other states with all, ‘rights and responsiblities’.90 Kohl outlined his aims for the IGC: the completion of the European internal market by 1992; the creation of a European civil society; the strengthening of the European Parliament; the creation of a CFSP as well as EMU. In relation to this Kohl stated that it was, ‘factually and politically compelling that Political Union be created parallel to Economic and Monetary Union’.91 A further Franco-German initiative of February 1991 provided a dynamic impetus for the debates concerning the creation of a CFSP and was part of an overall strategy of forging bilateral relations between the two countries during the parallel IGCs.92 The Genscher-Dumas Paper was presented before the EC Foreign Ministers in Brussels in conjunction with plans for the negotiation of PU. The joint paper called for the development of a EC foreign and security policy which, ‘should lead in the end to a common European defence.’93 The WEU was envisaged as the foundation on which the foreign and security policy would be based given that according to Genscher, ‘The WEU already possess all the possibilities for joint military action.’94 The British reaction to the FrancoGerman proposal was quite positive in terms of the need for the EC to strengthen its foreign policy role, but it soon became evident that France, the United Kingdom and Germany differed on how CFSP should be conducted.95 Within Germany, reactions amongst the leading parties in the Bundestag were generally favourable to the Genscher-Dumas plans. The chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, Alfred Dregger, called the paper a ‘practical suggestion’ and welcomed the suggestion to develop the role of WEU.96 The Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) supported the general aims of developing EC foreign and security policy but from a SPD perspective Norbert Gansel stressed two issues. Weapons exports: Germany was embarrassed by the fact that Iraq had received substantial amounts of weapons from Germany and Europe which it used to attack Kuwait and most significantly Israel;97 if the WEU was to develop an intervention force as part of the developments of EC foreign and security policy, the SPD could not countenance its deployment outside the NATO area. Gansel stated that Europe should not make itself, ‘the auxiliary policeman of global

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 43

politics’.98 The view of the SPD that any future Bundeswehr role in the WEU should restrict itself to the NATO area was shared by the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) in Bonn. The chairman of the European People’s Party parliamentary grouping of the European Parliament, CDU/CSU Member of the European Parliament (MEP). Dr Egon A. Klepsch, also argued that ‘One must guard against an agreement among the 12 on the form of foreign and security policy which is purely intergovernmental in character and bypasses the European Parliament. This is especially the case in view of discussions over the future role of the Western European Union’.99 This internal reluctance in Germany to consider an increased role of the EC/WEU in crisis management was reflected in the divergence of perspectives between France and Germany regarding the implications of the Genscher-Dumas paper of 4 February 1991. Here is an example of domestic politics restricting the freedom of manoeuvre of the Federal Government in negotiating with its major partners. The ‘self restriction to the UN-Minimum’ reflected in the ‘Foreign Office fostered German Sonderweg ideology’ concerning the deployment of the Bundeswehr, signified the contrast in German and French divergences in the ‘meaning and purpose of the European security and defence identity.’100 France and the United Kingdom agreed on the justification for developing a WEU intervention force which could act outside of the NATO area, something which for Germany remained anathema. Of note here is the lack of clear fault-lines within the Franco-German axis in the EU on matters involving security and defence policy. France and the United Kingdom often transpired to push the development of further military co-operation amongst European states when Germany remained reluctant to commit to such measures. The qualified support of UK Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd to the Franco-German proposals for PU and a CFSP ensured that despite differences concerning the details of working out the policy in reality, there was consensus among France, Germany and the United Kingdom concerning the need to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy presence.101 Hurd clearly stated the UK’s objection of including defence matters into the community competencies but signalled a willingness to build the WEU into a ‘bridge’ between NATO and the EU. The Franco-German conception of the WEU/NATO relationship was that of a canal. Hurd also agreed with the rationale for moving the administrative organs of the WEU to Brussels, something which France and Germany were calling for within the IGC negotiations.102 Manfred Wörner, the NATO Secretary-General in conjunction with Willem van Eekelen, the WEU Secretary-General,

44 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

added their support for the development of a European pillar within NATO on the basis of WEU.103 However, the United Kingdom remained very reluctant to discuss matters of integrating WEU into the EU, a standpoint which had vocal support from the Netherlands. Despite this there was general support for the development of WEU as an ‘instrument of military operation’ among the foreign ministers of the Member States at their meeting in Luxembourg on 28 March 1991.104 The first meeting on 11 March 1991 in Bonn between Kohl and Major after Margaret Thatcher’s resignation as Conservative Party leader opened up the possibility of improved British–German relations. In addition, this provided Kohl with possibilities of greater freedom to negotiate on the European level as it reduced the reliance on France to push through agreements. France’s concerns of a too-powerful unified Germany meant that during the negotiation of the TEU, France was very concerned not to allow Germany to gain too much from the treaty. In contrast, while Major was concerned with binding the unified Germany to multilateralism, the British Prime Minister was very aware of the need to ensure that Germany and the United Kingdom were at one on the need to maintain the involvement of the United States in Europe and modify French attempts to exert more European independence. Germany remained in a very difficult position. Germany’s stance was somewhere mid-way between that of France and the United Kingdom, with the United States playing a vital role in debates concerning the future European security architecture. This has been a defining mark of German security policy within the EU. It has also been a diplomatically more difficult part to play in negotiations in comparison with that of France and the United Kingdom. France, while being able to co-operate with NATO on major aspects of European security, has sought incrementally to gain more independence for European states to decide its security policy with less involvement in their decision from the United States. This has been a clear policy and one which can be strategically more straightforward to conduct. In contrast, the United Kingdom consistently argued for the continued involvement of the United States in European security not only to maintain continuity in the post-Cold War world but also to maintain its special relationship with the United States and thus its diplomatic clout both in Europe and beyond. Kohl was very aware that the new British Prime Minister John Major offered a chance to conduct a more positive relationship between the two countries, than during the Thatcher years. Here was someone with whom Kohl thought he could deal.105 Kohl attempted to cut Major enough slack within the negotiations to allow a compromise solution

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 45

for the Maastricht summit by advancing the EC’s ability to act on the international stage, while enabling Major to gather enough domestic support within the United Kingdom for ratification of the treaty’s chapter on CFSP.106 This was exacerbated by the looming Westminster elections in 1992. Kohl’s dovish treatment of Major left the British Prime Minister in a relatively strong negotiating position as he had little room to manoeuvre on major points of contention. Major insisted that the WEU could be strengthened to improve European Capabilities in crisis management to serve as a ‘bridge’ between both sides of the Atlantic.107 Major, however, was very clear in outlining his opposition to the development of WEU structures and the integration of WEU/EU as he feared the role of NATO as the cornerstone of European security would be compromised.108 Kohl hoped that negotiations taking place within NATO concerning the future of the Atlantic Alliance and western security architecture would open up a political space in which the EU could develop a stronger foreign and security policy role while not wishing to impact negatively on NATO. Despite this, it became clear towards the end of the Luxembourg Presidency of the European Council that there was little hope in having substantial moves towards a common defence policy included in the treaty text. Instead the Luxembourg Presidency attempted to find a compromise based around stating that a common defence policy may be the subject of future treaty revisions.109 In addition, the Luxembourg draft envisaged a treaty of three ‘pillars’ which left the chapter on foreign and security policy outside of the community competencies, firmly grounded in intergovernmentalism. Moves towards creating a WEU intervention force which would be available to NATO in crisis situation were strongly supported by the then Mayor of Paris and Chairman of the Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR), Jacques Chirac. In a speech at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Foundation) in St Augustin, Chirac argued that French and German troops should be central to such contingents, which would allow for the possibility of stationing German troops in France.110 The stationing of German troops in France was at this time of specific significance due to the tensions evident in the Franco-German relationship caused by unification. The political significance of continuing the stationing of troops in each other’s territory was not lost on Chirac and the Bonn elites. Combined with deepening military co-operation and European integration, this suggestion was designed to strengthen the bilateral relationship and reassure Germany’s allies of its dependability.

46 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Foreign Minster, Hans-Dietrich Genscher had a slightly different view on the building up of European capabilities in military deployment. In a speech in Lisbon, Genscher called for the creation of European Blue Helmet units and in addition, Green helmet units, which could protect the environmental basis of security in the new Europe.111 Genscher’s view of security in the immediate post-Cold War period sought to achieve an inclusive settlement which would include a pan-European dimension based on the CSCE. In this way he sought to balance Kohl’s recommitment to Westbindung with a pan-European perspective. The Franco-German summit in Bad Wiessee on 23 July 1991 concentrated on the development of the crisis in Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not to recognise Slovenia and Croatia. It was decided at this point that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would be premature. However, the main issues covered concerned the conferences on EMU and PU. Central to the meeting were talks aimed at achieving a compromise on a CFSP at the Maastricht summit. Kohl consistently saw himself as an intermediary between the positions of France and the United Kingdom, between the extremes of Atlanticism and Europeanism. There was also a clear awareness in Kohl’s mind of the supremacy of France and the United Kingdom in foreign and security policy as the two central policy shapers in EPC. The German WEU Presidency: July–December 1991 The German Presidency of WEU in the second half of 1991 allowed Germany to play a vital co-ordinating role in debates over the framing of the CFSP within the negotiations on PU. Central to the role of President is the ability to set the agenda and act as an honest broker in finding consensus amongst the WEU Member States.112 Alfred Dregger, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Bundestag grouping stressed the need to work with the British proposals to develop WEU as a ‘bridge’ between NATO and the EC.113 However, Dregger stressed the need for an organic development between the EC and WEU as outlined by the Kohl and Mitterrand proposal of December 1990 and underscored the need for the United Kingdom to accept that If the other European partners were ready, in accordance with the British suggestions to develop the WEU as a ‘bridge’ between the Political Union of Europe and NATO, then Great Britain should be ready to accept a clause on the WEU’s status within the EC treaty structure as a basis of this Political Union.114

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 47

The German Presidency sought to press for a greater role for the WEU within the debates concerning CFSP. Central to this was the co-operation with France which resulted in the Franco-German security policy initiative of the 15 October 1991, calling for the development of the Franco-German corps, to act as the basis for a future European army. The impact of this proposal was substantial. The WEU Council meeting of 29 October 1991 served as a forum for the airing of reactions to the Franco-German proposals and also as preparation for the NATO Summit of 7–8 November 1991 in Rome. The Franco-German security policy initiative of 15 October 1991 to develop the role of the Franco-German corps into a European corps, as the basis of a future European army, was aimed at strengthening France and Germany’s position in negotiating CFSP within IGCPU. It was also intended to revitalise the debates over the framing of a common European defence. While welcomed by the Belgian Foreign minister Mark Eyskens, the prospect of the development of a Eurocorps was further evidence of fears that the Franco-German alliance sought to undermine the future of NATO. This was the sentiment within the Netherlands, which held the Council presidency.

Competing national conceptions of Political Union and their implications for European Union Security Policy The negotiation of PU centred on debates about the future of the EC in a time of political upheavals all over Europe. Clear differences may be seen in Germany’s position in comparison with that of France and the United Kingdom. Whilst German elites saw the negotiation of PU as a chance to frame the EC as a federation mirroring that found in Germany, France maintained its preference for keeping nation-states as vital components of the future Europe in a confederal vision of European integration. Kohl’s main task on the domestic level was to outline the conditions in which Germany could play an increased role in international affairs without compromising its national singularities. The vehicle for achieving this for Kohl was PU.115 During the formal debate on the German government’s role in up-coming summit at Maastricht Kohl stated, ‘Political Union must create a firm basis for a common foreign and security policy. The move towards qualified majority voting belongs to this, especially when it comes to the implementation of decisions.’116 Kohl stressed the importance of strengthening foreign policy in the community institutions, something which was met with great scepticism by the United Kingdom and French governments.117

48 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Debates between elites in France and Germany concerning the future of European integration would continue throughout the course of the 1990s. In contrast, the United Kingdom refused to engage in such debates about the finalité of European defence, preferring a process driven approach to CFSP and the EU. In a seminar organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the European People’s Party parliamentary grouping in the European Parliament, the British Minster of State in the Foreign Office, Tristan Garel-Jones, insisted the British view on debates over the future of Europe was, ‘We are enthused by the journey, but where it is leading us must be left to the future to decide.’118 Both the European People’s Party and the CDU/CSU were very active in debates concerning not only the future of European integration but also in contributing to the negotiations within the IGC.119 In terms of Putnam’s two-level metaphor, this impacted on the Kohl government’s approach to its negotiations on the intergovernmental level, framing the realms of the possible on the German domestic level. In addition, the ability to conduct policy debates within the ranks of a party political context has often allowed German governments to spark Europe-wide debates on European integration while still being able to distance itself from general party positions should it meet with an unfavourable response.120 This is one way in which the senior coalition partner in the Federal Government has often attempted to dominate junior coalition partners in foreign policy-making within the government, despite the junior coalition partner usually holding the position of Foreign Minister.121 The debate over the deepening of the European integration process within the context of the future development of Germany’s role in Europe and the world had to be won by the government. Within the parallel IGCs on EMU and that of PU, serious concerns were raised as regards the phasing out of the D-Mark into a single European currency and the implications for Germany of a greater foreign and security policy role for the EC. Germany’s reflexive support for European integration was considered by Kohl in a speech in Berlin to be, ‘without restraint, but also without false modesty.’ However, this was within the context that, ‘we Germans remain ready to cede rights to the European Community, even when this means a noticeable incision into our national sovereignty’.122 What was necessary for Kohl was that ‘After the events in the Gulf, we Germans can no longer dodge the question of what we can contribute to security and stability outside Europe.’123 Kohl consistently argued in the domestic sphere that the overcoming of the division of Germany and the end of the Cold War necessitated a greater commitment to multilateralism rather than the previous situation of

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 49

‘free-riding’ on American, French and British security provisions. In the early period of the post-Cold War era the former political, strategic and military substance of East–West stand-off based on détente and deterrence was already being replaced by a new approach based on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management. The precondition of the successful adaptation of the newly unified Germany into the Western state system was according to Kohl that ‘We must recognise that our decision will be viewed by all as a touchstone of the earnestness of our political will to carry the burden with others for maintaining international peace.’124 In a Joint Declaration at the end of their consultations in March 1991, France’s Foreign Minister Dumas and Germany’s Foreign Minister Genscher stated the willingness of both countries to work towards the ‘organic association (organische Verbindung)’ between WEU and PU without wishing to weaken the ties to NATO.125 This represented an awkward compromise between the two countries, with Germany trying to balance its dependence on France and that of the United Kingdom and the United States. Whilst sparking concern within the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the Franco-German plans caused concern in Washington and resulted in the infamous ‘Bartholomew Telegramme’, outlining the Bush administration’s disquiet with the European’s plans.126 The nature of the differences between France, the United Kingdom and Germany centred not only on matters within the EC but also on issues relating to the wider world. As Nonnenmacher states, The UK and France will find it difficult to submit to majority decisions if it concerns the protection of the remnants of their world power status. In Bonn, in turn, a noticeable section of the political class wants the German role on the international stage to be assigned preferably only to Bundeswehr troops under Blue Helmet missions. Where is the basis for common ground?127 The stances adopted by Germany, France and Great Britain reflected their national conceptions of the emerging security environment, rather than a shared vision of what was to come. The response to these postCold War uncertainties resulted in the affirmation of the role of NATO in the post-Cold War world at the Rome summit in November 1991. The EC’s response was to assert its shared values, interests and identity on the international stage within the provisions on the CFSP in the TEU. The Luxembourg European Council Presidency presented the foreign ministers of the 12 Member States with two compromise papers on 15 April 1991 ahead of finalising its version of a draft for the up-coming

50 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

negotiations in Maastricht.128 These dealt with two of the central problematic issues within the negotiations on PU – developing a CFSP and strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the EC. Germany, France, Belgium, Italy and Greece stressed that the inclusion of the desire to work towards a common defence was a central issue of PU. Whilst the Luxembourg papers were greeted with general enthusiasm, London, supported by the Netherlands and Denmark expressed fears concerning the linking of defence policy within a CFSP. In addition, the attempt to close the democratic gap within the Community by increasing the role of the European Parliament was opposed by the United Kingdom and Denmark. The German Foreign Office State Minister Seiler-Albring repeated Germany’s call for the inclusion of a commitment to work towards a common European defence within the treaty and stressed the Kohl government’s determination to address the democratic deficit as outlined in the joint German–Italian initiative of the previous week on widening the joint decision rights of the Parliament, on the basis of the model of the Bundestag/Bundesrat institutional relationship. Douglas Hurd’s position on the German, French, Belgian, Italian and Greek position for the inclusion of defence components in the treaty sought rather to stress the role of NATO in successfully providing security for Western Europe for more than 40 years.129 However, this was qualified by his support of strengthening the role of the Europeans within NATO. The British position within the negotiations was therefore more complex than merely refusing the development of a CFSP. The Luxembourg compromise papers were largely greeted with support within the governing coalition in Germany. The deputy-chairman of the CDU Bundestag group, Prof. Dr Karl-Heinz Hornhues, quoting the Luxembourg papers, stressed the importance that the EU should develop a CFSP to work towards the ‘defence of common values, basic interests and the independence of the Union’.130 Whilst emphasising the importance of developing WEU as the ideal institution for a ‘European security union’ as part of European integration, he stressed the concern that such a security union should not damage the NATO alliance. In addition, Hornheus wanted the development of the role of the WEU so that a European security union would provide a cover for the double-hatting of military troops for NATO as well as for EC tasks. The government’s position on the Maastricht negotiations met with considerable criticism within the Bundestag. Most of this opposition stemmed from concerns over the future direction of German foreign policy and from fears within the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) that instead of working towards a process of demilitarisation of

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 51

international affairs at the end of the Cold War, Europe was witnessing a renewed bout of militarisation with the development of NATO and WEU/CFSP.131 The PDS and the SPD voiced concerns that the development of CFSP would result in greater pressures on the Bundeswehr to participate in military operations around the globe, despite constitutional limitations on their use.132 Norbert Gansel (SPD) also raised concerns about the Franco-German Corps being an exclusive ‘binationalising’ of military co-operation outside NATO.133 Heidiemarie Wieczorek-Zeul stressed the importance of national singularities in foreign and security policy which should not be overlooked when considering the deeper integration of German foreign policy into collaborative EU structures, as well as stressing the importance of democratic oversight for EC foreign and security policy.134 A final concern raised by the opposition parties was the perception that instead of working towards pan-European stability, the German government was reinforcing western European orientated institutions. Gerd Poppe (Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen) called for a ‘pan-European security policy’ to correct this misdirection (see Table 1.1).135 Public opinion German public opinion at the beginning of the 1990s was robustly behind the government’s efforts to push for greater co-operation in foreign policy within the EC (see Table 1.2). However, the German public were less supportive of European level co-operation in security and defence policy. This is consistent with traditional German attitudes to the deployment of force in international Table 1.1 IGCPU

Key norms shaping Germany’s approach to negotiations during the

German Policy Aim

German Policy Norm/Preference

Multilateralism

Recommitting German foreign policy to multilateral solutions

Kein Sonderweg

Convincing Germany’s partners of Germany’s rejection of foreign policy exceptionalism

Common European Defence

Explicitly stating a common defence within Article J of the Maastricht Treaty

European Union

Forging Political Union

Transatlantic Partnership

Recommitting to NATO and bolstering the role of WEU

52 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 1.2 Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … foreign policy toward countries outside the EU?136

Germany

EU

National Government

Don’t Know

11/89 11/90 3/91 11/91 4/92 10/92

67 60 69 67 69 75

27 32 26 27 26 21

6 8 5 6 5 4

Table 1.3 Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … security and defence?137

Germany

EU

National Government

Don’t Know

11/89 11/90 3/91 11/91 4/92 10/92

58 50 52 54 59 55

39 44 44 42 37 42

3 6 4 4 4 3

affairs. Kohl’s push for the agreement on the Petersberg Tasks with their implications of the future of the Bundeswehr therefore did not carry overwhelming support among the German population in the same way as non-military foreign policy co-operation did (see Table 1.3). As Table 1.4 shows, NATO still maintained substantial support despite the demise of the Soviet threat. Despite this positive support for EU initiatives, when respondents were asked to whether NATO or the EU should take the major decisions on the security of Europe, NATO came out less favourably (Table 1.5). These final poll results demonstrate continued support for EU activism in foreign affairs whilst not discounting the continued relevance of NATO in territorial defence.

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 53 Table 1.4 USIA (United States Information Agency): Some people say that NATO is still essential for our country’s security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country’s security. Which view is closer to your own?138 Germany 3/91 5/91 5/92

Essential

Not Essential

Don’t Know

62 69 65

27 19 23

11 12 11

Table 1.5 USIA: In your opinion, what organisation should make the most important decisions about the security of Europe in the future: NATO, the EU, or some other organisation?139 Germany 10/89 2/90

NATO

EU

Other/Don’t Know

44 17

24 43

32 40

German ratification of the Treaty on European Union Central to any analysis of international agreements is the domestic level ratification of treaties. Awareness of the how much room for manoeuvre a negotiator has is central to how much a head of government can bargain when involved at the coalface of international affairs – what Putnam refers to as the necessary ‘win-set’ to achieve domestic approval for an international agreement.140 The domestic ratification process which followed the signing of the TEU did not fundamentally question the agreement on CFSP which the German government had agreed upon.141 The ratification process as far as CFSP provisions was concerned displayed the traditional hallmarks of German consensus on European policy, which further reinforces the contention within this chapter that the CFSP broadly mapped onto existing German preferences in foreign and security policy. Therefore, the degree of adaptational pressure being exerted on Germany at this stage in the development of CFSP was not significant, thereby reducing the impact of dynamics of Europeanisation. The rapid pace of negotiations on PU and EMU and the complexities of European integration demanded the establishment of a European Committee in the German Bundestag, in which to scrutinise the actions of the government and also EC legislation for its impact on the German domestic political environment. Pressure for the establishment of such a committee came predominantly from the junior coalition partner, the

54 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

FDP, but also from within the ranks of the senior coalition partners, the CDU/CSU.142 The founding of the European Committee did, however, meet with a certain amount of difficulties mostly concerning the division of competencies amongst the existing foreign and defence policy committees within the Bundestag. The tensions evident in setting up the committee resulted in the creation of the temporary special Committee for the EU (Treaty of Maastricht).143 This was also seen as a stop-gap to deal with the strains within and among parties within the Bundestag, but also the inter-ministerial strains which were evident, most notably between the Foreign Office and the Chancellery.144 However, the creation of the European Committee is one visible sign of adaptation pressures emanating from European integration onto the domestic sphere. In May 1991, Chancellor Kohl, with an eye on the ratification of the treaty in the Bundestag, stated that he would make the use of the Bundeswehr in ‘out-of-area’ operations an election issue in the 1994 German Federal Elections.145 It was clear during the negotiation of the TEU that Kohl was very aware of the difficulties of ratifying a treaty which would make increasing demands on Germany’s foreign and security policy. Even in the midst of negotiations Kohl attempted to ‘play’ both domestic and international negotiations at the same time, being very aware that negotiations on European integration affected both levels equally. For his claims for a CFSP as a crucial component of PU, Kohl had to convince his fellow heads of state that Germany would play its part in a more active and involved manner. At the same time, promising that Germany would bear more responsibility for European security, Kohl had to convince the Bundestag of the rationale of doing so in the face of needing a two-thirds majority for ratification of international treaties and constitutional changes. Johannes Rau and Heidie Wieczorek-Zeul of the SPD countered such a proposal by stating, ‘The Federal government has no majority for a constitutional change which aims for the participation of Bundeswehr in the deployment of offensive forces outside the NATO-area’.146 They made it clear that the Federal government should not promise its partners within the negotiations more than it can expect to deliver on the German domestic level. Rau and Wieczorek-Zeul also called for the ‘far-reaching demilitarisation of the concept of security’ with humanitarian and civilian rights as the central claims of German international relations.147 Central to the SPD’s approach to the IGC was that national parliaments should maintain their constitutional control and decisionmaking rights over European foreign and security policy in the absence

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 55

of a wide-ranging granting of rights and powers to the European Parliament.148 In the run-up to the presentation of the Luxembourg Presidency’s draft treaty, the SPD presented the Federal government with a number of concerns which were raised by the style and strategy of the government’s negotiations within the IGC. The main points of contention were questions of the parliamentary control of European decisions, a common asylum and immigration policy, the anchoring of the principle of subsidiarity, the safeguarding of federal structures in a unified Europe and Bonn’s conception of a CFSP. The SPD continued to voice concerns that the Bonn government was prepared to work towards the establishment of a WEU intervention force which would have the potential to be deployed outside the NATO area.149 Bjorn Engholm, chairman of the SPD, stressed that the EC should not become a ‘substitute-NATO’ and that ‘the EC’s security policy does not mean the participation of Europeans in military interventions’.150 The position of the PDS was highly influenced by the unification of Germany and the implications of the united Germany’s foreign and security policy being that of West Germany’s before – Westintegration. The five new Länder and the PDS had to adapt to being gradually absorbed not only into Western security arrangements which had lined up against the GDR and its allies, but also into a Western security architecture which itself was adapting, albeit slowly, to the new challenges of the post-Cold War environment. In a European policy paper the PDS foreign policy spokesperson in the Bundestag, Hans Modrow, called for disarmament, more democracy and secure human rights with the prospect of a pan-European collective security system with a European security council at its core.151 In addition to this Modrow argued against Kohl and his contention that the unification of Germany should be viewed as an example for the future unification of Europe, insisting that Europe should not be a ‘Mehrklassen-Europa’ (multi-class Europe).152 In addition, during a speech to the Bundestag, Gregor Gysi outlined a further set of PDS fears associated with the development of the CFSP: The foreign and security policy which has been agreed causes us great concern. The treaty outlines that the Western European Union should act as the military arm of this European Union. That will be a military alliance without the USA and Canada. It should exist alongside NATO and allow for a European intervention force. So far no-one has been able to explain to me why the European Union needs its

56 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

own force, alongside and independent of NATO, the latter option which I think is unnecessary.153 Central therefore to the PDS’s concerns was a reluctance to consider a further increase in Western orientated military actors in Europe, in light of the promised de-escalation of the military stand-off which had defined Cold War Europe.154 Key to the aims of the CDU/CSU for the IGCs of 1990/1991 was to outline a course for Europe’s future with the ultimate goal being that of creating a United States of Europe.155 The CDU/CSU’s contribution to domestic debates concerning the government’s participation in the parallel IGCs was further bolstered by combining forces with the European People’s Parties Parliamentary grouping of the European Parliament.156 High-ranking members of the CDU stressed the importance of developing a CFSP for the EC as a major facet of building PU. Kohl stressed at the 14th meeting of the party leaders conference of the European Democratic Union, that PU would remain unfinished, ‘without a common foreign and security policy which also includes a vision for a common defence policy …’157 Not only was the building of a CFSP framed within the development of PU, but it was also part of a co-ordinated strategy to bring peace and stability to the whole continent of Europe. For Volker Rühe, then secretary-general of the CDU, this was based upon the reasoning that ‘The collapse of Communism … should not lead to a renewed growth of nationalist currents in a time of reorientation and new orientation in Europe’.158 Rühe’s comments were directed to the newly independent states of Central and Eastern Europe and the German public. Rühe’s central concern was to avoid any retreat into German foreign policy exceptionalism in the wake of unification. The FDP were in a potentially strong position to influence government policy as junior coalition partner, and in Hans-Dietrich Genscher, they also had the crucial post of Foreign Minister. Genscher’s position at the head of the Foreign Ministry, and his record as a supporter of moves to establish greater foreign policy co-ordination within the EC, enabled Genscher to play a key role in defining not only German policy, but also the decisions taken at Maastricht. The FDP Chairman, Graf Lambsdorff, was also a key figure in debates over the future makeup of European security architecture and through his insistence that Germany had to reconsider its Vorbehalt (reservation) in the deployment of the Bundeswehr in ‘out-of-area’ operations.159

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 57

The SPD managed to force the CDU/CSU/FDP government to treat the ratification as a constitutional issue, necessitated a two-thirds majority in favour of the document in the Bundestag and Bundesrat to ratify the Maastricht Treaty. The SPD controlled the Bundesrat and were therefore able to force this issue. However, the domestic debates surrounding the CFSP were not in direct confrontation with the policy agreed on at Maastricht. Rather, the debates centred on the role of the unified Germany in the future of European security and how to define Germany’s foreign and security policy in light of the end of the East–West conflict. Domestic debates on the proposed EMU and concerns over the perceived lack of democratic accountability proved much more divisive in the domestic arena.160 The SPD contended that CFSP should not represent new opportunities for an active German military role, but rather that Europe might speak more unanimously in international affairs.161 The European integration project as a whole was considered a bedrock of German and European security, in its economic and political guises.162 As the CFSP provisions did not represent a major step forward for European foreign and security policy, German elites could feel satisfied that this represented a rationale evolution in existing practices, rather than a wholesale redefinition of the role of the EC in international affairs. For the German population, the CFSP represented a relatively uncomplicated narrative, recommitting Germany to one of the key institutions of the Cold War era and further embedding German foreign policy within a multilateral framework.163

Assessing the impact of the decisions taken at Maastricht on German foreign and security policy Germany’s ability to influence the development of the CFSP at Maastricht was considerable (see Table 1.6). At a time when unification could have witnessed a relaxation of Germany’s commitment to the process of European integration, Kohl and Genscher were in the vanguard of attempts to forge greater co-operation in foreign and security policy among the EC12. The TEU’s provision on the CFSP were largely symbolic but they represented an important precursor to the more significant developments in EU foreign and security policy which emerged at the end of the 1990s. The most significant characteristic of German uploading was in terms of Bonn’s ideational influence on tabling the need for the IGCPU and for the inclusion of the aim of the issue of Common European Defence.

58 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 1.6

Germany influence on CFSP during the IGCPU

Uploading Mechanism

German Input

Discourse/Ideational Influence

Common European Defence; Political Union

Institutional export

Marginal, if any

Example Setting

Commitment to building European capabilities in foreign policy was seen as a sign of good faith of Germany’s Europeanist calling

Agenda Setting

WEU Presidency; however, there was little scope for influence on major decisions affecting European security due to the impact of unification

CFSP remained overwhelming intergovernmental in nature, which was reinforced by the pillar structure of the TEU. The innovations of the CFSP were largely in the form of institutional tinkering to encourage greater co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy, rather than establishing concrete institutions and capabilities. The united Germany’s ability to set the agenda was only possible due to the continued centrality of the Franco-German tandem. Attempts to unilaterally push German objectives would have greatly damaged German influence. Kohl’s relationship with Mitterrand was vital in establishing a shared vision for the IGCs. The limitations of CFSP at Maastricht, however, were a sign of the continued dominance of France and the United Kingdom in shaping security policy in Europe and Germany’s relative marginal role. The continued British reluctance to commit to deepening CFSP hampered any attempts to build meaning EU capabilities. During the period 1990/1991 Germany went through an ‘overload of change’.164 However, CFSP did not present Germany with major adaptational challenges – downloading was limited (see Table 1.7). NATO’s continued supremacy and Germany’s reluctance to embark on any significant changes of its foreign and security policy tempered the impact of reforms within European foreign and security policy. Understanding the domestic-level policy-making system within Germany is a prerequisite for grasping German foreign and security policy presence. The key actors within the German political debate were Kohl and Genscher. Alongside them their respective ministries – the Chancellery and the

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 59 Table 1.7

German adaptation resulting from CFSP

Downloading Mechanism

German Adaptation

Elite Socialisation

Greater international engagement and commitment to European and transatlantic military operations.

Bureaucratic/legislative reorganisation

Little – NATO structures remained in the ascendancy; setting up of the European Affairs committee was a sign of the greater complexity and importance of the EU. Establishment of a Bundestag European Committee for European Affairs as a result of the domestic German debate during the IGC 1990/1991 (Art.45, BL).

Constitutional/Legislative Change

CFSP itself did not lead to any significant changes.

Public Opinion Adaptation

Public opinion remained wedded to European and transatlantic structures; the population remained reluctant to consider Bundeswehr deployment.

Foreign Ministry – played important roles in the framing of German positions with regard to the negotiations on CFSP. The AA played its traditional role as ‘sponsoring ministry’ of European foreign policy cooperation and continued with a clear trajectory of pushing for greater co-ordination of foreign and security policy. The Chancellery under Kohl’s direction was involved in the framing of overall foreign policy direction within the debates over the future of European security. The rationale of deepening European foreign and security co-operation within the EC did not contradict Kohl’s overall foreign policy strategy of interlocking institutions. Agreeing on CFSP was therefore relatively uncomplicated as there were no significant sectoral interests which Kohl and Genscher had to bargain with on the domestic level, freeing the government’s hand to pursue a compromise with its European partners. The perceived interests of the key actors in the decisions taken at Maastricht were as follows. Kohl and Genscher placed considerable importance on the outcome of the parallel IGCs as a way of firmly establishing the united Germany in the post-Cold War European order. The compromise reached on the role of the WEU was in keeping with Bonn’s central strategy of balancing Atlanticist and Europeanist interests, thereby satisfying French and British interests. The integrative trajectory

60 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

of the German government was maintained within the agreements on EMU and PU, and was upheld within the German political system. Clearly, for Kohl and Genscher, this ability to carry the support for the Maastricht treaty on the domestic level was a question of political authority and legitimacy with an eye firmly fixed on re-election in the up-coming Federal Elections in 1994. Germany did not consider any serious alternative to reasserting its commitment to European integration after unification. Fears of a normalised Germany were at the forefront of Kohl’s strategic calculations.165 German unilateralism founded on a retreat from multilateral commitments in an attempt to accrue greater international power and influence was not an option.166 However, the decision to work towards PU and strengthen foreign and security policy co-operation in the form of CFSP was a conscious decision taken by Kohl and Genscher, in cooperation with Mitterrand and Dumas, in order to deepen European integration as a mean to tackle the future challenges of the post-Cold War system. Forging an agreement with France and the United Kingdom was also necessary to avert any suspicions over the future course of German foreign policy. Due to the highly co-ordinated nature of FrancoGerman proposals during the IGCPU, the positions were broadly consistent with each other, albeit reflecting different emphases.167 Germany was a very important theme in the Maastricht ratification debate within France with the perception of the fear of a strong Germany being an important argument in both the campaigns of the yes and no camps.168 As with any agreement there were alternatives. However, European co-operation in foreign and security terms was considered a positive endeavour. The extent of co-operation and its impact on transatlantic relations was, as it continued to prove to be throughout the course of the 1990s, a difficult issue to reconcile within NATO and the EU. Negotiations which took place at Maastricht and indeed throughout the IGCPU were concerned with how best for the EC to maintain security and stability in the post-Cold War era. Each country had its own views on how this should be achieved. This was clear in the case of Germany which sought to impress its own ideas and preferences on the negotiations, while at the same time, Germany was in turn influenced by the very process of interaction and negotiation with its eleven fellow Member States. Despite this, Germany did not decisively influence negotiations in the way that France and the United Kingdom were able to. Rather, Germany, through its pressure for the inception of the IGCPU

Germany, the European Community and Challenges 61

and through its ability to shape debates through its presidency of the WEU, was able to forge consensus with its main foreign and security policy partners.169 The degree of domestic adaptation under pressure from Europeanisation of German foreign and security policy caused by Germany’s involvement in the negotiations to establish the CFSP was limited. Rather than representing a wholesale recasting of German foreign and security policy, the immediate post-Cold War period saw Germany recommit itself to pre-existing institutions of European security – NATO, EU, CSCE. The structural constraints outlined in this chapter still played a significant role in Germany’s ability to adapt to new international circumstances. Another key factor impacting on the degree of adaptational pressures exerted on Germany in the agreement taken at Maastricht and under the WEU Petersberg Declaration was that the agreement was very broad in scope, leaving considerable room for manoeuvre for the signatories. NATO was also reaffirmed as the pre-eminent security institution in Europe in the Alliance’s Strategic Concept agreed on at the Rome Summit in November 1991. European foreign and security policy in the form of the new CFSP did not represent a vastly new organisational logic for German policy-makers. Indeed, the extent to which Germany ‘downloaded’ policy from the EU level was restrained by Germany’s ability to impact on the decisions taken at Maastricht. Finally, the European ‘effect’ emanating from CFSP was not pronounced at the beginning of the 1990s. Central to Germany’s foreign and security policy was restating its transatlantic credentials in foreign and security policy, whilst committing to Economic and PU within the framework of the EU. Due to the geopolitical uncertainties of the end of the Cold War, Germany saw fit to recommit itself to existing multilateral institutions rather than embarking on a root and branch adaptation of domestic and European level institutions. As the next chapter will show, pressure to formally adapt both NATO and the EU’s foreign and security policy increased during the mid1990s due, in the main, to the pressures deriving from the break-up of Yugoslavia. The failure of the EU to deal with the instability emanating from the Balkans stepped up the adaptational pressures on German and European foreign and security policy. What the mid-1990s demonstrated, however, was a continued German reluctance to radically reframe its foreign and security policy to meet these new challenges, and an inability and reluctance on the part of Germany and its

62 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

partners France and the United Kingdom to frame a more effective CFSP. Adaptational pressures being exerted on German foreign and security policy then, did not predominantly originate from the CFSP. Europeanisation remained a limited, peripheral pressure on German policy as the scope of CFSP reflected existing German preferences.

2 Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Introduction Chapter 1 outlined (West) Germany’s role in the development of European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) at Maastricht. A combination of the structural constraints of the Cold War (and its immediate aftermath) and the difficulties in forging a truly CFSP within the European Union (EU) ensured that CFSP remained a useful addition to national foreign and security policy, rather than a central institution in which national policy was constructed. The impact and legacy of the Cold War reduced the opportunities for (West) Germany to upload its foreign-policy preferences to the European level. In addition, the lack of substantive progress in developing institutions and policies within the European Community (EC)/EU greatly limited the adaptational pressures on German foreign policy emerging from Brussels. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remained the pre-eminent security institution in Europe even after the Berlin Wall had been demolished. These limitations reinforced the lack of Europeanisation witnessed in German foreign and security policy. This chapter examines the legacy of the decisions taken at Maastricht in the realm of CFSP at a time when the pressure for the EU to be a more active foreign policy actor increased significantly. The events of the 1990s, particularly in the Balkans region, reinforced the limitations of the EU in foreign and security policy. As this chapter will demonstrate, German foreign and security policy continued to resist root and branch Europeanisation, largely due to the German government’s reluctance to pursue significant deepening of CFSP co-operation, beyond the rhetorical level. Added to this, Europeanisation was limited due to the continued primacy of NATO, 63

64 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

which greatly narrowed the scope for the emergence of the EU as a foreign and security policy actor. Even as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) was signed it was recognised that there was much unfinished business remaining to be negotiated. Under Article N of the TEU it was agreed that a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) would convene in 1996 to deal with the unfinished business of Maastricht. The Maastricht treaty’s socalled ‘ratchet mechanism’ contained within Title V, Article N, stated that ‘A conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be convened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this treaty for which revision is provided.’1 The revision of matters relating to CFSP was also high on the agenda of German elites in order to deal with the perceived asymmetry of political and economic integration within the EU.2 Wider dissatisfaction with the CFSP at this time is highlighted by Bonvicini who states that The overall experience of CFSP in the short period between the Maastricht and Amsterdam IGCs was … unsatisfactory, not only because of limited effectiveness, but also because of the incomplete nature of the experiment being conducted. This certainly weakened the prospects for reform as the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference drew nearer.3 Fundamental to the revision was the growing concern of the EU’s inability to act in international affairs.4 Ironically, the Amsterdam Treaty left a legacy of numerous ‘leftovers’ with which to deal, as had been the case with the TEU.5 Preparation for the IGC that was planned for 1996 built on those areas of the TEU which needed more work, in this case CFSP, and was given life at the European Council Summit in Corfu on 24–25 June 1994. It was announced that a ‘Reflection Group’ would be established to prepare the agenda for the upcoming IGC in an attempt to prevent a repetition of the ‘garbage-can style’ negotiations which characterised the Maastricht Treaty.6 The Reflection Group was made up of representatives of the Member States, and the European Parliament.7 Dr Werner Hoyer Free Democratic Party (FDP), State Minister in the Foreign Office represented Bonn. Whilst topics such as enlargement represented key areas for the Reflection Group to consider, the continuing crisis in the former Yugoslavia where the EU had shown itself to be incapable of overseeing a solution, weighed heavy on the considerations to create a truly common CFSP. Parallel to this, pressure on Germany’s security policy had grown

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 65

in the light of Yugoslavia and the outbreak of numerous international conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, German preferences to multilateralise security policy required that the inadequacies of the EU’s foreign and security policy be addressed in order both to provide Germany with greater security and to develop CFSP as an institution in which it could play a more positive role.

Forging agreement at Amsterdam – Germany’s role in the negotiation of the CFSP reforms Pre-negotiation positions From the conclusion of the negotiations at Maastricht to the start of the 1996/1997 IGC a number of significant developments in European security took place. Each of these developments expanded the realms of the possible in CFSP by introducing new procedures and instruments in European security when it came to the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty. To begin with, the Petersberg Declaration of June 1992 outlined conditions in which the Western European Union (WEU) might be called to participate in crisis management.8 Jopp sees three reasons for the German negotiation of the Petersberg Tasks. First, as a response to French demands and as a way to outline a way forward for NATO in the post-Cold War era. Second, to outline a basis for European Crisis Management in light of changes within the European security environment, without impinging on national constitutional or democratic procedures. Finally, Jopp explains the German position on the Petersberg Declaration as a way of involving central and eastern European states in discussions.9 The Franco–German tandem sought to gain support from its EU partners by opening up membership of the Franco-German Brigade with the launch of the Eurocorps. At the La Rochelle Summit on 22 May 1992 Kohl and Mitterrand formally declared their intentions to open membership up to other EU Member States and to designate Eurocorps as Forces Answerable to Western European Union (FAWEU).10 In addition to this, the development of a European pillar within NATO through the Common Joint Task Force (CJTF) model and subsequently the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) increased Europe’s say in NATO and opened up new avenues for greater crisis management burden-sharing within the transatlantic community making use of WEU capabilities.11 Germany’s ability to influence the run up to the beginning of the IGC negotiations as Council President during the second half of 1994 was

66 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

limited by overriding domestic concerns surrounding the German federal election in that year.12 Not only did the Kohl government have to deal with German federal elections, but also with the European Parliament elections of the same year.13 The CFSP did not rank very highly during the German Council Presidency.14 Klaus Kinkel’s main issue for the development of CFSP was to create a, ‘Common foreign and security policy which is worthy of its name.’15 However, the concluding summit at Essen in December 1994 produced limited results in the field of CFSP, focusing on firming up relations with Central and Eastern European states and prioritising the establishment of Euro-Mediterranean co-operation.16 In his report on the Presidency Conclusions to the Bundesrat, Kinkel did not outline significant changes to CFSP. Rather, Kinkel sought to look forward to the treaty revision planned for 1996 as a way of deepening co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy. Kinkel stressed the importance of the Franco-German tandem in achieving substantive results in the revision negotiations.17 However, cracks in the CFSP on Bosnia further complicated the emerging transatlantic bargain which was emerging over the role of European states within the Atlantic Alliance.18

German inputs to negotiations The most clearly stated German position in the run-up to the beginning of the IGC came in the form of the so-called Schäuble-Lamers paper in September 1994.19 This paper, written by the Christian Democratic Union’s (CDU’s) leading foreign policy thinkers outlined a vision of Europe focused on a core group of lead nations, pressing ahead towards deeper integration. The paper called for a number of institutional developments and policy innovations which mark the paper out as being remarkably prescient. Schäuble and Lamers called for a strategic concept founded on a common policy for the stabilisation of Central and Eastern Europe, the development of relations with Russia with the aim of a comprehensive partnership, a common Mediterranean policy, development of a strategic partnership with Turkey and the reorientation of relations with the United States.20 The paper suggested that it was ‘high time’ for a common defence in light of difficulties between the United States and European states over the former Yugoslavia. Central to this common defence was the merging of WEU into the EU in order to effectively participate in CJTF missions.21 Finally, the paper outlined the need to establish a CFSP planning unit to facilitate greater co-ordination and direction.

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 67

The Schäuble–Lamers paper laid down the gauntlet to Germany’s key European partners – France and the United Kingdom. The paper sought to reinvigorate Franco-German relations and stress the importance of a strong core of lead nations. However, the paper contains a plea for great British involvement in Europe, particularly in the field of CFSP. French Prime Minister Balladur’s response to the paper was in favour of a more flexible core Europe than outlined Schäuble and Lamers wishing not to rule out other interested parties, notably the United Kingdom, from participation in the EU project.22 The Schäuble-Lamers paper underscored Germany’s willingness to consider a federal structure for Europe, from which all policy and institutional co-operation would flow.23 The paper also highlighted the range of views within the ‘big three’ on not only the future form of CFSP, but also the wider differences on the bigger questions of what format the EU itself should take to equip itself for the twenty-first century. Germany’s conviction of the organisational power of the federal model applied to European integration provided a backdrop of tension in the negotiations as they emerged throughout 1996/1997. However, hope for the acceptance of a federal model for Political Union (PU) abounded within Germany, not least with the President, Roman Herzog who declared, Germany’s best policy offer for the Political Union of Europe is federalism and the principle of subsidiarity. Let us continue to offer it patiently until our British friends realise that federalism is the opposite of centralism and our French friends get a feel for the fact that fatherlands can converge in a federation and yet remain fatherlands.24 The divergence of views between France, Germany and the United Kingdom on the major strategic security issues in the early 1990s were even more clearly magnified when put under the microscope of the crisis in the southern Balkans. Here Bruce Clarke perceptively commented that, Europe’s individual states retain a private sophistication in their analysis of the Balkans – and presumably other hot spots – which is so lacking in the multilateral organisations to which they belong. At least in the most sensitive areas of policy, individual states still seem to hold back from placing their individual expertise at the disposal of their collective institutions – such as the embryonic foreign affairs machinery of the EU.25 It was the case that instead of creating conditions for greater cooperation and effectiveness in foreign and security policy, the pressure

68 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

to act in the Balkans often resulted in showing up more clearly the inadequacies of CFSP based on the inherent difficulties of sharing national expertise in such a sensitive area as security policy. In addition to the differing national views on the future course of CFSP, there was a clear difference in methodology of the United Kingdom on the one hand and France and Germany on the other. At this stage Tony Blair was ‘Leader of the Opposition’, but his views on the future of CFSP in the run up to the IGC were typical of those circulating in London at the time namely, emphasising that greater effectiveness of EU foreign and security policy, ‘does not require new structures or institutions, but a common act of political will’.26 This view, which mirrored that of the Major government, was supported by the United States which feared that the creation of more security institutions would result in inter-institutional competition, and thus denigrate existing security co-operation based on NATO.27 This contrast with the Franco-German preferences for institutional solutions to impasses in EU integration, for example, the development of the Franco–German Corps which later became the Eurocorps was very much an institution to bind in countries to political-military co-operation. The divergence of opinion with regard to the future development of the CFSP to be decided upon during the 1996/1997 IGC was clear from an early stage in the negotiations between Member States within the European Council. The European Council Report on the functioning of the EU treaties made clear that there were discrepancies between the Member States concerning the need for the speeding up of co-operation within CFSP. The hesitation which existed within the Council concerning the development of CFSP was made clear by the fact that only one operation had been undertaken by the WEU under the new conditions contained within the TEU, that of the policing of Mostar, and there continued to be a lack of adequate exchange of information within the Council.28 There followed the European Parliament’s report on the functioning of the treaties in which it was very critical of the lack of common action in the areas of trade policy, development co-operation, humanitarian aid, and security policy.29 Despite the singular views of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the importance of creating a ‘ménage á trois’ in foreign and security policy was a vital element of any successful development of CFSP.30 Until Amsterdam, the history of European foreign policy had been dominated in the main by Franco-German proposals driving the debate and developments without making a major impact in terms of capabilities. The United Kingdom in the main played a constructive, if

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 69

backseat, role in proceedings. Whilst France and Germany were traditionally convinced of the rationale of deepening co-operation within CFSP, the British perspective remained cautiously grounded on expressly intergovernmental forms of co-operation. The memo circulated within the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in Whitehall at the beginning of March 1995 made it quite clear that the MoD preferred the continuation of an intergovernmental approach, the need to develop the role of WEU while maintaining its separate status (the MoD also suggested having back to back WEU/EU Council meetings at major summits), and ensuring that NATO was anchored into all stages of the process.31 In a speech to the German Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin, Douglas Hurd outlined his preference for a strictly intergovernmental approach to CFSP stating, ‘Decisions about military engagement are decisions about the lives of sovereign people. They can only be taken by governments.’32 In the same month, March 1995, the debate over the future of CFSP intensified with major policy speeches by Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU), the French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur and Jacques Santer. Schäuble attempted to frame the development of CFSP within a wider vision, through working towards Political Union as he had done in the Schäuble-Lamers paper the year before. Schäuble stated, No state in Europe can alone guarantee its peace and security … We have to learn to think in integrated structures of European unity and the Atlantic Alliance … Deepening integration means, in the first place, a common foreign and security policy; second, co-operation in the field of internal affairs and justice; and third, institutional reform.33 Less than a week later Balladur proposed developing European defence structures based on WEU.34 Santer took the opportunity to plead for a greater co-ordinating role and right for policy initiative for the European Commission.35 Schäuble was clearly attempting to steer a middle course between Atlanticists and Europeanists, Intergovernmentalists and Integrationists, with Balladur and Santer provoking intense debates concerning the role of WEU in CFSP and the place of the Commission in foreign and security policy. Germany was prepared to agree to an integration of the WEU into the EU but only on a medium to long-term basis so as not to upset the institutional balance of security provision in Europe, a position which allied it to those of the Netherlands.36 In its initial two page long proposals for the IGC submitted on the eve of the European Council at Turin, Germany also suggested the extension of

70 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to break the deadlock of unanimity in CFSP and also suggested the establishment of a foreign and security policy working unit under the guidance of a ‘Herr GASP – Mr CFSP’.37 A more formal and more detailed statement of Germany’s position emerged a month later which reinforced the ideas of the original Foreign Ministry proposals.38 The setting up of the Reflection Group at Messina on 2 June 1995 by the decision of the European Council at Corfu was an important step towards addressing the inadequacies and concerns raised by the European Council and European Parliament’s Reports of April and May 1995. The Reflection Group was instructed to report back to the Council by the end of 1995. The following five main issues were put before the first meeting of the Reflection Group on 3 June 1995 by its chairman, Carlos Westendorp, a representative of the Spanish government.39 ●

●

●

●

●

The basis and aims of the conference in relation to enlargement and how flexibility and co-operation could be reconciled within an enlarged Union. Questions concerning the institutional system; how institutional balance and how issues of democracy, transparency and efficiency in the decision-making process might be strengthened. The citizen and the Union; the definition, content and development of the Union citizenry as well as basic rights and a comprehensible treaty. The foreign and security policy in light of the overseas role of the Union, the development of enlargement, the overseas representation of the Union, the decision-making and implementation of foreign policy. In the area of security and defence policy, should the relationship between the EU, WEU and NATO be clarified? The instruments in service of the Union; norms, resources and policies and possible areas of involvement.

One representative from each Member State was appointed to sit on the Reflection Group, and in order to include the European Parliament in discussions, two Members of the European Parliament were also invited to sit on the committee, Elizabeth Guigou (French Socialist) and Elmar Brok (German Christian Democrat). It was hoped that a more rigorous approach to preparing the agenda for the IGC would have a positive impact on the main negotiations, instead of the relatively rushed and chaotic style which characterised the negotiations of the Maastricht treaty. The Franco-German tandem’s determination to be at the forefront

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 71

of the reaction to the Reflection Group’s proposals was demonstrated in the Kanzleramt and Auswärtiges Amt’s (AA’s) co-ordination work with the French government response to Westendorp’s suggestions during the second half of 1995.40

Party political debates on reforming Common Foreign and Security Policy In the run up to the IGC there was broad party political support favouring the strengthening of the CFSP within the IGC.41 As at Maastricht, deeper integration into European structures in the field of foreign and security policy was viewed by Germany’s main political parties as a solution to the immense structural and policy-related adaptational pressures affecting Germany since the end of the Cold War. The CDU grandee Alfred Dregger saw the development of CFSP as reinforcing the NATO alliance and as a vital cog in the restatement of transatlantic relations in the post-Cold War era, as part of a new transatlantic contract.42 Karl Lamers and Wolfgang Schäuble continued, however, to dominate CDU/CSU thinking on foreign policy.43 CSU member Theo Waigel focused his attention on improving decision-making procedures and improving the EU’s ability to react to crises.44 Another party grandee Rudolf Seiters focused on how the EU, NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should interact to produce pan-European stability and security.45 The CDU was reasonably effective in influencing the reform debate on CFSP issues. The presentation of CDU proposals for CFSP reform facilitated domestic party political influence, but also enabled Kohl to ‘test the waters’ on proposals without the fear of upsetting the delicate diplomatic interplay with the other member states. Through this party political channel, Kohl sought to upload German preferences in the debates. Using this means, the CDU was able to offer an alternative to the French driven idea on the creation of a Mr CFSP, and to push for the extension of QMV.46 The CDU proposals sought to improve co-ordination among EU foreign policy actors, rather than focusing attention on a figurehead responsible to the Council.47 By seeking to upload these suggestions through transnational processes, the Kohl administration was able to avoid an overly explicit demonstration of divergent Franco-German positions. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) position on the development of CFSP and Germany’s role in crisis management had been improved by its decision to sanction the use of the Bundeswehr in ‘out-of area’

72 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

operations, culminating in the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 July 1994.48 However, in an outline of the SPD position on the upcoming IGC, CFSP ranked only seventh on the list of eight areas for reform.49 The overall thrust of the SPD demands on the German government in the IGC were for further integration in foreign and security policy, with the ultimate goal of a communitarisation of CFSP.50 This communitarisation would allow greater involvement of the European Parliament in democratic oversight of foreign and security policy and eventually allow the WEU and EU to merge.51 Creating a defence component with the integration of WEU was considered a good thing as long as the WEU did not seek to duplicate NATO structures. Within the SPD’s proposals, however, a brake mechanism, that of the retention of national vetoes over the deployment of national armed forces was emphasised.52 The SPD’s most detailed proposals for the reform of the CFSP appeared in an SPD Discussion Paper in December 1996.53 This paper authored by Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (head of the European Commission of the SPD) and Gunter Verheugen (SPD Bundestag spokesperson for foreign and security policy) went above and beyond the government’s proposals. In the paper the SPD called for integrated European forces as a means to reduce troop numbers across Europe, a member of the European Commission to be responsible for the whole of CFSP, the creation of a policy planning unit within the Commission and not within the Council as suggested by France, and finally, the extension of QMV to all CFSP decisions except those directly relating to defence which should be the terrain of the national parliaments and the European Parliament.54 Each of these measures are in keeping with the SPD’s aims of working towards the communitarisation of European foreign and security policy, as a means to further anchoring Germany within multilateral structures in the EU and reducing Germany’s exposure to upheavals in the international arena after the end of the Cold War. For Kinkel and the FDP, Germany had four aims for the IGC: building Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), strengthening CFSP, developing Justice and Home Affairs, and finally, agreement on the EU’s budgetary and financial issues.55 Kinkel focused his attention on improving the EU’s capabilities in action in foreign affairs, through the introduction of QMV into decision-making, by a commitment from member states to greater financing of the CFSP and stating a commitment to the eventual integration of the WEU into the EU.56 National strategic cultures would be upheld by the retention of national decision-making in the deployment of troops, and the institutionally enshrined right of the Bundestag

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 73

to agree to Bundeswehr involvement in military operations.57 Calls within the FDP also highlighted the need for an EU military crisis reaction capability for the future.58 The SPD opposition had two main contentions with Kinkel’s position relating to an oversight in regards to the EP’s role in the CFSP decisionmaking process caused by a reluctance to fully communitarise foreign and security policy.59 The SPD’s Wieczorek-Zeul also raised concerns over a needless militarisation of CFSP in light of the continued centrality of the NATO alliance.60 Despite this, the CDU/CSU/FDP government did not face significant opposition to their reform plans within the Bundestag, due to the overwhelming consensus among members of the Bundestag on the rationale for deeper integration in CFSP. However, the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) both resisted the Kohl government’s direction on the reform of CFSP. The Greens saw the integration of WEU/EU as a negative move which would make the EU lose sight of the civilian aspects of its foreign and security policy.61 The Greens also pointedly rejected the French offer to Europeanise its nuclear forces, claiming this would only reinstate the position of nuclear weapons in Europe after the Cold War, rather than working towards making them redundant as tools of foreign and security policy.62 Likewise, the PDS argued that German foreign policy should be focused on establishing Europe-wide stability and security, not solely focused on NATO and the EU.63 In addition to this the PDS called for the government not to renew the WEU Brussels Treaty in 1998. Finally, the PDS stressed the importance of national and European Parliament input into foreign and security policy decisions (see Table 2.1).64

Public opinion Public opinion during the mid-1990s remained supportive of the German government’s position to push for greater co-operation in foreign and security policy with Germany’s European partners. Table 2.2 shows that support for foreign policy co-operation within the EU consistently rose above 70 per cent during the period analysed in this case study. As has been the case during the Cold War and in the early 1990s, German public opinion is more reluctant to consider the discussion of the use of hard security measures on the EU level, with a greater number of Germans (approximately 33 per cent) favouring security and defence policy being centralised at the national level (see Table 2.3). United States Information Agency data suggests that there was considerable support for the creation of a European defence force (see Table 2.4).

Table 2.1 Party political positions on the development of CFSP during the IGC 1996/1997 Political Party

Position on Development of CFSP

CDU/CSU

Communitarise CFSP; Integrate WEU/EU as soon as possible

FDP

Improve CFSP capabilities; extension of QMV; improved financing of CFSP; eventual integration of EU/WEU; need for an EU military crisis management capability; retention of the Bundestag’s right to decide on Bundeswehr deployments

SPD

Communitarise CFSP – merge WEU/EU as soon as communitarisation has taken place; greater involvement of EP and national parliaments

Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen

Communitarisation of the ‘civilian aspects of CFSP’ – rejected the nuclearisation of CFSP as a militarisation of EU (reaction to French offer to Europeanisation nuclear forces)

PDS

Only in favour if it is part of a pan-European initiative; EP and national parliaments’ roles should be strengthened; against any militarisation of the EU and against WEU/EU integration; WEU should be abandoned after 1998

Table 2.2 Eurobarometer: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … foreign policy toward countries outside the EU?65

Germany

EU

National Government

Don’t Know

4/93 11/93 5/94 12/94 5/95 12/95 11/96 6/97 11/97 5/98

75 68 68 72 73 71 73 71 72 73

22 27 26 21 19 20 21 21 19 19

6 5 6 7 8 9 6 8 9 8

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 75 Table 2.3 Eurobarometer 2: Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the [national] government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the EU. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by the {national} government, and which be decided jointly within the EU … security and defence?66

Germany 4/93 11/93 5/94 12/94 5/95 12/95 11/96 6/97 11/97 5/98

EU

National Government

Don’t Know

62 53 59 58 59 58 61 60 59 61

35 43 37 37 36 37 34 34 35 32

3 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 7

Table 2.4 USIA: There have been a number of proposals for actions the EU could take in the next several years. For each of the following, please tell me whether you are strongly in favour, somewhat in favour, somewhat opposed, or strongly opposed – or haven’t you heard enough about it to say: the development of a common European defence force?67 Germany 5/92 3/93 6/95 6/96 1/97 4/98

Total Favour

Total Oppose

68 69 70 66 63 68

32 26 28 33 29 21

Don’t Know 0 5 2 1 8 11

German participation, according to the polling data from Eurobarometer above would however be constrained and dependent on domestic approval. Finally, public opinion in Germany continued to favour the parallel development of NATO and European capabilities in foreign and security policy with considerable support remaining for the continued essential existence of the transatlantic alliance (see Table 2.5). Public opinion on the development of European security institutions is in line with that of the federal government’s position – that of maintaining both pillars of the transatlantic security community, NATO and

76 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 2.5 USIA: Some people say that NATO is still essential for our country’s security. Others say NATO is no longer essential to our country’s security. Which view is closer to your own?68 Germany 1/93 9/93 1994 6/95 6/96 1/97 9/97 4/98

Essential

Not Essential

Don’t Know

70 64 76 76 69 68 68 60

12 32 13 21 29 21 21 23

12 4 5 3 2 11 11 17

the EU/CFSP. The opinion data presented here demonstrates strong support for the development of CFSP and the continued role of NATO. The German public demonstrated continued strong support of the two key institutions responsible for unification and the renewal of West Germany after World War II. With such strong public support of Kohl and Kinkel’s overall foreign policy strategy, the CDU/CSU/FDP government possessed a large ‘win set’ for its stance on CFSP within the IGC 1996/1997.

Kohl’s vision for Political Union Kohl’s main aims for the IGC 1996/1997 were finalising EMU and making substantial progress towards PU. Germany’s decision to work towards a reform of the CFSP was driven by a concern to deepen Germany’s multilateral ties in Europe in the face of upheaval across the continent of Europe. For Germany, the deepening of PU was not as a response to EMU, rather a parallel, and ultimately converging process, designed to strengthen the EU’s policies and structures. In a speech to the French Senate in October 1993, the first by a foreign statesman since Woodrow Wilson in 1919, Kohl outlined his belief in the centrality of the Franco-German motor in achieving Political Union.69 Kohl called for the development of a credible CFSP but that, ‘Europe needs America, which takes a central role in questions of European security seriously, and at the same time, America needs a Europe which simultaneously takes more responsibility for itself and for international security.’70 Chancellor Kohl sought to lay out Germany’s credentials as a reliable partner for France and the wider transatlantic community by promising, ‘Germany must and Germany will grow into these new international tasks.’71

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 77

Kohl outlined his broad concept for the reform of the EU in a speech to the Bundestag shortly before the Dublin European Council in December 1996. In his speech he stated, Our underlying political goal is, and remains, to work for a European political and economic order, which guarantees all people in Europe long-term peace, freedom, prosperity and social security. That is why the Federal government, and myself, despite the current critical sentiment regarding the European Union, are totally committed to making the integration process irreversible.72 More specifically on the CFSP, Kohl outlined his vision for improved foreign and security policy by outlining the main deficiencies of the second pillar, The previous agreements on the Common Foreign and Security Policy are not sufficient for Europe to speak with one voice and act together. We must therefore take the necessary measures within the intergovernmental conference to improve the efficiency, the continuity, the coherence, the solidarity and the transparency of the Common Foreign and Security Policy as part of a total package.73 The issue of PU was front and centre in Kohl’s discourse on the IGC.74 For Kohl, PU was the ultimate goal which a fully functioning EMU and a truly CFSP would enable. This position distanced him from French views which equated PU and a workable CFSP as being much the same thing.75 Kohl’s most important role within the negotiations was as an animateur in outlining his strategic goal for EU reform, in which the holy grail of Political Union was the ultimate end point.76 The inseparable nature of German and European policy bound together by this push to PU was a constant theme in Kohl’s discourse, European unity is inseparably linked with Germany’s successful future in the new millennium. As a country in the middle of Europe, the united Germany has a vital interest in the construction of the European house. European unity is the decisive precondition for the safeguarding of peace and freedom.77 The CFSP was for Kohl a component of his strategy of establishing PU – CFSP was not an end in itself. Kohl’s dominance in foreign policy allowed him to remain at the helm of Germany’s overall position,

78 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

despite devolving authority to Kinkel to pursue CFSP goals. Kohl had considerable experience in pushing Germany’s broad European goals, which coupled with Kinkel’s relative inexperience in foreign policy and relative lack of influence in shaping Germany’s post-Cold War trajectory, ensured that the Kanzleramt proved the decisive driving force behind Germany’s involvement in the IGC.78

Kinkel’s aims for CFSP Kinkel’s activism in outlining his position on CFSP increased considerably with the commencement of the IGC. In a speech to the German Chamber of Commerce in Stuttgart a month before the Turin summit, Kinkel stated his intentions on CFSP within the reform negotiations by observing that The IGC must do for the Common Foreign and Security Policy what the Maastricht treaty achieved for Economic and Monetary Union … We want a common analysis and planning centre … I have nothing against a General Secretary for CFSP, however, the political responsibility for decisions must remain where it belongs – in the foreign ministers council … 1996 must show clear developments in the integration of WEU into the EU, for example, with the policy-making power of the European Council for WEU.79 Kinkel sought to reinforce his dissatisfaction with the current state of CFSP at every given opportunity in an attempt to ensure the general disappointment with CFSP that united the EU would result in concrete developments. Kinkel’s position was clear when he declared, ‘The existing structures of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU are no longer sufficient for a solution to the common problems facing us’.80 CFSP was one aspect of EU reform as part of what Kinkel hoped would be a ‘complete renewal of the EU’.81 Kinkel focused his attention on forging agreement with the United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands on CFSP, despite the inherent difficulties of emerging with a coherent agreement with such a range of national positions.82 Sensitive to the concerns of the United Kingdom on the issue of QMV, Kinkel sought to convince the United Kingdom of the necessity of reforming decision-making procedures without threatening the foreign policy interests of individual states. In a speech at

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 79

Oxford University Kinkel pressed this point by saying, The European Union should never bring into question the specific character of each individual member state … We need a common analysis and planning centre for the Common Foreign and Security Policy in order to identify the common foreign policy interests of the Union and to prepare decisions of the Council. We are increasingly experiencing, as a result of the demands of consensus, that the EU agrees on a lowest common denominator. We should therefore break the taboo of majority decisions in CFSP.83 Kinkel’s starting negotiation position pushed for the following aims: ●

●

●

●

●

● ●

Defence should be included in discussions on an intergovernmental basis; The WEU should be incrementally built up as the European Pillar of NATO; WEU should be integrated into the EU – medium term objective.84 The IGC should clarify the relationship between the two organisations – the WEU should be an instrument of EU foreign policy in carrying out the Petersberg Tasks; Taking military action should not necessarily be hampered by the need for unanimity. Solidarity among the members could take the form of financial support rather than military contributions; ‘Positive abstention’ should be agreed upon at 15 but the EU treaty should involve a clause on political solidarity to ensure cohesion; Analysis and planning unit within the Council Secretariat, or ideally within the Commission, should be agreed upon and made up by members of the Member States, the commission and the secretariat; the creation of a Mr CFSP;85 A common arms market should be established; and The Euro-Atlantic relationship should be strengthened – economically, politically and militarily.

Volker Rühe’s aims Kinkel’s colleague, Defence Minister Volker Rühe, focused his attention within negotiations on British and Dutch concerns over security and defence policy in constantly restating Germany’s transatlantic commitments.86 Rühe reinforced Kinkel’s message of the non-exclusive nature

80 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

of developing CFSP stating that ‘We must develop Europe into a real Political Union, which also deserves this title – a union which can be a credible and competent partner of the United States in political, economic and strategic terms’.87 Rühe’s stress on the centrality of NATO for German and European security was indicative of the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung’s (BMVg) transatlantic culture and of the Foreign Ministries lead-role in CFSP affairs within Germany. Rühe’s direct input into CFSP negotiations was limited for a number of reasons. As outlined above, the BMVg was traditionally pro-NATO due to the Bundeswehr/NATO integrated command structures. In addition, despite the inclusion of the word defence into the TEU, the role of defence ministries in member states was strictly limited due to the absence of EU military capabilities within the CFSP at this time. Rühe’s attention in security policy terms was firmly on the issue of NATO enlargement and the wider stability of Europe, not the nittygritty of CFSP institutional reform.88 Developing CFSP from Rühe’s standpoint necessitated factoring in issues relating to enlargement, because as he saw it, developing the EU’s ability to act in international affairs is only possible if Europe is ready to undertake the responsibility to become a Political Union with its own strategic capabilities and at the same time take on new members. Without the integration and the close co-operation of our eastern neighbours with one another there will be no stability in central Europe and with that there will be no security for the European Union.89 Rühe was mainly concerned with the reform of the Bundeswehr in the aftermath of unification, that the Bundeswehr should become one of the central institutions of the new Germany in which the Bundeswehr was ‘the army of unity’.90 This was especially pressing as troops in eastern Germany only came under NATO command as late as 1 January 1995.91 Of final concern for Rühe in his role as Defence Minister was coping with the mounting pressure on the German armed forces to participate in crisis management alongside its NATO and EU partners.92 Rühe had to outline a new strategic rationale for the German armed forces in order to prevent support for German isolation in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War focusing on reaping a peace dividend of lower military spending, over the continued relevance of the Bundeswehr for European security.93 Germany’s responsibility in this area was not lost on Rühe as

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 81

well as the adaptational pressures in terms of operational capabilities which this implied. The mid-1990s represented a vastly different strategic environment for Germany. Rühe’s assessment of the pressures facing Germany was as follows: Germany’s policy has taken a noticeable turn. Up until reunification, war as a tool of politics, in the sense of its threat potential, was completely unthinkable. There was the NATO collective defence clause and nothing else. Now the Bundeswehr and also the Defence Minister are playing a new, most serious role.94 Rühe was very aware that Germany could no longer avoid its responsibilities in crisis management. However, the decision to send Bundeswehr troops to Bosnia outlined deep sensitivities among the key players in the government.95 In a cabinet meeting before the key vote on the deployment there was relative agreement between Kinkel and Rühe over the nature of the deployment. For Rühe, the decision to send German troops was vital in demonstrating the will to develop real capabilities within CFSP as part of the IGC. Rühe stated, ‘We cannot create Maastricht II with paper commitments if you decline the practical solidarity of a common security and defence policy.’96 Kinkel’s reluctance to sanction a wide operational remit for the troops was clear as he stated, ‘It remains the case that no German ground troops will participate in military operations in the former Yugoslavia.’97 The SPD opposition also declared its interest in a minimalist role for the Bundeswehr in Bosnia with Rudolph Scharping stating that ‘We are in principle prepared to help set up civilian administration in Bosnia, ease suffering and rebuild destroyed cities.’98 In the end the government received decisive support in the Bundestag for the Bosnia deployment with 543 MdBs voting for the proposal out of 656 MdBs, with Verheugen and Scharping of the SPD stating they were ready to share the political responsibility for the deployment alongside the government.99 Rühe’s indirect influence on the negotiations was significant due to his central role in outlining and preparing for the Bundeswehr’s post-Cold War role. Rühe presented a conservative vision for the use of the Bundeswehr in crisis management in the face of strong international pressure, being aware of the Bundeswehr’s limited operational capabilities and of the reluctance within the German polity to permit widespread revision of the Bundeswehr’s operational remit. Rühe rejected the possibility of committing to ‘exotic deployments (Orchideen Einsätze)’100 and stated that Germany’s, ‘prime responsibility lies in Europe and on its

82 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

periphery.’101 The Bundeswehr’s deployment in Somalia as part of UNOSOM II between August 1993 – March 1994 was symptomatic of the international pressure Germany was under and according to Philippi, was consented to more as a sign of good faith to its partners, than out of operational necessity.102 Rühe’s job focused on the implementation of reforms, rather than shaping the wider German strategic goals for CFSP. What was clear, however, was that according to Stürmer, ‘The Bundeswehr will have to be part of the western response to chaos. If not, we will depart from collective defence and be left with collective insecurity.’103 Bundeswehr deployments during the mid-1990s in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of Implementation Force (IFOR) and later Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (SFOR) as part of the post-Dayton stabilisation process were central factors in the ‘stretching’ of elite and public acceptance of a larger role for the German armed forces.104 The stationing of 3,000 German troops (including combat units) in Bosnia was of huge significance for German foreign policy in marking a new German resolve to participate in military crisis management operations, the scope of which was greatly facilitated by the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of July 1994.105 This stretching of elite and public opinion significantly widened the possible scope of CFSP which was reinforced with the inclusion of the WEU Petersberg Tasks into the Amsterdam Treaty.

Constructing a winning coalition? – Multiple Bilateralism as a hallmark of German uploading Throughout the IGC Germany sought to be the interlocutor of the negotiations between France and the United Kingdom in a sophisticated form of ‘triangular diplomacy’.106 Germany’s position on the degree of national integration within CFSP represented a mid-way point between the minimalist position of the United Kingdom on developing CFSP and the maximalist position of the Commission.107 Germany’s position reflected not only the limitations of German capabilities, but also a willingness to take joint leadership in CFSP, and demonstrated the dominance of France and the United Kingdom in shaping policy within the EU.108 In addition, the decisions taken at Amsterdam represented fairly low-level results, due to the failure of the ‘big three’ to converge on substantive foreign policy issues. Amsterdam’s outcomes represented limited innovation, rather than wholesale reform.109 At no stage during the negotiations did Germany’s position fully converge with either France or the United Kingdom. The limitations of Germany’s position

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 83

were clear in its inability to outline anything more than broad aims and compromise positions, rather than a blueprint for the EU’s foreign and security policy aims and objectives for the twenty-first century. At the heart of the German government’s policy was the wish to be treated as an equal within its trilateral relations with France and the United Kingdom on matters relating to CFSP during the IGC (Table 2.6).110 Table 2.6

National positions on CFSP during the Amsterdam negotiations Position on IGC

Germany

The Western European Union (WEU) should be built up as the European Pillar of NATO Defence should be included in discussions on an intergovernmental basis WEU should be integrated into the EU – medium term objective The IGC should clarify the relationship between the two organisations WEU as an instrument of EU foreign policy in carrying out the Petersberg Tasks Taking military action should not necessarily be hampered by the need for unanimity Solidarity among the members could take the form of financial support rather than military contributions ‘Positive abstention’ should be agreed upon The EU treaty should involve a clause on political solidarity Analysis and planning unit within the Council Secretariat should be agreed upon made up on members of the member states, the commission and the secretariat The Troika should be improved – rather than a Mr CFSP The Commission should have a greater role on CFSP A common arms market should be established The Euro-Atlantic relationship should be strengthened – economically, politically and militarily WEU and EU should be merged

France

CFSP should remain strictly intergovernmental Supported the idea of a Mr CFSP Favoured unanimity in decision-making but open to some flexibility Flexibility to allow EU states with observer status in the WEU to participate in WEU operations Continued

84 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 2.6

Continued Position on IGC Inclusion of Petersberg Tasks in the Treaty EU should be able to use WEU capabilities in crisis management Building defence policy – Europeanisation of French nuclear deterrence

United Kingdom

EU should not take decisions relating to defence and military force WEU should not be integrated into the EU – improve WEUEU relations NATO remains central institution – WEU as European pillar Creation of WEU summit to discuss European deployments Developing WEU operational capacity to be compatible with NATO missions – CJTF Creation of a WEU planning/situation centre

Franco-German Co-operation Germany had sought to co-operate with France on a common position on the IGC 1996/1997 from early 1994.111 The Franco-German relationship was vital to the overall success of the IGC 1996/1997 but appeared less effective in the reform of CFSP due to substantial differences on the nature of the reform of foreign and security policy within the EU. Given the extent of these differences it was surprising that any substantial co-operation was achieved. These differences were not helped by Mitterrand’s departure as French President in 1995. The end of the Kohl-Mitterrand era ushered in a period of Franco-German relations absent of political chemistry at the highest levels. As Graham and Simonian contend, While Mitterrand remained in office, his long-standing personal relationship with Kohl kept the Franco-German couple going with only minor friction. But the advent of Jacques Chirac in the French Presidency signalled a more turbulent era. By formation Chirac was a Gaullist with limited enthusiasm for European integration. An opportunist by nature, he shared little affinity with the visionary approach to building a better Europe believed by both Mitterrand and Kohl.112

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 85

Chirac’s opportunist streak saw France seek to assert its leadership role in European security affairs, often to the detriment of smooth FrancoGerman relations. The French military reforms of the mid-1990s sought to place France squarely in the middle of moves towards increasing the European contribution to crisis management in Europe, but were carried out without consultation with Bonn.113 The agreement worked out within the Amsterdam Treaty was a compromise between France and Germany, which ultimately resulted from policy direction dominated by France and the United Kingdom. The compromise agreed on by France, Germany and the United Kingdom focused on institutional reforms and the adaptation of decision-making mechanisms rather than substantive policy developments, which produced the rather disappointing progress made by the Amsterdam Treaty. The centrality of the Franco-German partnership in European integration continued to be vital after German unification. However, clashes between the two states on revising the TEU were noticeable, making the bilateral relationship at times problematic and limiting the scope of their joint proposals on CFSP. According to Kay, ‘Paris hoped to propel European integration and confine Germany within an institutional framework that France could dominate.’114 Co-operation between France and Germany on CFSP was complicated by a number of factors. First, differences between the German and French views were noticeable, since the publication of the Schäuble-Lamers paper in September 1994 over the general goals of the conference. Second, the nationally stated positions during the pre-negotiated round reflected differences in expectation and ambition of the CFSP revision.115 Of most sensitivity between the two states was Germany’s initial insistence on the introduction of QMV to CFSP, which was eventually watered down due to French concerns. Finally, in terms of wider European security, France was much keener on speeding up the creation of a European pillar alongside of NATO, rather than Germany’s insistence that it be constructed within the Alliance. The Franco-German joint letter to the Spanish Council Presidency outlined the two countries’ broad goals for the IGC.116 Of particular relevance to foreign and security policy, Chirac and Kohl stressed the need for, ‘greater efficiency, continuity, coherence and solidarity’ within CFSP.117 This was built upon in February 1996 by the respective foreign and Europe ministers (de Charette and Kinkel, Barnier and Hoyer) with an elaboration of what this meant for CFSP.118 These joint papers did not adequately reflect the differences between the German and French positions. Underlying both standpoints were different conceptions of the

86 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

future decision-making procedures, with France favouring an intergovernmentalist approach and Germany apparently wishing to roll out QMV procedures wherever possible.119 Relations between the two sides had been complicated due to France’s offer to Europeanise its nuclear forces in the summer of 1995.120 This proposal caused a split within the government with Volker Rühe opposing such a plan as Germany already benefited from NATO nuclear forces, and Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers welcoming the offer as a basis for discussion.121 France’s offer to Europeanise its force de frappe as well as signalling upping the ante of its efforts to bolster European capabilities was also connected to softening the impact of its decision to carry out nuclear tests in the south Pacific which created significant tensions within the EU.122 Another major factor in the tensions between the French and German governments was France’s decision to withdraw the majority of its armed forces stationed in Germany and its commitment to end conscription.123 The disbanding of 11 units in Germany, thereby cutting French troop numbers from 20,000 to 3,000 threatened to compromise military relations between the two countries.124 The measures announced by Defence Minister Millon were received with ‘great regret’ by his German opposite number, Volker Rühe.125 The presence of allies’ troops on German soil was for Germany a symbol of its continued integration into the security institutions of the West and as a sign of Germany’s continued commitment to its main allies. The decision to recall the vast majority of French troops based in Germany signalled Germany’s new international position in the post-Cold War era. However, as a means to restrict the impact of the French defence cuts, Chirac sought to reassure Kohl by not cutting France’s commitment to the Eurocorps.126 A final complication of the relationship revolved around France’s short-lived rapprochement with NATO of 1995/1996 following the Defence Minister Charles Millon’s announcement of 5 December 1995 that France would rejoin NATO structures.127 France’s reawakened interest in working within NATO had been sparked by moves within the alliance since 1994 to increase the role of European states.128 What started off as an excellent opportunity for France to become involved in the Europeanisation of NATO, ended up turning into a strategic power-play with the United States over French demands for the post of Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH).129 This spat distanced the prospect of a French return to the NATO military integrated command structure and complicated Germany’s ability to seek a middle

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 87

way between exaggerated European and Atlanticist conceptions of the evolving security institutions in Europe. In spite of these difficulties, the Franco-German tandem did have success in forging a significant coalition in favour of their proposal to fuse the EU and WEU. The Six Plus One coalition of France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Dutch Presidency (the plus one) concurred with France and Germany’s aim of eventual integration of the WEU into the EU.130 For Germany, it was important to not let itself be isolated in the Franco-German tandem due to conflicting views between Paris and Bonn on the development of CFSP and to avoid the suspicion that Germany was being influenced by France to loosen its transatlantic ties.131 Germany felt pressured by French designs to make CFSP much more flexible in terms of the execution of Petersberg Tasks and compete for the same political territory as NATO. Despite these differences, Kinkel and his French opposite number de Charette were able to agree on the main thrust of their policy aims for the IGC. France and Germany agreed on an incremental integration of the WEU into the EU which should be codified in the treaty, which closely represented German interests.132 In addition, it was agreed that the European Council or General Affairs Council should agree on Common Strategies by unanimity but that the implementation of these decisions should be made on the basis of QMV within the Council.133 Finally, Kinkel and de Charette agreed on efforts to improve Brussels decision-making, notably in the co-ordinating role of a future General Secretary for CFSP.134 British–German Relations The dominance of Franco-British co-operation in shaping the CFSP often left Germany without decisive influence in deciding on major policy developments. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom’s relationship with Germany was one of necessity. As Wallace states that ‘There is no escape from the centrality of Germany in British foreign policy. It is Germany, not Britain, which is at the heart of Europe; the British can only play a central role in Europe – and in transatlantic relations – through rebuilding a close relationship with Germany’.135 Likewise, Geoffrey Howe recognised that, ‘the UK should accept that however fruitful the Anglo–French partnership might prove, keeping Germany in the game is essential if any deal is to be done.’136 The relationship between the WEU and the EU was the issue of most contention in the run up to and during the IGC 1996/1997. The WEU served as a means to increase the European’s contribution to transatlantic

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burden-sharing and to facilitate the integration of Central and Eastern European states in Western structures.137 There was agreement that the role of the WEU could be improved to benefit the transatlantic relationship, but where the United Kingdom–German positions diverged was on the integration of WEU into the EU. There was clear tension between the British and German governments on this issue demonstrated in a very public clash over Germany’s insistence in the ultimate fusion of WEU/EU.138 As Clarke outlines, the British approach to European security co-operation is process-based, focusing on how to best use the capabilities available to them.139 The United Kingdom does not react well, therefore, to institutional blueprints based on political and not military-security calculations. There were then patent British sensitivities to institutional adaptations proposed by Germany. Germany needed to fight hard to convince both the United Kingdom and France of the rationale for greater institutionalisation of CFSP, despite British and French insistence of the centrality of the Council in deciding foreign and security policy within the EU. The United Kingdom set out its stall on the CFSP elements of the IGC in March 1995. The United Kingdom’s position was as follows: The Government believes that the nation state should be the basic building block in constructing the kind of international order we wish to see; and that the nation state remains in particular the fundamental entity for co-operation in the field of defence … so the unshakable conviction on which our approach to the European defence policy will be based will be that the basis for European action in the defence and security field should be inter-governmental, based on co-operation between nation states.140 France and the United Kingdom had privileged non-institutionalised co-operation, most notably in the form of the Contact Group, in reinforcing their positions as lead nations in co-operation with the United States in European security decision-making, and in an attempt to seek greater effectiveness outside the restrictions of formal security institutions like NATO, the EU and the OSCE. Germany’s membership of the Contact Group had afforded it much needed influence in the Balkans.141 Whilst the United Kingdom strongly believed in the importance of building European capabilities in crisis management, the United Kingdom’s position on the WEU distanced itself from that of the French and German positions. For the United Kingdom, the role of WEU in

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mid-1990s was as a vehicle for enlargement and pan-European stability, and not as an add-on to EU integration. On this point, the United Kingdom and German governments converged, viewing the WEU as a useful organisation for gradually integrating central and eastern European states into western structures. However, the United Kingdom was consistent in opposing the merging of WEU/EU for most of the 1990s which represented a major sticking point in the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty.142 As Gourlay and Remacle state, from a British perspective, ‘The WEU obviously would play the role of an instrument for Atlanticizing the EU, but not for Europeanizing the Alliance.’143 The most fundamental objection from the British perspective was its opposition to the Franco-German proposals to eventually engender the WEU with the role as the defence component of the EU, above and beyond its role in crisis management.144 Schäuble’s proposals for the creation of a European army had been softened in order to seek British acceptance.145 The Madrid WEU Council meeting of 14 November 1995 established the United Kingdom’s role as an outlier on the issue of WEU/EU integration to Kinkel’s frustration, who appeared to admit defeat on the issue.146 The United Kingdom also made the most of its agenda-setting powers during the British WEU Presidency during the first half of 1996, calling an extraordinary WEU assembly meeting to discuss the WEU’s status in February 1996.147 The United Kingdom was primarily concerned with building European capabilities which were compatible with NATO and did not jeopardise NATO’s supremacy as the leading security institution in Europe.148 The Birmingham Declaration of the WEU of 7 May 1996 went some way to clarifying an acceptable role for the WEU which was adopted in the Amsterdam Treaty.149 This built on the agreement between Italy and the United Kingdom to firm up links between the EU and WEU.150 The agreement of Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden to allow the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP at a meeting in Cork chaired by the Irish Presidency was another significant step forward in reaching agreement on a compromise position on WEU/EU relations.151 The prospect for improved European capabilities and burden-sharing was also greatly improved by the agreement on CJTF which was taken at a NATO Foreign Ministers meeting on 15 May and rubber-stamped at the NATO Berlin summit in early June.152 With the agreement on NATO’s Berlin Summit in June 1996, the United Kingdom had achieved a major step forward in its policy on the development of European capabilities. From this point on, the United Kingdom’s position on the IGC was to reinforce these developments within NATO.

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The United Kingdom continued to insist on a division of labour between the WEU and the EU, achieving a compromise with the German position through the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the treaty text. The British government often played a negative and defensive position on foreign and security policy discussions with Foreign Minister Rifkind taking an almost antagonistic line on Franco-German initiatives.153 German frustrations with the British position on the CFSP were at times all too noticeable. Both Werner Hoyer (FDP), the German government’s representative on the Reflection Group and Karl Lamers (CDU) were quick to outline their dissatisfaction with the British position, and the apparent intransigence of their stance on developing CFSP institutions and capabilities.154 Hoyer’s and Lamers’ frustration was borne out of irritation at the Major government’s inability to play an active role in Europe due to domestic constraints. In a wider sense, however, both Lamers and Hoyer recognised that the Franco-German core Europe ideal in the sphere of CFSP lacked real credibility without British involvement. This resulted in clear complications in Germany’s wider foreign policy strategy of balancing its transatlantic and European calling. French–German–British Defence procurement co-operation One area of French–German–British co-operation was in the field of the European defence industry where Franco-German proposals to cooperate more closely on joint armaments projects met with British support. Although this co-operation was only tentative, it was a sign of the increasing budgetary constraints facing not only Germany, but France and the United Kingdom, as each state sought to rationalise defence spending after the Cold War. For Schmitt, these budgetary pressures were significant enough to force these states to consider collaboration on the European level, thereby engaging on a low level in the Europeanisation of the arms procurement sector.155 The United Kingdom had stated its intention to join the FrancoGerman proposal for a European arms agency (the Joint Armaments Cooperation Structure – JACS) in September 1995.156 According to Hayward, the British, ‘were … concerned to prevent the Franco-German axis setting the terms of future European procurement collaboration …. The British had to keep in touch with the Franco-German axis.’157 The most significant British commitment was to the Eurofighter project. The United Kingdom committed itself to buying 232 fighters, thus securing 37 per cent of production, compared with Germany’s commitment to buy 180 planes and securing 30 per cent of production work, according to the principles of juste retour – whereby the level of a country’s financial

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backing of a project would determine how much of the production work it would receive.158 However, limitations on the German government’s ability to Europeanise were clear in the financial constraints imposed by German unification and a downturn in the economy.159 Germany could not commit substantially to financing the development of joint European procurement initiatives due to budgetary constraints. These budgetary constraints were also of importance in financing the reform of the Bundeswehr to equip the German armed forces for military deployment as envisaged under CJTF and the Petersberg Tasks arrangements. EMU remained a higher order German objective to CFSP in European integration throughout most of the 1990s, leaving the Bundeswehr budget open for streamlining as Germany struggled to meet the EMU convergence criteria.160 Despite this, Germany committed to Eurofighter and invested 2 billion DM to the French-led Helios satellite project.161 Germany’s inability to fully commit to armaments projects affected its ability to Europeanise. A vital cog in the development of common defence machinery, the establishment of a more effective, co-ordinated and ultimately integrated European defence industry was of central importance for the EU in getting more bang for its euro – to seize the opportunity to benefit from greater economies of scale. Germany’s inability to commit financially to these programmes in the face of domestic budgetary constraints showed up a disparity between German discourse on forging co-operation and Germany’s ability to participate as a full member of such endeavours. This also showed up France and the United Kingdom’s lead role in defence procurement in Europe.162 Therefore, the resulting treaty commitment did not stress armaments co-operation in anything other than voluntary terms, stating that ‘The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as Member States consider appropriate, by co-operation between them in the field of armaments.’163

The negotiation end-game As with any negotiation, it is seldom the case that one party achieves everything it sets out to accomplish. This was the case for the German government, whose results in converting its policy preference into hard decisions were only moderately successful. However, by avoiding concrete positions in the run up to the Amsterdam summit, and by seeking broad goals instead of minutely worked out policies, Kohl and Kinkel were able to pursue compromise positions during the final negotiations

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to ensure some of their aims were achieved. By early 1997, most of the key issues regarding the reform of the CFSP had been resolved, or national positions had become entrenched to such a degree that ‘red lines’ had been drawn limiting the scope of negotiations. The end of the Major government and the arrival of Blair on the European stage were greeted warmly in Germany.164 The Labour Party victory in the United Kingdom General Election of May 1997 cleared the way for a more positive role for the United Kingdom in the IGC negotiations. Foreign Minister Robin Cook declared that the United Kingdom should, ‘be a leading player in a Europe of independent states.’165 It did not, however, have any noticeable bearing on the negotiation of the reform of CFSP, as the new government sought to demonstrate continuity in its foreign and security policy. Likewise the French election result of June 1997, which ushered in a period of cohabitation in the French government under Chirac and Jospin, had the potential to knock negotiations off course.166 However, the change in governments did not affect France’s position on the CFSP reforms at Amsterdam. The developments within NATO in 1996 had laid the basis of complementary moves within the WEU to bolster the European contribution to European security.167 The Paris Declaration of the Western European Union Council of Ministers of 13 May 1997 set up the final agreement on CFSP at Amsterdam.168 Paragraph six and seven outlined the main contentious issues facing the EU in its relationship with WEU, that of the WEU’s future integration into the EU and the operational role WEU would have in carrying out Petersberg Task missions on the Council’s behalf.169 At the Amsterdam Summit the Member States agreed the following formulation of WEU/EU relations, The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral part of the development of the Union with access to an operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. (Petersberg Tasks) It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.170 For Germany, this was far from a success. Germany had not achieved agreement on a timetable for the integration of both organisations.

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However, the operational linkages with both organisations had been improved and the option for future agreement on EU/WEU was codified in the treaty. Germany’s efforts to find a compromise to the thorny issue of EU/WEU witnessed a last roll of the dice at the Paris WEU summit when Klaus Kinkel suggested a three-stage plan for EU/WEU fusion, but this did not receive a positive response from Tony Blair.171 Kinkel also sought to clarify the nature of QMV provision in CFSP before the EU Member States met in Amsterdam.172 Another key decision taken at Paris was the agreement to establish a military committee which was implemented under the German WEU presidency in the second half of 1997.173 Kohl and Chirac had intensified their attempts to get an agreement on the integration of WEU/EU at the Amsterdam Summit. The six plus one agreement between France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Belgium, Spain – and the Dutch Presidency – and supported by the European Parliament which went a stage further in calling for an EU intervention force.174 However, in the days before the Amsterdam Summit, within the WEU Assembly the deputy leader of the German delegation, Robert Antretter (SPD), suggested a compromise position which the Assembly accepted and recommended to the WEU Council of Ministers.175 Warning against a speedy integration of WEU into the EU, Antretter suggested the operational and practical work of the two organisations should be strengthened, with the option of integration to be considered at some stage in the future.176 This is ultimately the compromise position that was arrived at within the European Council at Amsterdam. The Dutch Presidency’s suggestion that a single state could veto a foreign policy action was viewed unacceptable by the German government and was supported on this position by France and Italy.177 Immediately after the debate in the Bundestag over the government’s participation in the Amsterdam summit on 11 June 1997, Kohl and Kinkel met with Dutch Prime Minister Kok and Foreign Minister Van Mierlo in the Kanzleramt in Bonn to clarify the format of the final negotiation and to receive information on the current positions of the Member States on the reform agenda.178 Germany also sought to coordinate its final position for the negotiation with France in a meeting between Chirac and Kohl in Poitiers on 13 June 1997. The Bundestag debate on the government’s aims for the Amsterdam summit did not significantly tie the hands of Kohl and Kinkel.179 Kinkel stated that. ‘The government is convinced that the development of European integration is in Germany’s historical vital interests.’180 Kinkel stated the government’s two aims for the negotiation of CFSP being the

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need to rid CFSP of the ‘straightjacket of unanimity’ and the commitment to work towards developing a common defence through the decision to give policy direction over the WEU to the European Council and the work towards the future integration of WEU/EU.181 The SPD’s spokesperson Wieczorek-Zeul did not mention CFSP in her response to Kinkel’s outline of the government’s position, preferring to concentrate on social and economic consequences of the government’s position, a position which was mirrored by the PDS during the debate.182 Rudolf Seiters (CDU/CSU) was vocal in his support of the government’s efforts to create the post of Mr CFSP, the establishment of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) and the extension of QMV in CFSP to avoid a blockage in the EU’s ability to take decisive action in international affairs.183 The Green’s Christian Sterzing feared that the EU’s capacity to act would be reduced through the fusion of the EU/WEU resulting in a ‘militarisation of the CFSP.’184 The debate over the government’s position did not question Germany’s position on the development of CFSP. Rather, CFSP was clearly a lower order issue for the opposition parties than the introduction of the Euro, the development of the employment market and the area of justice and home affairs. What this highlights is that there was no significant domestic pressure outside of the government to push for a significant reform of the CFSP and Germany’s role within it. Germany was therefore not excessively engaged in a two-level game on CFSP at Amsterdam, restricting Kohl and Kinkel’s room to manoeuvre. Developing European foreign and security policy co-operation on the European level was not seen as a contentious issue (except by the Greens and the PDS) as the scope of CFSP was limited and this did not place Germany under burdensome adaptational pressures to participate. In the days following the final negotiation, Werner Hoyer tried to put gloss on the Amsterdam Treaty’s codification of the WEU/EU by claiming a small victory in the inclusion of the prospect for EU/WEU integration at an undetermined time in the future.185 The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks, the endowing of the European Council with policy direction over the WEU and a restatement of CFSP’s ultimate goal to work towards a common defence all represented central German objectives for the treaty revision.186 On another issue, Germany’s aim to improve the EU’s ability to act in crisis situations again had mixed success. Germany’s intention to introduce enhanced co-operation and flexibility into the CFSP was confounded as Kohl, Chirac and Blair all had differing views on what this would entail.187 Germany’s aim to create better co-ordination and synergies between the actors in European foreign policy writ-large

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was only marginally facilitated through enhanced co-operation through the inclusion of Commission officials in the proposed PPEWU.188 Franco-British concerns for greater effectiveness in CFSP were addressed through the issue of flexibility. The distinction between both procedures is important to recognise as one implies forging greater co-operation amongst a smaller group of states rather than the whole (enhanced cooperation), whilst the other suggests looser co-operation within and without formal EU structures (flexibility).189 Germany’s ability to upload its policy preferences was limited. CFSP was not of sufficient importance in the general negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam to risk political capital on demanding that the German preferences were met. Germany’s suggestions revolved around improving the EU’s ability to act, not the finer points of making foreign policy among the 15. Germany was also faced with the challenge of seeking agreement with France and the United Kingdom and the other Member States, by not appearing to be seen to be too Europeanist or Atlanticist, or too integrationist or intergovernmentalist. Germany, therefore, had partial success in the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks to the treaty, the commitment to closer relations between the EU and WEU, the extension of QMV in CFSP albeit limited and the creation of the PPEWU with the bi-product of an increased role of the Commission in CFSP (Table 2.7). Likewise, the adaptational pressures facing Germany were limited at this stage in the development of CFSP (Table 2.8). For Kohl and his administration, the absence of any perceived threat to German security, the working out of a transatlantic consensus on the development of ESDI within NATO and the perception that the European integration process itself, not solely CFSP, was the guarantor of German security all played active roles in limiting both the success of the Amsterdam negotiation and Germany’s commitment to it.

Conclusion Amsterdam’s results – symbolic change for CFSP and Germany? The Amsterdam Treaty did not represent a substantial leap forward for CFSP either for the EU or for Germany’s role within it. Innovations in decision-making procedures, the inclusion of new institutions and decision-making procedures (Mr CFSP, PPEWU, Flexibility and enhanced cooperation) and the inclusion of the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks did not represent a bold commitment by the EU to strengthen transatlantic burden sharing through EU structures and policies. Bretherton and Vogler’s report card on the Amsterdam Treaty highlights some

96 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 2.7

The uploading of German preferences during the IGC 1996/1997

Uploading Mechanism

German Input

Discourse/Ideational influence

A commitment to integrate WEU/EU – albeit in the most unspecific wording; Growth in the role of the Commission in CFSP

Institutional export

Some attempts to improve co-ordination among the EU’s foreign policy actors; The creation of the PPEWU; The Eurocorps; Support for the Finnish and Swedish idea to include the Petersberg Tasks within the Treaty.

Example setting

The partial acceptance of QMV with the option of ‘coalitions of the willing’

Agenda setting

A number of limited factors affected Germany’s ability to influence debates; German foreign and security policy was still adapting to post-Cold War conditions; Germany was reluctant to de-stabilise debates within NATO about its future; Germany was reluctant to make too many commitments to military crisis management due to the continued sensitivity surrounding Bundeswehr deployments even after the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of July 1994; The positions of France and the United Kingdom defined the scope of the possible in CFSP due to their overwhelming military dominance within the EU.

improvements made in co-ordination and visibility,190 whilst Cameron is more critical in citing disappointing and modest results,191 and Allen foresaw the introduction of ‘Constructive Abstention’ having the potential to lead to roadblocks and lowest common denominator policies.192 On another critical note, Maull points to Amsterdam’s success only by way of symbolic accomplishments in CFSP with the creation of the post of Mr CFSP and the commitment to establish a planning and analysis unit.193 Even Wolfgang Ischinger, Political Director of the German Foreign Ministry, saw only moderate advances in CFSP as a result of the decisions taken at Amsterdam.194 One EU ambassador was reported

Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 97 Table 2.8

Adaptational pressures on German foreign policy

Downloading Mechanism

German Adaptation

Elite socialisation

The growing acceptance of the need for a greater European role within transatlantic security provision and the acceptance of the necessity for an increased role for Germany in military crisis management (Strategic Culture). Increased pressure on Bundeswehr reform to meet these new responsibilities

Public opinion

The German public overwhelmingly supported the development of greater co-operation in CFSP. Strong support for NATO also demonstrated that the German public supported mutually reinforcing measures in both NATO and CFSP to bolster European security

Constitutional adaptation

Federal Constitutional Court’s ruling of 12th July 1994 to allow the deployment of the German Armed Forces outside of the NATO area

Resource allocation

Budgetary pressure on Bundeswehr reform and to meet EMU targets impacting on Germany’s ability to be involved in Europeanisation of European arms procurement

Bureaucratic reorganisation

Limited if any impact from Amsterdam Treaty

calling the Amsterdam Treaty a ‘dog’s dinner’.195 However, for the German Greens, Amsterdam has come to be viewed as an important step towards the militarisation of the EU by creating the enabling conditions for the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy as outlined in the next chapter.196 The German government’s position of reflexive Europeanism served it well in pursuing its negotiation aims and seeking compromises with its main partners, the United Kingdom and France. As Wagner states that The Europeanisation of the German identity has become clear in many instances in the Bundestag debates (over the CFSP provisions agreed on at Maastricht and Amsterdam) … Foreign policy interests were not defined in differentiation to other (EU) states, rather they were understood as indistinguishable from European interests.197 However, it was clear that German conceptions of what was in the interest of Europe did not always match up with the views of other

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EU Member States. The fundamental problem with such a stance was the inability to define specific EU foreign policy interests without a fully integrated CFSP. With a real lack of such a common view, Europeanisation in Germany only progressed slowly as a result of the reforms of the TEU. Germany’s ability to fundamentally and unilaterally redefine its foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War was limited by what Volgy and Schwarz identify as domestic and international ‘webs of restraint’ which defined the foreign policy direction and foreign policy options open to Kohl and his government.198 These restraints have ensured that ‘Germany’s approach to multilateral security and defence co-operation has largely been symbolic. Bonn’s policy aimed at promoting the political integration of the West rather than being orientated towards concrete military necessities’.199 Ultimately despite Germany’s convictions to be the multilateral actor par excellence, Europeanisation did not advance significantly as a result of the Amsterdam Treaty. Germany faced the continuing difficulty of outlining German interests within foreign and security policy.200 The major difficulty in this process was the problem of recommitting to the security institutions which had served it so well during the war, when at the same time these institutions were going through a period of upheaval and adaptation to meet the new challenges of the post-Cold War era. Germany was under increasing pressure to become more ‘normal’ in its involvement in foreign affairs, but Germany did not have a clear model for adaptation in the form of a coherent CFSP which could act as a blueprint for domestic change. Therefore singularities in the German view were likely to continue to exist. This push and pull between international expectations and Germany’s ability to adapt to new circumstances was not resolved at Amsterdam. Indeed, the limited progress made by the 15 Member States only increased the likelihood of maladaptation to the Europeanisation dynamic within Germany. As Hill states, ‘Traditional national foreign policies, even German and Italian, are now moving back into the space that the CFSP has proved unable to occupy through an insufficient socialisation of its units into a common mentality and definition of interests’.201 Germany’s inability to drive policy towards the creation of a truly common policy exposed Germany to difficult choices which Kohl had hoped the multilateralist route would avoid. This dilemma was summed up by one German politician as follows, ‘The temptation is there for us … For the first time, a united Germany has options again, to remake history

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and repeat old mistakes. The nightmare of 19th century Europe with all its nation states competitive and confrontational is still in the air’.202 What the IGC 1996/1997 demonstrated was that no amount of institutional tinkering could resolve this dilemma within CFSP. The next chapter will deal with perhaps the most intensive period of Europeanisation German foreign and security policy in the 1990s. The impact of the Kosovo War, and the German response to it, demonstrated not only increased German ability to influence CFSP, but also clear signs of national adaptation to EU level policy developments.

3 Learning to Lead: Germany, Kosovo and the Development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy

Introduction Germany and the European Union (EU) were at crossroads as the Red/Green coalition took office in the autumn of 1998.1 The EU was coming to the end of the Amsterdam process with the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty foreseen on the 1 May 1999. Germany was also due to become president of the Council on the same day as the introduction of the Euro. The need for a successful negotiation of Agenda 2000, the financial package designed to smooth the way for EU enlargement, also placed a major onus on the German Presidency. With the end of the Kohl era and the major challenges facing the Schröder administration, the Red/Green government’s ‘Europability’ was put under the spotlight.2 On top of an already crowded Council agenda, Germany was faced with its most significant foreign-policy test since unification in the form of the Kosovo crisis. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) mission in Kosovo marked a turning point for German, European and transatlantic security policy.3 Germany’s participation in the conflict was of huge symbolic importance and sparked an intense debate within Germany questioning whether it had abandoned the foreign-policy principles of the Cold War period for a new, more engaged international role.4 The Kosovo war also highlighted what had been a clear tension within the Atlantic alliance in that Europeans and Americans had not worked out adequate procedures for burden-sharing in military operations. Another facet of this 100

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tension arose from the difficulties inherent in the decision-making structures necessary for EU crisis management making use of Western European Union (WEU) assets. Blair’s initiative to improve capabilities and decision-making procedures was based on overcoming these tensions. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was a response to the imbalance in the transatlantic community and represented a determination on the part of France, the United Kingdom and Germany to bolster Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with real military capabilities. Germany’s position at the centre of these developments not only placed German policy-makers under intense adaptational pressures, but also allowed Germany to play an important role in the initial phases of ESDP’s development. An analysis of the German European Council Presidency during a time of intense international pressure on German foreign policy provides an excellent opportunity to assess the adaptational pressures on Germany within the framework of the CFSP. What this chapter outlines is the German input to overcoming the adaptational pressures relating to institutional issues surrounding European burden-sharing in foreign and security policy. However, Germany failed to address the pressures it faced in developing military capabilities to play an increased role in the development of CFSP. The German Presidency coincided with the worsening of the situation in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia which ensured that Germany would serve as the mouthpiece of the EU in its diplomacy to end the crisis. Concomitant with this, the debate over transatlantic burden-sharing in military affairs intensified in light of the upcoming fiftieth anniversary summit of NATO and due to the British volte face5 on its position on CFSP marked by the Franco-British St. Malo agreement of December 1998. Germany’s role as an interlocutor between these debates and institutions (EU/NATO/WEU/G-8) positioned it to play a central role in developments in Kosovo and within internal EU debates over the fashioning of an emergent security and defence policy. Given Germany’s traditional weakness in shaping security policy within the EU, Germany’s Presidency of the European Council increased the opportunities for Germany to upload German policy preferences to the European level. This chapter outlines how Germany was able to influence debates over the future of the CFSP and to play a pivotal role in outlining a solution to the Kosovo crisis. In terms of the overall contention of this thesis, Germany’s ability to influence European level decisions in the sphere of foreign and security policy was vital in the definition of a CFSP which Germany could live with and contribute to. Within the concept

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of Europeanisation, Germany pursued a policy of up-loading German preferences to the EU as it sought to cope with the down-loading effects of German involvement in Operation Allied Force. As has often been witnessed in German foreign policy, Germany sought to intensify its multilateral ties as adaptational pressures on Germany grew more significant. Germany’s ‘dual strategy’ of 1998/1999, supporting allied military pressure and pushing diplomatic initiatives, enabled it to play a role in influencing events surrounding the military action against Yugoslavia.6 Germany sought to work within already existing multilateral institutions to find a solution to the Kosovo issue – Contact Group, EU, NATO, United Nations (UN).7 The German Council Presidency is an excellent example of what Garton-Ash termed ‘attritional multilateralism’, in which Germany utilised its vast web of multilateral links in order to bring a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis.8 Such a strategy was vital as Germany’s influence within the NATO operation was limited due to domestic constraints on German participation in the attacks and due to overwhelming American dominance in the mission against Milosevic.9 The Red/Green German government was steamrollered by the Clinton administration into accepting the need to back diplomacy with military force and found it ultimately highly challenging to move from a position of diplomacy backed by the threat of force, to a position where force and diplomacy were exercised simultaneously.10 In line with Putnam’s two-level metaphor German policy-makers were forced into a situation where Germany’s domestic and foreign-policy positions were highly interwoven over the conduct of the war against Yugoslavia and the development of the early formative stages of ESDP.11 Schröder and Fischer were instrumental in convincing the German polity of the need to accept the use of force to implement the Rambouillet accords, whilst playing the lead role in bringing the hostilities to an end once they had begun. Vital to Germany’s position as a lynchpin of international efforts to end the war was delivering and maintaining German domestic support for German involvement in the air campaign. However, without the efforts made by Fischer and Schröder to achieve a diplomatic solution, German policy-makers would not have been able to maintain domestic support for Germany’s involvement in Operation Allied Force. The strains that this placed on the new Red/Green government were immense. During this six-month period Germany went through an important and oftentimes difficult process of seeking agreement among its European allies on the future of the CFSP. In addition to this, Germany

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also went through a process of re-examining the German contribution to peace and stability in Europe. Of central importance to this examination of Germany’s international role was the thorny question of the use of force in German foreign policy.12 Germany’s traditional preference for limiting the role of the Bundeswehr to self-defence came under pressure from developments on the EU level for a greater German contribution to military crisis management. This chapter analyses how Germany sought to evolve its foreign policy to react to new international developments as part of an expanded CFSP/ESDP, whilst still maintaining many of the central components of German foreign policy.

The Red/Green coalition The arrival of the Red/Green government in September 1998 marked an important transition in German politics, not least because for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) there was a complete change of coalition partners in government. In his opening speech to the Bundestag as Bundeskanzler, Gerhard Schröder declared that The change in government is also a generational change in the life of our nation. Today more and more of our land is made up of those who have not directly experienced the Second World War. It would be dangerous to misunderstand this as a departure from our historical responsibility. Each generation leaves behind a legacy for the coming generation and no one can speak of the ‘grace’ of a ‘late birth’.13 The imagery of generational change had been utilised during the Bundestag election campaign as a way of defining the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) as a new alternative to the then tired Kohl administration.14 The Kohl era had come to an end and a new style of politics was ushered in with the Greens acting as junior coalition partners. The change in capital city from Bonn to Berlin also suggested that Germany would be more confident and cosmopolitan with Berlin as the capital, rather than sleepy, provincial Bonn. Hans-Dietrich Genscher sought to play down the significance of the move to Berlin asserting that, ‘Berlin will have an influence in the sense that any metropolis affects one culturally and intellectually. But it’s absolutely wrong to think it changes anything in our constitution or our values’.15 In addition to this, the appointment of Joschka Fischer as Foreign Minister was to

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result in a renewed emphasis on a holistic foreign and security policy stressing non-military solutions to international disputes based on the basic principles of the Green movement. However, on assuming the mantle of Foreign Minister the pressures of office became all too clear for Fischer in the early months of the new government. There were five major security policy challenges still facing Germany which affected its participation in the CFSP. These were as follows: a. How to play an increasingly involved role in CFSP while not turning its back on Germany’s traditional norms, interests and preferences in security policy? b. How to reform the Bundeswehr to meet the new demands placed on Germany by its allies and the international environment? c. What the end goal of European integration should be and the place of Political Union (PU) in discussions concerning CFSP – differing ‘Eurovisions’. d. The place of the military and military force in German foreign policy. e. A vision for the future development of European security capabilities. Throughout the course of Germany’s European Council Presidency in the first half of 1999, the German Federal Government began to make some tentative moves towards answering some of these challenges. Due to the highly contentious military action against Serbia, the domestic debate concerning German foreign policy during this time placed immense pressure on the government’s approach to the Kosovo conflict and the German EU/WEU Council Presidency. The most important question to ask concerning German foreign and security policy is, why did Germany commit to the strengthening of CFSP in the field of military capabilities in the period 1998–1999 when such a suggestion, albeit voiced by some domestic political actors, was not feasible during the early 1990s? By looking at the Europeanisation dynamics of the decision to participate in the Kosovo action and in the initial framing of the Common European Security and Defence Policy and the Stability Pact for South–Eastern Europe, it is possible to focus on how Germany has adapted to the new security demands faced by the EU. The arrival of some of the key members of Germany’s 1968 generation symbolised a significant change in government.16 The student radicals of the 1960s, of whom Joschka Fischer was the most high-profile example, were now in office. For Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen the prospect of a paci-

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fistic foreign policy under Joschka Fischer’s leadership of the Foreign Ministry was short-lived. The break-up of the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s had made the ‘limits of pacifism’ very clear and the Kosovo crisis was to severely test the resolve of the new government.17 Despite this radical political past, continuity with the Kohl administration on foreign and security policy appeared an attractive option for the new government. It was ironic that it was under a Red/Green government that the German Armed Forces were to conduct its first combat operation since World War II. However, as Meiers points out, continuity in a radically changed post-Cold War Europe is not always the most practical option for a state’s foreign-policy strategy.18

The impact of St. Malo on the Common Foreign and Security Policy Prime Minister Blair’s role in the development of CFSP in 1998–1999 was vital in putting CFSP back at the top of the agenda after years of relative stagnation. Blair’s frustration with the inertia of EU foreign and security policy in the Balkans expressed at the informal Council meeting at Pörtschach 24–25 October 1998, only hinted at the fact that something had to be done about the state of European foreign and security co-operation to make it more capable in the event of a crisis situation. Charles Grant, director of the Centre for European Reform in London, was an important figure in the British debate in pressing for a greater role for the United Kingdom in the CFSP as a way of providing a greater leadership role within the EU, which had been damaged by successive Conservative governments’ stances on Europe.19 This assertion was backed up by the fact that in order for the EU to act in foreign and security policy, numerous decision-making procedures had to be followed before an outcome was reached.20 It was after Pörtschach that the British approached the French about the possibility of coming to an agreement about the future capabilities of CFSP. The British had difficulties in persuading the French of the seriousness of their offer which delayed the reaching of an agreement due to the lack of French effort in presenting draft proposals.21 It was only really when the ministerial cars had rolled into St. Malo that the French became fully aware of the British delegation’s seriousness in wanting to reach an agreement to push forward aims to improve EU military capabilities.22 As a consequence of French scepticism, the deliberations over an agreed text went on well into the night before the summit.23 Due to

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the time constraints the resulting document dealt mainly with generalities and aims rather than concrete methods and decisions. The agreement signed by Defence Minister George Robertson and his opposite number, Alain Ricard, on board the HMS Birmingham anchored off the coast of St. Malo, stumbled on the use of the word ‘autonomous’ in terms of a future European capability but this was overcome by an intervention by Blair, who was determined to press forward despite the problems that this presented in terms of selling it to NATO and the United States.24 Both sets of negotiators led by Richard Hatfield (Policy Director of the Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom) and Gerard Errera (Political Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France) knew that they were dealing with highly sensitive topics but enough common ground was reached in order to reach a suitable agreement. However, according to Howorth, ‘in large part because of the impossibility of discussing defence and even security issues within the EU, none of these scenarios offered any realistic prospect of recasting the underlying balance of influence and responsibilities inside the Alliance.’25 Despite this, the signing of the St. Malo declaration represented, according to Prime Minister Blair, a ‘significant step forward’ in Franco-British relations and ‘a positive sign for the future, not only for the future for Britain and France, but more widely for the whole of Europe’.26 For France, the rationale for agreeing to the St. Malo Declaration was clear. In the post-Cold War era, France has held to its belief in the importance of developing meaningful European capabilities in the defence and security policy area. Robin Niblett points to the phrase ‘Mutualisation of Power’ which appeared in the French Defence White Paper in 1994 as evidence of this. Niblett states that, ‘Mitterrand’s guiding assumption that France could only secure its long-term security and European stability – in the face of underlying tensions in Europe and a proliferation of new external threats – through greater co-operation, co-ordination and, if necessary, institutionalisation of its policies with those of its European partners’.27 While the United Kingdom has been very wary of setting up new institutions to deal with questions of EU security policy, France in partnership with Germany has been at the forefront of institutionalising EU foreign and security policy co-operation.28 Germany was rather surprised that the United Kingdom was able to bridge the gap between its position and that of the French at St. Malo.29 The subject of defence co-ordination was for many years a thorny issue between the two countries which had in many ways hindered the development of military capabilities with the CFSP. Once common ground

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was reached on the central tenets of creating greater EU military capabilities an agreement between the EU’s two main military powers could be reached. With the place of NATO secured, progress could be made in reaching a consensus among the other EU Member states over the scope of ESDP. Howorth accounts for the added importance given to the CFSP process at St. Malo, Cologne and the Helsinki summit at the end of 1999 as being affected by three distinct driving forces: ●

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The decision by America under pressure from Congress that there should be a greater burden-sharing within the Atlantic alliance, motivated by fears of overstretch due to the increasingly complex international security environment. The long-standing French pressure to create a European capability – the harsh reality of the break-up of Yugoslavia had however reinforced the importance of NATO. Perhaps the most vital momentum was the decision by the United Kingdom to lift the 50 year long veto on European defence discussions.30

An important question to ask is, why was Germany not involved in the discussions at St. Malo? This was down to the fact that within the UK’s defence elites Germany’s armed forces still had many question marks hanging over them in terms of capabilities and their willingness to act. Indeed, two major questions confronting the British defence establishment relating to the use of the Bundeswehr in crisis management are: Will they be there and will they be there in time?31 It was perceived within the British defence establishment that German security policy was hamstrung by its traditional Vorbehalt in foreign policy and the constitutionally enshrined role of the Bundestag for sanctioning the deployment of the German Armed Forces. While France and the United Kingdom have very different strategic outlooks in terms of the role of NATO in European security provisions, both sets of armed forces do have considerable expertise and experience in military operations around the globe and are without doubt the EU’s leading members in terms of military capacity. It was thus essential that France and the United Kingdom saw eye to eye on the need to develop the EU’s military capabilities in order for any initiative to be successful.32 In light of the history of European Political Co-operation (EPC)/CFSP, the France-British initiative at St. Malo, which breathed new life into CFSP, was a break with the norm in terms of bilateral endeavours to develop the CFSP. While operationally, France and the United Kingdom

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have much experience working together in various settings such as in the Contact Group, the main bilateral initiatives directed at improving EU foreign and security policy co-operation have in the main stemmed from Franco-German undertakings, rather than from the United Kingdom in partnership with another EU Member State. The discourse of the domestic debate in Germany for the bolstering of EU military capabilities varied markedly from the United Kingdom. Fischer was very insistent that the development of EU military capabilities would not mean a militarisation of the EU. In a speech to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, Fischer stated that efforts must be made to develop the EU, ‘as an effective and decisive peaceful power which is able, as was the case in Kosovo, to bolster the rule of law and renounce violence and thereby consign war as a political tool in Europe to the past’.33 The debate in the United Kingdom centred on two main issues: the possible weakening of the transatlantic link which had been the bedrock of UK foreign and security policy since the end of the World War II, and the misapprehension that the moves towards greater co-ordination in the field of military capabilities would mean the eventual integration of British troops into a European army and the gradual phasing out of the British army as an independent entity. The leader of the opposition, William Hague declared the efforts to develop a European Security and Defence Policy within the EU as, ‘an ill-judged Franco-German transplant operation’ (from NATO to EU).34

The joint European Union/Western European Union Presidencies in the debates concerning ESDP The German Presidency of the European Council in the first half of 1999 had a major role to play in co-ordinating efforts to reach an agreed basis for the discussions over the future of the CFSP. The additional pressure of the conflict in Kosovo placed an increased burden on German diplomacy but also helped to highlight the deficiencies inherent within CFSP.35 Hellmann’s assertion that the traditional German inhibition of the pre-unification period has been replaced by a greater confidence in raising German preferences on the international stage came under scrutiny during the German Council presidency.36 Germany was able to make an important impact during the European Council presidency, notably in suggesting a long-term strategy for dealing with the problems of the South–East Balkans area. However, any talk of such a newly invigorated Germany ready to take the lead in policy matters

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within the EU continued to meet with unease among German policymakers.37 The Red/Green German government had not expected to assume the responsibility to take forward the development of military capabilities within the CFSP on taking office in the autumn of 1998. In the Red/ Green Regierungserklärung of 10th November 1998, Schröder did not list CFSP among the priorities of the German presidency of the EU.38 The German contribution to developing CFSP during the first half of 1999 was therefore a reaction to events, rather than being symbolic of Germany playing a leading role in shaping events. The British–French St. Malo Declaration of December 1998 and the impact of the Kosovo War played a greater role in outlining the development of the ESDP than German policy up-loading. Circumstances conspired to make Germany a central actor in the events surrounding the Kosovo war and in the formative debates concerning the creation of European military capabilities. Indeed, the 1998 Red/Green Coalition Agreement outlined rather modest goals for the CFSP. The new federal government will strive to further develop CFSP in the sense of more communitarisation of foreign and security policy. It will support majority decision-making, more foreign policy competencies and the strengthening of the European Security and Defence Identity. The new federal government will endeavour to develop the WEU on the basis of the Amsterdam Treaty.39 The call for more communitarisation of European foreign policy lacked specifics and the assertion of the centrality of the OSCE and the UN were hallmarks of the German effort to end the war in Kosovo. Shortly after taking office the importance of developing CFSP soon dawned on Chancellor Schröder. In his address to the annual meeting of German ambassadors in Berlin at the end of November Schröder stated, ‘The crisis in the former Yugoslavia, most recently in Kosovo, highlights for us the limited capabilities of the EU in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy’.40 This sentiment echoes the words of Blair at Pörtschach, but it was not until the Franco-British agreement reached at St. Malo in December of 1998, that Germany could fully participate in tackling the limited effectiveness of the EU’s foreign and security policy. The Red/Green government outlined its outlook on foreign policy according to three key themes: Continuity (Kontinuitiät), dependability

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(Verlässlichkeit) and predictability (Berechenbarkeit). Continuity was of added significance in foreign policy given the intense commitment to Adenauer’s concept of Westbindung which Chancellor Kohl has demonstrated pre- and post-unification. The discourse of the Red/Green government highlighted Germany’s obvious foreign-policy constraints of the Cold War period had been carried over into post-unification Germany.41 The so-called generational change from Kohl to Schröder had not absolved the German government from reasserting Germany’s commitment to its allies and the multilateral institutions which had shaped its foreign policy since 1949. Despite these pressures to reaffirm the central tenets of Germany’s international role, the Red/Green government sought to place their imprint on German foreign policy, a short time after taking power. One early sign of teething problems between the coalition partners was demonstrated by Joschka Fischer’s suggestion that NATO should abandon its ‘first use’ policy on nuclear weapons during his first visit to Washington.42 Fischer’s stance on the use of military force was conditioned by his years as leading member of the pacifist Green Party. However, his position had become rather nuanced as a result of reflecting on the painful dissolution of the Yugoslav federation in the aftermath of the Cold War. Indeed, in 1995 in a famous article in Der Spiegel Fischer stated, As before, I reject war as a tool of politics. However, in our founding programme there is a right to self-defence, that is to say, in extreme circumstances. And that goes too for the victims of the horrible developments in the former Yugosalvia where a new fascism threatens to be victorious.43 Rather than rejecting the use of force outright, Fischer called for its use when fundamental values were at stake. This view was entirely consistent with Fischer’s position during the Kosovo war when he argued for German involvement in the mission on the basis of protecting human rights. Schröder’s normalising discourse on taking office placed Germany under greater scrutiny and raised question marks concerning the Red/Green coalition’s ability to steer a familiar course in its European policy and wider foreign policy in general.44 This normalisation, or in other words the greater prevalence of Germany sticking up for more short-term, national interests, was seen in some quarters as being associated with the likelihood of a greater German leadership role in the EU.45

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Fischer was at pains to stress that this would not be the case. When pushed on whether Germany’s new found self-confidence would witness a greater role for Germany in the upcoming Council Presidency Fischer stated that ‘Gemany should never undertake a leadership role.’46 The European reaction to the events in Kosovo was to work towards improving and strengthening capabilities and co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy. The ESDP was a result of this determination. Therefore, in terms of understanding the emergence of ESDP the work of David A. Lake is helpful. Lake states, ‘Institutions are both a product and a cause. Actors create institutions to serve their interests, and these institutions influence subsequent behaviour. Institutions either enable actors to achieve outcomes that might otherwise be impossible or constrain actors from undertaking behaviours that would other be chosen.’47 Germany supported the development of ESDP because it met with German interests, norms and policy preferences. The development of ESDP offered Germany considerable advantages: the opportunity to cooperate with France and the United Kingdom, the opportunity to pursue the deepening of co-operation within CFSP, and finally, the opportunity to further embed German foreign and security policy within the EU with the aim of playing a greater role in transatlantic burden sharing. What emerged throughout the course of the German Presidency was a compromise on the development of EU crisis management capabilities. Central to this for Germany was also the acceptance of new circumstances in which Berlin would have to play a more active role in military operations as part of an EU force. The emergence of ESDP necessitated German acceptance of an altered normative basis for European security in which Germany would play a vital cog in building real European military capabilities. This normative change affected Germany on the international and domestic level. The up-loading and down-loading dynamics of Europeanisation highlight the impact of the decision to develop ESDP with the knock-on effects of this for German security and defence policy.48 The Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen proposals for the German Presidency in 1999 focused on a number of key issues relating to CFSP:49 ●

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There was a clear recognition of the different interests and conceptual approaches to CFSP within Member States; There was a need for the co-ordination force of a Mr CFSP to represent the EU’s external policy;

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Central for future developments and effectiveness was a Planning and Analysis unit – which will contribute to framing common strategies, and for the creation of civilian conflict prevention and to work towards the development of common foreign policy interests. Satz and Sterzing stressed the need for the development of EU Common Strategies for Russia and Ukraine; Germany should work towards the strengthening of civilian components of CFSP and peaceful political initiatives. The suggestion was made to establish an EU Centre for Civilian Conflict Prevention; The EU should maintain and strengthen the Civilian Power (Zivilmacht) character of CFSP and50 Germany should work towards limiting weapons exports, for example, landmines. Many of Satz and Sterzing’s recommendations for the German Presidency came to fruition in the Cologne Declaration and ultimately in the Nice Treaty of 2000, demonstrating a clear example of German up-loading, not only during the six-month Council Presidency, but demonstrating long-term influence on policy deliberations as part of the CFSP/ESDP. However, Germany was only successful in its efforts because their proposals built on the dynamic created by Franco-British co-operation. In addition, Germany’s ideas presented during the Council Presidency dovetailed neatly with existing ideas among the 15 Member States.

The German Presidency of the (WEU) in conjunction with the Presidency of the European Council in the first half of 1999 greatly facilitated the co-ordination of efforts to work towards the development of EU military capabilities. The German position outlined in the 1998 Coalition agreement was to increase the role of the WEU in light of the imminent coming into force of the Amsterdam treaty. The programme for the German WEU Presidency included the following:51 ●

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Initiating a reflection on the question of Europe’s security and defence in the future – Probably the most important task and where Germany played its best hand; Strengthening institutional links and practical co-operation with the EU particularly in regard to Article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty outlining the terms of enhanced co-operation; Developing co-operation with NATO and the ESDI (European Security and Defence Identity) within the Alliance ahead of the Washington Summit, April 1999 – ‘Berlin Plus’;52

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Pursuing requests by the EU under Article J.4 (2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); Strengthening WEU Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) in Albania; Mine-clearing in Croatia and making available the WEU Satellite Centre for the international verification mission in Kosovo; Developing WEU’s own capabilities; Preparing for the accession of new members and developing links with third countries.

The importance of the dual Presidencies for German ambitions in the field of security and defence policy was evident in the words of Günther Verheugen who stated before the WEU Assembly in the run-up to the German Presidency of the WEU, This is something of a spur to our ambitions. Indeed, we want to prove that it does make sense to combine the two presidencies whenever possible. We think that this provides an excellent opportunity during our Presidency to make further headway in the discussion on the European Security and Defence Identity.53 Initial discussions on the issues raised by the Franco-British St. Malo declarations were convened by the German Presidency at the Amorbach Monastery in January 1999.54 The resolve of the German Presidency to force a solution to the crisis in Kosovo was strengthened by the discovery of the massacre of 45 Kosovar civilians in the village of Racak on 15th January 1999. This was a turning point (Wendepunkt) for Fischer.55 The growing seriousness of the situation in Kosovo led to increased German efforts to forge consensus on a solution to the crisis in Kosovo, and to build on Franco-British proposals for developing EU military capabilities. Fischer included the United Kingdom when discussing the development of CFSP reinforcing the fact that Fischer was aware of the importance of the trilateral relationship in building up military capabilities.56 British–German security co-operation was also seen within a strategy of improving British–German relations.57 This was soon followed in February with the circulation of a German EU/WEU Presidency paper entitled ‘Internal reflection of WEU on European Security and Defence’ which focused on, ‘how Europe can possess appropriate structures and capabilities to conduct crisis management in the sense of Petersberg Tasks’.58 Prime Minister Tony Blair backed Germany’s efforts in his call that members of the EU ‘should be able to take on some security tasks on

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our own’.59 The first serious discussions on developing the ESDP took place at Schloß Reinhartshausen on 13–14 March, only 11 days before the start of the NATO air campaign against Milosevic began.60 Kosovo was at the forefront of discussions held by the 15 Foreign Ministers, with the assertion by Fischer that, ‘We cannot put up with a development of mass murder and war in Europe.’61 Reinhartshausen presented Germany with an opportunity to present its proposals for the future composition of ESDP. Germany proposed the following on the basis of the ‘Internal reflection of WEU on European Security and Defence’: ●

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● ●

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Defence ministers to join EU foreign ministers at their regular meetings; A permanent body, made up of EU representatives, with political and military expertise; An EU committee of military representatives; A military staff, with a capacity for analysis of situations, strategic planning and its own sources of intelligence and Other resources, such as a satellite centre and Institute for Security Studies.62

The suggestions made by Germany reflected traditional German preferences for institution building. Whilst the proposals did not win universal endorsement from all its EU partners, no significant opposition emerged. Robin Cook, the British Foreign Minister expressed reservations on the institutional structure but not the end goal of working towards greater EU effectiveness in crisis management. Cook expressed a preference, ‘for a Brussels-based permanent committee of deputy political directors from the EU states’ foreign ministries, which would steer EU foreign and security policy. British officials said the German ideas were looking far into the future, whereas Mr Cook’s plan was a precursor to a common security and defence policy.’63 All in all, Reinhartshausen represented a first step in putting flesh on the bones of proposals outlined in the St. Malo declarations. Some Foreign ministers were clearly more enthusiastic than others with the Spanish Foreign Minister, Abel Matutes, reportedly stating, ‘I felt I was at the birth of an event as historic as the launch of the euro.’64

The Berlin Summit Conclusions Before the German Presidency of the European Council began, the Berlin European Council had been designed to deal with the issue of Agenda

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2000, the financial package to ready the EU for eastern enlargement. Whilst agreement was reached on a series of budgetary issues, the Kosovo War was at the forefront of deliberations between the Member States. Indeed, the Member States were faced with conducting negotiations whilst the first bombing raids were flown by NATO. It was therefore no surprise that the situation in Kosovo was mentioned in the final summit communiqué. The Presidency stated on behalf of the Member States that, ‘In the final analysis, we are responsible for securing peace and co-operation in the region. This is the way to guarantee our fundamental European values, i.e. respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, international law, democratic institutions and the inviolability of borders’.65 This statement was reminiscent of Jacques Poos’s ill-timed call for Europe to take responsibility for stability in the Balkans in the early 1990s. The statement did demonstrate a resolve to take ownership of the issue of bringing peace to the region, and balance American dominance in European security decision-making. It also seemed to suggest that the EU was finally going to take the problems of the former Yugoslavia seriously and work out a way to bring peace and stability to the region, instead of employing a policy of ‘fire fighting’ as problems arose.

The informal European Council 14 April 1999 The informal European Council meeting of 14 April was an important step in shoring up EU support for the NATO action against Yugoslavia. It was also of central importance to Germany’s efforts to propose a solution to the turmoil in south–eastern Europe and to force Milosevic to accept a political solution to the Kosovo crisis. The EU states agreed on a series of goals which, on analysis, demonstrated Germany’s determination to forge a wide international consensus on the future fate of the Balkan region. The decisions supported NATO’s operation against Milosevic, encouraged the efforts of the UN Secretary General and reinforced the centrality of the UN Charter, and also sought to include Russia in efforts to end the conflict. The EU Member States decided to endorse the following:66 ●

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Determination to stop murder and deportation in Kosovo – use of all strongest measures, including military is justified and necessary to stop this; A multiethnic, democratic Kosovo; Support for the UN Secretary General’s initiative of 9 April 1999;

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Calls for an immediate end of all violence, retreat of military forces, special police and irregular units, the stationing of international forces and the return of all displaced persons; Full acceptance of the demands of the international community by Yugoslavia to suspend military measures and allow room for a political solution; Implementation of Article VII of UN charter; Council supported the renewal of a political agreement on Kosovo based on the Rambouillet accord, including the establishment of an international transition administration, the creation of a police force representative of Kosovars; free and fair elections and the stationing of international forces to protect Kosovars; The inclusion of Russia in attempts to find a solution to the Kosovo crisis; The enforcement of the agreement taken by the Council on 8 April for the supply of humanitarian aid to the refugees and Calls for a conference on the region’s future.

The informal ‘Gymnich style’ Foreign Ministers meeting at Schloß Reinhartshausen and the follow-up meeting between France, Germany and the United Kingdom on 18 March 1999, the Berlin Summit and the informal Council meeting in April 1999 and the Bremen WEU Summit in May 1999 were important in developing the idea of ESDP, outlining the future role of the EU in the region and were good preparation for the General Affairs Council on the 17 May 1999. It was vital for the success of the ESDP that co-ordination between the EU/WEU was increased, which was greatly facilitated by the joint German presidencies. The dynamism which the German presidency instilled into the process of forging agreement on creating EU military capabilities, along with the impetus given by events in Kosovo, significantly added to the developments within ESDP leading up to the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) at Nice. While remaining predominantly intergovernmental in form, the CFSP and the inclusion of the ESDP in terms of military capacities were expressed as falling within the scope of Article V of the TEU. The Declaration of Cologne stated in Annex III of the Presidency conclusions The focus of our efforts therefore would be to assure that the European Union has at its disposal the necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for effective EU decision making in crisis management within the scope of the

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Petersberg tasks. This is the area where a European capacity to act is required most urgently. The development of an EU military crisis management capacity is to be seen as an activity within the framework of the CFSP (Title V of the TEU) and as a part of the progressive framing of a common defence policy in accordance with Article 17 of the TEU.67 Developments in ESDP must be seen therefore within the framework of European integration, which despite the continuation of the pillar structure of the treaties, has great potential to affect the external face of the EU. Gunter Verheugen, the then Minister of State in the Foreign Ministry, firmly nested CFSP within the European integration project, outlining that ‘European Security and Defence Policy is a central element of the European integration process.’68 The joint presidency of the WEU and the EU allowed Germany to generate and push forward the debate concerning CFSP and the early stages of ESDP. The NATO Washington Summit in April 1999 which built on the Berlin NATO summit of three years previous and the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam on 1st May 1999 also enabled Germany avail itself of decisive mechanisms, notably the inclusion of Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP, in the path towards the Cologne Declaration of June 1999. At the Bremen Summit, Defence Minister Scharping called for the integration of the WEU into the EU.69 Indeed, so confident was Scharping in his determination to convince his EU partners of the merits of merging the two organisations that he declared that he foresaw, ‘the end of the triple co-existence of NATO and the two European bodies’.70 In addition to this Scharping aired the need for the inclusion of defence ministers to the General Council and the need for a military council and military staff within the EU in order to develop planning capacities and expertise which referred to the Presidency’s paper of February.71 It was clear that both Scharping and Fischer viewed the integration of the WEU into the EU as part of the integration process which would lead to the greater effectiveness of security and defence policy within the EU. Scharping was to get his wish for a meeting of defence ministers on the 28 May 1999, albeit on an informal basis, but was forced to play down the short-term prospect of merging EU/WEU.72 However, Scharping was convinced that the Cologne summit would be the ‘start signal’ for the development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy.73 The Franco-German Summit in Toulouse on 29 May 1999 built on the efforts since the St. Malo declaration the previous December.74 First, the Franco-German tandem agreed to further develop

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the Eurocorps into a Crisis Reaction unit and act as a cornerstone for future EU capabilities. Second, France and Germany committed themselves to work towards merging WEU into the EU, a policy which Germany wholeheartedly supported. Finally, in an effort to develop military capacity, France and Germany declared a stated aim to strengthen air, space and weapons industries in Europe (Table 3.1). The Toulouse summit served two major purposes for Germany. First, it reinforced the Franco-German relationship within the CFSP which had lost some of its importance with the signing of the St. Malo agreement. Second, it

Table 3.1

National positions on the development of ESDP, 1999 Germany

France

United Kingdom

Position on the development of an EU military capability

Yes – although cautious on militarisation of CFSP and its impact on Germany

Yes – in favour for many years

Yes – growing acceptance of the need for transatlantic burden sharing

Relationship of EU military capability in relation to NATO

NATO as the cornerstone of European security – ESDP to strengthen transatlantic burden-sharing

ESDP to be able to act autonomously from NATO when NATO does not want to act (St Malo Declaration)

NATO irreplaceable although with a greater input from European states

Circumstances in which force could be used

Petersberg Tasks

Petersberg Tasks

Petersberg Tasks

Vision for the future of EU capabilities

Unclear – military option as last resort – Diplomacy first – UN mandate needed for possible military action

Unclear – based around Petersberg Tasks – comfortable with considering deployment

More comfortable resorting to use of force than Germany

Nature of defence co-operation within the EU in terms of EU competence and institutional scrutiny

Intergovernmental – Intergovernmental Bundestag endorsement of Bundeswehr deployment essential

Intergovernmental

The role of WEU and EU

Merge

Reluctant to consider full merging

Merge

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allowed Germany to play a more confident role in pushing for greater co-operation in CFSP safe in the knowledge that it was firmly committed to multilateralism.

Public opinion75 Public opinion has never had a significant impact on the future scope or direction of Germany’s policy on CFSP. Public opinion has, therefore, neither served as a sectoral interest to push for greater co-operation in foreign and security policy on the European level nor as a blocking majority on moves by Germany to co-ordinate its foreign policy with its fellow EU Member States.76 Where public opinion has been important is in acting as a ‘permissive consensus’ in German attempts to develop CFSP. During the first half of 1999, the three main issues affecting Germany’s foreign policy were the Kosovo War, the development of CFSP and the strategic adaptation of NATO. In a survey commissioned by the Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (Defence Ministry (BMVg)), the pollsters EMNID asked a sample of 2,500 people a range of questions relating to European security which demonstrated general public support for continued German involvement in NATO and for developing European capabilities. The survey compared data of 1999 and 2000 which served as a good comparison being on either side of the Kosovo campaign (Tables 3.2–3.7). Table 3.2 How important is NATO in relation to its task to secure the external security of its Member States?77 Feb 1999

Aug 1999

March 2000

39 46 12 3

54 35 8 3

45 41 9 3

Necessary Quite necessary Not really necessary Not necessary

Table 3.3

Germany’s NATO Membership78

Continue Membership Leave NATO No response

Aug 1999

March 2000

91 9 1

85 6 9

120 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 3.4 How important for you is the presence of American troops in Germany as an expression of Euro-Atlantic partnership for security and stability in Europe?79

Very important Important Quite unimportant Completely unimportant

Aug 1999

March 2000

17 46 26 10

15 45 27 12

Table 3.5 Do you think that it is important for the EU to develop an independent security and defence policy from the USA?80

Very necessary Quite necessary Not really necessary Completely unnecessary

Nov 1999

March 2000

31 37 20 7

22 45 21 7

Table 3.6 Are you for or against that the EU is planning a rapid reaction force, a type of European army?81

For Quite supportive Quite against Against

Nov 1999

March 2000

29 28 22 17

32 23 22 18

Table 3.7 Should Germany participate in this European rapid reaction force?82 March 2000 Yes, without restrictions and with soldiers Yes, but on a case by case basis Yes, but only financial Not under any circumstances

47 47 3 1

The data contained within these EMNID poles reflects considerable continuity within German public opinion on broad issues of European security. The EMNID data suggests, however, reluctance among the respondents to consider the participation of the Bundeswehr in military

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operations as part of a European Rapid Reaction Force (EPRF), a key pillar of ESDP. Despite this, respondents were supportive of the need to develop a ESDP independent of the United States (68 per cent for November 1999; 67 per cent for in March 2000). What these figures represent is that German public opinion supports the development of European level initiatives to forge closer foreign and security policy co-operation among Germany’s European allies, without agreeing to allowing the government carte blanche on Bundeswehr deployment on crisis management. This opinion reflects a brake on the scope of the possible options for German foreign and security policy-makers.

Germany’s response to the Kosovo War – up-loading German preferences to reduce adaptational pressures on German policy Kosovo was a ‘wake-up call’ for Germany’s foreign and security policy.83 Germany could no longer avoid painful political decisions on deploying military force by relying on its traditional ‘cheque-book diplomacy’.84 Germany’s response to the decision to launch Operation Allied Force was a committed attempt to work towards multilateral solutions, not only for the immediate crisis at hand, but to establish procedures for dealing with future crises in Europe. Rather than isolate itself, Germany sought to build up a web of multilateral efforts to bring the NATO action to a speedy conclusion and to enforce a political settlement to the Kosovo issue. Germany was faced with the demands of living up to its commitments to the NATO alliance and the onus was on Germany to play a leading role in the creation of meaningful European military capabilities. In addition, the constitutionally enshrined role of the Bundestag in ratifying the deployment of the Bundeswehr and the reluctance of the German public to consider German participation in the use of force against Milosevic presented the Red/Green government with major challenges.85 Germany’s traditional role as a Musterknabe (model pupil) in CFSP was coming under significant scrutiny. Germany had run the danger of portraying itself as a Musterknabe in CFSP, whilst all the while being resented by its main partners for not advancing quickly enough down to the road of defence reform in order to share the burden of European military deployment. Too often from the British perspective, ‘true believers’ in Berlin had sought to drive CFSP within a broader strategy of pushing PU, rather than purely seeking to improve European capabilities for contributing to European security.86 In addition, Germany traditionally portrayed its role in CFSP as ‘the biggest of the small states’

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rather than a leading force playing an active role in decisions.87 This position has been reinforced by the belief of one foreign-policy specialist in the Bundestag, that Germany had no more influence than Finland in CFSP.88 On taking office, Schröder could not have predicted his imminent role of Kriegskanzler during Operation Allied Force. Nor could Schröder have foreseen German participation in a NATO action without a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. Military involvement in Operation Allied Force not only saw the Bundeswehr used to fight a war for the first time since the World War II, but also, it brought back painful memories of the Luftwaffe’s destruction of Belgrade on 6 April 1941. Germany, therefore sought to avoid being exposed to international criticism and suspicion of its motives for involvement in the NATO mission by multilateralising its stance on Kosovo and seeking international legal justification for its actions. The centrality of the UNSC in sanctioning the use of force was a central pillar of the Red/Green foreign policy. Schröder stated before the Bundestag that, We will offer independent units for peacekeeping measures to the United Nations. Through this the Federal government will support the maintenance of the monopoly of the use of force of the United Nations and to strengthen the role of the Secretary-General. We will seize the opportunity to become a permanent member of the Security Council so long as there is no possibility of a common European seat.89 The determination to seek UNSC approval for the use of force for the Kosovo campaign created serious difficulties for the Red/Green coalition. Wheeler states, ‘once policy-makers take on the burden of legal justification, they enter into a distinctive language and practice of justification in which actions must be justified in terms of established, codified normative precepts’.90 Once it became clear that NATO would not obtain a UNSC mandate, Fischer, Schröder and Scharping’s discourse stressed moral legitimacy for action which superseded legal justification in the case of mass expulsion of Kosovars and the potential for genocide in the Balkans. Only a few weeks into the conflict, Scharping reinforced the seriousness of the situation facing Europe and stressed Germany’s responsibility for involvement in Operation Allied Force when he stated, ‘This is systematic extermination, a terrifying reminder of what was done in Germany’s name in the Second World War.’91 Moral responsibility for maintaining

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human rights in Europe was a central theme of the German government’s political discourse as it sought to shore up domestic support for Germany’s involvement in NATO’s mission against Milosevic. The Red/Green government had very little time to consider its involvement in Operation Allied Force.92 On 12 November 1998, under pressure from President Clinton, Fischer and Schröder were forced to agree to support possible NATO action against Milosevic in what Fischer described as a timeframe of 15 minutes.93 The German government became all too aware of the influence of America on European security policy. Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping was conscious of the impact this was having on policy-making. When reflecting on discussions at a WEU summit on 17 November 1998, Scharping commented in his memoirs of the Kosovo war, ‘We do not have too much America in NATO, rather too little Europe. In any case, we do not have too many institutions, rather too few common policies in the area of foreign and security policy’.94 This assertion was also reinforced by Schröder in his speech to the annual Security Conference in Munich in February 1999. During his speech Schröder reinforced that there should be Stronger responsibilty of the European Union for Europe; effective crisis prevention through farsighted policy; a new strategic vision for peace and development; armament control and decommissioning – this is the substance of what we are striving for when we say: A new Europe for a new NATO, and the new NATO for a new Europe.95 Schröder’s speech was important at a time when strains within the Atlantic Alliance over Kosovo were clearly showing. The recurrent theme of EU responsibility for European security within German discourse faltered on the overwhelming centrality of American military strength in backing up diplomatic efforts for an end to the abuses of human rights in Kosovo. This was further reinforced by Germany’s difficulties in deploying meaningful military forces due to the incomplete reform of the Bundeswehr and the singularity of Germany’s strategic culture. The result of this was Germany’s relative sidelining during the negotiations at Rambouillet which were dominated by the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Russia. However, by virtue of its structural role as Contact Group member and President of the European Council, WEU and the G-8, Germany’s position was reinforced when otherwise it might have had limited influence.96 Due to American military dominance, Germany’s influence on the Kosovo War was limited in purely military terms.97 It was perhaps this

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limitation on Germany’s ability to directly influence the prosecution of the war which forced Fischer to look for alternative routes out of the war once Operation Allied Force had commenced, to bring a lasting solution to the region. Not only this, but the fragile nature of domestic support within Germany for the air campaign against Milosevic necessitated a swift end to hostilities and meaningful measures to be put in place to deal with the aftermath of Serb atrocities against Kosovars and to prevent such occurrences from taking place again. Party political support for NATO’s action was relatively solid, with the exception of segments of the Greens and the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). The party leadership of Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen faced massive pressure (particularly Fischer) to play a constructive and dependable role in foreign affairs on taking office, despite the party’s pacifist leanings. At a party congress in Magdeburg in March 1998 when the situation in Kosovo was beginning to surface and destabilise the region, the party had voted against supporting the participation of German troops in the NATO-led UN mission in Bosnia.98 Fischer was under immense pressure from his party and his coalition partners the SPD. In the early stages of Operation Allied Force, Fischer stated, ‘I’m convinced that what we’ve done as the German government has been right from the start … Germany couldn’t have acted any other way. I haven’t only learned “no more war” … I’ve also learned “no more Auschwitz”’.99 The Green’s foreign-policy spokesperson, Helmut Lippelt, reinforced this message when he charged Milosevic with, ‘racist expulsion, accompanied with murder. This is something which even a pacifist cannot bear’.100 Despite this, Fischer faced a massive political challenge to carry his party with him in his determination to support German involvement in NATO air strikes against Serbia. Pressure mounted on Fischer when a junior minister Gisela Altmann became the first Green MdB (Member of the German Parliament) to oppose German support for the NATO attacks.101 On 13 May 1999 Fischer was paint bombed at a special party conference in Bielefeld, a meeting called to vote on the Kosovo campaign and which if the vote had not been carried, threatened the position of the Greens in the government and bring down the coalition. Fischer managed to convince those present of a compromise motion to push for a ceasefire to resume a diplomatic effort to end the hostilities. The onus on Fischer, therefore, to deliver a peaceful diplomatic way out to hostilities had major political ramifications on the Red/Green coalition. The Red/Green government managed to maintain domestic support for German participation in the war against Serbia. This support was

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founded on a wide political consensus of the necessity to stop the expulsion and killing of Kosovars and due to Germany’s determination to maintain cohesion within the EU and NATO. However, Germany’s contribution to the operation was limited in scope reflecting Germany’s relative inexperience in military crisis management.102 Germany was also very concerned about conducting a ‘limited war’, reducing the number of German casualties in the air campaign despite the contradictions which this entailed in terms of increasing the possibilities of civilian casualties on the ground and failing to deal with continued ethnic cleansing by Serb paramilitaries. Germany fundamentally opposed a ground war despite Germany’s highest military representative in NATO calling for its consideration. Klaus Naumann, chairman of the NATO military staff during Operation Allied Force stated, ‘You must be ready to commit ground troops, or the whole thing is a sham.’103 Germany’s policy-makers refused to sanction the use of ground troops for fear of getting involved in a protracted ground war resulting in significant amounts of Bundeswehr casualties. Germany refused to consider the use of ground troops because of the military risks of fighting the battle hardened Serbian troops and because they felt that this would destroy any chance of a diplomatic settlement based on the prospect of regional economic and political regeneration.104

The opposition parties and Kosovo The PDS The PDS was the only party within the Bundestag which refused to support Germany’s involvement in Operation Allied Force. The PDS was against the war for two overriding reasons. First, the party insisted that NATO intervention would lead to more and not fewer refugees.105 Second, the PDS continually stressed its opposition to NATO’s actions against Yugoslavia. The PDS stressed its concerns that NATO was developing from a defensive alliance to a ‘military intervention force’, a strategic shift which would be agreed upon at the Washington Summit in April 1999.106 Therefore, the PDS did not support the sending of Bundeswehr troops to the region and campaigned for their return.107 Central to this standpoint, was the belief within the party that international affairs should become demilitarised and work towards more co-operative, pan-European solutions to European security problems based on the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).108 The PDS’s position as the only anti-war party was used to its advantage in the European Parliament and Landtag elections in 1999 and showed up

126 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

the differences in opinion between eastern and western Germans. As Hough states, ‘The Kosovo crisis was an unambiguous case of the PDS standing alone as a representative of distinctive eastern German sentiment. It alone represented the majority opinion in the eastern states that rejected the NATO attacks on Yugoslavia.’109 The CDU/CSU On the surface, the decision to participate in Operation Allied Force should not have presented the CDU/CSU with a complicated narrative. German foreign policy founded on a commitment to the EU, NATO, OSCE and the UN had been the bedrock of Kohl’s foreign policy. However, it is debatable whether or not Kohl would have agreed to participate in the NATO mission for fear of sparking intense political divisions within German society.110 Somehow, having a German Foreign Minister from the Green Party, with a background in pacifism arguing for German participation in Operation Allied Force, was significant in convincing the German public of the rationale for German involvement. The CDU’s Paul Breuer supported the German involvement in the NATO Verification Mission in Kosovo (Operation Eagle Eye) under the auspices of UNSC resolution 1160 and 1199: The CDU/CSU parliamentary grouping supports the proposal of the Federal government for the participation of the Bundeswehr in the NATO air observation mission over Kosovo. The point is that Germany fulfils its responsible and conscious contribution … that not only the people in Kosovo are protected from humanitarian disaster but that we continue to maintain a prospect for life and peace in Kosovo.111 In the March 1999 debate over the participation of Germany in Operation Allied Force did not witness strong opposition to the government’s plans from the CDU/CSU. Wolfgang Schäuble insisted that, ‘The community of the world’s democracies and the Europeans must have the strength to bring an end to the killings’.112 Despite this, Schäuble, Chairman of the CDU, raised concerns over what he perceived as ‘a new, swaggering style’ in German foreign policy under the Red/Green foreign policy.113 The FDP The FDP supported the decision to take action against Serbia, accepting the rationale which Fischer and Schroeder had advanced – that of

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protecting human rights. In the Bundestag debate on the decision to participate in Operation Allied Force, FDP Chairman Gerhardt stated, ‘This is not about NATO’s war aims in Kosovo, rather this is a question directed to peacefully constituted societies whether they want to look away when people are made into refugees, when people’s lives are put in danger and when acts of destruction are carried out’.114 The FDP then provided further support for the Red/Green government’s stance on the war, strengthening the majority opinion in the Bundestag for Germany’s participation in the NATO air campaign.

The Stability Pact for South–Eastern Europe – up-loading German preferences and policy to the EU level Many of the main aspects of how Germany seeks to influence the Europeanisation of other national foreign and security policies within the EU can be seen in the development of the Stability Pact for SouthEastern Europe. The reason for looking at this policy area is to pinpoint how Germany was able to upload its foreign-policy preferences onto the European level. The Stability Pact for South–Eastern Europe is significant as it not only provided a framework for dealing with the aftermath of the Kosovo war, but it also demonstrated that the arguments which the German government had employed in order to convince the German public of the necessity for German involvement in the Kosovo war had been adhered to. The Stability Pact/Fischer Plan were an integral part of a strategy to bring an end to the Kosovo war and to provide a longer-term solution to the problems of the region.115 Pressure to find such a solution emerged due to the failure of the Rambouillet Conference and the resultant bombing of Serbia. The German Presidency (WEU/EU/G8) was an important agenda setter in time of crisis – consequently it had important diplomatic tools at its disposal. These were further strengthened by the opportunities opened up due to the coming into force of the new foreignpolicy clauses within the Amsterdam Treaty, 1 May 1999 (Article 15). Germany took full advantage of its structural position as President of EU/WEU/ G-8 to force German ideas onto the agenda of the international community. The Stability Pact for South–Eastern Europe/Fischer Plan are examples of domestic preferences being translated onto the international level (the up-loading and down-loading of Europeanisation) The Red/Green Coalition agreement of October 1998 had committed both parties to strengthening the EU’s capabilities in Civilian Conflict Prevention.

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However, when the Kosovo crisis hit home with the new government, its aspirations to develop non-military foreign-policy capabilities within the EU became central to reducing domestic pressure on Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer from public anti-war sentiment. It was imperative for the government to suggest a medium to long-term solution to the region’s problems. Germany’s role in the Balkans had been under suspicion as a result of the recognition fiasco of Croatia and Slovenia which caused major resentment among Germany’s EU partners and demonstrated the limits of Europeanisation in 1990/1991. The Contact Group was vital for Germany in re-establishing trust and cooperation with Germany’s key partners and restoring relative German influence in the former Yugoslavia.116 The following examination of the emergence of the Fischer Plan and the Stability Pact demonstrates many of the fundamental norms underpinning German foreign and security policy. It is therefore an excellent example with which to examine German foreign policy in action. Whilst some detractors have claimed that there was little new in Fischer’s proposals, Germany did seize the opportunity to make use of its structural position as agenda setter within the EU/WEU and G-8 to push for the acceptance of the plan.117 The Balladur Plan of 1994 for Central and Eastern Europe and the plan proposed by Védrine for Bosnia in 1998 contained many of the principles and ideas contained within the Fischer Plan. As has been shown already, Germany’s ability to influence substantive CFSP policy is limited by the power resources Germany can bring to bear in foreign policy. However, Germany’s characteristic ease when working within multilateral settings was of great importance in reaching agreement between the EU/WEU, NATO, UN and OSCE. The ‘Fischer Plan’ and the Stability Pact for South–Eastern Europe may be viewed as a German blueprint for the future shape of EU foreign and security policy. By presenting an all-encompassing view of security and stability in the Western Balkan region, Germany sought to offer wideranging solutions to Europe’s problem region based not only within the EU, but in a multilateral institutional context including the OSCE, NATO, WEU and the UN. Mirroring the Helsinki Accords of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe but using Tables instead of baskets to delineate spheres of competence and co-operation, the Fischer Plan sought to provide a medium to long-term solution to regional instability in Europe where security is viewed in the broadest possible terms and reactions to instability do not necessarily mean a predetermined military response. The Coalition Agreement between the SPD and Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen clearly stated that ‘The CFSP should be strengthened in its further development in order that it may be used

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to increase the capabilities of the EU in civilian conflict prevention and peaceful conflict management’.118 The German Presidency used the following mechanisms to upload its preferences regarding a political settlement of the Kosovo conflict to the international community. Each of these mechanisms represents typical German strategies in foreign policy which have continued to serve Germany in the post-Cold War era. ●

●

●

●

●

Ideational Export: Promoting German ideas on the EU and international level in conjunction with its key partners. Example Setting: Pledging considerable funds and resources to establishing the Stability Pact. (Pledged 1, 2 Billion DM) Co-operation between the Federal Foreign Office and the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development. Financing Conference in Brussels 29/30 March 2000 started the so-called ‘Quick Start Package’. Strengthening Co-operation: involving other international organisation to construct a web of complimentary institutions to back the Stability Pact. (EU, G-8, NATO (i.e. United States), UN, OSCE, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) etc.). Discursive influence: Emphasising the need for Europe to deal with its own backyard to establish regional stability and prosperity. Establishing European ownership of the problems facing south–eastern Europe. Exaggerated Multilateralism: Continually seeking to find multilateral solutions to international challenges, most clearly seen in facilitating Russia’s relations with Germany to find a diplomatic solution in Yugoslavia.

Bringing Russia back in – Germany’s peace diplomacy Central to the Fischer Plan and the successful conclusion of Operation Allied Force was Germany’s determination to include Russia in the settlement of the Kosovo issue. Russia’s role in the diplomatic solution was vital in influencing the Serbs of the futility of continuing their oppression of the Kosovars. Schröder was very aware of the importance of Russia in pushing for a diplomatic solution and as he outlined to the Bundestag, ‘The crisis in the Balkans should not jeopardise the good relations between Europe and Russia and Germany and Russia. Russia is an important factor in the stability and peace of our continent.’119 Germany’s role as President of the G-8 provided German policy-makers with an avenue to include Russia in diplomatic activities to bring the war to an end, especially given the sensitivities felt in Moscow over NATO’s involvement in the western Balkans.120

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Germany facilitated Russia’s involvement in the diplomatic solution by conducting bilateral discussions with Russia, as well as including Russia in the diplomatic solution to end the Kosovo War. The German Defence Minister, Rudolf Scharping visited Moscow to meet the Russian Foreign Minister Sergejew and Victor Chernomyrdin on 28th April 1999 and chaired a G-8 Special meeting on the Kosovo Crisis in Bonn on 6 May 1999. Berlin also played host to Kofi Annan and Victor Chernomyrdin (Yeltsin’s special envoy to Yugoslavia).121 Fischer also supported the inclusion of the OSCE in the Stability Pact in order to allow for the inclusion of Russia and the Ukraine in a pan-European effort to bring stability to the Balkans. Therefore, despite Russia’s stance on the Kosovo conflict, Germany was able to multilateralise its relationship with Russia whilst proving a loyal member of the alliance in Operation Allied Force. Maintaining a good working relationship with Russia was at the forefront of Germany’s calculations to end the war and forge stability across the continent. The acceptance of the ‘Petersberg Document’ negotiated by Finnish President Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin by the Yugoslav Parliament on 3 July 1999 was central to the cessation of the NATO bombing and the withdrawal of Serb militias from Kosovo and was a culmination of simultaneous military and diplomatic force being brought to bear on President Milosevic.122 Germany’s determination to forge a stronger EU-Russia relationship was also demonstrated in the agreement on the EU’s ‘Common Strategy for Russia’ in the Cologne Summit Conclusions, a policy instrument which the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty had enabled.

Domestic policy development and international up-loading of the Fischer Plan/Stability Pact The Stability Pact was conceived early 1999 during a meeting near Bonn between Foreign Minister Fischer and his State Secretaries from the Auswärtiges Amt (AA).123 Between February and April, the Stability Pact was discussed with the Bundessicherheitsrat (BSR – The Federal Security Council) before being released to the wider world.124 Discussions within the German system focused on what was achievable in the Stability Pact proposals, especially, the idea of extending the prospect of membership of the EU to the Balkan states.125 The principle of extending membership of the EU to the states of south–eastern Europe was the most significant aspect of Fischer’s proposals, and ultimately one of the Stability Pact’s most contentious issues. The proposal to extend the prospect for membership of European institutions was envisaged as a carrot and a stick, in

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the sense that by offering future pay-offs, the EU would be in a position along with other regional partners to push the south–eastern Europe region to reform fundamentally its regional political and economic systems. Fischer presented his plan to the international community at the beginning of April 1999. Germany had not engaged in any consultations on the proposal before presenting it to the Council on the 8 April 1999 in Luxembourg. The document was, therefore, greeted with surprise by Germany’s EU partners, due to the central component of Fischer’s proposals – that of offering the prospect of EU membership to the Balkan states.126 At the informal Council meeting of 14 April 1999 in Brussels (see above), the Member States agreed to call for a conference on the region’s future.127 Due the domestic and international pressure to reach a solution to the Kosovo war Germany was left with very little time to cobble together international support for its proposals.128 Fischer elaborated on his proposals in co-operation with the help of the Council’s working group on the Balkans (Coweb), with only two main preparatory meetings on 17 and 27 May 1999 scheduled before the final agreement on the pact on 10 June 1999 and the conference of foreign ministers planned for the formal inauguration of the pact on 30 July 1999.129 The Council meeting of 17 May 1999 signalled the acceptance by the EU of Fischer’s proposals for the Stability Pact by agreeing on a ‘Common Position concerning the launching of the Stability Pact of the EU on South–Eastern Europe.’130 The Common Position committed the EU to playing the leading role in reconstructing the south–eastern Europe region and working towards its integration in the West’s institutions, ‘once the Copenhagen criteria had been met.’131 Concerns were raised that there should be no automatic membership prospect built into the Pact. The concern that the Stability Pact would be fast-tracked into the EU was addressed by Fischer by insisting at the meeting to finalise the pact on 27 May 1999 at the Petersberg that there would be, ‘no short cut into European structures.’132 Reporting to the Bundestag on the results of the informal Council meeting of 15 April 1999 in Brussels, Schröder declared, ‘We want to achieve a peaceful, political solution for Kosovo.’133 Schröder also continued to struggle to maintain domestic political support for the deployment of German troops in Operation Allied Force. Germany’s role has changed since the break-up of state socialism. We cannot ignore our responsibility. Germany’s soldiers are involved in an aggressive military operation for the first time since World War II. They are carrying out an important and dangerous mission. We cannot rule out the prospect of casualties.134

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By stressing Germany’s aim to achieve a political settlement to the Kosovo conflict, Schröder was able to carry political support at home, to allow him and Fischer to pursue the Fischer Plan and the Stability Pact (Table 3.8). Without Germany’s involvement in the air attacks against Serbia, it would have been very difficult for Germany to convince its Table 3.8

The Two-level negotiation of the Fischer Plan Stability Pact/Fischer Plan

Kosovo War

Domestic level

Framing of proposals within the Federal Ministries in Berlin – contributions were invited from several departments, including the Human Rights and Humanitarian Assistance department under Gerd Poppe. Wieczoreck-Zeul also had an important role to play. Government need to prove it is making up for bombing and bringing stability and hope to the region.

Framing of German involvement in the operation in terms of Nie Wieder Völkermord statt Nie Wieder Krieg. Intensity of the imagery used intensified during the conflict to Nie Wieder Ausschwitz. Involvement was framed in terms of Germany acting as a reliable partner and having special responsibility to act in these cases due to the legacy of the World War II. Restrictions placed on the involvement by the Bundestag.

International level

Consensus building among Germany’s major allies in order to have the Fischer Plan accepted – vital to shoring up the German domestic consensus. Inclusion of the Russians in deliberations and the support of the work of Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin in reaching a diplomatic solution with Serbia – desire to involve the OSCE to have a Europe-wide solution to the problem. Use of ‘Helsinki model’ with this in mind.

Desire to put conflict prevention at the top of the list – military capabilities and Bundeswehr involvement important in light of the overwhelming support of the United States, but only as a last resort.

Stability Pact and linkages to future of EU integration as a whole – enlargement etc.

Using the Stability Pact as a blueprint for negotiations over the future of the ESDP.

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allies of the merit of its diplomatic proposals. The seriousness of the proposals which Schröder and Fischer had presented represented not merely a quick fix to the region’s problems but a long-term commitment to its future. Outlining the scope of the proposed Stability Pact, Schröder called for, ‘Comprehensive measures for the long-term stabilisation, security, democratisation and economic recovery of the region are necessary. A form of Marshall Plan for the Balkans is needed’.135 Clearly Schröder was committing to pledging political and economic capital to dealing with the problems of south–eastern Europe.

Analysing Germany’s position on the Fischer Plan/Stability Pact – reducing adaptational pressures by shaping Germany’s European neighbourhood By viewing the events and rationale behind the Fischer Plan in terms of Putnam’s two-level metaphor this chapter explains the domestic and international conditions affecting Fischer’s decisions and how Germany sought to influence its European partners to agree to such a wide-ranging proposal. The two-level metaphor will prove fruitful because Fischer, Scharping and Schröder needed to provide the conditions on the domestic level which would allow Germany to play a greater role in shaping the scope and direction of the CFSP, thereby necessitating a greater German involvement in military operations. While the domestic consensus in Germany since the end of World War II had been reluctant to sanction overseas deployment of the Bundeswehr, the Stability Pact is entirely consistent with German domestic political norms which inform the government’s foreign-policy choices. The translation of these embedded norms on the domestic level was transmitted to the EU level as a means to provide German policy-makers with policy choices which would require as little adaptation as possible as regards the domestic political climate or institutional set-up. Germany had an opportunity to influence European-level policy through the Stability Pact, whilst simultaneously forcing itself to focus on the nature and scope of its foreign and security policy. The Fischer Plan also continues to mirror German preferences for interlocking institutions meeting the wide range of German diplomatic objectives within an exaggerated multilateral framework. According to Peters, As posited by institutionalism, institutions are not mere instruments of states but are an independent factor explaining state preferences and policy strategies. Institutional embeddedness has influenced the

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definition of state preferences because it had made multilateralism a ‘causal belief’ for Germany. It has become a factor believed to be causally combined with Germany’s other fundamental foreign-policy preferences.136 This ‘causal belief’ which has impacted on German policy-making, multilateralism, has meant that even in the field of foreign and security policy, where national singularities and independence is most clung to, Germany will seek to increase political interdependence and multilateral problem-solving. The causal belief in multilateralism during the course of the 1990s has, however, meant that Germany has had more and more pressure exerted on it from its major allies to play a more active role in particularly multilateral military operations, proving that its commitment to multilateralism is indeed as embedded as it claims. Karl Lamers’ description of the effect of the Gulf war crisis in 1991 on German policy-makers as ‘cathartic’137 may not be as clear-cut as he claims. Germany did indeed come under increasing pressure to abandon its long-held policy of cheque-book diplomacy which was backed by Germany’s economic status, but the greater willingness on the part of German elites to sanction the use of the Bundeswehr overseas was an incremental process. The German participation in the bombing of Kosovo, while restricted to mainly reconnaissance duties, was for Germany, the crossing of the Rubicon, a point of no return for German policy-makers, a major critical juncture for German security policy.138 Indeed, any suggestion that Germany would shy away from its new responsibilities were refuted by the Bundeswehr’s involvement in the UN Interfet (International Force for East Timor) operation in East Timor. For those in the Bundestag who criticised the deployment in East Timor, Fischer had this to say: If we had not taken part here, the view would have circulated that the Federal Republic of Germany was retreating into Europe, that despite fully contributing in Kosovo with all our resources and in spite of the risks, that we are not prepared, however, to demonstrate solidarity and fulfil our responsibility alongside our European partners for the United Nations. This would have been the wrong decision.139 Whilst the German involvement in the bombing of Serbia represents a development in German security policy towards a more actively engaged policy in terms of Bundeswehr deployment, the development of the Fischer Plan and the desire to multilateralise the diplomatic effort

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to find a political solution to the crisis very much represented continuity in German policy, echoing the legacy of Genscher. The fact that the Fischer Plan was unveiled simultaneously in Brussels and Moscow in April 1999 shows the willingness of Fischer to involve Russia in the deliberations to find a diplomatic solution. In addition, during the German presidency of the G-8 in Cologne, the finished text was presented to the Russians on 8 June 1999 which in the view of Foreign Ministry State Secretary, Wolfgang Ischinger, provided the vital dynamic and momentum to reaching a solution to the problems of the Western Balkan region.140 The Fischer Plan marked a very visible German imprint on foreign policy within the EU by stitching together a web of institutions to work towards greater stability in the Balkans. The conceptual driving force behind Germany’s approach to debates concerning European security during its joint presidencies was to reinforce the primacy of Conflict Prevention and non-military capabilities for the future of EU foreign and security policy. The three tables of the Stability Pact deal with the following aims: ●

●

●

To promote democracy, minority rights and the advancement of civil society as a key function of peaceful and stable development; To redevelop, promote economic growth and regional co-operation with particular emphasis on the private sector and To establish security against internal and external threats. An allencompassing security concept which must include arms control confidence building measures, border security and protection from cross-border crime, and must act against the potential for violence and rearmament in parts of the region.141

The development of the Fischer Plan had as its central aspiration, ‘At the heart of the Stability Pact is an integrative approach, the goal of which is the long-term integration of all the states in south–eastern Europe into modern day Europe.’142 Mirroring the Helsinki Final Charter with its three Working Tables (instead of baskets) of Democracy and Human Rights, Regional Security, Economic Recovery and Development, the Stability Pact aimed to cover all aspects of political, military and economic affairs in the region. The Stability Pact is a prime example of the institutionalising of German preferences as means to strengthen European stability, something which Germany also demonstrated in the twin processes of EU and NATO enlargement.143 The seriousness with which Germany argued for the development of the Stability Pact and the task which faced the EU in its

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implementation were not lost on German policy-makers. Staatsminister Gunter Verheugen sought to reinforce to the Bundestag the importance of the agreed pact when he stated, ‘This Stability Pact is perhaps the greatest endeavour that we have undertaken in Europe for many years.’144 The Stability Pact was viewed within German policy-making circles as serving an important ‘Brückenfunktion’ (a bridging function) between the military conflict in Kosovo and the future integration of the region into Euro-Atlantic structures, by forging a web of European and international actors to work towards regional stability.145 Most notably, Germany worked hard to include NATO in the Pact, in order to maintain American involvement in the region. The long-term importance which Germany attributed to the pact contributed to the assertion that Germany should hold on to a large degree of influence on the development of the Stability Pact through campaigning to have Bodo Hombach (the then Chief of the Federal Chancellery) as its first Special Co-ordinator. The success of the German Presidency of EU/WEU/G-8 was its ability to construct a fragile consensus within the international community on the merits of its proposals to bring NATO’s air bombardments to an end. Most importantly, on this issue according to Vollmer, ‘The Europeans have succeeded in ironing out the failures of the past caused by the projection of national interests in the Balkans and arrived at a common position.’146 Germany’s predisposition to multilateralism and forging agreements based on long-term pay-offs was vitally important in mapping out a more hopeful future for the western Balkans. The Stability Pact outlined a German vision for the future security and stability of Europe at a time when the debates on security in Europe within NATO and the EU were being focused on military capabilities, rather than on implementing procedures to limit their need. A year after the Kosovo War, Joschka Fischer would describe the Stability Pact as a ‘prime example of conflict prevention’,147 the ultimate goal of German foreign and security policy. Germany’s government and its position on the use of force in international affairs had been put under serious adaptational pressure during the Kosovo saga. Fischer was at pains to point out the limitations of the impact of the Kosovo war on the Red/Green government’s views on the use of military force, ‘This deployment certainly marks a deep incision for our country. It was not, however, the beginning of a frivolous phase of association with military means.’148 The Stability Pact for Germany represented another tool at the disposal of the CFSP for Conflict Prevention in the hope that future scenarios for military intervention by EU forces would be reduced. Fischer was determined that the Stability Pact should end the cycle of conflict which

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Europe had witnessed during the 1990s that, ‘Europe should no longer solely get involved in the Balkans from crisis to crisis, from war to war. This region belongs to Europe. The point therefore is to highlight a European perspective for the whole of the Balkans.’149 Fischer saw his efforts to bring an end to the conflict and build towards a more stable environment in the western Balkans as a break from the policy of the Kohl administration. The decision to participate in Operation Allied Force had deeply challenged his leadership of the Greens and threatened to break-up the coalition. Fischer was convinced that he had played a positive role during the EU Presidency. In a newspaper article in autumn 1999 Fischer stated, But you must admit that in all that threatened to divide us, Germany and the Red-Green government made a clear and constructive contribution to the ending of the war. We brought Russia on board and brought the Security Council back into play. We’ve got nothing to be ashamed of. Exactly where we have had painful experiences in the past we have achieved a lot, for example the Stability Pact for the Balkans. That was a German idea.150

Conclusion: The German Council Presidency – a case of Europeanisation? Smith’s four areas of adaptation to CFSP – elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, constitutional change and public opinion – represent interesting avenues of investigation when examining domestic foreign-policy adaptation in Germany.151 Whilst the German Council presidency of 1999 equates to a mere six-month period, the Red/Green coalition came under enormous pressure not only to participate in the operation against Milosevic, but to become more active in terms of its involvement in military affairs within the EU and to co-ordinate a successful Council Presidency. This chapter argues that despite the pressures facing Germany to become more actively engaged militarily in European security policy, Germany maintained many of its foreign and security policy singularities. Germany did not suddenly become a ‘normal power’ overnight with its participation in Operation Allied Force. Rather, the Red/Green coalition sought to redefine Germany’s foreign policy to live up to the responsibilities of multilateralism and its commitment to the UN Charter. In brief, this chapter has demonstrated the following (see Table 3.9). German elites were noticeably socialised to accepting Germany’s

138 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 3.9 policy

The down-loading dynamic of Europeanisation on German foreign

German European Council and WEU Presidencies Elite socialisation

New government had little time to adjust to pressures of foreign and security policy dilemmas in the Balkans – Came to accept intervention on the basis of German ‘responsibility’ – conceptual shift.

Bureaucratic organisation

The introduction of the PSC, EUMC, EUMS has altered the form of security policy coordination and development. PSC has taken away some of the role of EUKOR from Berlin – now considerable co-ordination undertaken by Brussels PSC Ambassador (Interviews in Berlin, 2001). Bundeswehr reform

Constitutional change/ legislative adaptation

Constitutional change in the broadest sense due to the impact of the Cologne Declaration. This has also been in the context of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of 1994 to sanction the deployment of the Bundeswehr throughout the course of the 1990s.

Adaptation of public opinion

Signs that the German public moved towards acceptance of Bundeswehr involvement in EU ‘Petersberg Task’ missions – but still only if it is clear that all diplomatic avenues have been explored. Importance of a Conflict Prevention (CP) type foreign policy. With the development of the ERRF in the future, Germany’s pressing for a CP orientated ESDP approach may become all the more important in light of continued German reluctance to develop a military interventionist security policy. Minimalist vs. Maximalist approaches to CESDP/ERRF. General support for the creation of a European Army, but not a leading role within such a venture.

Key: PSC: Political Security Committee; EUMC: European Union Military Committee; EUMS: European Union Military Staff.

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responsibility to contribute to military crisis management. In terms of bureaucratic reorganisation, the Foreign Ministry continued to take the lead role in developing CFSP in its traditional role as ‘sponsoring ministry’ of the CFSP process.152 Whilst no restructuring took place during the Council Presidency, the ramifications of developing ESDP would have some impact on Germany’s CFSP policy-making in the future. Bundeswehr reform and the limited ‘Brusselisation’153 of CFSP policymaking with the introduction of new EU decision-making structures had a degree of influence over domestic institutions.154 However, during this period this influence should not be overstated in the German case, where policy directives were still primarily emanating from the AA, rather than a result of policy entrepreneurship on the part of German Ambassadors in Brussels.155 Public opinion remained committed to NATO and supportive of increased EU co-operation in the field of foreign and security policy. Public opinion, however, remained very conservative over issues of Bundeswehr deployment in crisis management. Constitutionally little changed. The role of domestic institutions in framing foreign policy did not change and the Bundestag remained the final arbiter of Bundeswehr deployment. German elites became socialised to being more responsible for regional security which set in train a push to more root and branch reform of the Bundeswehr. These pressures were developing in conjunction with a domestic reassessment of the role of the Bundeswehr on the international stage, impacting also on its perception within Germany. The developments in CFSP and Germany’s role within it were reflected in the Basic principles of German security policy which Rudolf Scharping outlined in September 1999.156 ●

●

●

●

●

The maintenance of freedom, security and prosperity for citizens and the integrity of the national territory. The consolidation and promotion of common values based on the North Atlantic Alliance to strengthen the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. Europe must take more responsibility in the strategic partnership with the United States. The deepening and widening of the integration with other European democracies in the EU. The extension of the comprehensive security order encompassing all states in Europe through the strengthening of the OSCE. World-wide respect for human rights and the rights of citizens as well as the safeguarding of peace in the world through the UN.

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Reform of the Bundeswehr to participate effectively in crisis management as part of ESDP forced Germany to speed up the pace at which reform was progressing. The streamlining of the armed forces which Scharping set in train, under the financial constraints of unified Germany also had an effect on the position of the armed forces within German society. The closing down of many barracks within Germany and the streamlining of forces to meet the demands of a greater German involvement in international operations will inevitably mean that the image of the Bundeswehr as ‘Citizens in Uniform’ in the future may not hold as much symbolic potency. The von Weiszäcker Report on the reform of the Bundeswehr also raised many questions concerning the future of the Bundeswehr in German society and its future participation in multilateral operations.157 The extent to which German policy was Europeanised during the Council Presidency was limited (see Table 3.10). The adaptational pressures which Germany faced were alleviated due to Germany’s relative success in laying down the early principles of ESDP during its Council Presidency in the first half of 1999.158 Germany was challenged by developments within NATO and the EU in a process to redefine the nature of transatlantic burden-sharing in light of experiences during Operation

Table 3.10

The up-loading dynamic of German foreign policy

Up-loading Mechanism Discursive/Ideational Influence

German Actions Centrality of CFSP for Political Union; Common European Defence as a means to strengthen the transatlantic community; Fusing WEU/EU

Institutional Export Example Setting

Stability Pact for South–Eastern Europe Commitments to the Capabilities Commitment Conference; Mixed results in forging a more effective European voice in international affairs.

Agenda Setting

Great success during the European Council/WEU presidencies of 1999; Consistently proactive with France in suggesting institutional reforms.

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Allied Force. Germany was successful in pushing for the Stability Pact and outlining the institutional blueprint for the development of ESDP as put forward in the ‘Internal reflection of WEU on European Security and Defence’.159 Up-loading German Preferences for Conflict Prevention One area in which the singularities of Germany’s foreign and security policy come to the fore is in the EU’s policy of Conflict Prevention (CP). The divergent national positions on CP expose the limits of Europeanisation in EU foreign and security policy, especially between Germany and its main partners in CFSP – France and the United Kingdom. Along with Germany’s aims to play a leading role in the CFSP alongside France and the United Kingdom in military presence, it finds itself more at ease with siding with smaller countries on the importance of non-military conflict prevention.160 The cohesiveness of the ‘big three’ as a leading coalition in CFSP/ESDP will be increased if Germany’s concerns and those of smaller EU Member States are addressed. Germany still places great emphasis on the importance of long-term relationships with its key European partners, despite the initial claims that the Schröder government would adopt a freer strategy of finding partners based on policy concerns within the EU. This emphasises the difficulties which Germany faces. Notwithstanding the challenges thrown up by developing a greater international presence in military operations, Germany continues to adopt a cautious approach to security policy in terms of military involvement. Germany’s ability to influence the course of CFSP/ESDP has always relied on its partnership with France. The legacy of this partnership and the increasing demands being placed on Germany to contribute to CFSP/ESDP will ensure the longevity of the Franco-German security partnership. The different German starting points to France and the United Kingdom in approaches to the development of ESDP can be seen in the contents of the Stability Pact for the South–Eastern Europe. While Germany is very aware of the need for the Europeans to develop military capabilities to deal with regional instability, the French and the British stress the importance of military capabilities as the basis for the stability of the continent, German policy-makers, and in particular Joschka Fischer, have stressed the need for civilian measures as contained within the Stability Pact for the South–East Balkans to create a dynamic for long-term stability in the region.161 However, there is a close relationship between civilian and military capabilities within CP

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due to the realisation that any civilian endeavour must be backed up by a credible military presence. This interconnection is perhaps the most suitable condition for the development of German ESDP policy in the coming years due to the continued weakness of the Bundeswehr and the persistent belief that military intervention is seen as the failure of diplomacy. Indeed in an interview in Die Zeit Joschka Fischer stated categorically, ‘I do not see the longing for an interventions army.’162 Fischer’s statement is borne out by the figures relating to deployment of German troops outside of the Federal Republic. The Kosovo War and the determination of the EU to build up military forces did not significantly affect the international presence of the Bundeswehr in military operations. The EU is also without doubt the most able international institution to conduct an all-encompassing strategy of CP due to the highly integrated nature of its membership in virtually all aspects of nation-state activity.163 By following a course of developing Conflict Prevention capabilities, a direction favoured by Germany, the EU would play to its strengths in the international community. In the Cologne Declaration, the Member States declared, We are convinced that to fully assume its tasks in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management the European Union must have at its disposal the appropriate capabilities and instruments. We therefore commit ourselves to further develop more effective European military capabilities from the basis of existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities and to strengthen our own capabilities for that purpose.164 Developing military capabilities in the traditional sense is an area where the EU acting then as 15 had little or no experience, as previously these fell under the rubric of the UN or NATO. The Petersberg Tasks encompassing humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking are capabilities which are designed to deal with crises if they arise. By stressing the importance of committing efforts to a medium to long-term timeframe to bringing stability and prosperity to the western Balkans region, Fischer clearly expressed a preference for crisis prevention measures which favour civilian capabilities above those from the military. Whilst Petersberg Tasks remain an important aspect of ESDP for German policy-makers, too much of an emphasis on military endeavours is considered the wrong approach for Germany, which is very much

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Germany

Civilian capabilities

Figure 3.1

UK & France

Military capabilities

Variations in National Policy preferences regarding CFSP/ESDP

determined by the domestic political climate, despite the ability of French and British policy-makers to encourage Germany to take a more active military role in European security during the 1990s.165 With the spotlight on diplomatic attempts to create a consensus for the development of European military capabilities since St. Malo and Germany’s determination to act as a Musterknabe (model pupil) for CFSP/ESDP, Fischer’s plan was a clear demonstration of German security preferences while, at the same time, still providing full support for the development of the ERRF (Figure 3.1). On the other hand, German attempts to co-ordinate defence and security policy on the European level by attempting to upload German policies as was the case with the Stability Pact. Former Foreign Ministry State Secretary von Ploetz stated in a speech in Moscow, ‘The EU’s security concept is inclusive as the proposals for the Balkans Stability Pact show: Association with – and if the preconditions are met – inclusion into the area of common rights, common security and common prosperity, the model commonly recognised as the EU.’166 Whilst the United Kingdom demonstrated its commitment to protecting human rights and conducting crisis management167 the Blair government has shown that it is not averse to using force when seeking to enforce human rights and democracy in the international community.168 On the surface Blair’s ‘doctrine of the international community’ contains many of the ideas argued by Fischer and Schröder to legitimatise Germany’s role in the Kosovo War, the Red/Green coalition remains reticent to sanction Bundeswehr deployment in all but the most severe cases. To conclude, Germany adapted successfully to the demands placed on it during the first half of 1999. By being in such an important structural

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position, Germany was able to manage its contribution in Operation Allied Force and play a leading role in bringing an end to the conflict. In addition, Germany’s ability to upload its ideas for pan-European stability and to suggest a blueprint for the future institutional structure of ESDP, allowed Germany to suggest policies and institutions it was comfortable with.

4 No Longer a ‘Reluctant Power’? Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP

If the period 1998–2000 represented the highpoint of efforts by the European Union (EU) Member States to develop Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in meaningful operational terms, the period 11 September 2001 to the present has been marked with periodical retreats from fulfilling the commitments contained within European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).1 Schröder pursued a foreign policy more characterised by his pursuit of more short-term foreign policy goals than big questions relating to German grand strategy.2 Through such a policy, Schröder was unable to provide an answer to some of the age-old foreign policy challenges facing Germany. As Hedetoft outlines, ‘Germany is a country centrally defined along a number of historical and contemporary dualisms, ambiguities, inconsistencies, riven between power and identity, between leadership and insignificance, and between different prescriptions for these predicaments’.3 Germany has become less adept in pursuing a balanced foreign and security policy on such issues as Iraq, thus complicating its traditional diplomacy of finding a middle way between European and Atlanticist views on the future of European security provision. Germany’s foreign and security policy has become more complicated at the beginning of the twenty-first century, but the Red/Green government has not as yet found a solution to the foreign policy challenges facing it.4 This chapter will examine the fall-out of Germany’s decision not to support the United States and the United Kingdom in the war in Iraq since 2003 and assess Germany’s commitment to the operationalisation of ESDP since 2003. 145

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Germany and the Iraq crisis The process of Europeanisation in German foreign and security policy has undergone a period of stagnation due in no small part to the temporary schism within the transatlantic community caused by the United States/ United Kingdom-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Serious tensions within the transatlantic community have generally not proved fertile ground to build EU military capabilities given the breadth of opinion within the EU on North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)/EU relations. Instead of galvanising an EU response, the Iraq debacle greatly complicated the emergence of ESDP. The Iraq War highlighted not only the weaknesses of European foreign policy, but also weaknesses in German foreign and security policy which have had serious consequences for Germany’s traditional role in CFSP. Differences with the United Kingdom over Iraq also threatened to compromise ESDP, witnessed in German efforts to sideline British involvement.5 The divisions over Iraq signified a lack of German influence to suggest a credible solution to transatlantic divergences. Germany was unable to influence Bush’s foreign policy on major issues resulting in a polarisation of transatlantic security between those in favour of the US’s policy on Iraq and those against.6 This has been particularly serious for Germany’s strategic position in debates over European security. As the previous chapters have illustrated, Germany’s ability to influence the development of CFSP and NATO has been grounded on a strategy of not doing anything to jeopardise transatlantic links. Germany has sought a middle way between France’s preference for Europe puissance and the United Kingdom’s transatlantic calling, despite its occasional flirtation with European initiatives. Schröder compromised his ability to balance these two positions, thereby weakening his influence in multilateral structures and outlining a more noticeable German position in international affairs. This is characterised within the literature as representing a stand-off between Europeanisation versus Renationalisation/Normalisation.7 This imbalance was further complicated by EU enlargement, with foreign policy divisions in the EU drawn between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Member States.8 It is ironic that with this the role of the balancer of transatlantic and Europeanist visions of security provision may now fall to the United Kingdom, who has maintained its traditional transatlantic commitments and been in the vanguard of pressing of improved European military capabilities.9 Germany’s foreign and security policy was deeply affected by the preexisting latent transatlantic differences which have been painfully

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uncovered by the Iraq issue.10 The war in Iraq also exposed major differences on both sides on the Atlantic concerning how best to tackle international terrorism after the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001. The cohesive effect of transatlantic sympathy and solidarity with the United States following the attacks, soon dissipated when differences over strategy and tactics to combat terrorism emerged.11 Germany’s success in foreign policy has been in fostering developments within NATO and the EU which were mutually reinforcing, rather than encouraging differing trajectories and agendas on both sides of the Atlantic. Schröder’s position on the war in Iraq greatly undermined his ability to influence American foreign policy at a stage when NATO and the EU are continuing to adapt to life according to the Berlin Plus agreements of 1999.12 By explicitly stating German preferences during the run-up to the Iraq War, Schröder departed from traditional German practice in foreign policy of not broadcasting differences when they occur, thus exposing the German position to scrutiny.13 Germany sought to avoid being isolated on Iraq and the debate on European security by pressing ahead with co-operation with France, Luxembourg and Belgium, signalled by a summit on 24 April 2003. According to this group of four, the break-down in transatlantic consensus on the major foreign policy issue on the agenda necessitated a new impulse for the creation of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) under the European Constitution.14 The ‘visionary’ for the idea of the ESDU was Eckhart Lübkemeier, formerly of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, but more recently in the Auswärtiges Amt (AA) and the Kanzleramt.15 The ESDU called for ‘speedy and far-reaching advances in the strengthening of co-operation in the area of defence’.16 According to the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the so-called ‘Pralinegipfel – chocolate summit’ represented a risky strategy of forging ahead with co-operation among a small group and bore the displeasure of the majority of the Member States who did not attend.17 Schröder’s decision to take part in the Pralinegipfel sidelined not only Foreign Minister Fischer, but also sidelined Germany. Germany’s ability to influence the development of CFSP in the 1990s was founded on its ability to find partners to work with (normally France), but without prejudicing Germany’s aim of finding agreement within the EU as a whole. Schweiger suggests that the break-down in British–German relations over Iraq heaped more pressure on German foreign policy, in addition to the transatlantic tensions between Washington and Berlin.18 Schweiger asserts that Germany’s poor relations with the United Kingdom in the immediate aftermath of the Iraq debacle made Germany more reliant on

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France, which due to Germany’s poor economic climate had the effect of demoting Germany to a junior role in the Franco-German tandem. Tensions between the United Kingdom and Germany caused by Iraq only began to be resolved with the advent of the Grand Coalition government in 2005. In general, tensions within the EU-triumvirate of France, Germany and the United Kingdom are rarely far from the surface. It is one of the main successes of the EU integration project that whilst these tensions do exist, the highly institutionalised relations between EU Member States help ensure that sporadic disagreements on foreign policy have limited long-term impact. Germany’s failure to force greater EU co-operation in the field of ESDP during the Iraq crisis reinforced the sensitivities within the EU over NATO and the United States’ role in European security. The Iraq controversy caused great difficulties between Washington and Berlin, but Schröder’s commitment to sending German troops to stabilise Afghanistan was an attempt to repair relations with Washington and to rebalance relations after the polarising debates over the Iraq war. On taking office, Chancellor Merkel remained committed to deploying the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan. Germany has proved a major player in the stabilisation of Afghanistan despite criticisms from some NATO partners over the German government’s reluctance to deploy troops in the more dangerous southern regions of Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains Germany’s most significant military deployment – Germany’s contribution stands at 3,000 troops. Germany’s role in Afghanistan underpins Germany’s commitment to NATO and transatlantic relations and reinforces the primacy of NATO for large scale military deployments. In contrast, ESDP remains too limited to deploy troops in such challenging operations.

Germany and the Common Foreign and Security Policy under the Grand Coalition in Germany The Federal Election of September 2005 did not produce a clear-cut result. Angela Merkel managed to move from a position of strength in the pre-election opinion polls to being forced to form a coalition government with the Social Democratic Party (SPD). For only the second time in the history of the Federal Republic the two main parties (Christian Democratic Union (CDU-SPD)) agreed to govern together.19 German foreign and security policy under the Red/Green government was characterised by a lack of clear direction and a marked cooling of relations with the United States and other Atlanticist EU Member States.

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At the same time, however, the EU has taken significant steps to develop the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), culminating in a number of deployments of EU forces in the Balkans and Africa. This chapter will analyse the impact of the development of the ESDP on Grand Coalition foreign and security policy and assess the nature of German foreign policy under Chancellor Merkel. Whilst Germany has been a consistent supporter of developing CFSP, the development of EU foreign policy presents Germany with a dual challenge: how can CFSP be advanced in an EU of 25 Member States and to what extent can Germany live up to the demands of leadership in CFSP which a more active EU foreign and security policy demands. Germany’s participation in the European Union Force Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD) mission in the Congo highlighted many of the challenges facing German CFSP policy which the grand Coalition must address. German foreign policy went through a number of substantial changes under the Red/Green government. Most significant was Germany’s participation in the NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 and, stemming from this, the decision to finally address the EU’s lack of autonomous military capabilities which the Franco-British agreement at St Malo in December 1998 facilitated. Germany’s foreign policy under the Red/Green coalition was characterised by Fischer’s grand narratives reinterpreting German history as a spur to action rather than standing in the way of German intervention in crisis management. However, as Schröder continued in office, the influence of the Chancellery grew which witnessed more adhockery in foreign policy decision-making rather than the traditional longer-term policy assessments of the Foreign Ministry. Germany no longer acted as a ‘reluctant power’,20 but underwent what Haftendorn has referred to as Germany’s ‘coming of age’ in foreign and security policy.21 Schröder’s well-documented assertion of a more self-confident Germany in international affairs had the potential to help reduce the historical burdens which had constrained Germany’s scope for action on the international stage.22 However, Schröder’s self-confidence was expressed in his public rejection of George W. Bush’s plans to invade Iraq during the run-up to the 2002 Federal Elections. Through distancing Germany from America’s foreign policy position and actively allying with France and Russia against Bush’s plans, Schröder rejected one of the central tenets of German foreign policy since 1949 – that Germany should always seek to balance European and transatlantic interests. Schröder’s premature rejection of American foreign policy left Germany isolated and without influence, playing second fiddle to France and

150 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Russia in the diplomatic fall-out in the United Nations (UN). By failing to outline a more balanced position, Germany forfeited its usual position in the centre ground of opinion in the EU. Stephen Szabo claims that Schröder’s foreign policy stance reinforced ‘parting ways’23 between the United States and Germany on foreign policy and contributed to a break-down in co-operation on foreign policy issues between Member States within theEU. Szabo’s assertion is overstated, as this chapter will demonstrate, that the poor quality of Berlin-Washington relations during the Red/Green government has, to a large extent, been mended. The fall-out within the EU over the Iraq issue highlighted the dualchallenge facing Germany with regards to the CFSP. First, in an EU of 27 states the challenge of forging a common foreign policy has become more difficult. Hopes for the emergence of a European strategic culture have become more complicated as the diversity of views and foreign policy traditions has grown.24 Second, with such heterogeneity of views on security policy the need for a lead-group of nations to give direction and order and capabilities to ESDP has become more pressing. This presents Germany with a significant challenge. Despite the major steps forward which German foreign policy has taken since 1998/1999, there are significant obstacles still facing Germany which it must overcome in order to be able to grow into a leadership role in CFSP. This dual-challenge has become all the more pressing as demands for a more active EU role in international affairs and crisis management grows. Much of these dynamics can be captured in the concept of Europeanisation which examines both German influence on EU policy and the adaptational pressures on German policy stemming from the development of the ESDP. This chapter will now move to examine the Grand Coalition’s policy on CFSP, in particular, Germany’s role in the EU’s response to the call by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to support United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo in their efforts to secure free and fair elections in the summer of 2006. The debate which took place on the national level highlights many of the enduring obstacles hindering Germany’s participation in the CFSP. The debate which marked Germany’s decision to participate in EUFOR RD Congo also uncovers the wider issues relating to current discussions on the Weißbuch 2006 which outlines Germany’s national security strategy for the years to come. This chapter stresses the aspects of continuity and change in German foreign policy with the advent of the Grand Coalition since 2005. This chapter asserts that Grand Coalition foreign and security policy has witnessed a return to

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 151

the traditional German balancing of Europeanist and Transatlantic interests and a further embedding of Germany’s more global and interventionist foreign policy highlighted in the publishing of Germany’s 2006 White Paper on Defence policy.

Germany’s role in the development of CFSP As outlined above, Germany has been a leading player in the CFSP since its inception in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). As a strong supporter of European integration and multilateralism more broadly, the CFSP has been an important policy tool for German policy-makers since unification. Despite this, two dynamics have characterised Germany’s involvement in EU foreign policy. First, notwithstanding Germany’s generally pro-European outlook, there remain significant brakes on root and branch Europeanisation of German foreign and security policy. Second, Germany has yet to exert enough influence on the CFSP to truly say that Germany has definitively shaped policy – especially on the more contentious aspects of the EU’s international engagement.25 The reasons for the brakes on German participation in the CFSP fall into mainly structural factors relating to Germany’s institutional set-up in government and in the Bundeswehr and the relative stickiness of traditional strategic culture in the wider polity. Germany has dragged its feet in adapting to the new realities and responsibilities involved in playing a leading role in a more internationally engaged EU. However, Germany has not undergone de-Europeanisation.26 The advent of the Grand Coalition has witnessed greater pressure on the EU to play an increased role in international peacekeeping (Lebanon and the Congo). This has forced the German government to reconsider existing reservations concerning the scale and geographical scope of German international military deployments. Responsibility to play a leading role within the EU and an attempt to define Germany’s interests in foreign policy more clearly have been a hallmark of the discourse of the new German government. Germany’s contribution to EU military forces within the ESDP is nonetheless significant. Germany’s force commitment to the European Rapid Reaction Force (EPRRF) is approximately 18,000 troops and Germany is involved in four of the thirteen EU Battlegroups currently under construction. Yet taken in conjunction with Germany’s other commitments to the NATO Response Force (NRF), UN peacekeeping and forces designated for territorial defence, fears exist within the political establishment that Germany’s armed forces are approaching overstretch.

152 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 4.1

German Defence Spending as per cent of GDP27

Year

Defence Budget (As % of GDP)

1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

3.0 2.1 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4

Table 4.2

German Defence Budgets28

Year

Defence Budget (Millions DM & €)

1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

58650DM 68376DM 58986DM 59758DM 59943DM 31168€ 31060€ 30610€ 30435€

The transformation of the Bundeswehr currently in full swing is a means to address Germany’s responsibility to play a larger role in military crisis management. Yet, with a Bundeswehr which is significantly underinvested in (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2), Germany will continue to face limits on the effectiveness of its armed forces and run the risk of being left behind in the never-ending Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). At 2005 levels, Germany lags behind France with 2.5 per cent GDP and the United Kingdom with 2.3 per cent GDP investment in defence budgets.

Current German force planning The German armed forces have undergone considerable transformation since unification. The speed of this transformation has increased as more demands have been placed on Germany to play a greater role in crisis management. Germany’s Armed Forces face a number of challenges.

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 153

The emergence of new forms of conflict makes the traditional tenets and organisational principles of armed forces in Europe largely redundant. Germany no longer lives under the threat of imminent Soviet invasion or a military threat in the conventional sense. Threats have fundamentally changed. The German Weißbuch 2006 outlines terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, failing states and organised crime as the main threats facing Germany which the German Armed Forces must address. These are a very different set of challenges than in the Cold War era and thus demand different responses and capabilities to address them. Germany must now face the challenge of nation-building across the globe. Afghanistan is the best example of German military involvement to secure the fledgling post-Taliban regime. Germany has also been involved in lower level activities as part of EU efforts to support elections in the Congo. From the upper end of the scale of military involvement in Afghanistan, to a more conventional peace-keeping role in the Congo, German troops currently have to develop a range of skills and experience which more interventionist countries such as France and the United Kingdom have had considerable familiarity. The EU’s intervention in the Congo or the EU’s military deployments in the Balkans are examples where the German armed forces have had to adapt to semipolicing functions, rather than full battle readiness. The transformation of the German armed forces takes place within the wider context of the RMA, in which technical innovation sets a relentless pace. If Germany is to play an active role in crisis management alongside its closest allies, it will need to ensure interoperability with other armed forces working in multinational units. According to Meiers, ‘the German armed forces remain, for the foreseeable future, the least deployable of NATO and EU leading powers’.29 This is further hampered by the fact that Germany’s defence budget has declined since the end of the Cold War, a trend witnessed across most of the West. However, the modernisation of the Bundeswehr requires funding at a time when the Federal government coffers are under pressure from distinctly average economic performance. Armed forces are a tool of national governments and parliaments to pursue foreign policy goals and to ensure the territorial integrity of the nation state. The radical transformation that the Bundeswehr has undergone aims at improving capabilities across the whole spectrum of operational deployment – making the Bundeswehr better at doing whatever it is called upon to do in the name of Germany. Germany’s crisis management commitments to NATO, the EU and the UN are as follows. For the NRF Germany has pledged 15,000 troops.

154 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

To the ERRF (including Germany’s commitments to Battlegroups), Germany has committed 18,000 troops. Finally, Germany has 1,000 troops on stand-by for the UN under the UN Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS). In order to meet these commitments, the Bundeswehr is split into three main divisions. 35,000 troops are signposted as Response Forces which are trained for high intensity warfare. Developing these sorts of troops has been perhaps the greatest challenge for Germany, not only logistically in the military realm, but also within the wider political culture which is only now beginning to accept greater German overseas military deployments. A second tranche is designated as stabilisation forces which can contribute to such tasks as nation-building. The number of stabilisation forces currently stands at approximately 70,000 troops. Finally, Support Forces of approximately 147,500 troops are designated to fulfil support functions for Response Forces and Stabilisation Forces, such demands as policing and command and control (see Table 4.3 for overall numbers). With events not standing still during the transformation process, the Bundeswehr has had to adapt and learn through its experiences alongside NATO and EU Member States. The call for EU support of MONUC forces in the Congo presented Germany with a new challenge, not only in terms of deploying troops on the ground but in undertaking operational leadership of the EUFOR RD Congo. The debate over Germany’s involvement in the proposed EU mission highlighted concerns that Germany was being drawn into too many overseas military deployments without adequate resourcing of the Bundeswehr, or with a clear strategy for such deployments within wider German foreign policy. It is to this debate which we will now turn.

Table 4.3

German armed forces personnel30

Year

Armed Forces Personnel (Thousands)

1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

495,000 545,000 352,000 319,000 306,000 295,000 271,000 255,000 254,00031

Table 4.4

German overseas military deployments at time of EUFOR RD Congo mission in 2006 Strength of German forces operationally deployed overseas Total: 7,674

ISAF Afghanistan Uzbekistan

KFOR Kosovo

EUFOR Bosnia and Herzegovina

UNMIS Sudan

AMIS Sudan

UNOMIG Georgia

UNMEE Ethiopia Eritrea

OEF Horn of Africa

EUFOR RD CONGO Congo Gabon

OAE Mediterranean

Troops stationed in Germany for the medical evacuation of troops (STRATAIRMEDEVAC)

2.756

2.890

881

36

0

12

2

262

770

23

42

Of which women

114

121

55

0

0

0

0

16

38







Of which reservists

244

191

84

1

0

0

0

6

17







Of which FWDL*

137

338

70

0

0

0

0

31

16







Total

Note: *Freiwillig zusätzliche Wehrdienst Leistende (Volunteer Conscripts)

156 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Debating Germany’s participation in EUFOR RD Congo The debate over Germany’s involvement in the EUFOR RD Congo illustrates the singularities of Germany’s participation in the emerging ESDP (Table 4.4). The political debate within Germany underlined the challenges which ESDP presents Germany to deploy in regions where Germany has little past experience. In addition, the realities of leadership in ESDP were reinforced, particularly in terms of the reluctance of many of the EU member states to participate in the Congo mission. In terms of Europeanisation, the domestic debate signalled that German political elites overwhelmingly accept the ESDP and Germany’s responsibilities within it. The limitations in downloading are most evident in the modest levels of institutional adaptation in Germany, rather than as a result of insufficient socialisation to the rationale of closer EU cooperation in security and defence. Institutional adaptation will remain modest as long as ESDP remains a modest enterprise. Uploading is an area where Germany has become less sure-footed. The German government found it difficult to forge a coalition of willing participants in the Congo mission. In addition, the split command of the EUFOR between German operational command in Geltow and French field command in the Congo/Gabon was not efficient. As has been demonstrated in previous chapters, German uploading in terms of institutional export is an area in which Germany has been very influential. However, it is the operationalisation of such institutional structures within ESDP that has placed significant adaptational pressures on German policy and limited Germany’s ability to influence the emergence of ESDP. Germany has been a major player in the operationalisation of ESDP since 2003, (see Table 4.5). More than ever, the role of the EU in widening the geographical scope of Germany’s foreign policy is discernable. During the Cold War European Political Co-operation (EPC) allowed West Germany to develop its foreign policy without fear of being criticised for unilateral action. Nowadays, CFSP enables Germany to feel its way towards a greater leadership role in foreign policy, as part of a multilateral EU endeavour. The development of CFSP has been a stated aim of the Red/Green government and the Grand Coalition. Therefore, as the EU has operationalised ESDP and the range of activities which it has become involved in has increased, Germany has been fully behind this process.32 Of particular note was the EU’s mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo during 2006, a mission which would have been unthinkable for Germany without EU co-operation.

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 157 Table 4.5

Current and past ESDP Missions

EU ESDP Missions EUPM (Bosnia – Herzegovina) EUPOL Proxima (FYROM, 2004–2005) EUPAT (FYROM) CONCORDIA (FYROM) March–December 2003 EUFOR ALTHEA (BiH) EUPT Kosovo AMIS II Assistance (Sudan/Darfur) EUSEC DR Congo  EUSEC-FIN EUPOL Kinshasa (DR Congo) ARTEMIS (DR-Congo) June–September 2003 EUJUST THEMIS (Georgia) 2004–2005 AMM Monitoring Mission (Aceh/Indonesia) EUJUST-LEX (Iraq/Brussels) EUBAM Rafah (Palestinian Territories) EUFOR CONGO (DR Congo) EUPOL COPPS (Palestinian Territories)

To this point, the EU has conducted, or is in the process of conducting, 16 missions within the framework of CFSP, only four of which can be described as purely civilian deployments. In the most significant missions to date, Germany has been at the forefront in both the command of operations and in terms of deploying substantial troop numbers. For example, Germany’s contribution to Operation Concordia in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) was a quarter of all EU troops. Germany also has a prominent role in Operation Althea in BosniaHerzegovina deploying around 900 troops to the 6,000 strong force composed of 32 different countries. In the first half of 2007, Germany held the position of COMEUFOR, Commander of EU forces, under RearAdmiral Hans-Jochen Witthauer. Concordia, Althea and EUFOR RD Congo are the most significant deployments of EU forces to date, but they remain firmly within the lower scale of Petersberg operations, rather than high intensity crisis management. Due to their limited nature, there exists overwhelming support within the Bundestag for Germany’s involvement in such operations. However, unquestioning parliamentary assent for the deployment of the Bundeswehr is still not considered a given. The new global role of the Bundeswehr, which the Defence White Paper 2006 underscored, is something which ordinary Germans have yet to become fully accustomed to.

158 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Germany’s involvement in ESDP missions has passed off without major incident or loss of life. The modest scope of ESDP missions to date has ensured that EU and German forces have not been involved in high intensity military operations. NATO remains the preferred institution for high intensity operations, such as have been witnessed in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, Germany’s involvement in ESDP must be considered a learning experience both in terms of developing ESDP and in terms of expanding the role of the Bundeswehr in crisis management and conflict prevention across the globe. Part of this learning process has been the deployment of the German armed forces in areas where Germany has had little experience or a clear sense of the German national interest for being involved. These issues were central to the debate over Germany’s involvement in EUFOR RD Congo in 2006. As this chapter will demonstrate, the limits of Europeanisation in the German case become most apparent in cases of the deployment of the Bundeswehr within ESDP. The debate over the EU’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo laid bare ESDP’s limitations and helps explain why ESDP continues to exert relatively modest adaptational pressure on the foreign and security policy of EU Member States. As such, EUFOR RD Congo did not mark an acceleration of Europeanisation in the case of Germany. Germany conducted a rather protracted domestic debate on whether the Bundeswehr should participate in the EUFOR mission in the Congo. Whilst the Bundestag eventually consented to the government’s intention to send German troops to the Congo, the parliamentary debate uncovered many of the continuing singularities of German foreign and security policy. Germany’s role in forging a coalition of EU Member States to participate in the mission not only reinforced Germany’s leadership role in ESDP, but also underlined the challenges of the leadership for Germany within the EU. The German government’s position on participation in EUFOR RD Congo was characterised largely by reluctance, but this was tempered by a clear sense of Germany’s new responsibility alongside the United Kingdom and France to bolster ESDP. Kofi Annan’s call for the EU to support UN troops in the Congo presented German policy-makers with a major challenge. Annan’s request caught the German Foreign Ministry by surprise33 and the subsequent debate over whether Germany should participate in an EU mission to support MONUC raised a number of key issues central to Germany’s growing role in military crisis management. The debate made clear that the governing coalition and the opposition Greens now accept Germany’s responsibility to share the burden of the EU’s

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 159

new responsibilities for crisis management across the globe. Second, the debate highlighted the pressures facing the Bundeswehr in terms of resources and the relative inexperience of conducting crisis management operations, particularly in Africa. Much of the criticism of the government’s position by German politicians centred on lack of resources and the fear of overstretch of German forces. Third, Germany’s participation in the Congo mission marked a demonstration of the Grand Coalition’s new engagement with African affairs. No longer will military involvement in Africa be considered a taboo. Finally, the leadership role of the mission which Germany has undertaken has reinforced the new demands which Germany faces to ensure an effective EU security and defence policy in the twenty-first century. Participation in the Congo mission also reinforced the Franco-German partnership amid concerns in Paris that Angela Merkel had gone too far towards the United States in trying to repair relations with Washington. In the wake of calls for an EU presence in the Congo, Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung outlined Germany’s responsibility to participate in any EU deployment.34 This sparked an intense debate within Germany and between Germany and other EU Member States during which the Defence Minister’s position changed several times as Germany’s role in the mission grew. Jung’s reservations on a German deployment centred on lack of financial resources to fund the increasing scope of Bundeswehr deployments across the globe (notably in Afghanistan).35 In addition, the fear that the Bundeswehr lacked the necessary experience to deploy in the continent of Africa and concerns that the armed forces were reaching the limits of the number of troops available for international crisis management – the issue of overstretch – featured heavily in the domestic debate.36 As a result of these concerns Jung made it clear that he did not envisage a German leadership role in any EU mission to the Congo.37 According to Die Welt, French President Jacques Chirac had sympathy with this position, but it soon became clear that France, after leading Operation Artemis in the Congo in 2003, did not want to undertake operational leadership of a mission in 2006.38 In addition, France was initially reluctant to commit substantial numbers to the EU force, expecting Germany to make up the shortfall.39 With France expecting Germany to take the lead on the mission, severe pressure was exerted on Germany within the EU to take responsibility. The Franco-German tandem was central to preparations for the EUFOR RD Congo. Once the prospect of an EU mission was tabled, France and Germany sought to co-ordinate their positions during initial discussions at a Franco-German meeting in Paris on 23 January 2006.

160 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Franco-German co-operation became all the more important once the United Kingdom declined to participate in the mission citing military overstretch and the inadequate language ability of their troops (something which also concerned German military planners). Reinforcing the Franco-German tandem in this way was a calculated attempt to reassure the French government that Merkel’s efforts to repair relations with Washington would not be to the detriment of Berlin–Paris relations. By early-to-mid February the scope of German involvement in the possible EU mission was taking shape. At a meeting of the Bundestag Defence Committee, Jung informed the committee members of his intentions to send 300–500 troops, none of which would be front-line forces and two-thirds of which would be stationed outside of the Congo.40 Whilst Jung stated that Germany would match France’s force contribution to the mission, he informed the Defence Committee that Germany would not deploy frontline armed forces. Further to this, at a NATO Defence Ministers’ meeting in Sicily the next day, Jung restated that Germany would not take the lead on the EU mission in Congo.41 With broad agreement on the mission being taken in mid-February by EU foreign ministers, France and Germany were under pressure to accept the leadership role for the mission.42 As the leadership question avoided resolution, EU foreign ministers raised the prospect of more than one member state leading the mission. Nevertheless, it was hoped that Germany would provide the multinational operational headquarters for the mission at Geltow near Potsdam.43 As it emerged that Germany could not longer avoid taking on some leadership responsibility for the mission, the German government began setting out preconditions for German involvement. Chancellor Merkel demanded a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate, the agreement of the Congolese government for the stationing of EU troops in the country, that the EU force should be made up from a wide crosssection of EU Member States, and a clear decision that the deployment would be strictly limited to the capital Kinshasa.44 Merkel was clear that she would not agree to Germany’s involvement in the mission unless all of the conditions she outlined were put in place. As Germany’s position developed the domestic debate heated up with a significant number of leading German MPs signalling their disquiet over the operational planning. On the EU level, discussions on the composition of the force were slow, with few countries committing substantial amounts of troops, leaving German policy-makers feeling that undue expectations were being placed on them. Uncertainty also emerged concerning the rules of engagement for a possible force which

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 161

was expressed by former Defence Minister Struck (SPD).45 Domestic criticisms of EU planning added to the pressure on the Grand Coalition with the foreign policy spokesman of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), Werner Hoyer, describing the EU-level preparations as ‘catastrophic’.46 Despite Franco-German co-operation on the issue, Germany’s traditional concern of ensuring as wide as possible support within the EU for foreign policy actions reinforced concerns of Germany shouldering too much of the costs of conducting the mission and lacking wide material support from among the other EU states. With little headway being made on the EU-level by Javier Solana, the High Representative for the CFSP, Solana recommended that Germany take the lead in negotiations over the make-up of the EU force.47 With this in mind Foreign Minister Steinmeier arranged a meeting of EU states committed to the Congo mission on 20 March in Berlin.48 Mid-March also saw the beginnings of formal debates within the Bundestag on the deployment of German troops to participate in the EU mission. Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Defence Minister Jung called for German involvement in the proposed EU force to secure fair and free elections, emphasising the importance of the elections for the development of the central African region. In addition, Jung outlined that a peaceful region would reduce the problem of refugees49 and stability in an area rich in natural resources would be good for the German economy.50 After the force contribution meeting on 20 March, Germany declared its intention to lead the EU mission in Congo on the 21 March. The decision was welcomed by the majority opinion in the governing coalition parties and the Greens, but received hefty criticism from the Left and the FDP.

Nature of the opposition to the Grand Coalition’s plans Opposition to the government’s plans to lead the proposed EU mission in the Congo came from within all the major political parties. With the constitutionally enshrined right of the Bundestag to vote on all overseas deployments of the Bundeswehr, the party political debate on the merits of Germany’s contribution decided Germany’s role. The FDP and the Linkspartei overwhelmingly rejected the government’s intentions, while in the governing SPD and the Union, there were substantial misgivings about the mission and Germany’s role in it, particularly within the Christian Social Union (CSU).The FDP was the most vociferous opponents of Germany’s role in the EUFOR RD Congo. Franz-Josef Jung’s clear statements in January and February 2006 that Germany would not undertake leadership of the mission were a broken promise in the view

162 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

of the FDP.51 The FDP’s Defence spokesperson Birgit Homburger asserted that the EU force would not prove a deterrent with most of the force held in reserve outside of the Congo in Gabon. Homburger also raised concerns of the German leadership role despite actual French military leadership in the field. For Homburger the EU mission was half-hearted and had the potential to be inadequate for the stabilisation of the political situation within the Democratic Republic of Congo in order to allow elections to go ahead. Homburger was also quick to criticise Merkel for her premature decision to allow Germany to be drawn into the mission by France.52 The Linkspartei (Party of the Left, which formed as a result of the merger between the PDS and disaffected former SPD members) argued for the sending of civilian election observers rather than the militarisation of the EU mission. The Linkspartei also repeated its call for a reduction of the Bundeswehr to 100,000 personnel and the reallocation of the saved budget to fund other projects.53 Opposition within the SPD emerged primarily from the Seeheimerkreis, the right wing of the party. Their spokesman, Johannes Kahrs, was very vocal in opposition the government’s plans for several reasons. Kahrs’s opposition centred on his concerns of ‘mission-creep’ which would see the Bundeswehr mired in Congo for a considerable period. Kahrs also doubted the efficacy of the mission in terms of the overall goal of securing a lasting peace and stabile political system for the Congolese.54 Along these lines, the Defence Policy spokesman of the SPD Bundestag group disputed the sense of confining the operation to the capital Kinshasa.55 The Union witnessed a split between the two sister parties – the CDU and the CSU. Whilst the CDU was largely positive about plans for German involvement in the EU mission in Congo, the CSU was initially sceptical, with Bavarian Prime Minister, Edmund Stoiber refusing to sanction the mission in the initial stages of the debate. Opposition to the Congo deployment ebbed away once the government had its conditions for involvement accepted on the EU level. Merkel’s preference for a minimalist EU deployment sat well with concerns of the CDU/CSU who expressed concerns about possible mission-creep. Whilst supportive of Germany’s role in the EU mission the Greens criticised the planning of the mission on the EU and the lack of information given to the Bundestag.56 The Greens also questioned the sense of confining the EU mission to Kinshasa, most prominently Bundestag members Winfried Nachtwei and Hans-Christian Ströbele.57 For the Greens, support of German participation in the EUFOR RD Congo was a clear signal of the party’s embedded commitment to a more active

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 163

German foreign and security policy and continued commitment to building CFSP/ESDP, a position which was established during the Greens’ time in office in the period 1998–2005. Members of the Bundeswehr were also a source of criticism of the government during the debate over Germany’s contribution to the EU mission, which lingered on even after troops were deployed in Africa. Criticism focused on the perceived lack of planning on the EU-level for the mission and the under-resource of German troops. Leading the criticism was Bernhard Gertz, head of the Bundeswehrverband (the Armed Forces Association which represents the interests of German soldiers). In late March, once the mission was beginning to take shape and Germany’s leadership was assured, Gertz stated that the mission was, ‘pure show, that wasn’t worth risking the lives of soldiers’.58 The final tally of 780 Bundeswehr soldiers made up of 500 regular soldiers and 280 support personnel was almost double the number outlined initially by Jung, further adding to the appearance of poor planning on the EU level. Perhaps most significant of all was a leaked memo from the Policy Planning Section of the Defence Ministry written during the run-up to the German deployment which questioned whether Germany had any interest in intervening in Africa. The German Armed Forces remain largely cautious of any growing international role, which is accentuated by dissatisfaction with the level of investment designated for the Bundeswehr.

The European Union level Uploading aspects of Europeanisation are not clearly discernible in the planning of the EUFOR RD Congo. The German government found it very difficult to influence the initial decision-making process in Brussels and German efforts mainly revolved around ensuring that the German position and commitment to the mission did not leave Germany isolated. It was only after agreement had been struck on the leadership of the mission that Germany was able to exert influence on the scope and details of the operation. German domestic constraints highlighted in the debates in the Bundestag shaped government policy on the terms of Bundeswehr deployment and the duration of the mission which were then transferred to the EU level. Given the concerns of many German politicians and the Bundeswehr itself of deploying in the African continent, German operational leadership of the mission facilitated greater German agenda-setting on how the mission should run, along lines acceptable to the German polity. It was only through Germany’s

164 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

commitment to the mission and example-setting by pledging to contribute the most forces to the EUFOR that German ideational influence on the nature of the mission became possible. Germany’s leadership role in EUFOR RD Congo reinforced not only the difficulties of planning an ESDP mission, but also brought home, to Jung in particular, the political realities of playing a leadership role in international crisis management. Of particular relevance in this regard was the role played by the High Representative Javier Solana and his interplay with national capitals. Defence Minister Jung fell out with Solana because Jung felt that Solana’s open call for a German-led mission lacked the necessary logistical preparation. Jung was also aggrieved that Solana could not secure enough military commitments from EU Member States. Solana and Jung also differed on the operational remit of the mission. Whilst Jung and the majority opinion in the government and Bundestag called for a minimalist deployment solely in the capital, Solana did not rule out deploying troops throughout the country where they were needed. The fall-out between Jung and Solana is a part of well-covered arguments within the EU’s foreign and security policy architecture concerning where power and responsibility lie. Solana’s aim to expand the EU’s foreign and security policy profile clashed with national positions which were largely cautious to become embroiled in the Congo. Solana’s inability to cajole EU Member States to commit to the EU mission lead him to pressurise Germany to take the lead on planning the mission. The Council of Ministers’ decision of 27 April 2006 to conduct the Congo mission effectively put Germany in the driving seat once the Bundestag’s assent had been secured by the Federal Government. The EU had taken three months to plan for a small deployment of forces to support an existing UN mission in the Congo – this did not showcase an emerging and decisive international military actor. The haggling over the leadership of EUFOR RD Congo did not paint the United Kingdom, France and Germany in a good light. The United Kingdom’s decision not to participate, France’s initial reluctance and Germany’s protracted process of agreeing the deployment did not instil the mission with the leadership demanded of the directoire if ESDP is to be a success. With NATO regaining prominence due to its mission in Afghanistan and the ESDP heavily committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EU countries committed to stabilising Afghanistan and the Balkans may be less likely to consider embarking on further ESDP missions for the time being.

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 165

The Pressures of Leadership in ESDP Germany’s role as operational leader of EUFOR DR Congo underlined Berlin’s dual-challenge in the emerging ESDP. The cabinet’s decision to endorse the call for German participation in the mission was taken on 17 May 2006. An amount of 56 million Euros was allocated to cover the cost of the mission.59 Germany was forced into playing the lead role in composing the force through encouraging participation from EU-allies and rallying support for the mission. At the same time, the government in Berlin had to face the realities of Germany’s increased international role. Germany will be able to draw many lessons from the experience of leading an ESDP mission for the first time. The deployment of German forces under an EU flag in Africa is also a sign of greater EU and German commitment to play a more prominent role in African affairs. Continued reluctance within the Bundeswehr to deploy in Africa will take some time to abate, especially if German troops are drawn into higher intensity missions. Germany’s foreign policy rhetoric remains reserved. Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s description of Germany’s ‘self-confident modesty’ set the tone of Grand Coalition foreign policy. This has been in evidence in the EU3’s attempts to negotiate with Iran. However, given the growing demands of leadership within CFSP, a narrow directoire of France, the United Kingdom and Germany may no longer be enough to fulfil the EU’s newfound responsibilities, especially in light of existing commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans and in Africa. Relaxing the exclusivity of the ESDP directoire to include Spain, Italy and potentially Poland may in the short-term restrict the dominance of the EU3. In the longer term, however, drawing in more stakeholders to the CFSP/ESDP could greatly reduce the leadership burden of the big three in ESDP missions. Wider foreign policy issues As something of a foreign policy novice, Merkel has been surprisingly well received for her engagement in international affairs. Clearly attempts to reduce tensions between Washington and Berlin will leave more space for improved relations between Germany, the United Kingdom and other transatlantic-leaning EU Member States. Furthermore, in the context of the enlarged EU of 27 states, Merkel appears to be open to pursuing a greater variety of alliances and partnerships within the EU and is thus less stuck on an exclusive Franco-German dialogue. Merkel’s courting of George W. Bush in 2006, her more pragmatic approach to relations with

166 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Vladimir Putin and her co-operation with Chirac in leading EUFOR RD Congo are signs of Merkel’s efforts not to put all her diplomatic eggs in one basket. German foreign policy remains primarily interested in the wider European region. A sign of this was Chancellor Merkel’s intention to make Eastern Europe a priority during the 2007 German EU Presidency as part of efforts to strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Germany’s policy on Russia, as with the other leading EU states, continues to defy attempts at Europeanisation. With each major state vying for the Kremlin’s ear to secure access to the Russian Federation’s energy resources, there is no EU incentive to collaborate more closely within the EU. Since the fall-out over the war in Iraq French–German– Russian relations, rather than EU–Russia relations have been the favoured format for relations with Moscow under Merkel and Schröder.60 Whilst Merkel has been keen to stress that her relationship with Putin will be less amicable and more critical, Germany’s ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia remains a priority for the Chancellery and the AA.61 Germany’s involvement in the crisis management force in the Lebanon marked a significant moment for German foreign policy. The deployment of German forces in the Middle East was a significant step, not least due to the relationship with Israel. Germany’s involvement in Lebanon was justified on the basis of its commitment to the UN in crisis prevention and out of responsibility for Israeli security. The significance of the deployment in wider foreign policy terms was to reinforce Germany’s ever-expanding military commitments as part of UN, NATO and EU military operations. Within this context, the EU3’s diplomacy to avert the development of Iran’s nuclear weapons programme has drawn Germany further into efforts to maintain Middle-Eastern stability. Germany’s position as a leading EU state has afforded it a seat at the high-level negotiations with Iran alongside permanent UNSC Members. In Afghanistan too, Germany has carried a large part of the burden for maintaining the stability of the country, although it remains reluctant to become embroiled in efforts to tackle the Taliban in the south of the country. Continuity in German foreign policy was aided by the continuity of government in the form of Steinmeier’s role as Foreign Minister. Merkel sought to tread her own path in foreign policy, most notably in her efforts to rebuild relations between Berlin and Washington. The appointment of policy heavyweights Klaus Scharioth as German Ambassador to the United States and Wolfgang Ischinger as German Ambassador in the United Kingdom signalled the importance of the

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 167

transatlantic dimension of German foreign policy. Overall, Germany’s major strides in international crisis management burden sharing has made it now very difficult for Germany to say no to requests for German troops to act alongside their NATO, EU and UN allies.

Prospects for a British–French–German strategic triangle within ESDP The United Kingdom did not merit a mention in the Coalition Treaty between the CDU, CSU and the SPD.62 Rather the coalition agreement outlines Germany’s important relations with France, Poland, the United States, Russia and Israel. Nevertheless, despite the fact that bilateral relations do not rank at the very top of foreign policy priorities in both capitals, British–German relations are important and deserve attention for their relevance within both the European integration project and wider transatlantic and global affairs. The arrival of new governments in United Kingdom and Germany generally sparks renewed optimism in forging stronger British–German relations – in particular, Kohl and Major and Blair and Schröder. Recent post-Cold War experience has taught us that whilst British and German relations have often benefited from the improved engagement of British Prime Ministers and German Chancellors, these efforts have seldom proved permanent or had the foresight of Franco-German co-operation. Angela Merkel, a political prodigy of Helmut Kohl, engaged in some Kohl-like behaviour by falling back to the traditional German foreign policy technique of cheque book diplomacy in order to reach an agreement on the EU budget at the closing summit of the UK Council Presidency of the EU in December 2005. Whilst initially gaining plaudits for her deal-brokering success, as soon as it transpired that the deal had been secured by German funds, the success was somewhat soured.63 Germany can no longer engage in such magnanimous financial gestures at a time when the German economy is considered so weak, and where such payments cannot be justified in the face of the costs of a sluggish labour market with around 3.8 million unemployed.64 European policy in Germany has changed in recent years. Germany’s poor economic performance and the gridlock which characterises domestic political and economic reform have placed constraints on the German government.65 As a result, politics in Germany are currently marked by an end to unquestioned domestic consensus on the EU. This has reduced the Grand Coalition’s room to manoeuvre in finding compromises to political impasses on the EU level. The defining characteristic of German

168 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

European policy, particularly, since the Schröder era is that German policy has become more conditional – or as Harnisch and Schieder have put it, more ‘contingent’.66 Chancellor Merkel took office at a time when the leaders of the United Kingdom and France were coming to the end of long terms in office. As such, Merkel was viewed surprisingly favourably in the British press as a breath of fresh air in European politics and someone who may address Germany’s economic ails. In a rare show of positive British–German sentiment, The Times declared that, ‘London and Berlin are on the cusp of a beautiful relationship’, to mark Blair’s first meeting with Merkel in Berlin on 18 February 2006.67 The Times expected Merkel to be a ‘more congenial and reliable individual than Gerhard Schröder’, on such issues as the Iran nuclear issue, and pursue greater co-operation on EU issues such as energy security, deregulation and efforts to connect more effectively with ordinary EU citizens. Efforts to repair faults in British–German relations have also witnessed Blair actively praising Merkel’s speeches at the World Economic Forum at Davos and the 2006 Munich Security Conference, whilst Blair’s February 2006 European speech to Oxford University received a positive appraisal from Merkel.68 On the eve of the Grand Coalition’s first year anniversary in power, the Economist declared Chancellor Merkel to be a ‘world star’.69 Relations between France, Germany and the United Kingdom are vital to any initiative in developing the EU’s CFSP. Franco-British relations within CFSP, however, have witnessed more meaningful developments in recent years. As Clarke states, nothing short of an effective Franco-British axis in defence affairs will be sufficient to build an effective European security pillar. Only on the basis of such an axis can Germany play a full part in an ESDP: without it Germany is simply too far behind the curve in post-Cold War military adjustment and could not, for all its numbers, provide an effective pillar in a bilateral arrangement with either France or Britain alone. London and Paris hold between them the keys to a successful ESDP.70 France and the United Kingdom have been in the vanguard of developing the ESDP since the groundbreaking agreement of St Malo of December 1998 and have also been at the forefront of efforts to achieve the EU’s 2010 Headline Goal. The Franco-British Battlegroups concept first launched at the Le Touquet summit of 4 February 2003 and later developed at the Franco-British London summit of 24 November 2003, before being accepted by the EU as a whole.71 London and Paris have

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 169

also been at the forefront in the deployment of the ERRF, alongside Germany. Under British encouragement, France decided to Europeanise its involvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 under the guise of Operation Artemis. A further sign of strengthening FrancoBritish relations in European security have been efforts to co-operate more closely in defence procurement. The United Kingdom has been a lead player in the development of the Eurofighter/Typhoon, in the development of the A-400M transport aircraft and the Meteor and Principle missile projects and has recently announced a joint venture with France to build aircraft carriers together, which is the result of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac’s initiative of 2003.72 The Royal Navy hopes to take delivery of two aircraft carriers in 2012, with France taking receipt of its carrier in 2014. The United Kingdom also participates in the European Defence Agency which was established by a Joint Action by the Council on 12 July 2004.73 In themselves these measures do not signify Europeanisation in British policy, despite fears expressed in the Eurosceptic British press.74 They do demonstrate that the United Kingdom is not against European measures which make financial sense and/or are capabilities driven. In the past decade the United Kingdom has pressed Germany to play a more active role in military crisis management. Germany has come a long way to achieving this, especially under the Red/Green government between 1998–2005. Germany has undergone profound change in its attitude towards the use of force in international crisis management since unification. Currently, Germany has around 6,500 troops on three continents contributing to EU, NATO and UN crisis management operations.75 Due to financial constraints, Germany has not been as big a player in European defence procurement in recent years, with well documented difficulties in financing its commitment to the Eurofighter/ Typhoon project. Germany’s ability to forge closer European co-operation within the European defence market will continue to be curtailed under current economic difficulties, despite the obvious benefits which European co-operation could offer. German public opinion remains fully behind Germany for the development of European security and defence policy which Eurobarometer data demonstrates (Tables 4.6–4.7).76 On the same questions, British public opinion is less in favour, whilst signalling an improvement in favour of EU foreign and security policy over recent years (Table 4.8). On the questions of the EU’s role in security and defence policy, UK public opinion has been more positive over recent years, settling at

170 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 4.6 Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries? Germany

For

Against

Don’t Know

EB60 (Winter 2003) EB61 (Spring 2004) EB62 (Winter 2004) EB63 (Spring 2005) EB64 (Winter 2005)

72 74 80 78 78

15 16 15 17 17

12 9 5 5 5

Table 4.7 Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defence and security policy among EU Member States? Germany

For

Against

EB60 (Winter 2003) EB61 (Spring 2004) EB62 (Winter 2004) EB63 (Spring 2005) EB64 (Winter 2005)

76 80 87 85 87

12 12 10 10 11

Don’t Know 11 8 3 5 2

Table 4.8 Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries? UK

For

Against

Don’t Know

EB60 (Winter 2003) EB61 (Spring 2004) EB62 (Winter 2004) EB63 (Spring 2005) EB64 (Winter 2005)

35 39 47 44 50

44 39 36 38 34

22 22 17 18 16

around 59 per cent support for the EU with around 27–29 per cent opposed to the EU’s involvement in security and defence policy (Table 4.9). If one examines public opinion data on French views of the CFSP there is significant support for EU efforts to develop a more coherent foreign and security policy (see Tables 4.10 and 4.11). France and the United Kingdom appear comfortable with setting the pace of developments within the ESDP despite inevitable tensions which

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 171 Table 4.9 Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defence and security policy among EU Member States? UK

For

Against

Don’t Know

EB60 (Winter 2003) EB61 (Spring 2004) EB62 (Winter 2004) EB63 (Spring 2005) EB64 (Winter 2005)

48 52 60 59 59

35 28 27 27 29

18 20 14 14 13

Table 4.10 Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the Member States of the EU, towards other countries? France

For

Against

Don’t Know

EB60 (Winter 2003) EB61 (Spring 2004) EB62 (Winter 2004) EB63 (Spring 2005) EB64 (Winter 2005)

64 66 69 65 71

27 25 23 26 22

9 9 8 9 7

Table 4.11 Eurobarometer Question: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defence and security policy among EU Member States? France

For

Against

Don’t Know

EB60 (Winter 2003) EB61 (Spring 2004) EB62 (Winter 2004) EB63 (Spring 2005) EB64 (Winter 2005)

71 75 81 81 83

21 17 12 12 10

8 8 7 7 7

surface regularly caused by the difference in strategic visions emanating from Paris and London on defence related matters. Despite Germany’s increased willingness to share the burden in military crisis management in the Balkans and further afield, there remain self-limitations within German policy which policy-makers in Paris and London do not have to deal with. The discussions within the EU over the United Nation’s request for EU forces to help police Democratic Republic of Congo’s election in 2006 are a case in point. Germany was forced into a leadership role by its EU colleagues which it felt initially uncomfortable with.77

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The United Kingdom has stated its intention not to be involved in any mission in the Congo due to concerns within Whitehall of military overstretch caused by British involvement in Iraq and the increased military presence in Afghanistan, as well as reported fears of the lack of language ability among UK forces to operate in French.78 With little or no experience of peacekeeping in Africa, and continued sensitivities over the legacy of the Afrikakorps, Germany was keen to avoid deploying the Bundeswehr, even as part of an EU mission.79 Relations between the EU’s leading Member States suffered due to difficult personal relations between Blair, Chirac and Schröder. Realpolitik alone should not be a deciding factor in maintaining purposeful bilateral relations. However, the Iraq debate, major differences over the form which Europe’s economic and social model should take over the coming years and divergences over the future of European integration have all drastically reduced the range of issues Berlin and London can collaborate on. Within the United Kingdom, Angela Merkel has been dubbed the ‘New Thatcher’, but hopes for a Merkel-led Thatcherite reform of the German and European economy are far-fetched under the constraints of the Grand Coalition.80 Merkel’s European discourse stressing subsidiarity and EU-reform fit well with British conceptions of Europe, but problems remain due to German reluctance on the EU services directive, which is currently the subject of intense debate in Brussels.81 Strong differences remain within the EU3 concerning Turkish membership and the fate of the European Constitution, with only the United Kingdom clearly stating its support for eventual Turkish membership. Rather than injecting the EU project with dynamism, the difficulties which have plagued British–German–French relations under Blair/Schröder/Merkel have done little to advance co-operation among the EU25 and prepare the EU for the challenges of the twenty-first century.82 The success of Merkel’s first visit to Washington signalled hope for improved German–American relations with the expectation that Germany will once again play the role of ‘honest broker’ in transatlantic affairs between Europe and the United States.83 Chancellor Merkel’s message to Washington was based on the following premise, as outlined in her first speech to the Bundestag as Chancellor, ‘Let the battles of the past lie. Those battles have been fought. As far as the future is concerned, the new government will work with all its strength for a close, honest, open and trusting relationship in the trans-Atlantic partnership.’84 If Merkel can reinvigorate German–American relations, the impact on British–German relations should be significant. UK diplomacy in security affairs has struggled in light of major differences which emerged over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Despite the plaudits

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 173

won by Angela Merkel during her first trip to Washington as Chancellor, soured relations will not mend overnight. A legacy of ill-feeling between Berlin and Washington will take time to repair. During Merkel’s visit to Washington in January 2006 the Wall Street Journal caustically commented that, ‘until Mrs. Merkel deals head on with the moral and intellectual rot that now passes for sophisticated discourse in Germany, the battles of the past will not lie and the alliance will not be restored’.85 It may then be Blair and his successor as Prime Minister who act as the transatlantic interlocutor for Berlin and Washington in order to develop relations between Germany and America.

Common challenges and German ‘selbstbewußte Bescheidenheit’86 The United Kingdom, France and Germany have to deal with rapidly changing international circumstances. It is incumbent on the leaders of each state to forge common policies and views on the challenges which they both face. The experience of working within the EU3 alongside France on the thorny issue of Iran’s nuclear programme has demonstrated the benefits of working together within Europe on matters of great foreign policy importance, to reap the benefits of economies of scale and added clout which accompanies it. The Political Directors of the British, French and German foreign ministries have worked well together to present a common stance on the Iran issue and to prevent Teheran pursuing a divide and conquer strategy to break up the EU3’s diplomatic cohesion. The EU3 face common challenges – competing in a global economy with rising mega-economies such as China and India; maintaining momentum in European integration within an EU of 25 states and playing an influential role in world affairs in the post-11 September 2001 era. There is a need for both states to look at the world afresh in order to find the right policies to advance national and European interests in the twenty-first century.87 Central to forming a working relationship during these changing times is, whether both states seek to forge common responses to these challenges, or whether both states retreat to the apparent security of national policy-making circles. The United Kingdom’s relations with Germany are no longer characterised by fears of a dominant central power in Europe. As Peel puts it, In short, Germany today, whether ruled by the left of the right, is not quite the comfortable partner it used to be, always ready to concede cash in the interests of consensus. But thanks to its slow-moving

174 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

federal system and the eternal balancing act demanded by coalition politics, it will never be aggressive, either. For that, the rest of Europe should be thoroughly grateful.88 British–German relations will not take on a renewed quality without establishing more institutionalised modes of co-operation – perhaps not in the same way as Franco-German relations, but some way towards that. During Blair’s Berlin visit in February 2006, both states announced the introduction of video-conferencing between both capitals and the resumption of more regular intergovernmental meetings.89 This is evidence of the increasing important of bilateral relations between EU states, as an attempt to avoid the horse-trading which often plagues Brussels diplomacy. Germany must become more certain of its role in world affairs and aspire to meaningful leadership alongside France and the United Kingdom. For obvious reasons, Germany is concentrating on domestic challenges at the very time that it needs to play an active role in building Europe. It is a paradox that at the very time the United Kingdom and France would welcome a greater German contribution in international affairs, it does not have the resources to fulfil such a role. According to Mertes, ‘Whatever a heavyweight like Germany does has a strong impact on its environment. The same, however, is true for what it refrains from doing. Without Germany’s intellectual, financial and military contribution the economic giant of the EU will remain a dwarf in world affairs.’90 Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s description of Germany’s foreign policy as ‘self-confident modesty’ will not be enough for Germany to work in partnership with its EU partners on the major challenges facing Europe in the twenty-first century.

Assessing the level of Europeanisation under the Grand Coalition Europeanisation under the Grand Coalition has been marked largely by efforts to reinforce the decisions taken since 1998 to establish autonomous European military capabilities. Germany has committed to working towards the ESDP Headline Goal 2010, was fully in agreement with the 2003 European Security Strategy91 and has taken every opportunity to participate in EU crisis management operations culminating in the decision to lead the EUFOR RD Congo mission in 2006. Germany’s Defence White Paper 2006 states that, ‘The ESS is in accord with the goals and interests of German security policy. It serves to define, in

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 175

strategic terms, the role and tasks of the EU in a drastically changed security environment, and in the conditions of a globalised world’.92 At the same time, Germany has been less influential in terms of uploading its policies and ideas to the European level. This stems mainly from divisions over the decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 and the polarising of opinion in the EU on the issue. Schröder’s decision to ally with France and Russia on the issue and push for greater autonomy in military planning in the EU through Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg’s proposal for a military planning cell in Tervuren split opinion within the EU. In terms of downloading Germany has undergone modest but nonetheless important changes in its foreign and security policy stemming from impulses emanating from its involvement in the CFSP under the Grand Coalition (see Table 4.12). In terms of elite socialisation, the issue of Germany’s intervention in African affairs has become accepted within the government and the Bundestag, despite residual reluctance within the German Armed Forces. Germany’s leadership of EUFOR RD Congo was a major step for Germany not only in terms of Germany’s decision to deploy troops in Africa. In wider terms, Germany’s leadership of the mission with operational headquarters based at Teltow near Potsdam was sign of Germany’s coming of age in the leadership of EU military operations. German public opinion remains resolutely behind Germany’s involvement in the EU’s foreign and security policy. German public opinion remains supportive of a wider international role for the Bundeswehr, both within the NATO alliance and within ESDP. Public opinion on the deployment of German troops has yet to be tested by significant Bundeswehr casualties resulting from Germany’s multilateral commitments. In this sense, public support for the deployment of German troops may remain contingent on the avoidance of significant casualties. Constitutional adaptation has not been witnessed under the Grand Coalition. Defence Minister Jung’s efforts to change the constitution as part of the negotiation of the Weißbuch 2006 were unsuccessful. Defence Minister Jung campaigned for the inclusion of clauses in the Basic Law allowing for the domestic deployment of the Bundeswehr in cases of terrorist attacks or other national security issues. Jung also argued for the enshrining of the Bundeswehr’s new role in international crisis management in the Basic Law. Jung’s inability to gain support for his proposals suggests that German political elites remain cautious of wholesale changes in the role of the Bundeswehr in constitutional terms. Whilst German elites are much more confident about deploying

176 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table 4.12

Downloading under the Grand Coalition

Downloading Mechanism

German Adaptation

Elite socialisation

Africa is no longer a no-go area for the Bundeswehr after the decision to lead the EUFOR RD Congo mission in 2006. Acceptance of the pressure for leadership in EU crisis management.

Public opinion

Public opinion remains supportive of the need for a larger role for the Bundeswehr in crisis management. This support remains fragile, however. Significant Bundeswehr casualties would test the solidity of German public opinion.

Constitutional adaptation

Discussions over a change in the constitution to allow the use of the Bundeswehr within Germany was raised by Jung, but rejected by political elites. ESDP adaptational pressures did not result in constitutional changes.

Resource allocation

The Bundeswehr remains under-funded. Merkel hinted at the possibility of raising the defence budget, but substantial financial constraints remain, limiting the chances of increased spending on defence. The Bundeswehr has continued its process of Transformation, but the ESDP is not the main focus of Bundeswehr reform.

Bureaucratic reorganisation

The Grand Coalition did not bring in any significant bureaucratic changes as a result of pressures emanating from involvement in the CFSP. Emergence of a PSC ‘team’ in the Permanent Representation in Brussels suggests some limited Brusselsisation of foreign and security policy-making. Doubling of ranking diplomats dealing with CFSP within the Foreign Ministry.

the Bundeswehr, it is too early for the Bundeswehr’s new role to be formalised in such a way. However, the Defence White Paper of 2006 – the first since 1994 – was a rubber-stamping of the Bundeswehr’s new role in the post-Cold War and post-11 September 2001 international environment.

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 177

Resource Allocation under the Grand Coalition remains understood in terms of the Transformation process in the Bundeswehr rather than any injection of new funds into the Defence budget. Jung has continued efforts to transform the Bundeswehr from its Cold War collective defence vocation to that of a highly mobile army capable of being deployed within multinational units on a global scale. Hints from Chancellor Merkel that the Defence budget may be increased in recognition of the increased burdens of international crisis management are unlikely to bear fruit given Germany’s continued economic malaise. The German Armed Forces will have to continue to do more with modest funding. This should not be problematic within the modest scope of ESDP, but if Germany is to continue to develop its joint leadership role with France and the United Kingdom in ESDP, it will need to maintain effective forces capable of working alongside its EU partners. Finally, bureaucratic re-organisation within Germany as a result of impulses emerging from CFSP/ESDP has been minimal. The Grand Coalition did not change to basic structures of foreign policy-making on taking office, and the post-2005 period has not witnessed wholesale changes on the European level. The failure to ratify the EU Constitution with the significant changes to the policy-making process in Brussels envisaged within the treaty has put off any necessary changes taking place in Berlin. In the vacuum left by the failed constitutional treaty, there is also a sense within Berlin that foreign policy co-operation within CFSP should not be accelerated too fast without the measures outlined in the treaty for fear of giving the impression that the proposed measures are superfluous for greater CFSP effectiveness.93 Whilst bureaucratic re-organisation remains limited some minor changes have been witnessed. Within the Foreign Ministry in Berlin a number of small developments are notable. Bureaucratic change on the national level perhaps says more about the growing role of Brussels as a centre for European foreign policy-making rather than wholesale national transformation. The main change has been that the number of ranking diplomats focusing on co-ordinating CFSP policy has doubled from one to two. Despite this, the overall co-ordination of German EU policy has not altered significantly. The EUKOR (European Co-ordination) – the section in the Foreign Ministry responsible for the co-ordination of German EU policy – co-ordinates Germany’s EU policy within the Foreign Ministry, between the federal ministries in Berlin, the Permanent Representation in Brussels, and if need be, with other EU Member States. Co-ordinating the two PSC and RELEX (External Relations) meetings per week takes up most of the time of those diplomats directly responsible for German CFSP policy.

178 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

There are a number of limiting factors which preclude significant Europeanisation of the German Foreign Ministry. Despite the increasing influence of the EU on national politics the number of people within the AA who have worked in Brussels remains relatively small.94 There is, therefore, a significant knowledge gap within the Foreign Ministry about the nuances of foreign policy co-ordination within Brussels. There is a big difference working in Brussels policy process to normal bilaterals. Whilst bilateral ties can often be fraught with complexities, the Brussels policy environment is much more difficult to grasp and work within. This is in the main due to the wide range of institutional actors and Member States involved in policy-making and operationalising CFSP. The rise in the importance of the CFSP also means that people need to be trained how to ‘do’ CFSP within the foreign ministry to better understand the differences in the policy-making process on the EU level. These limitations signal that structures have not changed significantly in the 1999–2007 period in terms of how CFSP policy is made within Germany’s chief ‘sponsoring ministry’. It is in Brussels at Germany’s Permanent Representation to the EU that one can witness more significant adaptation in bureaucratic procedures. Since the emergence of ESDP in 1999 the German Permanent Representation has witnessed a number of changes. Most significant is the emergence of a German ‘PSC team’.95 This ‘team’ headed up by Germany’s ambassador to the PSC – currently Dr Clemens von Goetze – who in turn reports to both the German Permanent Representative and the Political Director of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. A strong team spirit has emerged within the PSC team in the German Permanent Representation which sometimes results in different policy assessments emerging in Brussels to those developed in Berlin. The growth in numbers of diplomats dealing with foreign policy issues in the Permanent Representation is indicative of foreign and security policy’s rise in importance on the EU level. The increase in the number of diplomats working in foreign policy issues and the emergence of a team spirit within this group fits squarely within the ‘Brusselsisation’ concept relating to the growing importance of Brussels as a centre for foreign policy-making.96 Most importantly, Brusselsisation contends that the machinery of national foreign policy-making are relocated to Brussels from national capitals, coinciding with the emergence of a foreign policy epistemic community external to existing national structures.97 Despite these modest changes, the national level remains to dominant forum for the development of German foreign policy.

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 179

Within the Chancellery, changes have also been modest in scope. Chancellor Merkel’s appointment of Dr Christoph Heusgen as her foreign and security policy advisor, formerly of Javier Solana’s inner policy circle, suggested that Merkel would stress more ‘European’ solutions for German foreign policy challenges. Dr Heusgen is responsible for Department 2 (Abteilung 2) of the Chancellery which deals with ‘External Relations, Global Issues and External Security’. Heusgen’s Brussels experience will no doubt aid Merkel present the German position to the EU-27, but it has not signalled a radical change of commitment or direction. Heusgen’s major task under the German Presidency was in the development of the Berlin Summit Declaration of March 2007. His main aim will be to ensure that its impact is long lasting and that it plays a role in the revival of the Constitutional Treaty. Germany’s increasing focus on the CFSP has been witnessed to a limited degree with German leadership of the ESDP Congo operation and in the chancellor’s continued co-operation with France and the United Kingdom on the question of Iran’s potential nuclear weapons capability. However, continuity in Merkel’s style of foreign policy from the former Red/Green government is noticeable in the chancellor’s preference for ‘Great Power’ diplomacy in conducting foreign policy. This was magnified by Germany’s Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2007 and Merkel’s efforts to negotiate a new Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between Russia and the EU. Within the foreign policy process of the chancellery CFSP is organised as one of many foreign policy options open to Germany, rather than a central focus. Neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Chancellery overrate the importance of CFSP, but view it rather as an institution with great potential for the future, particularly, if the EU Constitutional Treaty comes into force. The involvement of the Ministry of Defence clearly highlights the limitations of ESDP for the German defence establishment. The NATO remains for the foreseeable future the pre-eminent defence organisation in Europe. For those in the German Defence Ministry, ESDP is a welcome additional tool for crisis management, but it pales into insignificance when compared to capabilities of NATO.98 German military command structures remain integrated into NATO and building Europe’s voice within NATO is considered the most sensible step to achieve greater European capabilities into the future. Strengthening Germany’s contribution to the NRF is a more credible way forward for the Bundeswehr rather than building rival capabilities within the framework of the ESDP – such as the Battlegroups concept, which Germany is highly committed

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to. Efforts for greater efficiency in defence procurement are also viewed sceptically as political rather than capabilities-driven projects, which the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS)/Airbus example illustrates.99 ESDP also fails to spark significant interest within the German Defence Ministry because of its scale – if the EU was to commit to larger capabilities which would place greater pressure on German capabilities then adaptation would be more significant. NATO’s increasingly global role and tensions in the EU/NATO relationship caused in part by the asymmetric membership of both organisations will continue to make German defence and strategic planning problematic until the EU/NATO relationship is finally solved. With such uncertainty abounding, Europeanisation is likely limited within the Defence Ministry and the Bundeswehr. Germany’s ability to influence the formulation of the CFSP has also witnessed a slowing down of activity (see Table 4.13). Germany’s ability to influence the development of CFSP through discursive and ideational engagement took a major step back during Chancellor Schröder’s second term in office. Germany’s traditional vocation of occupying the centre ground in discussions over the formulation of security in Europe was compromised by the polarisation of opinion on the Iraq issue. Germany’s retreat from the centre ground has reduced its influence. However, Germany’s leadership of EUFOR RD Congo and Chancellor Merkel’s foreign policy engagement has helped Germany recoup some of the lost ground of the Schröder period. Germany’s influence will be tested in discussions over the revival of the Constitutional treaty over the 2007–2009 period. With many of the institutional arrangements surrounding CFSP/ESDP dealt with, the Grand Coalition has had little opportunity to influence the EU’s future institutional development. Kurt Beck’s (Chairman of the SPD) suggestion for the development of a 100,000-strong EU army is one example in which German political elites have tried to influence the institutional development of ESDP, but this has been an isolated case. ESDP is going through a period of consolidation rather than wholesale change which is likely to continue until such time as the current EU Constitution or some modified version is ratified by the EU Member States.100 In the meantime, Germany’s influence under the Grand Coalition has been most keenly felt in setting an example for others to follow through its participation in ESDP operations. Germany has signalled its commitment to operationalising ESDP, thus justifying its claims to leadership alongside the United Kingdom and France. However, Germany’s influence may have shown signs of limitation,

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 181 Table 4.13

German uploading in CFSP

Uploading Mechanism

German Actions

Discursive / Ideational influence

Germany’s ability to influence its partners suffered during Schröder’s second term in office. Germany became less influential on losing its traditional position in the middleground of discussions on European security as a result of Germany’s position on the Iraq controversy.

Institutional export

With the main components of the ESDP in place there was little opportunity to export German institutional models to the European level. The Tervuren proposal, for a separate EU military planning cell, was blocked by the United Kingdom and other transatlanticminded Member States.

Example setting

Germany maintained its record of being at the forefront of deployments of the ESDP in the Balkans, Africa and further afield.

Agenda setting

Germany’s influence waned during Schröder’s second term. Germany has found it more difficult to influence ESDP in an EU of 27 states. Closer British–French–German relations, therefore, have taken on a new importance, in order for ESDP to maintain some degree of momentum.

most notably in the substantial efforts Germany needed to undertake in order to put together a force package for EUFOR RD Congo. European Policy in Germany has changed since unification. Germany’s poor economic performance and the gridlock which characterises domestic political and economic reform have placed constraints on the German government.101 As a result, politics in Germany are currently marked by an end to unquestioned domestic consensus on the EU. This has reduced the Grand Coalition’s room to manoeuvre in finding compromises to political impasses on the EU level. The defining characteristic of German European policy, particularly, since the Schröder era, is that German policy has become more conditional – or as Harnisch and Schieder have put it, more ‘contingent’.102 On one level this makes the job of acting as an ‘honest broker’ as Council President more difficult, as

182 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

the temptation to pursue German interests has become stronger for the Grand Coalition. German economic stagnation is the major challenge facing Germany. Without improvement, Germany’s ability to set the agenda will remain questionable as the ‘ordo-liberal’ German economic model has lost influence on the EU-level – most notably within the Eurozone.103 Germany’s Council Presidency in 1999 was greatly influenced by events in the Balkans and most of Germany’s efforts were focused on achieving an end to the conflict in Kosovo. In the face of the Kosovo crisis German foreign policy made substantial steps forward with the decision of the Red/Green government to sanction the use of the German Armed Forces in NATO’s Operation Allied Force. The EU faces many significant international challenges which deserve attention from the German Presidency. However, due to issues such as the Iran nuclear question, Germany is likely to be very active in foreign policy on behalf of the EU. A skilled hand is needed to balance dealing with the internal challenges facing the EU embodied in the failed Constitution and the need for the EU to continue to develop its external policy.

Conclusion Writing in the weekly Die Zeit, von Randow argues that we are now in, ‘the age of post-Fischerisation and the re-politicisation of foreign policy’ in Germany (Randow, 2006).104 Fischer’s rhetoric as Foreign Minister was important in stressing Germany’s responsibility for crisis management – notably in the Balkans. However, in the cold light of day, Germany’s new foreign policy position, which Fischer paved the way for, presents Germany with significant challenges. This chapter has outlined Germany’s dual-challenge reflected in the domestic and international dynamics at play in the Grand Coalition’s foreign and security policy. Germany’s domestic political challenge is to resolve the underlying question surrounding German foreign and security policy – what is Germany’s role in the world to be? In post-unification Germany, fudging the issue of Germany’s international calling through embedding itself in NATO/EU/UN structures and deflecting attention away from difficult national decisions. In the context of the CFSP, the development of EU foreign policy during the 1990s focused on institutional tinkering, rather than living up to demands for great EU engagement in foreign policy and equipping the EU with the capabilities needed to fulfil this

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 183

role – the so-called ‘capabilities-expectations gap’ which Hill outlines.105 Should Germany remain committed to its expanded international role, which it shows every sign of doing, Germany has used the process of writing the Weißbuch 2006 as a means to embed this new international leadership calling. Just as important, despite Germany’s difficult economic situation, German coffers will need to be raided to adequately fund the German Armed Forces to plan a leading role alongside the countries of the ESDP directoire – the United Kingdom and France. There is sufficient support from the leading political parties for Germany’s new international role (with the exception of the Linkspartei and the FDP) which the Grand Coalition must take advantage of in this period of cohabitation. Africa, however, still remains a subject of uncertainty for German intervention, despite calls from the Grand Coalition and Federal President Köhler to play an increased role in stabilising the continent. The Bundeswehr and policy planners within the German Defence Ministry remain sceptical of the government’s rationale for German military intervention in Africa. Germany is driven by a set of interests in foreign policy which become more pronounced as the level of foreign policy issue becomes higher – that is CFSP contains a full set of foreign policy issues which are relatively uncomplicated for Germany in a normative sense. However, as the case of ESDP demonstrates, the use of force within the EU framework is an area where German interests are under pressure, and which have been most clearly demonstrated in the push to reform the Bundeswehr for international military service. Germany’s normative predisposition to find European Union solutions to foreign policy challenges place pressure on German interests vis-à-vis the use of force. This is further complicated by the enduring issue of NATO’s role in the twenty-first century and what the implications of an increased European role in NATO will be. As long as the EU/NATO relationship is viewed as a competitive one, encroaching on each other’s policy and operational terrain, Germany will continue to be pushed and pulled between European and transatlantic co-operation in defence. At the EU level, Defence Minister Jung was taught a salutary lesson in the nuances and difficulties of planning and conducting a multinational military operation – even among its closest EU allies. The French government’s cajoling of Germany into taking the main leadership role was a signal from Paris that they would no longer carry a disproportionate burden in the ESDP. Pressure on Germany was also exacerbated by Solana’s assertions that the EU would answer the UN’s call to support

184 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

MONUC and by pressing Germany to take responsibility for signing up EU members to participate. Europeanisation has continued under the Grand Coalition. On most issues Germany continues to look to the EU as a forum to construct a policy of a response to the foreign policy challenges facing the continent. The CFSP remains a benchmark for German foreign policy, with foreign policy adaptation on the German domestic level often stemming from European developments. Germany has been socialised over the past decade in the need to play a leadership role in EU foreign and security policy. Policy adaptation has occurred in the form of Bundeswehr reform and the emergence of a wide consensus of Germany’s new security policy responsibilities. The pressures to play a greater role in military crisis management have also led to a reassessment of the Defence budget in light of Germany’s ever expanding international commitments. These pressures on resource allocation have started to influence government thinking on the level of the German defence budget as comments from Angela Merkel demonstrate. Downloading therefore is clearly in evidence. The EU does exert adaptation pressure on German policy and institutions. Downloading is, however, only one part of the Europeanisation dynamic. With greater German involvement and leadership in CFSP, Germany’s influence has grown its uploading potential. Germany can not yet claim to have the same influence as France or the United Kingdom in European security, but through its operational involvement in ESDP and NATO missions and in the EU’s diplomacy on such issues as the development of Iran’s nuclear programme, Berlin is proving a useful and capable partner. Germany still maintains low levels of defence spending and insists on the retention of conscription which limits the effectiveness of its armed forces. Despite this, Germany’s commitment to building ESDP capabilities remains strong, which its involvement in 4 out of the 13 planned ESDP battlegroups demonstrates. Overcoming these challenges of maintaining German military effectiveness and driving CFSP forward will have a significant bearing on the future course of Europeanisation in the German case. The decision to play the leading role in the EUFOR RD Congo was a difficult one for Germany; not so much in regards to the rationale for the mission, rather in terms of the difficulties surrounding the planning of the force on the EU level and the preparation of German troops to be deployed in Gabon and Kinshasa. Through its participation, Germany displayed its commitment to the success of the CFSP/ESDP, but this also highlighted to continued domestic and EU-level challenges facing Germany and

Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 185

other Member States. Clearly, the ESDP now is an important aspect of Germany’s international role which is reflected in the Weißbuch 2006. Bundeswehr deployments remain a subject for intense debate within Germany. A clearer expression of the role of the military in German defence policy as part of a Gesamtkonzept for German foreign policy will help clarify Germany’s new role in international affairs.

Conclusion – Between Europeanisation and National Singularities

German Defence policy comprises the preventive security action Germany takes within the scope of its foreign and security policy. Armed forces are an integral part of a foreign and security policy that aims at the prevention and containment of crises and conflicts.1 … Germany’s security environment is characterised by changed risks and new opportunities. At present, and in the foreseeable future, there is no conventional threat to the German territory. The Bundeswehr’s spectrum of operations has changed fundamentally.2 This book has focused predominantly on Germany’s contribution to the development of the European Uunion’s (EUs) military capability since the 1990s. In broad terms, the EU is no longer an insignificant foreign policy actor, punching below its weight on the international stage. The growing list of Common Foreign and Security Policy/European Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/ESDP) missions around the world attest to the EU’s growing foreign policy engagement. Yet the limits of German Europeanisation, which this study has highlighted, are largely due to the fact that the EU’s military capabilities remain extremely modest. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) remains the security institution with by far the most credibility and as such, defence establishments across the EU will continue to view it as the most credible institution to work within. The development of ESDP is further complicated by the development of the NATO Response Force and the enduring uncertainty surrounding the EU/NATO relationship, despite the Berlin Plus agreement and EU/NATO co-operation in ESDP operations. Until the EU/NATO relationship is resolved, the EU will remain limited in defence policy and thus fail to exert significant Europeanisation pressure on Germany and the other EU Member States. Germany’s military deployments under the 186

Europeanisation and National Singularities 187

aegis of ESDP remain a modest component of Germany’s overall military crisis management activities (see Table C.1). Despite the underlying structural limitation of EU/NATO relations and their impact on the EU’s ability to forge ahead with closer security and defence co-operation, Germany’s involvement in CFSP/ESDP is of great significance. Multilateralism has been the defining characteristic of German foreign and security policy since the beginning of the Adenauer era. West Germany’s semi-sovereign status and the proximity to a shaming past had led successive governments to develop a policy stance of exaggerated, or reflexive multilateralism, and to define its external goals in terms of shared European, rather than specifically national interests. This European vocation was flanked by a constitutionally anchored commitment to overcoming German division and a predominant NATO/Atlanticist orientation in security policy. German foreign and security policy has been Europeanised since its very inception. Unification did not witness a shedding of Germany’s European vocation. The impact of the Europeanisation of German foreign and security policy in the 1990s has witnessed a two-way process of a projection of German preferences on CFSP, mainly in conjunction with France, and of reception in terms of redefining the role of the Bundeswehr in international military operations and the character of German foreign and security policy. It is domestic actors within the German polity which participate in the projection of German preferences within the process of Europeanisation – Auswärtiges Amt (AA), Kanzleramt, Verteidigungsministerium, Finanzamt, Bundestag, and key players such as Genscher/Kinkel, Rühe and Kohl; Fischer, Scharping, Schröder and Struck; and Merkel, Steinmeier and Jung. In this way, Germany has exercised what Nye refers to as ‘soft power’ in which it has sought to influence the ideas and preferences of its EU partners by suggesting the way forward for EU foreign and security policy co-operation.3 The overall aim of German foreign and security policy within the EU has been to create an ‘institutional and normative fit’ between the EU and German policy in order to reduce the adaptational pressures resulting from the development of CFSP.4 The time frame of the study, 1990–2007 corresponds not only with a period of major changes within the EU, but also to a period which has witnessed radical changes for Germany and its role in the world.5 This book claims that Germany has been a forceful supporter of foreign and security policy integration within the EU. German policy-makers have adapted their views and beliefs through a process of socialisation with their European partners, accompanied with institutional adaptation.

Table C.1 Overseas deployments of the Bunde (Correct as of March 2007 – http:www.bundeswehr.de) Total 7.562 ISAF Afghanistan Uzbekistan

KFOR Kosovo

EUFOR Bosnia Herzegovina

UNMIS Sudan

UNIFIL Lebanon

UNOMIG Georgia

Active Endeavour

UNMEE Ethiopia Eritrea

OEF Horn von Africa

in Deutschland zur Evakuierung aus medizinischen Gründen bereit gehalten (STRATAIRMEDEVAC)

Total

2953

2283

831

36

1089

11

38

2

257

42

Women

116

112

54

0

46

2

0

0

20




Reservists

258

186

59

1

13

0

0

0

15




Voluntary Conscripts

194

208

52

0

160

0

0

0

25




Europeanisation and National Singularities 189

However, significant singularities have remained in German security policy, concerning what form CFSP should take and what measures are required to develop CFSP further. In addition, German policy-makers continue to act within the framework and authority of the German political system and strategic culture, despite the increased level of coordination on the EU level. German domestic constraints still frame the realms of the possible, limiting the impact of Europeanisation. This book sought to pinpoint the extent to which Germany’s foreign and security policy has gone through adaptation developments as a result of Germany’s involvement in the CFSP. The answer is mixed. Germany has gone through a considerable adaptational change in its view on the use of force in the post-Cold War era, but as this conceptual change has not been met with sufficient implementation of new policies and capabilities.6 As Risse outlines, Germany has been able to maintain continuity in its foreign and security policy through managing the adaptational pressures impacting upon it.7 Europeanisation has been a central pillar in the united Germany’s foreign and security policy, but it has not resulted in a dramatic restructuring of foreign and security policy within Germany. Germany has generally sought to deepen cooperation with its EU partners within the CFSP. However, there are a number of limiting factors impacting on the degree of Europeanisation in Germany’s foreign policy which this conclusion sums up. Germany has been committed to the CFSP but this has not had a dramatic impact on its domestic or European level policy-making process. Nor has the development of CFSP witnessed significant reallocation of resources to enable Germany to play a more active role in EU foreign and security policy. The 1990s witnessed a debate over the definition of the nature of European security for the post-Cold War era. This debate focused on the conditions and basis on which Europeanisation could, if desired, take place. Germany has had to contend with the existence of competing Europeanisations.8 Has Germany then been able to impact on this debate to shape policies in line with national preferences, or has German been subject to increased adaptational pressures as the EU’s role in international affairs has increased? Each of the case studies has examined Germany’s role in the CFSP as one of uploading and downloading. These dynamics seek to examine the impact of national policies on the European level, and the adaptational pressure exerted on Member States as a direct result of involvement in the CFSP. This book has asserted that Europeanisation is not solely a matter of domestic adaptation. Rather states are vital cogs in the policymaking machinery of the EU and therefore play a major role in policy

190 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

formation. As Duffield states, ‘the domestic setting has been at least as important as external factors in determining how Germany has responded to the new challenges that it has been faced in its security environment’.9 The hypothesis driving this assumption is that adaptational pressures on the national level will be reduced if Member States are able to influence the formulation of policy on the European level. Member States are therefore engaged in a process of ensuring that there is a ‘goodness of fit’ between national and European levels and that instances of misfit, that is, where adaptational pressures emerge, are kept to a minimum.10 Accordingly, Germany has been driven since unification by a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in CFSP. March and Olsen outline that the logic of appropriateness, is a perspective that sees human action as driven by rules of appropriate or exemplary behaviour, organized into institutions. Rules are followed because they are seen as natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate. Actors seek to fulfil the obligations encapsulated in a role, an identity, a membership in a political community or group, and the ethos, practices and expectations of its institutions. Embedded in a social collectivity, they do what they see as appropriate for themselves in a specific type of situation.11 Even when the CFSP framework was substantially challenged during the Kosovo crisis, the logic of appropriateness held true as Germany sought to reassess its role within the CFSP and suggest a concrete blueprint for the development of EU foreign and security policy.12 Olsen does not outline how this process occurs, which is why the uploading mechanisms of Europeanisation are useful.13

Assessing German uploading This study has offered a number of mechanisms contributing to the uploading of national preferences in the Europeanisation dynamics within CFSP. These are ideational export founded on a highly visible discursive input into policy developments; institutional export of domestic modes and practices, or well thought out policy blueprints; example setting through the consistent commitment to European solutions to foreign policy challenges and the relative scarcity of overtly national posturing; and finally, the ability to utilise formal structural powers within the CFSP policy process, most notably through the agenda setting opportunities afforded the by Council Presidency.

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Germany’s discursive influence has been central to the framing of the realms of the possible in CFSP since unification. The embedding of the CFSP within the overall aim of achieving a Political Union (PU) to balance Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was a defining aspect of German CFSP policy under Kohl and Kinkel. Kohl consciously ‘nested’ discussions of CFSP within discussions of higher order issues relating to European integration. For Kohl, CFSP did not solely represent a chance to increase German influence in foreign and security policy. Rather, Kohl sought to build on the security which European integration had established for the citizens of Germany and Europe since the Treaties of Rome. Kohl and Kinkel constantly stressed the rationale for the integration of EU/WEU throughout the 1990s. Despite British opposition to the integration of both institutions, Germany continued to press for their medium to long-term integration in order to facilitate more effective discussions of security and defence policy among EU member states. This German preference has been implemented to a significant degree with the signing the Treaty of Nice and within the European Constitution when it is ratified. This must be seen as a success for German policy preferences in gaining acceptance of this principle through incremental association between the two organisations agreed on in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty of Amsterdam. Regarding institutional export as a mechanism of uploading, nowhere is there a better example that, the case of the Stability Pact for SouthEastern Europe. Schröder and Fischer were able to export a policy blueprint, worked out at the national level and receive almost unflinching support from the international community for the model for regional reconstruction contained within the pact. This was facilitated by the effective use Germany made of the agenda-setting powers of the Presidency of the WEU/EU and the G-8. Alongside the formal powers of the Presidency for setting the agenda of the EU, the Franco-German partnership remained instrumental in maintaining the dynamic towards deepening foreign and security policy co-operation within the EU throughout the 1990s. Germany played a proactive role in suggesting paths for institutional reform and agreeing joint positions with France for presenting proposals to their fellow EU Member States. This proactive stance on institutional reform on the EU level was not reflected in the domestic reform of foreign and defence policy within Germany where Strategic Culture remained resistant to speedy adaptation, thus ensuring the continued importance of German singularities in foreign policy.

192 Germany and EU Foreign Policy Table C.2 Mechanisms of policy uploading in CFSP Uploading Mechanism

German Actions

Discursive/Ideational influence

Centrality of CFSP for Political Union; Common European Defence as a means to strengthen the transatlantic community; Fusing WEU/EU.

Institutional export

This is most clearly visible in the export of the Fischer Plan which became the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

Example setting

Commitments to the Capabilities Commitment Conference; Participation in the Battlegroups concept and working towards fulfilling the Headline Goal; Mixed results in forging a more effective European voice in international affairs; Playing a leading role in operationalising ESDP in the Congo, the Balkans and further afield.

Agenda setting

Great success during the European Council/WEU presidencies of 1999; Consistently proactive with France in suggesting institutional reforms; Less able to set the agenda in an EU of 27 states despite shared leadership role with the United Kingdom and France.

The final mechanism of German uploading was that of example setting (Table C.2). Germany remained at the forefront of attempts to deepen co-operation in CFSP, most notably in its commitment to the Headline Goal, the Battlegroups concept and the operationalising of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).

Assessing German downloading Analysing the downloading aspects of Europeanisation highlights the adaptational pressures facing a Member State of the EU. Adaptational effects concerning elite socialisation, bureaucratic reorganisation, constitutional change/legislative adaptation, public opinion adaptation and the reallocation of resources for CFSP have been examined in the German case to pinpoint areas of domestic adaptation. In terms of elite socialisation, each of the case studies has outlined a broadly consistent

Europeanisation and National Singularities 193

commitment from German policy elites to the CFSP process during the 1990s. Successive German governments since Kohl have sought to reinforce German responsibility for and the dependability in developing CFSP with Germany’s key partners within the EU. The most fundamental issue in which German elites have become socialised is the need for German involvement in military crisis management. This has been most clearly demonstrated in the military operation in Kosovo in 1999 and subsequently in Afghanistan, the Congo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Knill outlines three mechanisms of downloading within the process of Europeanisation.14 First, European policies may, ‘prescribe a concrete institutional model for domestic compliance; they might be confined to changing domestic opportunity structures; or, in their “weakest” form, have no institutional impact at all, while being primarily directed at changing domestic beliefs and expectations.’15 I suggest within this book that downloading in the case of Germany and the CFSP has focused on what Knill regards as the ‘weakest’ mechanism of Europeanisation, that of changing the domestic beliefs and expectations of policy elites within Germany. The EU does not as yet have a sufficiently concrete and substantial institutional model to serve as a focus of adaptation for Member States. As Howorth points out in relation to France, ‘In the area of defence and security, there are no European institutions with sufficient political or military autonomy to influence directly a centuries old national policy-making process such as that of France.’16 Whilst the AA does not have the historical memory of the French Quai d’Orsay or the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, EUlevel institutions do not yet have the capacity to fully replace the cultural and political proximity which German foreign policy institutions provide for the German polity. Nor are there sufficient domestic interest groups pressing for a communitarisation of German foreign and security policy, or among Germany’s key partners France and the United Kingdom.17 The CFSP represents a range of ideas which German policy-makers support and accept. The European Security Strategy of 2003 lays down the central tenets of EU foreign policy, none of which contradicts German foreign policy interests. The main problems emerge for Germany when discussions focus on defence issues and, in particular, what role the EU and NATO should play in providing for European and global security into the future. Meyer argues convincingly that national strategic cultures are more susceptible to change than has been previously thought due to processes of elite socialisation, the emergence of

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shared perceptions of the main threats facing Europe and through learning as a result of shared experiences in crisis management.18 Despite this, fundamental changes would be needed in terms of the institutional organisation of German defence along EU lines for there to be a significant Europeanisation of German policy. Such a step would require a major intergovernmental bargain among the EU27 and NATO members, recasting the very basis of defence in Europe. In its current guise ESDP is too limited to act as a driving force for defence reform in the EU, and EU/NATO relations remain too fraught with difficulties for a farsighted discussion on the future of European defence to have much impact. Germany has faced a number of adaptational pressures associated with foreign policy and its involvement in CFSP. The Defence Ministry has endured most of the significant adaptational pressures facing Germany in terms of institutional/bureaucratic reform as a result of increasing the European role in transatlantic burden sharing in crisis management. Whereas European Political Co-operation (EPC) afforded West Germany a forum in which it could develop its foreign policy without resorting to unilateralism and being exposed to the pressures of going for it alone in international relations, the development of ESDP since 1999 has served as a spotlight on deficiencies in German foreign, security and defence policy. These pressures developed in conjunction with a domestic reassessment of the role of the Bundeswehr on the international stage, and had an impact on the perception of the Bundeswehr within Germany. The streamlining of armed forces which Scharping set in train, the most wide-ranging reform of the Bundeswehr ever put in place, due to the financial constraints dictated by the Finance Ministry, also affected the position of the armed forces in German society. The closing down of many barracks within Germany and the streamlining of forces to meet the demands of a greater German involvement in international operations, will inevitably mean that the image of the Bundeswehr as ‘Citizens in Uniform’ in the future may no longer hold as much symbolic potency. In addition, the plan to sell off decommissioned barracks on the open market did not bring in the expected funds.19 The von Weiszäcker Report on the reform of the Bundeswehr also raised many questions concerning the role and future of the Bundeswehr in German society and as part of Germany’s multilateral commitments.20 Here, Europeanisation has acted as a cover, or facilitating milieu, for the Bundeswehr reform by giving successive Defence Ministers a template and a raison d’etre for the German armed forces in the new millennium.

Europeanisation and National Singularities 195

The development of CFSP/ESDP has broadened the role of the Verteidigungsministerium in Berlin and Bonn through the inclusion of matters relating to defence. It is becoming less and less the case that CFSP policy within Germany is the exclusive domain of the AA, with pressure coming from the Chancellery. The Defence Ministry’s involvement in German CFSP has risen as the Bundeswehr has become more involved in ESDP. The inclusion of defence matters within the CFSP/CESDP raised the profile of the Finance Ministry. With greater scrutiny and pressure on Defence Ministers to reform the Bundeswehr to meet the commitments of the ESDP Headline Goal and Germany’s greater international commitments, there have been almost continual struggles between the need for the Defence Ministry to deliver on these commitments and the Finance Ministry’s desire to balance the books especially in light of the EMU criteria as outlined in the Stability and Growth Pact. This has led to the huge financial pressures placed on the defence budget by the A440M and Eurofighter projects. In the area of bureaucratic reorganisation, policy-making remains firmly embedded within Berlin despite the establishment of EU-level institutions such as the European Union Military Committee, European Union Military Staff, Political Security Committee (EUMC), (EUMS) and the (PSC). Often, much of the co-ordination work on foreign policy matters is conducted on a bilateral basis between Berlin and Paris or Berlin and London, rather than in Brussels. Germany’s Permanent Representation to the EU has only a modest input into policy decisions. The role of the AA remains central to CFSP on day-to-day matters, although as the political importance of CFSP/CESDP has risen under the Red/Green government, the Chancellery has taken a much greater interest in pursuing policy objectives in this area. Whilst the development of EU military capabilities in the form of the ERRF would suggest a greater role for the Defence Ministry in CFSP affairs, this remains limited. The Defence Ministry remains an institution firmly wedded to the NATO alliance and to transatlantic co-operation and has been cautious over the development of EU capabilities.21 Europeanisation has only had a modest impact on the Defence Ministry. Volker Rühe’s time in office was dominated by his concerns over eastern enlargement of NATO and restructuring the Bundeswehr to meet peacetime demands. In addition, Rühe saw in the Bundeswehr an institution which could symbolise the efforts made to reintegrate both eastern and western parts of Germany and to reinforce Germany’s continued commitment to NATO. This cautious attitude to restructuring in terms of building EU capabilities and in regards to conscription has continued under Scharping, Struck and now Jung.

196 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

Public opinion provides solid support for European initiatives in foreign policy but has been generally reluctant to consider the use of military force compared with other major EU states.22 In terms of wider foreign policy issues, Lantis finds that, ‘public opinion seems to have lagged behind elite attitudes on German foreign policy restructuring in the 1990s, rather than shaping the parameters of acceptable behaviour.’23 Since the Kosovo War, public opinion has demonstrated remarkable continuity in its support of EU foreign and security co-operation. There is strong domestic support for developing CFSP still further. Public opinion remains more cautious when it comes to discussions with defence implications within theEU. Germans in general are in favour of greater co-operation in civilian crisis management and diplomatic solutions to foreign policy challenges and less keen on German involvement in military crisis management. This suggests that public opinion has been resistant to adaptational impulses emanating from Germany’s involvement in CFSP. Constitutional and legislative change has been minimal. The key judgment took place in July 1994 with the Constitutional Court’s decision on issue of ‘out-of-area’ deployment of the Bundeswehr which opened up the possibility for Germany to play a larger role in transatlantic burden-sharing. Legislative changes stemming from agreements on CFSP as part of the EU treaties have been minimal. Finally, resource reallocation resulting from commitments to CFSP have been negligible. Germany’s Defence budget has been greatly reduced, with successive defence ministers being forced to make cuts to the Bundeswehr to find the necessary resources to fund the armed forces’ modernisation. Cuts in the defence budget have also gone hand-inhand with cuts in personnel numbers to reflect the Bundeswehr’s new operational remit. Domestic economic difficulties resulting in pressure on German public spending have witnessed cuts in the defence budget. Post-unification German governments have not implemented any significant investment in the Bundeswehr to build capabilities for Germany’s future role in transatlantic burden-sharing (Table C.3).

Wider implications of this study for the analysis of Europeanisation in Member States This book concentrates on one EU Member State to assess Germany’s role in the CFSP of the European Union. This study has sought to develop a typology which can be applicable to other EU Member States to assess the impact of the EU’s foreign and security policy under the impact

Table C.3

German downloading

Downloading Mechanism

German Adaptation

Elite socialisation

Both the CDU/CSU/FDP and the SPD/Bündnis 90/Die Grünen have committed to the incremental strengthening of CFSP; Themes of responsibility and dependability have been hallmarks of the German government’s growing role within CFSP; Awareness of need for greater participation in military crisis management – but only as a last resort.

Bureaucratic reorganisation

Policy-making remains mainly Berlin-based despite the establishment of new CFSP institutions; The emergence of a PSC ‘team’ in the German EU Permanent Representation in Brussels marks the emerge of Brusselsisation of German CFSP, but this remains limited in scope; The Defence Ministry has only modest input into CFSP/ESDP and plays a conservative role in foreign and security policy due to the ongoing Bundeswehr reform.

Constitutional change/ legislative adaptation

The Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of 12th July 1994 remains the landmark decision impacting on Germany’s deployment of troops in crisis management operations; Legislative changes as a result of implementing treaty commitments as part of CFSP have been modest.

Public opinion adaptation

Public Opinion has remained consistently behind Germany’s support of the EU’s international role; Where public opinion shows signs of national singularities is in its reluctance to consider German participation in military operations as part of CESDP; Public opinion remains a domestic constraint on the scope of Germany’s involvement in CFSP.

Resource reallocation

Germany’s defence budget has been on a continuous slide throughout the 1990s so there has not been an increase in or substantial reallocation of resources to build CFSP; The Bundeswehr remains embedded in NATO structures despite small-scale commitments to building European capabilities in the form of the ERRF.

198 Germany and EU Foreign Policy

of the process of Europeanisation. The assertion that Europeanisation is the result of domestic adaptation and national influence in a process of uploading and downloading will also have relevance for the theoretical literature on the concept of Europeanisation which remains divided on whether it should focus solely on downloading or factor in national inputs – uploading.24 This study proves that Germany has not merely been a passive object in adapting to European policy developments. Rather, German policy-makers have been central to the framing of CFSP throughout the 1990s, as they sought to shape CFSP to match German preferences. Agency and structure are therefore key to understanding how Europeanisation emerges within the EU. It is hoped that the findings within this book will add to the literature on the development of Germany’s foreign and security policy since the end of the Cold War. Much of the literature of German foreign policy has characterised Germany as a Europeanised power par excellence.25 Yet there are clear limiting conditions which this study has outlined, stemming in the main from the domestic level. Germany’s CFSP policy remains very much driven by policy elites, ensuring that CFSP does not rank highly in terms of political saliency in the German policy. Without the backing of interest groups within Germany, there appears to be no pressure on the Federal government to pursue policy objectives involving deeper integration with Germany’s EU partners. Sensitivities still remain concerning the use of force, despite the growth in Bundeswehr deployment across the globe.26 However, Germany still maintains conscription, a singularity which complicates its ability to co-operate effectively with France and the United Kingdom in military crisis management.27 The findings contained within this book also add to the assumption within much of the literature that Germany is becoming a more normal state, both in terms of its attitude towards the use of military force, and in terms of its growing confidence in stating national interests in its dealings with its main partners, that is its conception of power.28 Germany has not undergone a process of maladaptation defined as a retreat to national solutions to foreign policy challenges. Germany has not reassessed its commitment to the EU’s foreign and security policy as a result of its improved international position since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Adaptation where it has taken place, has taken the form of Europeanisation, where the EU has become a more important institution for the pursuit of German foreign and security policy interests.

Notes Introduction 1. It is important to note that whilst the international context of German foreign policy changed virtually overnight with the end of the Cold War, the content of German foreign policy was resistant to wholesale changes. To this end Eberwein and Kaiser state, ‘To a certain extent, when Germany was unified and attained full sovereignty, its position in international politics changed overnight’, in Eberwein, W.-D. and Kaiser, K. (eds) (2001), p. 3, Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-making in an Interdependent World (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Banchoff contends that, ‘The collapse of the Soviet bloc and reunification transformed the context of German foreign policy’ in Banchoff, T. (1999), p. 131, The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945–1995 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 2. Ladrech, R. (1994), ‘Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: the case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/1: 69–88; Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’, in K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) (2003), German, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345; Lüdeke, A. (2002), Europäisierung der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik: Konstitutive und operative Europapolitik zwischen Maastricht und Amsterdam (Opladen: Leske
Budrich); Schmalz, U. (2004), Deutschlands europäisierte Aussenpolitik (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag); Smith, M. E. (2000), ‘Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-operation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/4: 613–631; Torreblanca, J. I. (2001), ‘Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy’, Arena Working Papers, WP01/26, University of Oslo. 3. Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2000), ‘Coming to Terms with Europe: Europeanisation, Whitehall and the Challenge of Devolution’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, No. 9/2000, Queens University Belfast, http://www.qub. ac.uk/ies/onlinepapers/poe9.pdf 4. Art 17 Treaty on European Union – humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. 5. Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2001), ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture’, International Affairs, 77/3: 587–603; Meyer, C. O. (2005), ‘Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, European Journal of International Relations, 11/4: 523–549. For a more elaborated version of this argument see also, Meyer, C. O. (2006), The Quest for a European Strategic Culture (Basingstoke, Palgrave). Longhurst defines strategic culture as, ‘ … a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a collective (usually a nation) and arise gradually over time, through a unique and protracted historical process. 199

200 Notes Strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.’ See, Longhurst, K. and Zaborowski, M. (eds) (2005), Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security (London: Routledge). 6. Garton-Ash, T. (1993), ‘Germany’s Choice’, in Foreign Affairs, 73/4: 65–81; Zimmer, M. (1997), ‘Return of the Mittelage? The Discourse of the Centre in German Foreign Policy’, German Politics, 6/1: 23–38; Wallace, W. (1990), ‘Deutschlands zentrale Rolle: Ein Versuch die europäische Frage neu zu definieren’, Integration 13. Jg, 1/90, Beilage zur Europäischen Zeitung; Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1996), ‘Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?’, International Affairs, 72/1: 9–32; Bach, J. P. G. (1999), Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National Identity After 1989 (New York: Lit Verlag/St.Martin’s Press); Bulmer, S., Jeffrey, C. and Paterson, W. E. (1997), ‘Shaping the regional milieu’, Gutachten für die Forschungsgruppe Europa und die Bertelsmann Wissenschaftsstiftung, München; Janning, J. and Meyer, P. (1998), Deutsche Europapolitik: Vorschläge zur Effektivierung (Gütersloh: Verlag Bertelsmann Stiftung); Pond, E. and Schoenbaum, D. (1996), The German Question and other German Questions (Basingstoke: Macmillan) Marsh, D. (1995), Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unity (London: Mandarin); Rometsch, D. (1995), ‘The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Union: Patterns of Institutional and Administrative Interaction’, Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper 95/2, University of Birmingham; Garton-Ash, T. (1994), In Europe’s Name (London: Vintage); Katzenstein, P. (1987), Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of A Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press); Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1987), The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community, (London: Allen and Unwin); Collins, S. D. (1998), Managing the Agenda? German Policy-Making with Regard to Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, PhD Study, Institute for German Studies, University of Birmingham; Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.) (1997), Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. E. (2000), Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu (Manchester: Manchester University Press); Banchoff, T. (1999), The German Problem Transformed: Institutions, Politics and Foreign Policy, 1945–95 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press). 7. Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1987), The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: Allen and Unwin); Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1996), ‘Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?’, International Affairs, 72/1: 9–32; Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. E. (2000), Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu (Manchester: Manchester University Press); Katzenstein, P. (1987), Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press). 8. For three excellent studies tackling German conceptions of European security see, Remmert, M. (1994), Westeuropäische Zusammenarbeit in der Sicherheitsund Verteidigungspolitik: Positionen von Regierung und Koalitionsparteien der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1982–1991), (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag); Rühl, L. (1995), Deutschland als Europäische Macht, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn; Sauder, A. (1995) Souveränität und Integration (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag).

Notes 201 9. Eliassen, K. A. (ed.) (1998), Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union (London: Sage); Hill, C. (ed.) (1996), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge); Hill, C. (ed.) (1983), National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (Hemel Hempstead: Allen and Unwin); AICGS (1999), Franco-German relations and European Integration: a transatlantic dialogue – Challenges for German and American Foreign Policy, Conference Report, 16th September 1999, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies; Wyatt-Walter, H. (1997), The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979–92 (Basingstoke: Macmillan); Ifestos, P. (1987), European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework for Supranational Diplomacy (Aldershot: Avebury); Carlsnaes, W. and Smith, S. (1993), European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: Sage); Howorth, J. and Menon, A. (eds) (1997), The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge); Aybet, G. (1997), The Dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945–91 (Basingstoke: Macmillan); Nuttall, S. (1992), European Political Co-operation (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Regelsberger, E., De Schoutheete de Tervarent, P. and Wessels, W. (eds) (1997), From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers); Tsakaloyannis, P. (1996), The European Union as a Security Community: Problems and Prospects (BadenBaden: Nomos Verlag); Van Eekelen, W. (1998), Debating European Security, 1948–1998 (The Hague: Sdu Publishers). 10. Lüdeke, A. (2002), ‘Europäisierung’ der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik? (Opladen: Leske
Budrich) Schmalz, U. (2004), Deutschlands europäisierte Außenpolitik, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden. 11. For an excellent survey see, Olsen, J. P. (2002), ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/5: 921–952. 12. For example, Ladrech, R. (1994), ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/ 1: 69–88; Croft, S. (2000), ‘The EU, NATO and Europeanisation: The Return of Architectural Debate’, European Security, 9/ 3: 1–20; Solana, J. (1996), ‘NATO: Shaping up for the future’, Speech to the IISS, 19 September 1996, London, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s960919b.htm 13. Miskimmon, A. J. (2001), ‘Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship’, in D. Webber, (ed.) New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy: German Foreign Policy since Unification (London: Frank Cass and Co.). 14. Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. A. and Risse, T. (2001), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H. (eds) (2003), Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/ Oxford University Press); Ladrech, R. (1994) ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/1: 69–88; Olsen, J. P. (2002), ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/5: 921–952; Tonra, B. (2001), The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate). 15. Torreblanca, J. I. (2001), ‘Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy’, Arena Working Papers, WP01/26, University of Oslo. 16. They include, Lüdeke, A. (2002) ‘Europäisierung’ der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?: Konstitutive und operative Europapolitik zwischen Maastricht

202 Notes

17. 18. 19.

20.

21. 22.

23.

und Amsterdam (Opladen: Leske
Budrich); Manners, I. and Whitman, R. (2001), The Foreign Policies of European Member States (Manchester: Manchester University Press); Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003) ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’, in K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/ Oxford University Press); Torreblanca, J. I. (2001), ‘Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy’, Arena Working Papers, WP01/26, University of Oslo. Rosenau, J. N. (1981), p. 29, The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics (London: Frances Pinter). Gourevitch, P. (1978), p. 882, ‘The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics’, International Organization, 32/4: 881–912. Rosenau uses the terms adaptation and maladaptation in his study of 1981. Rosenau, J. N. (1981), The Study of Political Adaptation: Essays on the Analysis of World Politics (London: Frances Pinter). Duffield, J. S. (1998), World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Culture after Unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Putnam, R. (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of two-level games’, International Organisation, 42/3: 427–460. Key texts include, Anderson, J. J. (2002), ‘Europeanization and the Transformation of the Democratic Polity – 1945–2000’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41/5: 793–822; Bomberg, E. and Peterson, J. (2000), ‘Policy Transfer and Europeanization: Passing the Heiniken Test?’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanization No.2/2000, Queen’s University, Belfast, http://www.qub.ac. uk/ies/onlinepapers/poe2.html; Börzel, T. A. (1999), ‘Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation in German and Spain’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39/4: 573–596; Börzel, T. A. (2001), The Domestic Impact of Europe: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Börzel, T. A. and Risse, T. (2000), ‘When Europe hits home: Europeanization and Domestic Change’, European University Institute, RSC Working Paper, 2000/56; Goetz, K. H. and Hix, S. (eds) (2001), Europeanised Politics. European Integration and National Political Systems (London: Frank Cass); Harmsen, R. (1999), ‘The Europeanization of National Administrations: A Comparative Study of France and the Netherlands’, Governance, 12/1: 81–113; Green-Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. and Risse, T. (2001), Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Dyson, K. (2000a), ‘Europeanization, Whitehall Culture and the Treasury as Institutional Veto Player: A Constructivist Approach to Economic and Monetary Union’, Public Administration, 78/4: 897–914; Dyson, K. (2000b), ‘EMU as Europeanization: Convergence, Diversity and Contingency’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38/4: 645–666; Knill, C. (2001), The Europeanization of National Administrations, Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Kohler-Koch, B. and Eising, R. (eds) (1999), The Transformation of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge). Ladrech, R. (1994), ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/ 1: 69–88; Ladrech, R.

Notes 203

24.

25. 26.

27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

(2001), ‘Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework of Analysis’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanization, No.2/2001, Queens University, Belfast. However, Ladrech has more recently appeared to accept the significance of uploading within Europeanisation. See, Ladrech, R. (2004), p. 64, ‘Europeanization and the Member States’, in M. Green Cowles and D. Dinan (eds) (2004), Developments in the European Union: 2 (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 47–64. Ladrech, R. (1994), p. 69, ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: the Case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/ 1: 69–88. Börzel, T. A. (2003), ‘Shaping and taking EU Policies: Member State Responses to Europeanization’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation, No. 2/2003. Koenig-Archibugi explains government preferences on institutional change in CFSP by the analysis of four central factors: relative power capabilities, foreign policy interests, Europeanised identities and domestic multilevel governance structures. Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004), ‘Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy’, International Organization, 58/1: 137–174. This study factors in these four criteria to its analysis of German participation in the development of CFSP. Dunleavy, P. (1991), Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf). Russell Holden has charted the development of the Labour Party’s European Policy in these terms. See, Holden, R. (2002), The Making of New Labour’s European Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave). For an analysis of how Member States contribute to the bottom-up aspect of Europeanisation, see also, Beyers, J. and Trondal, J. (2003), ‘How Nation-States “hit” Europe: Ambiguity and Representation in the European Union’, European Integration Online Papers (EIOP), 7/5, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/ 2003-005.pdf Bomberg, E. and Peterson, J. (2000), ‘Policy Transfer and Europeanization: Passing the Heineken test?’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation No.2/2000, Queen’s University, Belfast. Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Moravcsik, A. (1993), ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31: 473–524. On this point see, Majone, G. (1989), Evidence, Argument and Persuasion in the Policy Process (New Haven: Yale University Press). Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’, in K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), 325–425. However, Smith has noted some aspects of a legal order creeping into the CFSP process – Smith, M. E. (2001), ‘Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39/1: 79–104. See also, Tilikainen, T. (2001), ‘To Be or Not To Be?: An Analysis of the Legal and Political Elements of Statehood in the EU’s External Identity’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 6: 223–241. Moravcsik, A. (1993), ‘Armaments Among Allies: European Weapons Collaboration, 1975–1985’, in P. B. Evans, H. K. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam

204 Notes

34.

35.

36. 37.

38.

39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44.

(eds) Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press), pp.128–168. For example, Wincott, D. (1995), ‘Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33: 597–609; Forster, A. (1998), ‘Britain and the Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty: A Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36/3: 347–368. Aggestam, L. (2004), ‘Role Identity and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach’, in B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds) (2004), Rethinking European Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 81–98; Lüdeke, A. (2002), Europäisierung der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik: Konstitutive und operative Europapolitik zwischen Maastricht und Amsterdam (Opladen: Leske
Budrich); Torreblanca, J. I. (2001). ‘Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy’, Arena Working Papers, WP01/26, University of Oslo. However, Irondelle paints a more explicit picture of the mechanisms through which Europeanisation occurs. See, Irondelle, B. (2003), ‘Europeanization Without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991–96’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10/2: 208–226 and Rieker, P. (2004), ‘Europeanization of Nordic Security: The European Union and the Changing Security Identities of the Nordic States’, Cooperation and Conflict, 39/4: 369–392. For example, Lübkemeier, E. (1997), ‘Europäisierung der NATO?’, Die Neue Gesellschaft, Frankfurter Hefte, 44/1: 16–21. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’ in Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H. (eds) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–425. Smith, M. E. (2000) ‘Conforming to Europe: the Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Cooperation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/4, pp. 613–631. Smith concentrates on European Political Co-operation in this article but the classifications of adaptation which he employs have relevance for CFSP. Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H. (eds) (2003) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press). Olsen, J. P. (2002), p. 936, ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/5: 921–952. Haftendorn, H. (2001), Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Selbstbeschränkung und Selbstbehauptung, (Stüttgart und München: DVA Verlag). Ibid. Indeed Hellmann describes Germany’s participation in Europe as a ‘symbiotic relationship’ (eine symbiothische Beziehung) Hellmann, G. (2002), ‘Deutschland in Europa: Eine symbiothische Beziehung’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, December 2002, B48/2002: 24–31. An exception is, Irondelle, B. (2003), ‘Europeanization without the European Union? French Military Reforms 1991–96’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10/2: 208–226. Irondelle outlines indirect pressures, institutional mediations, socialisation and learning as the three key mechanisms of Europeanisation in

Notes 205

45.

46.

47.

48. 49.

50.

51.

52.

his study of French military doctrine. Yet, this study focuses on domestic adaptation and not on the ability of the nation-state to influence policy development. March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (2004), ‘The Logic of Appropriateness’, Arena Working Paper, WP04/09, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp04_9.pdf. See also, their landmark work, March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989), Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press). Smith, M. E. (2000), ‘Conforming to Europe: The Domestic Impact of EU Foreign Policy Co-operation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/ 4: 613–631. See also, Smith, M. E. (2004), ‘Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Co-operation’, European Journal of International Relations, 10/1: 95–136; Smith, M. E. (2004), Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Co-operation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). See, Checkel, J. T. (1999), ‘Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe’, International Studies Quarterly, 43/1: 83–114. Checkel highlights the importance of ‘norm diffusion’ as part of this socialisation/social learning process. On the conditions for the successful acceptance of a norm, Kratochwil states, ‘The decisive criterion is whether direct communication takes places among the parties in regard to the norm, or whether its operation is unilaterally inferred or imputed from each others’ actions’, see, Kratochwil, F. (1989), p. 55, Rules, Norms and decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Hill, C. (2003), The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 262–268. The final aspect of exaggerated multilateralism/institution building draws on Nina Phillipi’s concept of ‘salami tactics’ where Germany seeks to achieve policy objectives with small, incremental steps. Philippi, N. (1997), Bundeswehr-Auslandseinsätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang Verlag); Philippi, N. (2001), Civilian Power and War: The German Debate About out-of-Area Operations’, in S. Harnisch and H. W. Maull (eds) Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 49–67. See, Hayes–Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (1996), The Council of Ministers, (Basingstoke: Macmillan); Tallberg, J. (2003), ‘The Agenda-shaping Powers of the EU Council Presidency’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10/1: 1–19. See, Larsen, H. (1997), Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe (London: Routledge); Larsen, H. (2004), ‘Discourse Analysis in the Study of European Foreign Policy’, in B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds) Rethinking European Union foreign policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 62–80. Also Howorth, J. (2004), ‘Discourse, Ideas and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy’, West European Politics, 27/2: 211–234. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’, in K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) German, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345.

206 Notes 53. Genscher, H.-D. (1998), Rebuilding a House Divided (New York: Broadway Books). 54. Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1987), p. 44, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community, (London: Allen and Unwin). Musterknabe can also have the connotation of ‘swat’ or of being ‘out of touch with reality’, which is illuminating the dichotomous attitude often displayed by Germany in CFSP affairs. Interview with German Civil Servant, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, 7 July 2003. 55. Siwert-Probst, J. (2001), p. 19, ‘Traditional Institutions of Foreign Policy’, in W.-D. Eberwein and K. Kaiser (eds) Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decisionmaking in an Interdependent World (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 19–37. 56. For more information on the role and organisation of the German Foreign Ministry, see, Brandt, E. and Buck, C. (2002), Auswärtiges Amt: Diplomatie als Beruf, 2. Auflage (Opladen: Leske
Budrich). 57. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003) ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp Between Transformation and Accommodation’, Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H. (eds), German, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345. 58. A Spiegelabteilung is effectively a department which amongst its tasks is to monitor the work of another ministry – the European Department in the Chancellery is perhaps the best example of this in monitoring the work of other ministries involved in European affairs, notably the Auswärtiges Amt. Discussion with a researcher in the House of Commons, London, July 2003. 59. Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.4.1, ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence.’ 60. See, Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1987), The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community (London: Allen and Unwin); Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1996), ‘Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?’, International Affairs, 72: 9–32; Bulmer, S., Maurer, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2001), ‘The European Policy Machinery in the Bonn Republic: Hindrance or Handmaiden?’, German Politics, 10/1: 177–206; Katzenstein, P. (1987), Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press); Johnson, N. (1983), State and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: The Executive at Work, 2nd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Derlien, H.-U. (2000), ‘Failing Successfully?’, in K. Kassim, B. G. Peters and V. Wright (eds) The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 54–78; Maurer, A. and Wessels, W. (2001), ‘The German Case: A key Moderator in a Competitive Multi-level Environment’, in H. Kassim, A. Menon, B. G. Peters and V. Wright (eds) The National Coordination of EU Policy: The European Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 101–128. 61. Kassim, H. (2001) ‘Representing the United Kingdom in Brussels: The Fine Art of Positive Co-Ordination’, in Kassim, H., Menon, A., Peters, B. G. and Wright, V. (eds) The National Co-Ordination of EU Policy: The European Level (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 47–74.

Notes 207 62. Interview in the Europa Abteilung (Abteilung V), Kanzleramt, Berlin, 8 July 2003. 63. Axel Lüdeke also makes the important distinction between constitutive and operative policy in German CFSP. Lüdeke, A. (2002) ‘Europäisierung’ der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?: Konstitutive und operative Europapolitik zwischen Maastricht und Amsterdam, (Opladen: Leske und Budrich). 64. Interviews in the Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Brussels 2nd and 3rd July 2003. Maurer and Wessels pinpoint the ineffectiveness of Germany’s Permanent Representation to the European Union as being down to difficulties arising from the vertical and horizontal diffusion of power in Germany which is out of step with the policy-making style in Brussels. Maurer, A. and Wessels, W. (2000), ‘Die Ständige Vertretung Deutschlands bei der EU – Scharnier im administrativen Mehrebenensystem’, in B. Kohler-Koch and M. Knodt (Hrsg.) Deutschland zwischen Europäisierung und Selbstbehauptung (Frankfurt/Main: Campus), pp. 293–324. 65. Interview with German diplomat, Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Brussels, 3rd July 2003. See, Table 1. 66. Wallace, H. and Wallace, W. (1996), p. 427, Policy-making in the European Union, 3rd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 67. Interview with German diplomat, Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 3 July 2003. Interview with British diplomat, UKREP, Brussels, 30th June 2003. 68. Cited in Wyatt-Walter, H. (1997), p. 202, The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979–92 (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 69. See, Figure 3. 70. Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. E. (2000), p. 78, Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 71. Hill, C. (1993), ‘The Capabilities-expectations Gap or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3: 305–328. See also, Hill, C. (1998), ‘Closing the Capabilities-expectation Gap?’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge); Ginsberg, R. H. (1999), ‘Conceptualizing the European Union as an International Actor: Narrowing the Capability-Expectations Gap’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37/3: 429–454. 72. Smith, M. (2001), p. 297, ‘The EU as an International Actor’, in J. Richardson (ed.) European Union: Power and Policy-making (London: Routledge), pp. 283–301. See also, Elgstöm, O. and Smith, M. (eds) (2001), ‘Negotiation and Policy-making in the European Union: Process, System, Order’, Special Issue of the Journal of European Public Policy, 7/5. 73. Hill, C. (1993), ‘The Capability-expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3: 305–328. 74. As Joachim Bitterlich stated, ‘It can no longer be the case that some EU Member States benefit from the military status of others’, cited in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Schengen eine Katastrophe – eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik gibt es nicht’, 9 October 1995.

208 Notes

1 Germany, the European Community and the Challenges of the End of the Cold War 1. Smith, M. E. (2003), p. 176, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 2. Anderson, J. (1997), ‘Hard interests, Soft Power, and Germany’s Changing Role in Europe’, in P. Katzenstein (ed.) Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 80–107. 3. Garton-Ash, T. (1993), p. 262, In Europe’s Name (London: Vintage). 4. Anderson, J. and Goodman, J. (1993), ‘Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe’, in R. Keohane, J. Nye and S. Hoffmann (eds) After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 5. Wallace, W. (1983), p. 10, ‘Introduction: Cooperation and Convergence in European policy’, in C. Hill (ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (London: Allen and Unwin): 1–16. 6. Ifestos, P. (1987), p. 285, European Political Cooperation: Towards a Framework for Supranational Diplomacy (Adershot: Avebury). 7. Remmert, M. (1994), p. 24, Westeuropäische Zusammenarbeit in der Sicherheitsund Verteidigungspolitik (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag). 8. Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1996), ‘Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?’, International Affairs, 72/1: 9–32. 9. Hedetoft, U. cited in, Aggestam, L. (1999), ‘Role Conceptions and The Politics of Identity in Foreign Policy’, Arena Working Paper 99/8, http://www.sv.uio.no/ arena/publications/wp99_8.htm 10. Becher, K. (2004), p. 404, ‘German Forces in International Military Operations’, Orbis, 48/3: 397–408. 11. Preamble to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (The Brussels Treaty) Brussels, 17 March 1948. 12. Fursdon, E. (1980), The European Defence Community: A History (Basingstoke: Palgrave); Ruane, K. (2000), The rise and fall of the European Defence Community (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 13. The European Defence Community Treaty, Paris, 27 May 1952, Part I, Chapter I, Article I. 14. Brombart, S. N. (1993), p. 140, ‘Uneasy Partners in Foreign Policy-Making: European Political Cooperation and the European Community’, Vierteljahresberichte, Nr.132: 139–160. 15. North Atlantic Council (1967) Ministerial Communiqué, Brussels, 13–14 December 1967, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c671213b.htm (The Harmel Report). 16. Report on the Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report), Brussels, December 1967, paragraph 8. 17. Genscher, H.-D. (1998), p. 49, Rebuilding a House Divided (New York: Broadway Books). 18. Wallace, W. (1983), p. 5. ‘Introduction: Cooperation and Convergence in European Foreign Policy’, in C. Hill (ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (London: Allen and Unwin), pp. 1–16.

Notes 209 19. Soetendorp, B. (1994), p. 115, ‘The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy Actor’, in W. Carlsnaes and S. Smith (eds) European Foreign policy. The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: Sage), pp. 103–119. 20. Brombart, S.-N. (1993), p. 141, ‘Uneasy Partners in Foreign Policy-Making: European Political Cooperation and the European Community’, Vierteljahresberichte, Nr.132: 139–160. 21. Wallace, W. (1983), p. 1, ‘Introduction: Cooperation and Convergence in European Foreign Policy’, in C. Hill (ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (London: Allen and Unwin), pp. 1–16. 22. Tsakaloyannis, P. (1996), p. 50, The European Union as a Security Community: Problems and Prospects (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft). 23. Wallace, W. (1983), p.2, ‘Introduction: Cooperation and Convergence in European Foreign Policy’, in C. Hill (ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (London: Allen and Unwin), pp. 1–16. 24. Tindemans, L. (1975), Report of the European Union (The Tindemans Report), 29 December 1975. 25. Wyatt-Walter, H. (1997), p. 102, The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979–92 (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 26. Statement by Mr Giulio Andreotti, Italian Foreign Minister and President-inOffice of the Council of Ministers, before the European Parliament, 11 Jun 1985, Strasbourg, in, European Foreign Policy Bulletin Online, 85/096, http://www.arc1.iue.it/iue/efpball?nd85%2f096 27. Wallace, W. (1983), p. 2, ‘Introduction: Cooperation and Convergence in European Foreign Policy’, in C. Hill (ed.) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation (London: Allen and Unwin): 1–16. 28. Salmon, T. (1992), ‘Testing Times for European Political Co-operation: the Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990-1992’, International Affairs, 68/2: 233–253. 29. The London Report, 1981. 30. Solemn Declaration on European Union, 1983. 31. Nuttall, S. (1992), p. 189, European Political Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 32. Aybet, G. (1997), p. 137, The dynamics of European Security Cooperation, 1945–91 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Limited). 33. Nuttall, S. (1992), p. 245, European Political Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 34. Ibid., p. 246. 35. SEA Title III, Art.30 (5) cited in Brombart, 1993, p. 139. 36. Salmon, T. (1992), p. 234. 37. Wyatt-Walter, H. (1997), p. 110, The European Community and the Security Dilemma, 1979–92 (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 38. Edwards, G. and Regelsberger, E. (1990), Europe’s Global Links: The European Community and Inter-regional Co-operation (London: Pinter). 39. Wessels, W. (2002), ‘Hans Dietrich Genscher: Initiator des interregionalen Dialogs – Architekt einer Zivilmacht Europe’, in H.-D. Lucas (Hrsg.) Genscher, Deutschland und Europa (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 185–200. 40. Garton-Ash, T. (1994), In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage); Jarausch, K. (1994), The Rush to German Unity (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Fritsch-Bournazel, R. (1992), Europe and German unification (Oxford: Berg); Gaddis, J. L. (1987), The Long Peace: Inquiries Into

210 Notes

41.

42.

43. 44.

45. 46. 47.

48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53.

the History of the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Gaddis, J. L. (1997), We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Hogan, M. (1992), The Ending of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Westad, O. (2000), Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass); Blacker, C. (1990), ‘The collapse of Soviet power in Europe’ Foreign Affairs, 70/1: 88–103; Kaiser, K. (1990), ‘Germany’s Unification,’ Foreign Affairs, 70/1: 179–206; Nixon, R. (1988), ‘American Foreign Policy: The Bush Agenda,’ Foreign Affairs, 68/1: 199–220. Glaessner, G.-J. (1992), The Unification Process in Germany: From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London: Pinter); Anderson, J. J. and Goodman, J. B. (1993), ‘Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War Europe’, in R. O. Keohane J. S. Nye and Hoffmann, S. After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), pp. 23–62. Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990), ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15/1: 5–56; Layne, C. (1993), ‘The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, International Security, 17/4: 5–51; Waltz, K. (1993), ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, 18/2: 44–79. Bach, J. P. G. (1999), p. 15, Between Sovereignty and Integration: German Foreign Policy and National Identity After 1989 (New York: Lit Verlag/St.Martin’s Press). Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990), ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15/1: 5–56; see also, Layne, C. (1993), ‘The Unipolar Vision: Why Great Powers Will Rise’, International Security, 17/4: 5–51; Bergner, J. T. (1991), The New Superpowers: Germany, Japan, the USA and the New World Order (New York: St. Martin’s Press); Hacke, C. (1997) Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein). Pond, E. and Schoenbaum, D. (1996), p. 179, The German Question and other German Questions (Basingstoke: Macmillan). Ibid., p. 187. Marcussen, M. et al. (1999), p. 624, ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6/4: 614–33. Garton-Ash, T. (1993), p. 385, In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent (London: Vintage). Paterson, W. E. (1998), ‘Germany and EMU’, in Lankowski, C. (ed.) AICGS Research Report No.8, Break Out, Break Down or Break in? Germany and the European Union after Amsterdam, pp. 31–38. Anderson, J. J. (1997) p. 80, ‘Hard interests, Soft Power, and Germany’s changing role in Europe’, in Katzenstein, P. (ed.) Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 80–107. Ibid., pp. 81–82. Garton-Ash, T. (1993) pp. 74–79, ‘Germany’s Choice’, Foreign Affairs, 73/4: 65–81. Hyde-Price, A. (1997), ‘Germany’s security policy dilemmas: NATO, the WEU and the OSCE’, in, Larres, K. (ed.) Germany since unification: The domestic and external consequences (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 203–231. See also,

Notes 211

54.

55. 56.

57. 58. 59.

60. 61.

62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70.

Chancellor Kohl’s explicit framing of German policy within the Sowohl – als Auch’ paradigm – Kohl, H. (1992), ‘Die Bedeutung der Westeuropäischen Union für die gemeinsame Sicherheitspolitik’, Ansprache des Bundeskanzlers vor den Chefs der Generalstäbe der WEU-Staaten am 27. Januar im Bundeskanzleramt in Bonn, Bulletin, Nr.11/S.77, Bonn den.31 Januar 1992. Tewes, H. (2002), Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave). In relation to the choices facing Germany in Europe Gunther Hellmann has identified five schools of thought within the debate over the future course of German foreign policy; pragmatic multilateralist, europeanist, euroskeptics, internationalist and normalisation-nationalists. These groupings relate to policy preferences held by policy-makers as well as, in the case of the internationalist and the normalisation-nationalists, options for the pursuit of German grand strategy. Hellmann, G. (1996), ‘Goodbye Bismarck? The foreign policy of contemporary Germany’, Mershon International Studies Review, 40/1: 1–39. Marsh, D. (1995), p. 138, Germany and Europe: The Crisis of Unity (London: Mandarin). Kirchner, E. J. (1996) ‘Germany and the European Union: From Junior to Senior Role’, in Smith, G., Paterson, W. E. and Padgett, S. (eds) Developments in German Politics: 2 (Houndmills: Macmillan), pp. 156–172. Pedersen, T. (1998), France, Germany and The Integration of Europe: A Realist Interpretation (London: Pinter). Schmidt, M. (2003), Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press). See, Wessels, W. (1992), ‘Staat und (westeuropäische) Integration. Die Fusionsthese’, in Kreile, M. (Hrsg.) Die Integration Europas, PVS-Sonderheft 23, Opladen, S. 36–61. Prince, M. K. (1995), p. 3, ‘Germany, Europe and the Dilemma of Democratic Legitimation’, Aussenpolitik, 1/95: 3–13. Bulmer, S. (1997), p. 49, ‘Shaping the rules? The constitutive politics of the European Union and German power’, in Katzenstein, P. (ed.) Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press), pp. 49–79. Ibid., pp. 14–15. VonWeizäcker, R. (1990), cited in, Joffe, J. (1990), p. 84, ‘The Security implications of a United Germany’, in America’s role in a changing world, Part II, Adelphi Paper No. 257, IISS 32 Annual Conference Papers, pp. 84–91. Genscher, H.-D. (1998), pp. 471–486. Ibid. Speech to the Bundestag by Foreign Minister Genscher, 23 August 1990, cited in, Genscher, H.-D. (1998), p. 474. Crawford, B. (1996), ‘Explaining defection from international cooperation – Germany’s unilateral recognition of Croatia’, World Politics, 48/4: 482–521. Ginsberg, R. H. (2001), p. 28, The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield). Schoenbaum, D. and Pond, E. (1996), p. 178, The German question and other German questions (Houndmills: Macmillan Press). Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999), p. 748, The Road to Maastricht (Oxford: Oxford University).

212 Notes 71. For example, Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999), The Road to Maastricht (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Mazzucelli, C. (1997) France and Germany at Maastricht (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc.). 72. Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999), p. 751, The Road to Maastricht (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 73. VanEvera, S. (1990/1991), ‘Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, 15/3: 7–57. 74. Smith, M. E. (2003), p. 179, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 75. For an examination of issue linkage and bargaining within the European integration process see, Huelshoff, M. G. (1994) ‘Domestic Politics and Dynamic Issue Linkage: A Reformulation of Integration Theory’, International Studies Quarterly, 38/2: 255–279. 76. Buzan, B. and Waever, O. (2003), p. 362, Regions and Powers: The structure of International Security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 77. Kohl and Mitterrand’s leadership was also vital in negotiations surrounding EMU. As Dyson and Featherstone state, ‘Kohl and Mitterrand sought to escape the confines of EMU as negotiated by bureaucracies and constrained by bureaucratic politics and to focus on the big issues of creating a viable European structure to ensure a stable peace order in the wake of German unification. Without this political leadership, agreement would have proved protracted and quite possibly elusive’, in Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999) p. 757, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford University Press). 78. Soetendorp, B. (1993), ‘The Evolution of the EC/EU as a Single Foreign Policy Actor’ in Carlsnaes, W. and Smith, S. (eds) European Foreign Policy: The EC and Changing Perspectives in Europe (London: Sage), pp. 103–119; Hurd, D. (1994), ‘Developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (in Setting an Agenda) International Affairs, 70/3: 421–428. 79. Gnesotto, N. (1991), ‘European Defence: Why not the Twelve?’, Chaillot Paper No.1, http://www.iss-eu.org/; Smith, M. and Woolcock, S. (1993), The United States and the European Community in a transformed World (London: Pinter); Regelsberger, E., De Schoutheete de Tervarent, P. and Wessels, W. (1997), ‘From EPC to CFSP: Does Maastricht Push the EU Toward a Role as a Global Power?’ in Regelsberger, E., De Schoutheete de Tervarent, P. and Wessels, W. (eds) Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond (London: Lynne Rienner); Sloan, S. R. (1990), ‘NATO’s future in a new Europe,’ International Affairs, 66/3; Ullman, R. (1990), ‘Enlarging the zone of peace,’ Foreign Policy, No. 80; Ullman, R. (1991), Securing Europe (London: Adamantime); Meuller, J. (1989), ‘A New Concert of Europe,’ Foreign Policy, No. 77, 1989–1990; Kupchan, C. and Kupchan, C. (1991), ‘Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe,’ International Security, 16/1: 114–161. 80. Fink-Hooijer, F. (1994), ‘The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union’, European Journal of International Law, 5/2: 1–26. 81. See, Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the cusp between Accommodation and Transformation’, in Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H. Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy 119/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345. Smith argues, however, that over the course of the development

Notes 213

82.

83. 84.

85.

86. 87.

88.

89.

90. 91.

92.

of European foreign policy, aspects of legalisation have emerged. See Smith, M. E. (2001), ‘Diplomacy by Decree: The Legalization of EU Foreign Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39/1: 79–104. Fink-Hooijer, F. (1994) p. 9. Guidelines for Joint Actions were not outlined until the Lisbon Summit 26–27 June 1992 under the so-called ‘Lisbon goals’. See, Annexe I ‘Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a view of identifying areas open to joint action vis-à-vis particular countries or groups of countries’, Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council, Lisbon, 26–27 June 1992, http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/lisbon/li2_en.pdf. The Lisbon goals included strengthening democracy and human rights, helping establish economic and political stability in a region or state, conflict prevention, co-operating in international emergency situations, building on existing international co-operation in counter-terrorism, anti-drug trafficking and arms proliferation and promoting and supporting good government. See also, Regelsberger, E. and Wessels, W. (1996), ‘The CFSP Institutions and Procedures: A Third Way for the Second Pillar’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 1/1: 29–54. Duke, S. (1996), ‘The Second Death (or Second coming) of the WEU?’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 34/1: 167–190. North Atlantic Council (1991), ‘The Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation’, Press Communiqué S-1(91) 86 Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome 8th Nov. 1991, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c911108a.htm; The Economist (1991), ‘Of Bridges, Pillars and Canals’, 9 February 1991. Gnesotto, N. (1992), ‘European Union after Minsk and Maastricht’ (in European Union) International Affairs, 68/2: 223–231; Taylor, T. (1994), ‘West European Security and Defence Cooperation: Maastricht and Beyond’ (in Securing Europe) International Affairs, 70/1: 1–16. For a discussion of linkage politics see, Lohmann, S. (1997) ‘Linkage Politics’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 41/1, New Games: Modeling Domestic-International Linkages, pp. 38–67. Hort, P. (1991), ‘Der Golf-Krieg entzweit die Europäer’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 Janurary 1991. For an excellent study of the interaction between Genscher and Kohl in foreign policy see, Fröhlich, S. (2001), “Auf der Kanzler kommt es an”: Helmut Kohl und die deutsche Außenpolitik, Schöningh, Paderborn. DPA ‘Golfkrieg/Bundesrepublik: Genscher für “tiefgreifende Eingriffe” gegen Waffenexport, 27 January 1991. (bas 150 3 pl 308 vvvvb dpa 126) dpa cg 271224 Jan 91 nnnn. DPA Bundestag/Regierungserklärung: Kohl: Für die Deutschen keine Nische inder Weltpolitik – Regierungsziele: Einheitliche Lebensverhältnisse – Politische Union, 30 January 1991, (bas150 3 pl 360 vvvvb dpa 132). Ibid. DPA Bundestag/Regierungserklärung: (Kohl drei und Schluß) – Rechtstaaliche Bewältigung der SED Vergangenheit, 30 January 1991, (bas 177 3 pl 445 vvvvb dpa 160 zu 132). Baun, M. J. (1995–1996), ‘The Maastricht Treaty as High Politics: Germany, France, and European Integration’, Political Science Quarterly, 110/4: 605–624.

214 Notes 93. DPAEG/Außenminister: Bonn und Paris starten Initiative für EG Sicherheitspolitik, 4 February 1991, (bas291 3 317 vvvvb dpa 267) 041439 Feb 1991. 94. Ibid. 95. Interview with a former British Foreign Secretary, 14 May 2002. 96. DPAEG/Sicherheitspolitik: Parteien begrüßen Initiative zur europäische Sicherheitspolitik, 5 February 1991, (bas261, 4 pl 215 vvvvb dpa 239). 97. Germany proposed the creation of an agency for arms control, arms export control and economic aspects of security as a means to reduce German exposure to national differences in arms export rules. See, Kremp, H. (1991), ‘Doch ein Sonderweg’, Die Welt, 16 February 1991. 98. Ibid. 99. Klepsche, E. A. (1991), ‘Die Politische Union voranbringen: Rechtuend Konpetenzen des Europäischen Parlaments stärken, Deutschland-UnionDienst, Nr.26, 45.Jhrg, 6 February 1991, p. 2. 100. Kremp, H. (1991), ‘Doch ein Sonderweg’, Die Welt, 16 February 1991. 101. Handelsblatt (1991), ‘EG/Die Diskussion um den Ausbau zur Politischen Union gewinnt klarere Konturen: Westeuropäische Union und Kontrollen für Rüstungsexporte rücken ins Blickfeld’, 21. Februar 1991. 102. Interview with former British Foreign Secretary, 14 May 2002. 103. Handelsblatt (1991), ‘EG/Die Diskussion um den Ausbau zur Politischen Union gewinnt klarere Konturen: Westeuropäische Union und Kontrollen für Rüstungsexporte rücken ins Blickfeld’, 21. Februar 1991. 104. SüddeutscheZeitung (1991), ‘Neues Konzept für WEU’ 28 March 1991. 105. DPA, (1991), ‘Kohl und Major bekräftigen Ziel der europäischen Union – Unterschiede in Verteidigungsfragen – Hilfe für Gorbatschow’, bas446 3 pl324, vvvvb dpa 441, 21 March 1991. 106. Hadler, W. (1991), ‘Die “Vereinigten Staaten von Europa” im Visier: Nur die Briten zieren sich’, Die Welt, 17 June 1991. 107. DPA, (1991), ‘Kohl und Major bekräftigen Ziel der europäischen Union – Unterschiede in Verteidigungsfragen – Hilfe für Gorbatschow’, bas446 3 pl324, vvvvb dpa 441, 21 March 1991. 108. Ibid. 109. Hauser, E. (1991), ‘London bremst Entwicklung zur politischen Union’, Frankfurter Rundschau, 18 June 1991. 110. FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung (1991), ‘Den früheren Gleichklang gibt es nicht: Chirac beklagt mangelende Zusammenarbeit beim Aufbau Europas’, 3 July 1991. 111. DPA, (1991) ‘Portugal/Deutschland; ‘Genscher fordert europäische “Blauund Grünhelme”’, 12 July 1991 (bas506 3 p1 199 vvvvb dpa 501). 112. Genscher, H.-D. (1995), p. 394, Erinnerungen, Siedler, Berlin. 113. Dregger, A. (1991), ‘Dregger zur deutschen WEU Präsidentschaft’, CDU/CSU Fraktion im deutschen Bundestag, Pressedienst, 21.6.1991. See also, Luomaaho, M. (2004) ‘Arm Versus Pillar: The Politics of Metaphors of the Western European Union at the 1990–1991 Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 11/1: 106–127. 114. Dregger, A. (1991), p. 3. 115. For an examination of the role of Political Union in Kohl’s thinking on CFSP in the 1990s, see, Chapter 4.

Notes 215 116. Kohl, H. (1991), Speech to the Bundestag, Bundestag Drucksache, Deutsche Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, 6 November 1991, S.4367C. 117. Ibid. 118. Handelsblatt (1991) ‘Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: Meinungsunterscheide zwischen Christdemokraten: Der Weg zur Europäischen Politischen Union wird steinig und langweilig sein’, 9 March 1991. 119. Johansson, K. M. (2002) ‘Another Road to Maastricht: The Christian Democrat Coalition and the Quest for European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/3: 871–893. 120. The Schäuble-Lamers paper is one such example of this strategy. 121. For a more detailed examination of the role of the junior coalition partner in German foreign policy see, Kaarbo, J. (1996) ‘Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The role of Junior Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly, 40/4: 501–530. 122. BPA Informationsfunk, Nr.62, 15.3.1991, Bundesrepublik Deutschland/ Europa ‘Kohl: Europäische Union als Kernanliegen des Vereinten Deutschlands’, 2183d/0–1403. 123. Ibid. 124. Ibid. 125. GemeinsameErklärung der Außenminister Hans-Dietrich Genscher und Roland Dumas, Anläßlich ihrer Gespräche am 21.03.91 in Paris, p.27, Fernseh-/Hörfunkspiegel Ausland, Genscher/Dumas 1, AND/5102/22.03.91/ 16.47/gl, pp. 27–28. 126. The Bartholomew Telegram – reprinted in van Eekelen, W. F. (1998), Debating European Security, 1948–1998 (The Hague: SDU Publishers), Appendix II. 127. Nonnenmacher, G. (1991), ‘Die hinkende Union’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 April 1991. 128. European Council, (1991), Conclusions of the Presidency, Luxembourg, 28–29 June 1991, reproduced at http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/luxembourg/ default_en.htm 129. Interview with former British Foreign Secretary, 14 May 2002. 130. Hornhues, K.–H. (1991), ‘Zum Luxemburger Entwurf für gemeinsame EGAußen- und Sicherheitspolitik erklärt der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Prof. Dr. K-H Hornhues, MdB’, CDU/CSU Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag, Pressedienst, 16.04.1991. 131. Lederer, A. (1991), Speech to the Bundestag, Bundestag Drucksache, Deutsche Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, 6 November 1991, S.4382B. 132. Ibid S.4381D. 133. Gansel, N. (1991), ‘Speech to the Bundestag’, Bundestag Drucksache, Deutsche Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, 6 November 1991, S.4373A. 134. Wieczorek-Zeul, H. (1991), ‘Speech to the Bundestag’, Bundestag Drucksache, Deutsche Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, 6 November 1991, S.4391D. 135. Poppe, G. (1991), ‘Speech to the Bundestag’, Bundestag Drucksache, Deutsche Bundestag, 13. Wahlperiode, 53. Sitzung, 6 November 1991, S.4386C.

216 Notes 136. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003) pp. 643–644, ‘The Polls-Trends: Having it Both Ways: European Defence Integration and the Commitment to NATO’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 67: 627–659. 137. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003) p. 646. 138. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003) pp. 652–653. 139. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003) pp. 655–656. 140. Putnam, R. (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Twolevel Games’, International Organisation, 42/3: 427–460. See also, König, T. and Hug, S. (2000), ‘Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts’, European Union Politics, 1/1: 93–124. 141. See also, Wagner, W. (2001), Die konstruktion einer europäischen Außenpolitik: Deutsche, franzöische und britsche GASP-Politiken im Vergleich, Doctoral Dissertation, Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität, Frankfurt am Main. 142. Hornhues, K.-H. (1992), ‘EG vor der Schaffung der Politischen Union’ Deutschland-Union-Dienst, Nr.84, 45. Jhrg, 6.5.1991, Seite 2. 143. Article 45, Basic Law; Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the cusp Between Accommodation and Transformation’, in Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H. Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy 119/ Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345. 144. Sterzing, C. and Tidow, S. (2001), ‘Die Kontrolle der deutschen Europapolitik durch den EU-Ausschuss des Bundestags: Bilanz und Reformpotentiale’, in Integration, 3/1, 24.Jg., pp. 274–288. Also, interview with CDU member of the EU Committee of the Bundestag, 10 July 2001, Berlin. 145. Kohl, H. (1991), quoted in DPA ‘Kohl: Erweiterte Bundeswehreinsätze notfalls Wahlkampfthema – Polenvertrag “gewaltiger Fortschritt” – Bonner Koalition stabil’, 17 May 1991 (bas 277 3 pl 466 vvvvb dpa 934). 146. FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, (1991), ‘SPD verlangt Realismus und Verantwortung in der deutschen Außenpolitik’, 15 May 1991. 147. Ibid. 148. Hänsch, K. (1991), p. 8, ‘Thema des Monats: Vor einer Reform der Europäischen Gemeinschaft’ Europa Info, Informationsdienst des Internationalen Sekretariats Nr.8/91, SPD. 149. FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung (1991), ‘Wie kann die Kontrolle durch die Parlamente gewahrt werden?: Anfrage der SPD zu den Verhandlungen über die Politsche Union’, 22 June 1991. 150. DPA, ‘EG/SPD: Engholm warnt vor Armutsgrenzen in Europa – EG keine Ersatz-NATO’, 4 September 1991, bas454 4 pl 239 vvvvb dpa 428. 151. DPA, ‘Modrow: Vereinigung Deutschlands kein Vorbild für Europa’, 14 June 1991 (bas216 4 pl 119 vvvvb dpa 911). 152. Ibid. 153. Gysi, G. (1992), Rede von Gregor Gysi in der Maastricht-Debatte des Bundestages am 8.10.92, Quelle: Pressebuero der PDS/LL, 09.10.1992, http://www.glasnost.de/db/Europa/92maastgysi.html 154. Interview with PDS Foreign Policy spokesperson, 11 June 2001, Berlin.

Notes 217 155. Lamers, K. (1991) p. 3, ‘Unsere Ziel: Vereinigte Staaten von Europa’, Deutschland-Union-Dienst, Nr.112, 45.Jhrg, 1.6.1991. 156. See, ‘Prioritäten der EVP-Fraktion für die Regierungskonferenzen’, Europa im Blickfeld, 7. Ausgabe, 28 August 1991, pp. 25–27. 157. CDU Pressemitteilung (1991) p.1, ‘Rühe: Union Europas braucht eine gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik’, Bonn, 13 September 1991. 158. Ibid., p. 2. 159. FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung (1992), ‘Lambsdorff auch für WEU-Einsätze’, 24 April 1992. 160. FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung (1992), ‘Deutliche Kritik an Lafontaines Ansichten zu Europa’, 7 March 1992. 161. Präsidiumder SPD (1992), ‘Mitteilung für die Presse: Zu den Verträgen von Maastricht hat das Präsidium der SPD die folgende Erklärung verabschiedet’ Presseservice der SPD, Bon, den 9. März 1992, Nr.162/92. 162. Schäuble, W. (1992), p. 2, ‘Ohne Europa gibt es keine Sicherheit: Keine Pause im europäischen Einigungsprozeß’, Deutschland-Union-Dienst, Nr.38, 46. Jhrg, 26 February 1992. 163. Rattinger, H. (1994), ‘Public Attitudes to European Integration in Germany after Maastricht: Inventory and Typology’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/4, pp. 525–540. 164. Piepenschneider, M. (1995), p. 353, ‘Deutsche Einheit als Motor der europäischen Einigung: Deutschlands Weg nach Europa’, in Altenhof, R. and Jesse, E. (Hrsg.) Das wiedervereinigte Deutschland: Zwischenbilanz und Perspektiven, Droste Verlag, Düsseldorf. 165. Baring, A. (ed.) (1994) Germany’s new position in Europe (Oxford: Berg); Janning, J. (1996) ‘A German Europe – a European Germany’, International Affairs, 72/1: 33–41; Schöllgen, G. (1993) Angst vor der Macht. Die Deutschen und ihre Außenpolitik (Berlin: Ullstein); Senghaas, D. (1993) ‘Was sind der deutsche Interessen?’ Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Nr.38 Heft 6. 166. Layne has argued that the rise of Japan and Germany as great powers is inevitable. Layne, C. (1993), ‘Primacy and Its Discontents The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise’, International Security, 17/4: 5–51. 167. Mazzucelli, C. (1997), p. 137, France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union (New York and London: Garland Publishing Inc.). 168. Guérin-Sendelbach, V. (1999), pp. 136–142, Frankreich und das vereinigte Deutschland: Interessen und Perzeptionen im Spannungsfeld, Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 1999. 169. Moravcsik, A (1999), The Choice for Europe: Social purpose and State power from Messina to Maastricht (London: UCL Press Ltd.), pp. 384–385.

2 Reforming the Common Foreign and Security Policy 1. Hill, C. and Smith, K. E. (eds) (2000), p. 168, European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (London: Routledge). See also, Hill, C. (1998) ‘Closing the Capabilities-expectations Gap’, in, J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge), pp. 18–38.

218 Notes 2. Kohl, K. (1996), ‘Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl hielt beim VI. Europäischen Bankenkongreß am 22. November 1996, in, der Alten Oper in Frankfurt am Main folgende Rede’, Bulletin Nr.99, 5th December 1996, Bulletin 2003: Bulletin 1996–2003, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, CDROM; Hoyer, W. (1997), ‘Der Staatsminister im Auswärtigen Amt, Dr. Werner Hoyer, hielt bei dem Niedersächsischen Rat der Europäischen Bewegung am 28. Januar 1997 in Hannover folgenden Vortrag’, Bulletin, Nr.9, 30th January 1997, Bulletin 2003: Bulletin 1996–2003, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, CD-ROM. 3. Bonvicini, G. (1998), p. 70, ‘Making European Foreign Policy Work’, in M. Westlake (ed.) The European Union beyond Amsterdam: New Concepts of European Integration (London: Routledge), pp. 61–75. 4. Edwards, G. (1992), ‘European Responses to the Yugoslav Crisis: An Interim Assessment’, in R. Rummel (ed.) Toward Political Union (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft), pp. 165–190; Hill, C. (1993), ‘The CapabilitiesExpectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3: 305–328. Schäuble, W. and Lamers, K. (1994), Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik, 1 September 1994, reproduced at http://www.cdu.de/ 5. Fella, S. (1999), ‘The 1996/97 Intergovernmental Conference and the Treaty of Amstedam – a thwarted reform’, South Bank European Papers, 1/99, http://www.lsbu.ac.uk/cibs/european-institute-papers/papers1/199.PDF; Weiler, J. (1997), ‘Editorial: Amsterdam, Amsterdam’, European Law Journal, 3/4: 309–312. 6. Schlußfolgerungendes Vorsitzes des Europäischen Rates, in, Korfu vom 24./25. Juni 1994, Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung Nr. 73 vom 4. August 1994; Cohen, M. D., March, J. D. and Olsen, J. P. (1972), ‘A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice,’ Administrative Science Quarterly, 17: 1–25; For the application of the ‘garbage can’ model to EMU and its relationship to Political Union, see, Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999), pp. 28–33, The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 7. Presidency Conclusions (1994) Section IV, Preparations for the Intergovernmental Conference 1996, European Council at Corfu, 24–25 June 1994, http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/cor1_en.htm#igc 8. Article II paragraph 4 outlined the so-called Petersberg Tasks of ‘humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’. Western European Union Council of Ministers (1992) Petersberg Declaration, 19 June 1992, reprinted at, http://www.weu.int/; Murray, I. (1992), ‘Bonn Pact Allows Peace Role for European Armies’, The Times, 20 June 1992. 9. Jopp, M. (1999), p. 40, ‘Germany and the Western European Union’, in C. Lankowski and S. Serfaty (eds) Europeanizing Security: NATO and an Integrating Europe, AICGS Research Report No.9: 35–52, http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/ PDF/weu.pdf. The Lisbon Declaration also added greater detail to the CFSP in the sphere of ‘joint actions’, Report to the European Council on the Likely Development of the Common Foreign and Security Council (CFSP) with a view to Identifying areas open to Joint Action vis-à-vis Particular countries or groups of countries, Lisbon, 26–27 June 1992, reprinted, in C. Hill and

Notes 219

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

K. E. Smith (2000), European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (London: Routledge), pp. 162–168. See, Eurocorps Website, http://www.eurocorps.org/site/index.php?language en&contenthistory; Wassenberg, P. (1999), Das Eurokorps: sicherheitsrechtliches Umfeld und völkerrechtliche Bedeutung eines multinationalen Grossverbands (Baden-Baden: Nomos). For ESDI, see, Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (96) 165 held at NATO HQ Brussels 10 December 1996, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1996/p96–063e.htm; for CJTF, see also, Final Communiqué of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, M-NAC-1(96)63, 3 June 1996, http://www.nato.int/docu/ pr/1996/p96–063e.htm; Final Communiqué of the Defence Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group in Ministerial Session, M-DPC/ NPG-1(94)38, Brussels, 24 May. http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/ c940524a.htm; Statement issued at the Meeting of the Defence Ministers M-DPC/NPG-1(94)39, 25 May 1994, Brussels, http://www.nato.int/docu/ comm/49–95/c940525a.htm. Cameron, F. (1998), p. 61, ‘Building a Common Foreign Policy: Do Institutions Matter?’, in, J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge), pp. 59–76. Dalton, R. (ed.) (1996), Germans Divided: The 1994 Bundestagswahl and the Evolution of the German Party System (Oxford: Berg); Phillips, A. L. (1995), ‘An Island of Stability – The German Political Party System and the Elections of 1994’, in West European Politics, 18/3: 219–229. Palmer, J. (1994), ‘Bonn Plans Brisk EU Programme: Germany’s Priorities are Environmental and Social Issues’, The Guardian, 4 July 1994. Kinkel, K. (1994), p. 20779D, ‘Speech to the Bundestag on the Agenda for the German Council Presidency’, Bundestag, Bonn, 29 June 1994, Drucksache, 237. Sitzung, 12. Wahlperiode. European Council (1994), Presidency Conclusions Essen Summit, 9–10 December 1994, Bulletin of the European Communities, No.12/1994; Marshall, A. (1994), ‘The Essen Summit: EU faces tough truths at summit’, The Independent, 9 December 1994; Boyes, R. (1994), ‘Lame-duck Leaders Held Hostage by Domestic Agendas’, The Times, 10 December 1994; Bundesregierung (1994), 54. Bericht der Bundesregierung über die Integration der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die Europäischen Union (Berichtszeitraum 1. Januar bis 30. Juni 1994), 8 December 1994, Bundesrat Drucksache, 1099/94. Kinkel, K. (1994), p. 631B, Speech to the Bundesrat on the results of the German Council Presidency, Drucksache, 678. Sitzung, German Bundesrat, Bonn, 16 December 1994. Larres, K. (2004), ‘ “Bloody as Hell”: Bush, Clinton and the Abdication of American Leadership in the Former Yugoslavia, 1990–1995’, Journal of European Integration History, 10/1: 179–202; McAllister, R. (1997), From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey (London: Routledge), pp. 233–234. Schäuble, W. and Lamers, K. (1994), Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik, CDU/CSU Bundestag Fraction, 1 September 1994, http://www.wolfgangschaeuble.de/positionspapiere/schaeublelamers94.pdf; Confidential Interview with Bundestag member, 10 September 2001. Ibid.

220 Notes 21. Duke, S. (1996), ‘The Second Death (or the Second Coming) of the WEU’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36/2: 167–190. 22. Boyes, R. and Bremner, C. (1994), ‘Balladur Softens Kohl’s Version of Hardcore Europe’, The Times, 8 September 1994. 23. Central to this federal project was the Franco-German core. See, Schäuble, W. (1994), ‘Deutsche und französische Konzeptionen für die institutionelle Zukunft der Europäischen Union’, Speech to the European Movement of France colloquium, 21st December 1994, Paris, CDU/CSU Fraktion im deutschen Bundestag Pressedienst, Nr.11436, 21st December 1994. 24. Herzog, R. (1995), p. 31, ‘The Globalization of German Foreign Policy is Inevitable’, Speech to the German Society for Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1995, reprinted in Roman Herzog: Lessons from the past and visions for the future, German Issues, No.18, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, pp. 26–39. 25. Clarke, B. (1995), ‘Each State for Itself’, Financial Times, 6 January 1995. 26. Blair backed, ‘new ways to give reality to joint military forces, while remaining within the “crucial” NATO alliance’, Brown, K. (1995), ‘Labour Leader Backs Full Role for Britain in Europe’, Financial Times, 11 January 1995. Within Germany, Blair was seen as a potential hope for Europe by improving the UK’s contribution to the European project, see, for example, Nonnenmacher, G. (1996), ‘Kleine Brötchen für Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 November 1996. 27. Kornblum, J. (1995), ‘Speech by John Kornblum, the State Department’s Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs, 30 January 1995 at the Opening of NATO’s Annual Seminar on Alliance Public Opinion’, USA Embassy, Brussels, Newsbrief, 1 February 1995. 28. Berichtdes Rates über das Funktionieren des Vertrages über die Europäische Union vom 6. April 1995. 29. Entschließungdes Europäischen Parlamentes über das Funktionieren des Vertrages über die Europäische Union vom 17. Mai 1995, ABl. der EG, C 151 vom 19. Juni 1995. 30. Stürmer, M. (2001), ‘Europa – An Open Relationship’, Financial Times, 27 January 2001. 31. Bellamy, C. (1995), ‘Defence Memo Outlines UK’s Euro-strategy’, The Independent, 2 March 1995. 32. Clarke, B. (1995), ‘Hurd Rejects Idea of European Army’, Financial Times, 1 March 1995. 33. Schäuble, W. (1995), ‘Germany’s Vision of Europe’, The Wall Street Journal Europe, 15 March 1995. 34. Mortimer, E. and Buchan, D. (1995), ‘Balladur Makes Plea for a European Defence Force’, Financial Times, 21 March 1995. 35. Münchau, W. (1995), ‘Santer Seeks Right to Shape Foreign Policy for Europe’, The Times, 22 March 1995. 36. Atlantic News (1995), ‘Dutch Proposals on CFSP’, 20 April 1995. 37. Bulmer, S., Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. E. (2000), Germany’s European Diplomacy: Shaping the Regional Milieu (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 76–77. 38. Kempe, F. (1995), ‘A Peek Inside Germany’s Vision for Europe’, Wall Street Journal Europe, 25 April 1995.

Notes 221 39. See, Lim, J. H. (2000) p. 70, Die Weiterentwicklung der gemeinsamen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union unter besonderer Brücksichtigung der Haltung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1995–1999) (München: Hertbert Utz Verlag). 40. FrankfurterAllegemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Vor Maastricht II eine deutsch-französische Inititative: Bonn und Paris woollen der Regierungskonferenz den Weg weisen – Vorschlag mit drei Säulen’ 9 October 1995. 41. Deubner, C. (1995), Deutsche Europapolitik: Von Maastricht nach Kerneuropa? (Baden-Baden: Nomos). 42. Dregger, A. (1995), ‘Ein transatlantische Vertrag ist nötig’, Die Welt, 2 February 1995. Volker Rühe also called for the creation of a transatlantic ‘problem solving community’ as part of a reinvigorated ‘Atlantic Community’, in, Frankenberger, K-D. (1995), ‘Eine breitere Brücke über den Atlantic’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 February 1995. This sentiment was echoed by Malcom Rifkind on taking office as Foreign Secretary and stating there was a real need for the creation of an ‘Atlantic community’, see, Financial Times (1995), ‘Rifkind in search of an Atlantic Community’, 7 July 1995. 43. For Lamers especially, the centrality of the Franco-German tandem was of key importance in the IGC, see, Lamers, K. and Schockenhoff, A. (1995), ‘Gründung des Arbeitskreises Frankreich der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion zur Intensivierung der deutsch-französischen Beziehungen – Schwerpunkte der Zusammen arbeit und des Dialogs’, CDU/CSU Pressemitteilung, 9 October 1995. 44. At a CSU conference on military policy in Munich, Waigel stated that, ‘The co-ordination and decision-making procedures must be streamlined and sped-up in order to secure the presentation of the EU’s political position in the event of a crisis.’ Die Welt (1996), ‘Waigel fordert Stärkung der EUAußenpolitik’, 21 October 1996. 45. Seiters, R. (1996), ‘Bald sind Entscheidungen fällig’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9th May 1996. 46. Norman, P. (1996), ‘Kohl looks at EU foreign policy troika’, Financial Times, 17 September 1996; Rohwedder, C. and Coleman, B. (1996), ‘German Party Rejects “Mr Europe” Idea’, The Wall Street Journal, 17 September 1996. 47. CDU Bundesfachausschuß Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (1996) ‘Die Weiterentwicklung der Gemeinsamen Außen, Sicherheitsund Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union in der Regierungskonferenz 1996’, 16 September 1996. 48. See, Philippi, N. (2001), ‘Civilian Power and War: The German Debate About Out-of-Area Operations 1990–99’, in, S. Harnisch and H. W. Maull (eds) Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 49–67; Gow, D. (1992), ‘Move to take shackles off Bundeswehr’, The Guardian, 24 August 1992. 49. Fraktionder, SPD (1995) ‘Forderungen zur Reform des Vertrages von Maastricht 1996 und der Europapolitik’, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1739, 21 June 1995. 50. Ibid., p. 7. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid., p. 8.

222 Notes 53. Wieczorek-Zeul, H. and Verheugen, G (1996), Weiterentwicklung der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union, SPD Diskussionspapier, 9 December 1996. 54. See also, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1996), ‘Die SPD denkt über integrierte Streitkräfte in Europa nach’, 19 December 1996. 55. Kinkel, K. (1995), ‘Fünf Ziele für Europapolitik’, Die Zeit, Nr.11, 10 March 1995; Kinkel, K. (1995), ‘Speech to the Bundestag on the Upcoming Intergovernmental Conference’, 22 June 1995, 13. Wahlperiode, 44. Sitzung, Bundestag Drucksache 13/3542B. 56. Ibid., p. 13/3545B 57. Ibid. 58. The FDP security policy spokesperson for the FDP Bundestag fraction Günther Nolting, cited in, Die Welt (1995), 6 October 1995. 59. Wieczorek-Zeul, H-M. (1995) Bundestag Drucksache, 13. Wahlperiode, 44. Sitzung, 13/3549A
B. 60. Ibid. 61. Sterzing, C. and der Fraktion der Bündnis, 90/ Die Grünen (1995), ‘Aktuelle Fragen der Europapolitik, insbesondere Vorschau auf die tagung des Europäischen Rates am 26/27. Juni 1995’, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1734, 21 June 1995. See also, Die Bundesregierung (1998), ‘Antwort auf die groß Anfrage der Abgeordneten Beer, A., Nachtwei, W., Sterzing, C. and der Fraktion der Bündnis, ‘90/Die Grünen (1998) Die künftige Rolle der Westeuropäischen Union’, Drucksache 13/7949, Bundestag Drucksache 13/10106, 11 March 1998. 62. Volmer, L. (1995), 59. Bundestag Sitzung, 29 September 1995, 13. Wahlperiode, 4979/D–4981/D; Volmer, L., Beer, A., Lippelt, H. and der Fraktion der Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen (1995), Neue europäische Sicherheitsarchitekteur und die Rolle der französische Atomwaffen’, Bundestag Drucksache 13/2456, 27 September 1995. 63. Die Gruppe der PDS (1995), ‘Europapolitik der Bundesregierung’, Bundestag Drucksache 13/1728, 21 June 1995. 64. Ibid. 65. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003), pp. 643–644, ‘The Polls-Trends: Having it Both Ways: European Defence Integration and the Commitment to NATO’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 67: 627–659. 66. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003), p. 646. 67. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003), p. 648. 68. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003), pp. 652–653. 69. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1993), ‘Deutsche und Franzosen bilden Kern der Europäischen Union’, 14 October 1993. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Kohl, H. (1996), ‘Current Issues in European Policy in Light of the Summit of the European Council in Dublin on 13–14 December 1996’, Speech to the Bundestag, Bulletin, Nr.103, 16 December 1996. 73. Ibid. 74. Kohl, H. (1996), ‘Speech to the 6th European Banking congress’, 22 November 1996, Frankfurt am Main, Bulletin, Nr.99, 5 December 1996; Kohl, H. (1996), ‘Eine Partnerschaft für Europa, Bundeskanzler’, Dr. Helmut Kohl,

Notes 223

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

84.

85.

Le Nouvel Observateur, Ausgabe vom 28 November 1996, Bulletin Nr.99, 5 December 1996; Hennes, M. (1997), ‘The Future of Europe: Monetary or Political Union’, Aussenpolitik, 48/1: 11–21. Le Gloannec, A.-M. (1998), p. 24, ‘Embracing the “British” Vision’, in, C. Lankowski (ed.) Break Out, Break Down, or Break in?: Germany and the European Union after Amsterdam, AICGS Research Report 8: 21–30. This is akin to Kohl’s role in the negotiation of EMU at Maastricht, see, Dyson, K. and Featherstone, K. (1999) The Road to Maastricht (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Kohl, H. (1996), ‘Rede des Bundeskanzlers, in, Bonn, Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl, Wirtschaftstag 1996 des Wirtschaftsrates der CDU am 13. Juni 1996’, Bulletin, Nr.56, 1 July 1996. Kohl, H. (1997) Rede des Bundeskanzlers in Mannheim, Bundeskanzler Dr. Helmut Kohl hielt anläßlich des 25jährigen Bestehens der SAP AG am 11. April 1997, in Mannheim, Bulletin, Nr.31, 28 April 1997. See, Paterson, W. E. (1993), pp. 153–154, ‘The Chancellor and Foreign Policy’, in, S. Padgett (ed.) Adenauer to Kohl: The Development of the German Chancellorship (London: Hurst), pp. 127–156; Hanns, W. Maull also points to Kinkel’s lack of success in influencing Germany’s foreign policy direction at this time reflected in the influence of the Kanzleramt under Kohl; Maull, H. W. (1997) p. 1248, ‘Quo vadis, Germania?: Außenpolitik in einer Welt des Wandels’, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 10: 1245–1256. Kinkel, K. (1996), ‘Speech at the German-American Chamber of Commerce, 27 February 1996, in, Stuttgart’, Bulletin, Nr.17, 28 February 1996; see also, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Kinkel will Reform die EUAußenpolitik: Der deutsch-französische Motor stottert nicht’, 13 October 1995. Kinkel, K. (1996), Speech to the European Forum, Alpbach, Austria, 28 August 1996, Bulletin, Nr.68, 3 September 1996. FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Kinkel fordert “Runderneuerung” der EU’, 22 February 1995. Nonnenmacher, G. (1996), ‘Kleine Brötchen in Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 27 November 1996. Kinkel, K. (1996), ‘Speech at the Opening of the Centre for the Advanced Study of European and Comparative Law, University of Oxford, 17 January 1996’, Bulletin, Nr.7, 26 January 1996. On this point Kinkel had the support of the Federal Council of the CDU, see, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Mehrheitprinzip für europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik gefordert’, 3 Jul 1995. Germany had suggested the appointment of a political personality to head the Council Secretariat back in 1987, see, Rummel, R. (1996), p. 50, ‘Germany’s role in the CFSP: Normalität or Sonderweg?’, in, C. Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy (London: Routledge), pp. 40–67. However, there was disagreement between France and Germany over the proposed Mr CFSP with France wanting a more high profile appointment than Germany. Germany compromised with France that the PPEWU and the Mr CFSP should be based in the Council Secretariat, but that efforts should be made to improve co-ordination with the Commission on the full range of foreign policy issues which the EU was engaged in. State Secretary Hoyer pressed these matters with his EU colleagues. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

224 Notes

86.

87.

88.

89.

90.

91. 92.

93.

94. 95.

96.

(1996), ‘Bonner Vorschläge zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik’, 8 May 1996; Handelsblatt (1996), ‘Bewegung in der Gemeinsamen Außenpolitik’ 8 May 1996. Rühe, V. (1996), Speech before the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Chatham House, London, 19 November 1996, Bulletin, Nr.94, 22 November 1996. Rühe, V. (1996), Speech to the Johns Hopkins school for Advanced International Studies/American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 30 April 1996, Washington D.C., Bulletin, Nr.34, 2 May 1996. For an excellent analysis of Rühe’s role in the debates concerning NATO enlargement, see, Tewes, H. (2002), Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe (Houndmills: Palgrave), pp. 140–197. Rühe, V. (1996) Speech to the Bundeswehr staff college, Hamburg, 26 January 1996, Bulletin, Nr.15, 14 February 1996; Rühe, V. (1996) Speech to the Centre for International Relations in the institute for Public Affairs in Warsaw, 13 May 1996, Bulletin, Nr.39, 17 May 1996. Rühe, V. (1996), ‘Speech at the ceremonial swearing in of Soldiers from the army, air force and marines on 12 March 1996 in Bordenau’, Bulletin, Nr. 93, 20 November 1996; Rühe, V. (1996), Speech to the 14th meeting of federal delegates of the reservists of the German Armed forces in Würzburg on 10 November 1996, Bulletin, Nr.91, 14 November 1996; Rühe, V. (1996), ‘Order of the Day on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the passing of the conscription law in the German Bundestag on 7 July 1956, 5 July 1996’, Bulletin, Nr.58, 9 July 1996; ‘Conscription remains irreplaceable. The Bundeswehr is a central factor in European stability’, Rühe, V. (1996), ‘Declaration by Federal Minister Volker Rühe, Bonn, 5 July 1996’, Bulletin, Nr.58, 9 July 1996; Rühe, V. (1997), ‘Stability in Europe’ Speech at the 9 Forum of the Bundeswehr and Society, 2 June 1997, Bulletin, Nr.47, 9 June 1997. Die Welt (1995), ‘Großer Tag für die Bundsewehr’, 4 February 1995. Wette, W. (1994), p. 984, ‘ Rückkehr zu “Normalität” und Weltmachtdenken: Die Renaissance des Militärischen im neuen Deutschland’, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 8: 981–990. Gow, D. (1992), ‘Bonn to save 10bn in army shake-up’, The Guardian, 16 December 1992; Lieven, A. (1992), ‘Kohl Seeks to Widen Field of Bundeswehr operations’, The Times, 19 December 1992. Der Spiegel (1995), Spiegel Gespräch, ‘Wir drängeln uns nicht vor’, Der Spiegel, Vol. 12. For an excellent and detailed analysis of Germany’s participation in the former Yugoslavia, see, Lüdeke, A. (2002), Europäisierung der detuschen Außenund Sicherheitspolitik: Konstitutive und operative Europapolitik zwischen Maastricht und Amsterdam (Opladen: Leske
Budrich), pp. 217–370. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995) ‘Kabinett stimmt Einsatz deutscher Soldaten in Bosnien zu’, 26 June 1995. The government decided to commit headquarters staff, 8 ECR Tornados, 6 RECCR Tornados, 600 logistical soldiers to Split, and 12 Transall transport aircraft. The government agreed to commit up to 5,000 soldiers, mainly used in a support role in Croatia. Rühe argued that Germany’s wartime legacy in the Balkans during WWII meant that German troops would be unacceptably exposed to attack from Serb forces, necessitating a support role and not front line involvement.

Notes 225

97. 98.

99.

100. 101.

102.

103.

104. 105.

106. 107.

See, Cowell, A. (1995) ‘Germany will send soldiers to Balkans’, Herald Tribune, 12 October 1995. For the impact of Bosnia on European security cooperation, see, Wright, J. (1997), ‘European Security – Post Bosnia’, European Security, 6/2: 1–17. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Kabinett stimmt Einsatz deutscher Soldaten in Bosnien zu’, 26 June 1995. Moniac, R. (1995), ‘Bonn schicht 4000 Soldaten nach Kroatien: Scharping signalisiert Unterstützung für die Pläne der Bundesregierung – PionerEinsätze in Bosnien vorgesehen’, Die Welt, 23 October 1995. Throughout the early to mid-1990s the SPD went through a fierce internal debate concerning Germany and the use of military force, eventually agreeing with the elite consensus which emerged after the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 July 1994. See, Ehrhart, H.-G. (2000), Rudolf Scharping and the formation of Social Democratic foreign and security policy in the 1990s’, in Les Cahiers de l’IFRI Nr. 30: 73–109, http://www.ifsh.de/dokumente/ artikel/ scharping.pdf Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Der Bundestag mit großer Mehrheit für die Entsendung der Bundeswehr-Soldaten nach Bosnien’, 7 December 1995. Shrwastava, A. (1995), ‘Germany’s Tortured Debate Over its Military’, Wall Street Journal Europe, 10 February 1995. Financial Times (1995), ‘The FT Interview – Volker Rühe, Front Row Defender’, 10 February 1995. In the same interview, Rühe also outlined his reluctance to consider permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council because of the unwelcome extra responsibility this would bring in his view. This ran contrary to the aims of both Kohl and Kinkel. Philippi, N. (2001), p. 54, ‘Civilian Power and War: The German Debate About Out-of-area Operations 1990–99’, in, S. Harnisch and H. W. Maull (eds) (2001), Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 49–67. Stürmer, M. (1995), ‘Europa: ‘Germany’s Defence Role’, Financial Times, 25 April 1995. Stürmer also contends in this article that ‘ … the Bundeswehr has acquired an importance far greater than the subsidiary role it held in previous decades’, further stressing the adaptational pressures impacting upon the Bundeswehr and German foreign policy from the international level. Many thanks to Dr. Kerry Longhurst for drawing my attention to the wider implications of these deployments. Baumann, R. and Hellmann, G. (2001), ‘Germany and the Use of Military Force: Total War, the Culture of Restraint and the Quest for Normality’, in, D. Webber (ed.) New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy since Unification, Special Issue of German Politics, 10/1: 61–82. See also, Baumann, R. (2001), ‘German Security Policy Within NATO’, in, Rittberger, V. (ed.) German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 141–184. The Economist (1995), ‘Britain, France and Germany: The Return of Triangular Diplomacy’, 4 November 1995. A report commissioned by Commissioner van den Broek written by Jean Durieux entitled ‘European Security Policy in the run-up to 2000 – ways and

226 Notes

108.

109.

110.

111.

112.

113. 114. 115. 116.

means of achieving real credibility’, suggested the following steps in CFSP: Ending unanimity in decision-making except in troops deployments; appointment of a figurehead for CFSP; a new clause stating the common goal of creating an intervention force of 150,000–200,000 troops; agreement to work towards common defence in conjunction with NATO and finally, the creation of an CFSP budget. See, Barber, L. (1995), ‘EU Must End “rudderless” Foreign Policy’, Financial Times, 28 January 1995; Commission President Santer, was reported as saying, ‘What people clearly resent is the gulf between the expectations, which derived from the announcement of a common foreign policy and the everyday reality of chaos’, in, Münchau, W. (1995), ‘Santer Seeks Right to Shape Foreign Policy for Europe’, The Times, 22 March 1995. On issues relating to Franco-British co-operation in foreign and security policy, one British official was quoted as saying, ‘We get along fine with the French so long as we can stop them talking about fancy architecture.’ Quoted in, The Economist (1995), ‘The Defence of Europe – it Can’t be Done Alone’, 25 February 1995. A degree of suspicion characterised the bilateral contacts within the triangular diplomacy of the Franco-German-British lead group. As one British diplomat stated, ‘A lot of people in all three capitals still see each bilateral relationship as a zero-sum game, that any extra energy in French-British relations has to come at the expense of Bonn’s ties with Paris and London’s links with Bonn.’ Cited in, Fitchelt, J. (1996), ‘Toward a European Triumvirate?’, Herald Tribune, 31 July 1996. Through its involvement in efforts to strengthen CFSP/ESDI Rühl asserts, ‘Through this, the German partner should in no way be shut out, rather be an equal partner in a military-political triangle and thereby be bound to it.’ Rühl, L. (1996), ‘Europas militärische Handlungsfähigkeit wieder starker: neue Perspektiven für eine gemeinsame Sicherheitspolitik von London, Paris und Bonn’, Die Welt, 2 August 1996. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1994), ‘Deutschland und Frankreich wollen ein gemeinsames Regierungsprogramme für Europa’, 25 March 1994. In a speech in Paris Kinkel sought to overcome difficulties in Franco-German relations since unification and the Maastricht Treaty by proposing the IGC 1996/97 as a project in which both states could work together. Graham, R. and Simonian, H. (2003), ‘Prospects for the Franco-German Relationship: The Elysée Treaty and after’, AICGS Policy Report No.4, http://www.aicgs.org/Publications/PDF/frgerm2003.pdf Howorth, J. (1997), ‘France’, in, J. Howorth and A. Menon (eds) The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge), pp. 23–48. Kay, S. (1998), p. 124, NATO and the Future of European Security (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield). See, Hendriks, G. and Morgan, A. (2001), The Franco-German Axis in European Integration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 111–117. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Die Handlungsfähigkeit der Europäischen Union verbessern’, 8 December 1995. This was also reinforced by a joint article by Werner Hoyer and Michel Barnier in the Frankfurter Allegemine Zeitung calling for developments in CFSP, see, Hoyer, W. and

Notes 227

117.

118.

119. 120.

121. 122.

123.

Barnier, M. (1995), ‘Existiert Europa’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 December 1995. Chirac, J. and Kohl, H. (1995), p. 116, ‘Gemeinsamer Brief des deutschen Bundeskanzlers und des französischen Staatspräsidenten an den Vorsitzenden des Europäischen Rates vom 06.12.1995’; überreicht vom Bundespresseamt, reprinted in M. Jopp and O. Schmuck (eds) (1996), Die Reform der Europäischen Union: Analysen – Positionen – Dokumente zur Regierungskonferenz 1996/1997 (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag), pp. 115–117. De Charette, H. and Kinkel, K. (1996), ‘Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik: Leitlinien, verabschiedet anläßlich des Seminars der Außenminister Frankreichs und Deutschlands, am 27. February 1996 in Freiburg, überreicht vom Auswärtigen Amt, Bonn’, in, M. Jopp and O. Schmuck (eds) Die Reform der Europäischen Union: Analysen – Positionen – Dokumente zur Regierungskonferenz 1996/1997 (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag), pp. 118–120. Norman, P. (1996), ‘Paris and Bonn agree EU Foreign Policy opt-out Pact’, Financial Times, 28 February 1996. Bell, S. and Sage, A. (1995), ‘Chirac offers to share nuclear shield with EU’, The Times, 1 September 1995; Goldsmith, C. (1995), ‘EU Foreign Ministers reject France’s Nuclear Umbrella’, Wall Street Journal, 11 September 1995; Moisi, D. (1995), ‘Europa: The bomb won’t go away’, Financial Times, 26 September 1995; Juppé had stated in Le Figaro that, ‘ … the future European defence will not exist without in some way the French – and the British – deterrence playing a role.’ Cited in, Rühl, L. (1995), ‘Frankreich’s Kernwaffen und die europäische Sicherheit’, Die Welt, 4 September 1995; Stürmer, M. (1995), ‘Europa: A Defence Initiative: Chirac’s Offer to Share Nuclear Strategy with Germany May Shift Weight Towards a Common European Defence Policy’, Financial Times, 14 November 1995. The nuclear issue had been problematic since the inception of the Federal Republic. The Brussels Treaty and Germany’s internal sensitivities towards nuclear weapons made this a particularly touchy issue for German foreign policy. See, Hoppe, C. (1993), Zwischen Teilhabe und Mitsprache: Die Nuklearfrage in der Allianzpolitik Deutschlands 1959–1966 (Baden-Baden: Nomos); Messemer, A. (1999), ‘Konrad Adenauer: Defence Diplomat on the Backstage’ in J. L. Gaddis, P. H. Gordon, E. R. May and J. Rosenberg (eds) Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 236–259. Rohwedder, C. (1995), ‘Kohl’s Party Lists Frictions with France’, The Wall Street Journal, 11 October 1995. Witney, C. (1995), ‘Paris Spurns Italians and Belgians for nuclear vote: Allies’ action in UN to condemn testing arouses French anger’, International Herald Tribune, 20 November 1995. On announcing the nuclear tests, Chirac defiantly declared, ‘I feel today that I have accomplished one of the chief duties of my office, by endowing France with the means of her independence and security in the coming decades.’ Cited in, Financial Times (1996), ‘Disarming Chirac’, 1 February 1996. For an examination of French military reforms in the early to mid 1990s, see, Irondelle, B. (2003), ‘Europeanization Without the European Union?

228 Notes

124.

125. 126. 127.

128.

129.

130.

131.

132.

French Military Reforms 1991–96’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10/2: 208–226; McKenna, J. (1997), ‘Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France’, West European Politics, 20/4: 125–145. Webster, P. (1996), ‘France to Slash Defence Forces’, The Guardian, 18 July 1996; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1996), ‘Französische Soldaten verlassen Deutschland bis 1999’, 18 July 1996. Ibid. Ibid. Bozo, F. (1998), ‘France’, in, M. Brenner (ed.) (1998), NATO and Collective Security (Basingstoke: Macmillan), pp. 39–80; Le Gloannec, A.-M. (1997), ‘Europe by Other Means’, International Affairs, 73/1: 83–98; Menon, A. (1995), ‘From Independence to Co-operation: France, NATO and European Security, International Affairs, 71/1: 19–34; Menon, A. (1997), France, NATO and the Limits of Independence, 1981–1997 (Basingstoke: Macmillan); Pond, E. (1999); p. 82, The Rebirth of Europe (Washington D.C.: Brookings); Rynning, S. (2001), Changing Military Doctrine: Presidents and Military Power in Fifth Republic France, 1958–2000 (New York: Praeger); Sloan, S. R. (2003), NATO, The European Union and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield). Wise, E. (1995), ‘Alliance Breaks New Ground’, European Voice, 24 November 1995. France decided to resume its seat on the NATO military committee, at the NATO situation centre, at NATO’s Defence College in Rome and at Oberammergau and to re-establish its mission to NATO headquarters in Brussels. France did not rejoin the Defence Planning Committee or the Nuclear Planning Group, see, Evans, M. (1996), ‘France and NATO ease nuclear rift’, The Independent, 18 January 1996. France also signalled its intention to construct closer working relations with SHAPE and SACEUR and were willing to discuss nuclear issues within the North Atlantic Council should NATO members wish this. Through its decision to rejoin NATO France was sending a double signal to its partners – do you want to build ESDI, and if yes, are you willing to make the necessary reforms within NATO to make this possible? See, Atlantic News (1996), ‘France/NATO: Paris to participate fully in military committee and is willing to speak out on nuclear questions within the Council’, 17 January 1996. See, Sloan, S. R. (2003), NATO, the European Union and the Atlantic Community: The transatlantic bargain reconsidered (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield), pp. 98–100. International Herald Tribune (1997), ‘6 EU Nations Draft Defence Plan’, 25 March 1997; Buerkle, T. (1997), ‘Make the EU a Defence Alliance? Debate Deepens Security Policy rifts’, International Herald Tribune, 28 March 1997; See also, Gourlay, C. and Remacle, E. (1998), p. 87, ‘The 1996 IGC: The Actors and Their Interaction’, K. A. Eliassen (ed.) Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union (London: Sage), pp. 59–93. LeGloannec, A.-M. (1998), ‘Embracing the “British” Vision’, in, Lankowski, C. (ed.) Break Out, Break Down, or Break in?: Germany and the European Union after Amsterdam, AICGS Research Report No. 8: 21–30. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1997), ‘Abstimmung zwischen Bonn und Paris’, 4 March 1997.

Notes 229 133. Ibid. 134. Ibid. 135. Wallace, W. (1995), ‘Balancing Act’, The Guardian, 8 July 1995. This positive interpretation of the bilateral relationship was counteracted by Rees-Mogg who states; ‘The truth is that Chancellor Kohl has got it wrong. He has almost intentionally, converted Britain from friendship towards Germany and the European idea to a scepticism not unmixed with hostility.’ ReesMogg, W. (1995), ‘A German Union’, The Times, 21 December 1995. 136. Howe, G. (1995), ‘A Defining Moment’, Financial Times, 3 July 1995. 137. Davis, D. (1996), ‘WEU und EU: Grossbritanniens Ambitonen für eine europäische Verteidigung, Speech to the Reflection Groups seminar in Oslo, 22 January 1996’, Britische Dokumentation, D 2/96, 26 January 1996, British Embassy, Bonn; Hurd, D. and Kinkel, K. (1994), ‘Eine Strategische Vision für Europa’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 26 April 1994; Major, J. (1994), ‘Europe: A Future that Works’, William and Mary Lecture given by the Prime Minister the RT HON John Major MP at the University of Leiden, 7 September 1994’, 10 Downing Street Press Notice; Portillo, M. (1995), ‘1996: Substanz und Symbolismus’, Speech tp the WEU Assembly, 5 December 1995, Britische Dokumentation, D 36/95, 8 December 1995, British Embassy, Bonn; WEU Council of Ministers (1994) The Kirchberg Declaration, Luxembourg, 9 May 1994, http://www.weu.int/documents/940509en.pdf; Cutileiro, J. (1995), ‘WEU’s operational development and its relationship to NATO’, NATO Review, 43/5: 8–11, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1995/9505-2.htm; WEU Council of Ministers (1995), The Lisbon Declaration, 15 May 1995, http://www.weu.int/documents/950515en.pdf 138. The Wall Street Journal/Associated Press (1995), ‘German-UK Clash on Group’s Future Mars WEU Meeting’, 16 May 1995. At the summit, UK defence minister, Malcolm Rifkind, was reported as saying, ‘I couldn’t find a single minister from any country who expressed the view that it is possible to merge the WEU and the EU now or in the next years.’ 139. Clarke, M. (1998), p. 143, ‘British Security Policy’, in K. A. Eliassen, (ed.) Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union (London: Sage), pp. 124–146. 140. Unpublished Memorandum (1995) ‘Memorandum on the United Kingdom Government’s Approach to the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference’, cited in, Clarke, M. (1998) pp. 11–12, ‘Britain’, in, Brenner, M. (ed.) NATO and Collective Security (Basingstoke: Macmillan), pp. 6–38. 141. Commissioner van den Broek vented his frustrations at the creation of this rival grouping stating, ‘The paralysis (of foreign policy) has not only blocked effective action in the prolonged crisis facing post-Cold War Europe, but has lead to a plethora of ad hoc groupings, which themselves have proved ineffective and have weakened the Union’s identity’, in, Marshall, A. (1995), ‘Veto Blocks EU Foreign Policy’, The Independent, 10 July 1995. 142. Croft, S., Redmond, J., Wyn Rees, G. and Webber, M. (1999), p. 107, The Enlargement of Europe (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 143. Gourlay, C. and Remacle, E. (1998), p. 64. 144. Tams, C. (1999), ‘The functions of a European Security and Defence Identity and its Institutional Form’, in, H. Haftendorn, R. O. Keohane and

230 Notes

145.

146.

147.

148.

149.

150. 151.

152.

153.

C. Wallander (eds) (1999), Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 80–103. Brown, K., Clarke, B. and Kupar, S. (1995), ‘Retreat on European Army’, Financial Times, 3 November 1995. Schäuble confirmed that he had not suggested the break-up of NATO, rather, ‘It should be our goal to integrate the WEU into the EU – if required, step-by-step and through increased structural integration – and thereby to create a European army.’ Kinkel stated, ‘We cannot deny it: we have not succeeded in convincing the British to accept at least the second option (that of gradual WEU/EU integration) … It would be a difficult thing … We Germans want the Council to have the ability to issue guidelines to the WEU; in the long term we are in favour of a common defence policy and a common defence, which would require the full integration of the WEU into the European Union’, cited in, Atlantic News (1995), ‘WEU Council: Large Majority in Favour of WEU’s Integration into the EU – Creation of Crisis Centre at WEU Secretariat’, 15 November 1995. The UK’s insistence to maintain WEU autonomy led to deep frustration among WEU members, with the Italian Foreign Minister Susanna Agnelli defining the UK’s position as ‘extremist’, in International Herald Tribune/Reuters (1995), ‘Britain Blocks EU on Defence Identity’, 15 November 1995. Major, J. (1996), ‘Die europäische Sicherheit als Thema der Regierungskonferenz und darüber hinaus’, Speech by, John Major to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly in Church House, London, 23 February 1996, Britische Dokumentation, D 10/96, British Embassy, Bonn, 28 February 1996; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1995), ‘Großbritannien gegen Integration der WEU’, 6 December 1995; Tigner, B. and Hitchens, T. (1996), ‘EU Nations Split on Defence Policy’, Defence News, 2 July 1996. The British position was further bolstered by Sir Dudley Smith, President of the WEU Assembly. AUK House of Commons Defence Committee report reinforced the centrality of NATO and stressed the WEU should be built up to effectively conduct Petersberg Tasks, but that the WEU should not assume a defence role and not be subsumed into the EU. See, Fairhall, D. (1996), ‘WEU Dismissed in British Report’, The Guardian, 22 May 1996; Lord Carrington (1996), ‘Die Atlantische Allianz muß Vorrang behalten’, Handelsblatt, 15 May 1996. WEU Council of Ministers (1996), ‘The Birmingham Declaration’, Birmingham, 7 May 1996, http://www.weu.int/documents/960507en.pdf; Lichfield, J. (1996), ‘European lays the foundation for EU defence arm’, The Independent, 8 May 1996. Smith, M. E. (2004) p. 232, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalisation of Co-operation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Financial Times (1996), ‘EU Neutrals to Join Defence Initiative: Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden Give Maastricht Review its First Breakthrough’, 23 July 1996. Evans, M. (1996), ‘NATO Approves European-led Joint Task Forces’, The Times, 16 May 1996; Clark, B. (1996), ‘NATO Seeks to Bridge Ambiguity Gap’, Financial Times, 6 June 1996. The future British Foreign Minister Robin Cook felt the UK’s Conservative government, ‘ … has fashioned a foreign policy which takes on the whole of

Notes 231

154.

155.

156. 157.

158.

159. 160.

161.

162.

163. 164.

165.

Europe at the same time.’ Cited in, Webster, P. (1996) ‘Rifkind’s Warning Heralds Fresh Problems in EU’, The Times, 25 October 1996. Süddeutsche Zeitung (1996), ‘Die Problem mit den Briten sind nicht lösbar: Gespräch mit Werner Hoyer, dem deutschen Unterhändler in der EURegierungskonferenz’, 13 March 1996; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1996), ‘Lamers: Großbritannien ist europapolitisch handlungsfähig’, 16 March 1996. Schmitt, B. (2000), p. 2, ‘From Co-operation to Integration: Defence and Aerospace industries in Europe’, Chaillot Papers No.40, Western European Union, Institute for Security Studies, Paris. Buchan, D. (1995), ‘Britain Joins Arms Agency’, Financial Times, 28 September 1995. Hayward, K. (1997), ‘Towards a European Weapons Procurement Strategy: The shaping of common European requirements for new arms programmes’, Chaillot Paper No.27, Western European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, http://www.iss-eu.org/ James, B. (1996), ‘Britain Now Ready to Join the Eurofighter’, Herald Tribune, 3 September 1996; Die Welt (1996), ‘Eurofighter: Bonn und London einig’, 22 January 1995; see also, Taylor, T. (1997), ‘Arms Procurement’, in J. Howorth, and A. Menon (eds) The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge), pp. 121–140. Atlantic News (1996), ‘German budget threatens Eurofighter’, 27 September 1996. Lindemann, M. (1996), ‘Rühe faces further defence cuts. Minister determined to discuss “unacceptable” move with Kohl’, Financial Times, 29 June 1996; Die Welt (1996), ‘Kohl: Streit um Wehretat beigelegt’, 5 July 1996. The decision to cut the defence budget by $700m substantially undermined Rühe’s attempts to reform the Bundeswehr and commit to collaborative defence procurement projects. Fitchett, J. (1995), ‘Help with a Spy Satellite: Germany Poised to Join French Project’, Herald Tribune, 19 October 1995. The first Helios 1A satellite was launched on 7 July 1995. France had committed 79%, Italy 14% and Spain 7% to the cost of the project. Germany’s decision to join the project was a significant financial boon to Helios’ development. See, IISS (1995), p. 34, The Military Balance 1995–96, International Institute for Strategic Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Norman, P. (1997), ‘Fighter Funding Still in the Air’, Financial Times, 7 January 1997; Gray, B. (1997), ‘Dogfight Over Funding: Ministers Will This Week Try to Break the Impasse Over Finance for the Much-delayed Eurofighter Project’, Financial Times, 2 June 1997. Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), Article J.7.1. Kohl sought to take advantage of the new government’s honeymoon period in the UK’s position on Europe. See Wallace, I. (2000), p. 22. ‘A United Germany in a New Europe: Some British Perceptions’, Studien zur Internationalen Politik, Heft 2000/1 (Hamburg: Universität der Bundeswehr). Cited in Holden, R. (2002), p. 149, The Making of New Labour’s European Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Cook also stated that, ‘We want there to be three main players in Europe, not two’, cited in, Kampfner, J. and Norman, P. (1997), ‘Cook Pledges End to Battles with Europe: Foreign Secretary Seeks

232 Notes

166.

167. 168. 169.

170. 171. 172.

173.

174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184.

New Relations with France and Germany’, Financial Times, 8 May 1997. In response to Cook’s overtures, Kinkel stated that Bonn had a, ‘vital interest in good relations’ with the UK. Leading Conservative politicians in Germany, Karl Lamers (CDU) and HansGert Pöttering (Chairman of the European Peoples’ Group in the European Parliament) sought to reduce any possible co-ordination problems in the Franco-German tandem by encouraging the new government to commit to its ‘European destiny’. See, Union in Deutschland (1997) ‘Das Wahlergebnis in Frankreich darf den europäischen Zug nicht verlangsam’, Informationsdienst der CDU, 5 June 1997. Naumann, K. (1997), ‘Schlanker, flexibler, europäischer: Die Herausforderungen an die neue NATO’, Das Parlament, 16 May 1997. WEU Council of Ministers (1997), Paris Declaration, 13 May 1997, http://www.weu.int/ Paragraph six stated, ‘Ministers recalled their commitment to continue to develop WEU’s relations with the European Union in order to build up WEU in stages as the defence component of the Union.’ However, Paragraph seven stated, ‘Ministers noted with satisfaction that, without prejudice to the ongoing work of the IGC, a real impetus has been given to operational co-operation between WEU and the European Union’. The Amsterdam Treaty (1997), Article J.7.1. Die Welt (1997), ‘WEU beschließt Militärausschuß’, 14 May 1997. See also, Wittke, T. (1997), Am Zeitplan darf nicht gerüttelt werden’, General Anzeiger, Bonn, 21st May 1997. In this interview, Werner Hoyer was keen to point out that although there was still disagreement on the decision-making process in CFSP, it did not represent a major strategic disagreement and therefore should not be overblown. Die Welt (1997), Stabschefs gründen Militärausschuß’, 29 October 1997; Kinkel, K. (1997), Speech by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel at the autumn meeting of the WEU Assembly in Paris, 1st December 1997, Bulletin, Nr.96, pp. 1235–1237. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1997), ‘Für die Schaffung einer europäischen Schutztruppe’, 15 May 1997. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1997), ‘Genügend Zeit für die Fusion’, 6 June 1997. Ibid. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1997), ‘Trotz allem: Kinkel erwartet “substantielles Ergebnis” vom Amsterdam Gipfel’, 12 June 1997. Ibid. Bundestag Drucksache (1997), Nr.180, Sitzung des Bundestags, 13. Wahlperiode, 11. Juni 1997. Ibid., 16158/C Ibid., 16061/A Ibid., 16162/A – 16165/D Ibid., 16166/A – 16169/A Ibid., 16169/C. In the run up to the debate, the Greens group in the Bundestag had published their aims for the CFSP reform in, Sterzing, C., Beer, A., Nachtwei, W., Saibold, H., Nicehls, C. and der Fraktion Bündnis

Notes 233

185.

186. 187.

188. 189.

190. 191.

192.

193.

194. 195. 196.

197.

198.

‘90/Die Grünen (1997), ‘Die Europäischen Union muß zum Motor für eine Zivile Außenpolitik werden’, Bundestag Drucksache, 13/7825, 5 June 1997. Hoyer, W. (1997), ‘Speech by Werner Hoyer, Minister of State in the Foreign Office in front of the WEU-Assembly in Paris on 19 June 1997’, Mitteilung für die Presse Nr.1076/97, Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn. Ibid. Enhanced co-operation was designed to allow an inner group of actors in foreign and security policy to forge ahead with co-operation in a stronger form than the whole may wish, i.e., differentiated integration. Flexibility was seen as a mechanism to allow different groupings of states to co-operate in foreign and security policy using different procedures depending on the case in hand. See, Missiroli, A. (2000), p. 5, CFSP, Defence and Flexibility, Chaillot Paper No.38, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, http://www.iss-eu. org/chaillot/chai38e.pdf. See also, Stubb, C.-G. (1996), ‘A Categorization of Differentiated Integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 36/2: 283–295; Phillippart, E. and Edwards, G. (1999), ‘The Provisions on Closer Co-operation in the Treaty of Amsterdam: The Politics of Flexibility of the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 37/1: 87–108. The PPEWU was to be made up of representatives from the Commission, The WEU, the General Secretariat and the Member States. Missiorli, A. (2000), p. 5, CFSP, Defence and Flexibility, Chaillot Paper No.38, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/ chai38e.pdf Bretherton, C. and Vogler, J. (1999), The European Union as a Global Actor (London: Routledge), pp. 188–193. Cameron, F. (1998), p. 68, ‘Building a Common Foreign Policy: Do Institutions Matter?’, in, J. Peterson, and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge), pp. 59–76. Allen, D. (1998), p. 54, ‘Who Speaks for Europe?: The Search for an Effective and Coherent External Policy’, J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge), pp. 41–58. Maull, H. W. (1997), p. 1254, ‘Quo vadis, Germania?: Außenpolitik in einer Welt des Wandels’, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, 10: 1245–1256. Ischinger, W. (1998), ‘Die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Amsterdam – Praxis und Perspektiven’, ZEI Discussion Paper, C.14, Bonn. Bremner, C. (1997), ‘London to Challenge “Dog’s Dinner” Treaty’, The Times, 26 June 1997. Schroedter, E. (2003), ‘Zivilmacht Europa? Illusion und Chancen’, in P. Schlotter (Hrsg.) Europa – Macht – Frieden? Zur Politik der ‘Zivilmacht Europa’, AFK-Friedensschriften Band 30 (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 179–190. Elizabeth Schroedter is a Green MEP. Wagner, W. (2001), p. 217, Die Konstruktion einer europäischen Außenpolitik: Deutsche, französische und britische GASP-Politiken im Vergleich, PhD Thesis, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University of Frankfurt am Main. Volgy, T. J. and Schwarz, J. E. (1991), ‘Does Politics Stop at the Water’s Edge? Domestic Political Factors and Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Cases of Great Britain, France and West Germany’, Journal of Politics, 53/3: 615–643.

234 Notes 199. Meimeth, M. (1998), ‘Germany’ in, M. Brenner (ed.) NATO and Collective Security (Basingstoke: Macmillan), pp. 81–115. 200. Hacke, C. (1997), ‘Die Bedeutung des Nationalen Interesses für die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik’, in, G. Niedhart, D. Junker and M. W. Richter (eds) Deutschland in Europa: Nationale Interessen und internationale Ordnung im 20. Jahrhundert (Mannheim: Palatium), pp. 18–35. 201. Hill, C. (1998), p. 36, ‘Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP’, in, J. Zielonka (ed.) Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (Kluwer Law International), pp. 5–51. 202. The Guardian (1995), ‘Germany’s creeping “boss-politik”’, 27 November 1995.

3 Learning to Lead: Germany, Kosovo and the Development of the Common European Security and Defence Policy 1. Maurer, A. (2000), p. 43, ‘The German Presidency of the Council: Continuity or Change in Germany’s European Policy?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38 (Annual Review): 43–47. 2. Ibid. 3. Miskimmon, A. J. (2001), ‘Recasting the Security Bargains: Germany, European Security and the Transatlantic Relationship’, in D. Webber (ed.), New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy: German Foreign Policy since Unification (London: Frank Cass and Co.), pp. 83–106. 4. See, for example, Maull, H. W. (2000), ‘Germany and the Use of Force: Still a “Civilian Power”?’, in Survival, 42/2: 56–80. 5. Hill, C. (2004), ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42/1: 143–163. 6. Rudolf, P. (2000), p. 131, ‘Germany and the Kosovo Conflict’, in P. Martin and M. R. Brawley (eds) Alliance Politics, Kosovo and NATO’s War: Allied Force or Forced Allies (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 131–143. 7. Ibid., p. 132. 8. Garton-Ash, T. (1993), p. 71, ‘Germany’s Choice’, Foreign Affairs, 73/4. 9. Clark, W. K. (2001), Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs). 10. Hofmann, G. (1999), ‘Wie Deutschland in den Krieg geriet’, Die Zeit, 20/1999, 12 May 1999, http://www.zeit.de/, accessed 28th July 2004. Hofmann claims that in the end, Germany had little choice but to participate in the Kosovo campaign. 11. Putnam, R. (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Twolevel Games’, International Organization, 42/3: 427–460. 12. For an examination of the debates concerning the use of military force in German foreign policy from a constructivist perspective, see, Zehfuss, M. (2002), Constructivism in International Relations: The Politics of Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 13. Schröder, G. (1998), ‘Weil wir Detuschlands Karft vertrauen … ’, Regierungserklärung, Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder vor dem deutschem Bundestag am 10. November 1998, Bulletin vom 11.11.1998. 14. Interview in German Embassy, London, 4 December 2000.

Notes 235 15. Simonian, H. (1999), ‘Comment and Analysis: The Rebirth of Confidence: Fifty Years on, a Post-War Generation of Germans is Able to Move on from its Tainted Past and Assert Itself Once Again in International Politics and Business’, Financial Times, 25 May 1999, http://www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999. 16. Siemon-Netto, U. (2004), ‘The 68er Regime in Germany’, Orbis, 48/4: 641–656. 17. Hyde-Price, A. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy’, in S. Padgett, W. E. Paterson and G. Smith (eds) Developments in German Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 184–205. 18. Meiers, F.-J. (2002), p. 196, ‘A Change of Course? German Foreign Policy after Unification’, German Politics, 11/3: 195–216. 19. Some of Grant’s working papers on the topic – Grant, C. (1998), ‘Can Britain Lead in Europe?’, Centre for European Reform Working Paper, http://www. cer.org.uk/; Grant, C. (2000), ‘European Defence Post-Kosovo’, Centre for European Reform Working Paper, http://www.cer.org.uk. Blair also saw, CFSP as a way to develop a ‘step change’ in British European policy, an overall strategy of providing for a greater leadership role within the EU in an area where the UK had clear strengths and could forge strategic partnerships with leading EU member states. See, Smith, J. and Tsatsas, M (2002), The New Bilateralism: the UK’s Relations Within the EU (London: The Royal Institute for International Affairs). 20. Réflexion sur le mode d’emploi pour la mise en oeuvre practique de l’article J.4.2. du Traité de Maastricht, compt-rendu officieux de séminaire 17.4.1997 organisé par la présidence francaise réunissant les directeurs des affairs stratégiques des ministieres des affaires étrangeres des pays de l’UEO. This flow chart demonstrated the immensely cumbersome decision-making process needed in order to conduct a WEU mission. Reprinted in MeierWalser, R. C. and Harke M. (Hrsg.) (1999), ‘Neue Herausforderungen für die Sicherheit Europas’, Argumente und Materialien zum Zeitgeschehen 6, Hanns Seidel Stiftung, Akademie für Politik und Zeitgeschehen, pp. 29–30. 21. Interview with a Senior Ministry of Defence official, Ministry of Defence, 29 January 2001. 22. Ibid. 23. ‘Franco-British Declaration on European Defence’, 4 December 1998, reproduced in, Hill, C. and Smith, K. E. (eds) (2000), European Foreign Policy: Key Documents (London: Routledge), pp. 233–234. 24. Roper, J. (2000), ‘Keynote Article: Two Cheers for Mr. Blair? The Political Realities of European Defence Co-operation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38/3: 7–24. 25. Howorth, J. (2000), p. 4, ‘European integration and defence: the ultimate challenge?’, Chaillot Paper 43, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, November 2000. Emphasis in the original. 26. Prime Minister Tony Blair quoted in, ‘UK Politics: Anglo–French Military Pact’ (1998) BBC Online Network, 4 December 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 1/hi/uk_politics/227598.stm 27. Niblett, R. (2001), p. 101 ‘France and Europe at the End of the Cold War: Resisting Change’, in R. Niblett and W. Wallace (eds) Rethinking European Order: West European Responses 1989–1997 (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 89–123.

236 Notes 28. Pedersen, T. (1998), Germany, France and the Integration of Europe: A Realist Interpretation (London and New York: Pinter). 29. Interview with an official in the British Embassy in Berlin, 13 March 2001. 30. Howorth, J. (2000), pp. 28–29. 31. Interview British Embassy, Berlin, 21 March 2001. 32. Interview French Embassy, London, 14 March 2002. 33. Fischer, J. (1999), Rede zum Ende der deutsche Präsidentschaft in der Europäische Union: Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Joschka Fischer vor dem Europäischen Parlament am 21.Juli 1999 in, Sträßburg, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6_archiv/2/r/r990721/htm 34. Oakes, M. (2000), p. 18, ‘European Defence: From Pörtschach to Helsinki’, House of Common Research Paper 00/20, 21 February 2000. 35. Many of the inconsistencies within the CFSP were highlighted by Hill’s conception of the ‘Capabilities-expectations gap’ within EU foreign and security policy. 36. Hellman, G. (1999), ‘Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-containment and Civilian Power: United Germany’s Normalising Ambitions’, Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper 99/10, University of Birmingham. See also, Sloam, J. (1999), ‘Germany: President of the EU, Keeper of the Peace – The German Presidency of European Council and the summits at Berlin and Cologne’, Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper 99/14, University of Birmingham. 37. See, the interview with Joschka Fischer, Die Zeit (2001), ‘Die Antwort ist auf fast alle fragen: Europa’, 13/2001, http://www.zeit.de/ 38. Schröder, G. (1998), pp. 47–67, 14/3 Bundestag Deutscher Bundestag – 14. Wahlperiode – 3. Sitzung. Bonn, Dienstag, den 10. November 1998 Plenarprotokoll 14/3. 39. SPD – Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen (1998), Aufbruch und Erneuerung – Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen, Bonn, 20. Oktober 1998, Chapter 11, Part 3, Reproduced at http://www. datenschutz-berlin.de/doc/de/koalo/index.htm#01 40. Schröder, G. (1998), ‘Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder hielt anläßlich des Jahresempfangs für das Diplomatische Corps am 23. November 1998 im Palais Schaumburg in Bonn folgende Rede’, Bulletin Nr.77, 25 November 1998. 41. Bach, J. P. G. (1999), Between Sovereignty and Integration. German Foreign Policy and National Identity after 1989 (Münster: Lit Verlag); Bredow, W.von and Jäger, T. (1993), Neue deutsche Außenpolitik. Nationale Interessen in internationalen Beziehungen (Opladen); Eberwein, W.-D. and Kaiser, K.(Hrsg.) (1998), Deutschlands neue Außenpolitik, Bd. 4: Institutionen und Ressourcen (München: Oldenbourg); Haftendorn, H. and Riecke, H. (Hg.) (1996), Die volle Macht des souveränen Staates. Die alliierten Vorbehaltsrechte als Rahmenbedingungen westdeutscher Außenpolitik 1949–1990 (Baden-Baden: Nomos); Hanrieder, W. F. (1989), 40 years of German Foreign Policy (New Haven); Katzenstein, P. (ed.) (1997), Tamed Power. Germany in Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Markovitz, A. S. and Reich, S. (1997), The German Predicament: Memory and Power in the New Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press); Schwarz, H.-P. (1985), Die gezähmten Deutschen. Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit, 2. Aufl., (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt).

Notes 237 42. Der Spiegel (1998), ‘Fischer’s Schläge’, Spiegel Vol. 49, p. 88. Fischer had called for the end of the right to first use of nuclear weapons during his first visit to Washington. See, Financial Times (1998), ‘Europe: Germany Seeks to Allay US NATO Fears’, 25 November 1998, http://www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999. 43. Der Spiegel (1995), p. 27, ‘Das ware blutiger Zynismus’, Der Spiegel, Vol. 34, pp. 27–29. Fischer was provoking a debate within the Greens over the nature of armed force in German foreign policy in light of events in the former Yugoslavia, in particular in Srebrenica. The SPD’s Oskar Lafontaine had argued against a NATO operation in Bosnia as it did not correspond to NATO’s role as a self-defence organisation. 44. Norman, P. and Atkins, R. (1998), ‘Comment and Analysis: Germany’s moderniser: FT Interview Gerhard Schröder: The Social Democratic party’s chancellor candidate tells Peter Norman and Ralph Atkins of his plans to create a new beginning for the German model’, Financial Times, 10 May 1998, www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999. See also, Hyde-Price, A. and Jeffery, C. (2001), ‘Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Nov 2001, 39/4: 689–718. 45. A publication of the Institut für europäische Politik (IEP) charted the growing pragmatism of German European policy under the Red/Green government: Schneider, H., Jopp, M. and Schmalz, U. (Hrsg.) (2001), Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik: Rahmenbedingungen – Problemfelder – Optionen (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag). 46. Der Spiegel (1998), p. 85, Spiegel Gespräch ‘Wir wollen keine Soli tanzen’, Vol. 48, pp. 84–87. See also, Fischer, J. (1998), ‘Die Selbstbeschränkung der Macht muß fortbestehen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 August 1998. In this article Fischer outlined the continued structural and normative constraints on German foreign policy. 47. Lake, D. A. (2001), p. 136, ‘Beyond Anarchy: The Importance Of Security Institutions’, International Security, 26/1: 129–160. 48. For the linkage of domestic and international norm development, see, Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998), ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’, International Organization, 52/4: 887–917. 49. Satz, A. and Sterzing, C. (1999), ‘Grüne Perspektiven auf die deutsche Rat spräsidentschaft’, Integration, 22.Jg., 1/99: 21–37. 50. In a confidential interview with a leading CDU specialist on foreign-policy issues the interviewee rejected the description of the EU as a Civilian Power, claiming it was not representative of the EU’s role in international affairs. Interview, 10 July 2001, Bundestag, Berlin. The interviewee consistently argued throughout the 1990s for an increased German and EU role in crisis management as part of Germany’s contribution to transatlantic burdensharing. 51. WEU Council of Ministers, Rome Declaration, 16–17 November 1998. 52. However according to one British MoD official, the UK’s role in smoothing over difficulties in this field was vital for the success of the Washington Summit. Interview 29 January 2001, Ministry of Defence, London. 53. Verheugen, G. Address by Mr. Verheugen, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Germany (Translation) WEU Assembly – 2nd part of the 44th session, Paris, 1 December 1998, http://www.weu.int/eng/documents.html

238 Notes 54. Jopp, M. (1999), p. 6, European Defence Policy: The Debate over Institutional Aspects, June/July 1999 (Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik). 55. Hofmann, G. (1999), ‘Wie Deutschland in den Krieg geriet’, Die Zeit, 20/1999, 12 May 1999, http://www.zeit.de/ 56. Fischer, J. (1999), ‘Rede des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Joschka Fischer in der französischen Nationalversammlung am 20. Januar 1999’, in Paris, http://www.eu-presidency.de/03/0302/00233/index.html, accessed 25 October 1999. 57. Jeffery, C. and Handl, V. (1999), ‘Blair, Schröder and the Third Way’, in L. Funk (ed.) The Economics and the Politics of the Third Way (Hamburg), pp. 78–87. See also, Miskimmon, A. and Sloam, J. (2003), ‘Assessing the Impact of Social Democracy on European Union Foreign Policy’, paper presented at the UACES 33rd Annual Conference and 8th Research Conference – The European Union: The First Ten Years, The Next Ten Years? University of Newcastle, 2–4 September 2003 and A. Giddens (2000), The Third Way and its Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press). 58. German European Council/WEU Presidency (1999), ‘Internal reflection of WEU on European Security and Defence’, 24 February 1999, reprinted in Rutten, M. (2001), pp. 14–16, ‘From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers No.47, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union. 59. Nicoll, A. (1999), p. 3, ‘Boost role, says Blair’, Financial Times, 9 March 1999. 60. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1999), ‘Limounsinen, Wasserwerfer und Traktoren: Dramaturgie eines Großereignisses: Europas Außenminister im Rheingau’, 15 March 1999, p. 65. 61. FrankfurterAllgemeine Sonntagszeitung (1999), ‘Außenminister warnen vor Gewalt-Eskalation im Kosovo: Keine weitere Fristverlängerung für Friedensabkommen’, 14 March 1999, p. 2. 62. German Council Presidency (1999), ‘Strengthening the Common Policy on Security and Defence’, Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers, Eltville (Schloß Reinhartshausen), 13–14 March 1999, German Proposal prepared on 8 March 1999 for discussion at the informal meeting, reprinted in, Rutten, M. (2001), pp. 17–19, ‘From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers No.47, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union; Walker, M. (1999), ‘Comment and Analysis: Inside Europe: Hand in Hand on the Western Front In the Discreet Belgian Suburbs, Two Powerful Men are Bonding’, The Guardian, 19 April 1999, p. 14. 63. Walker, M. (1999), ‘Comment and Analysis: Inside Europe: Hand in Hand on the Western Front In the Discreet Belgian Suburbs, Two Powerful Men are Bonding’, The Guardian, 19 April 1999, p. 14. 64. Ibid. 65. German Presidency (1999), ‘Presidency Conclusions, Berlin European Council, 24–25 March 1999’, Part III Statements on Kosovo, http://ue.eu.int/ ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFB2.html 66. Schröder, G. (1999), ‘Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im Deutschen Bundestag zur Aktuellen Lage im Kosovo am Donnerstag, 15. April 1999’, Bonn, http://www.eu-presidency.de/ accessed 25 October 1999.

Notes 239 67. Cologne Declaration 3–4 June 1999, Annex III European Council Declaration on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, paragraph 2. 68. Verheugen, G. (1999), ‘Rede des Staatsministers im Auswärtigen Amt Günter Verheugen im Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Paris am 9 März 1999’. 69. Scharping, R. (1999), Speech at the first Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU, ‘Europe’s security and defence in the light of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Washington Summit’, 10 May 1999. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ 70. Buckley, N. (1999), ‘Defence: Support for EU Army Grows’, Financial Times, 12 May 1999, http://www.ft.com/ 71. Scharping, R. (1999), Speech at the first Meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU, ‘Europe’s security and defence in the light of the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Washington Summit’, 10 May 1999. http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ 72. Graham, R. (1999), ‘Defence: France and Germany in talks’, Financial Times, 29 May 1999, http://www.ft.com/ 73. Ibid. 74. Franco–German Defence and Security Council (1999), ‘Franco–German Declaration’, 29 May 1999, reprinted in, Rutten, M. (2001) p. 40, ‘From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers No.47, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union. 75. The following data comes from BMVg (2000) Meinungsbild zur Sicherheitspolitischen Lage (SPL) 2000: Repräsentative Umfrage durch EMNID: Muendlich und telefonisch durchgefuehrt vom 11.02 bis 13.03.2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Presse- und Informationsstab, http:// www.bundeswehr.de/ 76. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp between Transformation and Accommodation’, in K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345. 77. BMVg (2000), Meinungsbild zur Sicherheitspolitischen Lage (SPL) 2000: Repraesentative Umfrage durch EMNID: Muendlich und telefonisch durchgefuehrt vom 11.02 bis 13.03.2000, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Presse- und Informationsstab, http://www.bundeswehr.de/ 78. Ibid. 79. Ibid. 80. Ibid. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Interview House of Commons, 5 December 2000. 84. Ibid. 85. Brechtefeld, J. (1999), ‘Kosovo – eine Wendepunkt in der deutschen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik?’, Welt Trends, Nr.23: 121–127. 86. Interview British Embassy, Berlin, 13 March 2001. 87. Ibid. 88. Interview with member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundestag, Berlin, 29 March 2001.

240 Notes 89. Schröder, G. (1998), p. 65, 14/3 Bundestag Deutscher Bundestag – 14. Wahlperiode – 3. Sitzung. Bonn, Dienstag, den 10. November 1998 Plenarprotokoll 14/3. NATO eventually received a UNSC mandate for Operation Allied Force but had not secured one before 24 March when bombing began. 90. Wheeler, N. J. (2004), p. 195, ‘The Kosovo bombing campaign’, in C. ReusSmit (ed) The Politics of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 189–216. 91. Financial Times (1999), ‘Purposeful Germans line up behind NATO’, 5 April 1999, http://www.ft.com, accessed 21 October 1999. 92. Hofmann, G. (1999), ‘Wie Deutschland in den Krieg geriet’, Die Zeit, 20/1999, 12 May 1999, http://www.zeit.de/ 93. Ibid. 94. Scharping, R. (1999), p. 35, Wir dürfen nicht wegsehen: Der Kosovo Krieg und Europa (Berlin: Ullstein). 95. Schröder, G. (1999), Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder anläßlich der Münchner Tagung für Sicherheitspolitik am 6. Februar 1999, http:// ww.eu-presidency.de/03/0302/00428/index.html, accessed 25 October 1999. 96. Weller, M. (1999), ‘The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo’, International Affairs, 75/2: 211–251. 97. For a very frank discussion on the conduct of the air campaign against Serbia, see, Clark, W. K. (2001) Waging Modern War (New York: Public Affairs). 98. Agence France Presse Intl. (AFM) (1998), Greens take hard-line positions but still seek to govern with left, http://www.globalarchive.com/, accessed 21 October 1999. 99. Financial Times (1999), ‘War Takes its Toll on Pacifist Minister’, 10 April 1999, http://www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999. 100. Financial Times (1999), ‘Purposeful Germans line up behind NATO’, 5 April 1999, http://www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999. 101. Financial Times (1999), ‘War Tests Germany’s Red/Green coalition’, 23 April 1999, http://www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999 102. For an analysis of the development of German policy on the use of force, Baumann, R. and Hellmann, G. (2001), ‘Germany and the Use of Military Force: Total War, the Culture of Restraint and the Quest for Normality’, in D. Webber (ed) New Europe, New Germany, Old Foreign Policy?: German Foreign Policy since Unification, Special Issue of German Politics, 10/1: 61–82. 103. Klaus Naumann quoted in, Power, S. (2003), p. 455, ‘A Problem from Hell’: America and the Age of Genocide (London: Flamingo). 104. For an examination of the German and international opinions on the rationale of a ground offensive against Milosevic, see, Lantis, J. S. (2002), Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification (London: Praeger), pp. 150–159. 105. Jelpke, U. and Pau, P. (1999), ‘Behandlung von Kosovo–Flüchtlingen durch deutsche Stellen vor und nach Beginn der NATO-Luftangriffe’, Deutsche Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/802, 16 April 1999; Jelpke, U. and Pau, P. (1999), ‘Keine Zurückweisung von Kosovo-Flüchtlingen an den Grenzen, die Erteilung von Visa für Familienangehörige sowie

Notes 241

106.

107.

108. 109. 110.

111. 112. 113.

114. 115.

unbürokratische Ausstellung von Reisedokumenten und Aufnahme und Schutz von unbegleiteten Flüchtlingsund Waisenkindern’, Drucksache 14/1182, Deutsche Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode, 17 June 1999; Jelpke, U. and Pau, P. (1999), ‘Anerkennung eines Asylanspruchs für jugoslawische Deserteure und Kriegsdienstverweigerer’, Drucksache 14/1183, Deutsche Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode, 17 June 1999; Jelpke, U. and Pau, P. (1999), ‘Kleine Anfrage: Bewertung der Lage im Kosovo durch das Auswärtiges Amt (II)’, Deutsche Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 14/1378. Fraktionder, PDS (1999), ‘Europäischer Sicherheitsarchitektur statt Dominanz der Nordatlantische Allianz’, Drucksache 14/454, Deutsche Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode, 12 March 1999. Entschließungsantragder Fraktion der PDS (1999), zur Abgabe einer Erklärung der Bundesregierung zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rates am 3. und 4. Juni 1999 in Köln und zum Stand der Friedensbemühungen im Kosovo-Konflikt, Drucksache 14/1120, Deutsche Bundestag 14. Wahlperiode, 8 June 1999. Interview with PDS Foreign-Policy Spokesman, 11 June 2001, Bundestag, Berlin. Hough, D. (2001), The Fall and Rise of the PDS in Eastern Germany (Birmingham: Birmingham University Press), pp. 175–176. In a speech to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Wolfgang Schäuble stated, ‘Without the change in Government in 1998 we would not have been able to carry out the Kosovo operations – if at all – without considerable and dramatic internal differences. Even today if the leftist government of Schroeder and Fischer were to be in opposition, they would use all their powers to fulfil the promises which the chancellor had made to the Americans. Schroeder did in fact use the challenge posed by foreign policy in 1999 to gain new stature after the initial disaster of the red and green parties till the time that Lafontaine left the active political scene. I often ask myself nowadays, whether this could be his motivation for his inexplicable behaviour in foreign policy which can neither be explained nor be regarded as responsible’. Schäuble, W. (2003), ‘Continuity and Change – the Future of German Foreign Policy’, Speech to the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Berlin, 10 March 2003, http://www.cducsu.de/upload/1eac85a463302c7f869224f38efc5fe511376z0sfv1bh.pdf, accessed 1 September 2004. Breuer, P. (1998), Deutscher Bundestag – 14. Wahlperiode – 6. Sitzung. Bonn, Freitag, den 13. November 1998, Plenarprotokoll 14/6, p. 360. Schäuble, W. (1999), Deutscher Bundestag – 14. Wahlperiode – 30. Sitzung. Bonn, Donnerstag, den 25. März 1999, Plenarprotokoll 14/30, p. 2425B. Simonian, H. (1999), ‘Comment and Analysis: The Rebirth of Confidence: Fifty Years on, a Post-war Generation of Germans is Able to Move on from its Tainted Past and Assert Itself Once Again in International Politics and Business’, Financial Times, 25 May 1999, http://www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999 Gerhardt, W. (1999), Debate over German Participation in the NATO Air Campaign in Yugoslavia, Plenarprotokoll 14/30, Drucksache 2426C. Biermann makes the distinction between the Fischer Plan – the diplomatic efforts to bring the war in Kosovo to an end, and the Stability Pact for

242 Notes

116.

117. 118.

119.

120.

121. 122.

123.

124.

125.

South–Eastern Europe – which sought to establish long-term stability in the Balkans region. Biermann, R. (1999) p. 16, ‘The Stability Pact for South–east Europe: Potential, Problems and Perspectives’, ZEI Discussion Paper, No.C56, Bonn, http://www.zei.de/ Schwegmann, C. (2000), ‘The Contact Group and its Impact on the European Institutional Structure’, WEU Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper No. 16, Paris. http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ16.pdf Interview Research Section, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, 13 August 2002. SPD- Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen (1998), ‘Aufbruch und Erneuerung – Deutschlands Weg ins 21. Jahrhundert’, Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN Bonn, 20. Oktober 1998, http://www.bundesregierung.de/ Schröder, G. (1999), ‘Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im Deutschen Bundestag zur Aktuellen Lage im Kosovo am Donnerstag, 15. April 1999’, Bonn, http://www.eu-presidency.de/, accessed 25 October 1999. Buckley, M. (2001), ‘Russian Perceptions’, in M. Buckley and S. N. Cummings (eds) Kosovo: Perceptions of War and its Aftermath (London: Continuum): 156–175; Antonenko, O. (1999), ‘Russia, NATO and European Security after Kosovo’, Survival, 41/4: 124–144; Levitin, O. (2000), ‘Inside Moscow’s Kosovo Muddle’, Survival, 42/1: 130–140. Financial Times (1999), ‘German Drive in Search of a Settlement’, Financial Times, 29 April 1999, http://www.ft.com/, accessed 21 October 1999. Chef des Kanzleramts (1999), ‘Deutsche Beteiligung an einer internationalen Sicherheitspräsenz im Kosovo zur Gewährleistung eines sicheren Umfeldes für die Flüchtlingsrückkehr und zur militäsrischen Absicherung einer Friedensregelung für das Kosovo’, Drucksache 14/1111, 7 June 1999. ‘The first papers for the Stability Pact were already drafted by the Fischer staff in the early weeks of 1999, long before the air campaign started on 24 March 1999. During a meeting with his State Secretaries and with the Heads of Department on the Petersberg near Bonn, Joschka Fischer discussed the Plan at length as part of a tour d’horizon. Two aspects were striking: Firstly, Joschka Fischer strongly favoured the Plan. (Second) From this point onwards, the German Foreign Minister was seriously committed to making the Stability Pact a real success’, in Biermann, R. (1999), p. 14, ‘The Stability Pact for south–east Europe: Potential, Problems and Perspectives’, ZEI Discussion Paper, No.C56, Bonn, http://www.zei.de/ Ibid., p. 15. For an examination of the role of the Federal Security Council, see, Rühl, L. (2001), ‘Security Policy: National Structures and Multilateral Integration’, in W.-D. Eberwein, and K. Kaiser Germany’s New Foreign Policy: Decision-making in an Interdependent World (Basingstoke: Palgrave): 102–116. The roles of Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul (Minister for Economic Co-operation and Development) and Gerd Poppe (Federal Government Commissioner for Human Rights Policy and Humanitarian Aid, 1998–2003) were important in the framing of the Stability Pact and in forging domestic agreement on the plan within the German government. Interview, 28 February 2001, MRBB-B, Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin.

Notes 243 126. Friis, L. and Murphy, A. (2000): p. 5, ‘Turbo-charged Negotiations: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/5: 767–786. 127. Schröder, G. (1999), ‘Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder im Deutschen Bundestag zur Aktuellen Lage im Kosovo am Donnerstag, 15. April 1999’, Bonn, http://www.eu-presidency.de/, accessed 25 October 1999. The structure of the Stability Pact had yet to be agreed upon, but was scheduled for agreement on 17 May 1999. 128. Friis and Murphy described the negotiation of the peace and the Stability Pact as ‘Turbo-charged’. Friis, L. and Murphy, A. (2000), pp. 767–786. 129. Ibid. 130. Council (1999) ‘Common Position concerning the launching of the Stability Pact of the EU on South–Eastern Europe’, http://europa.eu.int/ comm/external_relations/see/docs/stability_pact_17_may_99.htm, accessed 6 September 2004. 131. Ibid. Preamble, paragraph 7. 132. Biermann, R. (1999) p. 18. 133. Schröder, G. (1999). 134. Ibid. 135. Ibid. 136. Peters, I. (1999), pp. 196–197, ‘OSCE and German Policy: a Study in How Institutions Matters’, in, H. Haftendorn, R. O. Keohane and C. A. Wallender, Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 195–220. 137. Anderson, J. J. and Goodman, J. B. (1993), p. 45, ‘Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-cold War world’, in R. O. Keohane, J. S. Nye and S. Hoffmann (eds) After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), pp. 23–62. 138. Germany undertook 1.3% of the total of 38,004 sorties flown in the NATO operation against Serbia, which were predominantly flown by 14 Tornado aircraft with Electronic Combat Reconnaisance (ECR) technology. As there was a shortage of this technology within the alliance, ECR was termed a ‘Critical Asset’ in the operation. See, Rieks, A. and Weigold, D. (2000), p. 33, ‘Der Kosovo-Konflikt – eine militärpolitische Auswertung,’ in J. Krause (Hrsg.) Kosovo: Humanitäre Intervention und cooperative Sicherheit in Europa (Opladen: Leske und Budrich), pp. 13–53. 139. Fischer, J. (1999), ‘Bundesminister des Auswärtigen Joschka Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur deutschen Beteiligung an dem internationalen Streitkräfteverband in Osttimor (Interfet), 07. Oktober 1999’, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, October 1999, Nr.10, pp. 3–4. 140. Ischinger, W. (1999), ‘Staatssekretär Wolfgang Ischinger in der Zeitschrift Deutschland (Ausgabe Juli/August 1999) zu den Konturen einer neuen Außenpolitik’, in Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr.8, August 1999, pp. 3–6. 141. Fischer, J. (1999), p. 30, ‘Südosteuropa am Wendepunkt’, Rede der Bundesminister der Auswärtigen, Joschka Fischer, bei der Vorbereitungskonferenz zum Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa auf dem Petersberg, Bonn, 27. Mai. 1999, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr.5, Juni 1999, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, pp. 28–30. 142. Ibid., p. 29.

244 Notes 143. Tewes, H. (2000), Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 144. Verheugen, G. (1999), ‘Günter Verheugen, Staatsminister im Auswärtigen Amt, am 08.06.1999 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag’, http://www.eupresidency.de/, accessed 25 October 1999. 145. Auswärtiges Amt (2001), p. 43, Deutsche Aussenpolitik 2001, Berlin. 146. Volmer, L. (1999), ‘Dr. Ludger Vomer, Staatsminister im Auswärtigen Amt, am 08.06.1999 vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur Deutschen EURatspräsidentschaft’, http://www.eu-presidency.de/, accessed 25 October 1999. 147. Fischer, J. (2000), ‘Kosovo – Herausforderung auf dem Weg des Balkan nach Europa’, Regierungserklärung zum Kosovo abgegeben durch den Bundesminister des Auswärtigen Joschka Fischer am 5. April 2000, in Berlin, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ 148. Ibid. 149. Ibid. 150. Fischer, J. (1999), Bundesminister Joshka Fischer am 18.11.1999 in der Stuttgarter Zeitung zur Außenpolitik der rot-grünen Bundesregierung (Auszüge), http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/ 151. Smith, M. E. (2000), ‘Conforming to Europe: the domestic impact of EU foreign policy co-operation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/4: 613–631. 152. See, Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003). 153. Mueller-Brandeck-Boucquet, G. (2002), p. 197, Deutsche Europapolitik von Konrad Adenauer bis Gerhard Schroeder (Opladen: Leske
Budrich). See also, Allen, D. (1998), ‘Who Speaks for Europe?’ in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of CFSP, (London: Routledge) and Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, G. (2002), ‘The New CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of the European Union’, European Foreign Affairs Review, 7/2: 257–282. 154. The Treaty of Nice (2000) formally inaugurated three new institutions as part of ESDP – the Political Security Committee, the EU Military Committee and the EU Military Staff. 155. Confidential Interviews in the German Permanent Representation to the European Union, Brussels on 2 and 3 July 2003 and in the Auswärtiges Amt, Berlin, on 7 July 2003. 156. Scharping, R. (1999), p. 15, ‘Grunlinien deutscher Sicherheitspolitik’ Rede des Bundesministers der Verteidigung Rudolf Scharping an der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in Hamburg, 08. September 1999, Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, September 1999, pp. 15–23. 157. GemeinsameSicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr (2001), Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, 23 May 2001. See also, Sarotte, M. E. (2001), ‘German Military Reform and European Security’, Adelphi Paper No.301, IISS, London. 158. See, Table 3.10. 159. German Council Presidency (1999), ‘Strengthening the Common Policy on Security and Defence’, Informal meeting of EU foreign ministers, Eltville (Schloß Reinhartshausen), 13–14 March 1999, German Proposal prepared on 8 March 1999 for discussion at the informal meeting, reprinted in Rutten, M. (2001), pp. 17–19, ‘From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence

Notes 245

160.

161.

162.

163.

164. 165.

167.

Core Documents’, Chaillot Papers No.47, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union. European Parliament (2001), ‘Instruments of Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management Available to the European Union’, Directorate General for Research-Directorate A STOA – Scientific and Technological Options Assessment Briefing Note N 1/2001 PE nr. 296.707 March 2001; Swedish Presidency (2001) Results of the Swedish Presidency (final version), http://www.eu2001.se/; Lalumière, C. (2000) Report on the establishment of a common European security and defence policy after Cologne and Helsinki (2000/2005(INI)) Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy. The UK has been clear in its support for Conflict Prevention as part of a strategy of influencing European security, but is more comfortable in using military force than Germany. See, Ministry of Defence (2001), Policy Paper No.1 ‘Defence Diplomacy’, p. 2, http://www.mod.uk/ – ‘Britain’s Armed Forces, and civilians working in defence, have a long and proud record of providing support to conflict prevention through a wide range of activities. During the SDR (Strategic Defence Review), conflict prevention and peacetime diplomacy were acknowledged as being core defence activities. A new defence mission called Defence Diplomacy was created to give greater priority, impetus and coherence to these types of activities, and to ensure alignment with the Government’s foreign and security policy objectives.’ Germany privileges CP above military capabilities. Fischer, J. (2001), ‘Interview: Die Antwort auf fast alle Fragen ist: Europa’, Die Zeit, 12/2001, http://www.zeit.de/2001/12/Politik/200112_fischer. neu9.3.html. The title of this article is a misquote of what Fischer actually said in the interview which may lead to some misinterpretation. What Fischer acutally stated was, ‘Die Antwort auf fast alle internationale Fragen ist: Europa’ (my emphasis). This is a clear sign that despite the importance of the EU in many areas affecting Germany, the German national interest remains relevant, albeit in terms of Selbsteinschränkung within a multilateralist context. Report Presented to the Nice European Council by the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission, Nice, 8 December 2000, ‘Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of the European Union Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention’, reprinted in Rutten M (2001), ‘From St. Malo to Nice: European Defence: Core Documents’, Chaillot Paper No.47, EU ISS, Paris, pp. 212–221. Cologne Declaration (1999) Annex III, paragraph 2. See, Figure 3.1.166. von Ploetz, H.-F. (1999), ‘Europäische Union – Rußland: Partnerschaft für das 21. Jahrhundert’ Ansprache Staatssekretär/AA Dr. Hans-Friedrich von Ploetz vor dem Rat für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Moskau, 28. Mai 1999, in Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 6 Juni 1999, Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, pp. 3–7. ‘The security concept of the EU encompasses, like the suggestions for the Balkan stability pact show: Binding on and, if the prerequisites are fulfilled, inclusion into the space of common rights, common security and common prosperity, which are the model to which the EU professes itself.’ See, for example, Cook, R. (2001), ‘Human Rights – a priority for Britain’s Foreign Policy’, Speech by the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, in the Foreign

246 Notes Office, London, 28 March 2001. http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext. asp?4873 168. Blair, T. (1999), ‘Speech by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Economic Club of Chicago’, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, 22 April 1999, reproduced at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/politics/blair.htm, accessed 6 September 2004.

4 No Longer a ‘Reluctant Power’? Germany’s Emergent Leadership Role in ESDP 1. Dempsey, J. (2001), ‘Power to the Capitals’, Financial Times, 15 October 2001. 2. Confidential Interview, 8 July 2003, Kanzleramt, Berlin. 3. Hedetoft, U. (1998), p. 2, ‘Germany’s National and European Identity: Normalisation by Other Means’, in C. Lankowski (ed.) Break Out, Break Down or Break In? Germany and the European Union after Amsterdam, AICGS Research Report No.8, pp. 1–10. 4. Hacke, C. (2002), ‘Die Außenpolitik der Regierung Schröder/Fischer: Zwischenbilanz und Perspektiven’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, 48/2002, available at, http://www.das-parlament.de/2002/48/Beilage/002.html; Hellmann, G. (2001), ‘Deutschlands Kraft und Europas Vertrauen oder: Die Selbstbewussten, die Befangenen und die Betroffenen der neuen deutschen Außenpolitik’, in C. Lammers and L. Schrader (Hrsg.) Neue deutsche Außenund Sicherheitspolitik? Eine friedenswissenschaftliche Bilanz zwei Jahre nach dem rot-grünen Regierungswechsel (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 42–78. 5. Cornish, P. (ed.) (2004), The Conflict in Iraq, 2003 (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 6. Clarke, M. (2004), ‘The Diplomacy that Led to War in Iraq’, in P. Cornish (ed.) The Conflict in Iraq, 2003 (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 27–58. 7. Reutter, W. (ed.) (2004), Germany on the road to Normalcy: Policies and Politics of the Red-Green Federal Government (1998–2002) (Basingtoke: Palgrave). 8. Spanish sponsored ‘Group of Eight Letter’ supporting America’s position on Iraq, Aznar, J. M. et al. (2003) Letter to The Times, The Times, 30 January 2003, http://www.timesonline.co.uk 9. Miskimmon, A. (2005) ‘Continuity in the face of upheaval – British Strategic Culture and the impact of the Blair government’, in K. Longhurst and M. Zaborowski (eds) Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security (London: Routledge). 10. Pond, E. (2004), Friendly Fire: The Near-death of the Transatlantic Alliance, European Union Studies Association (Pittsburgh, Brookings Institution); Daalder, I. H. and Lindsay, J. M. (2003) America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution); Gordon, P. H., and Shapiro, J. (2004) Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis over Iraq (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution). 11. The Economist (2001) ‘Solid, but for How Long?’, 20 September 2001. 12. The then National Security Adviser to the President of the United States, Condoleezza Rice, outlined her summation of how America should view its relations with Germany, France and Russia after the Iraq War in 2003 as that of, ‘Punish France, ignore Germany and forgive Russia’, cited in, Hare, D. (2004) p. 116, Stuff Happens (London: Faber and Faber).

Notes 247 13. Hedstück, M. and Hellmann, G. (2003) ‘Wir machen einen deutschen Weg’ Irak-Abenteuer, der transatlantische Verhältnis und die Risiken der Methode Schröder für die deutsche Außenpolitik’, in Kubbig, B. (Hrsg.) (2003) Brandherd Irak, US-Hegemonieanspruch, die UNO und die Rolle Europas, Campus, Frankfurt am Main, S.224–234. 14. Gemeinsame Erklärung Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Luxemburgs und Belgiens zur Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (2003) 29 April 2003, http://www.bundesregierung.de/, accessed 21 July 2003. 15. Interviews in the German Foreign Ministry, 7 July 2003. 16. Ibid. 17. Bacia, H. (2003), ‘Unnötige Eile: Das Treffen könnte der gemeinsame europäischen Sicherheitspolitik schaden’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 April 2003. See also, Doyle, L. (2003), ‘French Call for Military Cooperation divides EU’, The Independent, 28 April 2003; Financial Times Deutschland (2003) ‘Vierergipfel berät über EU-Verteidigungspolitik’, 29 April 2003. 18. Schweiger, C. (2004), ‘British–German Relations in The European Union after the War on Iraq’, German Politics, 13/1: 35–55. 19. The last time Germany had a Grand Coalition government was during the 1966–69 period. 20. Meiers, F.-J. (1995), ‘Germany: The Reluctant Power’, Survival, 37/3: 82–103. 21. Haftendorn, H. (2006), Coming of Age (London: Rowman and Littlefield). 22. Hyde-Price, A. and Jeffery, C. (2001), ‘Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39/4: 689–718. 23. Szabo, S. (2004), Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution). 24. Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2003), ‘Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture,’ International Affairs, 77/3: 587–603; Cornish, P. and Edwards, G. (2005), ‘The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report,’ International Affairs, 81/4: 801–821. 25. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp between Transformation and Accommodation’, in K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) Germany, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press); Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2006), ‘Adapting to Europe? German Foreign Policy, Domestic Constraints And The Limitations of Europeanisation since Unification’, in H. W. Maull (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 26. Hellmann, G. (ed.) (2006), Germany’s EU Policy on Asylum and Defence: DeEuropeanization by Default? (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 27. NATO (2005), NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-161.pdf, accessed 7 September 2006. 28. Ibid. In contrast, the UK figure currently stands at 2.3% of GDP and France stands at 2.5% GDP (Based on 2005 figures). 29. Meiers, F.-J. (2005), p. 159, ‘Germany’s Defence Choices’, Survival, 47/1: 153–166. 30. NATO (2005). The UK figure stands at 202,000 with French forces numbering 357,000 (On the basis of 2005 figures).

248 Notes 31. Figures from German Armed Forces Homepage (Figures correct as of 2 August 2006), http://www.bundeswehr.de/, accessed 10 August 2006. 32. As a result of Germany’s involvement in military crisis management, Germany has become much more at ease with deploying the Bundeswehr. See, Wagener, M. (2006), ‘Normalization in Security Policy? Deployments of Bundeswehr Forces Abroad in the Era Schröder, 1998–2004’, in H. W. Maull (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 79–92. 33. Confidential Interview, German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 7 February 2007. 34. Die Welt (2006), ‘Jung halt Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Kongo für möglich’, 23 January 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 35. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2006), ‘NATO weitet Einsatz auf ganz Afghanistan aus’, 6 March 2006, www.faz.net, accessed 5 June 2006. 36. Die Welt (2006), ‘Jungs Reserven’, 23 January 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 37. Die Welt (2006), ‘Bundeswehr soll im Kongo nur mit Logistik helfen’, 28 January 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 38. Chirac’s initial suggestion that the proposed Franco-German EU Battlegroup should be readied for the mission was immediately rejected by the German government – the Franco-German Battlegroup consists of 1,500 German soldiers and only four French troops. 39. Stuttgarter Nachrichten (2006), Kongo: SPD appelliert an faire Arbeitsteilung mit Paris – Bonde hält Bundeswehr-Einsatz für falsch’, 7 March 2006, http://www.stuttgarter-nachrichten.de, accessed 7 March 2006. 40. Die Welt (2006), ‘Deutschland schickt Soldaten in den Kongo’, 10 February 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 41. In a newspaper interview in early February, Jung confirmed that Germany would not undertake the leadership role in Congo. Die Welt (2006), ‘Hoffentlich bleibt mir so ein Befehl erspart’, 11 February 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 42. Financial Times (2006), ‘Europe Ready to Send Peacekeeping Troops to Congo’, 11 February 2006, p. 3. 43. Die Welt (2006), ‘Möglicher EU-Einsatz im Kongo nimmt Gestalt an – auch Deutschland bereit’, 28 February 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 44. These preconditions were the same as those stated by Walter Kolbow (SPD) – that is a fixed duration and destination of the mission; an internationalised force; a legal basis for the mission and the agreement of the Congolese government for the EU’s presence. The Union’s defence policy spokesman Bernd Siebert outlined five points which mirrored Kolbow’s points; an wide range of support within the EU to be reflected in military involvement in the mission; a robust UN mandate; an agreement by President Kabila for the mission; a restriction on the mission solely to the Congolese capital and a fixed duration for the mission of four months – one month before the elections and three months after. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2006), ‘SPD hat weniger Vorbehalte gegen Kongo-Einsatz’, 9 March 2006, www.faz.net, accessed 24 July 2006. 45. Die Welt (2006), ‘Struck warnt vor Einsatz der Bundeswehr im Kongo’, 13 March 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 February 2006.

Notes 249 46. Die Welt (2006), ‘Union: Massive Bedenken gegen Kongo-Einsatz’, 14 March 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 47. Die Welt (2006), ‘Union: Skepsis bei Kongo-Einsatz’, 15 March 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 48. These included: Portugal, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Belgium and Austria, as well as, Germany and France. 49. Peter Struck (SPD) supported this view stating, ‘Europe has a special responsibility to stabilise Africa so that no more refugees traverse the Mediterranean.’ Cited in, Die Welt (2006), ‘Solana zu Gesprächen über EUEinsatz in Kongo’, 19 March 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 50. Die Welt (2006), ‘Bundesregierung treibt Kongo-Einsatz deutscher Soldaten voran’, 17 March 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 51. Leersch, H.-J. (2006), ‘Schwere Vorwürfe gegen Jung’, Die Welt, 22 March 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 52. The view that Chancellor Merkel was too willing to accommodate France was also echoed by Guido Westerwelle, Head of the FDP. Die Welt am Sonntag (2006), ‘Stapeln Sie hoch, Herr Westerwelle’, 26 March 2006, www.wams.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 53. Schäfer, P. (2006), ‘Speech to the Bundestag’, 29th March 2006, Bundestag Plenarprotokoll 16/28, 28. Sitzung. 54. Deutschlandfunk (2006), ‘Widerstand gegen Kongo-Einsatz in der SPDFraktion’, 21 March 2006, http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/ interview_dlf/481339/, accessed 24 July 2006; Handelsblatt (2006) ‘Politiker meutern gegen Kongo-Einsatz’, 21 March 2006, www.handelsblatt.com, accessed 24 July 2006. 55. Die Welt (2006), ‘SPD: Deutsche sollen in ganz Kongo helfen’, 2 May 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 56. Bonde, A. (2006), ‘Speech to the Bundestag’, 29 March 2006, Plenarprotokoll 16/28, 28. Sitzung. 57. Financial Times Deutschland (2006), ‘Grüne werben für Ja zu Kongo-Einsatz’, 17 May 2007, www.ftd.de, accessed 20 July 2006; Die Welt (2006) ‘Grüne wollen Bundeswehr in den ganzen Kongo schicken’, 6 May 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 58. Die Welt (2006), ‘Pro und contra Kongomission’, 25 March 2006, www.welt.de, accessed 20 July 2006. 59. Bundesregierung (2006), ‘Antrag der Bundesregierung: Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an der EU-geführten Operation EUFOR RD CONGO zur zeitlich befristeten Unterstützung der Friedensmission MONUC der Vereinten Nationen während des Wahlprozesses in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo auf Grundlage des Resolution 1671 (2006) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen vom 25 April 2006’, Drucksache 16/1507, 17 May 2006. 60. A recent meeting of this trilateral group was on 23 September 2006 in Compiegne, France. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the Lebanon issue and energy policy were all on the agenda for the leaders. For more details see, the Federal Government’s press release for the meeting at, http://www.bundesregierung. de/nn_1264/Content/DE/Artikel/2006/09/2006-09-23-treffen-compiegne. html, accessed 24 September 2006.

250 Notes 61. The Foreign Ministry’s understanding of the Germany-Russia strategic partnership can be found at, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/ Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/OsteuropaUndRussland/Russland. html, accessed 24 September 2006. 62. CDU/CSU and SPD (2005), Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, 11 November 2005, Voltmedia, Paderborn. 63. Most of the groundwork for the compromise also stemmed from Schröder’s time in office. Rinke, A. (2006) ‘100 Tage Bundesregierung: Die Stille Macht’, Handelsblatt, 1 March 2006, http://www.handelsblatt.de/,. accessed 5 March 2006. 64. Poland was particularly happy with the deal, receiving €100 million extra out of funds which had been earmarked for eastern Germany. 65. Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. E. (2004), ‘Germany and European Integration: A Shifting of Tectonic Plates’, in H. Kitschelt and W. Streeck (ed.) Germany Beyond the Stable State (London: Frank Cass), pp. 59–78; Streeck, W. and Trampusch, C. (2005), ‘Economic Reform and the Political Economy of the German Welfare State’, German Politics, 14/2: 174–195. 66. Harnisch, S. and Schieder, S. (2006), ‘Germany’s New European Policy: Weaker, Leaner, Meaner’, in H. W. Maull (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 95–108. 67. The Times (2006), ‘German Lesson: London and Berlin are on the Cusp of a Beautiful Relationship’, 18 February 2006, p. 23. 68. Williamson, H. (2006), ‘Berlin-London Links Thrive on Mutual Praise’, Financial Times, 18 February 2006, p. 8; Blair, T. (2006), Speech on European Integration, St Anthony’s College, Oxford University, 2 February 2006, http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/BlairSpeechStAntonys.pdf, accessed 15 March 2006. 69. Economist (2006), ‘Merkel as a World Star: Special Report – Germany’s Place in the World’, 18–24 November 2006, pp. 25–27. 70. Clarke, C. (2000), p. 733, ‘French and British security: Mirror Images in a Globalized World’, International Affairs, 76/4: 725–739. 71. Currently there are 13 Battlegroups either already in existence or in the planning to be operational by 2007, which have been committed to make up of the following member state constellations – France; Italy; Spain; United Kingdom; France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and potentially Spain; France and Belgium; Germany, the Netherlands and Finland; Germany, Austria and Czech Republic; Italy, Hungary and Slovenia; Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal; Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania; Sweden, Finland and including Norway as a third State; United Kingdom and the Netherlands. 72. Aillot-Marie, M. and Reid, J. (2006), ‘Carriers deal signals important step in EU defence links’, Financial Times, Asia Edition, 6 March 2006, p. 12; Jivkov, M. (2006), ‘Britain and France to share carrier programme’, The Independent, 25 January 2006, p. 55. 73. Council of Ministers (2004), Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2004/l_245/l_24520040717en00170028.pdf 74. Booker, C. (2005), ‘Defensive Measures: Europeanisation of the British Army is Coming on the Double’, Sunday Telegraph, 10 July 2005, p. 21.

Notes 251 75. See, Löwenstein, S. (2005), ‘Die wundersame Verwandlung der Bundeswehr’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 25 August 2005, http://www.faz.net, accessed 7 March 2006. See also, Wagener, M. (2006), ‘Normalization in Security Policy? Deployments of Bundeswehr Forces Abroad in the Era Schröder, 1998–2004’, in H. W. Maull (ed.) Germany’s Uncertain Power: Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 79–92. 76. The following data can be accessed at http://europa.eu.int/comm/ public_opinion/index_en.htm 77. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2006), ‘Merkel und Chirac plädieren für Militärmission in Kongo’, 14 March 2006, http://www.faz.net, accessed 14 March 2006. 78. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2006), ‘Jung fordert mehr EU-Solidarität für Kongo-Einsatz’ 7 March 2006, http://www.faz.net, accessed 7 March 2006. 79. Käppner, J. (2006), ‘Wir kennen uns dort nicht aus’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 March 2006, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/558/71487/, accessed 8 March 2006. 80. Browne, A. (2006), ‘Merkel Looks to Britain as Model for a Free Market’, The Times, 26 January 2006, p. 43. 81. Buck, T. (2006), ’Protectionist storm shakes EU’s single market’, Financial Times, 1 March 2006, p. 1; Monti, M. (2006), ‘Damage at the Heart of Europe’s Single Market’, Financial Times, 2 March 2006, p. 17; Financial Times (2006) ‘A New Mood is What Europe needs most: Germany and France Hold the Keys to Economic Recovery’, Financial Times Leader, 9 January 2006, p. 16. 82. Wallace, W. (2005), ‘Das Führungstrio Deutschland – Frankreich – Grossbritannien: Europas zentrales Problem?’, Integration, 4/05: 328–331. 83. The Independent (2006), ‘A German Bridge Across the Atlantic’, 14 January 2006, p. 34. 84. Angela Merkel, cited in, Stevens, B. (2006), ‘Terms of Endearment’, Wall Street Journal, 14 January 2006, p. A14. 85. Ibid. 86. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2006), ‘Ich empehle eine selbstbewußte Bescheidenheit’, 6 March 2006, p. 6. 87. Stevens, P. (2006), ‘UK Should Look at the World Afresh’, Financial Times, 20 February 2006, http://www.ft.com, accessed 20 February 2006. 88. Peel, Q. (2005), ‘Germany is entering an assertive era’, Financial Times, 12 October 2005, http://www.ft.com, accessed 23 February 2006. 89. The Times (2006), ‘German lesson: London and Berlin are on the cusp of a Beautiful Relationship’, 18 February 2006, p. 23. 90. Mertes, M (2002), p. 16, ‘A “German Way”’, Internationale Politik, Transatlantic Edition, 4/3: 11–16. 91. For an excellent analysis of the European Security Strategy and its relationship to the United States’ military planning, see, Dannreuther, R. and Peterson, J. (eds) (2006), Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations (London: Routledge). 92. German Ministry of Defence (2006) p. 34, Defence White Paper, Berlin, http://www.weissbuch.de/download/White_Paper_2006.pdf 93. Confidential Interview, German Foreign Ministry, Berlin, 7 February 2007. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid.

252 Notes 96. Allen, D. (1998), ‘Who Speaks for Europe?: The Search for an Effective and Coherent External Policy’ in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (ed.) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge), pp. 41–58. 97. Ibid. 98. Confidential Interview, German Embassy, London, 14 February 2007. 99. Done, K. and Wiesmann, G. (2007), ‘National Tensions Resurface at EADS’, Financial Times, 20 February 2007, http://www.ft.com, accessed 20 February 2007. 100. Pfaff, W. (2006), ‘Does Europe Need an Army?’, International Herald Tribune, 10 November 2006, www.iht.com, accessed 10 November 2006. 101. Jeffery, C. and Paterson, W. E. (2004), ‘Germany and European Integration: A Shifting of Tectonic Plates’, in H. Kitschelt and W. Streeck (ed.) Germany Beyond the Stable State (London: Frank Cass), pp. 59–78; Streeck, W. and Trampusch, C. (2005), ‘Economic Reform and The Political Economy of the German Welfare State’, German Politics, 14/2: 174–195. 102. Harnisch, S. and Schieder, S. (2006), ‘Germany’s New European Policy: Weaker, Leaner, Meaner’, in Maull, H. (ed.) (2004), Germany’s Uncertain Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave), pp. 95–108. 103. Dyson, K. (2005), ‘Economic Policy Management: Catastrophic Equilibrium, Tipping Points and Crisis Intervention’, in S. Green and W. E. Paterson (eds) Governance in Contemporary Germany: The Semisovereign State Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 115–37; Dyson, K. and Padgett, S. (eds) (2006) Politics of Economic Reform in Germany (London: Routledge). 104. Von Randow, G. (2006), ‘Sterben furs Öl?’ Die Zeit, 15 May 2006, www.zeit.de, accessed 15 May 2006. 105. Hill, C. (1993) ‘The Capabilities-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3: 305–328; Hill, C. (1998) ‘Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?’ in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing Visions of the CFSP (London: Routledge), pp. 18–38.

Conclusion – Between Europeanisation and National Singularities 1. Struck, P. (2003), Paragraph 6, Defence Policy Guidelines, 21 May 2003, Berlin. 2. Ibid., paragraph 9. 3. Nye, J. S. (1990), Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books). 4. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp between Transformation and Accommodation’, K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) German, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345. 5. See, Hellmann, G. (1999) ‘Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-containment and Civilian Power: United Germany’s Normalising Ambitions’, Institute for German Studies Discussion Papers IGS 99/10, University of Birmingham. 6. Overhaus, M., Harnisch, S. and Katsioulis, C. (2003), ‘Schlussbetrachtung: Gelockerte Bindungen und eigene Wege der deutschen Sicherheitspolitik?’,

Notes 253

7. 8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

in S. Harnisch, C. Katsioulis and M. Overhaus (Hrsg.) (2004), Gelockerte Bindungen – eigene Wege? Die deutsche Sicherheitspolitik unter der rot-grünen Koalition (Baden-Baden, Nomos), pp. 253–262. Risse, T. (2004), ‘Kontinuität durch Wandel: Eine “neue” deutsche Aussenpolitik?’, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B11/2004: 24–31. Waever, O. (1990), ‘Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian’, International Affairs, 66/3: 477–493. Duffield, J. S. (1998), p. 236, World Power forsaken: Political Culture, international institutions and German security policy after unification (Stanford: Stanford University Press). Olsen, J. P. (1996), ‘The Changing Political Organization of Europe: An Institutional Perspective on the Role of Comprehensive Reform Efforts’ in J. J. Hesse and T. A. J. Toonen (eds) The Yearbook of Comparative Government and Public Administration, Vol. II (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 225–250; Olsen, J. P. (2001), ‘The Many Faces of Europeanization’, ARENA Working Papers, WP01/2, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm; March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (1989), Rediscovering Institutions (New York: Free Press); March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (2004), ‘The logic of appropriateness’, ARENA Working Paper, WP04/09, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp04_9.pdf March, J. G. and Olsen, J. P. (2004), p. 1, ‘The logic of appropriateness’, ARENA Working Paper, WP04/09, http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/ wp04_9.pdf Börzel argues that states are driven by the logic of appropriateness rather than a logic of consequentiality in the Europeanisation of domestic governance structures in their initial response to a policy development or challenge. However, as Börzel states, ‘Actors start to consider alternative strategies only if their initial strategy proves to be ineffective in pursuing their interests’, Börzel, T. A. (2002), p. 230, States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in Germany and Spain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Checkel highlights social learning/socialisation as a mean to fill the gap which Olsen left in his analysis. See, Checkel, J. T. (1999), p. 555, ‘Social Construction and Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6/4: 545–560. Knill, C. (2001), p. 213, The Europeanisation of National Administrations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Ibid. See also, Knill, C. and Lehmkuhl, D. (1999), ‘Difference mechanisms of Europeanization’, European Integration Online Papers, 3/7, http://eiop.or.at/ eiop/pdf/1999-007.pdf. Howorth, J. (1997), p. 24, ‘France’, in J. Howorth and A. Menon (eds) The European Union and National Defence Policy (London: Routledge), pp. 23–48. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003) p. 343, ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp between Transformation and Accommodation’, K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) German, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345. Smith makes this point in relation to the relative insulation from transnational, sectoral interests, of European foreign policy elites, on issues relating to CFSP. Smith, M. E. (1998), ‘Rules, Transgovernmentalism, and the Expansion of European Political Co-operation’, in W. Sandholtz and

254 Notes

18.

19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

A. S. Sweet (eds) European Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 304–333. Meyer, C. O. (2005), ‘Convergence towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, European Journal of International Relations, 11/4: 523–549. For a more elaborated version of this argument, see also, Meyer, C. O. (2006) The Quest for a European Strategic Culture (Basingstoke, Palgrave). Gehrmann, W. (2002), ‘Scharpings Luftnummer’, Die Zeit, 10/2002, http://www.zeit.de/2002/10/Wirtschaft/print_200210_euro-fighter.html VonWeizsäcker Report (2001), Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr Bericht der Kommission an die Bundesregierung, 23 May 2001. Interview in the Defence Ministry Planning Staff, Berlin, 12 June 2001. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003), ‘The Polls-Trends: Having it Both Ways: European Defence Integration and the Commitment to NATO’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 67: 627–659. Lantis, J. S. (2002), p. 176, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since Unification (London: Praeger). For a range of case studies representing these differing views on the concept of Europeanisation, see, Dyson, K. and Goetz, K. H. (eds) (2003), German, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press). One exception is Hellmann, G. (ed.) (2006), Germany’s EU Policy on Asylum and Defence: De-Europeanization by Default? (Basingstoke: Palgrave). Becher, K. (2004), p. 404, ‘German Forces in International Military Operations’, Orbis, 48/3: 397–408. Longhurst, K. (2003), ‘Why aren’t the Germans Debating the Draft? Path Dependency and the Persistence of Conscription’, German Politics, 12/2: 147–165. The 2006 White Paper on Defence reinterates Germany’s commitment to maintain conscription. Hampton, M. N. (2000/2001), ‘The Past, Present and the Perhaps: Is Germany a “Normal” Power?’, Security Studies, 10/2: 179–202; Sperling, J. (2001), ‘Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in postCold War Europe’, British Journal of Political Science, 38: 389–425; Wagener, M. (2003), ‘Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr. Normalisierung statt Militarisierung deutscher Sicherheitspolitik’, in C. Grund, S. Harnisch and H. W. Maull (Hrsg.) Deutschland im Abseits? Rot-grüne Außenpolitik 1998 – 2003 (Baden-Baden: Nomos), pp. 33–48.

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Book chapters and journal articles Aggestam, L. (2004), ‘Role Identity and the Europeanisation of Foreign Policy: A Political-Cultural Approach’, in B. Tonra and T. Christiansen (eds) Rethinking European Foreign Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press), pp. 81–98. Allen, D. (1998) ‘Who Speaks for Europe?: The Search for an Effective and Coherent External Policy’, in J. Peterson and H. Sjursen (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge), pp. 41–58. Berger, T. U. (1996), ‘Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan’, in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.) The Culture of National Security, (New York: Columbia University Press), pp. 317–356. Biermann, R. (1999), ‘The Stability Pact for South-East Europe: Potential, Problems and Perspectives’, ZEI Discussion Paper, No. C56, Bonn, http://www.zei.de/ Bulmer, S. (1991), ‘Analysing European Political Cooperation: The Case for a Twotier Analysis’, in M. Holland (ed.) The Future of European Political Cooperation: Essays in Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: MacMillan). Bulmer, S. (1997), ‘Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power’, in P. J. Katzenstein (ed.) Tamed Power: Germany in Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), pp. 1–49. Bulmer, S. and Burch, M. (2000), ‘Coming to Terms with Europe: Europeanisation, Whitehall and the Challenge of Devolution’, Queen’s Papers on Europeanisation No. 9/2000, Queens University, Belfast. Bulmer, S. and Paterson, W. E. (1996), ‘Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?’, International Affairs, 72/1: 9–32. Crawford, B. (1996), ‘Explaining defection from International Cooperation: Germany’s Unilateral Recognition of Croatia’, World Politics, 48/4: 482–521. Deighton, A. (1997), ‘On the Cusp: Britain, Maastricht and European Security’, European University Institute, RSC Working Paper No. 97/59. Eichenberg, R. C. (2003), ‘The Polls-Trends: Having it Both Ways: European Defence Integration and the Commitment to NATO’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 67: 627–659. Friis, L. and Murphy, A. (2000), ‘Turbo-charged Negotiations: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/5: 767–786. Garton-Ash , T. (1993), ‘Germany’s Choice’, Foreign Affairs, 73/4: 65–81. Grant, C. (1998), ‘Can Britain Lead in Europe?’, Centre for European Reform Working Paper, http://www.cer.org.uk/.

260 Select Bibliography Grant, C. (2000), ‘European Defence Post-Kosovo’, Centre for European Reform Working Paper, http://www.cer.org.uk. Hellman, G. (1999), ‘Beyond Weltpolitik, Self-containment and Civilian Power: United Germany’s Normalising Ambitions’, Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper 99/10 (Birmingham: University of Birmingham). Hellmann, G. (2002), ‘Deutschland in Europa: Eine symbiothische Beziehung’, in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beilage zur Wochenzeitung Das Parlament, December 2002, B48/2002: 24–31. Hill, C. (1993), ‘The Capability-expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 31/3: 305–328. Hill, C. (1998), ‘Closing the Capabilities-expectations Gap’, in Peterson, J. and Sjursen, H. (eds) A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge), pp. 18–38. Hill, C. (1998), ‘Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP’, in J. Zielonka (ed.) Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), pp. 35–51. Hill, C. (2004), ‘Renationalizing or Regrouping? EU Foreign Policy Since 11 September 2001’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42/1: 143–163. Hyde-Price, A. and Jeffery, C. (2001), ‘Germany in the European Union: Constructing Normality’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39/4: 689–718. Janning, J. (1996), ‘A German Europe: a European Germany’, International Affairs, 72/ 1: 33–41. Jopp, M. (1999), European Defence Policy: The Debate over Institutional Aspects, June/July 1999 (Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik). Ladrech, R. (1994), ‘Europeanization of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case of France’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 32/1: 69–88. Marcussen, M., Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin, D., Knopf, H. J. and Roscher, K. (1999), ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6/4: 614–33. Maull, H. W. (1990), ‘Germany and Japan: the New Civilian Powers’, Foreign Affairs, 69/5: 91–105. Mearsheimer, J. (1990), ‘Back to the Future’, International Security, 15/1: 5–56. Miskimmon, A. and Paterson, W. E. (2003), ‘Foreign and Security Policy: On the Cusp between Transformation and Accommodation’, K. Dyson and K. H. Goetz (eds) (2003), German, Europe and the Politics of Constraint (Oxford: Proceedings of the British Academy/Oxford University Press), pp. 325–345. Putnam, R. (1988), ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games’, International Organisation, 42/3: 427–460. Schmalz, U. (2002), ‘Die europäische Macht: Deutschland in der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik’, in H. Schneider, M. Jopp and U. Schmalz (eds) Eine neue deutsche Europapolitik? Rahmenbedingungen – Problemfelder – Optionen (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag), pp.15–68. Smith, M. E. (1998), ‘Rules, Transgovernmentalism, and the Expansion of European Political Co-operation’, in W. Sandholtz and A. S. Sweet (eds) European integration and Supranational governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 304–333. Smith, M. E. (2000), ‘Conforming to Europe: the Domestic Impact of EU Foreign policy co-operation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7/4: 613–631.

Select Bibliography 261 Smith, M. E. (2004), ‘Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy Co-operation’, European Journal of International Relations, 10/1: 95–136. Sperling, J. (2001), ‘Neither Hegemony nor Dominance: Reconsidering German Power in Post-Cold War Europe’, British Journal of Political Science, 38: 389–425. Torreblanca, J. I. (2001), ‘Ideas, Preferences and Institutions: Explaining the Europeanization of Spanish Foreign Policy’, Arena Working Papers, WP01/26, University of Oslo.

News sources A number of news sources have been relied on for this study including: Agence France Presse Intl. Atlantic News BBC Bonn General Anzeiger BPA Informationsfunk CDU Pressedienst Das Parlament Defence News Der Spiegel Deutsche Presse Agentur Deutschland-Union-Dienst Die Welt Die Zeit Europa Info Europa im Blickfeld European Voice Financial Times Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Frankfurter Rundschau Handelsblatt Herald Tribune International Herald Tribune Süddeutsche Zeitung The Economist The Guardian The Independent The Times Wall Street Journal

Index A-400M 169 Adenauer, Konrad 28, 33, 48, 110, 187 Afghanistan 31, 148, 153, 155, 158–159, 164–166, 172, 188, 193 Ahtisaari, Martti 130, 132 Amsterdam Treaty 15–19, 68, 82–83, 85, 89, 91–98, 100, 109, 112, 117, 127, 130 Annan, Kofi 130, 150, 158 Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Ministry) 13–15, 24, 130, 149, 158, 159, 177–179, 187, 193, 195 Balladur, Edouard 67, 69, 128 Barnier, Michel 85 Battlegroups 151, 154, 168, 179, 184, 192 Beck, Kurt 180 Berlin Plus Agreement 112, 147, 186 Bevin, Ernest 26 Birmingham 89 Blair, Tony 68, 92–94, 101, 105–106, 109, 113, 143, 167–169, 172–174 Bosnia-Herzegovina 66, 81–82, 155, 157, 164 Breuer, Paul 126 Brok, Elmar 70 Bündnis ‘90 / Die Grünen (The Greens) 14, 73–74, 94, 97, 103–104, 111, 124, 128, 137, 158, 161–163, 197 Bundeswehr (German Armed Forces) 36, 43, 49, 51–52, 54, 56, 59, 71, 73–74, 80–82, 91, 96–97, 103–104, 107, 118, 120–123, 125–126, 132–134, 138–140, 142–143, 148, 151–154,157–159, 161–163, 165, 172, 175–177, 179–180, 183–185, 186–188, 194–198 Bundeswehrverband 163 Bush, George 49 Bush, George. W. 146, 149, 165

Chernomyrdin, Viktor 130, 132 Chirac, Jacques 45, 84–86, 92–94, 159, 166, 169, 172 Christian Democractic Union (CDU) 38, 42–43, 46, 48, 50, 54, 56–57, 66, 69, 71, 73–74, 76, 90, 94, 148, 162, 167, 197 Christian Social Union (CSU) 38, 42–43, 46, 48, 54, 56–57, 71, 73–74, 76, 94, 161–162, 167 Clinton, Bill 102, 123 Cologne Treaty 15, 107, 112, 116–117, 130, 135, 138, 142 Colombo, Emilio 24, 30 Common Joint Task Force (CJTF) 65–66, 84, 89, 91 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 10, 28 Cook, Robin 92, 114 Cork 89 Croatia 37, 46, 113, 128 De Gaulle, Charles 28 Democratic Republic of Congo 18, 19, 21, 149–151, 153–166, 169, 171–172, 174–176, 179–181, 184, 192–193 Dregger, Alfred 38, 42, 46 Dumas, Roland 42–43, 49, 60 EADS 180 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 7, 34, 38, 41–42, 46, 48, 53, 57, 60, 72, 76–77, 91, 97 Engholm, Bjorn 55 Errera, Gerrard 106 EU3 165–166, 172–173 Eurocorps 47, 65, 68, 86, 96, 118 Eurofighter/Typhoon 90–91, 169 European Defence Community 26–27 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 166

262

Index European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) 3, 138, 143, 154, 169 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 65, 95, 112 European Security Strategy 174, 193 Europeanisation 2, 4–12, Eyskens, Mark 47 Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) 14, 26, 119, 163, 179–180, 183 Fischer, Joschka 102–104, 108, 110–111, 113–114, 117, 122–124, 126–137, 141–143, 147, 149, 182 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) 157 France 4, 18, 24–26, 34–35, 37–38, 40–50, 58, 60, 62, 101, 106–107, 111, 116, 118, 123, 129, 140–141, 143, 146–150, 152–153, 158–160, 162, 164–165, 167–171, 173–175, 177, 179–180, 183–184 Free Democratic Party (FDP) 38, 54, 56–57, 64, 72–74, 76, 90, 126–127, 129 G-8 101, 123, 127, 129–130, 135–136 Gansel, Norbert 42, 51 Garel-Jones, Tristan 48 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich 22, 24, 30–33, 36–38, 41–43, 46, 49, 56–60, 103, 135 Grand Coalition 148–151, 156, 159, 161, 165, 167–168, 172, 174–177, 180–184 Guigou, Elizabeth 70 Gysi, Gregor 55 Harmel, Pierre 27–28, 30 Hatfield, Richard 106 Haughey, Charles 41 Headline Goal 168, 174, 192, 195 HELIOS 91 Helsinki Treaty 107, 128, 132, 135 Herzog, Werner 67 Heusgen, Christoph 179 Hornheus, Karl-Heinz 50 Howe, Geoffrey 87 Hoyer, Werner 64, 85, 90, 94

263

Hurd, Douglas 43, 50 Hussein, Saddam 21, 36 Implementation Force (IFOR) 82 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 129 Iran 165–166, 168, 173, 179, 182, 184 Iraq 21, 145–149, 157, 165–166, 172, 175, 180–181 Ischinger, Wolfgang 96, 135, 166 Joint Armaments Co-operation Structure (JACS) 90 Jospin, Lionel 92 Jung, Franz Josef 159–161, 163–164, 175–177, 183 Kahrs, Johannes 162 Kinkel, Klaus 66, 72–73, 76, 78–79, 81, 85, 87, 89, 91, 93–94 Klepsch, Egon 43 Kohl, Helmut 31–33, 34, 36–42, 43–50, 52, 54–60, 65–66, 71, 73, 76–77, 84–86, 91, 93–95, 98, 100, 103, 105, 110, 126, 137, 187 Kok, Wim 93 Kosovo 16, 19, 21, 101–102, 104–105, 108–111, 113–116, 119, 121–132, 134, 136, 142–143, 190, 193, 196 Kosovo Force (KFOR) 155 Lamers, Karl 38, 66–67, 69, 71, 85–86, 90, 134 Lebanon 151, 166 Linkspartei (Party of the Left) 162 Lippelt, Helmut 124 Lübkemeier, Eckhart 147 Major, John 44–45, Merkel, Angela 148–149, 159–160, 162, 165–168, 172–173, 176–177, 179–180, 184, 187 Millon, Charles 86 Milosevic, Slobodan 102, 114–115, 121, 123–124, 130, 137 Mitterrand, Francois 37, 39–41, 46, 58, 60, 84

264 Index Modrow, Hans 55 Moravcsik, Andrew 6–7, Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE) 113 Nachtwei, Winfried 162 NATO Response Force 151 Naumann, Klaus 125 Netherlands 26, 44, 47, 49–50, 69, 78 Nice Treaty 112, 116 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 2–3, 10, 20, 23–24,26, 32–33, 35–36, 38–47, 49–56, 58–61, 63, 65, 68–73, 75–76, 79–81, 83–89, 92, 95–97, 100–102, 106–108, 110, 112, 114–115, 117–119, 121–130, 135–136, 139–140, 142, 146–149, 151, 153–154, 158, 160, 164, 166–167, 169, 175, 179–180, 182–184 Operation Allied Force 21, 102, 121–127, 129–131, 137, 144 Operation Althea 157 Operation Artemis 157, 159, 169 Operation Concordia 157 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 71, 88, 109, 125–126, 128–130, 132, 139 Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) 50–51, 55–56, 73–74, 94, 124–125, 162 Petersberg Declaration 61 Petersberg Tasks 3, 65, 79, 82–84, 87, 89–92, 94–96, 113, 117–118, 138, 142, 157 Pörtschach 105, 109 Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) 94–96 Poppe, Gerd 51, 132 Pralinengipfel (Chocolate Summit) 147 Putin, Vladimir 166 Putnam, Robert 5–7 Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 40, 70–72, 74, 78, 85–87, 93–96

Rau, Johannes 54 Reflection Group (Amsterdam Treaty) 64, 70–71, 90 Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 152 Robertson, George 106 Rühe, Volker 56, 79–82, 86, Russia 66, 112, 115–116, 123, 129–130, 132, 135, 137, 149–150, 166–167, 175, 179 Santer, Jacques 69 Schäuble, Wolfgang 66–67, 69, 71, 85–86, 89, 126 Scharioth, Klaus 166 Scharping, Rudolph 81, 117, 122–123, 130, 133, 139–140 Schloss Reinhartshausen 114, 116 Schröder, Gerhard 100, 102–103, 109–110, 122–123, 128–129, 131–134, 141, 143 145–150, 166–168, 172, 175, 180–181 Seiters, Rudolf 71, 94 Single European Act (SEA) 30–32, 40 Slovenia 37, 46 Social Democratic Party (SPD) 42–43, 51, 54–55, 57, 71–74, 81, 93–94, 103, 124, 128, 148, 161–162, 167, 180 Solana, Javier 161, 164, 179, 183 St Malo 2, 19, 101, 105–107, 109, 113–114, 117–118, 143 Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 19, 100–144 Stabilsation Force (SFOR) 82 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter 161, 165–166, 174 Stoiber, Edmund 162 Ströbele, Hans-Christian 162 Struck, Peter 161 Supreme Allied Commander Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH) 86 Thatcher, Margaret 44, Treaty of European Union (Maastricht Treaty) 7, 14, 16–19, 22, 30, 33, 39–40, 44, 49, 53–54, 57–58, 64, 68, 77, 80, 85, 98, 113, 116–117, 145–148, 152–153, 158, 160,

Index Treaty of European Union – continued 164–170, 172–174, 177, 179–181, 183–184

265

UN Interfet 134 United Kingdom 4, 18, 24–26, 31, 37–38, 40–50, 58, 60, 62, 87–91, 101, 105–108, 111, 113, 116, 118, 123, 141, 143, 145–148, 152–153, 158, 160, 164–174, 177, 179–181, 183–184 United Nations 10, 37, 102, 122, 134, 150 United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) 150 United Nations Security Council (UNSC)

Waigel, Theo 71 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 153 Westendorp, Carlos 70–71 Western European Union (WEU) 12, 26, 125–26, 40, 42–47, 49–52, 55, 58–59, 61, 65–66, 68–70, 72–74, 78–79, 82–84, 87–90, 92–96, 101, 104, 109, 112–114, 116–118, 123, 127–128, 136, 138, 140–141 Wieczorek-Zeul, Heidemarie 51, 54, 72–73, 94 Witthauer, Hans-Jochen 157 Wörner, Manfred 43 World Bank 129

van Eekelen, Willem 43 Verheugen, Gunther 72, 81, 113, 117, 136 von Goetze, Clemens 178

Yugoslavia 36–37, 41,46, 61, 101–102, 107, 109, 115–116, 125–126, 128–130