Combating Child Labour: A Review of Policies

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Combating Child Labour A REVIEW OF POLICIES

Combating Child Labour

Public opinion has expressed considerable concern about the persistence of child labour. Despite the increasing ratification of international conventions on this issue, 23% of the world’s children aged 10-14 are at work. But why do children still have to work? Under what conditions do children work? What are the implications of child labour for the future development of the countries concerned? What are the most effective policies to combat child labour, and how can they improve economic development?

A REVIEW OF POLICIES

This book seeks to answer these questions. After highlighting the reality of the many child labourers in the world, it reviews the economic causes of the phenomenon and the effectiveness of the various policies which have been implemented to reduce child labour.

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Combating Child Labour

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A REVIEW OF POLICIES

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Combating Child Labour A Review of Policies

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shall promote policies designed: – to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy; – to contribute to sound economic expansion in member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and – to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations. The original member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries became members subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter: Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28th January 1969), Australia (7th June 1971), New Zealand (29th May 1973), Mexico (18th May 1994), the Czech Republic (21st December 1995), Hungary (7th May 1996), Poland (22nd November 1996), Korea (12th December 1996) and the Slovak Republic (14th December 2000). The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention).

Publié en français sous le titre : Combattre le travail des enfants Un bilan des politiques

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FOREWORD

In 2000, the OECD published a study entitled International Trade and Core Labour Standards in response to a request from OECD Ministers to analyse the complex interplay between trade, employment and core labour standards. Further work was mandated on one key core standard, namely child labour, and its links to economic development. The present study is the result of this follow-up work. This work has been supported by France, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. The effective abolition of child labour is one of the four fundamental principles included in the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. Moreover, since 1999 with the adoption and rapid ratification by many countries of the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, a new impetus has been given to addressing the issue. Public opinion has also become increasingly sensitive to the issue, as demonstrated by the proliferation of public and private initiatives which comprise provisions against child labour. Nevertheless, non-compliance with the relevant international conventions remains a serious problem. Indeed, as shown in this study, the causes of child labour are complex and multi-dimensional. The study therefore examines the extent to which existing policies and programmes to eliminate child labour are tackling effectively the core root of the problem. This allows a rich examination of the dynamics between child labour and economic development. This report has benefited from discussions in the OECD's Employment, Labour and Social Affairs Committee as well as comments and advice received from the International Programme for the Eradication of Child Labour (IPEC), from the International Labour Office and two advisory committees to the OECD, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC). The report was drafted by a team from the Secretariat composed by Elena Arnal, Steven Tobin and Raymond Torres, with the assistance of Heloise Wickramanayake. It is published under the responsibility of the SecretaryGeneral of the OECD.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

OVERVIEW........................................................................................................9 Chapter 1 THE REALITY OF CHILD LABOUR IN THE WORLD.............13 A. B.

Defining and measuring child labour..................................................14 Economic activity of children in SIMPOC countries: incidence and nature ............................................................................................20

Chapter 2 ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CHILD LABOUR...............................25 A. B. C. D. E.

Determinants of the demand of child labour.......................................25 The role of poverty, lack of education opportunities and other supply-side factors ..............................................................................29 The worst forms of child labour: some explanations ..........................34 Determinants of child labour in selected case studies: main findings ......................................................................................35 Labour force participation of children: some simple correlations ......42

Chapter 3 ACTIONS AND PROGRAMMES TO COMBAT CHILD LABOUR ...............................................................................51 A. B. C. D. E.

The role of international organisations ...............................................51 Action and programmes at the national level......................................57 Private initiatives and corporate social responsibility.........................74 Fighting the worst forms of child labour ............................................83 Concluding remarks ............................................................................86

GLOSSARY OF TERMS .................................................................................89 Annex A: Data Sources ......................................................................................91 Annex B: Child Labour's Legislative Framework ...........................................113 Annex C: A Review of the Observations of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations Concerning ILO Convention 138 ....................................................118 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................................................................123

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List of Boxes Box 1.1. Child labour and its “worst forms” .....................................................15 Box 2.1. Child labour and globalisation: a review of selected studies..............28 Box 3.1. The International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) ...........................................................................................52 Box 3.2. The role of labour inspectors in combating child labour in Turkey.........61 Box 3.3. Family subsidies linked to schooling attendance in Mexico: from Progresa to Oportunidades ..............................................................72 Box 3.4. Promoting corporate social responsibility against child labour..........75 Box 3.5. The Rugmark experiment ...................................................................82 List of Tables Table 1.1. Child labour according to international conventions........................ 17 Table 1.2. Economically active children by region and gender, 2000a ............. 18 Table 1.3. Child labour by age group and gender, 2000a .................................. 19 Table 1.4. Unconditional worst forms of child labour by region, 2000 ............ 20 Table 3.1. Progress in ratifications of ILO and UN conventions on child labour ................................................................................................... 54 Table 3.2. Ratification of ILO Conventions C29, C138 and C182 (as of June 2003) ....................................................................................... 55 Table 3.3. Minimum age for admission to employment and compulsory education in selected non-OECD countries............................................... 58 Table 3.4. Minimum age for admission to employment and compulsory education in OECD countries.................................................................... 59 Table 3.5. School net enrolment in selected non-OECD countries, 1998 .............. 64 Table 3.6. Public education expenditures in selected non-OECD countries, 1998 ................................................................................................... 64 Table 3.7. Education initiatives to increase school attendance of working children ................................................................................................... 67 Table 3.8. Industry codes of conduct and agreements concerning child labour ................................................................................................... 78 Table A1. SIMPOC country profiles, 1999....................................................... 94 Table A2. Questions used to measure economic activity.................................. 95 Table A3. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by age and gender, 1999 .............................................................................................. 97 Table A4. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by region, gender and age, 1999................................................................................. 99 Table A5. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by main industry and gender, 1999 ....................................................................... 101 Table A6. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries engaged in unpaid activities by gender and age, 1999............................................... 103 6

Table A7. Main reasons for children in SIMPOC countries to engage in economic activity, 1999 .......................................................................... 104 Table A8. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by hours worked per day, 1999 .............................................................................. 105 Table A9. Incidence of workplace injuries for children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries, 1999 ........................................................................................ 106 Table A10. Children attending school in SIMPOC countries by gender and age, 1999........................................................................................... 107 Table A11. Activities of children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries by type, gender and region, 1999 .......................................................................... 109 Table A12. Children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries engaged in domestic chores, 1999......................................................................................................... 111

List of Charts Chart 2.1. Labour force participation of children and trade openness, 1999.....44 Chart 2.2. Labour force participation of children and the quality of education, 1998 ...................................................................................................45 Chart 2.3. Labour force participation of children and GDP per capita, 2000....46 Chart 2.4. Labour force participation of children and income poverty, 2000 ...48 Chart 2.5. Labour force participation of children and human poverty index, 2000 ...................................................................................................49 Chart 2.6. Labour force participation of children and human development, 2000 ...................................................................................................50 Chart C1. Index of non-compliance with ILO Convention 138, 1992-2002...121

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OVERVIEW

Public opinion has expressed considerable concern about the persistence of child labour. The fact is that, despite the increasing ratification of international conventions on the elimination of child labour and regular awareness campaigns, many children continue to work: according to ILO estimates, more than 12% of the world’s children aged 5-9 are at work. The figure rises to 23% in the case of children aged 10-14. Among those who work, about 179 million children are subject to the “worst forms” of employment, such as hazardous work, trafficking, forced and bonded labour, prostitution and other activities carried out under exploitative conditions. Still, in thinking about how best to eliminate child labour, it is important to address the root of the problem – indeed, as this report shows, some of the proposed solutions may be counter-productive. The purpose of this report is, therefore, to examine the factors behind child labour and, on this basis, review promotion mechanisms and policies to combat it. Child labour may threaten economic development Child labour may threaten the health of the children concerned and reduce human capital development – negatively affecting future economic growth. To start with, children subject to long working hours cannot attend school and therefore have limited opportunities to develop their human capital. At the aggregate level, this is likely to translate into weaker productivity growth which is the basis for improved living standards. Second, certain forms of child labour (under hazardous conditions) may affect the health conditions and longevity of children, thereby also affecting human capital. The incidence of injuries among child labourers is as high as 17% in countries for which data are available. Finally, and more importantly, the “worst forms” of work have devastating effects on the health and psychological development of the children involved in such practices. However, not all forms of labour are necessarily detrimental to the health and human capital development of children. This is particularly the case of light work, short working hours or seasonal work carried out under non-exploitative

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conditions, to the extent that these practices are consistent with school attendance. Such forms of work may be important sources of income and labour for poor families, while at the same time leaving some room for human capital development. Development-related factors, in turn, explain some forms of child labour The causes of child labour are complex and multi-faceted. A combination of supply and demand factors operate. In many cases, children work with their parents as part of a family enterprise or farm. This is why child labour is often “unpaid”. It is therefore essential to understand the household decision-making process, which is based on the following key factors: •

Income from child labour. This, in turn, may be influenced by the nature of technology: the higher the demand for unskilled labour, the higher the return to child labour (which is often unskilled). It is also sometimes argued that there is a high demand for child labour in certain activities, such as carpet production, supposedly because of the physical characteristics of children – the “nimblefingers view”. However, these demand-side factors play a negligible role in the aggregate.

•

The expected return to education, which in turn depends on the availability of educational facilities and quality factors. According to available studies and evidence presented in this report, school costs and the quality of education play an essential role in parents’ decision to send their children to school – as opposed to work. Indeed, there are reportedly cases where the quality of education is so poor that parents see little benefit in sending their children to school.

•

The overall level of income and wealth of the household. Even where incentives are created to favour education, family income and the asset situation of the household may compel families to send children to work. In particular, some studies find that adult wages need to reach a certain level before parents can afford sending their children to school. However, more analysis is needed to shed light on this crucial policy issue.

•

There are also special circumstances such as death of the parents, community factors, and the socio-cultural environment (mainly in the case of bonded labour), which often lie behind the worst forms of child employment. 10

A multi-dimensional policy approach is needed to tackle the problem of child labour These complex dynamics need to be borne in mind when thinking about how to eliminate child labour. Though some forms of child labour are unacceptable and should be eliminated urgently, others are closely related to the development process. Recent experience shows that it is important to adopt a comprehensive approach, including: the adoption of child labour legislation which is consistent with market realities, measures to improve access to and the quality of education, financial incentives and food-for-school programmes, as well as community or social awareness raising. It is also possible to combine schooling with work for children so long as the latter meets certain conditions. Policy approaches should also address the fact that the realities of child labour between boys and girls are often quite different. Normative approaches are important, but “unrealistic” norms may be counter-productive Initiatives taken by international organisations to eliminate child labour have contributed to raise awareness of the problem. Such initiatives are especially important in the fight against the worst forms of child labour. In some cases, they can also help collect financial aid to support targeted programmes. However, since in many cases child labour is intrinsically associated with the development process, it would be illusory to believe that child labour can be entirely eliminated in the absence of further action to enhance development opportunities. National legislation prohibiting child labour below a certain age, together with the appropriate enforcement mechanisms, is of course important. However, two key considerations should be kept in mind when designing such legislation: a) the minimum age of employment should take into account market (and poverty) realities – otherwise there is a risk that legislation, if enforced, may force children to work in the informal economy or under more hazardous conditions, and thus be counter-productive; and b) legislation on a minimum employment age should be consistent with legislation on compulsory education. Better education, targeted financial incentives and overall development strategies are essential More generally, legislation and enforcement alone cannot be successful without additional measures that make it cost-effective for poor households to send their children to school. This can take the form of targeted financial rewards to families that send children to school (as in the case of the Progresa

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/Oportunidades programme in Mexico). The size of the reward can be set on the basis of progress in school performance. And, importantly, financial reward to families should be accompanied by sustained efforts to improve the quality of education. It is obvious that economic growth and broader development strategies will facilitate the progressive reduction of child labour. In this respect, successful trade liberalisation may help provide the resources for such strategies. Corporate social responsibility can help too, if properly monitored and linked with alternative opportunities for children The proliferation of codes of conduct, social labelling and other private initiatives are an important response to the social preoccupations of consumers and public opinion. These private initiatives can be a complementary tool to combat child labour, but only to the extent that they are monitored properly and alternatives to child labour are effectively offered – otherwise, there is a risk of displacement to other occupations, sometimes aggravating the problem. A stronger commitment to fight the worst forms of child labour is urgently needed Finally, combating the worst forms of child labour should become a top priority. A stronger fight against the nets of child trafficking and prostitution is clearly called for. This will require greater international co-operation in the judiciary field. It means, above all, a strong political will at all levels and determination to eradicate such intolerable practices.

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Chapter 1 THE REALITY OF CHILD LABOUR IN THE WORLD

There is considerable concern in the international community about child labour. With the adoption in 1999 of the ILO Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, a new impetus has been given to addressing the issue. It is urgent to eliminate all forms of child labour involving exploitation and abuse and to protect children from any form of work that can damage their health and development. But besides the human rights aspects, there are also economic factors at work. In developing countries, child labour is an important source of income for poor families which is why reducing or eliminating child labour is not easy and must always take into account household income and survival possibilities. On the other hand, those forms of child labour that interfere with schooling may negatively affect economic development. In the absence of education opportunities, human capital formation is low, resulting in low adult wages, thereby requiring children to work to supplement the household income. This vicious circle can perpetuate poverty across generations. This is why it is essential that child labour not stand in the way of effective school attendance. Despite recent campaigns to address child labour and ratification of the relevant international standards, non-compliance remains an important problem. Eliminating child labour requires a detailed analysis of the factors at work, as well as the complex dynamics between child labour and economic development. Therefore, the purpose of this report is twofold: to shed light on the economic determinants of child labour in order to deepen the understanding of why child labour standards are not enforced; and to consider a range of possible remedies to the problem, including international norms and national legislation, financial incentives to families who send their children to school, and corporate social responsibility. The structure of the report is as follows: Chapter 1 provides stylised facts on child labour in both developed and developing countries. Chapter 2 focuses on the economics of child labour through a review of the theoretical

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and empirical literature. Some empirical correlations between child labour and different measures of development are also presented. Chapter 3 reviews actions and programmes, at both the international and national levels, to combat child labour and concludes by opening up questions for further research. A.

Defining and measuring child labour

From the outset, it is important to stress that the nature and the measurement of child labour vary considerably across countries. The boundaries of “labour” and even “childhood” depend on the level of development of the country as well as the socio-cultural context. For the purpose of this report, child labour will be defined along the lines of ILO Conventions 138 and 182 (see Table 1.1). Therefore it includes: a) all economic activity done by children until age 11; b) all economic activity done by children aged 12 to 14, excluding permitted “light work” in the sense of Convention 138; c) all economic activity carried out under hazardous conditions by children aged 15 to 17, and d) “the worst forms” of child labour carried out under age 18 (see Box 1.1).1 However, in some cases, and mainly for statistical reasons the broader concept of children in economic activity will be considered as well. Children in economic activity are those working in market and nonmarket production (including the production of goods for own use) during a reference period, both in the formal and the informal sector. This definition includes also the domestic work carried out for a third, but excludes the domestic chores carried out in the own household. In practice, it is not easy to measure child labour and under what conditions children actually work. Most national labour force surveys do not collect information for persons less than age 15 and, almost none, for persons less than age 10 – on the assumption that children are not in the labour force. However, the ILO has carried out a special programme to measure child labour in various countries under the Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC). Other sources of comprehensive data on child labour include the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) and the UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) (see Annex A). In the present report, after describing the ILO global estimations on child labour by region, the analysis will focus on 17 countries covered in the 1.

See also the glossary of terms (p. 89) for more details on these concepts.

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SIMPOC database.2 It should be stressed that the countries have been selected solely on the basis of data availability; these countries are not necessarily those with the most serious child labour problems. Box 1.1. Child labour and its “worst forms” There is no universal consensus of what a child is as the dividing line between childhood and adulthood varies greatly across societies and cultural approaches. In most industrialised countries, the dividing line is mainly based on the chronological age, but in 3 other societies the definition depends more on social responsibility. In many countries, some people less than 18 years of age are regarded as young adults. They may not have full citizenship rights, but they can be married, have children and be responsible for their own lives. Thus, the limit between childhood and youth is neither well-established nor is it a static one. Moreover, the frontier between these two periods of life evolves with time in accordance with increases in life expectancy and economic development. Children can be involved in a variety of work-related activities ranging from helping with domestic and household work, to working in home enterprises or farms or working outside. Some activities are worse than others for the children’s physical and moral development and integrity. It is therefore important to distinguish the conditions under which these activities take place. More generally, there has been some debate in the literature on the differences between “child labour” and “child work” (Boyden et al., 1998; Myers, 1999; and Anker, 2000). “Child work” is mainly described as that work which is not particularly harmful for the child and does not damage educational opportunities. On the contrary “child labour” is used for work which is likely to damage children’s health, physical and psychological development as well as their chances of fulfilling other rights, mainly the right to education. The worst forms of child labour, as defined in Convention 182, include slavery or similar practices such as forced or compulsory labour and trafficking of children, the use of children for prostitution and for illicit activities and all forms of hazardous work. Debt bondage is mainly found in rural areas where traditional class (or caste) structure persists (e.g. in some regions of South Asia). It results when parents, having no other resource, offer their children’s labour to repay a loan or any kind of debt. Bonded child labourers end their state of servitude when the debt is repaid. However, this happens rarely as the children are not paid as promised or the debt may increase because the employer deducts payment for equipment, tools or other charges (food and maintenance expenses) from their presumed salary.

2.

SIMPOC provides data for 17 countries: Belize, Cambodia, Guatemala, Kenya, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Turkey, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

3.

As stated by Brown (1999), the social responsibility of children seems to be affected by, among other variables: cultural considerations; the level of economic development; the level and composition of social expenditures and the phase of demographic evolution.

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Trafficking of children often begins with a false promise of a better life or with parents selling their children into early marriages not always being aware of their real destination, which in the majority of the cases is prostitution for girls or bonded labour for 4 boys. Using children – mainly young girls – as domestic servants is also widespread in many countries. They are normally given or even sold to families to help in the household and find it difficult to change their position later on. Domestic servants normally work long hours, often are not paid, and in many cases are badly treated by their employers or even 5 sexually abused. 6

Children in prostitution are often engaged at a very young age. They generally work long hours, without protection and are vulnerable to violence, undesired pregnancy and diverse diseases, including HIV/AIDS. They rarely get any help from their relatives and tend to organise support networks to assist themselves. In many occasions, they themselves use crime and violence to survive. Child prostitution may reflect a variety of “pull” and “push” factors such as: a) family poverty and the inability of parents to support their children; b) the death of the parents or other circumstances of child neglect or child abuse or violence that force children to leave the family; c) negative peer influence; d) migration; e) in some regions tourism has also been a big factor. Hazardous work is the work that, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children. Its incidence is often high in mining, construction, ship-breaking, fishing and some forms of agriculture. But hazardous work can also be found in other sectors as it is related more to the way in which an activity is carried out than to the nature of the sector itself (e.g. the use of inappropriate protective clothing, the use of pesticides or heavy loads, the exposure to cuts, pain and fatigue from standing long periods, etc.).

4.

The traffic of children mainly occurs in the poorest families and from the poorest countries to their richer neighbours in the region. There exist a number of wellestablished trafficking routes. To cite some examples, in the Mekong sub-region, Thailand is the main receiving country of children forced into prostitution and other exploitative forms of work from Cambodia and Laos. In South Asia, the most alarming situation is the trafficking of girls from Nepal to India but the problem also exists in Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In West Africa, children from Burkina Faso and Mali are trafficked to Côte d’Ivoire and children from Togo and Benin are trafficked to Gabon. In Latin America, the large number of children working in the streets make them an easy target for trafficking networks.

5.

There can also be a link between child domestic work and the risk of entering into child prostitution. This link has been observed by the ILO, for example in Tanzania.

6.

According to the ILO, children are engaged in prostitution from around age 10 in Tanzania, Nepal and Jamaica. The growing incidence of child prostitution is sometimes linked to the belief that they are less likely to carry sexuallytransmitted diseases.

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Table 1.1. Child labour according to international conventions Age restrictions by convention UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

General definition Normal circumstances Exceptions

ILO Convention No. 138 on Minimum Age of Employment

ILO Convention No. 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour

Light work

Hazardous work

General definition

18 yearsa

General minimum age 15 yearsb

13 years

18 years

18 years

-

14 yearsc

12 yearsc

16 yearsd

-

a)

There is an exception to that age limit when national legislation considers that majority is attained earlier (Art. 1). b) Not less than compulsory school age and, in any case, not less than 15 years of age. c) When economic and educational facilities are insufficiently developed. d) Under certain strict conditions. Sources: UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; ILO Minimum Age Convention (No. 138); and ILO Worst forms of Child Labour Convention (No. 182).

ILO estimates that 352 million children are economically active… According to ILO, there were almost 352 million economically active children aged 5-17 years in the world in the year 2000. About 60% of them were less than 14 years old (Table 1.2). By region, two working children in three aged 5-14 years were in the Asia and Pacific region, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean Region. Nevertheless, in relative terms Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for the highest proportion of working children for all age groups considered: in this region, almost one child in three aged 5-17 are economically active compared with one in four in the Asia region. In developed economies relatively few children are economically active. However, in 2000, a non-negligible 14 million children aged 5-17 were estimated to have an economic activity, among which almost one in five were 5 to 14 years old. In all regions the incidence of economic activity increases with age. In fact, the employment to population ratio varies the most for the youngest children and the difference tends to narrow with age. There seems to be no significant gender difference in the incidence of economic activity below 15 years of age. At the age of 15-17, the employment to population ratio is 4 points higher for boys than for girls. Nevertheless, the fact that these estimations exclude the provision of domestic services for the family suggests that the incidence of economic activity among girls is underestimated (ILO, 2002a).

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Table 1.2. Economically active children by region and gender, 2000

a

A. Number of working children (in 000s) 5-9 Developed economies Transition economies Asia and Pacific Latin America & Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East & North Africa Totalb Boys Girls Totalb

10-14

800 900 40 000 5 800

1 700 1 500 87 300 11 600

20 900 4 800

27 100 8 600

73 200

137 800

38 100 35 000 73 100

70 900 66 800 137 700

5-14 By region 2 500 2 400 127 300 17 400

15-17

Total

11 500 6 000 86 900 10 300

14 000 8 400 214 200 27 700

18 100 7 500

66 100 20 900

211 000 140 300 By gender 109 000 75 100 101 800 65 800 210 800 140 900

351 300

48 000 13 400

184 100 167 600 351 700

B. Employment to population ratioc Developed economies Transition economies Asia and Pacific Latin America & Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East & North Africa Totalb

1.4 3.1 12.3 10.6

2.8 4.2 26.5 21.5

By region 2.0 4.0 19.0 16.0

31.3 29.1 48.4 35.0

9.0 10.1 25.4 19.9

23.6 10.8

34.7 19.6

29.0 15.0

44.8 31.8

31.9 10.1

12.0

23.0

18.0 42.3 22.8 By gender Boys 12.3 23 17.7 44.1 23.4 Girls 12.0 22.9 17.5 40.7 22.5 Totalb 12.2 23.0 17.6 42.4 23.0 a) ILO defines economic activity in a large sense to include all market production (paid work), certain types of non-market production (unpaid work) and production of goods for own use. Domestic work done in someone else's house is included but domestic work within own household is not. One hour of work during the week of reference suffices to be classified as at having an economic activity. b) According to the ILO, the number of data sets available was reduced for the regional estimates compared to those used for the global estimates. This, jointly with the rounding, explains the difference in the totals by region or by gender. c) The employment to population ratio for each group of age is defined as the percentage of children in economic activity with respect to the total children of this group of age. Source: ILO (2002a).

18

…with 245 million children subject to child labour, of which more than 178 million to its worst forms In 2000, of the 352 million economically active children, 245 million were subject to child labour.7 Three in four were in the group of age 5-14. From the total of child labourers aged 5-17 years, those working in hazardous conditions are estimated to be around 170 million, which represents 70% of all child labour. Boys tend to be more affected by child labour than girls – and even more by hazardous labour – a pattern that intensifies with age (Table 1.3). a

Table 1.3. Child labour by age group and gender, 2000 Boys

Girls

Total

Share of girls in total

Child labourers (000s) 5-11 56 300 53 400 109 700 48.7 12-14 41 500 35 100 76 600 45.8 5-14 97 800 88 500 186 300 47.5 15-17 34 400 24 800 59 200 41.9 Total 132 200 113 300 245 500 46.2 Children in hazardous conditions (as a % of child labourers) 5-11 54.5 55.8 55.2 49.3 12-14 73.7 57.5 66.3 39.8 5-14 62.7 56.5 59.7 44.9 15-17 100.0 100.0 100.0 41.9 Total 72.4 66.0 69.5 43.9 a) Child labour is defined as any regular economic activity done by children aged 5-11; any regular economic activity for those aged 12-14 years of age except “light work”; the hazardous work done by those aged 15 to 17 years; and all the worst forms under 18 years of age. Source : ILO (2002a).

The ILO has estimated that an additional 8.3 million children are subject to the unconditional worst forms of child labour, defined as those worst forms that exclude hazardous work (see Glossary of terms). As the ILO acknowledges, this is a lower bound estimate.8 Forced and bonded labour account for almost 60% of this total, followed by prostitution and pornography. By region, the 7.

Compared to economically active children, child labour excludes all children above age 12 who are working only a few hours a week in permitted “light work” and those above age 15 whose work is not classified as “hazardous”.

8.

The figures for the unconditional worst forms of child labour are based on conservative estimates, as stated in ILO (2002a). A country not offering reliable data is not considered in the regional or global counting and no extrapolation was made from one country to another.

19

unconditional worst forms of child labour are concentrated in the Asia and Pacific Region. Trafficking, prostitution and pornography are the most widespread in Latin America and Asia, but in developed countries, 530 000 children are estimated to be involved in such practices too (Table 1.4).9 Table 1.4. Unconditional worst forms of child labour by region, 2000 Number of children (000s) Traffic

Forced and bonded ..

Armed conflicts

Prostitution and pornography 420

Illicit activities

Totala

Developed .. 1 110 531 economies Transition 200 .. 5 .. .. 5 economies Asia and 250 5 500 120 590 220 6 430 Pacific Latin 550 3 30 750 260 1 043 America & Caribbean Africa 200 210 120 50 .. 380 Total 1 200 5 713 276 1 810 590 8 389 . . Not available. a) In order to avoid double-counting, the total does not include trafficked children. The assumption is that children are generally trafficked into another worst form of child labour, such as prostitution or forced and bonded labour. Source: ILO (2002a).

B. Economic activity of children in SIMPOC countries: incidence and nature Meaningful comparisons between countries are often quite difficult. This partly reflects the fact that the sampling methodology and survey design are country specific, rendering cross-country comparisons complex. However, based on the SIMPOC database and other ILO reports, it is possible to examine patterns of child economic activity in 17 countries.10 The main findings are the following: •

Age and gender: It is generally agreed that older children are more productive and consequently, the returns to economic activity increase with age. In all countries, the data conform to

9.

Table 1.4 gives an estimate of almost 9.5 million for five categories of the worst forms of child labour. Nevertheless, it is assumed that trafficked children end-up in one of the other four categories. For this reason and to avoid double-counting, the estimated 1.2 million trafficked children are subtracted from the total.

10.

See Annex A and Table A2 of this annex for definitions.

20

the vast literature on the subject with the percentage of economically active children systematically increasing with age (Table A3, Annex A). In most cases, for each 5-year age group, boys are slightly more economically active than girls. The activity rate of boys is greater on average by five percentage points than for girls. As will become clear below, however, the nature and intensity of activities undertaken by children varies considerably by gender. •

Regional composition: The incidence of child economic activity is much higher in rural areas than in urban ones (Table A4, Annex A). Moreover, the slightly higher activity rate of boys appears not to be any stronger or significant in either urban or rural areas.

•

Nature of activity: With a rurally concentrated population in the SIMPOC countries, it is not surprising that the majority of working children (usually two-thirds or more) are engaged in agricultural activities (Table A5, Annex A). A distribution by gender reveals that girls are more involved in services than boys (compared to manufacturing/construction and agriculture), but agriculture is still by far their main activity.

•

Status in employment: An overwhelming number of children are engaged in unpaid activities. The vast majority of working children are classified as unpaid family workers (Table A6, Annex A). The percentage of children engaged in unpaid activity decreases with age. This may be consistent with the fact that older children are more productive and perhaps less vulnerable and consequently are able to demand compensation for their activities. As well, a slightly higher proportion of girls is involved in unpaid activities, which is likely due to the fact that girls are more engaged in economic activities related to the family and the household (which is often of an unpaid nature).

•

Reasons for economic activity: Children engage in economic activity as a result of family circumstances and pressures. Assisting family income and obligation or duty to the family (which includes helping pay outstanding debt) are the main reasons why children engage in some form of economic activity (Table A7, Annex A).

21

11.

•

Work intensity: The distribution of hours worked per day is quite variable by country (Table A8, Annex A). However, in six of the sixteen countries for which data are available, more than onethird of children work more than 7 hours per day. This suggests that a large number of children are working full-time. Consequently, there is little time left not only for normal child activities such as playing but also for education and schooling. In terms of gender breakdown, it appears that boys are working slightly more intensively than girls.

•

Injuries: It is often very difficult to make any inference about the incidence of injuries among working children. Of the 15 countries for which data are available, the average injury incidence among working children is nearly 17% (Table A9, Annex A).11 Though the vast majority of injuries occur only occasionally or rarely, the incidence of injuries among children at work is quite high compared to some evidence in developed countries.

•

School attendance: School attendance in the 14 countries with available data varies considerably by age group and gender – ranging between 35% and nearly 100% (Table A10, Annex A). The highest attendance rates are among children aged 10 to 14. This is partially explained by the fact that some children aged 5-9 has not yet reached the compulsory age for school attendance. And, not surprisingly, school attendance declines for children aged 15-17, who also have the highest rate of participation in economic activity. With respect to gender, girls and boys appear to attend school at the same rate until the age of 14. After that age, in nine countries out of fourteen, school attendance is lower for girls than is the case for boys. Furthermore, the school attendance of working children is about 15 points less than is the case for all children but varies a lot between countries, groups of age and gender.

•

Combining school and economic activity: As Table A10 shows, economically active children attend school less frequently than their non-working counterparts, and hence their development may suffer. In fact, Table A11 shows that a significant portion of

The injury incidence among adult workers of the same 15 countries is not available.

22

children combines these two activities. Of the countries with available information, 17% of boys and 15% of girls in rural areas combine schooling and economic activity compared to 10 and 11% in urban areas. Not only are rural children more likely to combine these activities than urban ones, but boys in rural areas combine work and economic activity more often than girls (the opposite is true in urban areas). Consequently, the percentage of children only attending school and not engaged in economic activity is as low as 67% in rural areas and approximately 80% in urban ones.12 Furthermore, there are a number of children that are neither economically active nor attending school. In rural areas, approximately 13 and 16% of boys and girls, respectively, are inactive in this sense. In urban areas, these figures are slightly lower. However, a large number of these children are involved in domestic chores, especially girls. In rural and urban areas, nearly 66 and 59% of the so-called ‘inactive’ girls are involved in domestic chores. For boys, the same figures drop to 51 and 46% respectively. •

Domestic chores: Children engaged in domestic chores within their own household are not considered economically active. However, it is important to stress that girls often spend long hours on domestic activities in order to allow adult members of the household time to work. Table A12 illustrates that indeed in almost all countries, girls are more engaged, and more intensively involved, in domestic activities than boys. In nearly every case, girls undertake household activities for more than four hours per day – a much higher figure compared with boys. Unfortunately, this factor is often ignored in discussions about child labour.

To supplement the analysis on child labour, three case studies, based on national household surveys were undertaken in three different regions. These case studies were carried out by Bhalotra (2003) for Africa (Ethiopia and Ghana), Edmonds (2003) for Asia (Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam) and Couralet (2003) for Latin America (Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela). All studies conclude that when talking about child labour, time spent not only in wage work, but also in household farm/enterprises and in household production must

12.

These figures are based upon a population set that answered questions on school attendance and economic activity.

23

be considered. Focusing only on market work seriously underestimates the extent of child activities and gender differences. Even if considering that comparisons between these case studies are difficult as the definitions of child labour given in the household surveys used vary from country to country, some patterns emerge: a) child labour is a very heterogeneous phenomena and important differences appear among countries in the same area, and even among regions in the same country; b) age and gender play an important role in the incidence of child labour. Child labour increases with age, and boys work in general more than girls but when including domestic chores, the picture is mainly reversed. In most cases, girls work longer hours than boys, negatively affecting their school attendance; c) working children are mainly engaged in agriculture, basically in household farms, and are unpaid; d) no clear pattern emerges on the link between child labour and schooling even if there is some evidence that the first negatively affects the second both in terms of attendance and performance; e) there is no conclusive evidence on the link between household income and the incidence of child labour. Nevertheless these two latter conclusions relate to the determinants of child labour that will be discussed with more detail in Chapter 2 below.

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Chapter 2 ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CHILD LABOUR

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the possible economic causes of child labour and the complex dynamics between this and economic development. This is an important question since effective remedies to eliminate child labour depend on a better understanding of the factors at work. For instance, if labour demand associated with specific low-skilled technologies is the cause, technological upgrading would be the main policy objective. By contrast, if low family income is the main problem, then a range of targeted programmes together with overall growth strategies is the best solution. In practice, child labour is caused by a variety of both demand and supplyside factors. This chapter begins by reviewing the determinants of child labour on the basis of existing studies.13 It then summarises the findings of three case studies conducted for the purpose of this project. Finally, empirical work on the dynamics between child labour and development is discussed. A.

Determinants of the demand of child labour

1. theory

Specific characteristics of child workers: the “nimble fingers”

It has been argued that the specific physical attributes of children influence the demand for child labourers, e.g. their small stature or hands make them particularly effective at performing certain tasks (the “nimble fingers” theory).14 Furthermore, it has been argued that child workers are also more compliant and 13.

Evidence is partly based on a literature review carried out by Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2003).

14.

As an example of the “nimble fingers” model, public attention has focussed on the carpet industry in Pakistan. A 1992 UNICEF report found that 90% of the workers in the carpet-weaving industry in Punjab Province were children. In areas with concentration of industries where children have a comparative advantage because of their “nimble fingers”, wages for children would be higher and this will encourage children to work more.

25

easily disciplined, making them more “attractive” to certain employers in the functioning of the work place. Even if there is some anecdotal evidence that supports this theory, it is debatable that children possess special valuable characteristics. For example, Boyden et al. (1998) find little evidence that children are faster or more accurate than adults. In order to determine the extent to which children have specific and highly valued skills, Diamond and Fayed (1998) estimate the Hicks elasticities of complementarity between adult and child labour in Egypt. They find that adult female labour is a substitute for adult male and child labour, but child and adult male labour are complementary. However, this latter result does not necessarily imply that there are skills that children have that cannot be replicated by adult males. Rather, it is more likely that adult males have special characteristics that children do not have. Likewise, Edmonds (2003) shows that in Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam most children work in activities where their labour is substitutable for adult labour.15 2.

Unskilled labour-intensive technology

Technological advances are also said to play a role in the demand for child labour. Indeed skill-biased technological change can lower the relative demand for unskilled labour including that provided by children. On the other hand, a rise in the demand for skilled labour will raise the return to education, reducing the relative reward of child labour. However, liquidity constraints may make it difficult to respond to this incentive. The evidence on technological change is also mixed. For example, Nardinelli (1980) argues that one of the most important demand-side factors leading to a fall in demand for child labour in English cotton mills in the early part of the 19th century was due to technology advances in steam-driven plants. Cogan (1982) also argues, based on an analysis of census data, that mechanisation in cotton farming lowered the demand for low-skilled agricultural employment in the US between 1950 and 1970. However, there was

15.

This result, combined with evidence that child labour is mainly explained by household-specific factors rather than by community factors, shows that the “nimble fingers” theory has no empirical support in Nepal, Vietnam and Pakistan.

26

considerable variation in child employment across plants using the same technology in the cotton industry.16 While the evidence is not conclusive, it has often been suggested that, from a technological point of view, children are not essential to any phase of industrialisation. Moreover, in many industries in which children work, there is available technology that is being employed in industrialised countries that would completely eliminate tasks that are performed by children in less developing countries. 3.

Economic activity

The level of economic activity can also have a strong impact on the demand for child labour. In equations controlling for adult family income, child labour is markedly pro-cyclical. Moreover, a rise in the unskilled wage increases the number of children employed. Wage effects of this nature are found by Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) for Peru, and by Levison, Moe et Knaul (2001) and Binder and Scrogin (1999) for Mexico. Duryea and Kuenning (2001) find significant wage effects for 14-16 year old urban Brazilian children. The opportunity cost of schooling is measured by the variations in the wages of low-skilled males. 4.

Globalisation

There is also some debate on the possible links between globalisation and child labour. Some think that trade liberalisation will raise the relative return to unskilled labour in developing countries – indeed, unskilled labour is the abundant factor in these countries. This would, in turn, lower the return to education. However, much of the evidence tends to suggest that there is no direct link between globalisation and child labour (Box 2.1).

16.

Whereas, in the south, children and whole families were employed, in the north, employers relied on the employment of young women. This may reflect supplyside factors (Cogan, 1982).

27

Box 2.1. Child labour and globalisation: a review of selected studies Ranjan (2001) considers the inter-relationship between trade and the returns to education within the context of credit constraints. He models an economy that has a comparative advantage in unskilled labour-intensive goods. Credit-constrained parents are able to make a transition out of the child-labour equilibrium only after the wage of unskilled adults rises above the subsistence level. Once the unskilled wage rises sufficiently that one generation of unskilled parents is able to educate one generation of children, the family makes the transition to a high-wage/educated-labour path. Thus, all subsequent generations of children are educated as well. Openness will tend to lower the return to skilled labour and raise the return to unskilled labour. If the return to education remains strongly positive but families with unskilled labour are credit-constrained, then trade openness will relax the credit constraint. More children will become educated even though trade lowers the return to an education. Jafarey and Lahiri (2002) further explore the impact of trade openness and credit constraints. A reduction in the interest rate raises the present discounted value of education. Thus, to the extent that openness implies access to credit at a rate below that prevailing on the domestic market, child labour is reduced and educational attainment is increased. Basu et al. (2002) find similar results based on a modified framework which provides for the possibility that labour markets in developing countries are not fully integrated into world markets. Cigno et al. (2002) estimate equations where child labour depends on real per capita income, health policy and skill composition. Their results are rather ambiguous. If skill composition is not controlled for, trade raises the incidence of child labour but has no effect on school attendance. If skill composition is controlled for, openness has no significant effect on child labour or school attendance. If trade openness is measured by the Sachs-Warner index, trade openness reduces child labour. Shelburne (2001) undertakes similar empirical analysis, finding that child labour is negatively correlated with income and trade openness. Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) review the available empirical evidence for Vietnam, focusing on the 1993 liberalisation of the rice market. Between 1993 and 1998, the average price of rice rose 29% compared to the consumer price index in Vietnam. They find that a 30% increase in the price of rice is associated with a 10 percentage point reduction in the probability of a child working. Further, the impact is stronger for rural children who are most likely to be engaged in rice production. This result masks two contradictory trends: a rise in child labour among land-less families, which is outweighed by a fall among land-holding families. The rise in the incidence of child labour in landless families when rice prices rise appears to be a consequence of the increase in the wages paid to children. Therefore, for poor families, the income effect associated with the rise in the adult wage on child labour is offset by the higher opportunity cost of education associated with a rise in child wages. By contrast, in land-holding families, the rise in the price of rice also raises the price of land. This either relaxes the credit constraint or improves family income sufficiently to reduce child labour.

28

B. The role of poverty, lack of education opportunities and other supply-side factors 1.

Household income, poverty and credit constraints

Clearly, there is a very strong cross-country negative correlation between child labour and per capita GDP. The common perception is that child labour is bound by household poverty (Grootaert and Kanbur, 1995; Hamid, 1994; and the US Department of Labor, 2000). However, the evidence is not so robust. In Latin America, Couralet (2003) finds a weak relationship between the household’s total income and child labour, especially in Colombia and Venezuela. By contrast, Edmonds (2003) finds that living standards, as measured by per capita expenditure, appear to be a key determinant of child labour supply in Pakistan and Vietnam (see Box 2.1). The relationship between income inequality and child labour at the macroeconomic level has been stressed by different authors. For example, Ranjan (2001) finds that in an economy where child labour is inefficient, meaning that the return to education outweighs the return to children’s work, greater income inequality is associated with more child labour. On the contrary, Rogers and Swinnerton (2000) emphasise that increased inequality reduces child labour in economies that cannot support the entire population without child labour. More specifically, according to the latter study, in higher productivity countries, a more equal income distribution can reduce or eliminate child labour, but the opposite hold true in low-productivity countries. In this case, only the highest-income families survive without sending their children to work but a more equal distribution of income could also lower their income, pushing their children to work. Other authors have examined the key role of adult labour and wages in determining child labour providing an important insight to the role of family income in affecting choices between child labour and school attendance. For example, Basu and Van (1998) present a model in which altruistic parents withdraw their children from the labour force once adult wages have reached some critical level. As a consequence, the supply of labour is increasing in the wage below this critical level, and once that level is reached, parents begin withdrawing their children from the labour force. Consequently, the supply of labour begins to bend back. Once child labour has been reduced to zero, the supply of labour resumes its upward slope.17 Such models form the basis for 17.

In that model, the demand for labour may intersect the supply of labour more than once showing two stable equilibria: a low-wage equilibrium characterised by child labour and a high-wage equilibrium in which children are attending

29

policy intervention through compulsory education policies, as the best way to eliminate the low-wage equilibrium. The broader literature tends to support that it is not so much the absolute level of family income that matters for the child labour decision but, rather, the current level relative to future income. As well, the role of family income is not so predominant in explaining variations of child labour within a community. Consequently, it has been argued that household income often indirectly affects the child labour decision through other factors: •

An important strand of the literature indicates that child labour arises when families are credit-constrained (Parsons and Goldin, 1989; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Baland and Robinson, 2000).18 For example, if parents expect family income to be rising over time (e.g. because they will send children to school), they may find it optimal to “borrow” against the future to smooth consumption across time. However, if parents do not have access to credit markets, they have to turn to internal assets. In the child labour scenario, parents “borrow” from the future by putting their children to work rather than investing in human capital that will make their children more productive later on.

•

Moreover, in economic environments in which insurance cannot be purchased at an actuarially fair price, some studies find that parents may be motivated to have children as a form of insurance, particularly when land tenure rights are uncertain (Pörtner, 2001; De Vany and Sanchez, 1977).

•

Finally, economic crisis and its effect on income volatility can affect household-decision making through a number of channels. For families that are credit-constrained or lack access to employment insurance, children may be withdrawn from school and put to work in order to cope with the negative effects of an

school. Developing countries may be stuck in this low-wage child labour equilibrium. The low-wage child labour trap is characteristic of a number of dynamic models as well. 18.

Empirical evidence concerning the role of credit constraints and educational attainment across countries can be found in Dehejia and Gatti (2002) and in Jacoby and Skoufias (1997) for India.

30

economic downturn.19 To the extent that it is used to stabilise income, child labour will be correlated with the severity and frequency of negative income shocks. 2.

Household assets

A remarkable stylised fact that emerges from the analysis of micro-data for several developing countries is that, on average, the children of land-rich households are more likely to work and also less likely to be in school than the children of land-poor households.20 Since land is the most important store of wealth in rural societies and a substantial fraction of households do not own land, this challenges the commonly held presumption that child labour emerges from the poorest households. In the presence of labour and land market failures, a family with large land holdings may use the children to work the land rather than invest in human capital.21 For instance, optimal use of the land may require child labour inputs if there are significant monitoring and moral hazard issues with hired labour. This is consistent with the fact that a household must be sufficiently asset-rich to create employment opportunities for children. In the very poorest households, there may be a need for children to work but there may be no work available within or outside the household. In this way, it is expected that there would be little child labour in the very poorest households, its incidence increasing, at least initially, with household assets. The continuing accumulation of wealth will tend to make child labour redundant among the richest households, at which point the allocation of child time between work and school will depend only upon relative returns. Bhalotra (2003) finds that in Ghana, households with working children are relatively poor but the relation between child work and household poverty is non-linear. Furthermore, there is evidence that landholdings (owned or not) increase the probability that children work and decrease the probability that they attend school.

19.

There is considerable evidence that families adjust children’s activity in response to shocks in developing countries. See Jacoby and Skoufias (1997), Duryea (1998), Behrman, Duryea and Szekely (1999), Skoufias and Parker (2001).

20.

See Bhalotra and Heady (2000).

21.

Skoufias (1995) emphasises the importance of the difficulties that families may have employing labour or leasing land in India. There may be, for example, lower monitoring costs associated with the use of family labour.

31

3.

Intra and extra-household bargaining power

Some authors sustain that a bargaining failure found inside or outside the household contributes to increasing child labour. For example, Alderman and King (1998) argue that cultural factors may limit the ability of young female workers to make remittances to their parents. Parents would then have a lower incentive to invest in girls’ education and are less reluctant to send them to work. Moreover, considering that parents maximise a weighted family welfare function, the bargaining power of the components of the household will determine the different weights.22 In that sense, Basu and Ray (2001) find that a balance of power between parents in the household is likely to reduce child labour compared with cases where the decision making process is concentrated in the hands of a single parent. Regarding extra-household bargaining power, Genicot (1998) suggests that even when parents are altruistic towards their children, bargaining with the parent’s employer may give rise to child labour. In a context of very low levels of income and nutritional scarcity, it is expected that a higher wage would make the worker more productive through the improvement of its nutrition. However, some of this wage increase may be spent to increase the consumption of other family members. In order to internalise that leakage, the employer may seek to employ all members of the family, including the spouse and children. 4.

Parental education

Parental education plays a persistent and significant role in lowering the incidence of child labour, above and beyond the impact on family income (Brown et al., 2003). However, in the African case study the results concerning the effects of parents’ education seem to be complex (Bhalotra, 2003). Compared to mothers with no education, mothers with primary education are more likely to have boys in work and less likely to have girls in work. Mothers’ secondary education has the reverse effect. Fathers’ primary education has a smaller effect than mothers’ primary education, but a larger effect at the secondary level.

22.

As stated in Kanbur and Haddad (1994), households where mothers have a higher bargaining power than fathers, spend more on clothes and food and less on tobacco and alcohol.

32

5.

Education and compulsory attendance

The expected return to education plays an obvious role in parents’ decision to send their children to school. To the extent that school attendance does not leave time for other major activities, the return to education will influence child labour. In a study of child labour in Africa, Bhalotra (2003) finds that children involved in herding, child minding and domestic work have the lowest enrolment rates, suggesting that these time-intensive activities conflict most with school attendance. Finally, it has often been argued that improving access to schools may raise school attendance at the expense of child labour. It is then expected that the rate of return to education would be affected by the reduction of school costs (including school distances) as well as by the improvement of the quality of education. Moreover, as discussed by many authors, parents’ decision to educate their children may depend on whether they are altruistic or not. As stressed by Baland and Robison (2000), when parents are altruistic and have free access to capital markets, investment in children’s education will be efficient. But if parents are non-altruistic, they will want to maximise their own income.23 They will have some set of rules requiring each child to pay a certain amount when they become adult. This amount is a function of human capital formation activity and childhood consumption. Time inconsistency of the arrangement may lead to the possibility that children will not make the transfer to their parents. The result is that non-altruistic parents have lower incentives to invest in their children’s education. Some argue that to the extent that compulsory schooling laws affect attendance, they can indirectly affect the incidence of child labour. However, the empirical evidence on the impact of legislation of school attendance is ambiguous. Angrist and Krueger (1991) find a statistically significant effect of compulsory schooling laws in the United States. On the other hand, Margo and Finegan (1996) analyse the schooling choices of 14-year-olds reported in the 1900 federal census and conclude that the laws had no discernible effect on the probability of fulltime school attendance. Even with this ambiguity, it is not clear that school attendance necessarily impedes child labour – it is certainly not a sufficient condition. In Brazil, seven out of eight working children also attend school. Stylised facts in Africa suggest that children often combine work and school attendance, presumably because both household-based work and school schedules are relatively flexible. In Ghana, three in four boys and two in three 23.

Statistical evidence of non-altruistic parents can be found in Burra (1995), Gupta (2000), and Parsons and Goldin (1989).

33

girls working on the household farm also attend school. Similarly, virtually all boys and almost half of the girls combine working on the household enterprise with going to school.24 Anker (2000) concludes that working two to three hours per day does not affect the schooling decision. Of course, all depends on how much time children spend working: in Ethiopia, enrolled children have a heavy workload (three hours per school day and ten hours per weekend), which appears to negatively affect school performance as measured by exam results. C.

The worst forms of child labour: some explanations

There is a general belief that children are far better off not being involved in the worst forms of child labour. Yet, why do these activities persist? It has sometimes been argued that the demand for some of the worst forms of child labour, mainly sexual exploitation and drug trafficking, can be related to the special physical features children have.25 Children are in general more vulnerable and easy to influence and control, which is why they become an easy target for these exploitative practices. Even if these demand factors prevail in some cases, other factors related to parents’ decision-making process probably play a more important role. These factors include: a) cases where parents do not have any option (e.g. when children are taken away from their families and then trafficked); b) cases where parents prefer to ignore the harm that this kind of work can have on their children for different reasons; or c) cases where parents think that the best thing for their children is to put them to work, but they ignore the real conditions of the activities they perform. In that sense, Rogers and Swinnerton (2002) take the case of parents who want to maximise their children’s utility but have imperfect information on whether their children will end up in an exploitative situation or not. Some unscrupulous employers will take advantage of this imperfect information situation. Under this model, a ban of those worst forms of child labour is desirable and will lead to Pareto efficiency equilibrium. On the contrary, other authors like Dessy and Pallage (2002), argue that banning the worst forms of 24.

But school attendance does not necessarily result in good school performance. In fact, Heady (2000) finds that in Ghana, working negatively affects school performance, even though it does not affect school attendance.

25.

Some argue that children are valued runners in drug trafficking because they are more difficult to detect by law enforcement officials and, once caught, the punishment is less severe than for adults. As to sexual exploitation, children are reportedly preferred to adults because they are less likely to carry sexuallytransmitted diseases, as already noted.

34

child labour would be undesirable unless accompanied by poverty alleviation mechanisms. They suggest that it can not be ignored that in poor countries, these activities play a non-negligible economic role. The wage premium the worst forms of child labour have over the other forms of labour explains that parents tolerate their children’s participation in such harmful activities. Banning them without any compensatory mechanisms for the households, would make them worse off. D. Determinants of child labour in selected case studies: main findings 1.

Case study of Ethiopia and Ghana (Bhalotra, 2003)

As seen in Chapter 1, the incidence of child labour is higher in subSaharan Africa than in any other region in the world. Moreover, while the incidence of child labour in Asia and Latin America has witnessed a secular decline in the post-war era, this is not the case in sub-Saharan Africa. Slow or negative economic growth, war and conflict, poor governance and the spread of HIV/AIDS are all likely to have contributed to keeping the incidence of child labour high. Moreover, the trend may worsen as a result of demographic explosion of impoverished people, deterioration in living standards, incapacity of education systems to cater to all children and inadequate levels of economic growth across the continent. Considering that it is difficult to generalise across the experiences of different African countries, this case study has focussed on the analysis of the household surveys available in Ethiopia and Ghana.26 A characteristic of many African countries – more than in Asia or Latin America – is that many children do not live in their parental household mainly as a result of child fostering and orphanhood. Whereas the first has a long history in Africa the second is a recent but explosive phenomenon associated mainly with both war and HIV/AIDS.27 There is not much evidence on the links between foster 26 .

For Ghana, the data used come from the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) collected by the Ghana Statistical Service in co-operation with the LSMS team of the World Bank. For Ethiopia, data come from a survey on Ethiopian households that resulted from a joint effort between the Economics Department of Addis Abeba University (AAU) and the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE) in Oxford.

27.

Africa accounts for the greatest proportion of orphaned children in the world. In 2001, 34 million children in Sub Saharan Africa were orphans, one-third due to the AIDS epidemy. And it is estimated that, by 2010, the number of orphans will reach 42 million. Twenty million of these children – or almost 6% of all children in Africa – will be orphaned due to AIDS (USAID, 2002).

35

children or orphans and child labour. However, it seems that orphans are less likely to be in school than non-orphans with whom they co-reside, suggesting that distant relatives invest less in orphaned children than in their own children. Data for Ethiopia and Ghana support the hypothesis that biological children of the household head are less likely to work than other children. Concerning the nature of child labour in these two countries, the study shows that child labour is more widespread in Ethiopia, the poorest of the two countries, and starts at an earlier age than in Ghana.28 This may be associated with the fact that the net enrolment rate in primary school in Ethiopia is the lowest in the world. Girls often suffer a relative disadvantage in terms of school enrolment but this problem is somewhat less acute in Ghana compared to Ethiopia. Both countries have “inactive” children who neither work nor go to school, but the proportion is higher in Ghana. As in most African countries, most working children are engaged in agricultural activities, employed mainly on household-run farms or enterprises.29 Farm work is often a half-time activity for children, although there is quite a dispersion in work hours around the mean. This permits most children combining work and school, which is mainly explained by the fact that both household-based work and school-schedules are relatively flexible.30 Other variables related to specific attributes of both the children and the parents as well as community characteristics play also a role but their importance differs from country to country. For example, in Ghana: a) being the first child makes it more likely to work as does being a child not of the household head; b) household size does not play a major role;, and contrary to what is often asserted, working girls appear to come from relatively small households; c) girls are clearly more likely to work if they come from femaleheaded households; d) working children are more likely to be found in households where a parent is absent suggesting that adult migration plays an important role in the incidence of child labour, e) child labour is negatively correlated with the level of parent’s education, the effect of mother’s education being more striking than that of fathers.

28 .

In Ethiopia, more than half of all children aged 4-15 identify work as their main activity whereas in Ghana 40% of children aged 7-14 do so. Although work participation increases rapidly with age, half of children begin to work very young in Ethiopia (at age 5).

29 .

In Ghana, work on the household farm engages 49% of boys and 44% of girls aged 7-17, while less than 1% report any employment outside the household.

30.

This happens more in Ghana than in Ethiopia.

36

The case study demonstrates that in both countries there exists a trade-off between working and schooling, in terms of either attendance or performance. Although work does not seem to affect so much school attendance in Ghana, it does impact negatively on school performance. In Ethiopia school enrolment is very low, drop-out rates very high and consequently the average number of school years is low. In this country, the activities performed by children are often incompatible with school attendance.31 Moreover, the Ethiopian data indicate that child labour also negatively affects the other important dimension of human capital, namely health. Even if it is difficult to establish the direction of causality in these relationships, the Ethiopian data show that healthier children are more likely to be active than inactive and more likely to attend school than working. The relation between child labour and household poverty is weak. Evidence suggests that income effects on child labour are surprisingly small, being larger for girls than boys and for schooling than for work. On the other hand, there is considerable support to the idea that landholdings (owned or not) increase the probability that children work and decrease the probability that they attend school, the “wealth paradox”. For instance, in Ghana children of landrich households are more likely to be engaged in work. In the case of girls, the work-increasing effect of land-size persists even after controlling for household income and other variables. In Ethiopia, it is not land acreage but land slope which raises the work participation of girls. Ownership of draught animals and tools, on the other hand, reduces the work of boys. The study states that trade sanctions or minimum wages are unlikely to have much of an impact on child labour in Africa. On the contrary, as relative returns to work matter, measures that improve both the functioning of labour and land markets and increase the returns to schooling will help reduce child labour. It must be nevertheless considered that policies that draw children into school may not necessarily draw them out of work. The study concludes that the appropriate response to combat child labour depends on the nature of the problem and on the country’s administrative and institutional framework as well as the commitment and enforcement capacity of governments to combat it. There is no single model but on the contrary, once analysed the nature of the problem, policies must be tailored to particular needs. They should also be directed to address the underlying constraints and incentive 31.

In Ethiopia, herding, child minding and domestic work are activities clearly incompatible with school attendance. The most cited reason behind nonenrolment is the need to work, suggesting that poverty drives child labour and low enrolment.

37

structure of the household that make parents prefer to send their children to work. Beyond policy design, policy implementation requires “good governance”. 2.

Case study of Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam (Edmonds, 2003)

One key finding of the case study on Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam32 is that supply-side factors, such as family income and household characteristics, lie at the heart of the child labour problem. By contrast, the “nimble fingers” theory and other demand-side explanations would play an insignificant role. The study examines the activities performed by children in the labour market, i.e. those activities which give rise to a monetary remuneration. But, importantly, it also looks at the unpaid work such as household production activities. It emerges that there are significant substitution effects between the two types of activities – so that it is important for policy to focus on both. The three countries vary in terms of labour participation of children, which includes both wage work and the unpaid work done inside and outside the household. For example, in Vietnam, 22% of children aged 6-15 participate in labour market while in Pakistan and Nepal this figure reaches levels of 42% and 46% respectively. However, in all three countries, most children work for their own household in agriculture and wage work is very rare. When analysing the reasons why children work in Nepal, Pakistan and Vietnam, a distinction is made between factors related to the child, the household and the community in which working children live. Among personal attributes, even if there are many striking similarities across all three countries, the determination of the labour supply of girls relative to boys appears to be very different. Gender explains little of the variation in household work in Vietnam, but explains over 10% of the variation in household work in Nepal. Moreover, birth order influences the labour supply of boys and girls equally in Vietnam, but affects substantially more the labour supply of girls than boys in Nepal. Girls are more likely to work overall in Nepal but are less likely to participate in work outside the household. There are major differences in the labour market behaviour of girls vis-à-vis boys in Pakistan. It is unusual for girls in this country to participate in any form of market work. 32 .

Data on Nepal come from the Nepal Labour Force Survey 1999 (NLFS). For Pakistan, data come from the Pakistan Child Labour Survey conducted with the help of the ILO in 1996 (PCLS) and the Pakistani Integrated Household Survey conducted in 1991 (PIHS). Data on Vietnam come from the 1993 and 1998 waves of the Vietnam Living Standards Surveys (VNLSS).

38

Aside from gender differences in labour supply that might have a cultural component, there is some evidence of child labour persistence within household through time. More generally, household specific factors have a higher influence on the incidence of child labour than personal attributes or factors related to the community. Among the household characteristics, the most important are the earnings opportunities available to children within the household, household composition and living standards. Regarding the first, as employment within the household appears more flexible than outside it, households with farms or enterprises are more likely to have working children, even if they are likely to work relatively few hours. Household composition clearly influences child labour supply but it is not possible to identify whether it works through the value of the child’s marginal product in work or the household’s marginal utility of consumption.33 Finally, living standards are a key determinant of child labour as evidence shows that both in Pakistan and Vietnam improvements in the first translates in declines of the second.34 As already mentioned, community attributes are not a key factor behind child labour.35 There is no evidence of a correlation between the presence of an industry in a community and child labour. This is taken as an evidence in this study that the “nimble fingers” view does not apply in these countries. On the contrary, child labour supply is very responsive to variations in household attributes and especially to household living standards. This permits to conclude that policies to combat child labour should be oriented to changing the incentive structure of the household within the context of a poverty alleviation approach. According to the study, policies that recognize explicitly the determinants of child labour supply may be more effective than policies that attempt to 33.

For example, each younger sibling appears to increase household production time for children by 1 hour a week in Vietnam and by 1.5 hours for girls in Nepal. Adding a younger brother increases hours in market work by approximately 2 hours per week in both Vietnam and Nepal.

34.

In Vietnam, in the period 1993-1998, improvements in living standards explained 94% of the decline in market work for households near the poverty line.

35.

In both Nepal and Vietnam around 60% of the variation in household work (65% for market work) is between households. Differences in age and gender can explain 22% of the variation in household work in Nepal and 23% in Vietnam (12 and 14 respectively for market work). Community attributes explain 15% of the variation in household production in Nepal and 17% in Vietnam (25 and 22% respectively for market work). But even these estimates overstate the importance of community attributes, as household attributes within communities are likely to be correlated.

39

eliminate or restrict child labour demand. Limiting the demand of child labour can just lower household income and leave households worse off, having no effect on the return to schooling. Secondly, efforts to modify the child’s working environment to make child labour more compatible with schooling and leisure may reduce the costs of child labour without punishing households for needing to send children to work. Finally, recognizing that part of the reason children work is because of missing markets for the goods and services children provide to the household suggests that policies that either promote these markets or provide substitutes for the contribution of children may lead to large reductions in child labour. 3.

Case study of Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela (Couralet, 2003)

The main findings of the case study on Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela36, relate to the strong complementarity between the work done by children and the work done by adults. In the decision to send children to work the nature of parents’activity plays an important role, as do the perceived return to education. On the contrary, household income plays a non-negligible role but seems to be weaker than expected. In these three countries the incidence of child labour presents great disparities among the rural and urban areas. In Venezuela the incidence of child labour is lower than in Brazil and Colombia, and its nature is very different too as working children are mainly in the service sector and industry represents almost the double than in the other two countries. In fact, 4.4% of children aged 10-14 declared to have an economic activity in Venezuela compared to 16.6% in Brazil and 12% in Colombia. In these two later countries, most working children are found in agriculture (61% and 55% respectively) and are mainly not paid, whereas this figure falls to 36% in Venezuela. On the contrary, in Venezuela 49% children work in the service sector. Moreover, in the three countries, between 4-8% of children declare themselves as inactive, not working not at school. Nevertheless, among those, a majority of girls are in fact working on domestic chores whereas boys tend to be involved in illicit activities.

36 .

The household surveys used in this study come from the LSMS system of the World Bank and were conducted in 1998. For Brazil, data come from the survey “Pesquisa Nacional per Amostragem a Domicilio (PNAD)” that covers children aged 10-14. In Colombia the survey used was “Encuesta Nacional de HogaresFuerza de Trabajo (ENH)” directed to children aged 12-14. A different questionnaire was used nevertheless for rural and urban areas. In Venezuela the survey used was “Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo” for children aged 10-14.

40

When looking at child labour and school attendance, one in eight working children do not attend school in Brazil. This proportion increases greatly to one in two working children in Colombia. This translates into different intensity of child labour among these countries with Brazil having the lowest percentage of children working full time. In fact, in Venezuela and Colombia three working children out of four declare to work more than 20 hours per week compared to half of the working children in Brazil showing that the work done by those children could not easily be qualified as “light work”. Working children that also attend to school tend to work less hours than those only working but when adding the time spent at school and the time spent at work, they clearly have longer journeys than those working only. After the statistical analysis of the incidence and nature of child labour in the three countries, the study focuses on the links between child labour and school attendance, as well as on the links between child labour and the household’s structure and income. Concerning school attendance of working children, it is found that in rural areas it do not differ of their non-working counterparts. On the contrary, in urban ones, working children have a higher probability of suffering delays in their scholarity. Among the household characteristics explaining the supply of child labour, the size of the household and the proportion of active adults in the household are clearly positively correlated with child labour. Referring to income, even if most children are not paid for the work they do, the study shows that their income represents about half of the income received by an unskilled adult worker. Moreover, children’s income represents between 1/6 and 1/3 of the total household income. This proportion is higher in rural areas than in urban ones, as well it is higher for boys compared to girls. In view of the high wage rate of children, it is difficult to argue that employers demand child labour because of its lower cost.37 The econometric analysis of the supply of child labour offers additional conclusions on the interaction between the decision to send children to work or to school. As expected, there is a negative link between child labour and the household level of income, but this is weak. Moreover, in the three countries, doubling the household income would not be enough to eliminate child labour. Other variables linked to the rate of return of education, like the local rate of non-scholarisation or the level of parents’ education seem to play a more 37 .

In Colombia and Venezuela, children’s wage rate represents 75% of the wage rate of unskilled workers. In Brazil the percentage is lower but still in accordance with the lower marginal productivity of children’s labour compared to adults.

41

important role in the decision to send children to work. Also, in the decision to send children to work, parents’ activity is fundamental. In particular, it is shown that child labour complements adult labour instead of substituting it, meaning that parents send their children to work to complement the work they do. This is specially the case, when parent’s activity is of a non-wage nature, which explains why a majority of working children are found in household-run farms or enterprises. Finally, this study concludes, as in many other cases, that because child labour is a multi-dimensional problem, public policies that impact its incidence are not necessarily policies whose main objective is to combat it. In addition to programmes that target child labour, the role of education policies and conditional tuition grant measures is specially highlighted in that study. Special importance should be given to increasing the rate of return to education. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to improve children’s access to a good quality education system. Parent’s attitudes towards their children’s work also need to change. The provision of financial aids to families, conditioned to children’s school attendance, could be an effective way to attain that objective too. E.

Labour force participation of children: some simple correlations

This section presents some cross-country correlations between the labour force participation rate of those aged 10-14 and a number of factors. In doing so, the analysis will revisit where possible some of the determinants of child labour discussed in the previous section. The main sources of these data are the World Bank Indicators (2002) and the UNDP Human Development Indicators (2002). The results are presented in Chart 2.1 to Chart 2.6 for which the countries included vary due to data availability. Such simple statistical analysis proves to be useful in understanding which variables have an influence on child labour.38 However, no causality relationship should be inferred from it. 1.

Trade openness is usually associated with lower child labour

Trade liberalisation has received a great deal of attention in the area of child labour with much of the literature focusing on developing countries (see Box 2.1). Some suggest that trade liberalisation may augment the incidence of child labour, notably if it were to reduce the returns to education. On the other hand, trade openness is said to relax credit constraints, which is seen by many

38.

In this section most of the references to “child labour” have to be interpreted in the broader sense of economic activity of children aged 10 to 14.

42

authors as a non-negligible determinant of the household’s decision to supply child labour. However, though some of the literature is mixed, there is little or no empirical evidence to support that increases in trade activity, or globalisation, intensifies the incidence of children participating in the labour market. There is some evidence to suggest that the opposite is true. In fact, there is a slight negative correlation between trade openness, as conventionally measured, (imports plus exports divided by Gross Domestic Product in purchasing power parity terms) and the incidence of child labour (Chart 2.1). 2. Education quality (but not spending) tends to be correlated with child labour The importance of increasing the returns to education should be emphasised. However, the evidence concerning educational factors and child labour is far from robust. In fact, there is little or no correlation between the combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio and labour force participation of children aged 10-14 (correlation coefficient of 0.02). Moreover, with a correlation coefficient of zero, there also appears to be no relationship between public education expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures and the incidence of child labour.39 Interestingly, in contrast to the lack of correlation concerning education expenditures, there appears to be a weak positive relationship (R-squared of .45) between the pupilteacher ratio, a crude measure of education quality, and children’s labour force participation (Chart 2.2).40

39.

There is also no evidence of a link between education expenditures as a percentage of GDP (or changes) and the incidence of child labour. Furthermore, there is little or no evidence of a link between pre-primary and primary education expenditures as a percentage of total education expenditures and child labour.

40.

A simple multivariate analysis was undertaken that regressed public education expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditures, the pupil/teacher ratio in pre-primary and primary education expenditures as a percentage of total education expenditures and other variables (GDP per capita, trade openness and life expectancy at birth) against labour force participation of children aged 10 to 14. An attempt was made to run a similar regression using the ratio of teachers to school-age population but it was not possible to obtain a significant number of common observations. However, no attempt has been made to introduce school costs to the analysis due to the absence of proxies measuring them.

43

Chart 2.1. Labour force participation of children and trade openness, 1999

a,b

Labour force participation (10-14) 60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0 y = -11.106Ln(x) + 47.743 2

R = 0.2314 20.0

10.0

0.0 0.0

10.0

20.0

30.0

40.0

50.0

60.0

70.0

80.0

90.0

Trade openness (% of GDP, PPP)c

Note: Any conclusions should be moderated since child labour is not restricted to the age group 10 to 14. a) The countries included in the calculation are based upon availability of both variables. b) The correlation is based on data from 79 countries. c) Trade openness is calculated as the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP (in PPP, USD). Source: OECD estimates based on World Bank (2002).

44

a,b

Chart 2.2. Labour force participation of children and the quality of education, 1998 Labour force participation (10-14) 60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0

20.0 y = 0.725x - 6.0067 R2 = 0.4525 10.0

0.0 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Pupil-teacher ratioc

Note: Any conclusions should be moderated since child labour is not restricted to the age group 10 to 14. a) See Note a) to Chart 2.1. b) The correlation presented incorporates data from 85 countries. c) Primary school pupil-teacher ratio is the number of pupils enrolled in primary school divided by the number of primary school teachers (regardless of their teaching assignment). Source: OECD estimates based on World Bank (2002).

3. There is no automatic link between higher economic growth and lower child labour The review of the determinants of child labour reveals that family income and household assets may compel families to send children to work. Therefore, on a macroeconomic level, not surprisingly, when the labour force participation of children aged 10-14 is plotted against GDP per capita, a strong negative correlation is present (Chart 2.3). However, there are a large number of variables that are correlated with GDP per capita that may, in fact, be driving the correlation between income and child labour. For example, high-income countries also have welldeveloped capital markets. Thus, as witnessed in Subsection B, credit-constrained households may choose to use child labour to transfer income from the future into the present when current income is low relative to future income.41

41.

In fact, in the multivariate analysis undertaken, mentioned heretofore, per capita GDP PPP was not a significant determinant of variations in children’s labour force participation.

45

Chart 2.3. Labour force participation of children and GDP per capita, 2000

a,b

Labour force participation (10-14)

60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0 y = -13.567Ln(x) + 123.93 R2 = 0.5874 20.0

10.0

0.0 0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

-10.0 GDP per capita, PPP (USD)

Note: Any conclusions should be moderated since child labour is not restricted to the age group 10 to 14. a) See Note a) to Chart 2.1. b) The correlation is based on data from 83 countries. Sources: OECD estimates based on World Bank (2002) and UNDP (2002).

To examine in more detail this relationship, a dynamic analysis of the evolution of GDP per capita and the evolution of the participation of children in the labour market from 1980 to 2000 was undertaken. The evidence reveals that countries where growth in GDP per capita has been the strongest, are not the countries where the reductions in the incidence of children’s participation have been largest. Consequently, it appears that policies promoting economic growth as a means to eradicate child labour are not enough. Moreover, there is no relationship between the incidence of participation in 1980 and the growth in per capita GDP in PPPs experienced between 1980 and 2000. Still, it is difficult to argue that income does not play a fundamental role in helping to eradicate child labour, but apparently the relationship is not a direct one and growth in itself is an insufficient policy tool.

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4. labour

There is a close link between poverty, human development and child

As it is broadly accepted that a higher income does not necessarily correspond with better living conditions, GDP per capita seems to be an imperfect measure of poverty. Nevertheless, there is no universally accepted definition of poverty, making it also difficult to measure.42 Following UNICEF (2001), two definitions of poverty can be used: income-poverty and basic-needs poverty.43 These definitions correspond with two additional indicators: the percentage of the population below the national income poverty line and the UNDP’s human poverty index (HPI).44 Considering income poverty, a weak positive relationship with child labour is observed, as shown in Chart 2.4. When taking poverty in a broader sense, that encompasses factors other than income, there is an even stronger positive correlation (Chart 2.5). Consequently, it is difficult to argue that poverty in a broader sense (including such factors as living standards and quality of life) is not an important factor to consider in the context of child labour. Though the same caveats mentioned above should be taken into account when considering these correlations, clearly the elimination of poverty should play a role in the eradication of child labour – not to mention the other benefits that reducing poverty, especially among children, would bring (UNICEF, 2001). Another indicator which also seems to be a better proxy of living standards than GDP per capita when talking about child labour, is a measure of economic development. In that sense, the Human Development Index, developed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), is one possibility. As shown in Chart 2.6, there is a strong negative correlation between the labour force 42.

A household can be considered poor because of inadequate income, because of unmet basic needs such as education, health and nutrition, or both. The selection of relevant indicators and their respective weight remains a subject for debate.

43.

Income-poverty is defined as insufficient income to buy a minimum basket of goods and services and basic-needs poverty is interpreted as the lack of basic capabilities to live in dignity. The latter goes beyond a definition of poverty as a strictly material condition and recognises poverty’s characteristics such as frequent illness, low birth weight, low education, social or political marginalisation, discrimination based on gender, age or any other ground.

44.

The international community commonly defines the poverty line as USD 1 per day per person, expressed in PPPs to adjust for differences in prices between countries. According to this definition, the World Bank estimated that in 1998, 1.2 billion people in the world were living in poverty. A further 1.5 billion were in marginally better conditions (with less than USD 2 per day and person).

47

participation of children aged 10 to 14 and the human development index. However, critics argue that this development measure is too simplistic in nature and it is difficult to establish what is driving this relationship. Furthermore, the composite HDI constitutes a number of indicators such as school enrolment and life expectancy at birth, which themselves are highly correlated. Chart 2.4. Labour force participation of children and income poverty, 2000

a,b

Labour force participation (10-14)

60.0

50.0

40.0 y = 0.3872x + 7.2965 R2 = 0.2412

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Percentage of population below national income poverty linec

Note: Any conclusions should be moderated since child labour is not restricted to the age group 10 to 14. a) See Note a) to Chart 2.1. b) The correlation is based on data from 59 countries. c) Data refer to the most recent year available during the period 1987 and 2000. Sources: OECD estimates based on World Bank (2002) and UNDP (2002).

48

Chart 2.5. Labour force participation of children and human poverty index, 2000

a,b

Labour force participation (10-14)

60.0

50.0

40.0 y = 0.7759x - 4.0808 2 R = 0.6556

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

-10.0 Human Poverty Index (value in %)c

Note: Any conclusions should be moderated since child labour is not restricted to the age group 10 to 14. a) See Note a) to Chart 2.1. b) The correlation is based on data from 59 countries. c) The Human Poverty Index is calculated by the UNDP for developing countries with reliable data for each of its components (probability at birth of not surviving to age 40; adult literacy rate; percentage of population not using improved water sources; and percentage of children under five who are underweight). Sources: OECD estimates based on World Bank (2002) and UNDP (2002).

49

a,b

Chart 2.6. Labour force participation of children and human development, 2000 Labour force participation (10-14) 60.0

50.0

40.0

30.0 y = -74.702x + 62.305 2

R = 0.685

20.0

10.0

0.0 0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

0.70

0.80

0.90

1.00

-10.0 c

Human Development Index

Note: Any conclusions should be moderated since child labour is not restricted to the age group 10 to 14. a) See Note a) to Chart 2.1. b) The correlation presented incorporates data from 59 countries. c) The Human Development Index is calculated by the UNDP taking into account the following four components: a) life expectancy at birth; b) adult literacy rate; c) a combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio. d) GDP per capita (in PPP USD). Countries are classified into three groups according to their achievement in human development: countries with a high human development (HDI > 0.80); with a medium human development (0.50 < HDI < 0.80); and with a low human development (HDI < 0.50). See Annex B for a breakdown of these variables within SIMPOC countries. Sources: OECD estimates based on World Bank (2002) and UNDP (2002).

50

Chapter 3 ACTIONS AND PROGRAMMES TO COMBAT CHILD LABOUR

The previous chapter has shown that child labour is both the result of “demand” and “supply” factors but, in many cases, the latter plays a more determinant role. The income situation of the family, the lack of educational facilities (the costs and the quality of education itself), as well as complex socio-cultural considerations appear to play an important role. The result is that the short-run return to work is sometimes higher than the longer-term benefits arising from school attendance. Even in cases where the latter benefits are higher than the return to work, credit constraints may force families to make children work. In addition, there are situations where demand-side factors also play a role. The purpose of this chapter is to: a) document existing policy instruments to reduce child labour; and b) assess the extent to which each instrument addresses the causes of the problem. A.

The role of international organisations

1.

Awareness raising and technical co-operation

International organisations have increasingly been aware of the need to combat child labour for human rights and economic development reasons. During the past decade, the main international organisations involved in understanding child labour and its eradication have been the ILO through the International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), UNICEF and the World Bank. IPEC actions have been mainly oriented to encouraging countries to ratify the relevant ILO Conventions, and through technical co-operation, helping countries formulate policies and programmes dealing with child labour (Box 3.1). UNICEF has emphasised the child labour problem from a human rights perspective, especially with a mandate guided by the principles of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and a proven strength in promoting basic education initiatives as the best strategy to combat child labour. Its programmes include formal and non-formal education and support services to parents, as

51

well as promoting stricter law enforcement against traffickers, providing services for street children and changing cultural values that tolerate children’s exploitation. The World Bank launched in 1998 its Child Labour Programme.45 The programme was established to develop knowledge and identify strategies to enhance the effectiveness of the World Bank's programmes on children, notably through poverty alleviation strategies. Other international financial institutions like the Inter-American Development Bank Group or the African Development Bank are also addressing the issue (OECD, 2000a). These organisations are introducing respect for core labour standards, and especially prohibition of child and bonded labour into their policies and programmes. These are timely initiatives showing that child labour cannot be eliminated only through financial aid, but requires the involvement of national governments and other key stakeholders. Box 3.1. The International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC) The ILO launched IPEC in 1992 in order to strengthen its action against child labour. Its aim is the progressive elimination of child labour, giving priority to its worst forms, through the implementation of preventive and protective measures as well as through withdrawal and rehabilitation actions. The programme comprises three main pillars: a) ratification and communication campaigns in support of Conventions 138 and 182; b) information and knowledge activities through quantitative and qualitative studies on child labour; and c) technical co-operation by supporting specific programmes targeting working children, mainly those involved in the worst forms. Governments wanting to address the problem of child labour confirm their commitment by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ILO and initiate actions within the framework of IPEC. Between 1992 and 2002, 52 countries have signed a MOU and an additional 30 participate in various IPEC programmes as associated 46,47 countries.

45.

The programme is part of the Human Development Network's Social Protection Unit. See http://www1.worldbank.org/sp/childlabor/index.asp. Additionally, the World Bank, UNICEF and the ILO have engaged in a joint child labour project, called “Understanding children’s work”, in order to put together the relevant child labour data and promote research on child labour issues. This meant the launch in 2002 of the joint web: http://www.ucw-project.org.

46.

Since 1992, the countries that have signed a MOU are the following: 16 in Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia); 11 in Asia (Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Nepal, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand); 18 in Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,

52

Donor countries have increased progressively from two in 1992 to 15 in 2002 (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States) and contributions from other institutions have also been received recently (the European 48 Commission, municipalities and trade unions). The budget devoted to the programme has also increased, having doubled in the last biennium to reach almost USD 120 million for the period 2002-2003. Since 1999, IPEC has been measuring the direct impact of its activities on children 49 on the basis of the so-called “units of services”. Following this approach, during the period 2000-2001 it has been estimated that 311 000 units of service were provided to children and this number is expected to multiply by three in 2002-2003. Additionally, 9 358 units of services were provided to parents and communities (ILO, 2001a). On the other hand, in order to collect information on the size and characteristics of child labour, IPEC created in 1998 the Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child 50 labour (SIMPOC). In order to improve understanding of the child labour problem, the aim of SIMPOC is to ensure that child labour surveys are sustainable and integrated into national statistical programmes (see Annex B for details).

2.

Setting international labour standards

Although core labour standards may be established by national governments, international institutions also play an important role. The United Nations through the Convention on the Rights of the Child has established the principle of nonexploitation and related rights. In the case of ILO instruments, the importance of the Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela); 3 Arab States (Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen) and 4 European and Central Asia countries (Albania, Romania, Turkey, Ukraine). 47.

In 2002, the associated countries were the following: Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, Malawi, Namibia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Syria, West Bank and Gaza, China, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Guyana, Mexico, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay.

48.

During the 1990s other countries like Australia, Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Poland and Sweden have also been donors to IPEC (ILO, 2002b).

49.

This method has been preferred to a straight calculation of the number of children involved in the programmes. Indeed, there are qualitative differences in the provision of different types of service (e.g. a counselling session is quite different from a three-year education programme).

50.

See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/index.htm.

53

elimination of child labour has grown in recent years.51 ILO Convention 138, which provides for a minimum age of employment was adopted back in 1973 (before, child labour was indirectly covered by Convention 29 that calls for the suppression and abolition of forced labour). With the adoption in 1998 of the ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the adoption in 1999 of Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, the principle of the elimination of child labour has been reaffirmed (see Annex B).52 Table 3.1. Progress in ratifications of ILO and UN conventions on child labour All countries

OECD countries (25 total)

All countries

As of October 1995

OECD countries (29 total)

As of June 2000

All countries

OECD countries (30 total)

As of June 2003

ILO Convention 29 (Forced Labour)

137

22

153

26

162

27

ILO Convention 138 (Minimum Age)

49

12

93

22

129

24

ILO Convention 182 (Worst Forms of Child Laboura)

-

-

-

-

142

29

47

11

90

20

111

23

Number of ILO countries that ratified all ILO conventions listed aboveb

As of end 1994

As of October 1999

As of June 2003

UN Convention on 168 21 187 28 192 29 the Rights of the Childc a) Ratifications began in November 2000. b) As of June 2002 there were 175 ILO Member States. c) As of April 2003 there were 191 UN Member countries. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by 189 UN Member countries. It has also been ratified by Cook Islands, Holy Sea and Niue. Source: ILOLEX.

51.

The Declaration of the Singapore Ministerial Conference of December 1996 highlighted the commitment of the participating countries to observe internationally-recognised core labour standards and affirmed that the ILO was the competent body to set and deal with these standards (OECD, 1996).

52.

The Declaration reaffirms the four fundamental principles that have to be observed at work, among which is the effective abolition of child labour. ILO conventions are a legal instrument with a binding effect on ratifying countries.

54

Table 3.2. Ratification of ILO Conventions C29, C138 and C182 (as of June 2003) C29 on Forced Labour (1930)

C138 on Minimum Age (1973)

C182 on Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999) R

Australia

R

Austria

R

R

Belgium

R

R

Canada

R R

Czech Republic

R

Denmark

R

R

R R

Finland

R

R

R

France

R

R

R

Germany

R

R

R

Greece

R

R

R

Hungary

R

R

R

Iceland

R

R

R

Ireland

R

R

R

Italy

R

R

R

Japan

R

R

R

R

R

R

R

R

R

R

Korea Luxembourg Mexico

R

Netherlands

R

New Zealand

R

R

R

Norway

R

R

R

Poland

R

R

R

Portugal

R

R

R

Slovak Republic

R

R

R

Spain

R

R

R

Sweden

R

R

R

Switzerland

R

R

R

Turkey

R

R

R

United Kingdom

R

R

R

United States Total OECD Non-OECD members Total ratifications

R 27

24

29

135

105

113

162

129

142

Source: ILOLEX.

55

Since the adoption of Convention 182, the ILO has launched a special campaign for its ratification. The result has been spectacular: 142 States (as of June 2003) have ratified the Convention, the best ratification record in such a short period. An increase in the number of countries having ratified Convention 138 has also been registered. This means that among the 175 ILO Member States, 111 countries have ratified the conventions related to the elimination of child labour, 23 of which belong to OECD (Tables 3.1 and 3.2).53 Of course, the main problem concerning the effective elimination of child labour goes beyond the ratification of ILO Conventions. Several mechanisms exist in ILO to monitor enforcement of Conventions. First, the regular system of supervision includes the obligation to provide regular reports on the measures taken by member countries having ratified a given Convention. These measures are then assessed by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) which presents yearly a report on the progress made. Between 1992 and 2002, the CEACR has made 124 observations concerning the application of Convention 138 in 26 different countries. The number of observations has increased in recent years. Nevertheless, no clear pattern emerges regarding compliance with Convention 138 (Chart C1, Annex C). Most of the non-compliance observations concern non-OECD countries, and in many cases they are reiterated for several years, suggesting slow progress to improve compliance. But it has to be noted that some progress in compliance has been observed in several countries like Nicaragua or the Russian Federation, among others. Second, there is a special system of supervision which addresses specific allegations against a member State through Articles 24 and 26 of the ILO Constitution.54 No use has been made of complaints under Article 26 and only two representations have been conducted under Article 24 concerning the application of Convention 138 on Minimum Age (none on Convention 182). 53.

More than hundred countries (including 23 OECD countries) have ratified both Conventions 138 and 182.

54.

Under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution, any national or international worker or employer association can claim that a given member state has failed to apply an ILO Convention that it has ratified. The Governing Body of the ILO may then invite the Government concerned to make a statement on the subject. Under Article 26, any ILO member State having ratified a specified Convention or any delegate of the International Labour Conference can complain against other member States which are not satisfactorily securing the effective application of the same Convention.

56

The first was presented in 1984 by several Costa Rican trade unions against the Costa Rican government and the second in 1987 by the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union (AFL-CIO) against the Federal Republic of Germany, both alleging the failure of the respective governments to observe, among others, the Convention on Minimum Age. But whereas in the first case the Committee had not enough information to cast doubts on the application of the said Convention, in the second, the case was considered non-receivable and the procedure was closed. In the end, there is little recourse to the special system of supervision. In sum, initiatives taken by international organisations to eliminate child labour contribute to raise awareness of the problem as well as setting standards in the child labour area. Such initiatives are especially important in the fight against the worst forms of child labour. In some cases, they can also help collect financial aid to support specific programmes. However, it is essential to understand that in many cases child labour is intrinsically associated with the development process -and it would be illusory to believe that child labour can be entirely eliminated in the absence of further development opportunities. Moreover, the effectiveness of international initiatives depends critically on the extent to which national governments and other key stakeholders adopt a coherent strategy vis-à-vis child labour. B.

Action and programmes at the national level

National governments have established different policies, programmes and plans of action to combat child labour. For example, of the 36 countries covered in the follow-up of the ILO Declaration, 27 have indicated that a national policy or plan has been implemented to ensure the effective abolition of child labour (ILO, 2002c).55 1.

Improving coherence of labour legislation

Most countries have laws prohibiting child labour under a certain age or regulating working conditions for such labour. However, there are many cases where child labour laws are unclear or inconsistent, making them difficult to enforce. Understanding, explaining and enforcing the law becomes difficult and sometimes impossible when there are gaps in the laws, or when there are excessively complex, fragmented or even inconsistent regulations (e.g. varying 55.

The countries are: Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Cambodia, China, Comoros, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Lithuania, Mali, Mexico, the Republic of Moldava, Pakistan, Peru, Qatar, Saint-Lucia, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand.

57

minimum ages, confusing and different definitions of hazardous and nonhazardous work, out-dated regulations). The comments from CEACR on the lack of coherence of national laws are revealing is this respect. As shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, in most OECD countries education and child labour laws are complementary in the sense that the statutory age of completion of compulsory schooling coincides with the minimum employment age – when it does not, there is a provision requiring the completion of compulsory schooling. The situation is different in many non-member countries. Table 3.3. Minimum age for admission to employment and compulsory education in selected non-OECD countries Minimum age for work Age limits for Basic minimum compulsory education Light work Hazardous work age Belize .. .. .. 5-14 Brazil 16a .. 18 7-14 Cambodia 15 12 18 No compulsory laws Colombia 14 12 18 6-12 Ethiopia 14 .. .. 7-13 Ghana 15 13 18 6-14 Guatemala 14 .. 18 7-14 Kenya .. .. .. 6-14 Namibia 14 .. 15 to 16 6-16 Nepal 14 .. 16 6-11 b Nicaragua 14 .. .. 6-12 Pakistan 14 to 15 .. 15 to 21 .. (by sector)c Panama 14d .. 18d 6-15 Philippines 15 No limit 18 6-12 South Africa 15 .. 16 6-14 No limit 16 to 18 5-14 Sri Lanka 14 to 15 (by sector)e Ukraine 15 to 16 .. 17 to 18 6-15 Venezuela 14 .. 18 6-15 Vietnam 15 .. 18 6-11 Zambia 14 .. .. 7-14 Zimbabwe .. .. 17 7-15 a) In Brazil, the minimum age is set at 16 except for apprenticeship which is 14. The minimum age for hazardous work is set at 18 except for underground work and stevedoring which is set at 21. b) In Nicaragua, the Labour Code requires parental consent for those aged 14-16 and fixes a maximum of 6 hours a day of work for those until 17. c) In Pakistan, the minimum age is set at 14 for factories, shops and commerce and work at sea whereas it is set at 15 for work in mines and railways. d) The Labour Code of Panama prohibits the employment of children under 14 or under 15 if they have not completed primary school. Minors under 18 can't work in places where the consumption of alcohol is allowed and can't work at night, but there is no special provision for other hazardous work. e) In Sri Lanka, the general minimum age is 14 unless for work at sea which is 15. Sources: UNESCO (1999); ILO (1998) and USDOL (2002).

58

Table 3.4. Minimum age for admission to employment and compulsory education in OECD countries Minimum age for work Basic minimum age Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Korea

varies a) 15 14 b) varies c) 15 15 15 d) 16 e) 15 f) 15 15 d) 15 g) 15 d) 14 to 15 (by sector) h) 15 13

Age limits for compulsory education

Light work

Hazardous work

.. 12 13 to 14 .. .. 13 14 12 to 14 13 .. 14 14 14 ..

16 to 18 16 to 18 16 to 21 16 to 18 18 15 to 18 16 to 18 16 to 18 18 16 to 18 16 to 18 18 to 19 18 ..

6-15 6-15 6-18 6-16 6-15 7-16 7-16 6-16 6-18 6-15 6-16 6-16 6-15 6-14

12 13 (with permission) .. .. 13 to 15 .. ..

18 18

6-15 6-15

15 d) 18 6-15 14 16 to 18 6-14 15 18 5-18 15 i) 15 to 21 6-16 15 to 16 .. 7-15 (by sector) Poland 15 15 18 7-15 Portugal 16 14 18 6-15 Slovak Republic 15 .. 18 6-15 Spain 16 .. 18 6-16 Sweden 16 13 18 7-15 Switzerland 15 13 16 to 18 6-16 Turkey 15 14 18 6-14 .. 16 to 18 5-16 United Kingdom 13 to 16 (by sector) j) United States 16 .. 16 to 18 6-16 a) In Australia, regulation only covers work at sea with a minimum age of 16. Certain provinces and territories impose a minimum age in certain sectors while others merely prohibit the employment of young persons during school hours. b) In Belgium, the minimum age is set at 14 provided that compulsory schooling has been completed. Light work has to be determined by the competent authorities on condition that well-being, safety and health are not endangered. c) The Canada Labour Code does not set an absolute minimum age for employment. Persons under 17 years of age can be employed in the following situations: a) occupations specified by regulation; b) under certain conditions and at a wage not less than the minimum wage prescribed; c) persons under 17 when not required by provincial law to be attending school. In certain provinces, the employment of young persons is prohibited in specified sectors only during school hours. Persons under 17 years of age cannot be employed in specified jobs or at night. d) In Finland, Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg, the minimum age is set at 15 provided that compulsory schooling has been completed. Luxembourg Mexico Netherlands New Zealand Norway

59

Notes to Table 3.4 (cont’d): In France, the minimum age is set at 16 provided that compulsory schooling has been e) completed. f) In Germany, the minimum age at 15 applies not only to employment relationships but also to self-employment. g) In Iceland, the minimum age applies only to factories and transport. It is also required to have completed compulsory schooling. h) In Italy, the general minimum age is set at 15 and at 14 for work in agriculture or to assist the family. i) In New Zealand, the minimum age applies only to factories, work at sea, fishing and railways. j) In the United Kingdom, the minimum general age is 13 years but it is 16 for work in industry. Sources: OECD; UNESCO (1999); and ILO (1998).

2.

Improving enforcement: the key role of labour inspection

Enforcement of labour law depends crucially on the existence of a labour inspectorate. According to the annual report on the follow-up of the ILO Declaration, labour inspection is the most cited measure that countries put in place (or are thinking to put in place) to improve enforcement of minimum age legislation.56 Nevertheless, there are various obstacles to a well-functioning labour inspection. First, some countries devote limited resources to their labour inspection. Too often, labour inspectors are negatively affected by organisational deficiencies, lack of training, lack of transport, lack of information and guidance, lack of clear programmes and priorities and a lack of support when dealing with the sensitive and intractable problem of child labour. Second, the existence of a slow or inefficient judicial system doesn’t help either (USDOL, 1998). Third, another problem often reported by labour inspectors is the difficulty to determine the exact age of the children and subsequently the compliance or not with the minimum age required to work. Last, cultural values are another important obstacle that labour inspection has to overcome. People may feel that because they belong to a certain social category, ethnic class, caste or religious group they have no other options. In other cases, child work can be seen as a normal stage in the process of growing up, as the best way to prepare children for community life. The family may prefer to make children work rather than sending them to school if work is more rewarded and better perceived by the family itself and the community as a whole. 56.

Measures of vocational training and improvement of the competencies of the young workers come next, followed by measures related to the reform of the regulating instruments and by raising the awareness and mobilisation of the population (ILO, 2002c).

60

But the main problem that arises when combating child labour through labour inspection is the lack of access to the informal or unregulated economy, where child labour most commonly occurs. It is clear that if labour inspection is planned only on the basis of official business registers, it will not cover the informal sector. Complex and diffuse employment arrangements that characterise the informal economy (small workplaces, “invisible” workplaces like the child’s own or somebody else’s home where they can work as domestic employees or as family aid, shifting workplaces like streets…), as well as formal sector activities based on sub-contracting chains that make it difficult to identify the relationship between the employer and the employee, make enforcement difficult. Moreover, it should be noted that in order to enhance the effectiveness of labour inspection, which normally falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Labour, as a tool against child labour, a broader co-operation is needed with other ministries, government agencies and institutions. To cope with these challenges, an approach based on a shift towards promoting a culture of prevention among employers and workers based on their social responsibility has been proposed by the ILO. The key to this preventive action lies in the close relationship between labour inspectors, employers’ organisations, trade unions, and civil society. The inspector becomes first an advisor, and then an enforcer when the advice is not accepted. This is complemented by a child labour monitoring system in which family associations, community officials, teachers and health workers have a role to play as they are the best placed to observe where children work and under which conditions (ILO, 2002d). This approach has been followed by Turkey since 1994 and seems to have been relatively successful (Box 3.2). Box 3.2. The role of labour inspectors in combating child labour in Turkey Since 1994, the Turkish Board of Labour Inspection has implemented several action programmes on child labour within the framework of IPEC. The first project, “Upgrading the skills of Labour Inspectors on child labour”, gave an overall picture of the situation of child labour in Turkey. Under that programme, labour inspectors through visits to the workplaces, made an analysis of the situation of child labour in order to determine the sectors and sub-sectors in which children were employed (their working conditions and environment, the risks they were exposed to and the attitudes and expectations of the different parties involved). This was followed in 1995 by the programme “Implementation of Labour Inspection Policy on child Labour in Turkey” under which labour inspectors carried out an evaluation of the situation in order to develop a list of prioritised risks and determine an action plan or the strategies to follow. The action plan was implemented at the local level with a multi-sectoral approach in order to develop awareness and understanding on the subject among provincial government directorates, chambers of commerce, employers and workers associations, private companies, health institutions and NGOs. This was conducted under the aegis of the programme on “Training Work Inspectors on Child Labour” launched in 1997.

61

The majority of working children were in small-size enterprises (one to nine 57 employees). Most of them were not enrolled in Apprenticeship Training Centres (ATCs), 58 so were not receiving proper vocational training. Working conditions were characterised by long daily working hours, insufficient work breaks, absence of paid annual leave and low wages. In certain cases, children were exposed to dangerous health and safety 59 conditions. During the period 1997-1999, labour inspectors noticed a decrease in the number of children working under the age of 15. For those remaining in employment, an improvement in working conditions was also observed during the same period: raising awareness among employers and trade unions helped reduce working hours, provide social security, increase the enrolment of working children in ATCs, and insert children in the non-formal education system. Labour inspectors have also helped mobilise local financial resources to improve health and safety conditions (Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Turkey, 2000). The main conclusions that can be drawn from this Turkish case study is that the identification of the causes of child labour, the mobilisation of the related institutions at the national and local level, awareness campaigns and training activities have contributed to improve children’s working conditions as a first step to the elimination of child labour. This approach has also led to an increase of the minimum age for light work and for starting apprenticeship training (from 13 to 14 years). In sum, to improve working conditions of child workers and eradicate child labour, changes in the workplaces and outside them are needed, going hand in hand with certain legal requirements.

57.

The sectors and trades studied were: wood products, furniture and finishing; leather items, dresses and shoes; textiles and dressmaking; metal processing and motor vehicle repair and maintenance; accommodation and recreation facilities and hotels and restaurants.

58.

According to the Apprenticeship Act 3308, children under the age of 19 cannot be employed without a formal apprenticeship contract. There are currently 318 Apprenticeship Training Centres (ATCs) in Turkey providing children with theoretical knowledge to complement the practical training they receive at the workplaces. Children who attend them are automatically registered in the social security system. But, it is estimated that only 23% of working children take advantage of these centres.

59.

The most cited dangerous health and safety conditions were: unsafe machinery and hazardous materials, products and wastes; inappropriate heating in workplaces, failure to meet ergonomic requirements, environments with high noise levels; unsafe electrical systems; poor ventilation; and insufficient equipment for personal protection.

62

3.

Improving access to, and quality of, education

As already mentioned, there are many cases where children work because their families cannot afford the direct costs of sending them to school (fees, books, uniforms, meals, transports…) or the indirect one related to the opportunity cost of the income they will not receive. In other cases, schools are not easily available mainly because they are geographically distant. Moreover, the quality of education is sometimes so poor that many children and their families view it as a waste of time. This view is more widespread when parents themselves have not gone to school. For all these reasons, it is essential to create better alternatives to child labour by increasing school enrolment and attendance and improving the quality of education. Focusing on enrolment: a compulsory, affordable and accessible education Universal primary education is recognised to be a necessary goal to combat child labour as it helps remove children from the workplaces by offering them an alternative use of their time. Even though some progress has been made towards achieving this goal over the past decade, there are still more than 100 million children out of school, two thirds of whom are girls. One children in four drop-out before completing five years of basic education. Whereas universal primary education is a reality in developed and transition countries, this is not the case in many developing countries (Table 3.5). Government expenditures in education also give an idea of the commitment of different countries to universal primary education (Table 3.6). Moreover, in many countries, access to education is unevenly distributed across groups: girls and ethnic minorities often have restricted access to basic education. For example, data on the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education for all the countries for which this information is available for the past decade in the World Bank Indicators, show that in almost one in five countries, this ratio is under 80%. In order to increase primary school enrolment, retention and completion rates, different countries have put in place different initiatives to improve access to education, ranging from providing free schooling, school meal programmes, free transportation, flexible locations and schedules to economic incentives to families.

63

a

Table 3.5. School net enrolment in selected non-OECD countries, 1998

Girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%) Belize 99.4 39 97.2 Brazil 98.5 .. 99.9 Cambodia 100 20 79.3 Colombia 86.7 45.6 100.8 Ethiopia 35.3 15.8 61.5 Ghana .. .. .. Guatemala 82.7 .. 85.2 Kenya .. .. 96.3 Namibia 86.3 31.4 103.3 Nepal .. .. 69.2 Nicaragua 77.3 32.7 .. Pakistan .. .. .. Panama .. .. .. Philippines 100 58.8 .. South Africa 100 55.9 102.1 Sri Lanka 100 .. 99 Ukraine .. .. 105.7 Venezuela 83.8 22.3 101.3 Vietnam 97.4 48.8 88.4 Zambia 72.9 21.5 89.3 Zimbabwe .. .. 94.3 a) All data refer to either 1998 or the most recent year available of the period 1995-1998. Source: World Bank (2002); UNDP (2002). Primary

Secondary

Table 3.6. Public education expenditures in selected non-OECD countries, 1998 Primary school as a % As % of total of total education government b expendituresb expenditures Belize 4.9 19.5 62.8 Brazil 4.6 .. 53.5 Cambodia 5.5 .. .. Colombia 3.5 16.6 40.5 Ethiopia 4.3 13.7 46.2 Ghana 4.0 19.9 .. Guatemala 2.0 15.8 63.0 Kenya 6.6 16.7 .. Namibia 8.1 25.6 58.0 Nepal 2.5 13.5 45.1 Nicaragua 4.2 8.8 68.6 Pakistan 2.7 7.1 51.8 Panama 5.0 16.3 31.1 Philippines 3.2 15.7 56.1 South Africa 6.1 22.0 43.5 Sri Lanka 3.4 8.9 .. Ukraine 4.4 14.8 .. Venezuela .. 22.4 .. Vietnam 2.8 7.4 43.0 Zambia 2.3 7.1 41.5 Zimbabwe 10.8 .. 51.7 a) Public expenditures in education as a percentage of GDP come from the 2002 CD-ROM World Bank Indicators and refer to 1998 except for: Pakistan and Vietnam for which data refer to 1997 and for Belize, Colombia, Guatemala, and Sri Lanka when they refer to 1996. b) Data come from the UNDP Human Development Indicators and refer to the most recent year available of the period 1995-1997. Source: World Bank (2002); UNDP (2002). As % of GDPa

64

Some countries have specifically targeted working children and tried to make schooling more accessible to them through more flexible schedules, not necessarily requiring them to abandon their work completely, like it is the case in Guatemala, Peru and the Philippines among others (Table 3.7). Others have put the emphasis on trying to reintegrate those working children who droppedout early or have never gone to schools, e.g. the Back-to-School Programmes in India, Nicaragua and the Philippines. In both cases, it must be taken into account that working children are difficult to insert into formal education because they are typically older, are not used to the school environment and have had other experiences. For these reasons, non-formal education has often been seen as an entry, a re-entry or an alternative to former working children. Some initiatives have focussed on the development of an informal education for working children, offering certified and equivalent programmes in order to allow an easier transition into the formal education system later on. In India, strategies to draw working children into mainstream education have been incorporated into the governmental District Primary Education Project following the success of the MV Foundation’s campbased bridge courses that have allowed 15 000 bonded and working children come back to schools in the state of Andhra Pradesh.60 In Pakistan, over 6 000 children in the football stitching industry have attended non-formal education centres while in Bangladesh 10 000 children working in the garment industry have received formal and non-formal education. Nevertheless, these are all small-scale initiatives which have often been criticised as been isolated from the educational programmes of the country. In order not to perpetuate a dual education system in which generally the informal one is seen as inferior, informal education must be considered as a short-term road to formal education, requiring a stronger linkage with the formal 60.

MV Foundation began working on child labour in 1991 in the rural areas of Andhra Pradesh, the Indian state with the highest number of child labourers, with a twofold objective: eradicating all forms of child labour and universalising education. Its main goals are: a) to enrol more children in school and keep them there; b) increase at the same time parents' involvement, and c) improve existing government schools. The idea is not to install a parallel system but to mobilise communities and press government to improve and expand the present elementary education system for the poor. The programmes are based on the provision of summer camps and bridge courses for children who need smooth transition to middle school (mainly bonded labourers, girls doing domestic work and children from low castes).

65

educational system (ILO, 2000). Moreover, in many cases, the reintegration into schools of working children can’t be done without financial aid to families (see below). Improving the quality of education As already pointed out, increasing enrolment and school attendance is a necessary step to combat child labour, but it is not enough. Increasing the quality of schools by improving the education infrastructure is also important. Families need to be persuaded that sending their children to school will effectively improve their education prospects and future income. The absence of adequate school as well as an insufficient number of qualified teachers affect the vision parents have of schools and their utility. To overcome this situation several initiatives have been taken during the 1990s in different countries such as the construction of new schools or classes, the distribution of books in primary schools, the improvement of teachers’ training as well as their payment. Initiatives along these lines were taken for example in Brazil, Egypt, Philippines and Turkey (Table 3.7). Even if investing in education infrastructure improves the quality of education, many studies have identified the quality of teaching as a major influence on student achievement (UNESCO, 2002). Concerning the quality of teaching, in many developing countries the main problem is that there seems to be a trade-off between the number of teachers and their qualifications. In other words, too often, relaxing entry requirements for teachers erodes quality. On the other hand, another problem that the education sector faces in many developing countries is how to retain the best-qualified teachers (UNESCO, 2002). Nevertheless, special efforts have also been made recently in some countries to improve the quality of teachers. For example in Benin, between 1990 and 1994 the number of teachers with professional qualifications rose by 10%. This was accompanied by institutional reforms to assure that teachers were regularly paid. In Brazil, in the last five years 225 000 teachers have received the minimum training required for teaching and this has been accompanied by an increase in the teacher’s average wage ranging from 13 to 50% (USDOL, 2002).

66

Table 3.7. Education initiatives to increase school attendance of working children Country

Date

Project/Ministry Aims/Results Back-to-school programmes

India

1997

Andhra Pradesh Social Welfare Department

It identifies children that have never enrolled in schools (mainly bonded labours, domestic girls servants and low castes child) or who have dropped out early. It offers “camp schools” for two months each year in order to get an education to re-enter the formal education system. From the 37 000 children that enrolled in those camps in 1997, 74% where admitted in formal schools.

Extra Age/Ministry of Education

The aim is to serve children and adolescents who are unable to complete their primary school education on the normal age and grades by offering them classes during work-off hours. The aim is to reduce the number of dropouts and improve achievement in elementary schools. It consists of teaching modules for out-of school working children in order they can re-enter formal schools and complete the basic education cycle and qualify for secondary education or vocational training.

Nicaragua

Philippines

Late 1980s

Project from the Bureau of Non Formal Education of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports

Guatemala

Since 1997

Different governmental programmes

Different programmes based on a flexible teaching structure oriented to the students in order to make school schedules compatible with those of working children in rural areas (missing school hours are supplied with additional independent study). Another programme was directed to migrant children working in harvest coffee and sugar in order to offer them community-based school.

Mexico

Programme from PRONJAGa

Provide increased access to basic education for children of migrant farm workers that live away from their place of origin for several months a year. It offers educational modules enabling migrant children to complete a grade without attending the same school for an entire academic year.

Peru

Ministry of Education

Offers three shifts during the day (morning, noon, night) and includes a flexible curriculum to working children permitting teachers to adapt instruction to their needs and interests.

Bolivia

Alternative Youth Education Programme. Ministry of Education

The programme targets girls, street children, children workers and youth at risk. Its aim is to keep them at school by offering night classes with specially designed curricula that are flexible and adapted to their specific needs.

Philippines

Project from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)

Offers a work-study programme in which children attend school in the morning and report for work in the afternoon. Child workers are at the same time directed to less dangerous work

Flexible schedules

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Table 3.7. Education initiatives to increase school attendance of working children (cont.) Country

Date

Project/Ministry Aims/Results Financial aid to families

Brazil

1995

Bolsa Scola

Consists in giving cash grants, equivalent to the minimum wage, to poor families with children in school age (7-14 years old) on the condition that a minimum attendance rate of 90% is necessary to continue receiving the cash grant. Its main results have been to increase school enrolment but it has found to be inconclusive in terms of reducing child labour.

Brazil

1996

Programa de Erradicacao do Trabahlo Infantil (PETI)

It targets rural areas having the greatest incidence of the worst forms of child labour (work in sisal and cassava processing, charcoal production, mining, quarrying and the collection of sugar cane, tobacco and cotton) and is combined with the Bolsa Scola Programme. It seems to have been successful in reducing these forms of labour. Since September 2000, the Brazilian Government has integrated PETI with other cash-grant initiatives financed by the federal government like the Minimum Income Fund (Fundo de Garantia da Renda Minima) into a single project, the Alvorada Programme, in order to address design and implementation issues in poor municipalities having the worse indices of social development in the country.

Mexico

1997

Progresa/Oportunidades. Federal Government of Mexico

It is an anti-poverty programme with a threefold aim: a) providing educational subsidies to poor families to send their children to school on a regular basis, varying the amount of the transfer with the child’s grade level and gender; b) promoting health care through free preventive interventions, such as nutritional supplements, and education on hygiene and nutrition as well as monetary transfers for the purchase of food tied to mandatory health care visits; and c) offering nutritional supplements for small children that are not contingent on schooling and to pregnant and breast-feeding mothers. It gives a lumpsum to families, varying with the age and gender of the children, linked to their school attendance of at least 85% of school days a month (see Box 3.3).

Improving infrastructure Brazil

1997

Livro Didatico. Ministry of Education and Sports

Acquisition of books to be distributed in primary schools. Funds have also been raised to increase the wages of low paid teachers.

Egypt

Mid1990s

Project from the Ministry of Education

Construction of 8 500 new one-classroom schools in rural communities to encourage working children and school dropouts to attend schools. It has also increased investment in teachers training.

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Table 3.7. Education initiatives to increase school attendance of working children (cont.) Country

Date

Project/Ministry Aims/Results Improving infrastructure

Philippines

Since 1990

Project from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)

Implementation of a multigrade programme to increase the number of elementary and high schools in villages where monograde classes are not feasible due to limited enrolment. Five years later, the number of villages without primary school has been halved (from 12 000 to 6 000).

Project from the Ministry of Education

Construction of 670 new primary schools and appointment of 1 930 new teachers in order to implement a new law comprising eight years of compulsory schooling.

Turkey

Awareness raising against child labour Tanzania

Thailand

Ministry of Education

Mid1990s

To bring children from poor rural families into school at an earlier stage to avoid their participation in child labour before the entry in primary school. The goal was to motivate children and their parents that they stay at school.

Provincial Primary Education Office of Srisaket Province

To inform children of a total of 22 primary schools with high drop-out rates, about the effects of child labour on their health and safety as well as about the existing laws applicable to them. Teachers worked also with parents to convince them of the benefits for their children to continue secondary education. a) PRONJAG is the Mexican Secretariat of Social Development's National Agricultural Day Labourers Programme. Sources: USDOL (1998, 2002) and ILO (2000).

4. The role of school nutrition programmes and financial incentives to families In many cases, the additional income gained by working children is essential to the survival of poor families. To overcome the situation, certain countries have put in place programmes that offer financial aid to households to compensate for the income lost by sending children to school. If sometimes those programmes have not had the purpose to combat child labour directly, they do it indirectly by removing children from work, at least on a full-time basis. School nutrition programmes and food-for-schooling programmes Food-for-education programmes use food as an incentive for parents to send their children to school. These programmes have been implemented in two basic forms: children are fed in school (School Nutrition Programmes), or

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families are given food if their children attend school (Food for Schooling Programmes). The first type of programmes intends to attract children to school by providing them with meals to alleviate short-term hunger enabling them at the same time to learn. An example of this kind of programme is the Merenda Escolar programme implemented in Brazil in 1997 in 3 299 municipalities. While school-meal programmes help to alleviate hunger, they do not compensate families for the opportunity cost of sending children to work. The second type of programme goes further in inducing families to give up the income earned by children as all the family can take advantage of the ration of food and not only the children who are nourished at school. An interesting example is the Food for Schooling (FFS) programme set up in Bangladesh in 1993 by the government in collaboration with the World Food Programme. The aim of this programme was to enable poor households to release children from household obligations in order to attend school in exchange for an income entitlement in the form of a monthly ration of food grains that could be used to feed all family members, or sold for cash to satisfy other needs. More than 2.2 million children from 17 403 schools have benefited from it (USDOL, 2002). According to evaluations done by the International Food Policy Research Institute, this programme has been successful in increasing primary school enrolment, promoting school attendance and reducing drop-outs.61,62 Nevertheless, as schools involved in the programme have been more crowded than those not involved, the quality of education seems to have decreased. Moreover, whereas the FFS provides a strong incentive for households to send children to schools, children can indeed combine work with school attendance. In that sense, no evaluation of the impact of the programme on the effective use of children’s time has been conducted (to the knowledge of the OECD Secretariat). Similar outcomes are observed in the School Nutrition Programme implemented in Pakistan.

61.

See http://www.ifpri.org.

62.

The International Food Policy Research Institute has estimated that as a result of the FFS, the enrolment rate increased by 35% compared with 7% in non-FFS schools, and to a larger extent for girls than for boys (44% for girls and 28% for boys). In FFS schools, the attendance rate reached 71% against 58% in non-FFS schools and 6% of beneficiaries dropped-out compared with 15% of children who did not receive the aid. But the number of children by class was 76 students in FFS schools compared with 62 in non-FFS schools, resulting in slightly lower student achievement scores in the former. On the other hand, bringing children to school has not necessarily guaranteed an improvement of their nutritional status, which was also one of the aims of the programme.

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It seems therefore that offering food as an incentive to education is useful to increase enrolment and attendance at school but, to be effective the aid must be sustained in time and must be accompanied by other measures, like a complementary financial and technical assistance programme to improve the educational outcomes and the quality of education as a whole. Monetary transfers to families Financial incentives can take the form of monetary transfers to families conditional on them sending the children to school. These programmes are frequently part of a broader anti-poverty programme. This is the case of the poverty-targeted cash-transfer programmes put in place in recent years in many countries in Latin America following the success of the Bolsa Scola programme in Brazil (for details of this programme see Table 3.7). On the same principles as the Bolsa Scola, Mexico has implemented the Progresa/Oportunidades programme, an anti-poverty programme with a multisectoral focus covering the fields of education, health and nutrition. Its aims are to provide educational subsidies to poor families to send their children to school on a regular basis, to promote health care through prevention interventions and to offer nutritional supplements to small children and their mothers. Concerning education, a lump-sum is given to families varying with the age and gender of the children, linked to a school attendance of at least 85% of school days a month (Box 3.3). Honduras has installed a Family Allowance Programme (Programa de Asignacion Familiar), Ecuador the School Grant Programme (Beca Escolar) and Nicaragua is designing its own demand-side intervention in education, health and nutrition. Most of these programmes, except the Mexican and Brazilian ones, are too recent so no evaluations are available to judge their success. Concerning Bolsa Scola, indirect evidence has shown that the programme has been well targeted to those poor families with children of school age and to the poorest regions within the metropolitan areas but, in many municipalities, the programme has not been successful in reaching all potential beneficiaries (World Bank, 2001). The impact on educational outcomes has been positive as shown by: the lower drop-out rates among beneficiaries compared with nonbeneficiaries (0.4% and 5.6% respectively in 1996); a larger proportion of the children in beneficiary schools enter the school system at the right age compared with non-beneficiaries; and beneficiaries children exhibit a higher promotion rate (80% against 72% for non-beneficiaries children). According to the World Bank, even if there is evidence of immediate poverty reduction through the Bolsa Scola programme, its impact on child labour seems to be

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inconclusive.63 In fact, Bolsa Scola has no mechanism to monitor child labour as it relies on the hope that the cash grant and the increased education will serve as incentives to not working. However, attending school at the minimum rate is perfectly compatible with working some hours a day. Another criticism of Bolsa Scola is that it gives a cash-transfer independent of the recipient. Families, instead of children, receive the income grant, reducing the incentives of families with many children from participating in the programme. At the same time, older children are likely to have higher opportunity costs of going to school, so increasing the amount with age seems to be a better option, as shown by the Progresa programme in Mexico. Box 3.3. Family subsidies linked to schooling attendance in Mexico: from Progresa to Oportunidades The Progresa programme was launched in 1997 as an anti-poverty programme with a threefold purpose: i) to provide educational subsidies to poor families to send their children to school on a regular basis; ii) to promote health care through prevention initiatives; and iii) to offer nutritional supplements to small children not attending school and to pregnant and breast-feeding mothers. Rather than being a simple cash-transfer programme, it requires an active participation by the recipient households in exchange for the benefits received. The title of the programme was changed to Oportunidades in March 2002 but its main aims were unchanged. However, the attention and support given to households in the three areas of education, nutrition and health has been extended. Its coverage and its financial resources have increased too. Some changes have been introduced to increase its transparency and its supervision system as well as greater involvement of local governments. However, it is too early to judge the effect of the most recent changes. Regarding education, the major goal of Progresa was to ensure that families have sufficient resources so that their children can complete basic education. Its most critical objective is to increase the transition of poor rural children, aged 8 to 17 years, into junior secondary school. The educational benefit consists of a lump-sum, linked to a school attendance of at least 85% of school days in a month, given to families (directly to the female of each beneficiary family) every two months (indexed to the inflation rate every 6 months). The benefit is provided for three years (but can be renewed) and varies with the age and sex of the child. The benefit level is greatest for children in secondary school as it is assumed that older children are more likely to engage in outside work or in building their own family, as it is for female children who traditionally have lower secondary school enrolment levels.

63.

On the contrary, evaluations of PETI (Table 3.7) show no evidence of misstargeting. Moreover, PETI has lowered the incidence of children’s work and has increased school attendance. Additionally, the PETI programme, that has provided assistance to almost 800 000 working children in 2002, was accompanied by a transfer per child to finance after-school activities (Jornada Ampliada) which seems also to have been successful (World Bank, 2001).

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For example, in the second semester of 2000 the educational grant varied from USD 9.5 for a boy attending third grade (8 years old), to a maximum of USD 35.4 for a girl attending the third year of secondary school. In order to reverse the observed tendency in Mexico that girls drop out of school earlier than boys, Progresa is designed to target specifically girls in the first three years of secondary school by increasing the grant devoted to them by almost 15%. The general lump-sum is accompanied twice a year by another amount for school materials, depending on educational level (USD 19 a year per child in primary schools and USD 23.7 a year in secondary schools). The maximum amount of monthly benefits is set at USD 83.4 in order to encourage the efforts made by families to overcome poverty, but, at the same time, the benefit intends to discourage them from having more children in order to raise family income. Two years after it was launched, Progresa covered approximately 2.6 million families (Oportunidades has increased its coverage to 3.2 million families in 2000 and is expected to reach an extra million families by 2002). This represented 40% of all Mexican rural families and almost 12% of all families, operating in over 53 000 localities. Its budget was estimated to represent almost 0.2% of Mexico’s GDP (Gomez de Leon et al., 2000; Skoufias and McClafferty, 2001), permitting families to receive an estimated average total cash transfer of USD 55 per month, which represents over a fifth of the Mexican average household income (Behrman and Todd, 2001).

Evaluations of Progresa show that the programme has had a positive effect on enrolment rates, increasing them between 0.74 and 1.07 percentage points for boys and 0.96 to 1.45 for girls in primary schools and between 7.2 to 9.3 for boys and from 3.5 to 5.8 for girls in secondary schools (Schultz, 2000). Nevertheless, these positive effects have been more pronounced in enrolment rates than in attendance rates, the former being higher in localities that are further removed from major urban areas (Skoufias and McClafferty, 2001). But as enrolment doesn’t guarantee attendance, further investigation is needed in the next evaluation of the project. On the other hand, the internal rate of return of the Progresa grant has been estimated at roughly 8% a year, meaning that children having received the grant and having increased their educational attainment will have, in their adulthood, permanently higher earnings of that amount. Concerning the impact of Progresa on child labour, the International Food Policy Research Institute has estimated that the implementation of the programme has lead to important reductions in child labour force participation both in salaried and non-salaried work. The probability of working after the implementation of the programme compared to the probability of working prior to it, is reduced between 15 and 20% for boys aged 12-15 years (15 to 25% for girls) but is not significant for older children (Parker and Skoufias, 2000). In sum, national legislation prohibiting child labour below a certain age, together with the appropriate enforcement mechanisms, is important. However, two key considerations should be kept in mind when designing such legislation: a) the minimum age of employment should take into account market (and

73

poverty) realities – otherwise there is a risk that legislation, if enforced, may force children to work in the informal economy or under more hazardous conditions, and thus be counterproductive; b) legislation on a minimum employment age should be consistent with legislation on compulsory education, which is not always the case. More generally, legislation and enforcement alone cannot be successful without additional measures that make it cost-effective for the household to send their children to school. This can take the form of targeted financial rewards to families that send children to school (as in the case of the Progresa programme in Mexico), or food-for-school programmes. But even in these circumstances, programmes that are successful in terms of increasing educational opportunities and performance for children may not diminish child labour significantly. Moreover, programmes like Progresa/Oportunidades cannot be afforded by the majority of low-income countries. Financing aid to families that send their children to school would then need international transfers, which raises the issue of whether developed countries are willing to fund these programmes. C.

Private initiatives and corporate social responsibility

In recent years, consumers, trade unions and, more generally, civil society have been increasingly calling upon companies to take responsibility for the conditions under which they manufacture the goods they sell. On a deeper level, the business sector has been invited to assume its “social responsibility”. To satisfy these demands, many companies and industries have formulated their own codes of conduct and related policies covering different issues like environmental, labour, health and safety practices. These private initiatives can include child labour issues. Some international organisations have also developed different instruments to promote this social responsibility among the enterprises, e.g. the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) or the UN Global Compact (see Box 3.4). 1.

Enterprise codes of conduct

Companies adopt codes of conduct to project a positive image, vis-à-vis both their staff and external stakeholders (consumers, affiliates, etc…). Through these codes of good practices, companies engage themselves to respect and build labour and or environmental standards into the whole production chain, sometimes including their sub-contractors in other countries. According to a survey conducted by the OECD with information on 246 codes of conduct from a variety of sectors, environmental and labour relations are the areas most

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frequently addressed (OECD, 2001).64 Among the companies of this study, 60% have a formalised commitment concerning labour standards and, of those, just 43% refer to the abolition of child labour. Moreover, only 41% of the codes dealing with labour issues mention obligations for sub-contractors or other business partners.65 Box 3.4. Promoting corporate social responsibility against child labour The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises: They are recommendations addressed by governments to MNEs that constitute a non-binding instrument to promote an appropriate conduct in areas such as core labour standards, environment, human rights, consumer protection and the fight against corruption. Concerning child labour, the OECD guidelines recommend specifically that MNEs shall contribute to its effective abolition in the sense of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the ILO Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour. Governments are committed to promoting the observance of these guidelines and, to do so, they should establish a government office responsible for promoting the use of the guidelines and helping enterprises to implement them. A report must be submitted each year to the OECD Committee on International Investment and MNEs, which is responsible for clarifying the meaning of the Guidelines and their effectiveness. The United Nations Global Compact: This initiative was launched in 1999 with the aim to strengthen the role of business in building the social and environmental pillars required to sustain the “new” global economy. The Global Compact is not a code of conduct, nor is it a prescriptive instrument. Instead, it is a “learning model”, consisting of a platform designed to promote institutional learning. Its aim is to identify and disseminate good practices based on nine universal principles, drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development. It asks companies to act on these principles in their own corporate domains. Companies are asked to post on the Global Compact web-site, once a year, concrete steps they have taken to act on any of these principles in their own corporate domains, and the lessons learned from doing so. The purpose is to highlight “good practices” in this domain.

64.

From the 246 codes of conduct reviewed by the OECD, 118 are issued by MNEs, 92 from industry and trade associations, 32 from a partnership of stakeholders and 4 are issued by inter-governmental organisations. The sectors covered vary from high technology, mass retailing, heavy manufacturing, light manufacturing, primary production to financial services.

65.

It must nevertheless be taken into account that in the OECD survey there is no information available on the practices of MNEs from developing countries, which are the countries most directly affected by the existence of child labour. Further research would be needed to determine if private codes of conduct are largely confined to companies based in OECD countries or whether they are a global phenomenon.

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The global ethical standard SA8000: Social Accountability International was founded in 1997 to harmonise the growing number of codes of conduct put in place by companies during the 1990s. Its aim is to develop and verify the implementation of voluntary corporate social responsibility standards, the first of which was called SA8000. SA8000 is a standard for socially responsible employment practices, modelled on the well-established ISO9000 technical and quality standard, but based on the relevant ILO Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The SA8000 code of practice comprises nine core areas: child labour; forced labour; health and safety; freedom of association and collective bargaining; non-discrimination; disciplinary practices, working hours; compensation and management systems. It offers two different ways for companies to demonstrate their commitment to social responsibility: membership and certification (membership is mainly directed to retailing firms whereas certification is intended for manufacturers and suppliers). Through membership the system offers a self-assessment package and other tools to implement a policy on social responsibility. This means notifying their suppliers that they intend to adopt SA8000, setting at the same time a timetable to interrupt dealings with companies failing to meet those criteria. For certification, the process begins with the company contacting an accredited auditor. Certification auditors then look for objective evidence of effective procedures and performances that comply with the standard, and if this is the case, they issue an SA8000 certificate which is valid for three years. The Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI): The ETI was established in 1998 as a UK partnership of companies, trade union organisations and non-governmental organisations trying to identify and promote ethical trade. Its aim is to develop and promote standards designed to improve working conditions throughout world-wide supply chains of companies trading into the United Kingdom. Member companies are expected to adopt the ETI Base Code (no forced labour, no use of child labour, freedom of association and collective bargaining, no discrimination, living wages, safe and hygienic working conditions, no excessive working hours, provision of regular employment, no harsh or inhumane treatment). While not being an accreditation agency, the ETI develops methods and systems for monitoring and verifying labour standards in relation to company codes of conduct. It also develops training to build institutional capacity where needed in the field through its own pilot projects (i.e. banana plantations in Costa Rica, prawn exports from Andhra Pradesh in India, wine in South Africa, readymade garments in Sri Lanka, fresh produces in Zimbabwe). The ETI’s pilot project of Zimbabwe, for instance, has helped to encourage the setting up of the Agricultural Ethics Assurance Association of Zimbabwe which in turn is starting to influence auditing 66 methodology in other parts of Africa.

Child labour issues appear in the codes of conduct established by companies, industries, employers associations, and trade unions or jointly by all of them. Some of these initiatives have gone further regarding the abolition of child labour than others. Certain codes also address reintegration issues, specifying what happens to the children once they have lost their job (i.e. they return to family or re-entry into school including provisions for education and training of child labourers displaced by the implementation of the code). This is the case of the Code of Labour Practices 66.

See http://www.ethicaltrade.org.

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by the International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) and the commitment signed in 1996 between the Brazilian Citrus Fruit Exporters (ABECITRUS) and the Abrinq Foundation (Table 3.8). Others, on the contrary, do not specify any special obligation of the firm concerning the child. Even if a code of conduct is put in place, the obvious question that arises is whether these initiatives really do change business behaviour. Some claim that codes of conduct are not credible if they are not subject to external verification and related sanctions. It has also been argued that companies without a code of conduct are not necessarily “worse” with respect to such practices because what really counts is the company’s behaviour, not the content of any published code. The evidence suggests that many existing codes of conduct do not contain detailed provisions for monitoring and implementation, nor do many companies have a reliable and permanent monitoring system in place. In some cases, the companies use their quality control personnel to act as social auditors while others hire outside agencies to monitor compliance. Others, instead, just ask their contractors to sign a contract certifying that they do not engage children and rely on their work without further verification. Finally, codes of conduct do not apply, by definition, to the children who are working in the informal sector, which account for a large part of the problem. It can also been argued that these initiatives, even if they can help change employers’ mentalities, are limited in their ability to address the root causes of child labour. 2.

Initiatives on labelling

Another way to respond to consumers’ demand for labour standards has been through the promotion of “social labelling”. As stated in OECD (1996), the aim of “social labelling” programmes is to offer consumers information that enables them to choose goods that meet certain standards considered as socially desirable. Product labelling initiatives oriented to combat child labour began in the early 1990s to satisfy this kind of demand, but also as a response to the threat of trade boycotts to specific products. They were initially launched in hand-knotted carpets but since then different initiatives have been put in place in different sectors. Even if all of them have the primary goal of assuring consumers that the goods they purchase were produced without any child labour, labelling schemes may have different monitoring mechanisms and they may (or may not) offer alternatives to child labour.

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78

The US Apparel Industry

Chocolate Manufacturers Association, the World Cocoa Foundation and US Congress International Federation of Football Associations (FIFA) World Federation of the Sporting Goods industry (WFSGI)

Brazilian Citrus Fruit Exporter ABECITRUS) and Abrinq Foundation

Partners

Industry

Industry

Code of conduct signed in August 1997

Workplace Code of Conduct signed in 1997

Industry

Agriculture

Sector of activity Agriculture

Code of Labour Practice signed in September 1996

Harkin-Engel Protocol signed in October 2001

Code of conduct or agreement Agreement “Terms of Commitment” signed in May 1996

Member companies should ensure that there is no children under 15 years of age (14 under certain conditions), nor children younger than the age for completing compulsory education (if higher than 15). No children should be involved in any employment which jeopardizes their educational, social or cultural development. No children under 15 should be employed (or 14 where allowed by the law of the country), nor below the age for completing compulsory education (if higher than 15).

Recommends to the partners' associates: a) to not employ children at any level of the production network; b) to initiate actions to keep children at school; c) to collaborate in the development of professional training to integrate adolescents in the formal job market; d) to lend support to the public authorities for joint participation against child labour. Identifying and eliminating any of the worst forms of child labour in the growing and processing of cocoa beans in cocoa farms of West Africa. It also provides for public certification that cocoa used in chocolate or related products has been grown and processed without forced child labour. Footballs produced with child labour will not be given FIFA authorized marks.

Provisions concerning child labour

Yes. Since 1998, the Fair Labour Association, a non-profit organisation, offers an independent monitoring system of holding companies, their contractors and their suppliers around the world.

Yes. It includes: information concerning operations; inspection at any time; maintaining records of workers (age, hours worked…); inspection for wages paid and informing workers about the code. No

Yes, but no detail.

No

Monitoring system

Table 3.8. Industry codes of conduct and agreements concerning child labour

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The Company ARTSANA and the Commercial Unions FISCAT-CISL, FILCAMSCGIL, UILTUCS-UIL

European Apparel and Textile and Organisation (EURATEX) and the European Trade Union Federation of Textiles Clothing and Leather (ETUF/TCL) The Toy Industries of Europe (TIE)

Partners

Agreement signed in October 1997

Code of Business Practices signed in November 1997

Code of conduct or agreement Agreement signed in September 1997

Manufacturing Industry (toys)

Manufacturing Industry (toys)

Sector of activity Textile Industry

Employment of children under the legal minimum age is forbidden at any stage of the toy manufacturing. When no legal minimum age is in place, it is fixed at 14 years.

Employment of children under the legal minimum age is forbidden at any stage of the toy manufacturing. When no legal minimum age is in place, it is fixed at 14 years.

Prohibits child labour for those aged 15, or younger when not having completed compulsory schooling.

Provisions concerning child labour

Yes. TIE member countries evaluate their own facilities and those of their contractors with on-site inspections. Contractors are requested to follow the same practices with subcontractors. An annual statement of compliance with the Code must be signed by an officer of each company or contractor. Yes, but not detail.

Yes. EURATEX and ETUF/TCL evaluate yearly the compliance with the agreement. The European Commission and Member States could be asked for assistance to make those evaluations.

Monitoring system

Table 3.8. Industry codes of conduct and agreements concerning child labour (cont.)

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Sector of activity Manufacturing (wood sector)

Commerce and offices

Code of conduct or agreement Code of conduct on the right of the workers signed in May 1998

Joint Declaration on measures to combat child labour signed in January 1996

IKEA demands to its owned manufacturing companies and contractors that the employment conditions of their employees fulfil at least their national legislation. The suppliers must respect ILO Conventions and Recommendations.

Provisions concerning child labour

The producing country must combat the exploitation of children. Countries concerned should promote measures to guarantee the development of children and ensure their education. It supports avoiding the purchase of goods produced in violation of children's rights and requests wholesalers, the retail trade and international purchasers to be alert to indications that give rise to any suspicion on the use of child labour. Sources: International Organisation for Employers (2001) and ILO (2000).

IKEA and the International Federation of Building and Wood Workers (IFBWW) Norwegian Commerce and Offices Union and the Confederation of Norwegian Business

Partners

Yes. Provide data and information on the use of child labour.

Yes. A Monitoring Group is appointed with two members from IKEA and two members from the IFBWW and will meet at least twice a year.

Monitoring system

Table 3.8. Industry codes of conduct and agreements concerning child labour (cont.)

Theoretically, the mechanism through which a labelling initiative should improve the situation of child labourers is that the premium paid by consumers is large enough to raise adult wages in such a way that households decide to remove their children from working. However, even assuming that markets are perfectly competitive, and that proper monitoring mechanisms exists, it is by no means obvious that social labelling will effectively eliminate child labour. The risk is that much of the premium paid by consumers will be captured by producers instead of children or their families. Thus, if labelling is to be effective, it should be used in conjunction with other initiatives to help child workers. This could be through imposing a licensing fee to create a fund to finance education and training programmes. An example of a combination of these two mechanisms is offered by the Rugmark experiment, probably the most credible labelling initiative to combat child labour (Box 3.5). Labelling initiatives also present some other limitations. When monitoring is absent or imperfect, producers can be induced to cheat and practice false labelling. Rational consumers can incorporate this possibility in their consumption decision, and once the label is not trusted, it will not have its desired effect.67 Moreover, labelling initiatives are a very limited way to combat child labour because they are only applicable to export goods that are directly purchased by consumers, and, as shown in Part I, child labour is mainly found in agricultural or service goods produced for the internal market. Moreover, social labelling can be assimilated to a kind of sanction. And sanctions have in many cases contributed to worsening the situation of many children, by displacing them to more hazardous occupations. Codes of conduct and labelling measures are a response to consumers’ demand and a way to preserve a firm’s reputation. Even if these private initiatives can be an important complementary tool to combat child labour, to be effective the focus should be on the alternatives offered to the children. The better codes of conduct and labelling initiatives seem to be those that try to help remove children from work by devoting some revenues to their survival and to their education. Moreover, to be effective codes of conduct should be wellmonitored and seek to cover the whole supply chain.

67.

A discussion on this possibility can be found in Basu, Chau and Grote (2000). Other authors like Davies (2002) argue that, even when consumers value a product without child labour, there are incentives for the industry to use child labour. An industry or a firm will tend to segment the market by using different production methods (using child labour and labelling when not) in order to discriminate prices and obtain higher profits.

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To conclude, the proliferation of codes of conduct, social labelling and other private initiatives is an important response to the social preoccupations of consumers and public opinion. These private initiatives can be a complementary tool to combat child labour, but only to the extent that alternatives to child labour are effectively offered – otherwise, there is a risk of displacement to other occupations, sometimes aggravating the problem. Box 3.5. The Rugmark experiment Rugmark is an international initiative against the use of illegal child labour in the carpet industry, initiated in 1995 by the German aid agency and some Indian nongovernmental organisations. Its initial aim was to eliminate child labour in the Indian carpet industry, but it was rapidly extended to Nepal in 1996 and Pakistan in 1998. The Rugmark concept includes two main objectives in the producing countries: the inspection and certification of the carpet production, and social programmes for former child workers and their families. To be certified by Rugmark, carpet manufacturers sign a legal contract in which they oblige themselves: a) not to employ children under age 14 and pay their adult employees at least the official minimum wage-family businesses must prove in addition that their children helping with the carpet production attend school regularly; b) to present to the Rugmark Foundation a detailed register of all their production’s looms; and c) to allow access to the looms for unannounced inspections. Carpets produced according to these criteria receive the internationally registered label. If child workers are found on two separate inspections, the application is permanently rejected. In the consumer countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States), Rugmark tries to increase public awareness and accommodate the needs of carpet dealers to ensure its labelled 68 carpets are included in their range of products. Importing companies have also to sign a contract with the Rugmark Foundation in which they agree, among other things, to pay a fee between one and 2% of the import value of the labelled carpet. The Rugmark Foundation returns 75% of this amount to the producing countries through a fund that grants rehabilitation and education programmes for children. Since the beginning of the Rugmark initiative, around 50 000 looms have been licensed and more than two million carpets carrying the label against illegal child labour have been produced. Inspectors have discovered nearly 1 800 cases of violation of the Rugmark criteria – of which between 15 and 30% concerned bonded labourers. But there appears to be a decreasing trend in violations. At the beginning one illegal child worker 69 was found in every five inspections, now the proportion is one in nineteen. The inspections have permitted to rescue those children from work as well as offering them 70 the opportunity to attend one of the Rugmark’s affiliated schools.

68.

Germany has been the most important consumer country and its license fees alone have amounted to over 1.5 million Euro.

69.

http://www.rugmark.de.

70.

Children wishing to return to their households to attend school in their own communities can also obtain from Rugmark the payment of their education costs (tuition, books, uniforms...).

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D.

Fighting the worst forms of child labour

As mentioned above, the worst forms of child labour include hazardous work, slavery or similar practices, forced or compulsory labour, trafficking of children, the use for children for prostitution as well as children involved in armed conflicts. It is widely accepted that these forms of child labour greatly harm children’s education, health, longevity and morals, and should therefore be eliminated urgently. Actions and programmes to combat the worst forms of child labour generally contain elements that are also necessary to fight other forms of child labour. The main difference rests in giving priority to children at greater risk and subject to the most abusive and hazardous forms of work and exploitation. 1.

Initiatives at the national level

Any action to combat the worst forms of child labour at national level usually has three main objectives: a) preventing children from engaging in these forms of work; b) removal of children from these forms of labour; and c) rehabilitation and social integration of the children involved.71 Prevention measures can be diverse. According to the annual report on the follow-up of the ILO Declaration (ILO, 2002b), Member States give priority to raising awareness and mobilisation, followed by legal reform and measures to strengthen labour inspection. On the other hand, measures to withdraw children from the worst forms of work can range from persuasion through dialogue with children, parents and employers, to more radical ones like “rescue” operations conducted in some cases by different organisations. Rehabilitation of children who have been involved in the worst forms of child labour is not an easy task. It includes the provision of health care and psychological support to overcome the traumas suffered as well as legal aid and protection for children threatened with reprisals. It also needs to offer some basic education and training in order for children to be progressively reintegrated into the school system. In any case, rehabilitation covers a wide range of actions. For example, IPEC’s evaluation of programmes in seven countries (Brazil, Indonesia, Kenya, Philippines, Tanzania, Thailand, and Turkey) shows the importance of interventions tailored to the special needs of the target group, having sensitivity to the local culture.72 71.

According to ILO (2002f), meeting these objectives requires actions on five broad fronts: sensitising public opinion, legislation, enforcement, education and support for the children and their families.

72.

ILO (2001b).

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The prevention of hazardous work must begin with the identification of the types of work and the circumstances under which those forms of work are carried out and their recognition by all actors. Situations that could affect the child mentally (e.g. stress, violence, isolation) must also be taken into account when determining if the work or the circumstances under which it is carried out are considered hazardous. Once a list of hazardous work is established in national law and periodically re-examined, governments should focus on raising awareness and distributing information to companies, trade unions, parents, NGOs, schools, labour inspectors and health professionals. Finally, good practices when implementing programmes for children in prostitution need to bear in mind that the children involved in these practices are often traumatised which requires considerable psychological and other support. Targeted programmes are needed here, bearing in mind, once again, the gravity of the situation and the need for sustained actions in this area. Another of the lessons learned in that field, is that once removed from these activities, children should be trained in skills which are in demand (marketable products), in order to permit them to earn their living. This includes also the possibility that children earn some income during training to improve their self-esteem and confidence (ILO, 2001b). 2. Initiatives at the international, regional and bilateral level: the case of child trafficking and prostitution International, regional and bilateral co-operation is a fundamental tool to combat those worst forms of child labour which involve cross-border activities, e.g. child trafficking and prostitution. A growing number of initiatives have been taken since the mid-1990s. For example, as a follow-up to the Stockholm Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children held in August 1996, the World Tourism Organisation launched in 1997 a Task Force to protect children from sexual exploitation in tourism.73 Moreover, in May 2000 an optional Protocol on the sale of children for prostitution purposes was added to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.74 Moreover, the need for international co-operation was recognised in 2001 at the second World Congress against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children held in 73.

See http://www.world-tourism.org/protect_children/index.htm.

74.

The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography entered into force in January 2002. As of December 2001 it had been ratified by 13 countries: Andorra, Bangladesh, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Holy See, Iceland, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Norway, Panama, Romania, Sierra Leone and Uganda.

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Yokohama which emphasised the importance of increasing networking of decision-making, at all levels. Some bilateral agreements such as those concluded between the Philippines, Australia and the United Kingdom have also gone in the same direction, though only recently.75 An important initiative to address child trafficking was agreed upon November 2000 under the aegis of the United Nations Protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, specially women and children.76 Under this Protocol, Member States have the following obligations: a) to take the necessary actions to prevent and combat trafficking (i.e. research, media campaigns, and social economic measures) as well as to protect the victims; b) to tackle the factors such as poverty, underdevelopment and unequal opportunity, that make people vulnerable to trafficking; and c) to strengthen legal provisions and education measures to cut demand for trafficked children. In addition to these multilateral agreements, international and regional cooperation to fight child trafficking has also increased in the Greater Mekong region, in South Asia and in West and Central Africa. For example, in West and Central Africa the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted in December 2001 a Declaration and a Plan of Action against trafficking in persons according to which Member States must take specific measures to criminalise trafficking in persons, to protect and support the victims, to promote awareness-raising activities and to improve co-operation between border control agencies.77 But the main problem with existing international programmes in this area is that the perception of child trafficking varies greatly across countries. 75.

The bilateral agreements between the Philippines and Australia and the Philippines and the United Kingdom intend to combat these practices through increasing information, police co-operation, harmonisation of laws and judicial procedures as well as through protecting the children involved.

76.

The Palermo Protocol supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its aim is to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking of persons, to provide the legal foundation for co-operation between countries and to ensure the protection of witnesses. Its Article 3a provides the international definition of trafficking, envisaged as the transfer of persons by fraudulent means to exploitative purposes. In the case of children, the fraudulent mean is not necessary to be classified as child trafficking.

77.

Since 1999, nine countries of the region are involved in a regional project launched by IPEC with USDOL aid to combat child trafficking and increase the efforts to channel identified trafficked children to NGOs providing social protection and support services.

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Nevertheless, international pressure and media campaigns have recently favoured some bilateral agreements, e.g. the first co-operation agreement signed in the West and Central Africa region between Mali and Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, the media interest in the growing traffic of children from Mali to work in the Côte d’Ivoire’s plantations, prompted the signature in September 2000 of a bilateral agreement to combat the cross-border trafficking, based on joint national plans of action for prevention, control, repatriation and rehabilitation. In sum, combating the worst forms of child labour is a main priority. It requires above all a strong political will at all levels of the decision-making process, as well as effective bilateral, regional and international co-operation. A stronger fight against the nets of child trafficking and prostitution is clearly called for. This will require greater international co-operation in the judiciary field. This should go hand-in-hand with raising awareness and diffusing information to all parties involved (companies, trade unions, parents, schools, labour inspectors, health professionals and NGOs). E.

Concluding remarks

Child labour is a complex phenomenon whose nature varies considerably between countries but also within them. This study has examined a range of possible factors at work and associated policy remedies – the main findings of this work are presented in the Overview at the beginning of the book. It would be useful, however, to further refine the analysis and policy issues raised in the report. First, there is agreement that, although not all forms of child labour are necessarily detrimental to the health and human capital development of children, most working activities have negative consequences for the children who perform them. This is especially true for children whose health and psychological development are damaged by exposure to the worst forms of employment. In practice, however, it has proved difficult to identify the degree to which particular activities undertaken by children affect their health and human capital development. Understanding how the nature and intensity of child labour varies by gender, age, country, region, community, household and socio-cultural context would help formulate meaningful solutions to the problem. Second, this report documents the role of a variety of “push” and “pull” factors behind child labour. In many cases children work for their parents as part of the family enterprise or farm and therefore understanding the household decision making process is essential. The expected return to education, which, among other things, depends on the availability and quality of education, plays

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an important role in the household’s decision to send children to work as opposed to school. In this context, the respective roles of availability versus quality of education need to be better understood. Furthermore, although the overall level of income and wealth of the household also plays a role, more research could shed light on whether there are non-linearities involved in the poverty-child labour dynamics. Third, recent experience illustrates that, given the complex nature of child labour, a multi-dimensional policy approach is important. This encompasses not just greater emphasis on education, but also the adoption of child labour legislation consistent with market realities, as well as financial incentives to households that send their children to school and keep them out of work. But not all developing countries can afford to finance this comprehensive approach. Therefore one key issue which requires further investigation is the funding of programmes and their cost-effectiveness. Not only must all the programme costs – direct and indirect – be properly measured. But since the economic impact of child labour is most pronounced in developing countries there is of course the fundamental question of the extent to which developed countries are prepared to co-finance the programmes. Private initiatives, like corporate social responsibility and labelling also have a complementary role to play in combating child labour. In the early 1990s, product labelling was initially launched in the hand-knotted carpet industry but since then different initiatives have been put in place in different sectors. Many of these programmes have met with some success. But they are not a panacea. Corporate initiatives of this nature are an important response to the social preoccupations of consumers and public opinion but only to the extent that alternatives to child labour are effectively offered – otherwise, there is a risk of displacement to other occupations, sometimes aggravating the problem. Understanding further these initiatives, how they work and their applicability to solving child labour problems would prove informative. Finally, the fact that so many children continue to be subject to the worst forms of child labour such as slavery, forced or bonded labour, hazardous work, trafficking, prostitution and other illicit activities is appalling. Working (and living) conditions of this nature are difficult to imagine under any circumstance, but especially for children who are unable to defend themselves. An analysis of the different policy options for further international action is clearly called for.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Economic activity Economic activity covers all market production (paid work) and certain types of non market production (unpaid work) in the formal as in the informal sector. It also includes production of goods for own use. Children engaged in domestic work in someone else’s household are considered as economically active whereas children engaged in domestic chores in their own household are not. Child labour For the purpose of this report child labour will be defined accordingly to Conventions 138 and 182 as: a) all economic activity done by children until age 11; b) all economic activity done by children aged 12 to 14, excluding permitted “light work” in the sense of Convention 138; c) all economic activity carried out under hazardous conditions by children aged 15 to 17, and d) “the worst forms” of child labour carried out under age 18. Light work “Light work” is defined in Convention 138 (Art. 7) as that work that is not likely to harm the health and development of the child and as that work that do not prejudices its school attendance and its participation in vocational orientation or training programmes. Nevertheless that definition leaves open a certain degree of uncertainty laying on the interpretation of what is “likely” to harm a child’s development and what “prejudices” its school attendance. Hazardous work Hazardous work is defined in Convention 138 (Art. 3) as that work “that by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to jeopardise the health, safety or morals of young persons”. Countries must determine which work is considered hazardous by national laws or regulations following the guidelines given in Recommendation 146. This kind of work is

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also considered in Convention 182 (Art. 3d) as one of the worst forms of child labour. The worst forms of child labour The worst forms of child labour are defined in Convention 182 (Art. 3) as: a) all forms of slavery or similar practices like sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and forced or compulsory labour; b) the use of children for prostitution, for the production of pornography or for pornographic performances; c) the use of children for illicit activities in particular for the production and trafficking of drugs; d) hazardous work. The unconditional worst forms of child labour Are all the worst forms of child labour defined above excluding hazardous work (ILO, 2002a).

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Annex A DATA SOURCES

The main sources of data on child labour include surveys carried out by various National Statistical Offices, the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS), UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) and the ILO’s Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC). A.1.

National Labour Force Surveys

Labour force surveys are a readily available source of valuable information on the economic activity of individuals. However, when it comes to measuring children and their activities, the labour force surveys conducted in most countries fall short in several areas. For example, the surveys and sampling methodology are designed to capture the activities of adults, not those of children. Furthermore, many labour force surveys do not attempt to collect information on children younger than 15. However, labour force surveys can provide useful information in the absence of other more pertinent data and can also be used to verify the results obtained in surveys designed specifically for children. A.2. The World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) The main objectives of the LSMS, established in 1980, were to develop new methods for monitoring the living conditions of households and the policies affecting them. The surveys are household based and multi-topic in nature including a community questionnaire to gather information on the demographics of the community, its infrastructure, health services, etc. There is also, of course, the standard household questionnaire designed to capture generic household information such as income, expenditures, and economic activity (generally answered by individuals themselves). Within the household portion of the LSMS survey, information is gathered on economically active children (reference week and the past 12 months), their main occupation and industry, hours of work, school attendance, and more 91

recently, domestic chores. The surveys are very much country-specific and the information gathered and questions asked vary considerably. Furthermore, the surveys often have small sample sizes since they are configured to understand certain trends and phenomena, as opposed to providing statistically reliable data. And, since they are also not designed to capture information on children’s activities, the data collected provide few reliable estimates concerning economically active children and any detailed breakdown of their activities. However, recently more effort has been made in certain cases to obtain detailed information on children and their activities. In 2000, a joint LSMS and SIMPOC survey was carried out in Guatemala. A.3.

UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS)

The MICS was developed in response to the 1990 World Summit for Children which proposed a plan to monitor children’s rights and their wellbeing. Consequently, some 75 indicators were identified with this aim in mind. The surveys were designed to be stand-alone surveys or modules attached to existing household surveys and were developed in collaboration with other international organisations including the World Health Organization, the United Nations Statistics Division and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The MICS survey consists of three questionnaires: the household questionnaire, one on individual women and finally a third questionnaire detailing information on children under five years old. Each questionnaire has various modules attached to it depending on the needs of the country. The child labour module is found within the household questionnaire and consists of seven questions. It collects information on economic activity – the past week and past 12 months, domestic chores, other family work, and hours spent in each activity within the reference week. The caretaker of the child, usually the mother, answers the questions in the child labour module and answers for each child aged between 5 and 14 residing in the household. Consequently the data obtained within MICS do not provide very detailed information. Nonetheless, despite some inconsistencies with results from other surveys, the quality of the MICS data is considered to be relatively high. A.4. ILO’s Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour (SIMPOC) SIMPOC was launched in January 1998 as part of the ILO’s International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), in response to the growing need for reliable data on child labour. Key elements are standardised household surveys with questions addressed to both parents and children. The surveys are either stand-alone inquiries or attached as a module to a labour force or other

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household-based survey. The programme currently provides assistance, at various stages, to over 40 countries in the collection of data. The surveys are countryspecific and carried out most often by the National Statistical Office (NSO) with help – technical and financial – from SIMPOC. In general, the SIMPOC surveys include numerous questions on the characteristics of children ranging from working activities, hours of work, type of work, schooling, etc. Furthermore, information on basic demographic and household characteristics is also collected. The SIMPOC countries for which data sets and published reports are currently available cover a diverse set of countries with extensive representation from the regions of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.78 All of the countries presented, except Portugal, are classified as medium or low-term human development, with the majority falling into the former (Table A1). Therefore, not surprisingly, the populations are concentrated for the most part in rural areas and, given the low life expectancy of most, the populations of these developing nations are relatively young, with children aged 5 to 17 making up approximately one-third of the total population. Current versus usual economic activity The “usually active” population comprises individuals involved in an activity over a set period of time – usually 12 months in duration or activities engaged in during the past year. The benefit of using responses to ‘usually active’ to measure children in economic activity is that it captures seasonal work. In countries with a strong rural or agriculture element, this could be of importance. However, children cannot be relied upon to remember if they engaged in a particular activity in the past year or 12 months. Consequently, “currently active” measures those who are economically active over the reference period – usually the past week or seven days. The shorter reference period eliminates the recall bias arising from requiring children to remember their activities over the past year, but will of course exclude children who partake in work of a seasonal nature and are currently not economically active. The surveys and questions used to measure economic activity differ by country (Table A2). However, for the purpose of this study, economic activity is based upon, where possible, activity of at least one hour captured in the last seven days or reference period – in line with the international definition of individuals economically active. The following section will review the specific questions covered in each country survey. 78.

The countries for which detailed data are available are: Belize, Cambodia, Guatemala, Kenya, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Turkey, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

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Table A1. SIMPOC country profiles, 1999

a,b

A. Population and regional distribution Total population (000s) Africa Kenya Namibia South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Asia Cambodia Nepal Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Latin America Belize Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugal Turkey Ukraine

Children 5-17 Urban (%)

% of total

Rural (%)

30 029 1 724 42 754 10 187 12 400

36.3 25.8 31.3 39.0 37.5

21.2 32.9 46.5 35.9 20.8

78.8 67.1 53.5 64.1 79.2

12 766 20 938 137 556 69 806 18 747

40.1 29.7 29.1 32.6 23.2

19.0 8.4 28.3 46.7 12.7

81.0 91.6 71.7 53.3 87.3

226 11 089 4 938 2,811

35.0 30.3 19.9 28.8

41.6 24.8 .. 56.2

58.4 75.2 .. 43.8

10 003 65 674 50 022

11.9 24.5 16.6

.. 59.5 67.9

.. 40.5 32.1

B. Human development indicators LEABc Africa Kenya Namibia South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Asia Cambodia Nepal Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Latin America Belize Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugal Turkey Ukraine

ALRd

CGERe

GDP per capitaf

HDIg

51.3 44.9 53.9 41.0 42.9

81.5 81.4 84.9 77.2 88.0

51.0 78.0 93.0 49.0 65.0

1 021.9 5 468.2 8 908.2 756.2 2 875.6

.514 (132) .601 (111) .702 (94) .427 (143) .554 (117)

56.4 58.1 59.6 69.0 71.9

68.2 40.4 45.0 95.1 91.4

62.0 60.0 40.0 82.0 70.0

1 361.0 1 237.2 1 834.4 3 805.1 3 278.7

.541 (121) .480 (129) .498 (127) .749 (70) .735 (81)

73.8 64.5 68.1 73.9

93.1 68.1 68.2 91.7

73.0 49.0 63.0 74.0

4 959.0 3 674.0 2 279.0 5 875.0

.776 (54) .626 (108) .635 (106) .784 (52)

75.7 69.5 68.1

92.2 84.6 99.6

96.0 62.0 77.0

17 290.0 6 380.0 3 457.6

.880 (28) .735 (82) .742 (74)

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Notes to Table A1: a) Data for Nepal and the Philippines refer to 1995-96; Cambodia 1996; Sri Lanka 1998; Kenya 1998-99; Guatemala 1999-2000; Nicaragua and Panama 2000; Belize 2000-01; and Portugal 2001. b) Data for Namibia refer to children aged 6-18; Guatemala and Turkey 6-17; Nicaragua 10-17; Portugal 6-15; Ukraine 7-17. c) Life expectancy at birth. d) Adult literacy rate. e) Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio. f) Expressed in terms of USD purchasing power parity. g) Rank out of 162 is given in parenthesis. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published reports; United Nations (2001); and UNDP (2002).

Table A2. Questions used to measure economic activity Africa

Asia

Country Kenya

Questions What is…employment status? Either of the following categories is considered: Paid Employee, Working Employer, Own Account Worker, Unpaid Family Worker, Apprentice or Worked last 12 months?

Namibia

Did you do any work for pay, profit or family gain during the last 7 days, even for one hour on any day?

South Africa

In the last 7 days, did you do any of the following activities?: Any kind of business, big or small, for yourself?; Help unpaid in a family business of any kind?; Help on the family plot, food garden, cattle post or kraal?; Catch any fish, prawns, shells, wild animals or other food for sale or family food?; Do any work for a wage, salary, or any payment in kind even if only for an hour?; Beg for money or food in public?

Zambia

What was…main economic activity (working and assisting with work of any kind) in the last 7 days?

Zimbabwe

Was child engaged in any economic activity during the last 7 days? Did you do any work even for one hour on any day during the last 7 days

Cambodia

Nepal

Children who worked most of the year.

Pakistan

Economically active in the past week.

Philippines

Did you at any time…(work) during the past 12 months work?

Sri Lanka

Currently (at the time of survey) engaged in economic activity.

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Table A2. Questions used to measure economic activity (cont.) Latin America

Other

Country Belize

Questions Engage work activity for at least one hour or Ever worked for pay, profit, etc.?

Guatemala

During the past week did you work for pay or salary, for yourself, or did you work for a third party? Not even one hour? Nor helping a relative in a business, in construction or related business? Nor washing, ironing or sewing clothes for other people? Neither taking care of cars, cleaning shoes or other similar activity? Although you did not work the last week, did you have some work or business from which you were absent for reasons of leave of absence, sickness, holidays, maternity or another motive?

Nicaragua

Did you work during the last week? Or, last week did you carry out any activity such as: Cultivate or harvest land, sell some product, care for animals, make and/or sell bread, tortillas, food, handicrafts, others, unpaid apprentice, other economic activity? Or, have you ever worked?

Panama

Did you work last week? Did you do some work last week for which you received money, such as selling lottery, newspapers, cooking, washing, ironing, or sewing clothing, washing cars, shining shoes, cutting grass, etc.? / Last week, did you work with a family member in their business, firm, or farm for 15 or more hours? What did you do last week and last year? Valid responses for economic activity include “I helped someone in my family with work (non-paid)”, “I helped someone else with work (non-paid)” or “I worked”.

Portugal

Turkey

Children who work for pay, or profit (as self-employed) or as unpaid family workers at an establishment/land belonging to one of the household members and who fall under either one of the following categories: a) persons who were economically active during the reference period for at least one hour as a regular or casual employee, employer, self-employed or as unpaid family worker; b) persons who have a job but who did not work during the reference period for various reasons.

Ukraine

Did you do any paid or unpaid work over the last 3 months? Or, Did you do anything else or occasional jobs for pay (selling stamps, badges, contest reward, invention, programming, etc) in the last 3 months? Or, Did you happen to work in school holiday over the past 3 months?

Source: ILO SIMPOC database.

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Economically active children in SIMPOC countries It should also be stressed once again the data comparability and reliability issues inherent in child labour data, especially household surveys. Meaningful comparisons between countries are often quite difficult. This is often due to the vast cultural differences that exist between countries but also, the sampling methodology and survey design are country specific. And, as the previous Table A2 illustrated, the use of different reference periods (usually active, active in the past 7 days, active in the past 12 months) further renders crosscountry comparisons a difficult task. Furthermore, the hidden nature and the difficulty in understanding what constitutes child labour accentuate the problems of household surveys in collecting accurate data. Table A3. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by age and gender, a,b 1999

(employment to population ratios, in %) Boys

Africa Kenya Namibia South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Asia Cambodia Nepalc Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Latin America Belize Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugald Turkey Ukraine

Girls

5-9

10-14

15-17

5-17

5-9

10-14

15-17

5-17

12.5 (14.0) 13.9 6.5 8.8

19.1 (15.9) 21.9 14.2 17.8

24.6 22.3 28.9 25.1 24.7

17.5 16.9 20.1 13.3 16.0

10.6 (10.8) 10.4 5.7 7.5

18.1 15.7 19.4 12.7 15.6

27.5 19.6 19.9 28.5 21.6

17.2 15.1 15.9 12.9 13.9

25.9 20.3 3.0 3.0 6.1

65.3 51.5 22.2 22.5 26.0

82.8 .. .. 44.2 48.6

53.1 34.6 11.8 19.9 25.8

25.5 29.5 2.3 1.9 5.5

64.4 65.9 7.2 13.2 16.5

83.7 .. .. 23.5 29.2

52.8 45.8 4.5 11.2 16.6

3.3 8.9 .. 1.6

12.7 38.5 29.8 9.0

37.9 70.5 55.8 25.5

14.4 34.4 38.9 9.4

2.5 5.2 .. (0.3)

6.6 20.1 11.1 2.1

18.7 36.7 25.1 10.1

7.2 18.0 16.0 3.0

2.0 1.1 1.0

7.2 12.6 4.8

.. 34.8 10.0

5.5 12.3 5.3

1.4 1.4 (0.7)

3.3 8.1 2.7

.. 20.9 5.3

2.7 7.9 2.9

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Table A3. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by age and gender, a,b 1999 (cont.)

(employment to population ratios, in %) Both sexes 5-9

10-14

15-17

5-17

Africa Kenya 11.6 18.6 26.0 17.3 Namibia 12.3 15.8 20.9 16.0 South Africa 12.2 20.6 24.3 18.0 Zambia 6.1 13.5 26.7 13.1 Zimbabwe 8.2 16.7 23.2 14.9 Asia Cambodia 25.7 64.9 83.2 53.0 Nepalc 24.8 58.3 .. 40.0 Pakistan 2.7 14.9 .. 8.3 Philippines 2.5 17.9 34.1 15.7 Sri Lanka 6.6 21.3 38.9 21.3 Latin America Belize 2.9 9.7 29.1 10.9 Guatemala 7.1 29.8 53.6 26.4 Nicaragua .. 20.5 40.7 27.6 Panama 0.9 5.7 18.0 6.3 Others Portugald 1.8 5.3 .. 4.1 Turkey 1.2 10.4 28.0 10.2 Ukraine 0.8 3.8 7.7 4.1 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) Data for Namibia refer to children aged 6-9, 10-14, 15-18 and 6-18, respectively. Data for Nicaragua refer to children 10-14 and 10-17, respectively. For Turkey and Guatemala, data refer to children 6-9 and 6-17. Data for Portugal refer to children 6-9, 10-15 and 6-15 respectively. For the Ukraine, data refer to children 7-9 and 7-17, respectively. For countries where some age groups are missing, 5-17 refers to the total of the available age groups. c) Data for Nepal refers to children who worked most of the year. d) For Portugal, data are derived from the report of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour (2003) (forthcoming). This report stresses that 2.4% of children are involved in child labour following the ILO’ definition on child labour, which is more restrictive that the definition on economic activity of this table. Moreover, when breaking down economic activity into hazardous and non-hazardous work, it is found that in Portugal only 1.2% of children are subject to hazardous working conditions (1.8% for boys and 0.5% for girls). Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

98

Table A4. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by region, gender a,b and age, 1999

(employment to population ratios, in %) Rural Boys

Africa Kenya Namibia South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Asia Cambodia Nepal Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Latin America Belize Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugal Turkey Ukraine

Girls

5-9

10-14

15-17

5-17

5-9

10-14

15-17

5-17

14.2 21.4 21.1 9.3 10.2

21.7 22.7 32.7 20.0 20.0

28.7 30.4 41.9 30.6 27.5

20.2 24.3 29.7 17.8 17.9

12.7 15.2 15.3 7.8 8.5

20.3 22.6 27.7 17.3 17.8

28.7 27.2 26.8 40.2 24.4

19.0 21.2 22.5 17.6 15.6

27.5 .. 3.6 4.1 4.6

69.0 .. 27.5 29.9 28.4

86.2 .. .. 56.8 50.9

55.7 .. 14.2 25.8 28.0

26.8 .. 3.1 2.2 6.0

67.3 .. 9.6 16.8 18.1

86.5 .. .. 27.3 31.2

54.6 .. 6.1 13.4 18.0

4.5 9.1 .. 2.9

16.0 42.6 .. 15.7

46.5 76.2 .. 42.8

17.9 37.2 .. 15.5

3.8 5.8 .. (0.5)

9.0 21.6 .. 2.8

22.4 35.2 .. 14.8

9.4 18.4 .. 4.0

.. 2.1 1.3

.. 19.7 6.2

.. 51.3 14.1

.. 18.2 7.1

.. 3.2 (1.2)

.. 15.2 4.5

.. 38.6 7.4

.. 15.0 4.4

99

Table A4. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by region, gender a,b and age, 1999 (cont.)

(employment to population ratios, in %) Urban Boys 5-9

10-14

Girls 15-17

5-17

5-9

10-14

15-17

5-17

Africa Kenya 7.0 5.6 8.1 6.8 1.9 10.9 23.9 10.9 Namibia 0.6 0.8 5.5 2.0 0.7 1.7 5.7 2.5 South Africa 5.6 9.8 15.4 9.3 4.4 9.2 12.5 8.0 Zambia 1.7 3.3 14.8 5.0 1.8 4.6 10.7 4.7 Zimbabwe (3.7) 7.7 14.9 7.9 (3.5) 6.7 14.4 7.8 Asia Cambodia 18.3 49.6 69.2 42.0 19.3 51.9 74.1 45.1 Nepal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Pakistan 1.1 10.1 .. 5.6 0.2 1.5 .. 0.8 Philippines 1.7 13.9 30.6 13.2 1.5 9.1 19.5 8.7 Sri Lanka 1.6 9.0 29.6 10.9 2.2 4.5 14.8 6.6 Latin America Belize (1.4) 7.7 25.1 9.0 (0.8) 3.4 13.9 4.3 Guatemala 8.5 25.5 53.6 25.5 (3.4) 15.5 40.9 16.7 Nicaragua .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Panama (0.4) 3.5 13.6 4.5 (0.1) 1.6 7.4 2.3 Others Portugal .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Turkey 0.4 7.6 24.8 8.4 0.2 2.6 8.9 3.0 Ukraine (0.9) 4.1 8.2 4.5 (0.4) 1.8 4.4 2.2 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

100

Table A5. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by main industry a,b and gender, 1999

(percentages) Boys Manufacturing/ Construction

Agriculture Africa Kenya Namibia South Africa Zambia Zimbabwe Asia Cambodia Nepalc Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Latin America Belize Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugal Turkey Ukraine

Services/ Other

85.5 87.6 76.0 80.8 86.3

3.4 1.4 (2.0) 8.6 6.3

11.0 11.0 22.0 10.6 7.4

91.4 94.4 63.3 74.2 64.1

2.6 3.5 12.8 5.6 16.7

6.0 2.1 24.0 20.3 19.2

.. .. 61.5 ..

.. .. 15.7 ..

.. .. 22.8 ..

51.9 46.3 42.1

24.4 26.9 11.3

23.7 26.7 46.6

101

Table A5. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by main industry a,b and gender, 1999 (cont.)

(percentages) Girls Manufacturing/ Construction

Agriculture

Services/ Other

Africa Kenya 68.6 1.3 30.1 Namibia 88.3 (0.6) 11.0 (1.2) 33.8 South Africa 65.0 Zambia 79.3 6.9 13.8 Zimbabwe 78.6 1.7 19.7 Asia Cambodia 88.0 4.0 8.0 Nepalc 95.0 3.0 1.9 Pakistan 77.2 12.1 10.7 Philippines 47.6 8.1 44.3 Sri Lanka 64.5 21.1 14.7 Latin America Belize .. .. .. Guatemala .. .. .. Nicaragua 25.2 14.6 60.3 Panama .. .. .. Others Portugal 40.9 14.6 44.5 Turkey 75.8 13.4 10.7 Ukraine 52.4 8.5 39.2 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) For Nepal, transportation and communication is included in manufacturing and construction and is based upon activities during the last week of the survey. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

102

Table A6. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries engaged in unpaid a,b activities by gender and age, 1999

(percentages) Boys Rural

Urban

5-9

10-14

Girls 15-17

5-17

5-9

10-14

15-17

5-17

Africa Kenya 93.2 65.1 98.8 92.6 81.8 91.4 98.0 91.1 79.1 88.8 Namibiac 91.9 34.0 95.8 92.8 77.4 88.3 97.2 95.4 80.1 90.4 South 85.3 64.7 87.6 80.0 78.0 81.6 90.3 81.4 65.4 79.6 Africad Zambiac 91.6 50.1 96.0 89.8 74.4 84.7 96.6 93.2 79.1 87.6 Zimbabwee 89.2 75.4 95.2 91.5 79.2 88.1 96.0 92.1 75.5 87.2 Asia Cambodia .. .. .. .. . . 88.1 .. .. . . 87.5 Nepal 83.5 72.7 86.9 83.9 . . 84.7 87.2 80.0 . . 82.1 Pakistanc 75.1 30.4 .. .. . . 67.4 .. .. . . 77.6 Philippines 65.9 56.3 100 72.0 52.8 63.8 100 71.8 44.0 60.8 Sri Lanka 77.8 56.5 .. .. . . 74.8 .. .. . . 80.0 Latin America Belizec 42.8 (7.5) 68.4 38.9 17.6 29.6 71.6 58.3 22.0 42.6 Guatemalac 65.6 48.3 92.2 73.2 42.6 61.5 93.4 71.1 47.9 63.2 Nicaragua .. .. .. 65.0 37.7 51.2 .. 63.5 27.0 43.4 Panama 67.8 10.4 80.2 62.8 41.3 51.9 (77.0) 57.9 36.3 43.3 Others Portugal .. .. .. .. . . 85.5 .. .. . . 84.8 Turkey 83.7 9.8 95.0 48.0 51.0 51.1 96.3 86.2 78.2 71.2 Ukraine 45.6 21.9 (26.6) 29.5 28.7 28.9 (57.3) 44.7 32.6 39.2 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) For Namibia, Zambia, Cambodia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Belize and Guatemala refer to unpaid family worker and are based upon the question of main status. It is important to note that some of the other activities undertaken by children, i.e. “employee” may indeed also be unpaid. d) Data for South Africa are based on the children reporting zero gross monthly earnings. Furthermore, approximately 85% of economically active children are engaged in activities related to their family business or family land/plot. e) Data for Zimbabwe are based on the amount they were paid in the last pay period. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

103

Table A7. Main reasons for children in SIMPOC countries to engage a,b,c in economic activity, 1999

(percentages) Assist family income

Duty to familyc

Personal

Other

Africa Kenya 40.6 41.5 14.7 3.3 Namibia .. .. .. .. South Africa 10.6 69.8 18.7 0.9 Zambia 59.8 1.7 5.0 33.5 46.8 37.2 .. 16.1 Zimbabwed Asia Cambodia 73.5 23.0 2.7 0.8 Nepal .. .. .. .. Pakistan 27.5 55.2 .. 17.3 Philippines 38.3 33.1 24.7 3.9 28.4 58.3 .. 13.3 Sri Lankad Latin America Belizee 21.3 9.8 64.9 4.0 Guatemala .. .. .. .. Nicaragua 53.1 32.9 .. 14.0 Panama 31.2 30.9 .. 37.9 Others f 15.9 13.7 61.3 9.1 Portugal Turkey 38.4 40.8 16.7 4.2 Ukraine 33.1 .. 59.0 7.9 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) Where applicable, to help family pay outstanding debt or help family enterprise is included under “Duty to family”. d) Answered by parents. e) For Belize, the parents answered this question. Consequently, “Personal” reasons relate to "teach him/her work ethics/training”. f) For Portugal “Assist family income” refers to economic difficulties. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

104

Table A8. Economically active children in SIMPOC countries by hours worked a,b,c per day, 1999

(percentages) Boys ≤3

4-6

Girls ≥7

≤3

4-6

Both sexes ≥7

≤3

4-6

≥7

Africa Kenya 33.6 33.9 32.5 30.8 32.7 36.5 32.2 33.3 34.4 Namibiad 36.2 48.5 15.4 50.5 41.1 8.4 42.9 45.0 12.1 South Africa 82.8 15.0 2.2 85.8 11.4 2.8 84.1 13.5 2.4 Zambia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. Zimbabwed,e 51.6 41.2 7.2 46.0 42.8 11.2 48.8 42.3 8.9 Asia Cambodia 69.7 24.4 6.0 70.4 22.7 6.9 70.0 23.5 6.4 Nepal 40.2 37.9 21.9 27.4 37.5 35.1 34.1 37.8 28.1 Pakistan 33.0 31.4 35.6 44.1 35.2 20.7 38.4 27.3 34.2 Philippines 65.5 22.3 12.2 71.0 13.6 15.4 67.3 19.4 13.2 Sri Lanka 60.2 18.1 21.7 70.3 15.5 14.1 64.0 17.1 18.9 Latin America Belize 37.5 18.2 44.3 50.7 (9.6) 39.6 41.5 15.6 42.9 Guatemala 15.5 20.0 64.5 19.1 30.5 50.4 16.7 23.5 59.8 Nicaragua 20.4 30.7 48.9 26.2 32.4 41.4 21.8 31.2 47.0 Panama 50.2 31.2 18.6 54.2 24.9 20.9 51.1 29.8 19.1 Others Portugal 67.0 16.0 17.0 68.7 15.8 15.5 67.5 15.9 16.5 Turkey 25.4 33.8 40.8 36.6 34.4 29.0 30.5 33.9 35.6 Ukraine 72.1 23.8 4.1 66.9 28.9 (4.2) 70.3 25.6 4.2 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) In some cases, the information is based upon hours reported over the past week and may not correspond precisely to the above categories. Missing responses, zero hours, and hours greater than 24 where daily hours were reported, were ignored in the calculation. d) Data for Namibia and Zimbabwe are based upon usual hours worked per day. e) Data for Zimbabwe refers less than 3 hour not 3 or less. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

105

Table A9. Incidence of workplace injuries for children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries, a,b 1999

(percentages) Injury frequencyc c

Injury incidence

Seldom/ rarely

Occasionally

Often/ frequently

Africa Kenya 21.5 .. .. .. Namibia 4.6 (21.4) 59.0 19.6 South Africa 4.3 .. .. .. Zambia 11.7 89.5 .. 10.5 Zimbabwe 17.1 78.9 15.2 (5.9) Asia Cambodia 46.4 18.0 78.1 3.9 Nepal .. .. .. .. Pakistand 67.5 49.3 40.9 9.8 Philippines 24.1 .. .. .. Sri Lanka 10.5 78.4 16.3 5.3 Latin America Belizee 15.6 80.6 (19.4) .. Guatemala .. .. .. .. e Nicaragua 13.9 77.3 17.8 (4.9) Panama 6.4 93.4 (4.7) (1.9) Others Portugal 5.1 .. .. .. Turkey 1.6 .. .. .. Ukraine 2.9 .. .. .. Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) Percentage distribution of economically active children who answered the question. d) Injury incidence for Pakistan is based upon the injury frequency responses. That is 32.5% of working children recorded never having an injury. e) Frequency distribution for Belize and Nicaragua is based upon questions answered by the parents. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

106

Table A10. Children attending school in SIMPOC countries by gender and age, a,b 1999

(percentages) All children Boys

Africa Kenya Namibiac South Africa Zambiad Zimbabwe Asia Cambodia Nepal Pakistan Philippinese Sri Lanka Latin America Belizef Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugalg Turkey Ukraineh

Girls

5-9

10-14

15-17

5-9

10-14

15-17

65.6 90.0 84.2 35.4 76.9

75.1 91.1 97.3 75.6 92.7

60.8 77.0 93.1 61.5 76.4

67.3 90.5 86.3 36.5 78.2

73.5 94.5 98.4 74.3 92.4

55.2 76.9 91.3 50.8 69.5

42.6 63.2 .. 74.3 97.1

67.0 78.2 .. 90.8 96.6

50.0 .. .. 65.9 69.4

42.2 50.5 .. 75.3 97.9

65.1 60.4 .. 93.0 97.1

36.1 .. .. 73.7 72.0

93.5 .. .. 84.3

94.2 .. 80.9 92.5

55.5 .. 55.9 68.5

93.4 .. .. 84.5

92.7 .. 85.7 93.1

57.7 .. 60.6 72.1

99.5 92.9 91.3

97.3 86.6 94.9

.. 58.2 87.3

99.7 90.5 91.5

98.0 74.4 94.6

99.5 43.6 87.2

107

Table A10. Children attending school in SIMPOC countries by gender and age, a,b 1999 (cont.)

(percentages) Working children Boys 5-9

Girls

10-14

15-17

5-9

10-14

15-17

Africa Kenya 31.2 36.0 25.3 32.9 35.1 22.5 Namibiac (89.5) 83.1 56.6 (91.5) 92.7 70.7 South Africa 93.7 96.2 91.4 95.8 97.4 88.2 Zambiad 15.7 19.6 9.2 (16.0) 23.1 8.0 Zimbabwe 84.3 89.1 63.8 87.7 89.2 54.6 Asia Cambodia 53.3 65.7 47.5 53.9 64.6 33.7 Nepal .. .. .. .. .. .. Pakistan .. .. .. .. .. .. Philippinese 81.4 76.3 45.5 92.2 83.2 57.2 Sri Lanka .. .. .. .. .. .. Latin America Belizef 94.9 82.6 23.8 93.7 77.2 28.9 Guatemala .. .. .. .. .. .. Nicaragua .. 58.4 33.5 .. 64.7 36.0 Panama 75.9 59.5 25.5 (89.8) 66.1 31.7 Others g Portugal 100 82.5 84.7 100 84.4 87.2 Turkey .. .. .. .. .. .. Ukraineh 95.9 98.1 78.0 97.9 98.6 80.1 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) Data for Namibia refers to "still attending". d) For Zambia, missing responses to currently attending where replaced by no if the answer to ever attended school was no. e) Data for the Philippines refer to children who attended school at any time in the past 12 months. f) Includes a small percentage of part-time students. g) The school attendance rate by age groups is the simple average of attendance by single age. In Portugal, the attendance rate of working children aged 15-17 refers to total working children aged 6-15. A small number of working children aged 14 and 15 who have completed school were counted as “not attending”. h) School attendance for Ukraine is derived from the main status question. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

108

Table A11. Activities of children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries by type, gender a,b,c and region, 1999

(percentages) Only attending school

Rural Africa Kenya Namibiad South Africa Zambiae Zimbabwe Asia Cambodia Nepalf Pakistan Philippinesg Sri Lanka Latin America Belizeh Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugal Turkey Ukrainei

Boys Urban

Combining economic activity and school

Girls Rural Urban

Boys Rural Urban

Girls Rural

Urban

58.7 65.8 55.3 49.0 67.1

74.5 90.8 75.8 63.3 83.2

58.2 69.2 66.3 45.3 68.3

73.2 88.9 79.8 64.0 81.7

6.8 19.0 35.7 2.8 14.7

1.5 1.0 17.1 0.7 6.0

6.6 18.7 26.3 2.8 12.6

1.4 1.4 14.0 1.0 5.1

.. .. .. 60.1 ..

.. .. .. 76.2 ..

.. .. .. 71.2 ..

.. .. .. 80.5 ..

55.3 27.8 .. 16.0 ..

50.5 14.0 .. 8.2 ..

67.3 24.3 .. 10.2 ..

61.1 23.0 .. 6.0 ..

74.3 ..

77.3 ..

5.8

5.1 .. 17.6 2.4

5.1 ..

75.9

89.2 .. 69.1 90.0

8.9 ..

70.7

84.4 .. 54.6 88.1

1.2

2.7 .. 7.7 1.4

.. 83.3 89.4

.. 79.1 93.1

.. 56.9 92.5

.. 62.7 95.7

.. 8.5 6.2

.. 1.0 4.3

.. 5.5 4.3

.. .. 2.1

109

Table A11. Activities of children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries by type, gender a,b,c (cont.) and region, 1999 Neither in school nor engaged in economic activity Boys Rural

Girls Urban

Rural

Urban

Africa Kenya 20.4 18.0 22.2 15.2 Namibiad 9.4 7.2 9.1 8.5 South Africa 7.1 5.4 5.8 5.6 e Zambia 31.8 31.1 35.0 30.9 Zimbabwe 14.4 9.2 15.6 10.6 Asia Cambodia .. .. .. .. Nepalf 14.5 7.4 16.7 8.5 Pakistan .. .. .. .. Philippinesg 13.7 10.5 14.9 10.7 Sri Lanka .. .. .. .. Latin America Belizeh 7.6 6.5 13.3 6.5 Guatemala .. .. .. .. Nicaragua 7.1 .. 15.0 .. Panama 13.8 7.3 20.2 7.6 Others Portugal .. .. .. .. Turkey .. .. .. .. Ukrainei 3.2 2.2 2.8 2.0 Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) Percentage distributions based upon children who answered both the questions referring to economic activity and school attendance. d) Data for Namibia refers to “Still attending”. e) For Zambia, missing responses to “Currently attending” where replaced by no if the answer to the question “Ever attend school?” was no. f) For Nepal, school attendance is based upon principal occupation status. g) Data for the Philippines refer to children who attended school at any time in the past 12 months. h) Includes a small percentage of part-time students. i) School attendance for Ukraine is derived from the main status question. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

110

Table A12. Children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries engaged in domestic chores, a,b,c 1999

(percentages) Boys By daily hours undertaken

Participation rate

Africa Kenya Namibia South Africad Zambia Zimbabwee Asia Cambodia Nepal Pakistan Philippinesf Sri Lankag Latin America Belize Guatemala Nicaragua Panama Others Portugal Turkey Ukraine

≤3

4-6

≥7

31.6 .. 92.4 74.2 84.3

33.8 .. 94.0 89.1 76.2

47.4 .. 5.1 9.8 22.2

18.7 .. 0.9 1.1 1.6

73.6 .. .. 73.1 66.5

.. .. .. 95.5 93.8

.. .. .. 2.0 ..

.. .. .. 2.5 6.2

63.5 .. 60.7 64.9

34.4 .. 82.0 96.3

27.9 .. 15.6 3.4

37.7 .. 2.4 (0.3)

2.0 15.7 79.1

90.1 97.8 97.9

8.0 1.4 2.0

1.9 0.8 (0.1)

111

Table A12. Children 5-17 in SIMPOC countries engaged in domestic chores, a,b,c (cont.) 1999

(percentages) Girls By daily hours undertaken

Participation rate

≤3

4-6

≥7

Africa Kenya 29.1 36.6 48.0 15.4 Namibia .. .. .. .. d South Africa 93.9 91.1 7.4 1.5 Zambia 82.0 84.3 13.3 2.4 Zimbabwee 88.9 72.2 24.8 3.1 Asia Cambodia 75.9 .. .. .. Nepal .. .. .. .. Pakistan .. .. .. .. Philippinesf 91.6 91.5 4.1 4.4 Sri Lankag 78.5 81.8 .. 18.2 Latin America Belize 68.8 28.6 26.9 44.5 Guatemala .. .. .. .. Nicaragua 83.0 67.1 29.1 3.8 Panama 75.8 91.1 7.9 1.0 Others Portugal 6.2 96.4 3.2 0.4 Turkey 44.3 84.8 7.3 7.9 Ukraine 87.4 97.9 2.0 (0.1) Note: When discussing children and economic activities, the realities and nature of the issue between industrialised and developing countries are quite different. Consequently, the organisation of SIMPOC countries by region is for presentational purposes only and as mentioned numerous times previously, direct comparisons should be avoided. Figures in parenthesis and italics should be interpreted with some caution since they refer to cases where the number of observations is less than 25. a) See note a) Table A1. b) See note b) Table A3. c) In some cases, the information is based upon hours reported over the past week and may not correspond precisely to the above categories. d) Children engaged in domestic chores were determined by questions referring to the number of hours in these activities. e) Data for Zimbabwe refer to less than 3 hours not 3 or less. f) Data for Philippines refers only to economically active children. g) For Sri Lanka, data on 7 or more hours refers to 3 or more. Sources: ILO SIMPOC database and published country reports.

112

Annex B CHILD LABOUR'S LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

I.

The international legislative framework concerning child labour

1.

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)

The purpose of the Convention on the Rights of the Child was to extend the inherent rights of all human being to children, defined as those under 18 years of age.79 The aim to fight against child labour is clearly expressed and member States should take the necessary measures to assure it. This is reflected basically in the recognition of the right to education, the right to rest and leisure and the right to be protected against economic exploitation and from performing hazardous work interfering with education or harming children’s health, mental, physical and social development. States should then take measures to make primary education compulsory and available free to all, encourage secondary education and take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and reduce the drop-outs. States should also provide for minimum age legislation for admission to employment, regulation of hours and conditions of employment as well as the sanctions to endure it. To examine the progress made in achieving the obligations undertaken, a Committee on the rights of the child was created. Based on the reports submitted by member States (within two years of the ratification and thereafter every five years) the aim of the Committee is to make suggestions and recommendations to governments and the United Nations General Assembly on ways to meet the Convention’s objectives.

79.

The Convention on the Right of the child was adopted by the General Assembly on the United Nations in November 1989 and came into force in September 1990. It has been ratified by almost all United Nations members (except Somalia and the United States) and more quickly than any other human rights’ instrument.

113

2. (1998)

ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at work

The Declaration on the Fundamental Rights at work constitutes the most important step forward in the universal recognition of core labour standards. Under the Declaration, all Members of ILO, even if not having ratified relevant Conventions, have the obligation to respect the following four core labour standards: a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; b) elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; c) effective abolition of child labour and d) elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. These four core labour standards, that are recognised not to be used for protectionist purposes, are currently covered by eight ILO conventions. Conventions covering the effective abolition of child labour are: Convention 138 on the Minimum Age and Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour.80 Under the 1998 Declaration, the ILO has the obligation to assist its Members to attain these objectives by offering technical co-operation and advisory services to promote the ratification and implementation of the cited conventions.81 A follow-up mechanism of the Declaration has been established to encourage the efforts made by Members to promote it under which a yearly report is published based on submissions made by non-ratifying countries in order to indicate the steps they have taken to promote the principles of the eight fundamental conventions.82 Another global report is presented each year by the ILO’s Director General, covering countries that have ratified the relevant conventions as well as countries that have not, to try to identify the trends and the needs regarding one of the four principles of core labour standards.

80.

The other six main ILO conventions are: Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (1948); Convention 98 on the right to organise and collective bargaining (1949); Convention 29 on Forced Labour (1930); Convention 105 on the Abolition of Forced Labour (1957); Convention 100 on Equal Remuneration (1951) and Convention 111 on Employment and Occupation Discrimination (1958).

81.

ILO assistance comprises advising on legislative reform, capacity building of regulators and administrators, training government officials, and strengthening the capacity of the tripartite constituents (trade unions, employers associations and government). Technical assistance is often integrated in specific programmes like is the case for example for the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC).

82.

Trade unions, employers groups as well as a group of experts can comment on the national submissions and their comments can be integrated in the final report.

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3.

ILO Conventions

3.1.

Convention 138 on Minimum Age (1973)

The aim of the Convention on Minimum Age is to ensure the effective abolition of child labour and progressively raising the minimum age of admission to employment. Members ratifying it must specify the minimum age for admission to employment within their territory, and under this age, no one shall be admitted to employment in any occupation. The Convention puts the minimum age at 15 years, but a lower limit of 14 years is accepted for Member countries whose economy and educational facilities are insufficiently developed. Countries that are in that later situation can also limit the scope of application of this Convention. Employment for those having between 14 and 18 years of age is permitted if their health, safety and morals are protected. Also, national laws or regulations may permit children between 13-15 years perform some “light work” defined as that work that is not harmful for health, and not interferes with attending to school. The Convention is applicable at least in the following sectors of activity: mining, manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water; sanitary services; transport, storage and communication; plantations and other agricultural activities for commercial purposes. Family and small-scale holdings producing for local consumption and not hiring workers are excluded, as it is the participation in artistic performances. The Convention is accompanied by a Recommendation in order to help States to take the appropriate measures to enforce it.83 All measures, including appropriate penalties shall be taken by the competent authority in order to ensure the enforcement of the provisions of the Convention. 3.2.

Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour (1999)

Members ratifying Convention 182 shall secure the prohibition of the worst forms of child labour for any child under the age of 18. The worst forms of child labour comprise the following: a) slavery or similar practices, trafficking of children and forced or compulsory labour (including armed conflicts); b) the use of child for prostitution; c) the use of child to produce and trafficking with drugs and d) any work that harm the health, safety or moral of children. This later kind of work must be established by national laws and can be periodically examined and revised in consultation with social agents. To eliminate those forms of child labour, States shall design programmes of action and take measures to implement and enforce them, including penal sanctions. The Convention recognises the importance of education in eliminating child 83.

Recommendation No. 146 on minimum age.

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labour and that is why States shall: a) prevent to engage children in the worst forms of labour; b) provide the necessary assistance to the removal of children from these forms of work and rehabilitate them, ensuring access to basic education and when possible to vocational training; c) identify and reach out children at risk; and d) take account of the special situation of girls. A Recommendation concerning the prohibition and immediate action that States should take to ensure the elimination of the worst forms of child labour accompanies the Convention.84 II.

The European legislative framework concerning child labour

1.

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union states that the employment of children is prohibited (Art. 32). The minimum age to enter employment may not be lower than the age of compulsory education. Some exceptions are nevertheless considered under limited circumstances. When young people are admitted to work, the Charter recalls that working conditions should be appropriate to their age. Moreover, young workers should be protected from any work that interferes with their education as well as from any exploitation and from all kinds of hazardous work. 2. The EU Directive on the protection of young people at work (94/33/EC of 22 June 1994) In June 1994, the Council of the European Union adopted the Directive on the protection of young people at work (94/33/EC of June 22 1994). It provides that Member States shall take the necessary measure to prohibit work by children under 15 and regulates work by adolescents aged 15 to 18 years of age.85 Nevertheless, some exceptions can be admitted, under certain conditions. These apply to: a) children employed for the purpose of cultural, artistic, sporting or advertising activities; b) children more than 14 years of age whose work is carried out under a work/training scheme; c) children aged more than 14 years of age performing light work other than the referred to in Art. 3.

84.

Recommendation No. 190 on the worst forms of child labour.

85.

Children are defined as those under the age of 15 still in full-time compulsory education according with national legislation of the Member States, and adolescents are defined as young people between 15 and 18 years of age no longer in full-time compulsory education (Art. 3).

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The Directive includes provisions relating to the employers’ obligations such as protection of the health and safety of young people or assessment of the risks to young people associated with their work. It also regulates working hours (Art. 8), night work (Art. 9), rest periods (Art. 10), annual leave (Art. 11) and rest breaks (Art. 12).

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Annex C A REVIEW OF THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON THE APPLICATION OF CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING ILO CONVENTION 138

As the ILO doesn’t monitor overall progress in cases of non-compliance identified by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) against a standard benchmark (e.g. the number and severity of cases outstanding), the Secretariat has developed a noncompliance indicator for Convention 138 on Minimum Age following OECD (2000a) and OECD (1996). Using data from the ILOLEX database, the OECD Secretariat has reviewed published observations concerning Convention 138 found in the CEACR annual reports for the period 1992 to 2002.86 Earlier years were not included due to their limited coverage in the ILOLEX database. During that period a total of 124 observations on non-compliance were described in the CEACR reports, covering only 26 countries. It should be kept in mind that some countries had more than one observation on non-compliance in a given year, and observations on some countries are repeated over the period. The number of observations varies greatly from year to year, from a low of one observation in 1996 and in 2000 to 33 in 2001. As in previous studies, the Secretariat has developed a non-compliance score for each observation identified by the CEACR. The score consists of two parts. First, each observation was assigned a rating (A) based on the type and degree of restriction identified by the CEACR with respect to the minimum age. Then, a second rating (B) was assigned based on the CEACR’s evaluation of the situation and the requested remedy. Once the ratings were assigned, each observation was scored by multiplying the two ratings (A times B), so the scores could range from 0 (full compliance) to 20 (extreme non-compliance). 86.

See ILO (2002g). Other CEACR Reports can be found in the ILOLEX data base in http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/index.htm.

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The rating system was essentially the same as the one used in previous OECD’s studies (OECD, 1996, 2000), adapted to the language of the observations made with respect to the Convention on Minimum Age. The non-compliance indicator can be represented as: Non-compliance indicator NCIt = ∑c∑ i[A ict x Bict] / Nt-2 Where: A is a rating of the nature of the observation, ranging from 1 to 5: 1 = least severe restriction (e.g. there is evidence that national legislation has been adapted to follow the principles of the Convention but additional confirmation is needed). 2 = moderately restriction (e.g. there is a national legislation or measures on the subject of the Convention but still exceptions are identified and non-compliance is documented). 3 = major restriction (e.g. there is a lack of coherence among national legislation, e.g. compulsory education and the minimum age for entrance to employment or the government talks about a draft of law but ILO has no information on its approval). 4 = severe restriction (e.g. the national law or measures that exist have varied since ratification, e.g. the minimum age has being lowered or it is planned to be so instead of increasing it as required). 5 = most severe restriction (e.g.: there is no national legislation or regulations at all on minimum age, hazardous work or light work, the existing legislation on the subjects doesn’t follow at all the Convention or there is no report sent to the ILO on the situation). B is a rating of the CEACR evaluation of the situation and the requested remedy, ranging from 0 to 4: 0 = favorable evaluation (e.g. the situation is consistent with ILO Convention). 1 = least critical evaluation (e.g. labour law amended and enforcement is improving; more information is requested)

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2 = moderately critical evaluation (e.g. labour law amended; information requested on enforcement). 3 = critical evaluation (e.g. labour law amendment is requested) 4 = most critical evaluation (e.g. the situation is completely inconsistent with ILO requirements; no government action or response). i = CEACR observations. c = countries that have ratified Convention 138 (at least one year before the year’s Report) for which at least one observation is made. t = Report year, ranging from 1992 to 2002. Nt-2 = the number of country ratifications (two years before the Report is released).87 As stated in OECD (2000), the non-compliance indicator provides only an approximate measure of the application of Conventions, as assessed through the CEACR monitoring mechanism because: a) as for other conventions, some reports are considered the following year; b) countries may send incomplete responses resulting in delays in the CEACR ability to assess the case; c) in some cases the CEACR simply repeats its previous comments, but the use of such repetitions is not uniform across all countries and over time; d) there may be a variation across countries and across years in the CEACR stringency; and e) the assignment of ratings depends on OECD Secretariat judgement. In the past decade, the average scores given to CEACR observations varied significantly one year to another showing an improvement in compliance between 1993 and 1996, but a deterioration thereafter. So no clear pattern of compliance with Convention 138 emerges from this indicator over the period 1992-2002.

87.

CEACR only reports on countries that have ratified the different Conventions. The CEACR Report is released in June each year with information from Member States of the previous year. As any country has one year to adopt the Convention since it ratifies it, the countries that can be covered by the CEACR Report each year are those having ratified the specific Convention at least one year early.

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Chart C1. Index of non-compliance with ILO Convention 138, 1992-2002 (OECD Secretariat assessment of CEACR observations covering 26 countries) 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0.0 1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Average country scores based on CEACR observations

Note: A certain level of caution should be taken into account when interpreting the non-compliance index, especially evaluations undertaken over time. First, CEACR observations are mainly qualitative in nature and are thus not intended or designed for quantitative indexing. Second, it is difficult to attribute the increase in CEACR observations over time to the actual deterioration of a particular situation due to improved availability of information, better awareness or better (national) monitoring systems on child labour. Source: Secretariat elaboration based on ILOLEX.

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