Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion Volume 4
Series Editor Eugene Thomas Long
For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/6034
Morny Joy Editor
Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion
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Editor Morny Joy Department of Religious Studies University of Calgary University Drive T2N 1N4 Calgary Canada
[email protected]
ISSN 1568-1556 ISBN 978-94-007-0058-1 e-ISBN 978-94-007-0059-8 DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0059-8 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010938784 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)
Acknowledgments
This volume, as with many such edited collections, has been a number of years in the making. For instigating the project, I would like to express my gratitude to Eugene Long, Series Editor, for inviting me to undertake this labor of love. I would also like to thank sincerely both Springer Publications, and the members of the editorial staff who shepherded this book through the various stages of production, for their support. To the six contributors, I want to extend my profound appreciation for their patient endurance during the many requests and queries of the editorial process. I am indebted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for the award of a fellowship that has sustained my own research. In addition, I am also particularly grateful to the Killam Trust for granting me a one year Fellowship with teaching release at a crucial time that enabled me to pull the project together. Finally, my utmost thanks to John King for his continuing guidance and expertise in all things editorial.
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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morny Joy
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Paul Ricoeur: Hermeneutics, Philosophy and Religion . . . . . . . . . . Morny Joy
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Thinking Otherwise: Derrida’s Contribution to Philosophy of Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ellen T. Armour
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Levinas’s Project: An Interpretative Phenomenology of Sensibility and Intersubjectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bettina G. Bergo
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The Challenge of Love: Kristeva and Irigaray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morny Joy
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Thinking Differently: Foucault and the Philosophy of Religion . . . . . Jeremy Carrette
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Deleuze and Philosophy of Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philip Goodchild
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Jean-Luc Marion: Phenomenology of Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christina M. Gschwandtner
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Critical Theory, Negative Theology, and Transcendence . . . . . . . . . James Swindal
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Encountering Otherness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Morny Joy
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Notes on Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Contributors
Ellen T. Armour Divinity School and Graduate Department of Religious Studies, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN, USA,
[email protected] Bettina G. Bergo Département de Philosophie, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec, Canada,
[email protected] Jeremy Carrette Department of Religious Studies, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK,
[email protected] Philip Goodchild Department of Theology and Religions, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK,
[email protected] Christina M. Gschwandtner Department of Philosophy, Scranton University, Scranton PA, USA,
[email protected] Morny Joy Department of Religious Studies, University of Calgary, University Drive, T2N 1N4 Calgary, Canada,
[email protected] James Swindal Philosophy Department, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh PA, USA,
[email protected]
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Introduction Morny Joy
This book will survey the work of twentieth-century Continental philosophy and its potential impact on philosophy of religion as it is practised predominantly in English-speaking countries. The term “Continental philosophy,” insofar as it refers to religion, can be ascribed to a tradition of thought that dates from the time of Kant, resulting from the demise of natural theology, where it had been assumed that human beings could have knowledge of God. Other philosophers connected with this tradition who have specific association with the subject of religion, if not necessarily an affinity for it, are Hegel, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard. In the first half of the twentieth century, the major philosophers identified with this philosophy are Husserl and Heidegger, and then, more recently, from the 1970s onwards, French thinkers such as Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault are included, as well as Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. The Frankfurt school of critical theory, exemplified at the present time by the work of Jürgen Habermas, has also not been without some influence. In the English-speaking domain, philosophy of religion is principally identified with analytic philosophy, where the universal presumptions of an abstract reason, especially with reference to matters of belief and its justification, have dominated. As a result, philosophy of religion, as a sub-discipline of Anglo-American philosophy, covers a vast range of topics, from the perennial question of the existence of (a good) God, to other concerns that derive from this pre-eminent divine existence, e.g., the problem of evil, life after death, miracles, as well as morality and ethics. In this tradition, truth pertains to an objective frame of reference, which is based both on logical arguments and processes of verification. As a result, theists and atheists have debated long and often, according to tenets of propositional argumentation, with occasional forays into symbolic logic, on the particular merits of their positions on the above issues. Continental philosophy does not demarcate a specific area or subject matter that is designated as belonging to philosophy of religion. The boundaries between M. Joy (B) Department of Religious Studies, University of Calgary, University Drive, T2N 1N4 Calgary, Canada e-mail:
[email protected] M. Joy (ed.), Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion, Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0059-8_1, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
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disciplines and their ideas are much more fluid and, especially in the twentieth century, the divide between philosophy and literature is not nearly as emphatic as in English. In contrast, then, questions regarding religion can be located with reference to specific themes within a worldview that allows for a wide range of influences. While not all of the philosophers that are presented in this volume subscribe to the same principles or positions, they share a very similar worldview that puts into question the discipline of philosophy of religion as it has traditionally been undertaken in analytic philosophy. Some of the principal factors that influence their positions, though not all of them address each of these specific issues named, are: 1. The “death of God,” specifically the God of modernity as it was postulated by reason. This move was initiated irrevocably by Friedrich Nietzsche. Gilles Deleuze’s work can be identified as a contemporary reworking of Nietzsche’s radical project. 2. The secular theories of Marx and Freud, which put into question both the proclaimed autonomy of the subject and the related reliability of consciousness. The work of Paul Ricoeur, especially his “hermeneutics of suspicion,” continues this task, though Ricoeur will attempt to reclaim a more modest approach to subjectivity. 3. The phenomenological approach, as it was introduced in the work of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. This approach placed an emphasis on understanding a human being’s lived experience and the nature of existence, rather than maintaining a reliance on definitions dependent on abstract reasoning. It also calls into question what Heidegger calls “onto-theology.” 4. The breakdown of confidence in the certainties of modern rationality and of Western Christian values, which were unable to prevent the two world wars. It is Emmanuel Levinas who interrogates this failure, specifically the aftermath of the Holocaust, and proposes an alternative approach which promotes the primordiality of ethics. 5. The depiction of intrinsic ideological bias masquerading as truth, that has been exposed by members of the Frankfurt school, or the disclosure of vested interests in power and control revealed by the genealogical investigations of Michel Foucault. Both the Frankfurt school and its different members, such as Walter Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas, as well as the work of the poststructuralist Michel Foucault, who was influenced by Nietzsche, respectively address different issues that result from forms of political and institutional domination and the abuse of power. Such influences have resulted in forms of philosophy that do not necessarily take for granted the existence of a God – beneficent or otherwise. This philosophy also puts into question the efficacy of traditional logic and argument as ways of either ascertaining or asserting the existence of this God by means of philosophy. There is a greater appreciation of historical and cultural influences on the formation of philosophy’s structures and procedures. At the same time, there is a move to greater self-reflexivity and a growing awareness of the need to formulate a distinct ethics of
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intersubjectivity that seeks justice. This move in the direction of self-interrogation and responsibility does not necessarily accept rational concepts as providing selfevident knowledge in response to questions regarding the meaning and purpose of existence. In addition, language is no longer regarded as transparent. If there is any acknowledgment of theology, it is often that of a negative or apophatic variety. No absolutes are taken for granted – any universal statement is subjected to interrogation. As a Catholic, Jean-Luc Marion may not necessarily agree with all of the characteristics described above, but he would not reject the idea of the “end of metaphysics” as it relates to a rejection of onto-theology. His own project, while phenomenogically based, seeks ways to reintroduce discussion of a god located beyond such former metaphysical constraints, i.e., where God is not identified with Being. Most of the above presuppositions would appear to indicate that philosophy of religion, as it has functioned within a normative and solely rational perspective, is no longer appropriate or even viable. This does not mean, however, that questions of a religious nature are no longer being posed, nor that traditional questions have become irrelevant. The Continental approach is neither nihilistic nor anti-human, though it does worry about self-proclaimed absolutes of either a humanist or religious nature. The terms of reference have indubitably been changed. Fascinating developments are today occurring as contemporary Continental philosophers explore new possibilities for formulating and responding to traditional problems from this more critical perspective. In determining the specific intention and the contents of this volume, a number of choices were made. Firstly, there was a conscious decision to select thinkers whose work has been adopted by contemporary scholars of religion. The aim is neither to defend religion nor to dismiss out of hand conventional philosophy as it has been pursued. Instead, the book is an exploration, written by scholars in religion and philosophy who have an in-depth knowledge of their subjects. The hope is that by undertaking such explorations of a select number of Continental thinkers, they will stimulate interest in alternate or innovative developments that could enrich the study of philosophy of religion. At the very least, there is the intention of providing thorough background information of the work of specific Continental thinkers and their attitudes and evaluations of religion. This is because these thinkers often do not address religious issues in a systematic or developed way and at times it can be difficult to extract the ideas that are specifically engaging with religion from their larger corpus. In this volume, there will be eight chapters that explore pertinent areas of these potential new directions in philosophy of religion. 1. 2. 3. 4.
The hermeneutic approach Paul Ricoeur (1906–2005) The deconstructive approach of Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) The ethical prioritization of Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) The psychoanalytically based gender analyses of Luce Irigaray (b. 1930) and Julia Kristeva (b. 1941) 5. The post-structuralism of Michel Foucault (1926–1984)
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6. The radical empiricism of Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) 7. The renegotiated phenomenological project of the “saturated phenomenon” of Jean-Luc Marion (b. 1964) 8. The critical theory of the Frankfurt School: Walter Benjamin (1892–1940), Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), and Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929) Another decision made with regard to the contents of the volume, principally in the interests of length, was not to include coverage of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. The reason for this is that there is a plethora of recent work available on their influence, particularly on Husserl (Bello 2009; Harnell 2000; Hart 1994) and on Heidegger (Vedder 2007; Crowe 2006; Schalow 2001). Gadamer himself was notably reticent to engage on the topic of contemporary religion as his interests in a religious direction were principally concerned with that of ancient Greek culture.1 Nor did there seem to be a pressing need to include a detailed development of the history of philosophy of religion. This is because of the number of excellent books already written on this topic. These range from the now classic work of James Collins, The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion (1967), to Eugene Long’s recent volume, Twentieth-Century Western Philosophy of Religion 1900–2000 (2000). It seemed more appropriate to focus on exploring the innovative developments of the Continental thinkers and their implications rather than to try and reconcile them with the tradition. This is because many contemporary scholars in philosophy of religion have observed that there is need for a change, but few have ventured to develop these ideas in a detailed study. In the General Introduction to his own volume, Long notes the criticisms that are being made today of philosophy of religion: Some philosophers argue that the philosophy of religion is too embedded in the eighteenthcentury problematic of western theism at a time when persons are becoming more global in outlook and the boundaries of our histories are being expanded. Other philosophers argue that the traditional approach to philosophy suffers from unacknowledged ideologies which limit its scope and prevent it from taking into account the rich diversity of human experiences, purposes, and social contexts. In some cases this results in calls to expand the scope of western philosophy of religion. In other cases philosophers call for the reconstruction of the philosophy of religion. At the root of many of these challenges are deep questions involving the nature of philosophy itself. (Long 2000: 2)
The need for change was also expressed from a different perspective by Walter Capps in “The Future of Religious Studies,” the concluding chapter of his book, Religious Studies: The Making of a Discipline (1995). He observes: When speculating about the future of religious studies, one encounters considerations whose long term influence is difficult to calculate. . .. Charles Long’s views about the ways in which
1 One of Gadamer’s more interesting statements in connection with religion concerns the unfortunate way it has used philosophy dogmatically. As a response, he states: “Yet, when modern philosophy begins to entrust itself to the ancient path of thought, perhaps thinkers will learn once again to discern the ancient content of the concept of God” (1999: 17).
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a prevailing colonial, social, political, and cultural structure bestows privileges on selected religious perspectives, and positions is. . . [a] significant example in point. Similarly, if taken seriously, Luce Irigaray’s analyses of differences between men’s and women’s discourse, together with her suggestions about seemingly impartial rules of gender and grammar being deeply rooted in phallocratic assumptions about the world, carry a thoroughly reformative (although still underrecognized and articulated) conceptual capacity. And the same powers lie inherent in Renato Rosaldo’s plea that astute reflection on culture cannot be properly achieved by detached, “objective” observers who mistakenly believe it virtuous to avoid dealing with subjectivity. . .It goes without saying that, at this writing, the field is only partially cognizant of the authority of some of these intellectual events, but will be influenced accordingly as they become better known. (Capps 1995: 338–339)
The late Grace Jantzen was someone who did not mince her words when she describes what she believed to be the shortcomings of the current state of philosophy of religion: The way in which the philosophy of religion as conventionally practised acts as a technology of powers stands out clearly in relation to the disciplinary boundaries that are drawn around it, the ways in which the topics which comprise it are disciplined. The same topics come up with predictable regularity: as Brian Davies says, philosophy of religion is about what philosophers of religion usually do! There is no indication in his work . . . that the discipline has a history, that it is a social construction which has not always been constructed in the way that it is at present, and that what counts as philosophy of religion (and indeed as religion itself) is closely related to who is doing the counting. (Jantzen 1999: 23)
Finally, David Tracy has also pronounced on the fact that things must change: “[T]he entire narrative of philosophy of religion in the modern West needs rethinking and retelling if both the ‘roots’ and ‘fruits’ of that curious modern invention, philosophy of religion, is one day to play a properly interdisciplinary and intercultural role” (1990: 29). In a recent article, I drew attention to what I considered to be some of the more obvious failings of philosophy of religion. One is the obvious fact that until extremely recently, “it has been a distinctly male enterprise. Any check of the table of the authorship in philosophy of religion texts vividly illustrates that most of the contributors to this enterprise have been male” (Joy 2004: 193). I also indicate the work of feminist philosophers of religion, Pamela Anderson (1998), Nancy Frankenberry (1998) and Grace Jantzen (1999), who have challenged this male monopoly and proposed constructive alternatives to counterbalance the traditional concentration on rationality and its reifications. One of their principal objections is that much energy has been misdirected in focussing primarily on faith and on the rational means needed to justify its claims, rather than investigating other ways of understanding how thought can reflect and examine human experience. Frankenberry queries the unacknowledged prerogatives of traditional epistemological categories. What has the status of knowledge? What gets valorized as worth knowing? What are the criteria evoked? Who has the authority to establish meaning? Who is presumed the subject of belief? . . . What do we learn by examining the relations between power, on the one hand, and what happens as evidence, foundations, modes of discourse, and forms of apprehension and transmission, on the other hand? (1998: 192)
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In addition, Frankenberry observes that philosophy of religion has been largely “Eurocentric and Anglo–American in orientation” (193), so that there has been little consideration given to the fact that philosophy of religion could concern itself with other religions of the world. She states: “The next crucial stage of philosophy of religion will require engagement with and inquiry into a plurality of religions. Methodologically, this will mean taking as much account of history of religious and cultural anthropology as previous practitioners have of speculative metaphysics and practical theology” (194). As I note, Frankenberry also brings to the reader’s attention: [T]he obvious absence of discussions of race, class and culture, as well as of gender, that has kept most of philosophy of religion confined to white, Western, and Christian parameters.. . . Again, for Frankenberry, it is the unexamined notions of a predominantly Christian and Eurocentric orientation that prevail, though claims to neutrality and objectivity are still asserted. (Joy 2004: 196)
Given all these qualifications, I believe that such a volume as this one is definitely warranted because, in effect, while it does not address all of these major problems, it endeavors to open up a space and to make suggestions that potentially will encourage philosophy of religion to recognize its shortcomings. Such issues are in dire need of further study and expansive treatment. Another type of difficulty arose in the development of the volume. Initially the basic idea had been that each of the contributing scholars would be given a list of what are considered to be the crucial questions that appear in most philosophy of religion textbooks, and they would describe how each thinker spoke to these issues. Such an approach proved not to be feasible, however, on a number of counts. Firstly, many of the authors are not especially concerned with such issues, or, if they are, it is only peripheral to their main purpose. Secondly, the aim of the volume is to introduce ideas that may even challenge the need for continuing with such traditional categories. As a result, while these topics are not entirely absent from most essays, they are not all represented, nor are they treated in the traditional methodical way. The book has thus unfolded in ways that may not resemble the accustomed coverage of this genre. But then again, the vital impetus for this book is to be stimulating, even provocative, in order to test present boundaries and open up the sort of debate that may lead to a rethinking of the discipline. One such challenge became obvious once all of the contributed essays were assembled. In a majority of the thinkers presented in the volume, there has been a decisive move from epistemology to ethics. This has introduced searching questions as to an obvious past lacuna in much philosophy of religion regarding the treatment of others – be it people of different races, classes, gender or religions other than Christianity. This was indeed remarked upon above by Capps and Frankenberry. While “the other” has indeed been a subject matter intrinsic to phenomenology since its beginnings, as capably presented by Michael Theunissen in his book, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Buber (1986), the
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treatment of the topic tended to remain on the level of abstract discussion, removed from any reference to practical involvement. Yet the plight of human suffering – be it in Levinas’s indictment of the ethical failure that did not prevent the Holocaust, or Ricoeur’s distress at humanity’s almost endemic propensity to resort to violence, which he considers as a form of evil – engages the emotions in ways that demand ethical or practical response. This inevitably demands greater attention be paid to context. As a result, there is a need for a deeper awareness of the present day problems that beset humanity that calls for a responsibility and discussion of issues that are not simply abstract test-cases. Epistemology has been found wanting in its avoidance of the interrelatedness of mind and body, of reason and emotion, of abstract and concrete. An ethical orientation, informed by, yet moving beyond the confines of phenomenology, attempts to address the inherent interelationship of these aspects. It appeals instead to an integrated mode of knowing and acting especially concerned with the condition of others. It would seem that philosophy of religion needs to give very careful consideration to such a dramatic change in human understanding and conduct towards intersubjectivity. This is because it is in this way that attention to another person becomes humanized, embodied, quickened in its ethical response. That such attention, in turn, will lead to a greater appreciation of diversity is a hope implied in a number of essays. Such diversity can today be found in the peoples from many religions and backgrounds who inhabit the urban centers of what is still described as the “Western world.” The further hope is that Christianity, with its Eurocentric heritage, will no longer consider itself as the sole arbitrator of what counts as absolute knowledge, and that questions of pluralism and/or heterogeneity will become an integral part of any deliberations that constitute what is understood as philosophy of religion. There is a vast sea-change taking place in the world. One influence is the great pattern of immigration of peoples that defy former easy divisions into East and West. At the same time refugees, of both economic and political provenance, are also influencing the changing demographics of many “western” countries. Religious differences are an inherent part of this diversification in ways that secularism neither anticipated nor is willing to acknowledge. At the same time, the enormous pressures exerted on the world’s resources, especially in the present economic decline, demand responses that cannot be met simply by the “bigger and better” rationale that governed the unchecked expansion of global capitalism. While there are certain groups of people who, in the face of these momentous transformations, appear to be resorting to regressive and defensive religious stances as a form of protection, the thinkers that are presented in this volume are, in various ways, facing these problems. While they admit that they do not have definitive answers, they have all, in extremely diverse and creative ways, and sometimes with unsparing honesty, endeavoured to address the issues that are arising. They are thus helping to prepare the citizens of the world to deal constructively, both theoretically and practically, with the profound problems that are facing them on a global basis in this century. If it is similarly responsive to these issues, philosophy of religion could
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well provide significant insights, of both a critical and constructive nature, on some of the most important and controversial issues facing humankind in the twenty-first century.
Overview of Contributions While there is no detailed treatment of the work of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) in this volume, a few words of introduction regarding their influence on phenomenology and the subsequent turn to hermeneutics are in order. This is because virtually all the thinkers discussed in this volume, with the possible exception of Julia Kristeva and the Frankfurt school, are deeply indebted to them, and engage with their ideas, whether or not they are in complete agreement with them. While neither Husserl nor Heidegger specifically addressed the question of philosophy of religion, the challenges that they issued to both western metaphysics and rationalism continue to have a major impact on most of the thinkers that are treated in this book. Edmund Husserl was deeply concerned about what he perceived as the crisis in European thought. Phenomenology was his attempt to respond to what he considered the excesses of enlightenment rationalism, specifically naturalism. His model of the phenomenological method proposed that in order to understand a particular phenomenon, there should be a return of focus to phenomena themselves rather than the automatic application of abstract categories. All previous suppositions of an explanatory nature, especially causal ones, needed to be suspended. This involved a movement of epoche, or “bracketing off” of preconceptions. Such a reduction permitted the resultant postulate of a “transcendental ego” to intuit the essence (eidos) of any object in an act of pure consciousness. Husserl’s phenomenological method also encouraged an awareness of the presuppositions of consciousness as manifested in the forms of intentionality that were involved in acts of knowing. This aspect was more evident in his later work that concentrated on the lived experience of subjectivity in what he termed the “life-world” (Lebenswelt). His work was influential on early scholars of religion who adopted this phenomenological method to different ends. Geradus van der Leeuw (1890– 1950), today identified as a phenomenologist of religion, was particularly interested in applying Husserl’s notion of intuition, which he connected with “understanding,” to appreciate the ultimate ground or essence of phenomena which he then identified as basically religious or sacred. While Rudolf Otto’s (1869–1937) The Idea of the Holy (1924 [1917]), cannot be said to be directly influenced by Husserl, or that he be called a phenomenologist in the strict sense of the word, his approach of attempting to understand the ultimate non-rational dimensions of religious experience by what he termed, “the numinous,” has certain resonances with phenomenology. Today, it is fascinating that the work of Jean-Luc Marion and his phenomenological studies of the “saturated phenomenon” do, after a fashion, involve these two approaches in an attempt to reintroduce theological topics to phenomenology. Even quite early in the reception of Husserl’s work, however, there were those, such as Eugene Fink,
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who detected a distinct theological strain in his writings.2 This type of expansion in a religious direction has continued in more recent work, as evident in Hart (1986); Laycock (1988) and Bello (2009). One other aspect of Husserl’s work that also continues to be debated is the relation to other people and the idea of empathy. Martin Theunissen’s intriguing book, The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber (1986), identified the issue of otherness and intersubjectivity as one of the main topics in Husserl’s later work (69–81) and as central to the sense of one’s subjectivity. Nevertheless, one of the charges against Husserl’s work by later thinkers initially associated with phenomenology, such as Paul Ricoeur and Jacques Derrida, is the neglect of any developed relationship to the other person or difference which involves an explicit intersubjective ethical programme. They will both develop this missing aspect with quite different resonances as a major focus of their own work. Husserl’s pupil, Martin Heidegger, was even more radical in his attempt to rethink the fundamental categories of western thought, not simply those of the dominant rationalism. Heidegger rejected not only Husserl’s transcendental idealism but the whole metaphysical enterprise since the time of Plato and Aristotle. As a result, there is a shift in Heidegger’s work not just from Husserl’s methodology but also from the development of what Heidegger terms “onto-theology.” This latter construct came about, in Heidegger’s view, principally because of the mistaken identification of the Christian God with the foundational Greek concept of Being. Heidegger denounces the resultant analysis of the “Being of God” which has since pervaded both philosophy and theology and thus displaced any further investigation of the primordial dimension of Being itself. His demanding interrogation (Destruktion) of the development of onto-theology, which also incorporated Husserl’s earlier refutation of the excesses of rationalism, puts into question the preconceptions of how philosophy of religion had previously defined its task – particularly as it evaluated the topics of God, truth, belief, revelation, language and the human condition. Heidegger endeavoured to introduce a new mode of philosophizing or revised ontology, that sought to understand Being (Sein), and that would act as a corrective to the errors made in the name of onto-theology. As far as Heidegger was concerned, the being of human existence (Dasein) could only be appreciated by understanding its specific location as both situated in an historical context and temporally ordered. This marked the introduction of hermeneutics into phenomenology, casting doubt as to whether any essence of a phenomenon could ever be surmised. Instead Heidegger proposed certain conditions of finitude or “facticity.” Under such temporal conditions it became requisite for human beings to enquire into their manner of being or existing in the world and to discern the way to live authentically. This would avoid the former grandiose claims of onto-theology and any pretensions to absolute knowledge. Instead, Heidegger’s philosophy allows that all human
2 I have written elsewhere on some of the problems that I have discerned in the early adaptations of phenomenology to more theological purposes, and the problems this created in Religious Studies (Joy 2004).
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understanding is hermeneutical, or subject to interpretation, as it is always mediated by the historical and temporal conditions of existence. Heidegger does not dismiss the possibility that a god may exist, in fact his final interview with the newspaper Der Spiegel was enigmatically entitled: “Only a God Can save Us” (1976). Such a god, nevertheless, would not be of the same order as has previously existed, particularly the Christian God as depicted by onto-theology. In the chapter on Paul Ricoeur that I have written myself, I first describe his philosophical pedigree. Perhaps the most formative influences in his early philosophical career were the works of both Husserl and Heidegger. During his internment as a prisoner of war in the Second World War, he deepened his studies of them, even translating Husserl’s Ideen 1 into French. In time, however, Ricoeur moved away from Husserl and followed the early Heidegger in his rejection of Husserl’s transcendental approach in favour of a more contextualized hermeneutical phenomenology. He also paid particular attention to “understanding” as a key process in any interpretative act. Understanding is thus appreciated as disclosing a form of truth as insight that both defies definition in conventional terms of proofs or argument and also eschews essences. Another preoccupation of Ricoeur was a concern with otherness. In his early book on Husserl, Ricoeur observed: “All aspects of phenomenology converge upon the problem of the Other” (1967: 195). The personal other and the problem of intersubjectivity became a major ethical focus in Ricoeur’s later work, but even in his earlier hermeneutical studies of texts, Ricoeur regarded the act of interpretation as an encounter with the other – in this context with ideas that engaged and expanded our understanding. Though he was a Christian, and this was indeed the inspiration of much of his life and thought, in his philosophical writings Ricoeur adopted a methodological agnosticism with regard to questions of religious belief and the source of conscience. Ultimately, his latest book on recognition was a plea for justice for all, but it also resonates with a concern for the personal other in a relationship of radical reciprocity. Though this can be realized in a secular society, it also bespeaks an orientation of openness and love that has definite Christian resonances. In the early work of Jacques Derrida there was an intense engagement with the work of Husserl and a prolonged investigation as to whether his work involved not only metaphysical, but also theological presumptions. Derrida characterized this by the phrase: “a metaphysics of presence.” In his own deconstructive strategy that was influenced by Heidegger’s notion of destruktion, Derrida was also concerned with the problem of otherness. Derrida’s neologism of différance was indicative of his interest in the exclusions and suppressions of the other that was an inevitable part of any conceptual closure – something which he felt Husserl had ignored. Much of his later work explores topics such as the gift, friendship, hospitality, and their heterogeneity that precludes attempts, such as Husserl’s, to posit any stable definition, let alone an essence. In her essay on Derrida, Ellen Armour relates how Derrida was first introduced to scholars of religion through the volume edited by Raschke, Deconstruction and Theology (1982). Since then his work has been taken up by scholars with a number of different interests in religion. Her paper focuses primarily on the avenues opened up for philosophy of religion by Derrida’s work that are
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distinct from its traditional preoccupations. In Armour’s view, for the most part these distinctions are not absolute divergences, and there are topical and thematic linkages between the two approaches. For example, both areas of deconstruction and theology have taken up the question of mysticism in recent years; both are concerned with theism and its limits. The treatments of these topics in Derrida’s work, as well as in the work of certain philosophers of religion influenced by him are, however, not uniform. Armour concentrates on what she sees as three particularly distinctive features in such work in regard to religion. In contrast to philosophy of religion’s traditional (virtually exclusive) focus on Christianity, Derrida’s work engages and has been engaged by diverse religious traditions. Where philosophy of religion seeks to establish the rationality of the contents of religious belief, Derrida seems drawn to religion because it pushes beyond the limits of rationality (narrowly conceived). Armour then concludes by observing that while traditional philosophy of religion seems to understand religious belief as somehow hermetically sealed away from cultural and historical change, Derrida sees religion and culture as very much intertwined. That is, for Derrida, religiosity “infects” (as it were) what purport to be very secular arenas and religion is itself part and parcel of a larger cultural landscape. In the third essay, I will concentrate on two contemporary thinkers who, though not of French origin, live and work in France, and who have been identified with a postmodern orientation. They are Luce Irigaray and Julia Kristeva. Although both of them are reluctant to identify themselves with the label “feminist,” they have each posed fundamental questions about the lives and status of women. Their investigations have been profoundly and diversely influenced by the theory of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan – whose work is a controversial mixture of the selective ideas from Freud, Hegel, Lévi-Strauss, and the linguist, de Saussure. They are also keenly aware of the impact of the Nietzschean proclamation of the “death of God.” Yet their work is suffused with images, of a spiritual nature, as they search for ways to express new understandings of the “divine” (Irigaray) and the sacred (Kristeva), as well as an ethics of love, devoid of illusions and projections. While they do not write in a traditional philosophical style, they do not hesitate to refer to the work of philosophers considered as having an impact on philosophy of religion, such as Plato, Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. Their modified phenomenological approach, understood within a broad mandate as an investigation of the meaning of lived experience, is qualified by a form of a suspicious engagement that questions the unconscious dimensions of thought and behaviour. Their interrogations of the gender of God, specifically as conceived in solely masculine and transcendent terms, to the exclusion of women and of “feminine” attributes, if taken seriously, would result in the transformation of philosophy of religion as it has been traditionally practiced. Emmanuel Levinas was encouraged by his professor at the University of Strasbourg, Maurice Pradines, to go and study with Edmund Husserl at Freiburg University. Levinas did this, and actually wrote his doctoral thesis on the concept of intuition in Husserl. During his years there, from approximately 1928–1935, however, he became more interested in the existential phenomenology of Heidegger. Gradually, he also broke away from Heidegger’s influence to concentrate on the
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nature of the ethical relationship to others, and not so much on the more subjective preoccupations of Dasein. As Bettina Bergo observes in introducing Levinas in her study of his work, much ink has flowed on the topic of Levinas and whether his philosophy is “religious,” “confessional,” a “Jewish” philosophy, or a mode of hermeneutical ethics adapted largely from a critical response to Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s ontology. Even more interesting, however, is the attention that is accorded to human intersubjective interdependency – set forth in the way Levinas configures the infinite responsibility of the face-to-face relationship. This “event” of human beings, in a face-to-face encounter, argues that Being or existence is inflected primarily through human relationships. This interruption or modification of Being is thus inaugurated by a purely intersubjective sentiment sometimes called “sincerity.” Because sincerity arises from no act of will, no moral sentiment, and no faculty, one is constrained to call it an intersubjective affect, without giving it an ideal or positive status. It is accorded neither a psychological nor a metaphysical status. It also stands unverifiable, because it is pre-representational and therefore largely unattainable through epistemic techniques of suspension, like Husserl’s phenomenological and transcendental reductions. Its most remarkable implication, however, lies in its claim to be a “first philosophy”. On this account, as Bergo argues, if the dual, dynamic structure of what is called human “intersubjectivity” is prior to Being, and inflects or interrupts it, then first philosophy must be revisited, and the primordiality of ethics needs to be taken into consideration. A notable facet of Michel Foucault’s work is that his first two publications were in the area of phenomenology. One of these was an introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s volume Dream and Existence, that was later published separately (1954 [1993]). The second was Maladie mentale et personalité (1962 [1976]). Initially Foucault was interested in undertaking a historical analysis of phenomenology and existential psychology. He was particularly curious about the relation of imagination to human existence, but he understood it as having a much more fluid, if not enigmatic role than Husserl’s employment of it as the agency by which one arrives at the essence of a phenomenon. In time, however, he preferred to concentrate on history, but with a particular emphasis on its construction and the specific manoeuvres by which certain categories are determined and imposed. Jeremy Carrette observes that Foucault’s work has been positioned between the disciplines of history, literature and philosophy, but his weaving of ideas from the French intellectual tradition allows him to reconfigure the status of knowledge itself. He saw the task of philosophy as a mode of “thinking differently” rather than “legitimating what was already known.” The sense of “thinking differently” recognises, in a post-phenomenological position, that the “conditions of thought” are shaped and determined by the play of “power” within institutions and society. This contextualisation of thought made Foucault useful methodologically for social theory, but also unsettled philosophy in its understanding of “truth,” “power,” “discourse,” and the “body. A post-Nietzschean and post-Heideggerian reading of Foucault thus presents a key set of interpretative frames for examining Foucault’s implications for philosophy of religion. One key frame involves a “repositioning” of religion in order to demonstrate that the political force of religious discourse, in both its power
Introduction
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to silence and to its power to demand an utterance, attempts to govern human life. In addition, Foucault problematizes certain foundational aspects of Christianity, e.g., its marginalization of the body within a dualist ontology. From Foucault’s critical perspective, philosophy of religion would need to consider more than rational arguments in its defence of beliefs and institutionalized practices. The underlying aim of Carrette’s chapter is to show how the “refusal” of the philosophy of religion to read its own history is a refusal to see the problem of knowledge in terms of disciplinary power and the historical conditions that have influenced it. Gilles Deleuze could in no way be considered a phenomenologist. He made a very strong distinction between his own work and the historicism that he discerned in the work of Husserl and Heidegger. Deleuze’s work is more concerned with a philosophy of becoming where terms such as “event”, “intensities”, “virtuality,” witness to a stance that refuses stasis and confinement to concepts and categories. This philosophy, according to Philip Goodchild, has little explicit to say on his own account in relation to the problems typically addressed in philosophy of religion. Thus, while questions of the existence and nature of God, and the nature of good and evil, are referred to in Deleuze’s works on Hume, Nietzsche, Bergson, Kant and Spinoza, the sceptical implications of the philosophy of immanence he draws from these thinkers would suggest that discussions on these matters are now closed, since they derive from false problems. Nevertheless, it is truly striking that Deleuze describes Spinoza as the “Christ of the philosophers,” thus positioning himself as one of his followers, and that, like Spinoza, he continues to construct a metaphysical system. In contrast to Spinoza’s emphasis on eternity, Deleuze’s metaphysics is entirely concerned with temporal existence. At the same time, according to Goodchild, Deleuze’s metaphysics, similarly to Spinoza’s, is inseparable from ethics: ethics are no longer objectified into eternal laws or values, but inform the temporal conduct of the thinker. The question that Goodchild then poses is whether the same could be said of a religious dimension, which remains very pertinent in Spinoza in the form of a “third kind of knowledge.” Goodchild’s chapter will explore the way in which conceptions of an excess significance of meaning and value are incorporated immanently throughout Deleuze’s work, focusing on the way in which he deploys concepts of intensive difference, repetition, and life. Goodchild proposes that there is a spirit at work in Deleuze’s philosophy which turns the entirety of his work into an immanent philosophy of religion. Another philosopher concerned with excess, but in quite a different way, is JeanLuc Marion. His appeal to phenomenology is of a quite different order from that employed by the other thinkers in this volume. As Christina Gschwandtner relates, Jean-Luc Marion is one of the most significant living French philosophers who has contributed much to the emerging field of Continental Philosophy of Religion. Marion proposes that we can think rigorously about religion and give coherence to faith and religious experience even after the “death of God” (and taking that “death” seriously). He rejects metaphysical ways of thinking about the divine, seeking instead for a phenomenological account of religious experience. His probably most significant idea is that of the “saturated phenomenon.” He contends that we can
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talk about experience of God or religious experience by examining its phenomenality. Such a “divine” phenomenon or a phenomenon of revelation is particularly rich or excessive, in that it “saturates” our experience and overwhelms us. It is from this perspective that Marion contends it is possible to identify and to describe religious experiences. Gschwandtner further relates how Marion rejects much that is part of a traditional approach to philosophy of religion, such as proofs for God’s existence or arguments about the coherence of divine omnipotence and goodness in light of the reality of evil. Instead, he operates out of a position that introduces a phenomenological approach to the possibility of expressing experiences associated with faith. From this position, Marion analyzes the phenomena of love, the sacraments, language about the divine, prayer, and various other aspects of religious experience. He maintains that the “rationality” of love (or the heart) is more appropriate to any experience of, or talk about the divine, rather than the rationality of Cartesian or Husserlian certainty. A number of other philosophers, such as Dominique Janicaud (2006), contend that Marion’s work is more theology than phenomenology. Such a charge arises because ultimately, in Marion’s work, it is necessary to dismantle idolatrous ways of talking about God that place limits on the divine, and instead to allow oneself to be addressed in an experience of saturated phenomena that witness to a “God beyond Being”. The next chapter of the book addresses questions of religion from a totally different philosophical orientation than phenomenology. It is, however, still of marked interest for the philosophical study of religion. This is because, as James Swindal explains, the early members of the “Frankfurt School” – Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno – while standing within the Marxist tradition, repudiated its reductionist tendencies when dealing with cultural phenomena. Inasmuch as the Marxist polemic against culture began as a critique of theology, which was then extended to all ideology as “priestly” deception, so the Frankfurt School’s rehabilitation of the cultural could be seen, from a certain perspective, as a return to a reformed idea of the theological. Swindal detects a common thread which runs through each of the above thinkers. This is that each one has a complex and somewhat strained relationship to his own socio-cultural heritage. Most of the members of the original Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt were Jewish by birth. At times, in fact, Jewishness and critical theory were all but interchangeable terms. This resulted in a kind of prophetic Jewish messianism – minus a messiah – that envisaged a just future that could not be expressed by positive theology or in graven images. As a result, they shared an attraction to highly nuanced forms of negative theology which served as a corrective to extreme forms of religious utopianism. Jürgen Habermas, a second generation critical theorist, though of Protestant descent, has also taken a keen interest in Jewish intellectual issues. Both he and the critical theorists also share a disdain for the exclusivity of instrumental reason in modern culture. Each theorist, in different ways, has confronted the role that religion played in socio-cultural life. This is because Marx, their inspiration and guide, understood religion to be a cipher of cultural life that encoded the ideology of capitalism. For the critical theorists, however, it is now the secularizing of religion that bears the mantle of historical inevitability that provides the hermeneutic key to any cogent
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analysis of religion. Swindal’s chapter will survey the writings of each thinker in roughly chronological order. What emerges is a constellation of various religious thematics: God and transcendence; messianism; language; suffering; morality and ethics, to name but a few of the most important topics. The final chapter will survey the topic of the “o/Other” as it has featured in many guises in the chapters of this book, particularly in those philosophers of French background. It will summarize a number of the arguments and also assess the repercussions that could result for philosophy of religion if their allegations and insights were encountered with an open mind and generosity toward this way of thinking otherwise.
Bibliography Anderson, Pamela. 1997. A feminist philosophy of religion: The rationality and myths of religious belief. Oxford: Blackwell. Bello, Angela Alles, 2009. The divine in Husserl and other explorations, Vol. 98, Analecta Husserliana, Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer. Capps, Walter H. 1995. Religious studies: The making of a discipline. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Collins, James D. 1967. The emergence of philosophy of religion. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Crowe, Benjamin D. 2006. Heidegger’s religious origins: Destruction and authenticity. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Foucault, Michel, and Ludwig Binswanger. 1993 [1954]. Dream and existence. In Studies in existential psychology and psychiatry, ed. Keith Hoeller, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press. Foucault, Michel. 1976 [1962]. Mental illness and psychology. (Based on Maladie mentale et psychologie) (trans: Sheridan, Alan). New York, NY: Harper and Row. Frankenberry, Nancy. 1998. Philosophy of religion in different voices. In Philosophy in a feminist voice: Critiques and reconstructions, ed. J.A. Kourany. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1999. Hermeneutics, religion & ethics (trans: Weinsheimer, Joel). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hart, James G. 1986. A precis of an Husserlian philosophical theology. In Essays In phenomenological theology, ed. S. Laycock and J.G. Hart. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Heidegger, Martin. 1976. Only a god can save us: Der Spiegel’s interview with Martin Heidegger. Philosophy Today 20: 267–284. Janicaud, Dominique. 2006. Phenomenology “wide open”: After the French debate (trans: Cabral, Charles C.). New York, NY: Fordham University Press. Jantzen, Grace. 1999. Becoming divine: Towards a feminist philosophy of religion. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Joy, Morny. 2000. Beyond a god’s-eye view: Alternative perspectives in the study of religion. In Perspectives on method and theory in the study of religion, ed. A. W. Geertz and R. McCutcheon, 110–140. Leiden: Brill. Joy, Morny. 2004. Philosophy and religion. In New approaches to the study of religion. Vol. 1. Regional, critical and historical approaches, ed. P. Antes, A. Geertz, and R.A. Warne, 185–217. Berlin: de Gruyter. Laycock, Stephen. 1988. Foundations for a theological phenomenology. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
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Long, Eugene T. 2000. Twentieth century western philosophy of religion 1900–2000. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Otto, Rudolf. 1957. The idea of the holy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Raschke, Carl. 1982. The deconstruction of god. In Deconstruction and theology, ed. Thomas J.J. Altizer, Max A. Myers, Carl A. Raschke, Robert P. Scharlemann, Mark C.Taylor, and Charles E. Winquist. New York, NY: Crossroads. Ricoeur, Paul. 1967. Husserl. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Schalow, Frank. 2001. Heidegger and the quest for the sacred: From thought to the sanctuary of faith. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. Theunissen, Michael. 1986. The other: Studies in the social ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber (trans: Macann, C.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tracy, David. 1990. On the origin of the philosophy of religion: The need for a new narrative for its founding. In Myth and philosophy, ed. F. Reynolds and D. Tracy, 11–36. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Van der Leeuw, Geradus. 1963. Religion in essence and manifestation. 2 Vols. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Vedder, Ben. 2007. Heidegger’s philosophy of religion: From god to gods. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press.
Paul Ricoeur: Hermeneutics, Philosophy and Religion Morny Joy
Paul Ricoeur was born on 27 February 1913 in Valence, near Lyons, but grew up in Rennes, Brittany. He was of Huguenot Protestant background. In the years before WWII, Paul Ricoeur was part of the rich philosophical scene in France where a number of new currents of thought were emerging, though they were not yet necessarily converging. Among the most prominent thinkers from this time who had a lasting influence on Ricoeur’s philosophy, even if in time he challenged or moved beyond their ideas, were the Catholic personalist philosopher, Emmanuel Mounier (1905–1950), and two existentialists of rather different persuasions, Gabriel Marcel (1899–1973) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980).1 It was from his interactions with them that Ricoeur acquired in large measure his commitment to an engaged philosophy. He never ceased to be concerned with the plight of humanity – especially with issues of undeserved or inflicted suffering and the consequent responsibility for human beings to alleviate it. He was not a political activist, but in his writing he attempted to chart a path of concern for, and accountability towards others – especially those of different religious, ethnic or minority backgrounds. This initial concern for others was no doubt intensified by the experience of World War II. Ricoeur was imprisoned for 5 years (1940–1945), in various camps in the area of Germany known at that time as Pomerania. Though he certainly suffered much privation, and even life itself could never be taken for granted, he was accorded certain privileges as an officer – among them reading. This was a somewhat unexpected boon. Thus, in the course of this period, Ricoeur deepened his appreciation of certain German philosophers – in particular Husserl, Heidegger and Jaspers, with whose work he had become familiar before the war. Apart from this access to philosophical texts, Ricoeur and his fellow prisoners organized a mini-educational system with lectures and courses. Ricoeur later reflected
M. Joy (B) Department of Religious Studies, University of Calgary, University Drive, T2N 1N4 Calgary, Canada e-mail:
[email protected] 1 See
especially Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay (1998: 22–25).
M. Joy (ed.), Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion, Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0059-8_2, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
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in an interview about this time, especially about the circumstances of such an extraordinary undertaking: Together with Michel Dufrenne, I read the work of Karl Jaspers. I am indebted to Karl Jaspers for having placed my admiration for German thinking outside the reach of all the negative aspects of our surroundings and of the “terror of history.” I note in passing that we knew nothing of the horror of the concentration camps until our liberation in the spring of 1945.. . . The meticulous study of Karl Jasper’s work was to lead us to write a work together and publish it under both our names under the title: Karl Jaspers and the Philosophy of Existence (1947). (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 9–10)
In the same interview, Ricoeur also observes that during this time he undertook the translation of Husserl’s Ideen I.2 He also sketched the outline of a projected major publication – the three volumes on the philosophy of the will. The actual composition of this magnum opus did not conform exactly to this anticipated plan, which was modeled on Karl Jasper’s trilogy, The Philosophy of Knowledge.3 There were a number of diversions that occurred for Ricoeur in the course of writing these volumes. These resulted in a revised programme which had far-reaching consequences for Ricoeur’s future philosophical orientation. It changed from a basic Husserlian phenomenology to a more hermeneutically engaged approach in the mode of the early Heidegger. The first published volume of this undertaking, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary (1966 [1950]), was conceived in accordance with Husserl’s eidetic phenomenology, i.e., it attempted to determine the essence (eidos), or the basic structures of the human will. Yet, even at this stage, Ricoeur differed from Husserl in that he did not confine himself solely to an analysis of acts of consciousness. Instead, he wanted to appreciate the interaction of the mind (the voluntary) and the body (involuntary), which would also acknowledge an emotional dimension. The body was thus accorded a dynamic role, give the fact that Ricoeur respected: “the meaning of the body as a source of motives, as a cluster of capacities, even as necessary nature” (Ricoeur 1966: 9). In undertaking this exploration, Ricoeur became aware of certain vicissitudes that occurred in the passage from an act of willing to practical implementation. His studies from this time demonstrate the radical finitude of the human condition – the free yet bound nature of the will, struggling to act in resolute ways, in conformity with rational decisions, but always susceptible to the vagaries of the body with its physical and emotional disruptions, as well as to unconscious impulses. Ricoeur discovered “a sort of residue, inaccessible to analysis and to the phenomenological method: infantile, archaic, pathological culpability” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay 1998: 29). He did not conclude as a result of these findings, however, that such human fallibility automatically led to 2 This
work was published in English as Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1982 [1913]). 3 Jaspers’s trilogy was published in German under the title of Philosophie (1932). It appeared in English also in three volumes, entitled, Philosophy in 1969 and 1970, published by the University of Chicago Press. Its basic plan was a movement from surveying conditions of everyday existence to those of transcendence.
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any grievous fault of the type he would call “bad will,” or even an evil act. Instead he proposed that: “The phenomenon of the voluntary and the involuntary appeared to me to be capable of accounting only for the weaknesses of being exposed to evil and capable of doing wrong, but not of actually doing evil” (Ricoeur in Hahn: 15). These unconscious contingencies nonetheless did pose problems for Ricoeur’s initial ideas concerning the nature of the will and it putative freedom. This is because other issues, such as those conveyed by the religious terminology of guilt and sin, also emerged. Ricoeur admitted he was especially predisposed towards such issues because of his “early formative training in Calvinist predestination” (29). This insight motivated Ricoeur to write two related volumes, instead of the second slated volume of the trilogy that he had previously designated as an empirics of the will. These appeared under the headings of Finitude and Guilt, Fallible Man (1965 [1960]) and the Symbolism of Evil (1969 [1960]). A number of changes in Ricoeur’s approach became evident in these two distinct works. Perhaps the most important was that Ricoeur was no longer content to accept that human consciousness was always immediately present to itself. As Ricoeur’s awareness continued to develop on this topic, he began to appreciate that human consciousness only arrived at knowledge by way of interpretation rather than by direct intuition. There is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, and texts; in the last resort understanding coincides with the interpretation given to these mediating terms. In passing from one to the other, hermeneutics gradually frees itself from the idealism with which Husserl had tried to identify phenomenology. (Ricoeur 1991 [1986]: 15)
This move in the direction of hermeneutics was henceforth to provide assistance to Ricoeur in delineating not just the dynamics of the human will, but all human experience. Ricoeur expressed his realization of this awareness: “A hermeneutic philosophy [is one which accepts the mediated nature of subjectivity and] gives up the dream of a total mediation” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 194). These changes in Ricoeur’s thinking led to the abandonment of his third planned volume on a “poetics of the will.” Ricoeur himself observed in his own intellectual biography: “As for the poetics of transcendence, this was never written, if by this title one expects something like a philosophy of religion; for lack of a theological philosophy” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 13). He further explains: As for the third part, here I was to deal with the relation of human willing to Transcendence – obviously a Jasperian term, which modestly designated the god of the philosophers.. . . It is difficult for me to express today to what extent I was fascinated, in the 1950’s, by Jaspers’ great trilogy, most specifically the final chapter of the third volume devoted to the “ciphers” of transcendence: was not the “deciphering” of these ciphers the perfect model of a philosophy of transcendence that would be at the same time a poetics? (13)
Abandoning this ambition, Ricoeur continued by describing his new philosophical focus: “My primary concern, which has never wavered, not to mix games together has instead drawn me closer to the notion of a philosophy without any
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absolute” (13). Nevertheless, as a result of attempting this aborted project, inspired by the work of Jaspers, Ricoeur became sensitized to the conundrum of the human condition with its infinite aspirations and its finite capacities – Pascal’s “ontology of disproportion” (15). The problem of human fallibility and its propensity to evil had graphically presented itself to Ricoeur and would continue to preoccupy him during his career. Towards the end of his life he became specifically concerned with humanity’s cruelty in its treatment of fellow human beings. He regarded this as a manifestation of evil. Ricoeur then focused on seeking human solutions such as justice and due recognition as ways of mitigating the situation.4 Ricoeur’s most immediate task when he wrote The Symbolism of Evil, however, became one of discerning what he understood to be both the opaqueness and multivalency that characterized symbols. He employed the catch-phrase: “The symbol gives rise to thought” (le symbole donne à penser [Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 17]).5 Ricoeur understood this task as more indirect than direct in that it indicated: “The passage from an analysis of the essence of the will to a symbolism of the myths expressing the figures and genealogies of evil” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay 1998: 29). These indirect meanings were expressed in the world’s literary heritage, rather than in philosophy. Ricoeur observed: “The Symbolism of Evil had set in motion this conception of indirect reflection by basing the avowal of bad will upon a set of symbols and myths deciphered in the public texts of great cultures” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 19). In keeping with a modified notion of poetics, conceived as an appreciation of the dynamics of creative expression, Ricoeur then turned his attention to the way in which the western tradition had attempted to account for this element of human weakness. His studies of biblical texts and the (neo-)Platonic tradition in The Symbolism of Evil (1967 [1960]), explored the various symbols and myths expressing insights into the source of the free yet bound human will. Instinctively, Ricoeur himself was not receptive to the Augustinian explanation of original sin as inherited, calling it a pseudo-concept (Ricoeur 1995: 254), and his investigations recount many other symbolic descriptions that endeavored to represent the source this phenomenon. At the very end of The Symbolism of Evil, he recapitulates his task, as he now understands it. The task of the philosopher guided by symbols would be to break out of the enchanted enclosure of consciousness of oneself, to end the prerogative of self-reflection [the Cogito].. . . All the symbols of guilt – deviation, wandering, captivity – all the myths – chaos, blinding, mixture, fall – speak of the situation of man in the being of the world. The task, then, is, starting from the symbols, to elaborate existential concepts – that is to say, not
4 This
aspect of Ricoeur’s work will be treated later in the paper. expands on this statement: “What the symbol gives rise to is thinking.. . . The aphorism suggests at the same time that everything has already been said enigmatically and yet that it is always necessary to begin it again as in the dimension of thinking. It is this articulation of thought given to itself in the realm of symbols and thought positing and thinking that constitutes the critical point of our whole enterprise” (1967: 349). 5 Ricoeur
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only structures of reflection but structures of existence, insofar as existence is the being of man. (Ricoeur 1967: 356–357)6
Ricoeur describes this task of symbolic interpretation, in an age when formalism and technical jargon had tended to constrict the resources of figurative language, as one of reviving the richness and subtleties of meaning that words can convey. This shift to philosophical hermeneutics, with its movement from “the statics to the dynamics” of symbols, facilitated a move to incorporate both the retrospective and anticipatory elements that Ricoeur posits as inherent in all symbolic expressions. In coming to terms with symbols, one cannot remain a purely detached observer. The world of symbols is not a tranquil and reconciled world; every symbol is iconoclastic in comparison with some other symbol, just as every symbol, left to itself, tends to thicken, to become solidified in idolatry. It is necessary, then, to participate in the struggle, in the dynamics, in which the symbolism itself becomes a prey to the spontaneous hermeneutics that seeks to transcend it. It is only by participating in this dynamics that comprehension can reach the strictly critical dimension of exegesis and become a hermeneutic but then one must abandon the position – or rather, the exile – of the remote and disinterested spectator, in order to appropriate in each case a particular symbolism. (Ricoeur 1967: 354)
For Ricoeur, this active participation involves not just a mind or word game but a shift in existential priorities that can have distinct consequences for human behavior. His move to hermeneutic phenomenology also marked a change in his appreciation of the need for a new mode of self-reflexivity. Ricoeur himself clarifies what is involved in this change from phenomenology to a Heideggerian form of phenomenological hermeneutics: Hermeneutics remains fundamentally an understanding of the self. Thus, it remains reflective. But, on the other hand, the means of understanding are no longer those of a transcendental or eidetic reflection but require understanding, interpretation and thus a mode of intelligibility other than that of the immediate and intuitive grasping of the essence of mental phenomena. (Ricoeur in Reagan 1996: 124)
At the same time, Ricoeur’s investigation into such figurative depictions of evil also led to a fascination with the work of Sigmund Freud. His subsequent intense study resulted in a volume: Freud: An Interpretation (1970 [1965]).7 In addition, 6 Ricoeur expands on this understanding as a means of illuminating the human condition: “By recounting our origins, where we come from, myths describe in a symbolic way what we are: the paradox of the good demon and that of the evil god are not merely playful fantasies but the privileged means of unraveling the tangled skein of passions belonging to the human heart. When the myth tells, for example, how the gods corrupted the demons, something is said about the hidden perversity of the ‘higher’ part of ourselves. When the myth recounts the birth of death, it touches the secret thread of our fright in the face of death, a fright that in fact closely links together evil and death and confronts death as a personified demon” (1996: 205). 7 This approach was also influenced by his high school studies with Ronald Dalbiez who Ricoeur notes was one of the first thinkers to attempt a philosophical reading of Freud. As Ricoeur observes, in noting the impact this would have on his future work: “His Freud was the ‘biological’ Freud: he stressed the realist conception of the unconscious which he used to refute the ‘Cartesian illusion’ of self-consciousness, and the alleged reduction of the world to my representation” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay 1998: 7).
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Ricoeur was also becoming aware that the opacity of symbols was not just a phenomenon related to representations of evil alone, but to “the entire intentional life of the subject.” Such a conclusion brought into question “a presupposition common to Husserl and Descartes, namely the immediateness, the transparence, the apodicity of the Cogito” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay 1998: 16). Ricoeur noted that such an awareness demanded an approach that moved beyond the confines of phenomenology of conscious activity to a mode of hermeneutic phenomenology that attempts to unravel, insofar as possible, the workings of the unconscious. For this task, Freud was indispensable. Ricoeur also credits Freud with helping him to leave behind his preoccupation with culpability and guilt. “The work did indeed help me to go beyond the somewhat obsessive and archaic side of the problem of culpability [and its relation to guilt], which has been replaced in my work by the question of suffering, of excessive suffering that overwhelms the world” (29). Yet Ricoeur remained intrigued by the purported origins of evil – and the fact of its contingency. “If the reason for evil does not lie in finiteness, then it just comes about, it happens, in the manner of an event that one recounts” (17). In order to help to find a way to express this conviction from a philosophical perspective, Ricoeur turned to the work of Kant, whom he was teaching at that time (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 15). From this period onwards, Kant, to whom Ricoeur refers as “my preferred author for the philosophy of religion” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay 1998: 148), becomes the most dominant influence on Ricoeur’s philosophical reflections about religion. This influence is apparent not just on the subject of evil and human frailty, but on the relationship of philosophy to religion, especially concerning Kant’s notion of the limit. Ricoeur has often expressed his admiration for Kant’s rejection of metaphysics and, in particular, for Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, which he describes as “a philosophical hermeneutics of religion” (Ricoeur 1995: 75). As he relates, “like Kant, I assume the question of determining whether a religion within the limits of reason is possible, which at the same time would recognize the external character of religious symbolism before taking on the task of providing a philosophical interpretation of it within the limits of reason alone” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 495–96).8 Ricoeur worries that all too often philosophy, in its presumptions, has taken upon itself a globalizing notion of responsibility for pronouncing upon matters of religion (472). Preferring instead, in a manner similar to Kant, to retain a distinction between non-philosophical (Denken) thinking and rational knowing (Erkennen),
8 Ricoeur completes this quotation in a way that henceforth situates his own approach: “Like Hegel, I assume the question of determining whether speculative philosophy can transmute figurative thinking into its own essence, while leaving it just as it is. In both cases, my response is, regretfully, somewhat negative. To this extent, I assume an irreducible dichotomy between what has been considered. . .as religious discourse and all other discourses falling under the jurisdiction of reason alone. This dichotomy does not exclude the fact that religious discourse allows itself to be instructed by philosophical reason precisely as a critique of anthropomorphism” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 496).
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Ricoeur maintains that philosophy needs to observe certain limits regarding matters which it cannot claim to control according to the dictates of reason. But this does not prevent a person from entertaining ideas that stretch beyond the bounds of reason. Ricoeur describes the difference accordingly: “Denken [functions] as the thought of the unconditional, Erkennen as the work of the understanding, as knowledge through objects. This disjunctive act, which Kant calls the limit, is the answer to the first of the three questions: What can I know?” (Ricoeur 1995: 212). Ricoeur then clarifies his position: My evolution has involved a clearer split, between what has to do with the responsibility of philosophical thinking and what belongs to non-philosophical sources of philosophy. What makes this enigmatic from an epistemological point of view is that it arises at the point of articulation of philosophy and non-philosophy. Kant’s approach in Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone seems to me exemplary in this regard: here we see the philosopher thinking at the limit, proposing an autonomous rational interpretation of figurative contents that reason does not draw out of itself. (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 472)
He then carefully elaborates a notion of the work of philosophy: “Philosophy has attempted in various ways to colonize this outside entirely for its own benefit and to make it its own. Renouncing this hubris seems to me the first stage in a philosophy that is at once responsible for its arguments and prepared to recognize its Other and to be instructed by it” (472). I have included this quotation in full because I believe it to be an apt and succinct summary of Ricoeur’s later philosophical orientation. In his own work, the identity of this posited “Other” is the means by which one’s selfunderstanding is tested and expanded.9 It is intriguing that Ricoeur is reluctant to use the term “Other” to portray God within a philosophical frame of reference. This is not to say, however, that Ricoeur dismisses “God-talk” from his work, especially his explorations of various biblical genres, such as his essay, “Naming God” (Ricoeur 1995: 217–235). Such explorations, however, are never regarded by Ricoeur as philosophical but as exercises by “an amateur of enlightened exegesis” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 448).10 As such, these exercises could rather be described as biblical hermeneutics of a theological nature, rather than philosophical hermeneutics – a position that he clarifies in the essay, “Philosophical and Theological Hermeneutics” (1975/1976: 14–33). Ricoeur states that “biblical faith cannot be separated from the movement of interpretation which elevates it into language” (32). It is in this context that Ricoeur provides his own understanding of what such a faith constitutes: “For my part I should link the concept of faith to that of self-understanding in the
9 Otherness will take on various designations at different periods in Ricoeur’s work. See especially Ricoeur (1992: 317–55). The most relevant usage for this essay is discussed later in the chapter. 10 In such exercises of exegesis, Ricoeur posits that, instead of resorting to the abstract arguments of philosophy, he prefers, using hermeneutical philosophy, to “try to get as close as possible to the most originary expressions of a community of faith, to those expressions through which the members of this community have interpreted their experience for the sake of themselves or others” (1995: 37). On his account, these forms are polyphonous: narration, laws, hymns, prophecy, wisdom, laments, supplications, praise. As such, from Ricoeur’s religious perspective, there is no one specific form that can be identified as the authentic or correct mode of revelation.
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face of the text. Faith is an attitude of one who accepts being interpreted at the same time he interprets the world of the text. Such is the hermeneutical constitution of the biblical faith” (Ricoeur 1995: 46). At the same time, any theological interpretation of biblical texts must adhere to certain requirements that Ricoeur advises for all forms of hermeneutics. Thus, though a theological hermeneutics will speak about God in ways that attest to one’s commitment and acceptance of its words as carrying a mode of revelatory importance, it must nonetheless be subject to critical analysis. Ricoeur describes what such a critical exercise involves: It is here that that I see an essential connection between the criticism of religion practiced by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud and the self-understanding of faith. This critique of religion is, of course, constituted entirely outside of hermeneutics, as a critique of ideology, as a critique of otherworldliness, as a critique of illusions. But for a text-centered hermeneutical understanding this critique can simultaneously remain the recognition of an external adversary, whom one does not attempt to retrieve and baptize by force, and also become the instrument of an internal critique, which appropriately belongs to the labour of distanciation which all self-understanding before the text requires. Today a “hermeneutics of suspicion” is an integral part of all appropriation of meaning. (Ricoeur 1975/1976: 32)
Ricoeur will nonetheless allow that such religious language has a particular affinity to poetics. With certain qualifications, he understands the Bible as a poem, albeit one that is “unique” and eccentric (Ricoeur 1995: 221). As a result, insofar as biblical language in its polyphonic genres speaks figuratively about God, it shares certain attributes with poetry. Ricoeur describes his understanding of their common characteristics: Poetic discourse is . . . about the world, but not about the manipulable objects of our everyday environment. It refers to our many ways of belonging to the world before we oppose ourselves to things understood as “objects” that stand before a “subject.” . . . In so doing, it calls into question the reduction of the referential function to descriptive discourse [defined by adequation to real objects] and opens the world to a nondescriptive reference to the world. (Ricoeur 1995: 222)
The unique “nondescriptive” reference, in the context of scripture, is that of God. It is in this context that Ricoeur explains why, as a philosopher, he is reluctant to introduce or discuss the concept of “God,” or arguments for God’s existence, etc., into his philosophical work. The word “God” cannot be understood as a philosophical concept, not even “being” in the sense that of medieval philosophy or in Heidegger’s sense. The word “God” says more than the word “being,” because it presupposes the entire context of narratives, prophecies, laws, wisdom writings, psalms, and so on. The referent “God” is thus intended by the convergence of all of these partial discourses. (227–228)11
11 This
statement is indicative of Ricoeur’s own self-described location within the western tradition and its inheritance from both Judaism and Christianity. In an interview Ricoeur discusses his own attitude that reflects the polyphony of the biblical texts that have been especially influential in his own life and work. He places himself in a close relationship to an intertextual inheritance: “There is certainly a very specific relation between Judaism and Christianity. I strongly resist the tendency in Christianity that consists in saying that Judaism is a thing of the past because it has
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Ricoeur often refers to his particular obsession about maintaining a distinction between his commentaries on scripture with their exploration of poetic language, and his strictly philosophical work.12 In fact, in one interview, he describes himself as being virtually “schizophrenic” (Ricoeur in Reagan: 134) in his adherence to this distinction between philosophy and theology of any variety. I am very committed to the autonomy of philosophy and I think that in none of my works do I use any arguments borrowed from the domain of Jewish or Christian biblical writings. And, if one does use these writings, it is not an argument from authority. I mean that, for example, I put on the same plane Greek tragedy or the histories of Israel, neo-Platonic metaphysical speculations or the patristic interpretations of biblical writing. As a consequence, there is no privileged place for religion in general, or for the Judeo-Christian tradition, in philosophical argumentation. (Ricoeur in Reagan: 125).
It is this position that David Tracy, his former colleague at the University of Chicago, describes in a remarkably respectful tribute: Like Kant, Ricoeur always keeps the genres clear in order not only to allow figurative and conceptual forms their distinct but dialectically related roles, but also to keep properly distinct religion, philosophy and theology.. . . Unlike some of his admirers Ricoeur himself never allows philosophy or theology to be confused or conflated. (Tracy 1996: 202)
He then continues: “He possesses all the virtues of the classical Reformation tradition.. . . rigorous in philosophical method; generous, but straightforward in criticism; aware and honest about distinctions and the need for limits. In a word beautiful in the Reformed sense [sic]. (203) It is in an article, “Hope and Structure of Philosophical Systems” (Ricoeur 1995: 203–216), that Ricoeur sets forth the basis of his philosophical agenda in relation to religion. Invoking the notion of intellectus spei, rather than the traditional intellectus fidei, Ricoeur appreciates a philosophy informed by hope as one that is not in search of absolute knowledge.13 Ricoeur states that the first step of a philosophy of hope: “consists in an act of renunciation by which pure speculative reason gives up its claim to fulfill the thought of the unconditioned along the line of empirical objects” (212–213). been replaced by Christianity. Christianity is grafted onto a minor branch of Judaism, the eschatological branch, it leads back, therefore, to what was already a dialectical relation within Judaism between the Rabbinical movement of the second Temple tied to restoration. . .and another variant of Judaism. Christianity, in this way, is placed within the continuation of a certain pluralism internal to Judaism” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay 1998: 165). 12 Ricoeur relates his philosophical reasons for this stance in an interview: “I have always been mistrustful with respect to speculation termed ontotheological, and I had a critical reaction to any attempt to fuse the Greek verb to be and God, in spite of Exodus 3,14” (1998: 150). 13 Ricoeur is at once subtle and precise in appealing to Kant for instruction on this position. “Can one, Kant asks, philosophize within the limits of reason about a structure of experience that lies to begin within the language of symbols and myths? Yes, he replies, to the extent that religion falls under the broader question of determining what I am permitted to hope for. This question emerges at the intersection of philosophy and religion, inasmuch as hope concerns the capacity of regenerating a moral will, whose structures are entirely the province of practical philosophy” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 446).
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The wager of an alternative mode of intelligibility fostered by hope is placed by Ricoeur within a horizon of promise; of an as yet unfulfilled claim that can never be known with certainty. This is definitely a philosophy that acknowledges human finitude, both theoretically and practically, but it is also one that prevents a premature closure that could promote, in Ricoeur’s view, idolatry or ideology. As a result, such a philosophy can thus open vistas of dynamic possibility within a teleological perspective that Ricoeur will continue to explore. In contrast to Hegel’s dialectic, which culminates in the triumph of reason as Geist, Ricoeur prefers an open-ended version of Kantian Denken that allows for imaginative investigation of prospective itineraries of meaning. In this context, the notion of the Kantian limit takes on resonances of approximation and probability rather than statements of certainty which he believes prematurely puts a halt to thinking. This approach is clearly visible in a number of Ricoeur’s initial forays into religious language. Though Ricoeur is appreciative of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, and admits that there are certain shared interests between linguistic analysis and phenomenological hermeneutics, particularly in the areas of semantics and pragmatics, he is at pains to enumerate their differences. He acknowledges that he is indebted to this analytic mode of philosophizing, having discovered in it “a level of argumentation and a sense of philosophical discussion sorely lacking in French philosophy” (Ricoeur 1978: 11). Still, although he sees a similar interest in linguistic articulation on the part of both phenomenology – particularly with regard to Husserl’s method – and philosophical analysis, he prefers the hermeneutic phenomenological approach, because he anticipates it will allow him to address human activity from an existential dimension – a move that will ultimately lead him to ethics. “The subordination of linguistical-phenomenological method to a hermeneutical-reflective philosophy, in its turn, prevents this theory from being restricted to what is termed ‘action’ at the level of ordinary language, but instead extends the philosophy of action into the regions of human praxis explored by Hegel and Marx” (Ricoeur 1978: 12). This differentiation between the two ways of philosophizing is also stressed by Ricoeur in relation another aspect of language. In “Philosophy and Religious Language,” he states that it is the expressive dimension of language that sets it apart from being merely a mode of rational clarification: “Whatever ultimately may be the nature of the so-called religious experience, it comes to language, it is articulated in a language, and the most appropriate place to interpret it on its own terms is to inquire into its linguistic expression” (Ricoeur, 1995: 35). While conceding this necessity of conveying the meaning of any experience in linguistic expression, Ricoeur prefers not to reduce the dimension of faith to propositions. As a result, he is extremely reluctant to begin any treatment of religious discourse with theological claims to the effect that “God exists” or that “God is immutable” etc. (37). Another clarification Ricoeur undertakes on behalf of his approach entails rejecting two negative assumptions about religion promoted by the Vienna Circle.14 The
14 The
Vienna Circle was a name given to a group of philosophers who began to meet in the 1920s whose main intention was to purge philosophy of metaphysics. Their approach was highly empirical and supported by logic based on mathematical principles.
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first of these is that religious language was viewed as a category mistake because it deals only with metaphysical statements. On this account, religious language is thereby eliminated from serious philosophical consideration, according to the tenets of symbolic logic. Ricoeur’s contention is that though religious language maybe extravagant and metaphorical at times, it should not necessarily to be regarded as solely metaphysical. The second assumption, which is related to the first, concerns the procedures of verification/ falsification. This form of assessment also used by the Vienna Circle holds that any statement that is non-falsifiable cannot meet the criterion of verification. In that religious language has always been regarded as not able to be falsified, it is therefore considered meaningless (Ricoeur 1981: 93). Ricoeur worries such a narrow conception of logical truth, according to the idea of adequation, cannot accept the meaningfulness of many forms of discourse. In his estimation, these other modes of discourse that are not metaphysical could nevertheless be evaluated according to their own criteria that differ from that of adequation. (To support such a claim, Ricoeur often refers to Wittgenstein’s notion of innumerable language games, with their variant standards.) He states: “The reduction of all truth-claims to the only category of scientific discourse which can be verified and falsified by empirical means can be and has been – rightly to my mind – challenged by the unbiased observers of the variety of ways language is used for the variety of purposes of these uses. Nobody, in this regard, has gone further than Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations” (Ricoeur: 1981: 94).15 Ricoeur’s move towards a more a more expansive appreciation of language can be undertaken only because of two hermeneutical presuppositions that Ricoeur advances that themselves depend on the multivalency of language. The first is that a text, as a form of linguistic expression, can interrogate a reader, because it puts into question already assumed ideas and ideals. Another presupposition is the acceptance that sentences or even extended descriptions have a dual referential capability, a theory that he adapted from R. Jakobson.16 Ricoeur describes his adaptation of Jakobson: I spoke, following R. Jakobson, of the “divided,” “broken” reference; according to this hypothesis metaphorical expressions were not confined to the creation of meaning, based on a new semantic relevance, but they contributed to a redescription of the real and, more generally, of our being-in-the-world, by reason of the correspondence between a seeingas on the plane of language and a being-as on the ontological plane. (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 46)
15 Ricoeur will then proceed to quote Paragraph 23 from the Investigations. In one of his interviews
with Charles Reagan, Ricoeur also declares: “I am completely on the side of Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, where language games have an unlimited world and philosophy has, among others, the responsibility to preserve the autonomy, the rights, of these language games” (Ricoeur in Reagan 1996: 134). 16 Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) was one of the two founders of the Prague School of linguistic theory. Ricoeur was specifically interested in his theory of split reference, as it applied to literary texts. He appreciated this dynamic idea of poetic and literary description in that it allowed him to move beyond the unilateral meaning ascribed to texts by the then predominant theoretical approach of structuralism.
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In this model, there is, at one level, the sense in terms of literal meaning of the statement. At the same time, from Ricoeur’s perspective, a sentence or text can have a reference which he posits as applicable to a person’s way of being-in-the-world. This mode of dual referentiality in the interpretation of a sentence (or text) can also introduce, in Ricoeur’s view, a productive clash of meanings in that it can challenge a person’s present worldview. This can stimulate a mode of self-reflection which can result in an existential change in belief, attitude or behavior. Given such a pluri-vocal view of language and its application in his hermeneutic orientation, it is of no surprise that Ricoeur’s approach to the topic of evil is similarly multifaceted. For Ricoeur, “The problem of evil does not simply constitute a speculative problem. It calls for the convergence of thought, action and feeling” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 474–475). For this reason, Ricoeur finds that traditional theodicies and their rational efforts to reconcile evil with an all-powerful and beneficent God are inadequate. Ricoeur also does not believe, any more than Kant, that it is possible to locate the origin of evil in the sense of providing a decisive answer on an intellectual level to this quandary. As I described earlier, Ricoeur thinks that philosophy, when instructed by the west’s symbolic heritage, can help provide a deeper awareness of the basic aporia at the heart of the problem of evil: “How can the will be bound and free at the same time?” Ricoeur’s own resolution is to appeal to hermeneutics, with its mediatory and wide-ranging interpretative investigations of the symbolic representations of evil. “The challenge has to be taken up as a provocation to think more and to think anew.. . . Action and feeling are summoned to give this aporetic situation not a solution but a response destined to make the aporia productive, that is, to continue the work of thinking in the domain of action and feeling” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 475). Yet Ricoeur remains aware that even the insights thus gained, though they may provide some consolation, will also never provide a completely satisfactory solution. As a way of further enriching his reflections on this dilemma, Ricoeur will turn to his favored collaborator in religion and philosophy, Kant. This is because in Kant’s Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone Ricoeur finds ideas that are in accord with his own project of “thinking more” on the topic of evil. Yet it is not only how Kant thinks but what he is thinking that resonates with Ricoeur – particularly his appeal to hope. How can a will exist freely? How can it become capable of exercising freedom? This is the existential question at the center of Kant’s philosophy of religion.. . . For what is evil if not the incapacity of the will? To restore to concrete freedom its fundamental power, what Kant calls regeneration, is the object par excellence of religion. And that this restoration should actually be possible is what it is reasonable to hope. Concrete effective freedom thus becomes an object of hope. But does this belong to the power of reason itself? With this question, two paths diverge, the one Kant follows and the one that recognizes a transcendent source of this power. (Ricoeur 1995: 296).
Ricoeur prefers to follow Kant’s option rather than adopt a transcendent view – though he adds his own more recent inflections to Kant’s position. “One of the major motifs of Kant’s philosophical hermeneutics of religion is to give an account, within
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the limits of reason alone, of this interweaving of the confession of radical evil and the assumption of the means of regeneration. And consequently, to the extent that this interweaving is constitutive of the motif of hope, we can say that hope is the specific object of this philosophical hermeneutics of religion” (Ricoeur 1995: 77). Ricoeur understands that this means of regeneration, proposed by Kant in the key of hope, refers to the potentiality for new positive operations of a human will that has become demoralized to be restored. Thus revitalized, a person can then act according to maxims derived from an innate predisposition (Anlage) to the good which will counteract the degenerate effects acquired by reacting impulsively to the dictates of a similarly inborn propensity (Hang) to evil. As Ricoeur observes: “In this sense, evil remains contingent, albeit always already there. This paradox could be called the “paradox of the quasi-nature of evil” (Ricoeur 1995: 80). Yet the principal question still to be asked is: How can this happen, that the will be regenerated? The problematic aspect of Kant’s additional postulates includes his apparent admission that such a radical renewal can only occur thanks to the intervention of some non-human agency, i.e., an act of grace. But Ricoeur will not necessarily admit to such an intervention,17 preferring a more philosophically nuanced resolution, though he is as ready as Kant to celebrate the seemingly inevitable subjugation of evil. “In philosophical terms: evil requires a nonethical and nonpolitical transformation of our will, what Kant calls regeneration; it is the task of religion within the limits of reason alone to elaborate the conditions of possibility of this regeneration, without alienating freedom either to magical conception of grace and salvation, or to an authoritarian organization of religious community” (Ricoeur 1995: 80). Ricoeur himself will attribute this regeneration to the stirrings of conscience. “However radical it may be, evil cannot bring it about that we cease being open to the appeal of conscience” (80).18 Yet, for Ricoeur, from a philosophical perspective, this “gift,” or “unfathomable aide” (86), defies any rational explication of its possible wellspring. To support his summoning of conscience Ricoeur turns to Heidegger’s invocation of conscience, a topic that he has treated in some detail (Ricoeur 1992: 341–355). Conscience, for Ricoeur, can encompass a number of references that indicate an inscrutable provenance, e.g., the immeasurable depths of Dasein, as evoked by Heidegger (342), etc. Ultimately, however, Ricoeur, in his philosophical guise, is unwilling to name God as its source. He concludes his reflections on conscience with line similar to the following meditation: “I cannot say as a philosopher where the voice of conscience comes from – that ultimate expression of otherness that haunts selfhood. Does it come from a person who is other whom 17 Ricoeur
is all too aware of the various dilemmas, if not aporia, that Kant is trying to resolve on this issue. For further discussion of the problematics involved see, in particular, (1992: 820–888). 18 Similarly to Kant, Ricoeur will nonetheless allow that this regeneration, as well as the call of conscience, can occur because of the deeply rooted or inherent goodness of human beings. “In other words, the fact [is] that the original goodness in man is more profound than the radicality of evil, a radicality that affects and infects a penchant, again to speak like Kant, without being able to equal the fundamental disposition to the good” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay: 148).
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I can still envisage, from my ancestors, from a dead or a living God, but one absent from life as the past is from reconstructed history, or even from some empty place?” (Ricoeur in Hahn 1995: 53). It was in the last 20 years of his life, Ricoeur moved from simply theoretical discussions of philosophical problematics – though he had always been concerned with existential matters pertaining to everyday life, i.e., the “life-world,” or Lebenswelt of Husserl – to struggle with more pronounced ethical and political issues. In large part, this shift was prompted by Ricoeur’s growing dismay at the undiminishing amount of violence that continued to plague the world. To Ricoeur, this was a manifestation of evil in the form of unjustified infliction of harm on innocent people. As he observed to Charles Reagan: “I must say that in my previous work there is very little about ethics and politics” (Ricoeur in Reagan: 114). He then continued, as if justifying the change that he would now make in his focus. It is this speculative problem of action and passion, but also the problem of victimization – the whole story of this cruel century, the twentieth century – and all of the suffering imposed on the Third World by the rich, affluent countries, by colonialism. There is a history of victims that keeps accompanying or reduplicating the history of the victors. But the history I try to revive has a strong ethical debt to the victims. (114)
As part of this response Ricoeur will move in two directions – one that is public, that is practical and ethical; the other of a more personal nature. At the heart of his practical, ethical claim for justice is an appeal to wisdom, seemingly inspired by Job, but also directed to constructive ethical change. “Wisdom, which is no longer to develop arguments or even to accuse God but to transform, practically, emotionally, the nature of desire that is at the base of the request for explanation. To transform desire practically means to leave behind the question of origins, toward which myth carries speculative thought, and to substitute for it the question of the future and the end of evil” (1987: 207). In his contribution to help counter the manifestations and effects of violence that witness to humanity’s on-going inhumanity, Ricoeur accepts initially the necessity of mourning that inevitably accompanies the acknowledgement of such unjust suffering. His own philosophical preference, to move to ethics, is no doubt informed by his religious convictions. It also results from his conclusions on the inability of abstract philosophical reasoning, or even of speculative explorations, to provide conclusive answers to the problem of evil. While he concedes that the different religions can provide sustenance for suffering of this nature (Ricoeur in Hahn: 475), Ricoeur’s intention is to attempt to address the root cause of evil as it lies within the behavior of human beings themselves. In so doing, he relates that such a project involved a return to his early mentors. “By taking into account the primordial suffering which appears to be inseparable from human action, I returned to the lessons from my first masters on limit-situations (Jaspers) and embodiment (Marcel), as well as my former investigation on the absolute involuntary” (Ricoeur in Hahn: 49) In one sense, both of these influences address the way in which a form of “otherness” can have an unpredictable impact, basically in that it defies any definite
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explanation. But Ricoeur has moved beyond his earlier and less applied investigations inspired by Jaspers and Marcel into demonstrations of human fallibility, although he now recognizes that even in his earlier work there was an impetus to liberation involved, however unthematized at the time. It is at this point that the distinction to which I am most attracted – that between, on the one hand fragility, vulnerability, fallibility – in short, finitude – and on the other, the historical effectiveness of evil already present – constitutes the primary resistance that I oppose to the temptation of mastery that thought claims to achieve, before considering any project of liberation, and this is so as early as the work of delimiting and identifying the problem of evil. (Ricoeur in Hahn: 473)
Ricoeur has since become vitally engaged with the question of the fragility of all things human, and how to protect them in a way that does not resort to the often hollow solutions supplied by ratiocination. “The question becomes: What shall we do with this fragile being, what shall we do for him or her? We are directed towards the future of a being in need of help to survive and to grow” (1996a: 16). It is in Oneself as Another (1992 [1990]), that Ricoeur begins his explorations into interpersonal “otherness,” as a way of grounding his ethics. This is most strongly developed in the chapter: “What Ontology in View?” (1992: 297–356). From a phenomenological perspective, Ricoeur admits that there is an inherent difficulty in its capability to constitute another person: “There appears to be a difficulty that phenomenology encounters in trying to get beyond this original asymmetry between self and others, and in forming an idea of reciprocity that is just as essential to the idea of truth as that of justice” (2005: 260). Yet Ricoeur wagers that, in this context, human responsibility for other human beings is the core issue, in that it is in the midst of others “we become effectively responsible” (1992: 17). Ricoeur looks to Hegel for inspiration to help develop formulations of this responsibility and undertakes an adaptation of his concept of recognition (296). Ricoeur, however, will surpass the Hegelian model of recognition as it is expressed in the dialectic. He does this by insisting on the integrity and irreducibility of the other person. This is expressed in a relationship of reciprocity that, on Ricoeur’s definition, surpasses mutuality. Ricoeur describes the movement that occurs: The passage from recognition-identification where the thinking subject claims to master meaning, to mutual recognition, where the subject places him- or herself under the tutelage of a relationship of reciprocity, passes through a variety of capacities that modulate one’s capacity to act, one’s agency. (2005: 248, translation amended)
In such a relationship, Ricoeur describes another person who has close ties as worthy of being bestowed with the same solicitude that one would lavish on oneself. “Ultimately the question at stake concerns mutual recognition – a recognition through which the other ceases to be alien and is treated as my peer according to a fundamental human fellowship” (1996a: 17) Then, on the impersonal level, in the public realm, where justice supplants reciprocity, the other is deemed as equally deserving of all the rights and benefits to which one believes one is entitled. Here:
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“As for the corollary of reciprocity, namely equality, it places friendship on the path of justice, where the life together shared by a few people gives way to the distribution of shares in a plurality on the scale of a historical, political community” (1992: 188). In proposing such an inclusive ethical gesture, Ricoeur is making a particularly positive supposition. This is that human beings are by nature predisposed to act in a supportive way towards their fellow beings. Unfortunately, however, as became evident in the earlier discussion of evil humanity’s innate propensity to evil as well as their predisposition towards the good, i.e., humans can deviate from goodness. Ricoeur can only propose – or is it hope? – that, in the end, the human predisposition to goodness and its accompanying solicitude will ultimately prevail. “Solicitude assumes that, counter to all cultural pessimism, I pay credit to the sources of goodwill – what the Anglo-Saxon philosophers of the eighteenth century always tried to affirm in opposition to Hobbes, i.e., that man is not simply a wolf to man, and that pity exists. It is true that these are very fragile feelings and that it is one functions of religion to take charge them and recodify them in a way” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay, 1998: 159). Within his chosen philosophical orientation, however, Ricoeur is nevertheless still unwilling to defer to religion to provide an endorsement of his position – though he acknowledges that religion dominates most deliberations on the subject of solicitude towards others. It would appear, however, that it is Ricoeur’s intention to make philosophy similarly responsive to and responsible for others. It could be said that what Ricoeur is striving to express is a phenomenological ethics of intersubjectivity. To this end, Ricoeur wants to make certain important distinctions in his work from the writings of Emmanuel Levinas as well as from Heidegger. The philosophy of Levinas has had a remarkable effect on Ricoeur – and Ricoeur has been at pains to stress his consensus with Levinas on the necessity of an ethical response to the summons of responsibility coming from another person. But ultimately, he will disagree with Levinas’s insistence on the primordiality of ethics as implying the absolute priority of the other person, at the expense of personal integrity. In relation to Heidegger, Ricoeur will find fault with his emphasis on Dasein as being principally preoccupied with realizing one’s “own most possibilities.” In Ricoeur’s view, although Heidegger allows that there is care, even a form of solicitude for others, he does not establish sufficient grounds for an ethics of intersubjectivity, where there is a distinct mode of reciprocal relations. Despite his disagreements with these thinkers, Ricoeur admits that he has not yet articulated a satisfactory ontological worldview of his own with which to support to his criticisms. “Not that I have ever found my ontological feet in any final or absolute sense. It is no accident that the title of the last chapter of Oneself as Another is in the form of an interrogation rather than an assertion – ‘Towards which Ontology?’ [sic]. Here I try to explore possibilities of an ethical ontology beyond the Heideggerian model of ontology without ethics and the Levinasian model of ethics without ontology” (Ricoeur in Kearney 2004: 167). In his turn to the practical as part of his attempt to delineate an interpersonal ethics that has an ontological grounding, Ricoeur will also acknowledge the need for
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close attention to particular circumstances. In his exploration of matters concerned with personal morality and public justice, there is a marked attention to phronesis, or practical wisdom, that is characterized by a starkly realistic observation of the discrepancies that beset the human condition and interfere with any definitive regulations. “Practical wisdom (or the art of moral judgment in situation) appeared to me to be required by the singular nature of cases, by conflicts among duties, by the complexity of life in society where choice is most often between grey and grey than between black and white, and finally by those situations that I call situations of distress, in which choice is not between good and bad, but bad and worse” (Ricoeur in Hahn: 52). The stress on practical wisdom or phronesis is part and parcel of Ricoeur’s expanded version of Aristotelian teleological ethics, described by Ricoeur as “the wish to live well with and for others in just institutions” (51).19 It is this invocation that allows him to incorporate the exacting demands of recognition, as enacted in both personal solicitude and public justice, as being integral to any vision of a good society. It is in this ethical move that Ricoeur places his hopes to provide a means of ameliorating the human situation, and, even more specifically, to counteract the continuing malign effects of evil in the world. The related more personal, though intimately connected commitment of Ricoeur is that of cultivating a profound sense of affirmation for life in this world, as opposed to a preoccupation with the question of life after death. It could be said that, in effect, this is the way that Ricoeur deals with the philosophical question of life after death. Ricoeur remarked in a late interview on the topic of immorality: “My own experience of the end of life is nourished by this deepest wish to make the act of dying an act of life. This wish I extend to mortality itself has to be thought sub specie vitae and not sub specie mortis. This explains that I by no means like nor do I use the Heideggerian vocabulary of being-toward-death, instead I would say being unto death” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay: 156). He also depicts in poignant language the hope which infuses his own disposition so that, at the moment of death, “the veils that conceal the essential buried under the historical revelation” will be removed (156). Rather than endorsing the actual possibility of life after death, let alone providing arguments in its defence, Ricoeur claims: “I therefore project not an after-death but a death that would be an ultimate affirmation of life” (156). He seems troubled that such extraordinary efforts are expended by people during this life in imagining various types of eternal existence. Instead of such fantasizing, Ricoeur describes his admiration for Hannah Arendt’s
19 This
teleological ethics is also tempered by a reworking of Kant’s understanding of the moral law to modify its abstract universalism. Ricoeur does this in order to make it more compatible with notions of aiming at the good and just life that needs an application of phronesis to address specific situations. In a footnote in Oneself as Another, Ricoeur indicates the basis for this adaptation: “It is striking, too, that in focusing on the nature of the bond between virtue and happiness, whether or not they are ‘absolutely identical,’ Kant had no reason to cross Aristotle on his path.. . . The formalism of morality prevented him from posing the problem of the sovereign good in terms of dynamism and aim, despite . . . in appearance [being] so close to Aristotle (1992: 212, footnote 1).
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notion of “natality” as confirming his own appreciation of life in this world. He refers to natality in a number of his works, remarking on the surprise he felt when he encountered it for the first time, thus recognizing a kindred spirit in Arendt. “I came across, with a certain amazement, the exclamation of Hannah Arendt, as someone who was Jewish, quoting the Gospels, which themselves quote Isaiah 9:6: “A child has been born unto us.” For her, too, birth signifies more than death. This is what wishing to remain living until death means” (Ricoeur in Azouvi and de Launay: 157) For Ricoeur, the ability to live in this way implies a certain detachment that he associates with a similar sentiment of “letting go” (Gelassenheit) in the work of the medieval mystic, Meister Eckhardt (156). In addition, Ricoeur aligns this detachment with Freud’s prescription for the necessary task of mourning involved in forfeiting any easy consolation of an eternal life after death. It is from such a position of non-attachment that Ricoeur can contemplate human mortality realistically with its attendant joys and sorrows in a way that could be read as a rebuke of Heidegger’s austere notion that authenticity can only be attained by facing the fact of the utter randomness of life and of mortality. Ricoeur’s vision is not quite as bleak. “I have to include within this work of mourning the assurance that joy is still possible when everything has been given up – and it is in this that suffering is the price to pay; not that it is to be sought out for itself, but it must be accepted that there is a price to be paid” (157). In his final years, however, Ricoeur had a surprising up his sleeve. Near the conclusion of what must be one of his last interviews in 2003 with Richard Kearney, he discusses his newfound interest in an exercise of comparison between the languages of biblical exegesis and philosophy. He had forecast this shift in a previous interview that took place in 1991, when Charles Reagan had asked him about future projects. At that time he replied that he was fascinated by the overlapping of different forms of discourse, particularly an example such as that of the language of love or agape which is common to religion and philosophy. He also said that: “I am very interested in a comparison between the Psalms and Greek tragedy, on the level of the complaint and lamentation” (Ricoeur in Reagan: 135). He then continued: “I am interested in exploring the areas of intersection between the religious, the poetic, the ethical, and the historical. I think that I have paid sufficiently for their distinction and I have a right to say something about their conjunction” (135). He did undertake one such an exploration in an essay on “Love and Justice” where he brought his ethical reflections on solicitude and justice into dialogue with the notion of agape. One of his conclusions was: I would like to build a bridge between the poetics of love and . . . the prose of justice, between the hymn and the formal rule. . . . [I]n our reflections on the hymn we saw, this relation to praxis was not considered. As we saw, love was simply praised for itself, for its elevation and its moral beauty. And in the rule of justice, no explicit reference was made to love, this latter if anything being left to the realm of possible motives. Yet both love and justice are addressed to action, each in its own fashion, for each makes a claim on action. Our dialectic must therefore move beyond our separate examination of love and justice to consider their interaction. (1996b: 32)
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Then, finally, in the 2003 interview with Richard Kearney, he seemed to have reached a further insight, as he observed: “I am not sure about the irreconcilability between the God of the Bible and the God of Being” (Ricoeur in Kearney 2004: 169). He then observes: “The tendency of modern French thought to eclipse the Middle Ages has prevented us from acknowledging certain very rich attempts to think God and being in terms of each other. I no longer consider such conceptual asceticism tenable” (2004: 169). It would certainly have been fascinating if Ricoeur had had the opportunity to develop these reflections further. While this would not imply a complete rejection of his former philosophical enquiries, I do believe there is a definite tempering of the strict delineation of the boundaries that he had formerly drawn between philosophy and religion. Yet it would not appear that Ricoeur was now ready to allow God to be associated with Being as it has been pronounced in traditional ontotheology – particularly with reference to Christian apologetics. Nor was there any indication that he would sanction proofs and truths. What intrigued Ricoeur was the possibility of finding in the work of philosophers such as Leibniz, Spinoza and Bergson – and who did not adhere to traditional metaphysical formulations – different modes of speaking about God that could be compatible with the plurivocal forms and expressions that he had always honoured in the biblical pronouncements. He gives some signal of the direction of his thinking with reference to the ethical ontology he had been working on. “This recent turn to religious thinking is intimately connected with my growing interest in the whole field of action and praxis which increasingly drew me away from the abstract universalism of Kant towards a more Aristotlian ethics of the ‘good life’ (bien vivre)” ( 2004: 167). Ultimately, however, this was all to be reconceived in a manner that also incorporated his phenomenological explorations of human capability (homo capax) within the context of the vicissitudes and tragedies of human existence and the crucial ethical response. He further opined: “And here it might be useful to rethink the Aristotelian notion of dunamis and Spinoza’s notion of conatus in rapport with Leibnitz’s notion of appetites – possibility as a dynamic tendency or inclination.. . . But my own interest in these questions is ultimately inseparable from the moral question – how do we relate a phenomenology of “being able” to the ethical events of ‘imputability’ and ‘attestation’?” (169) Unfortunately, Ricoeur did not live long enough to break this new ground in a major work. In concluding this essay and proposing the possible influences Ricoeur could have on philosophy of religion, one thing that comes immediately to mind is Ricoeur’s insistence on the plurivocity and richness of language which can result in creative interventions in thought and action. This viewpoint is at the heart of his own appreciation that “‘God’ can be said in many ways.” That is why Ricoeur is averse to restricting “god-talk” to narrowly defined linguistic arguments concerning his existence or attributes. Another contribution comes from his lifelong engagement with the problem of evil and violence. His position was not a theodicy of defending the ways of an inscrutable god, but rather of seeking to provide always deeper insights and tenable remedies for suffering fellow creatures. His search led Ricoeur to seek to express both an ontology and an ethics – building on a phenomenological ethics of capacity and intersubjectivity – that would support the flourishing of human life
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in just societies. Such an ethics need not necessarily be religious, but the manner in which Ricoeur frames his vision of a world where love and justice are coextensive is one inspired by the wisdom of Jewish and Christian scriptures. For the greater part of his life it appears that Ricoeur preferred to withhold his confessional allegiance from his strictly philosophical deliberations, anticipating that he could have a broader appeal if he followed a form of methodological agnosticism – especially in his evocations of a good and just existence. He seemed to have some doubts about the efficacy of such a method in the end, but he did not regret the path he had followed. Ricoeur’s remarkable philosophical odyssey in religion and philosophy certainly spurs any reader to think more – according to the Kantian directive that he was wont to encourage. His commitment to the vibrancy of life, the vitality of words, and the vulnerability of the human condition cannot but prove instructive, if not inspiring, to those who understand philosophy and its relation to religion as not simply word games or dogmatic fiats. There is both a love and a honest wisdom that shine through in the monumental tasks Ricoeur set himself, even if he did not always succeed in making the dialectical encounters that he constructed as productive as he intended.
Bibliography Azouvi, François, and Marc de Launay. 1998. Critique and conviction: Paul Ricoeur (trans: Blamey, K.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Hahn, Lewis Edwin. 1995. The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, Peru, IL: Open Court. Raynova, Yvanka. 2003. All that gives us to think: Conversations with Paul Ricoeur. In Between suspicion and sympathy: Paul Ricoeur’s unstable equilibrium, ed. A. Wiercinski, 670–696. Toronto: The Hermeneutic Press. Reagan, Charles. 1996. Paul Ricoeur: His life and work. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1965. Fallible man (trans: Kelbley, C.A.). Chicago, IL: Henry Regnery. Ricoeur, Paul. 1966. Freedom and nature: The voluntary and the involuntary (trans: Kohák, E.V.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1967. The symbolism of evil (trans: Buchanan, E.). Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1970. Freud and philosophy: An essay on interpretation (trans: Savage, D.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1975/6. Philosophical hermeneutics and theological hermeneutics. Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses 5/1:14–33. Ricoeur, Paul. 1978. My relation to the history of philosophy. The Iliff Review 35/3: 5–12. Ricoeur, Paul. 1981. The bibical worldview and philosophy. NICM Journal 6/3: 91–112. Ricoeur, Paul. 1982. Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and to a phenomenological philosophy (trans: Kersten, F.). The Hague: M. Nijhoff. Ricoeur, Paul. 1983. Action, story and history: On re-reading the human condition. Salmagundi 60: 60–72. Ricoeur, Paul. 1986. Life: A story in search of a narrator. In Facts and values. Philosophical reflections from western and non-western perspectives. ed. M.C. Doeser and J.N. Kraaj, 121–132. Dordrecht: Nijhoff. Ricoeur, Paul. 1987. “Evil,” The encyclopedia of religion, Vol. 5. Mircea Eliade (Editor-in-Chief), 199–208. New York, NY: Macmillan. Ricoeur, Paul. 1988. Time and Narrative, Vol. 3. (trans: Blamey, K., and Pellauer, D.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
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Ricoeur, Paul. 1991. From text to action, Essays in hermeneutics II (trans: Blamey, K. and Thompson, J. B.). London: The Athlone Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1992. Oneself as another (trans: Blamey, K.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1995. Figuring the sacred: Religion, narrative and imagination, ed. D. Pellauer (trans: Wallace, M.). Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1996a. Fragility and responsibility. In Paul Ricoeur: The hermeneutics of action, ed. R. Kearney, 15–22. London: Sage. Ricoeur, Paul. 1996b. Love and justice. In Paul Ricoeur: The hermeneutics of action, ed. R. Kearney, 23–39. London: Sage. Ricoeur, Paul. 1997. A response by Paul Ricoeur. In Paul Ricoeur and narrative: Context and contestation, ed. M. Joy. Calgary: University of Calgary Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1998. Critique and conviction, ed. F. Azouvi and M. de Launay (trans: Blamey K.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Ricoeur, Paul. 1999. Memory and forgetting. In Questioning ethics: Contemporary debates in philosophy, ed. R. Kearney and M. Dooley. London: Routledge. Ricoeur, Paul. 2004a. History, memory, forgetting (trans: Blamey, K., and Pellauer, D.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. Ricoeur, Paul. 2004b. On life Stories (2003). In On Paul Ricoeur: The owl of minerva, ed. R. Kearney, 157–169. London: Ashgate. Ricoeur, Paul. 2005. The course of recognition, (trans: Pellauer, D.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thinking Otherwise: Derrida’s Contribution to Philosophy of Religion Ellen T. Armour
The effects of the division between analytic philosophy and continental philosophy, a prominent feature of the U.S. philosophical landscape, have significantly affected philosophy of religion. For many decades, the analytic approach dominated the field. Continental philosophy impacted Christian thought (and religious thought more generally) through the work of such figures as theologian Paul Tillich, ethicists Reinhold and H. Richard Niebuhr, and theorist of religion Rudolph Otto, to name a few, but none of these figures claimed to be doing philosophy of religion. Engagement with continental philosophy led these scholars to new questions, new challenges, and in Tillich’s case, especially, new conversation partners (psychoanalysis, depth psychology, etc.). It also gave a distinctive shape to the new field of comparative religion. Meanwhile, those who laid claim to the realm of philosophy of religion, on the other hand, used analytic philosophy’s finely honed tools of logical argumentation to look more deeply into traditional Christian claims and questions. These scholars submitted the contents of traditional Christian faith to the scrutiny of reason in order to establish those contents on firmer ground. The resurgence of interest in contemporary continental philosophy that characterized the American academic scene in general in the latter decades of the past century has allowed continental philosophy of religion to emerge as a legitimate counterpart to its analytic cousin. Predominant among those philosophers that have attracted academics’ interest in recent decades is Jacques Derrida (1930–2008), known in American circles as the founder of deconstruction. A Sephardic Jew by birth, Derrida was born and raised in Algeria. His experience of living as a Jew in a predominately Arab French colony was, at times, difficult and clearly formative.1 He moved to Paris in 1949 where he pursued advanced degrees in philosophy at the École Normale Supérieur. He made his mark as a philosopher of note with the publication in 1967 of three of his major works: De la grammatologie, La voix et les
E.T. Armour (B) Divinity School and Graduate Department of Religious Studies, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN, USA e-mail:
[email protected] 1 See,
e.g., his quasi-autobiographical text, “Circumfession” (Derrida 1993).
M. Joy (ed.), Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion, Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0059-8_3, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
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phénomène, and L’écriture et la différence.2 All three books in various ways brought to the fore themes and conversation partners that remained central to Derrida’s work and to its reception. The titles indicate what became understood at first as the signal and most controversial aspect of Derrida’s work: a reconfiguration of language’s significance to philosophy, a concern that linked him with certain of his philosophical forebears (notably Martin Heidegger and Freidrich Nietzsche). More elliptically, the titles allude to another central preoccupation of Derrida’s with what is “other” to philosophy, a concern of many of his contemporaries in France, most notably Emmanuel Levinas.3 In different ways and degrees, each of these early texts seeks what lies at the limits of philosophy, of language and its ability to say – a preoccupation that remains central to Derrida’s oeuvre and, as we shall see, to its connection to religion. Perhaps because of these foci and a decidedly unconventional writing style (by the standards of analytic philosophy, especially), Derrida came to the attention of U.S. scholars not through American philosophers, but through literary critics, including most notably Paul de Man of Yale University.4 Deconstruction, a term that was for Derrida merely a descriptor of a certain technique, if you will, of inquiring after limits and what lay outside them, became in the American academy of the 1980s and 1990s a program – and a controversial one, at that. What some perceived as a fresh approach to scholarly inquiry seemed to others at best esoteric nonsense and at worst dangerously nihilistic. With time and more widespread exposure to Derrida’s texts, however, the more hysterical reactions died down somewhat even as interest in his work spread to other fields in the humanities and social science – including philosophy, particularly philosophers trained in continental thought and interested in religious issues, as I will note below.5 A similar trajectory from the somewhat hysterical overreaction to wider and more productive engagement can be discerned in religious studies. Scholars of religion were first introduced to Derrida through the 1982 volume, Deconstruction and Theology, which presented deconstruction as “in the final analysis the death of God put into writing” Raschke (1982: 3; author’s emphasis). Derrida’s work has 2 Subsequent references to these texts will be to their English translations. For more on Derrida, including a complete bibliography, see Lawlor (2008). 3 Indeed, one of the most important essays in Writing and Difference is Derrida’s critical but sympathetic engagement with Levinas, “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas.” In Derrida (1978: 212; 79–153). 4 A controversy erupted posthumously around Paul de Man in the late 1980s when writings surfaced from his previous career as a journalist in his native Belgium during World War II. Some of those writings seemed to indicate a collaborationist stance toward Naziism. The veritable firestorm of controversy that erupted caught deconstruction – and thus Derrida – up in its wake. See de Man (1988) and Hamacher (1989), which contains an essay by Derrida. For more from Derrida on de Man, see Derrida (1986). 5 Pre-eminent among Anglo-American philosophers who engaged Derrida’s work productively was Richard Rorty, whose particular blend of continental and Anglo-American philosophy was widely read in the 1990s. See, e.g., Rorty (1989). A prominent polemical exchange occurred between Derrida and John Searle. See Derrida (1988a).
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subsequently been taken up by scholars with a number of different interests in religion. The diversity of appropriations reflects the variety of ways that religion figures in Derrida’s work. This makes the task of writing an essay about Derrida’s impact on philosophy of religion rather daunting. I will not attempt an exhaustive catalogue of the uses made of, insights gained from, and questions raised about Derrida’s work on religion. I will focus primarily on the avenues opened up for philosophy of religion by Derrida that are distinct from those traditional to philosophy of religion. These distinctions are not absolute divergences, for the most part; there are topical and thematic linkages between the two fields including, for example, topics I discuss below (religious language, mysticism, theism and its limits). However, I would identify at least three distinctive hallmarks of Derrida’s approaches to religion. In contrast to philosophy of religion’s traditional (virtually exclusive) focus on Christianity, Derrida’s work engaged and has been engaged by diverse religious traditions (Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, as well as Christianity).6 Where philosophy of religion seeks to establish the rationality of the contents of (Christian) religious belief, Derrida seemed drawn to religion because it pushes beyond the limits of rationality (narrowly conceived). The parameters established by those limits and what lies outside them also yields a kind of religious philosophizing that places greater emphasis on ethical matters and implications than is usually the case in traditional philosophy of religion. Finally, Anglo-American philosophy of religion assumes and reinforces a boundary between the religious and the secular, a project Derrida’s work calls into question. While all of these elements of Derrida’s work with religion have influenced continental philosophers of religion, by far the greatest attention has been paid to the second – thereby drawing in only a limited way, I will argue, on the resources Derrida’s work offers to philosophy of religion. Thus, my aim in this essay is both to honor the impact that Derrida’s work has had and to expand its reach.
Derrida and Religion: Two Generations If the editors of Deconstruction and Theology were the vanguard of the initial influx of Derrida’s work into religious thought, then John Caputo, Kevin Hart, Merold Westphal, and Richard Kearney constitute the most prominent names in a second wave of philosophers who have become identified with philosophy of religion in a Derridean vein (see, e.g., Caputo 1997; Hart 2000; Westphal 2001; Kearney 2001). On the surface, one can hardly imagine two more opposite perspectives. If the first wave allied deconstruction with the death of God (and thus presumably the end of religion-as-we-know-it), the second enlists deconstruction as a chastening fire through which Christianity must go for its own sake. Yet both appropriations claim roots in Derrida’s exposure of and attempt to move beyond onto-theology, a term
6 For Buddhist and Hindu engagements with Derridean thought, see essays in Coward and Foshay (1992). For Derrida on Judaism, Islam, as well as Christianity, see Derrida (2002).
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first coined by the philosopher Martin Heidegger. Heidegger identified onto-theologic as a primary symptom of philosophy gone astray from its original aim and originary source, thinking the meaning of Being. Beginning with Plato and Aristotle, philosophy came to treat Being in terms of beings. It identified Being with transcendence thought through certain categories: as the ground that gives rise to beings (onto-logic) and as the highest being, the self-caused source of beings (theo-logic). (See Heidegger 2002: 67–75). This has consequences for theology as well as philosophy. Insofar as theology has adopted the God of the philosophers, it has lost its way for, as Heidegger is famous for saying, “man [sic] can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god” (2002: 74). Derrida takes up the question of the onto-theo-logical foundation of philosophy in his early work – most notably, in Of Grammatology and Dissemination – going arguably farther than Heidegger in establishing onto-theo-logic’s reach as extending into what he calls “the text of western metaphysics” outside of which “there is nothing.” The editors of (and many of the contributors to) Deconstruction and Theology, like many of Derrida’s early readers in the United States, read this as a claim about the linguistic nature of reality. If there is “nothing” outside “the text,” then any claims that language can successfully refer to anything – much less God – are clearly illusory. Thus, not only God, but truth, goodness, and reality itself also are endangered by deconstruction, which led to another charge against Derrida: that of political and ethical nihilism. Scholarly consensus since, however, has established this as a reductive version of Derrida’s claim. The “text” is the context within which we in the West speak, know, and do. Derrida calls it a “text” in part to alert us to its linguistic character. We speak in common parlance of what is “lost in translation” between languages. What is easily thinkable within one language (middle voice constructions in German, for example) is all but impossible in another (English has no middle voice). Similarly, the “text” of metaphysics sets the limits of what can and cannot be thought, of how we approach our world and all that resides in it. Like all languages, the text of metaphysics has a basic “logic” (onto-theo-logic) that takes on flesh via a “grammar” that determines what can and cannot be thought, done, and seen. Central to this text is the notion of absolute presence, unadulterated unity and pure being – i.e., God. This God, as the source of all that is (the theos that grounds ontos), serves as the guarantor of truth because his Word (logos) is reality. This understanding of the text of western metaphysics and its political and ethical import has clear implications for philosophy of religion, according to this second generation of Derrida’s interpreters. Christian thought is as affected – or better, infected – by the text of metaphysics’s onto-theo-logic as any other aspect of western culture. Understood as a therapeutic exposé of and intervention in ontotheology, Derridean deconstruction chastens Christianity by urging it to abandon the false security that “Athens” (philosophy and its concept of god) offers. They invite Christianity to return to “Jerusalem”; to its roots in the uncertain ground of faith in a god who, while hardly unloveable, remains ultimately un-knowable and forever out of reach of those who would enlist “him” in support of their own agendas. Such accounts of Derrida’s value for philosophy of religion have much to commend them both as readings of Derrida and as philosophies of religion in their own
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right. In refusing to cede this particular high priest of high theory to banal secularity, they call attention to the troubling of clean borders that is a key feature of Derrida’s thought. As philosophies of religion, they provide an alternative approach to the questions of theism and its limits – one that refuses from the outset the stark choice between theism and atheism in favor of figures of transcendence that elude substantialist metaphysics. Much in their work explicitly resists fundamentalisms of all stripes, particularly those that too closely align Christianity with American right wing politics, thus challenging those who see in deconstruction only political or ethical nihilism. Yet one would miss the full impact of Derrida’s work with religious motifs if one took their work to be exhaustive of it. My reference to the God of onto-theology as “he” is not coincidental, and it speaks to a dimension of Derrida’s work with religion that I will argue deserves more prominence in accounts of its significance. Among the thinkers whose proximity Derrida courts is the French psychoanalytic theorist, Jacques Lacan, often described as performing a linguistic turn upon Freudian theory.7 For Freud, becoming a fully functional and productive social subject centered on one’s status as a sexed and gendered being. “Anatomy is destiny,” he claimed; that is, taking up one’s place in society as a man or a woman involved coming to terms with one’s embodiment as male or female – specifically, with whether one had a penis or not. The central drama was played out in childhood within the confines of the patriarchal family and, if successful, resulted in the assumption of the social roles and responsibilities granted to the two genders within a patriarchal system.8 Influenced in part by structuralism, Lacan argued that the primary site of the primal drama was not first and foremost the individual psyche but larger social systems and the language in which they are embedded. The penis takes on such psychosexual freight because we are immersed in a culturo-linguistic system whose central value is the phallus. Although the penis is made of flesh and blood, the phallus is only a phantasmatic object, according to Lacan. It does not exist anywhere or in any form other than as the (absent) center of the culturo-linguistic system that it anchors. But, like the astronomical phenomenon called a dark star, it exercises an unmistakable and irresistible gravitational pull on that system. Derrida saw an inextricable link between Lacanian psycho-social-linguistics and the “text” of western metaphysics. The latter, Derrida claimed, is not just ontotheological and logocentric, but also phallo(go)centric. That is, its standard of value is the phallus around which economies of truth and desire revolve. Like ontotheology, the relationship to language is central. One’s ability to “speak the truth” is determined by one’s status vis-à-vis the phallus. To “have” the phallus (a masculine position) enables one to pose as a speaking subject; to lack the phallus (a feminine position) renders one incapable of speaking one’s mind and approximating truth. That the text’s grammar extends beyond “mere language,” though, is reflected in our
7 For
an introduction to Lacan, see Lacan (1982). of Freud’s essays that trace the changes in his thinking on these matters over time have been collected in Freud (1997). 8 Several
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sexual economy, for example, which rests on a heteronormative binary sex/gender system in which the desiring subject is masculine and the object of desire feminine. Derrida’s critical alliance of phallogocentrism with ontotheology is, I will demonstrate, a central aspect of his work with religion. Indeed, it is central to many of those dimensions of his work that have received the most attention and, I will argue, to his usefulness for philosophy of religion. Familiarity with these two generations of scholarship on Derrida and religion might also lead one to conclude that his work is primarily of interest to and import for Christianity. This, too, would be a misinterpretation. As early as 1992, a volume of essays entitled Derrida and Negative Theology was published. It featured essays by scholars of Buddhism and Hinduism as well as Christianity who inquired after the connections to and import of Derrida’s proximity to negative theology for scholarship in those traditions. In more recent years, the triad of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism emerged as an important theme of Derrida’s analyses. Attending to these dimensions of Derrida’s work will also allow me to reframe Derrida’s association with postmodernity. Although often either hailed or vilified as a harbinger of the postmodern zeitgeist (generally identified in these cases with radical relativisms of various sorts), Derrida explicitly resisted such assignation.9 His work on and with religion is particularly entangled with the question of his relationship to modernity and whatever might follow it. Hence, I will take that question as my point of departure.
Ontotheology and Beyond: The Death of God, The Death of Man? Derrida’s initial reputation as an enemy of religion rests on his association with a certain version of postmodernity that identifies the death of God, of reason, and of the subject as key markers of this epochal shift. Yet Derrida has explicitly resisted being associated with either postmodernity in general or these specific markers.10 The reasons for his reluctance are borne out in his work. Derrida neither advances nor announces the demise – timely or untimely – of any of these central tropes of western thought. He does, however, explore the extent of their reach and expose their boundaries. Their reach extends beyond discrete religious or philosophical domains and their boundaries turn out to be marked by both racial and sexual difference. As noted above, the text of western metaphysics (outside of which “there is nothing”) is not only ontotheological, but also phallogocentric and includes in its scope not only philosophy and religion, but language itself. Derrida’s reading of Plato in “Plato’s Pharmacy” (the first essay in Dissemination), for example, uncovers the centrality of God the Father to the text of metaphysics and signs that his reign is troubled from 9 On Derrida’s position on postmodernism, see, e.g., his “Response to David Tracy,” in Caputo and Scanlon (1999: 181–84). 10 “I try to keep myself at the limit of philosophical discourse. I say limit and not death, for I do not at all believe in what today is so easily called the death of philosophy (nor, moreover, in the simple death of whatever – the book, man, or god, especially since as we all know, what is dead wields a very specific power)” Derrida (1981: 6).
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the outset (Derrida 1981: 61–172). Derrida follows out the network that inscribes speech’s privileged status in relation to writing and finds at the heart of this network the presumed presence of a father god whose Word is Being and who thus guarantees that speech arrives at its destination. However, this god is himself afflicted by difference and deferral as are his “children” speech and writing. So also are those who use speech and writing as communicative tools. The linguistic economy is sustained by an economy of desire that circulates around the phallus, the standard of truth in our culture. Our ability to mean what we say (to approximate truth) depends on our proximity to the phallus. Those who (believe they) have the phallus, a position marked as masculine, are better able to approximate truth. Those who (believe they) are the phallus, a position marked as feminine, are assigned to the realm of the inchoate and incoherent. This economy is religious in two senses. At its heart lies the all-too-familiar religious figure of the God of ontotheology. The effects of God-the-Father reach to the level of basic presuppositions of western thinking, the distinction between writing and speaking. Note, as well, the role that belief plays in sustaining ontotheology. Insofar as we continue to believe that speech differs from writing in that our presence in speaking ensures we can mean what we says and say what we mean, then, contrary to the first generation of readers of Derrida, God-the-Father remains in some sense alive. Belief also sustains the phal(logo)centric economy that defines the standard of truth in ontotheologic. According to Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (on which Derrida depends), the phallus is a phantasmatic object, thus no one can really have – or be – the phallus. Indeed, the existence of the phallus is, like God’s existence, a matter of faith. Thus, the subject positions available to us within this economy have no ultimate ontological ground, but are sustained by our belief in them. This does not mean they are illusory; quite the contrary. A substantial infrastructure has grown up around them and continues to support them. My use of “economy” here is both literal and metaphorical. I speak of a sexual, racial, and linguistic “economy” because this system is a dynamic one that trades in certain “currencies” (truth, language, desire) and involves the circulation and accumulation of cultural and financial “capital.” That is, to acquiescence to the gendered/sexed/raced roles assigned to us in this system is to accrue a certain amount of cultural capital – the goods that come with having an identity at all, for example, and limited, of course, by the status accorded to that identity. One’s place in the system will likely effect and reflect one’s economic status. In this sense, the phallogocentric economy is analogous to the contemporary global economy, itself based no longer on the gold standard (an ostensibly solid material foundation) but on a floating – dare we say “fictional” – standard, the U.S. dollar, whose status is sustained both by belief and by the considerable infrastructure that has grown up around it.11 Derrida’s work also delineates the racial dimensions of the text of western metaphysics as they coalesce around both God and “man.” In “The Ends of Man,” originally delivered as a talk at an international conference on philosophy and
11 On
the fiduciary, see Derrida (1998a: 26–29). I will have more to say about this essay and this topic in particular below.
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anthropology held in 1968, Derrida notes “man’s” troubled status (Derrida 1982: 109–136). Posited as a purportedly universal ground for occasions such as an international philosophy colloquium, the very event of such a colloquium is of a piece with other symptoms of a “mute trembling” at “man’s” edges. There are, after all, places in the world where it would make no more sense to prohibit such a colloquium than to hold one. Lest we think this is merely a philosophical problem, we should note that Derrida connects man’s trembling with the events of the spring of 1968: the Paris student uprisings, the assassination of Martin Luther King, the war in Vietnam. Central to Derrida’s inquiry into “man’s” boundaries here and elsewhere is, once again, the work of Martin Heidegger, known for his attempts to break metaphysical humanism’s hold on western philosophy and notorious for allying himself all too closely with Nazism. Here, too, Derrida sees a conjunction between politics and philosophy. For all of his attempts to transcend metaphysical humanism, Derrida demonstrates again and again that “man” will not be disposed of so easily. Moreover, “his” reappearances often occur on stages replete with racist overtones. Metaphysical humanism is the flip side of ontotheology, he notes. This account of the target of Derridean deconstruction also allows us to add additional dimensions to what it means to say there is “nothing” outside the text. As noted above, to the degree that the text is co-extensive with western discourse and culture, then what lies outside the text is rendered largely invisible, illegible, and unintelligible – non-existent in any meaningful way, it would seem. That we can trace the boundaries of the text, however, suggests that what lies “outside” is something other than empty space, an absolute nothingness. Indeed, it is critical to note that Derrida’s primary interest lies not in simply exposing the text’s boundaries, but in evoking and invoking what lies outside it: to what is “othered” by it and thus “other” to it.12 Given religion’s role as a kind of placeholder for transcendent alterity or absolute otherness, it is perhaps not surprising that the pursuit of the text’s “others” carries Derrida down pathways with religious resonances. (See Levinas 1996: 8). Exceeding the boundaries of ontotheology intersects with an impulse or aim that always attended much religious thinking, namely, pointing toward what lies beyond our ability to say. Scholars in religion noted quite early a proximity between Derridean différance, his neologism for the differing/deferring that (un)grounds meaning, and the strategies of so-called negative or apophatic theology.13 As I noted above, in Coward and Foshay (1992), scholars not only of Christianity but of Hinduism and Buddhism, traditions also known for ways of unsaying and unknowing divine transcendence, explore connections between these traditions 12 For
a more substantial version of the aspects of Derrida’s work discussed to this point, see Armour (1999). 13 Derrida (1982, 1–28). On the connection to negative theology, see Hart (2000) and Carlson (1999). See also the exchanges between Derrida and Jean-Luc Marion in “On the Gift,” in Caputo and Scanlon (1999: 54–78). Caputo attempts to parse out the significance of the differences between these two thinkers in “Apostles of the Impossible” in the same volume (Caputo and Scanlon 1999: 185–222).
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and Derrida’s work. Derrida, however, expressed ambivalence about this religious embrace – particularly its Christian version. In “How to avoid speaking” (Coward and Foshay 1992: 73–142), for example, Derrida at times seems like the recalcitrant partner dragged onto the floor against his will and struggling to break free before he gets entangled in something that makes him uneasy. This text is full of resistances to the usual construals of a proximity between “deconstruction” and “negative theology.” Derrida takes pains to distinguish what he is attempting to think with différance from the use of negation in the service of a hyperessential god (God as Being Itself, e.g.). On the other hand, Derrida reads the texts of apophatic Christian theologians with considerable care and insight and his usual attention to detail. Moreover, some of Derrida’s movements of resistance are made on behalf of both “deconstruction” and apophatic theology. Because both attempt to open access to alterities that both lie beyond and motivate human endeavor, he resists equating either with mere language games. Because the alterities toward which each reaches are not the same, in his view, Derrida resists being drawn too deeply into negative theology’s orbit even as he finds avoiding it altogether ultimately impossible. Negative theology, as Derrida reads it, finds itself caught in the same (double) bind of being compelled/impelled simultaneously toward speech and silence, attraction and avoidance. It is as though one haunts the other perpetually; the need for silence haunts the need for speech, the need to confront haunts the desire to avoid, negative theology haunts deconstruction, deconstruction haunts negative theology. My analysis to this point might suggest that engagement with Derrida’s work on religion will result in, at best, a quiet mysticism – one that may indeed resonate with a certain strand of Christian theology and practice, but that ultimately has little to say to a world confronting daily conflicts between, to put it in a reductive shorthand, religion and democracy. However, further reading in Derrida’s corpus belies such a resolution and allows me to make my case for an expanded reading of the significance of that work for a philosophy of religion that aims for relevance to these contemporary issues.
Giving Place, Saving Names: or, What Has Athens to Do with Jerusalem? In “Sauf le nom,” an expanded version of “Post-Scriptum: Aporias, Ways and Voices,” the final essay in Derrida and Negative Theology, Derrida takes up once again the topic of negative theology.14 Though it opens within a discursive setting immediately recognizable as religious, it does not stay there – a fact with important ramifications for understanding the significance of Derrida’s work with religion for philosophy of religion. To what does “negative theology” refer, Derrida asks? 14 “Sauf
le nom,” in Derrida (1995b: 35–88). The title is left untranslated to preserve its multiple meanings: the name must be saved (“save the name”), the name is safe (“safe, the name”), the name is exceptional (“save, the name”). See Dutoit’s introduction, “Translating the Name?” in Derrida (1995b: xii–xiii).
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Certainly, first to a certain approach to theo-logy (talk of God) – one that originates in Platonic and Christian traditions – that aims beyond the usual appellations of the divine as a being possessed of certain attributes toward some(no)thing that, while it provokes those appellations, transcends and exceeds them. In that sense, then, one might define (or confine) negative theology to a (mere) linguistic strategy of interest only to devotees. Derrida notes, for example, that it is a performative discourse with a double address: as instruction to the disciple, on the one hand, and as prayer to God on the other. Its performance is a fiduciary act in two senses, one might say. First, it aims to be faithful to the name: to “save the name” in the sense of preserve it, hold it in reserve for that to which it most truly refers. Second, it aims to draw another into its circle of fidelity. Thus, saving the name also involves a kind of disbursement and dispersal from one to another in the name of the totally other (tout autre). Yet to what and for what is this name saved? To what does it refer, this name that “names nothing that might hold, not even a divinity (Gottheit), nothing whose withdrawal does not carry away every phrase that tries to ensure itself against him?” Derrida continues, “‘God’ ‘is’ the name of this bottomless collapse, of this endless desertification” (“Sauf le nom,” in Derrida 1995b: 56–57). This abyssal double movement of preservation and dispersal, it will turn out, is, on Derrida’s reading here and elsewhere not easily or simply confined to some sphere that we can delineate as religious (v. secular) or sacred (v. profane), but to a transcendental condition – or an unconditioned transcendence – that goes by other names, as well: democracy, justice, the gift, for example. Derrida is not claiming that all of these names are equivalent – to God or to one another. Rather, inherent in all of these names is the same abyssal structure of call and response, if you will; the same demand for a(n impossible) fidelity to a universality yet-to-come that is simultaneously announced and betrayed in any particular instance of its becoming. This openness is both temporal and spatial; that is, while the call announces itself in a particular time and place, it arises out of abyssal structures that give time and place. Derrida proposes terminology with religious or philosophical resonances to indicate these abyssal structures. As a figure for temporal openness, he turns to the messianic while the ancient Greek term khora, from Plato’s Timaeus, figures what gives space or place. By the messianic, he means a posture that anticipates an advent often in the name of a justice yet-to-come. The term is drawn from Jewish and Christian traditions, of course, but the temporal structure Derrida evokes with that term does not originate with them. Furthermore, its appearances or evocations are not limited to religion. Messianisms show up in secular, even anti-religious settings, as well – Marxism, for example, which anticipates a future of economic and social justice brought about by a revolution, not a slow, steady march of progress. The messianic transcends these particular messianisms in another way, as well. Given the histories of each of these messianisms, one can argue that each has betrayed the call of justice in responding to it. Thus, Derrida proposes a messianicity without messianism, or without a messiah.15
15 On
the messianic, see Derrida (1994).
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Khora, the figure indicating that which gives space or place, though its pedigree is philosophical, not religious, bears a structural similarity to the messianic. Moreover, the linguistic strategies used to evoke or invoke it echo those of negative theology – a feature highlighted by the publication in English of Derrida’s essay, “Khora,” in the same volume with “Sauf le nom.” In this essay, Derrida inquires after Plato’s use of that term in the Timaeus. Translatable variously as “space, place, location, region, country,” according to Derrida (1995b: 93), khora figures in the Timaeus as the name for the (non)place that serves as receptacle for and gives birth to the stuff of the cosmos (which is given creative intelligible order by the demiurge, readers of the dialogue will recall). I call it a (non)place because of its peculiar status; khora eludes fixation in any (one) place or as any (one) thing as it changes with its content. Indeed, its status vis-à-vis being is not altogether clear. “There is khora . . . but what there is, there, is not.. . . This there is . . . gives nothing in giving place or in giving to think” (Derrida 1995b: 96). Referring to it as a third genus to the intelligible and sensible, Plato deploys a series of metaphors aimed at invoking and evoking traces of khora’s presence, allowing readers to glimpse its outlines. Derrida notes that these metaphors (nurse, mother, imprint bearer) follow a gendered trajectory coincident with khora’s womblike function in the Timaeus’ cosmogony. It may seem like we are some distance from the explicitly theological landscape of “Sauf le nom,” but religious resonances abound. Fundamental to Derrida’s inquiry is the question of khora’s place vis-à-vis the topological grid formed by mythos and logos on which philosophy’s status as a purely rational discourse stands. As in his reading of Plato in Dissemination (described earlier), Derrida’s reading of Plato here demonstrates that the line between mythos and logos is not altogether clear. Plato’s recourse to khora as a necessary third term belies the Timaeus’s positing of the cosmos as nothing more or less than the outworking of an intelligent order. Beyond and before this rational creative principle lies khora, necessary to the principle’s realization, yet other (a/rational, not necessarily ir/rational) to it. And, like the God of apophatic theology, khora is not directly available to either sense experience or intellection; as a third genus, it is definable only in terms of what it is not. Thus, Plato’s turn to metaphors as indirect routes to khora’s evocation registers now as a kindred gesture to the via negativa. Most of the Timaeus’s interpreters “gamble on the resources of rhetoric without ever wondering about them” (Derrida 1995b: 92). They “speak tranquilly about metaphors, images and similes” (ibid.) without once noticing that that to which these rhetorical flourishes refer undoes the very logic of sensible and intelligible that constitutes the economy of the rhetorical flourish. As was the case with apophatic theology, khora’s metaphorology is no mere language game; rather, the medium is the message. “Deprived of a real referent, . . . [khora] has as its property. . .that it has nothing as its own and that it remains unformed, formless. This very singular impropriety, which precisely is nothing, is just what khora must, if you like, keep; it is just what must be kept for it, what we must keep for it” (Derrida 1995b: 97). As that which eludes naming (save, the name), khora is a name to be saved (save the name) for that which transcends not only ontologic, but theologic. “There is khora; . . . But what there is, there, is not. . .. This there is . . . gives nothing in giving place or in giving to think, . . . whereby it will be risky to
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see in it the equivalent of an es gibt, of the es gibt which remains without a doubt implicated in every negative theology, unless it is the es gibt which always summons negative theology in its Christian history” (96).16 What significance for philosophy of religion per se lies in considering these two texts together? After all, they originate from rather different sites – one (ostensibly) theological, one (ostensibly) philosophical, one Christian, the other Greek. What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? In some second generation accounts of Derrida’s work with religion, “Athens” has come to stand for an excessive rationalism borne of Christianity’s incorporation of Greek philosophy. John Caputo, for example, calls Christianity back to its roots in “Jerusalem,” that is, in faith as the name of the limit of knowledge – a limit to be acknowledged and embraced.17 I want to suggest another way of reading “Athens” and “Jerusalem” and of construing the relationship between them. First, it is noteworthy that the lineage of negative theology’s Platonic roots runs through the Timaeus (via first Jewish and then Christian Neoplatonism). Its attribution of cosmological order to a rational cause funded its appropriation into a Christian frame – with all the torques and torsions to Plato’s demiurge that such absorption entailed. Thus, these texts together invoke the historical origins of philosophy of religion itself. But they also evoke and invoke its more originary – and abyssal – origin in an attempted fidelity not to a Father God whose word is being, but to that which exceeds word and being. Reading the two essays together allows us to figure that transcendence in spatial terms via a dual trajectory of desertification (stripping away of place) on the one hand and of giving place on the other. Recall that the via negativa is a taking away of all names in order to reach what the mystic Angelus Silesius called “the unknowable God.”18 “‘God’ ‘is’ the name of this bottomless collapse, of this endless desertification of language,” Derrida writes (Derrida 1995b: 55–56), pure (non)place. “God,” then, opens onto khora, in a sense (indeed, Derrida goes on to invoke khora as evoked by desertification). Emplaced at this point of origin but ultimately displaced are not only onto-theologic, but phal-logo-centrism. Recall that the network of metaphors that (un)speak khora are predominately feminine. Recall as well that the process of desertification that constitutes the via negativa begins with a double address: to God and to the disciple, both of whom are male in Silesius’ text.19 Thus, the two genders to which the phallogocentric system gives place are ultimately displaced here.
16 Some
readers will recognize the allusion to Heidegger here. The theme of the gift, yet another abyssal figure of (im)possibility, has received a great deal of attention from scholars in religion who take up Derrida’s work. For a way into that literature, see Caputo and Scanlon, God, the Gift, and Postmodernism. 17 See, e.g., his introduction to Caputo and Scanlon (1999: 10). This typology guides much of his work on Derrida in Caputo (1997). 18 Angelus Silesius was the pseudonym for a 17th century German mystic, Johannes Sceffler. His extant writings are collected in Silesius (1984). For more on Derrida’s usage of this text, see Derrida (1995b: 145, n. 3). 19 In response to an interlocutor, Derrida acknowledges that the disciple is indeed male, but warns against concluding “that the scene is unfolding between men, and above all that the one who speaks is a man” (Derrida 1995b: 35). He does not elaborate on this point, but I take it as an allusion to the way the process of desertification undoes secure gendered positions for both the disciple and God.
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Yet another trajectory opens up out of “Save the name” that needs to be pursued. Recall that this text originated as the postscript to the volume, Derrida and Negative Theology, which included essays by scholars of Hinduism and Buddhism, as well as Christianity. Derrida asks after what enables the translatability of “negative theology” from its Latinate-Christian-Platonic (i.e., European) origins into other religious traditions and sites. It is questionable whether any Buddhist, Muslim, or Jewish discourse has been written under its aegis. What, then, authorizes negative theology’s migration to other traditions? This is not a question of family resemblances or analogous phenomena, but rather of the demands inherent in the internal logic of the very discourse of apophasis itself. Derrida claims that “what assigns [negative theology] a proper place [within a specific historical site] is what expropriates it and engages it thus in a movement of universalizing translation.” (Derrida 1995b: 63) He goes on to describe “the principle of negative theology” as “a movement of internal rebellion” that “radically contests the tradition from which it seems to come” (67). And fidelity to that principle prompts negative theology’s opening into and onto a process of universalization along “the horizon of translatability.” This then allows for the extension of this European idiom into other languages, traditions, and contexts. In that process, its European origin is effectively decentered in favor of fidelity to a more original origin. Once again, the line between the religious and the secular, the sacred and the profane, fails to hold. What seemed at first glance to be a purely religious concern turns out to have geographic and thus political overtones. Indeed, Derrida explicitly links negative theology’s translatability to other structures bearing (and betraying) the ideal of openness to alterity, namely friendship and the notion of a universal community, for example, topics given their own treatment elsewhere.20
Religion and (Post)modernity: The Return of the Religious In 1994, Derrida participated in yet another colloquium on religion, this one held on the Isle of Capri and hosted by the Italian philosopher, Gianni Vattimo. Derrida’s contribution to the volume of essays that emerged from the conference is entitled “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone” (Derrida 1998a). Derrida (1998a: 41) tells us that the title references two classic modern philosophical texts on religion, Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Reason Alone (1998) and Henri Bergson’s The Two Sources of Morality and of Religion (1935). Central to this essay is the association of postmodernity with the return of religion. Such an association presumes that modernity at least contained or confined religion to a particular sphere even if, in the end, it failed to eliminate it altogether. The wall banishing religion to modernity’s outside was erected using an epistemic grid that assigned the two sources of religion, faith and (the experience of) the sacred, to the irrational or a-rational. 20 “It is just this singular exemplarism that at once roots and uproots the idiom.. . . There, in this testimony offered not to oneself but to the other, is produced the horizon of translatability – then of friendship, of universal community.” (Derrida 1998a: 77). See also Derrida (1997b: 2000; 2001: 1998b), for example.
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Symptoms of religion’s return are usually associated with anti-modernism. Chief among them are the various forms of “fundamentalisms” with their anti-democratic and anti-intellectual aims.21 Once again, Derrida’s query begins with a question of language and naming but pursuit of the question takes us beyond both as “mere” cultural artifacts. In this instance, the query begins with the definition of “religion” itself. On the one hand, the very occurrence of such a colloquium presumes that the meaning of “religion” is self-evident, at least to all gathered around this table. It further assumes that religion per se is not confined to any particular historical or cultural form of itself (of which there are many). Thus, the colloquium takes for granted the term’s universality. And yet such an assumption – or belief – belies the specific historical, cultural, linguistic origins of the term. Like negative theology, its origins, too, lie within a Greco-Latinate-Christian idiom – one shared by the participants in the colloquium (men, all, who hail from Europe, itself the creation of and heir to this idiom). Thus, the success of religion’s ability to name what it claims to name (to save the name) rests on its ability to transcend its original idiom – a promise the fulfillment of which Derrida’s query calls into question Indeed, the colloquium itself betrays such a promise insofar as its (all male, recall) participants are of Jewish or Christian background. No representative from Islam (much less other religious traditions) is present, nor are there any women. Derrida singles out for particular attention – quite appropriately, given its centrality to modern accounts of religiosity – Kant’s account of religion. As is well known, Kant locates religion in the sphere of practical reason cordoning it off from speculative or “pure” reason (that associated with the pursuit of, e.g., scientific knowledge). Derrida notes that Kant recognizes two forms of religion: cultic religion, directed toward achieving divine favor, and moral religion, directed toward living rightly in communion with others. Both have their source in faith, but, where cultic religion’s faith is dogmatic and mistakes divine revelation for genuine knowledge, moral religion’s faith is (self) reflective and issues in action. Reflective faith allows the human being to exercise its capacity for freedom governed by reason, a capacity that distinguishes the human species from all other types of living creatures. Thus, in Kant’s scheme, true religion is universal, rational, and moral. While, at least theoretically, one may find true religion practiced by adherents of any particular revealed religion, divine revelation is not necessary to the exercise of true religion – that is, the cultivation of the ethical life. Anyone may access religion’s truth via the exercise of the human facility for practical reason.
21 I put “fundamentalisms” in quotation marks because, as I understand it, the term originated with
the 20th century American Christian movement that was quite explicitly a reaction to conflicts between traditional Christian doctrine and modern science and religion. Its leaders identified a set of “fundamentals” that they deemed essential to Christian faith (including, e.g., biblical literacy and the virgin birth of Christ) and thus became known as “fundamentalists.” The term is applied by analogy to forms of other religious traditions (Islam, for example) that are deemed “conservative.” How appropriately is certainly a question. In any case, that naming practice is, I would suggest, emblematic of some of the dynamics I will describe below.
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This does not mean that all religions are equal; quite the contrary. In Religion within the Boundaries of Reason Alone, Kant establishes self-reflective faith as the truth of religion not only through his account of the moral life, but through demonstrating its essential kinship to Christianity. Under Kant’s analytic gaze, the Christian faith reveals itself as the mirror image of rational religion, thus confirming rational religion’s claim on religiosity and ipso facto establishing Christianity as the only true religion. At first glance, then, it would seem that Kant has successfully contained religion within the boundaries of reason alone. Faith in God or in Christ, or religious experiences connected to that faith serve only as supplements to religion’s truth. “‘It is not essential and hence not necessary for everyone to know what God does or has done for his [sic] salvation, [writes Kant], but it is essential to know what man himself must do in order to become worthy of this assistance’” (Derrida 1998a: 10). Ironically, then, for all practical purposes, true religion requires the death of God, Derrida writes. That is, to be truly moral, one must act as if God did not exist – as if the increase of good and the decrease of evil in the world were entirely in one’s own hands. But how universal is this account of the truth of religion? Has this determinate, revealed religion really been dismissed from the scene or has it just gone underground disguised as the universal? Are we ready to measure without flinching the implications and consequences of the Kantian thesis? The latter seems strong, simple and dizzying: the Christian religion would be the only truly ‘moral’ religion; a mission would thus be reserved exclusively for it and for it alone: that of liberating a ‘reflecting faith’. It necessarily follows therefore that pure morality and Christianity are indissociable in their essence and in their concept. (Derrida 1998a: 10)
This indissociable association reflects and is reflected in what Derrida calls mondialatinization (translated as “globalatinization”). In many ways coincident with globalization, mondialatinisation renders explicit the cultural and linguistic (as well as economic) forces that have rather literally (re)made the world as a network. Naming the process of world-making “latinization” calls attention not only to current western dominance but to that dominance as a reflection of the legacy of Roman imperialism, a prior occasion of world (re)making to which the west (and Christianity, the last religion of the Roman empire) is heir and by which it remains haunted. Insofar as that heritage helped inspire and sustain previous western imperialisms – also world (re)making enterprises – mondialatinization links globalization with the centuries long western legacy of exploration, expansion, and colonization. Fundamentalisms’ rejection of modernity register differently against the backdrop of mondialatinization, Derrida argues, when he turns to consider “what is said and done, what is happening at this very moment, in the world, in history, in [religion’s] name” (Derrida 1998a: 23). The italics alert us to all that is at stake in the saying, doing, and happening: the very unity of world, the concept of history and time as these are deployed in the west. Indeed, ours is a time, we say, of renewed religious warfare, he notes (some 10 years before 9/11).
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E.T. Armour Like others before, the new ‘wars of religion’ are unleashed over the human earth (which is not the world) and struggle even today to control the sky with finger and eye,” he writes, but they do so through new technological means – “digital culture, jet and TV without which there could be no religious manifestation today.. . . No voyage or discourse of the Pope, no organized emanation (rayonnement) of Jewish, Christian or Muslim cults, whether ‘fundamentalist’ or not. Given this, the cyberspatialized or cyberspaced wars of religion have no stakes other than this determination of the ‘world’, of ‘history,’ of the ‘day’ and of the ‘present’.. . . All of history, the earth, the humanity of man, the rights of man, the rights of man and of woman, the political and cultural organization of society, the difference between man, god, and animal, the phenomality of the day, the value or ‘indemnity’ of life, the right to life, the treatment of death, etc. (Derrida 1998a: 24)22
But lest we identify religious wars only with “them” – whether Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or the Christian right – Derrida also asks whether the “military ‘interventions,’ led by the Judaeo-Christian West in the name of the best causes (of international law, democracy, the sovereignty of peoples, of nations or of states, even of humanitarian imperatives) are they not also, from a certain side, wars of religion?” (Derrida 1998a: 25)23 To answer in the negative would require the ability to isolate “the religious” from “the political, the economic, the juridical” – a project that a consideration of the role in politics, economics, and law of one source of religion, faith, renders problematic. Fiduciary trust (as, for example, in the move away from the gold standard described earlier) has literally made the world go around since the advent of capitalism and continues to do so in mondialatinisation. The signature, guarantor of the signatory’s now absent presence that not only makes checks legal tender, but makes bills into laws (in a democratic system) and turns pronouncements into edicts (in more tyrannical systems), rests ultimately on faith as well.24 The juridical system, likewise, rests on a foundation of faith. Testimony is given under oath. Witnesses have traditionally sworn an oath to God as a sign of their truthfulness, but even without that explicit address, religiosity appears. The witness promises to respond truthfully; the oath sets apart (renders “holy”) the speech acts that will constitute this testimony. And insofar as the juridical system rests on a notion of justice as unconditioned and absolute, outside the order of calculation, it too rests on faith. To
22 The
reference to the rights of women is not simply a throwaway line. Elsewhere in the essay, Derrida notes a phallic dimension to certain evocations of the sacred especially in the Abrahamic monotheisms and suggests this may be why, “in the most lethal explosions of a violence that is inevitably ethnico-religious – . . . on all sides, women in particular are singled out as victims not ‘only’ of murders, but also of the rapes and mutilations that precede and accompany them” (1998a: 49). One thinks, of course, of Bosnia, as well as the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 23 Apropos of the previous footnote, note the role defending the women of Afghanistan from the Taliban played in the justification of that war. On this, see Saba Mahmood’s closing comments in Mahmood (2006: 207–208). 24 For more on the signature (as part of his exchange with John Searle on speech act theory), see “Signature Event Context,” in Derrida (1988a: 1–23).
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be just is to do justice; that is, justice is instantiated in its performance – and its performance is a response to a “call to faith” in its (ideal, at least) unconditionedness.25 One could then, speak of the performance of justice as launched by a leap of faith. The allusion to Kierkegaard, here, is deliberate on my part. Insofar as the foundations of justice, democracy, testimony, etc., give rise to justice, democracy, testimony, etc., they are not themselves just, democratic, truthful, etc. They exceed those orders of naming and being – indeed, of nameability and the ability to be per se. But, while the moment of singularity is critical here, such leaps do not (only or simply) wrest one out of the company of others and the values and practices that sustain you (as with Kierkegaard’s solitary knight of faith). Rather, they ground as well as unground all that life-in-community requires and aspires to be.26 Without this performative experience of this elementary act of faith, there would neither be ‘social bond’ nor address of the other, nor any performativity in general: neither convention, nor institution, nor constitution, nor sovereign state, nor law, nor above all, here, that structural performativity of the productive performance that binds from its very inception the knowledge of the scientific community to doing, and science to technics.. . . We speak of trust and of credit or of trustworthiness in order to underscore that this elementary act of faith also underlies the essentially economic and capitalistic rationality of the tele-technoscientific. No calculation, no assurance will ever be able to reduce its ultimate necessity, that of the testimonial signature.. . . To take note of this is to give oneself the means of understanding why, in principle, today, there is no incompatibility, in the said ‘return of the religious’ between the ‘fundamentalisms,’ . . . or their politics, and on the other hand, rationality, which is to say the tele-techno-capitalistico-scientific fiduciarity, in all of its mediatic and globalizing dimensions. (Derrida 1998a: 44–45)
Given the fundamental status of faith, the project of fencing off the secular from the religious – of containing religion within a limited sphere – seems misguided, if not doomed from the start. Moreover, Derrida notes that such a project is itself religious; that is, it proceeds in the name of the other source of religion, the pure, the set-apart, the holy. That religions refuse to cooperate – and that they “return” in the form of fundamentalisms that turn violent and, in turn, provoke violence – registers, he suggests, as an autoimmune response. Modernity generates antimodernisms (including but not limited to so-called fundamentalist forms of religion), but both Islamists and Christian televangelists, for example, use all the technological means at their disposal to proliferate and grow, thus they infect themselves with
25 See “Force of Law,” in Derrida (2002: 241). Readers will doubtless hear in the present discussion
echoes of khora and the messianic as described above. Indeed, Derrida names these as origins of religion’s two sources. See Derrida (1998a: 17–20). 26 For Derrida’s own discussion of these matters in relationship to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, see Derrida (1995a).
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modernity.27 What sense, then, does it make to speak of the return of religion – as such, much less as a symptom of the passage of modernity?
Taking Stock: Philosophy of Religion in a Derridean Key Having laid out a programmatic sketch of Derrida’s work with religion, it’s time now to assess its significance for philosophy of religion. Insofar as this field is equated with the corpus of traditional Anglo American scholarship bearing that name, Derrida’s work with religion offers a critical perspective on dominant trends in the field. I noted at the outset that philosophy of religion is de facto Christian philosophical theology, for the most part. Scholarship in this field is dominated by the aim of shoring up Christian theism by setting it on an ever more solid rational footing – or destroying that claim to rationality once and for all. Hence, professional philosophers of religion pursue such perennially fascinating topics as the warrants for theistic belief and the challenges posed to it (by, for example, the problem of evil). Other religious traditions enter into its discursive field of vision as the challenge of religious pluralism; only rarely do philosophical inquiries in the service of other religious traditions – whether inherent in them (as in Daoism, for example) or in conversation with them (as in Coward and Foshay 1992) – appear under the aegis of Anglo American philosophy of religion.28 A Derridean philosophy of religion would clearly be a matter of thinking otherwise, I would argue. Derrida’s work opens up a wider playing field for philosophical engagements with religion. His work calls our attention to the “religiosity” that lies at the foundation of much of what the West holds dear. This is a much more ambivalent claim, however, than that made by those on the religious right who argue that the U.S. is (or at least should be) a Christian nation, for example. Certainly Derrida’s analysis acknowledges Christianity’s formative influence and ongoing, if unrecognized, dominance of western culture, but he considers it a legacy to contend with rather than the solution to what ails us. Furthermore, to expose religious foundations to western civilization is not to endorse some version of theocracy over democracy; quite the contrary, in Derrida’s case. The (abyssal) religious structures that (un)ground western culture neither originate within specific religious traditions or appear only there. Recall that justice and democracy – features we associate with secularity – share the same abyssal structure of radical openness. That openness
27 The
planes used in the 9/11 attacks are a rather literal case in point. The planes used “were in origin WWII bombers adapted in the 1960’s for mass tourism and business travel, refunctioned by [Mohammed] Atta and his crew as weapons of mass destruction” (Retort 2004: 98–99). 28 The scope of the work done by Anglo-American philosophers of religion is, of course, quite wide. But the canonical topics in the field remain relatively narrow. See the table of contents in textbooks for philosophy of religion, for example, Mann (2004). Quinn (2005) includes chapters on philosophy in other religious traditions, religious pluralism, etc., in addition to chapters on standard topics like arguments for God’s existence, the problem of evil, the question of religious experience, etc. Whether the former have any influence on the latter, though, is another question.
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is both spatial (in its directedness toward the other) and temporal (in its openness toward what is yet to come); i.e., khora-like and messianic.29 The radicality of that openness further distinguishes what John Caputo has called Derrida’s “religion without religion” from those visions articulated by conservative Christians in the U.S. To be open to the other is to be open to any other – the nature, features, or intent of that other cannot be predicted in advance. To be open to the future is to be open to any future, as by definition, the future cannot be predicted in advance. While these abyssal foundations bespeak utopian aspirations, they offer them no firm footing. Thus, rather than providing a solid foundation upon which to erect a shining city on a hill, these abyssal structures call forth a certain responsability under conditions of inescapable vulnerability. I say “respons-ability” to echo Derrida’s highlighting of the performative dimension of acting upon (or, perhaps better, enacting) any of these foundations by evoking the call to respond embedded in each of these foundational structures and the sense of being responsible that responding to that call bears.30 Of course, as Derrida reminds us here (and elsewhere), to respond in any particular instance is also to betray the unoriginary origin of the call.31 What, then, would a respons-able philosophy of religion look like? Rather than seeking ever firmer logical ground for belief, questions of justice, of ethics and politics, would take priority, though not in their usual form. Philosophical respons-ability to religion in this sense would involve attempting to be faithful to the unoriginary origins of the abyssal foundations to which justice, democracy, ethics, and religion ultimately refer and invoke. Fidelity to them would require, on the one hand, taking responsibility for religion’s imbrication in a mondialatinized world – attending to and attempting to address, then, its role in the systems of sexism/heterosexism, colonialism, racism, ethnocentrism that continue to structure the circulation of cultural and economic capital throughout the globe. So, for example, such a philosophy of religion would need to attend to the role that religious identities – themselves a creation of western culture around religio, as scholars like Tomoko Masuzawa have argued – play in the circulation of capital.32 Fidelity to religion’s unoriginary origins would also require seeking out and supporting 29 On
those spatial and temporal dimensions of democracy-yet-to-come, see especially Derrida (2000) and his address to UNESCO (Derrida 1997a). 30 I also echo Derrida’s discussion of religion with responsibility in The Gift of Death. Alert readers will also hear an echo of Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy of infinite responsibility in response to the call of absolute alterity, though I do not intend to equate Levinas’s position with Derrida’s. Fully unpacking the complex relationship between these two philosophical figures is beyond the scope of this essay, but, for Derrida’s perspective, see, e.g., his “Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas” in Derrida (1978: 79–195) and Derrida (1999). 31 In The Gift of Death, for example, Derrida notes that to respond ethically to any particular other is necessarily to shirk one’s responsibility for some other particular other. And yet one must respond, one must decide. This is the impossible demand structured into unconditioned ethical obligation (Derrida 1995a: 68). 32 The body of literature on the metadiscourse of religious studies is quite substantial. For two monographs particularly relevant to the perspective in this essay, see Masuzawa (1993; 2005).
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responses – whether within specific instances of the practice of a “revealed religion” or elsewhere – to these abyssal foundations that further movement toward democratization or a true univeralism, for example. In short, rather than the turn inward in search of greater security (as much of what goes under the banner of philosophy of religion seems to do), a respons-able philosophy of religion would turn outward in a posture of spatial and temporal openness. This would be, then, a philosophy at risk. Openness to the possibility of infinite justice brings with it openness to the possibility of injustice, as well. Indeed, in “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida notes that Kant’s Religion Within the Boundaries of Reason Alone is also a book on radical evil. And Bergson’s Two Sources, was written in 1932, “between the two world wars and on the eve of events of which one knows that one does not yet know how to think them, and to which no religion, no religious institution in the world remained foreign or survived unscathed, immune, safe, and sound.” Is, then, this or any other “‘return of the religious’ not without relation to the return – modern or postmodern, for once – of certain phenomena at least of radical evil?” (Derrida 1998a: 41) These are sobering words indeed for those of us living through the current religious wars, manifest in the events now known as “9/11” and their kin and in the global war on terror unleashed by the U.S. in 9/11’s wake. To take on or take up the task of a respons-able philosophy of religion in a time and place where life-giving and death-dealing deserts are more than metaphorical, where terrifying visions of the yet-to-come are all too easy to conjure up, is daunting, to say the least, but all the more important for that context.
Bibliography Armour, Ellen T. 1999. Deconstruction, feminist theology, and the problem of difference: Subverting the race/gender divide. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Bergson, Henri. 1935. The two sources of morality and religion (trans: Audra, Ashley, and Brereton, Cloudsley). New York, NY: Henry Holt and Co. Caputo, John. 1997. The prayers and tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without religion. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Caputo, John D., and Michael J. Scanlon, eds. 1999. God, the gift and postmodernism. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Carlson, Thomas A. 1999. Indiscretion: Finitude and the naming of God. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Coward, Harold, and Toby Foshay, eds. 1992. Derrida and negative theology. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. de Man, Paul. 1988. Wartime journalism 1939–1943, eds. Werner Hamacher et al. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Derrida, Jacques. 1981. Dissemination (trans: Johnson, Barbara). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Originally published as La dissemination [Paris: Seuil, 1972]. Derrida, Jacques. 1973. Speech and phenomena (trans: Allison, David B.). Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Originally published as La voix et les phénomène [Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967]. Derrida, Jacques. 1974. Of grammatology (trans: Spivak, Gayatri). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press. Originally published as De la grammatologie [Paris: Minuit, 1967]. Derrida, Jacques. 1978. Writing and difference (trans. Bass, Alan). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Originally published as L’écriture et la différence [Paris: Seuil, 1967].
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Derrida, Jacques. 1981. Implications: Interview with Henri Ronse. In Positions (trans: Bass, Alan). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago. Derrida, Jacques. 1982. Margins of philosophy (trans: Bass, Alan). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Derrida, Jacques. 1986. Mémoires: For Paul de Man (trans: Lindsay, Cecile, Culler, Jonathan, and Cadava, Eduardo), ed. Avital Ronell and Eduardo Cadava. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Derrida, Jacques. 1988b. Signature event context. In Limited, inc. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Derrida, Jacques. 1993. Circumfession. In Jacques Derrida, ed. Geoffrey Bennington and Jacques Derrida (trans: Bennington, Geoffrey). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Derrida, Jacques. 1994. Specters of marx: The state of the debt, the work of mourning, and the new international (trans: Kamuf, Peggy). New York, NY: Routledge. Derrida, Jacques. 1998b. Monolinguism of the other; or, the prosthesis of origin. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Derrida, Jacques. 1999. Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas (trans: Brault, Pascale-Anne, and Naas, Michael). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Derrida, Jacques. 2000. Of hospitality: Anne Dufourmantelle invites Jacques Derrida to respond. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Derrida, Jacques. 2001. On cosmopolitanism and forgiveness. New York, NY: Routledge. Derrida, Jacques. 2002. Acts of religion, ed. Gil Anidjar. New York, NY: Routledge. Freud, Sigmund. 1997. Sexuality and the psychology of love, ed. Philip Rieff. 1963. Reprint. New York, NY: Touchstone. Hamacher, Werner, et al., eds. 1989. Responses: On Paul de Man’s wartime journalism. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press. Hart, Kevin. 2000. The trespass of the sign: Deconstruction, theology, and philosophy, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Fordham University Press. Heidegger, Martin. 2002. The onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics. In The religious, ed. John D. Caputo, 67–75. Malden, MA: Blackwell. Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Religion within the boundaries of mere reason and other writings (trans: and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Kearney, Richard. 2001. The god who may be: A hermeneutics of religion. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Lacan, Jacques. 1982. Feminine sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne (trans: Rose, Jacqueline). ed. and introduced by Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose. New York, NY: Palgrave McMillan. Lawlor, Leonard. 2008. Jacques Derrida. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Stanford, CA: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University, 2006. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2006/entries/derrida/. Accessed 20 May. Levinas, Emmanuel. 1996. Is ontology fundamental? In Emmanuel Levinas: Basic philosophical writings, ed. Adriaan Theodor Peperszak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Mahmood, Saba. 2006. Agency, performativity, and the feminist subject. In Bodily citations: Religion and Judith Butler, ed. Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville. New York, NY: Columbia University Press. Mann, William E., ed. 2004. The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of religion. New York, NY: Blackwell. Masuzawa, Tomoko. 1993. In search of dreamtime: The quest for the origin of religion. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Masuzawa, Tomoko. 2005. The invention of world religions: Or, how european universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Quinn, Phillip L., and Charles Taliaferro, eds. 2005. A companion to philosophy of religion. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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Raschke, Carl. 1982. The deconstruction of god. In Deconstruction and theology, ed. Thomas J.J. Altizer, Max A. Myers, Carl A. Raschke, Robert P. Scharlemann, Mark C. Taylor, and Charles E. Winquist. New York, NY: Crossroads. Retort [Iain Boal, T.J. Clark, Joseph Matthews, and Michael Watts]. 2004. Afflicted powers: Capital and spectacle in a new age of war. New York, NY: Verso. Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, irony, and solidarity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Silesius, Angelus. 1984. Cherubinischer Wandersmann, ed. Louise Gnadinger. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam. Westphal, Merold. 2001. Towards a postmodern Christian faith: Overcoming ontotheology. New York, NY: Fordham University Press.
Levinas’s Project: An Interpretative Phenomenology of Sensibility and Intersubjectivity Bettina G. Bergo
Our relation with the Metaphysical is an ethical behavior and not theology Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78.
Introductory Remarks: Biography Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) was born in Kaunas, Lithuania, near Vilna where a rationalist strain of Jewish thought had been flourishing for many generations.1 He was the eldest of three brothers in a family that had reached a degree of prosperity sufficient to cultivate a Russian and Hebrew education, and take brief vacations in the Lithuanian countryside. Lithuania was not a seedbed for political anti-Semitism. The diasporic experience there entailed, rather, epithets and insults in the street. (See Malka 2002: 31) Fearing a change in the political climate, the family emigrated to the Ukraine for 6 years, during which time the young Levinas witnessed the revolutionary period in greater Russia. When the family returned to Lithuania in 1920, the country had already obtained its independence. Nevertheless, it was quite natural that Levinas travel to Strasbourg to study in 1923. French culture was second to none in prestige, and the Jewish community was settled for hundreds of years in that Alsatian city. During that period, the Third Republic, mightily shaken by the Dreyfus Affair (see note 2, below), there were three fundamental philosophical movements: Neo-Kantianism, Bergson’s vitalism, and the epistemologies of the emergent social sciences (Malka 2002: 40–41). In Strasbourg Levinas studied philosophy with Maurice Pradines, who urged him to work with Edmund Husserl in Freiburg, where he also encountered Martin Heidegger, in 1928. The dual influences of phenomenology and hermeneutics persist throughout his life. B.G. Bergo (B) Département de Philosophie, Université de Montréal, Montréal, Québec, Canada e-mail:
[email protected] 1 Heartfelt
thanks to Gabriel Malenfant (Université de Montréal) for his help and collaboration.
M. Joy (ed.), Continental Philosophy and Philosophy of Religion, Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion 4, DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-0059-8_4, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
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In 1935, Levinas published his first original philosophical exercise, On Escape. In that work, he proposed a meditation on existence very different from Heidegger’s influential ontology. Later, about a year before the French mobilization in 1939, he was naturalized a French citizen and enlisted in the officer corps. Within 4 months of mobilization, however, Levinas was captured and imprisoned in an officers’ labor camp. His entire Lithuanian family was killed, though his wife and daughter found protection with a Catholic religious order in Orléans. During his 5 years of imprisonment, he managed to work out the lectures that later became Existence and Existents (Levinas 1978 [1948]) and Time and the Other (Levinas 1988b [1947]). Levinas’s first major, original work appeared, late, when he was fifty-five. This was Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Levinas 1969). The book earned him a teaching position at the University of Poitiers, and then at the University of Paris, Nanterre. Between 1961 and 1974, he published numerous essays on Judaism, Talmudic interpretation, and phenomenological questions concerning sensibility, meaning, and transcendence. (See, for example, Levinas 1993). In 1974, he published Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (Levinas 1974), which significantly reworked themes from his earlier Totality and Infinity.
A Different Sort of Ethics Levinas has come to be known as the philosopher of responsibility and a new ethics. Yet his “responsibility” is not a prescription; it is not normative. One can certainly “be otherwise,” he says in 1974, but what Levinas is pursuing is something he calls “otherwise than being.” This “otherwise” simply happens outside of everyday time. Stated differently, it occurs outside of time, when we understand time as the dynamic flow of waking consciousness. Responsibility happens in what one could call intensive modes. These include modes of sensibility and modes of strong emotion. If these occur outside of flowing time, this is because we bathe in moods; the time sequences we can represent are already conditioned by affectivity. Moreover, one is subject to a host of petites perceptions or changing micro sensations of which one is unconscious until she or he turns her or his attention to them. Levinas’s responsibility thus takes place subliminally, before a person has the “time” to reflect on it, much less to construct a clear representation of a just-lived moment. This amounts to a certain revision of his earlier definition of responsibility as engendered by the face-to-face encounter with another person. The importance of the other person never disappears from his thought. However, by 1974, responsibility is studied in light of the layers of passive emotions and affects “in” me, in a subject. Levinas’s philosophy of emotion and responsibility is difficult because it reworks a vocabulary borrowed from Hegel, Heidegger, and Husserl. The sheer magnitude of his critical enterprise has made his philosophy challenging to pick up and simply read. That said, it is important to keep in mind that Levinas was working out his particular interpretation of the relationship of sensibility, affect and sense starting from the early 1930s. At that time, although he was influenced by Husserl’s phenomenological studies of passive synthesis, Levinas avoided
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extensive discussion of Husserl’s approach to embodiment. He did not extensively rethink bodies, affectivity, and drives, in part because vitalism and neo-romantic philosophies often approached these themes with racial and political metaphors. Lived embodiment does return explicitly in his work between the 1940s and the 1970s. Levinas’s concern with understanding bodies and skin as sensitive fields, open to the impact of other people, led him to a philosophy superficially close to the anti-mechanistic sense of force in the later Nietzsche. To explore this resemblance surpasses the space available in this essay, however. Suffice it to say that Levinas owes a debt to interpretive philosophies of sensation and emotion, notably in Husserl, Maine de Biran, and more distantly, in Nietzsche.
The Early Philosophy In the 1920s, Levinas’s thought had unfolded a profound interest in the genetic phenomenology Husserl was developing, and in the kind of anti-psychoanalytic psychology taught at the University of Strasbourg by Maurice Blondel and Maurice Pradines. Given his hostility to psychoanalysis, it is easily overlooked that psychological interests stay with Levinas like an undercurrent to his phenomenology. His teacher, Maurice Pradines had explored pre-conscious sensations, with a view to rethinking ethics, outside of Utilitarian approaches to pleasure and pain. Pradines’s work rejected psychoanalytic versions of the unconscious and its emergence through repression. His critical study of human sensation (Pradines 1928) showed that it was impossible to establish a simple continuity between pleasure and pain. Types of pain were qualitatively different from pleasure, he argued, and that meant that utilitarian interpretations of the Good, as maximization of pleasure and minimization of pain, could never yield a single measure. Indeed, if pleasure was not the antithesis of pain, then augmenting pleasure or happiness requires something other than simply diminishing its contrary. For Levinas, this something other opened into a phenomenological account of sensations and emotions. Maurice Pradines was thus a significant influence on Levinas for this and other reasons as well. He was one of the few in Strasbourg to speak out in defense of Captain Dreyfus, the French Jewish officer framed for espionage under the Third Republic.2 On the other hand, while Pradines urged Levinas to study phenomenology with Husserl in Freiburg, he
2 Captain Alfred Dreyfus (1859–1935) who was Jewish, and an elite officer in the French army, was arrested in 1894, charged with passing military arms secrets to the German embassy and courtmartialed, though evidence was weak. Ultimately, he was pardoned by the Président, though it was not until 1906 that the high court recognized his complete innocence and exonerated him. The drama divided France. While the Dreyfus Affair led to legislation separating church and state in 1905, the trauma persisted in France well into the 1920s. Maurice Pradines (1874–1958), pointed to the Dreyfus Affair as a case where, ultimately, ethics rose above political machinations. Levinas attended Pradines’s lectures, in which questions of politics were discussed. They also contained a firm opposition to mechanism, using Bergson who insisted, like Husserl, that sensation and affect were not irrational or deprived of cognition. See Marie-Anne Lescourret (1994: 60–63) and Malka (2002: 41 ff.).
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did not anticipate the importance Heidegger’s existence philosophy would have in Levinas’s development. It is important to begin this early in Levinas’s career, because there is a striking circle in his thought. It runs from an interest in sensibility and affectivity through a struggle with existence understood as both mine and the external other’s, back to a concern with pre-cognitive interiority. In the aftermath of his studies with Husserl (1928–1929), Levinas proved deeply influenced by Heidegger’s existentialism. In particular, he engaged with Heidegger’s analysis of existing in-the-world as Dasein (the human site that is open to the call of Being). He was also drawn to Heidegger’s concern with mortality, and his pursuit of the question of Being, which Heidegger argued had been forgotten by the philosophical tradition.3 In fact, Levinas praises Heidegger at the end of his doctoral thesis devoted to the concept of intuition in Husserl (Levinas 1973, first published in 1930). It is Heidegger, he there argues, who best understood the concrete problems of human existence. By 1933, Levinas was grappling with the terrible tension between Nietzsche’s philosophy of values – which likewise starts from lived, bodily existence – and the German rediscovery of his Wille zur Macht [will to power]. One of Nietzsche’s philosophical perspectives proposed a reinterpretation of life or existence, as conscious and unconscious forces in bodies. Sensation and emotions were, for him, responses to the working of these forces, therefore one could understand them as signs of modifications that we cannot actively control. Levinas viewed this intuition as dangerous, much the way he was skeptical about vitalist philosophies like Bergson’s. Nevertheless, Levinas chose to work against Heidegger’s existentialism by exploring, in the place of the latter’s Dasein, an embodied subject affected by its environment, but above all by other people. By 1935, Levinas had returned to France from Freiburg.4 In his first year back, he published a short experimental essay entitled On Escape. In that work, he broke completely with Heidegger arguing, among other things, that the Heideggerian Dasein was a formalistic presentation of human beings. Almost as a pure abstraction, Dasein had no body. Dasein was never hungry, Levinas ironized, because its everyday existence was given over to utilitarian tasks and to a futurally projected time consciousness. By contrast, On Escape was constructed upon Pradines’s themes like pleasure and its promise of transformation, sensuality, and other modes of existence into which humans plunge, as if, through enjoyment or ecstasy, they could transcend their own mortal existence. (See Levinas 1982a; English translation: Levinas 2003) In the place of Heidegger’s preoccupation with mortality or
3 In
Being and Time, Martin Heidegger presented an interpretive phenomenology intended to approach the fundamental question of philosophy which the tradition had consistently covered over, that of the Being of beings. Evacuating notions of God, other worldly transcendence and historic teleology, Being and Time deployed a new “transcendental level,” which one could conceive through non-cognitive states of mind such as anxiety. Addressing the question of Being was also entailed posing that of life, generally, albeit outside vitalism and biology. See Heidegger (1927). 4 In the interest of space, I will not examine the infamous “Davos disputation” between his erstwhile hero, Heidegger, and Ernst Cassirer.
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“being toward death,” which must be confronted stoically, Levinas gathered examples of our attempts to “get out” of existence, but in no way to die. Transcendence is sought in enjoyment, which means that life may feel constricting but there is also a love of life. On the other hand, shame and nausea also figure in this essay. Described and interpreted ontologically, nausea is the experience of being trapped in one’s body. The raw phenomenological presentation of nausea is that of being engulfed by one’s own existence, above all by a body that is “me,” and that has deprived the ego of control. From the immersion and suffocation experienced in nausea, there is a struggle to get free even before it is possible to distinguish cognitively between an objective world and a thinking, feeling subject. The immediate experience of nausea is one of submersion – in self, in world; in short, in existence. That means that nausea is one possible mode of directly experiencing what Heidegger called Being. This mode, however, was nothing like Heidegger’s lighted clearing.5 It also cannot be compared to the silent call of Being that Heidegger discusses in Being and Time. Nausea is the experience of existence simplified and neutralized into pure, suffocating presence (Levinas 2003, Part VI). Yet, unlike Heidegger’s Angst (anxiety), which volatilizes our concern with things in the world and opens us to the question “why is there Being instead of simply nothing?,” Levinas’s nausea shows that the question of nothing is a mere abstraction, to be asked without taking any account of the ways we experience our bodies. Like his analyses of pleasure, pursued for the promise it holds out of escaping our daily existence, nausea gives the lie to Heidegger’s resolute self-projection toward his personal mortality. According to Levinas, it is not more authentic or proper to us to pursue or confront the fact of death, and everyday experience shows this clearly. Tacitly grasping their condition as mortal and limited beings, human beings seek escapes. They seek the prolongation of moments of blissful absence. That is the lived promise of authentic transcendence, and it is experienced and cherished before (or even, after) any confrontation with the transcendence of Heidegger’s “possibility of impossibility” (one’s death). In fine, Levinas’s 1935 work inaugurated a life-long struggle against Heidegger’s existential ontology. Against Heidegger’s discussion of the necessity of confronting death, which is the only event that no one can live through “for me,” the only event for which there is no “substitution,” Levinas developed a worldly conception of transcendence. But the meaning of an event for which there is no “substitution” would preoccupy him throughout his life. Already in On Escape, Levinas set in the place of Heidegger’s being-toward-death a related, if less rigorist, notion: finitude. He asked, “Would an infinite being seek to escape?” (Levinas 2003: 56). To be finite for Levinas means to open sensuous vistas toward “elsewheres” that lead
5 Heidegger approached Being as an understanding fundamentally different from that of metaphysics or science. Meditating on the Presocratics, notably Heraclitus, Heidegger presented Greek thaumazein or wonder, as opening or thinking out into a lighted clearing (Lichtung) in which Being gathers and illuminates beings. See for example, “Aletheia” in “Aletheia” in Heidegger (1984).
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nowhere: pleasure, need, eros. These feature as so many promises of an outerside to one’s finite life and ennui. The abundant literature of escapism suggests that Heidegger’s ideal of resoluteness before the possibility of one’s death, or “authenticity,” is a rare behavior. Can I really believe, Levinas wondered, that a being who seeks to escape – often, to escape more than its daily routines – has failed to grasp its “own-most possibility,” mortality? What transcendence, and what escape, are opened in Heidegger’s version of the sublime, which confronts its imminent nothingness? If Heidegger captured the meaning of our concrete existence, in its immediacy and without illusions, then surely there are other dimensions to concrete life than confronting mortality.6 Levinas’s descriptions of multifaceted escapism points to another such dimension. Yet, some phenomena of group escapism evince the transformation of the evasion of mortality, turning into a forward race toward death, and Levinas was always deeply suspicious of these modes of social, religious or esthetic “participation.” Thus, his descriptions of intersubjectivity allot little room to spectacles and cults in which transcendence is aimed at through selfdissolution.
The War Years and Their Aftermath In 1940, Levinas, as reserve officer, was called into military service. His platoon was captured in May of that year. This was 4 months after the publication of the major interpretive essay in which he returned to Husserl’s phenomenology, “The Work of Edmund Husserl.”7 For 5 years, he was held in the Fallingsbostel camp – where he learned of the extermination of European Jews. He did not know whether his wife and daughter were still alive in France. It is unclear when precisely he learned of the murder of his Lithuanian family. What is nevertheless clear, from essays like Yves Béon’s Planet Dora,8 is that even the officers’ camps were not places where inmates were meant to survive. This is important, and yet one could read his two 1947 collections, Existence and Existents (Levinas 1978) and Time and the Other (Levinas 1988b) without thinking twice about it. Nevertheless, the context of the Endlösung (Final Solution) set the tone for his struggle with philosophers of transformative labor and the body, conceived in formal terms as a force that humanizes nature or forges culture. Descriptions that contrast the harshness of fatigue, the torment of exhaustion with the light in which the world shimmers by day, only to sink into oppressive darkness by night, are motivated by Levinas’s years in Fallingsbostel.
6 Heidegger discusses facticity in Being and Time in light of the experience of everyday life, the experience of Being “thrown” into existence, and the escapism of idle talk and curiosity. See Heidegger (1927: 203–223). 7 First published in the January–February 1940 issue of the Revue philosophique, Paris. Reprinted in Levinas (1982b: 7–52); for English, see Levinas (1998). 8 Béon (1985); in English: Béon (1997). Dora-Mittelbau was a concentration camp, next to Buchenwald, in which missiles were constructed. While not engineered to be a death camp, many among the 60,000 perished under its conditions.
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But his wartime notebooks have yet to be published. These diaries and his confessional writings are the only places where Levinas explicitly speaks of Jews and Jewishness. His philosophy, which flowered as an interpretive phenomenology, with elements of non-Freudian psychology in it, was meant to concern all persons. Most notably, by 1974, it addressed all those who had some experience of the antisemitism he called, simply, “the hatred of the other man” (Levinas 1974; in English: Levinas 1981: 1; Levinas, 2009). The work of the war years above all secures Levinas’s intuitions about existence, labor, embodiment, desire, finitude, and the idea of infinity. Between 1930 and the war’s end, Levinas is very clearly a hermeneutic phenomenologist. He describes impartially, but always with an eye to the modes in which humans receive and confer meaning on their experience. He presents what he called in 1961 a “dramatique des phénomènes” (Franck 2001) (a phenomenological “staging” of lived events), in which those subjective-objective distinctions I make after living through an experience are bracketed with a view to recapturing their dynamic immediacy. Levinas borrows Husserl’s method of e¯ poch¯e (bracketing or reduction of experience to its lived immediacy) to study passivity and the affects that are on the verge of becoming intentional consciousness. He uses Husserl’s insights into passivity against Heidegger’s interpretations of will and being-toward-death. But he also turns Heidegger’s interpretive interest in our situation in-the-world against Husserl’s epistemological formalism. The result is an original philosophy that proceeds from my being affected by an other, whose arrival cuts through my concerns about the world and my own mortality. Of course, this is Levinas, a Gallicized Lithuanian Jew, who had traveled from Vilna to the Ukraine and back, then to Strasbourg and Freiburg. This is Levinas, whose contact with Judaism was with the anti-pietist, anti-mystical motifs of rationalist, Mittnagdist Judaism as taught by the Gaon of Vilna (1749–1821).9 Mittnagdism focused more on Torah study than on the difficult hermeneutics of the Talmud, and this will be extremely important when he encounters a different path that permits the rapprochement between the ethical intuitions of Talmudic Judaism and the prophets, and the phenomenology of my encounter with the other person, who faces me. One thing seems clear, concerning the impact of the Shoah on Levinas’s philosophy. Existence, which Heidegger called “Being,” is not revelation and concealment. Levinas’s “existence” contains two dimensions: one that is especially marked in human interactions with nature; the other that comes to the fore when existence is described as brute being. In the first case, existence understood as our world is frequently a matter of light, desire, and enjoyment. However, when understood as the sum of entities in act, and persevering in existence, Being expresses the myriad conflicts of wills, both mechanistic-biological and conscious. Not unlike Nietzsche’s forces and Freud’s drives, Being neither glimmers nor beckons, nor is it an event, as in Heidegger. Existence or Being has all the qualities of Hobbes’s mechanism, and Darwinist competitions for scarce resources. In this
9 One
work available in French is Levinas (1986). Also see Lamm (1989).
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respect, it is a complete rethinking of Heidegger’s ontology, down to the moiling presence that besets the insomniac, unable to fully awaken and debarred from the sleep by which it could escape. In a framework such as this, while Levinas may have taken a step back behind Heidegger’s ontology – a step some argue is regressive10 – the strategy he adopts toward ontology allows him to characterize nature and history as fields of force, rather than as Heidegger’s revelation before all religious revelations. Theodicy, or the challenge of explaining how goodness or divinity could permit so much suffering among its creatures, thus finds an answer in Levinas. It is the way in which existence simply carries on: forces, whether cultural, political, or natural, proceed toward their logical conclusion. In this course toward dominance or discharge, they create or encounter destructive conflicts. No god is to be held accountable for – much less vindicated by – such a state of affairs. A fundamental dualism, light and dark, characterizes the world as living. No ultimate sublimation, in Hegel’s sense, can reduce this dualism.
Post-war Developments A curious event occurred in 1947, after Levinas was reunited in Paris with his wife and daughter. A polymath rabbi named Shushani – mathematician, physicist, and Talmudist – was introduced to Levinas by a colleague. At the time, Levinas was directing the École normale israélite orientale. Avid to learn Shushani’s Talmudic dialectic, even to distill its philosophical implications for phenomenology and hermeneutics, Levinas invited Shushani into his home in the 16th arrondissement. For 2 years, Shushani taught Levinas a profoundly humanist, pluralist approach to Talmud before disappearing in 1949. (During that time, he also taught Elie Wiesel, who was then a young journalist. Shushani ended his days in Montevideo, Uruguay.) His impact on Levinas clearly rivaled that of Husserl himself. What Levinas learned from Shushani was a way to weave together Judaism and phenomenology. The ethical reading of the prophets and subsequent commentaries are as old as the prophetic message itself, especially in Judaism where the question of an actual messiah is utopian and secondary. The ethical reading had been brought to the foreground by thinkers such as Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1786) and Hermann Cohen (1843–1918) – and, on the religious side, by the founder of Reform Judaism, Leo Baeck (1873–1956).11 What is remarkable about Levinas’s expansion of the ethical intuition, however, is that it requires neither the postulation of a god, a soul, nor the
10 Regressive, in an ontological sense, insofar as Levinas restores a conception of being or existence
in which conflict and mechanistic causality are its primary dimensions. Being as “conatus essendi” is clearly a characterization of existence that Heidegger sought to surpass. 11 The author of the Das Wesen des Judentums (Baeck 1987), Baeck was, among other things, a founder of the reform movement sometimes called Progressive Judaism. He was Chief Rabbi in Berlin until the Nazi seizure of power in 1933.
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conviction that divinity exists or acts in history. Levinas’s adoption of Husserl’s phenomenological approach to meaning, which Husserl defined in terms of intentional (conscious) “aiming” (at any object or idea) and modes by which an entity, idea or even mood “gives itself” to consciousness, made it possible to approach what has been called experiences of transcendence in terms of affectivity. Thus, Levinas approaches transcendence as immediate experience, in a face-to-face encounter with the other. This is given or lived as an excess of sensuous and affective meaning. In reflecting on such experiences of affective excess, certain traditions qualify them as “transcendent” or attach the name “god” to them. For Levinas, what can be elucidated are the conditions of possibility – conditions attaching to embodied, concrete existence – of these experiences. However, because one does not “get out” of existence itself – save, in dying – any interruption of the consciousness and temporal flow of existence occurs in the immediacy of intersubjective encounters. These interruptions are “transcendent” only in the simple sense that I am as if overtaken by the other’s face and respond to him or her, before I represent the experience to myself and constitute it conceptually. Intersubjectivity is the only “site” of transcendence, then. And it is “ethical” in the elementary sense that the roots of what is called “responsibility” are located in the peculiar way the gaze of another person affects me. This ethics-in-incipience is not normative any traditional sense; there is nothing particular “to do.” However, in the space of an instant the gaze pulls me out of my grounding in my thematizing consciousness. I answer. And the only thing I ever really answer is another person. When I speak to animals or pets of whatever sort, Levinas argues, I do so by analogy with the responsive circuit I first experienced before and through the other human being. This domain of phenomenology involves an interpretive step. This occurs especially insofar as Levinas is interested in what constitutes the discreteness of an “event” that cuts through the continuous flow of our consciousness.12 This concern with the meaning of an event that “interrupts” largely comes from Heidegger’s extension of phenomenology into hermeneutic ontology. For Heidegger, however, it is Being that glimmers and beckons, as the only bona fide event that pulls me out of my concern with particular entities or beings. In response to Heidegger’s existential-personal time distilled from the New Testament conception of the kairos, or awaited eschatological time, Levinas developed an interpretive phenomenology of the moment of intersubjective “responsibility” out of a conception of the present that he drew from the now moment of prophetic writing – as opposed to Heidegger’s interest in the Pauline letters.13
12 In
his lectures of 1905, Husserl characterized the passive and all-unifying flow of internal time as the minimal structure of “transcendental consciousness.” He would always preserve this formal, ground level of flowing consciousness as the foundation of all higher level consciousness that explores objects visually or works out logical categories. Both Levinas and Heidegger were influenced by Husserl’s conception of internal time consciousness, and both philosophers perceived flaws in its disembodied, mentalist character. 13 Heidegger introduced a significantly modified conception of the Pauline kairos in an attempt to move past the purely formal time discussed by the Neo-Kantianism of his day. The experienced
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Whatever one makes of their respective quests for deformalized conceptions of lived time, two things should be emphasized. First, working past abstract conceptions of time and space opens to interpretations drawn from literary and religious writings. Consistent with the goals of phenomenological investigations, it seeks the lived conditions of possibility underlying these writings and, in principle, attempts to pass behind the representations they have developed. Second, if Heidegger and Levinas’s thought is compared, then two distinct biblical heritages informing their existential interpretations of time and space can be detected. This remark should be explored in greater detail. For the present,14 I emphasize simply that there is no substantive tension between Levinas’s reading of Judaism and his philosophy. The methodological differences cross-fertilize each other, although the philosophy works toward a lived, non-confessional level at which his themes of responsibility, transcendence, even his mentions of “God,” take on meaning through an approach to embodied intersubjectivity that comes, for Levinas, before any constitution of a monadic subjectivity. In the 1950s, Levinas was part of the group of intellectuals that Jean Wahl had assembled informally into the Parisian Collège de Philosophie. These included Gabriel Marcel (1889–1973), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908–1961), Paul Ricœur (1913–2005), Vladimir Jankélévitch (1903–1985), and a host of others who were also attending Alexandre Kojève’s dramatic lectures on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Kojève 1980a). These lectures had as their thematic pivot the dialectic based on the figure of the master and slave. Levinas was aware of Jean Wahl’s earlier reading of the Phenomenology (Wahl 1929), which had foregrounded the unhappy consciousness – a very different figure in Hegel, for which the separate spheres of world, finite mind and divinity could not be reconciled through the movement of “Spirit.” There is every reason to believe that, while he rejected a dialectical vision of history as totalizing, Levinas found Wahl’s “unhappy consciousness” closer to the dualism of the world as totality and ethical in-finity, i.e., incompleteness and divisions,15 that he would develop. It is likely, too, that Levinas attended MerleauPonty’s lectures on passivity at the Collège de France (1954–1955), because his own work increasingly explored the ethical meaning of passivity. As a result, Levinas
“messianic” time of awaiting, found in several of Saint Paul’s letters opened to an existential and hermeneutical temporality in which the “pl¯er¯oma t¯on kair¯on” or fullness of time promises a recapitulation of lived time that constitutes an entirely new structure of the “now.” In so doing, it opens an eschatological promise in Saint Paul (see Galatians 4: 4; Romans 13: 9–10). Heidegger’s temporal structure of Dasein as out ahead of itself toward its ownmost possibility (of death) functions similarly to allow Dasein to get itself into view as a whole, and this – existentially rather than simply formally or speculatively. For a discussion of messianic time in Paul, see Agamben (2005), “Fourth Day: Apostolos.” 14 Notably the rationalist vein in Mittnagdism, opposed to mysticism of all stripes, but also the humanism of Levinas’s Talmud teacher, Shushani. 15 “In-finity” here underscores the difficulty of limiting, conceptually and at the level of passive syntheses of affectivity and vulnerability, the face-to-face encounter with the other person. Infinity thus does not denote divinity, much less an ontological ground that reveals and conceals itself.
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would always read Hegel against the French Nietzschean grain inaugurated by Kojève. Thus, for Levinas, it will be the primacy of the face-to-face encounter with another person that interrupts me affectively and passively, before it opens onto Hegel’s reciprocal struggle for the recognition of my own and the other’s desire. This is because the passivity Levinas and Merleau-Ponty were exploring entails a speculative reconstruction of affective life prior to the work of cognitive consciousness. Indeed, by 1974, the theme of my passivity before the other person who approaches will be unfolded into a layered sensuous undergoing, qualified as the un-positable, un-deducible “ground” through which an “other” inhabits the self as a pre-conscious mood and as a kind of bodily memory. This radical passivity is not directly recognizable to consciousness. Only repeating experiences of affective interruption and anguish, and the accompanying intensification of my concern or remorse suggest that the subject carries in its affective structure something it has difficulty “identifying” conceptually, which works within it. The passivity thematic opened a different vista on intersubjective existence. In the 1950s, Maurice Merleau-Ponty was also studying passive synthesis, combining experimental psychology, psychoanalysis, and Husserl’s unpublished notes on passivity, phantasy, and distant memory.16 The extent of his influence on Levinas is difficult to determine, although Levinas adopted his concept of “fundamental historicity,” which is personal, embodied and sedimented time. Against the grain of then fashionable neo-Nietzschean voluntarism and Kojève’s master-slave dialectic, the phenomenologies of passivity argued that alterity might affect a sensuous subject prior to acts of will and distinct from instincts or drives to selfpreservation or mastery. What Levinas learned from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the personal experience of time he adapted from Heidegger, and the hermeneutic understanding of language originating from a silent call – all these will not only be transplanted into his own “humanism of the Other, ” but will also prove compatible with an ethical reading of the Talmud and the Bible. The compatibility entails largely a precision of focus, not a reduction. Ethics, before it is any rule, calculus, or ethos, is the human relation, intersubjectivity, or religio in the preChristian sense of a disposition of conscience and actions to which human beings are bound. 16 For Merleau-Ponty, the elucidation of fundamental psychic acts of “institution” or creative posit-
ings required that we venture beyond Husserl’s phenomenology and set forth the different ways in which we are passively “acted on” or “acted by” our (social) imaginations, the various modalities of desire, deliria and our dream consciousness that does not begin and end with sleep. The other in the same, for Merleau-Ponty, denoted all these things. They were invariably related to sensations and memories of other persons. In his lecture notes for the Collège de France course of 1954–55, he wrote elliptically: “A dream is begun by that which in us receives events and classifies them in relation to our acquired, intersubjective dimensions. An onirism in filigree [that runs] throughout all [our] awakened life” in Merleau-Ponty (2003: 208), my translation. Also see Husserl (2001: 2006). Husserl did not publish these notes in his lifetime. They are a significant part of Husserl’s great reworking of his thought in the 1910s and 1920s, with a view to describing the embodied genesis of conscious life.
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Being, Intersubjectivity, and Totality and Infinity Let me risk what may seem to be a tangent, and recall that in the 1950s and 1960s, the poet Paul Celan, who had survived a Rumanian labor camp, was also teaching in Paris, at the École normale supérieure. Levinas was aware of Celan though he rarely quoted his poetry.17 Two years after the appearance of Levinas’s Totality and Infinity (1961), Celan’s brief collection of poems Die Niemandsrose (“The Noone’s-rose”) appeared. A little poem in that collection expresses the aftermath of central European Jews just after the Shoah. It was called Zürich, zum Storchen (At the Little Stork), a restaurant. Celan dedicated the poem to a survivor and fellow poet, Nelly Sachs, interned in Sweden and continually tormented by fears of Gestapo searches and bombings. Tellingly, the poem ends with the lines: Our talk was of your God, I spoke against him, I let the heart I had hope: for his highest death-rattled, his wrangling word – Your eye looked at me, looked away, your mouth spoke toward the eye, I heard: We really don’t know, you know we really don’t know what counts.18
This painful agnosticism oscillated between utter betrayal and abjection and a different way to conceive hope – a kind of weak messianism. In what was none other than a fierce scruple about the Jewish, and the human, condition, Celan pursued the deconstruction of aesthetics into strangely resonating fragments, and silence. Eschewing ideologies and faith, Levinas for his part pursued a philosophy that variously accommodated faith, agnosticism, and atheism. The dissolution of meaning haunted him from all sides – the surd being the threat of Being, experienced by the insomniac,19 as the ever possible threat of meaninglessness. Yet the pursuit of 17 See Levinas (1997) for Levinas’s essay on Celan. The essay concerns above all Celan’s “Büchner
prize essay,” Der Meridian (1961). deinem Gott war die Rede, ich sprach/ gegen ihm, ich/ liess das Herz, das ich hatte, / hoffen:/ auf/ sein höchstes, umröcheltes, sein/ haderndes Wort – // Dein Aug sah mir zu, sah hinweg,/ dein Mund/ sprach sich dem Aug zu, ich hörte: // Wir/ wissen ja nicht, weisst du,/ wir/ wissen ja nicht,/ was/ gilt.” 19 The theme of insomnia first arises in Levinas’s Existence and Existents (1947), where it is not Heidegger’s mood, or attunement of acute anxiety that alone reveals Being in its “purest” form. Instead, it is insomnia, where no thing comes to meet us or threaten us, yet we are anguished and 18 “Von
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fragments of a this-worldly revelation through the interstices of language in dissolution would become for Levinas a quest for the intersubjective, affective origins of speaking-to-another. Moreover, though forces in nature and politics may reign anarchically, it remains specific to human sociality that a different kind of time, one of interruption and response, occasionally puts those forces on hold. The project of ethicizing, more importantly of secularizing, Talmudic Judaism thus brought Levinas to a different affirmation of living. Alternatively, perhaps it simply slowed the nihilistic current characteristic of the thought of some of those who lived through the catastrophe of the Final Solution. Levinas knew of Celan, at least by the late 1960s.20 But when he wrote on Paul Celan, he chose Celan’s essays, not his poems, most notably the “Conversation in the Mountains”21 and Celan’s well-known Georg Büchner Prize address “Der Meridian” (October 1960). In commenting these, Levinas sought to show the resonance of responsibility, or sincerity – what he calls the “Saying” – in Celan’s deconstructive poetics. “For Celan, the poem is situated precisely at that presyntactic and pre-logical level,” he writes. “But also [at that of the] pre-revelatory [pré-dévoilant]: at the moment of pure touching, pure contact . . . a language of proximity for the proximity that is older than the truth of Being.”22 Nevertheless, Levinas will not follow Celan in his experiments with silence. Celan’s enigmatic experiments with natural metaphors hold his interest less than do Celan’s remarks that a poem “should not offer much difference with a handshake,” which underscores a poetic power of address and ethical interpellation. Thus Levinas’s adaptation of Celan weaves his own affirmation of the face-to-face encounter with another human being into the abjection of homelessness with which the essay, “Conversation” ends. Yet this is not made explicit, at least not until 1974, when suddenly Celan’s words, “I am you, if I am I” (ich bin du, wenn ich ich bin)23 introduce the central chapter of Levinas’s work, Otherwise than Being, “Substitution” (1974). If substitution points in this context to a subliminal and pre-reflective inhabitation of the other as a kind of emotional force in what I call “me,” it is crucial to keep in mind that substitution is also the essence of the activity of signification. Whether one adopts Saussure’s theory of the sign, which insists that a word disturbed by the sheer presence of obscure, indeterminate existence. See Levinas (1988a: 61 ff.) for a discussion of this positive presence, which Levinas calls the il y a. 20 Levinas’s own essay on Celan “De l’être à l’autre” appeared in the collection Noms propres (Levinas 1976). In 1974, however, he quotes a line from one of Celan’s poems. 21 Celan, “Gespräch ins Gebirge,” 1969. Published in English, among other places, in Celan (2005). Also see Celan (1990). 22 Levinas (1976: 50). Hereby, he lifts the intersubjective connection out of Heideggerian ontology, in which Being reveals itself and conceals itself, but also outside of any other thinking of revelation, including religious philosophy. 23 This can also be translated “I am you when I am I” – the temporal and the conditional modalities are carried by wenn, here it is not clear which is primordial. With Otherwise than Being, published four years after Celan’s suicide in 1970, the latter has been enlisted to illuminate Levinas’s final philosophical project – the description and interpretation of a broken subjectivity, where sensibility and sensuality are inhabited by something that is not simply subjective.
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points toward a concept, or whether one argues, with Derrida, that words themselves form complex networks pointing from one word to another word, or one signifier to another – which destroys the argument of an autonomous idea lying behind our words – substitution remains the central rule. One substitutes sound and meaning for the thing or idea to be denoted. All one has with which to do this is words. Whether one speaks of persons or concepts, “substitution” expresses the dynamic of meaningful relations. So the particular chiasmus that Levinas discovers in Otherwise than Being is the substitutive movement in which I am affected by something I cannot identify post facto as “me.” This hetero-affectivity may have a minimal structure. It is analogous to that substitution by which one signifier, or term, stands in the place of another, transforming it by opening up its initial system of references without diminishing its capacity to point beyond itself. This is what Celan himself understood as poetry’s role. Levinas thus joins Celan in revisiting substitution as the an-archic – lacking definite ground – source of ethical responsibility. This source of responsibility is none other than the impact of another, whether that other is described as the face that confronts me, as a persistent, ambiguous memory, or as a restless affect. Totality and Infinity was an exercise that laid out the lived meaning of “exteriority” in its interpenetrating layers: the exteriority of the world, that of the other person, finally the exteriority of the history one experiences in the family. There, the father whom Levinas describes sees history backward and forward. For him, the child both is and is not like the father. More importantly, the child can do what the parents could not – reconsider the past and pardon members of his or her generation. Totality and Infinity was, as Derrida said, a treatise on hospitality. It was a phenomenology of the human possibility of welcome and pardon. Totality and Infinity shows three large influences: that of Franz Rosenzweig24 and Shushani; that of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, and that of the Shoah. Let me take a moment to understand its logic before approaching its elaborate aftermath that is Otherwise than Being. This 1961 work represents a decidedly exceptional moment in Levinas. Perhaps it is his most involved struggle with Heidegger. Here, Being shows itself as “war,” not as the “event” that must be made one’s own – the Ereignis25 – according to Heidegger. Along with Being, understood as conflict, politics becomes the art of foreseeing and managing ontological conflicts. In this respect, Levinas sounds in 1961 disconcertingly like the German jurist Carl Schmitt. Schmitt had argued in the 1920s that the essence of the political concerned life and death. It was the political decision that distinguished the friend-state from the enemy-state, just as the 24 In the “Preface” to Totality and Infinity, Levinas pays tribute to Franz Rosenzweig’s antiHegelian Star of Redemption (Rosenzweig 2005) as “a work too often present in this book to be cited” (28). The Star was the work in which Rosenzweig severed his thinking from Hegelian speculative systematics, turning to the meaning of Jewish and Christian existence and temporality. 25 This is the language of Heidegger in the 1930s, in which Being comes to be expressed as the “Event” or Ereignis, while in the wake of the event, we are called to make that event our “own,” to sich er-eignen (ap-propriate for ourselves) the event.
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authentically political act has to seize the occasion for a struggle to the death with that enemy state.26 For both men, utterly different in other respects, to exist in the sphere called “political” means understanding when war is about to break out, or when the threat of death means one confronts a enemy worthy of the name – to speak like Schmitt. Now, whether Being is, in itself, a closed “sphere” or not – a claim that is not clear in Heidegger – it remains that Being, understood as our existence, is totalizing. It is all that there is. Therefore, Levinas can only counter Schmitt and Heidegger by thinking existence in terms of transcendence. In this context, transcendence is understood as interruptions of Being or existence. Here, the latter is experienced as human time and the flow of consciousness, which phenomenology showed as the passive ground underlying humans’ cognitive or “intentional” acts. Such a conception of transcendence implies simply that the other person, but never a god, intervenes to interrupt the everyday experience of time. There is no need for any recourse to a monotheistic God, or to proofs of God’s existence. That question belongs to a different discourse. While the other person who interrupts me is powerless to change (my) existence enduringly, my encounter with him or her opens a path to transcendence – beyond my egocentric needs, pleasures, or willing. In 1961, this difficult, erstwhile theological concept called “transcendence” is rethought by Levinas. It emerges, both temporally and spatially, as a sensuous, affective vector toward another person. This force occurs through that person’s expression and by virtue of the nudity of his or her face.27 Levinas calls this a “trans-ascendance” to hold traditional religious or theological resonances at bay. Ethics – or humans’ concern with the good – thus originates for Levinas in an affective transcendence, which moves as if in the direction of the other, “toward the other. ” It is occasioned by face-to-face encounters. Since the face looks, speaks, changes its expressions, the other person is uniquely unpredictable. It appears that no object, and probably no animal, is as utterly unpredictable as the other. From this perspective, Levinas characterizes the face as not-limited, or in-finite. This infinity, however, is also phenomenal and embodied. Part of its unpredictability lies in that it can actively touch me. Here too lies eros, which he approaches quite late in the book. Totality and Infinity, subtitled An Essay on Exteriority, thus turns around the two poles: one, of unpredictable, dangerous (political) existence (Being), and two, 26 While
he opposed the National Socialists prior to the election of 1933, Schmitt promptly turned around and joined the NSDAP (Nazi Party) three months later, on May 1, 1933. He was thereupon made president of Union of National Socialist Jurists and was able to keep his post at the University of Berlin. The anti-Semitism of his 1936 urgings that German law be “cleansed” of Jewish elements is patent and well known. Accused of opportunism, he would later qualify his Nazi engagement as mere pretence. 27 By 1961, the notion of the nudity of the face denotes above all its self-presentation as unprotected skin, eyes that look at me but remain directly vulnerable. Nudity will also be referred to with terms like “dénuement,” being laid or stripped bare, which only a creature of flesh and blood can be. This, too, is the being I can want to murder, because the face that looks at me is a gaze that has a frankness that disturbs me.
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of its brief yet repetitive interruptions by an embodied infinite – that is, the Other whose approach elicits an affective response that bespeaks spontaneous responsibility. Levinas calls this dualist schema, “religion” in 1961. It seems that he means this in two senses: the well-known re-ligare, denoting ties between persons, but also that of religio, those acts one performs by which the sanctity of the other is translated into words and deeds.28 It is nevertheless striking that Levinas’s “religion” and “trans-ascendence” interrupt an existence conceived as verb-like and conative, like the meta-physical ground of the struggle for resources, or an unbalanced Heraclitean flux. In this vision, “religion” is obviously no one established religion, and “transascendence” is not spatial transcending. Trans-ascendence goes to no place, it goes no where. It is an uncalculated response to another person; a mode of bearing witness to my presence, my disponibility: “Here I am,” or “after you, Sir.”29 This statement is not confessional. But neither is it deontological, nor some foundational philosophical principle from which to derive the common good. Levinas is simply describing – under the phenomenological suspension of our cultural and philosophical assumptions – the repeating event out of which grow our desire and concern for other persons.30 Now, these moments of respons-ability most often come to pass unnoticed. One invariably feels skeptical about this claim for heteronomy as transcendence, just as one might doubt the in-finite meaning of passing face-to-face encounters. After all, like all immediate experience that I later reflect on, I am obliged to return to the event, however brief, and reconstruct it linguistically, conceptually and temporally. To live reflectively means to live backwards. Or again, one lives forward and reflects backwards. Grammarians have understood this backwards-forwards as a mode sui generis of temporality. This indicates the time that it takes to put one or several lived events into a conceptually and syntactically coherent form. This time lapse, that permits “operativity” or meaningful, objectifiable experience, “introduces a gap and a delay in the ‘pure presence’ of utterances [lived experience].. . . [It] cannot be represented in its turn, in the representation that nevertheless implies it in a certain fashion.”31
28 In
his “Preface” to Totality and Infinity (23), Levinas writes of this ground level of religion, “Peace is produced as this aptitude for speech. The eschatological vision breaks with the totality of wars and empires in which one does not speak.. . . The first ‘vision’ of eschatology (hereby distinguished from the revealed opinions of positive religions) reveals the very possibility of eschatology, that is, the breach of the totality, the possibility of a signification without a context [in which a person simply responds to another].” 29 Levinas (1981: 117). Or again, “as simple as ‘hello,’” (143). 30 The phenomenological suspension, or epoché, denotes a technique Husserl revived from the Ancient skeptics. It entails describing lived events, while refraining from any judgement about the existence or inexistence, the objectivity or subjectivity of what is given in consciousness. See Husserl (1982: §32, 60–62): “What we demand [is that] the whole pre-discovered world posited in the natural attitude, actually found in experience . . . as it clearly shows itself in the concatenation of experience, is now without validity for us.” 31 Remarks by grammarian, Gustave Guillaume, cited by Agamben (2000: 111; my translation).
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Grammarians recognize this, as did theoretical psychology and psychoanalysis. Living forwards and reflecting backwards, skepticism is invariably reborn as one considers the upsurge of an uncanny sentiment or an affective interruption of our intentional projects. “What was that?” one wonders. “Oh, nothing; that was nothing,” one concludes. Heidegger also knew about this nothing. For him, the onset of anxiety dissolves our concern with the things of the world.32 One thereupon confronts oneself without accoutrements – one has become a kind of question for oneself. Then the anxious moment passes. When I consider it, I dismiss it out of a mixture of skepticism and conceptual confusion. “Oh, it was nothing.” Skepticism is a natural, pre-philosophical reflex. All this, Heidegger had discussed in 1927 and 1929.33 For Levinas, the locus of this “nothing” was crystallized in the moment of the face-to-face encounter. That is where our rational projects evaporate for him. Like all such moments, however, the encounter itself subsequently sinks into the flow of intentional consciousness. From this fluid place, it can be partly recovered as part of a conceptualizable process. The unity of the temporal flow, of course, lays the eccentricity of such an encounter – as a sensuous and emotional upwelling or surcharge – open to doubt. Like Heidegger’s anxiety, the encounter also evaporates or leaves one with a forgettable moment of perplexity, as when one wonders: “What happened to me?” When Levinas says that it is a “third party,” meaning those additional others or community of others – products of cognitive