Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present

CITIZEN AND SOLDIER

Dethloff and Shenk have selected an informative collection of significant documents pertinent to American military service. Encompassing all eras of American history, this work will be instructive as a text or reference for those learning how the United States has raised its military forces. Joseph G. Dawson III, Professor of History, Texas A&M University Americans grow up expecting that in a time of need their country can depend on its people for volunteer service to the military. Indeed, this has been a social and at times legal expectation for the citizenship of this country since 1776. Yet, since the end of World War II, United States forces have been caught up in many long-term military engagements, and the military aspect of citizenship has become an increasingly marginalized one in a world where only a minority of citizens even vote. Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present provides a useful framework and supporting documentary evidence for an informed discussion of the development of the American ideal of the “Citizen-Soldier.” Presented with insightful introductions and useful discussion questions, this concise collection of thirty-six primary documents takes a close look at the United States military and shows how it became entwined with the rise of American national identity. Henry C. Dethloff is Professor Emeritus of History at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. He is the author of many books, the latest being Texas Aggies Go to War: In Service of Their Country. Gerald E. Shenk is Professor of Social History at California State University, Monterey Bay, and author of Work or Fight! Race, Gender, and the Draft in World War One.

CITIZEN AND SOLDIER A SOURCEBOOK ON MILITARY SERVICE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE FROM COLONIAL AMERICA TO THE PRESENT

EDITED BY HENRY C. DETHLOFF GERALD E. SHENK

First published 2011 by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Simultaneously published in the UK by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2011 Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Citizen and soldier: a sourcebook on military service and national defense from colonial America to the present / edited with an accompanying narrative by Henry C. Dethloff and Gerald E. Shenk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. 1. United States—Armed Forces—Recruiting, enlistment, etc.—History— Sources. 2. Draft—United States—History—Sources 3. Military service, Voluntary—United States—History—Sources. 4. Citizenship—United States—History—Sources. I. Dethloff, Henry C. II. Shenk, Gerald E. UB323.C55 2010 355.2′230973—dc22 2010004739

ISBN 0-203-84648-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN13: 978–0–415–87703–9 (hbk) ISBN13: 978–0–415–87704–6 (pbk) ISBN13: 978–0–203–84648–3 (ebk)

CONTENTS

List of Figures

vii

List of Tables

viii

List of Documents

ix

Introduction

1

Chapter 1

Colonial and Revolutionary America

Chapter 2

The Early National Period

21

Chapter 3

Volunteers, Conscription, and a Professional Military Corps, 1800–1898

34

The Spanish-American War and the Building of Modern Armies, 1898–1916

58

Modern Warfare: Universal Military Training, Selective Service, and Conscription, 1916–1940

88

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

World War II, 1940–1947

8

111

vi • Contents

Chapter 7

Chapter 8

Chapter 9

The Cold War: Korea, Vietnam, and the Changing Dimensions of Military Service

128

The All-Volunteer Military and Post 9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance

159

Citizen and Soldier

212

Documentary Sources

223

Suggested Reading

227

Index

230

FIGURES

1.1 “Take Notice: A Call to Join the Troops Now Raising Under General Washington” 3.1 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Calls for Recruits, August 23, 1862 4.1 The Rough Riders 4.2 U.S. Navy Uniforms of the Spanish-American War 5.1 “Beat the Draft, Join Now” 6.1 The “Volunteer” Tradition 6.2 Uncle Sam’s “I Want You” 6.3 This is the Army 6.4 The Women’s Army Corps 6.5 Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP

19 41 60 61 97 113 114 116 117 126

TABLES

0.1 6.1 7.1 7.2

Military Engagements, 1776–2006 Selective Service: Induction by Years, 1917–1947 Selective Service: Induction by Years, 1948–1973 Military Engagements, 1945–2000

2 118 152 156

DOCUMENTS

1.1 The First Laws Made by the Assembly in Virginia, Anno MDCXXIII (1623–24) 1.2 Laws of Virginia, March 1657–1658 (9th of Commonwealth) 1.3 Laws of Virginia, March 1658–1659 (10th of Commonwealth) 1.4 New England Articles of Confederation, 1643 1.5 Pennsylvania Charter of Privileges, 1701 1.6 Pennsylvania Militia Act Passed by the Colonial Assembly, 1755 1.7 Military Service and the Declaration of Independence 2.1 George Washington, Sentiments on a Peace Establishment 2.2 The Militia, Military Service, and the Constitution of the United States 2.3 Amendments to the Constitution, 1791 2.4 The Uniform Militia Act, 1792 3.1 Daniel Webster on Conscription 3.2 Civil War Conscription: Union, 1863 3.3 Second Confiscation Act, 1862 3.4 Petition of the Colored Citizens of Nashville, January 9th, 1865 3.5 Morrill Land Grant College Act, 1862 (The Morrill Act) 4.1 The Dick Militia Act, 1903 4.2 The National Defense Act, 1916 5.1 Selective Service Act, 1917 5.2 Selective Training and Service Act, 1940 6.1 The Servicemen’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill), 1944 7.1 Executive Order 9981

9 10 11 11 13 14 16 22 27 28 29 36 43 46 47 49 64 71 89 101 119 131

x • Documents

7.2 Channeling Manpower, General Lewis B. Hershey, 1965 7.3 Selective Service System: Present Operations of the System and Local Draft Boards 7.4 U.S. Supreme Court, United States v. Seeger, 1965 7.5 Summary of the Report of the Presidential Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970 7.6 Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women in the Navy, 1972 7.7 Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974 7.8 U.S. Supreme Court, Rostker v. Goldberg, 1981 8.1 Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on “21st Century Transformation” of U.S. Armed Forces 8.2 The All-Voluntary Military: Issues and Performance 8.3 Emiliano Santiago v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense 8.4 Title V–Veterans Educational Assistance Act 8.5 Revolving and Management Funds 8.6 Gerry J. Gilmore, “All Services Meet or Exceed October Recruiting Goals,” 2009 8.7 Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “America’s Greatest Asset”

134 136 139 143 145 147 153 164 174 181 188 197 206 208

INTRODUCTION

The military forces of the United States have been engaged in combat, encounters, military occupation, or operations against hostile or potentially hostile forces in all but two of the sixty-plus years since the end of World War II in 1945. Indeed, since 1776, if the United States had a “war gate” open only in times of peace such as that of ancient Rome, the gate would have been open for less than two decades over the two-hundred-plus years since the adoption of the Articles of Confederation or the Constitution. Contrary to popular perceptions, war and international confrontations rather than peace have been the rule rather than the exception as indicated in Table 0.1 denoting military engagements, 1776–2006. Through it all, from the beginning of American colonization to the present, governing authorities have promoted a common expectation that male citizens would volunteer their service to the home guard, colonial or state militia, rangers, National Guard, Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, or Coast Guard as may have been appropriate at the time. But this common expectation has only rarely, with the possible exception of World War II, resulted in anything close to a universal willingness of male citizens in all regions of the country to take up arms when called. It has, on the other hand, provided a powerful incentive to recruits whose citizenship status was denied or limited. These included Native Americans, indentured servants, slaves, recent immigrants, and, in the twentieth century, women and homosexuals. Well into the twentieth century the tradition prevailed that large armies are to be raised only in times of major wars and to be demobilized in times of relative peace. But the United States has always maintained at least

2 • Introduction Table 0.I Military Engagements, 1776–2006 Campaign or Expedition

Inclusive Dates

American Revolution Wyoming Valley War/PA Shay’s Rebellion War with Northwest Territory Indians War with Tripoli Tecumseh/Indian Wars of Indiana Territory Seminole War War of 1812 Peoria Indian War Creek Indian War Second Seminole War War against Arickaree Indians/Upper Mo. R. Fever River expedition against Illinois Indians Winnebago expedition/LeFevre Indian War Sauk & Fox Indian War Black Hawk War Pawnee expedition Toledo War Florida or Third Seminole War Texas Revolt from Mexico Border incursions Sabine Disturbance/Louisiana Heatherly Indian Troubles/Missouri–Iowa Cherokee Revolt and Removal Osage Indian War War with Mexico Cayuse Indian War/MO Texas and New Mexico Territory Indian War Navajo Resistance/New Mexico Texas Indian Wars Pit River Expedition/California Expeditions against California Indians Rogue River Indian War/Oregon Territory Bleeding Kansas/Harper’s Ferry Oregon Indian War Yakima Expedition Klamath and Salmon River Indian War Winna’s Expedition against Snake Indians Cheyenne and Arapaho Conflict Florida Indian War Sioux Indian Conflict Expedition against Indians in Washington Ter.

1776–1783 1782–1787 1786–1787 1790–1795 1801–1815 1811–1812 1812 1812–1815 1813 1813–1814 1817–1818 1823 1827 1827 1831 1832 1834 1835–1836 1835–1842 1835–1845 1836–1837 1836 1836–1838 1837 1846–1848 1847–1848 1849–1855 1849–1861 1849–1861 1850 1851–1852 1851–1856 1853–1856 1854 1855 1855 1855 1855–1856 1855–1858 1857 1858

Introduction • 3

Campaign or Expedition

Inclusive Dates

Spokane, Coeur d’Alene and Paloos Conflict Wichita Expedition, Indian Territory Pecos Expedition/Texas Kiowa and Comanche Expedition Navajo Expedition Campaign against the Cheyenne Secession and Civil War Indian Wars of the Great Plains Campaigns against Indians of far Northwest Military Reconstruction Mexican Border Conflicts Modoc Indian War/California and Oregon Nez Perce Indian War Bannock Indian War Argentina intervention Wounded Knee/Expedition against Sioux Haiti intervention Conflict with Chile/Venezuela and Cuban Revolt Marines Land in Hawaii Nicaragua intervention Sino-Japanese War, Marines intervene Panama, Marines intervene Nicaragua, Marines intervene Chippewa Conflict Spanish-American War Boxer Rebellion/China Puerto Rico occupation Guam occupation War against Filipino Resistance Cuba occupation Bluefields, Nicaragua occupation Panama occupation Honduras, Marines intervene Dominican Republic, Marines intervene War in Muslim Mindanao–Philippines Korea/Russo-Japanese War, Marines intervene Cuba, Marines intervene Honduras, Marines intervene Bluefields, Nicaragua, Marines intervene Honduras, troops dispatched in civil war China, continuous naval occupation Cuba, intervention in civil war Honduras, Marine intervention in election

1858 1858–1859 1859 1860 1860–1861 1861–1864 1861–1865 1862–1887 1865–1868 1865–1877 1867–1881 1872–1873 1877 1878 1890 1890–1891 1891 1891–1897 1893 1894 1894–1895 1895 1896 1898 1898–1899 1898–1900 1898– 1898– 1899–1901 1899–1902 1899 1901–1914 1903 1903–1904 1903–1915 1904–1905 1906–1909 1907 1909–1912 1911 1911–1941 1912 1912

4 • Introduction Table 0.I continued Campaign or Expedition

Inclusive Dates

Honduras, Marine intervention Nicaragua, continuous troop occupation Mexican Revolution—evacuation of Americans Dominican Republic—Battle of Santo Domingo Mexico Naval and Marine interventions Haiti, bombing and occupation Dominican Republic Marine occupation Pancho Villa/border incursions Cuba, military occupation World War I Russia, five interventions against Bolsheviks Panama, military police duty after elections Honduras, Marine intervention Yugoslavia, against Serbs in Dalmatia Guatemala, intervention against unionists Turkey, intervention against nationalists China, intervention in nationalist revolt Honduras, two interventions during elections Panama, Marines suppress general strike China, Marines occupy for seven years El Salvador, Naval intervention—Marti Revolt Peacetime Draft World War II Navy Occupation of Trieste Navy Occupation of Austria Army Occupation of Germany (exclusive of Berlin) Army Occupation of Berlin Units of the Sixth Fleet (Navy) Army Occupation of Japan Chinese Service Medal Greece, Command Operation in Civil War Philippines, Command Operation against Huk Rebellion Puerto Rico, troops suppress independence rebellion Korean Service Vietnam Service Cambodia invasion and subsequent incursions Cambodia Cambodia Evacuation Mayaguez Operation Iranian/Yemen/Indian Ocean Indian Ocean/Iran (N/MC)

1912 1912–1933 1913 1914 1914–1918 1914–1934 1916–1924 1916–1917 1917–1933 1917–1918 1918–1922 1918–1920 1919 1919 1920 1922 1922–1927 1924–1925 1925 1927–1934 1932 1940–1941* December 1941–April 1952 May 1945 to October 1954 May 1945 to October 1955 May 1945 to May 1955 May 1945 to October 1990 May 1945 to October 1955 September 1945 to April 1952 September 1945 to April 1957 1947–1949 1948–1954 1950 June 1950 to July 1954 July 1965 to March 1973 1969–1973 March 1973 to August 1973 April 1975 May 15, 1975 December 1978 to June 1979 November 1979 to October 1981

Introduction • 5

Campaign or Expedition

Inclusive Dates

Panama El Salvador Libya, Naval air invasion El Salvador, civil war Lebanon Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury)

April 1980 to December 1986 January 1981 to February 1992 1981 1981–1992 August 1982 to December 1987 October 1983 to November 1983 1983–1989

Honduras, U.S. troops in support of Nicaraguan Contras Libyan Area Bolivia, Army cocaine raid Persian Gulf (Earnest Will) Libya, Naval Air attacks Virgin Islands, quell Black protests Philippines, air cover against coup Panama (Operation Just Cause) Liberia, evacuation of foreigners Southwest Asia (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) Somalia (Restore Hope) Rwanda (Distant Runner) Haiti (Uphold Democracy) Persian Gulf (Southern Watch) Persian Gulf (Intercept) Persian Gulf (Vigilant Sentinel) Zaire (Congo), Marines Iraq (Northern Watch) Persian Gulf (Desert Thunder) Persian Gulf (Desert Fox) Kosovo [Various Operations] Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) Operation Northern Watch Philippines–Sulu, Balikatan operations Operation Iraqi Freedom

January 1986 to June 1986 1986 July 1987 to August 1990 1989 1989 1989 December 1989 to January 1990 1990 August 1990 to November 1995 December 1992 to March 1995 April 1994 September 1994 to March 1995 December 1995– December 1995– December 1995 to February 1997 1996–1997 January 1997– November 1998–December 1998 December 1998 March 1999 to November 1999 September 2001– November 2002– 2002– March 2003–

Sources: Indian Wars: The Order of Indian Wars (http://www.oiwus.org/qualifying.htm) 1941– 1999. Department of Labor, Office of Veterans Employment and Training. Note: World War II Service is recognized by Congress as extending from December 7, 1941 through April 28, 1952.

6 • Introduction

a small permanent ground and naval armed force whose duties included quelling domestic unrest, clearing and securing Indian territory for white settlers, expanding and guarding national boundaries, protecting U.S. interests around the world, and training and directing the mobilization of the citizen armies in times of declared or major wars. That pattern is changing. War and the character of battle are also changing, but the concept of the citizen-soldier remains. While the character of war and military service has changed remarkably in the four hundred years since the settlement of Jamestown in 1607, the character of those responsible for the security, protection, and defense of the home has changed relatively little. Those who settled, those who formed their own “civil Body Politick,” as the Pilgrims defined their government under the Mayflower Compact in 1620, were also those responsible for security and defense against foreign and domestic enemies. The environment, their experiences and history, all combined to imprint and continually reinforce upon Americans the link between citizenship and military service. This text seeks to provide a useful framework and supporting documentary evidence for the study, discussion, and evaluation of how, when, and why the United States raises an army, an army that has historically been dependent upon the volunteer, citizen-soldier. A study of the volunteer, citizen-soldier necessarily examines the complementary issues of selective service, the draft, and universal military training. How we raise an army, and who serves, are topics that are at once timely and timeless. Even in times of great crises and national emergencies, such as the American Civil War, in World Wars I and II, and during the post-World War II period of military occupation and Cold War confrontation, including Korea and Vietnam, manpower raised through the draft or conscription (or selective service) generally supplemented the volunteer military forces. Should all male citizens of prescribed ages who are physically and mentally fit be obligated to military service or an approved alternative as they were from 1940 through 1974? If so, should women now share that obligation? Should foreign nationals who join the U.S. Armed Forces have preferred rights to U.S. citizenship? Should willingness to serve in the Armed Forces be a condition for acquiring naturalized citizenship? Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present addresses the very contemporary concerns and issues about military service (who serves, how, and why). It provides an historical overview of how and by whom American military units have been organized and raised since colonial times. The study and interwoven key documents illustrate the persistence of the volunteer citizensoldier as a mainstay in American military preparedness, and also examines the dual but changing roles of state and federal authority in national defense.

Introduction • 7

The text seeks to define the issues, stimulate discussion, and encourage further examination of the composition and controversies surrounding military service and the “call to arms.” When does the nation raise an army? How does it draw upon the human resources available for military service? What have been the terms or provisions for military service? Why do some citizens serve and others do not? Let us examine—and understand—the ways! The response of volunteer citizen-soldiers to the call to arms in times of national crises has been truly historic. Nevertheless, in every instance, through wars great and small, issues regarding who should serve, when they should serve, for what purposes one is called to serve, and who or what authority is calling them to serve have been matters of concern and a persistent issue of the American political and military experience. As American military engagements have become increasingly global, and the dangers and “crises” are seemingly less localized and less personalized, issues and questions relating to war and peace and to military service have become more acute. Nevertheless, during that period, as in the prior years and those years since, the military forces of the United States have relied upon volunteers as the major source of recruits. Does the dependence upon volunteers best serve the purposes of national defense and what after 9/11 was called “homeland security” in an increasingly global and complex community? The answers are often elusive. That is in part due to the fact that issues about military service usually arise when a society is under attack or in crises. In “normal” or peaceful times (the latter being more imagined than real), there is often a disinterest in issues associated with military service and less public knowledge about the institutional structures of “National Defense” and the composition of military forces. Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present offers a broad, historical, and informative review of the processes and rationale for raising and maintaining the militia, the home guard, the rangers, National Guard, the Reserves, and armies and navies of whatever composition since the United States came into being. The text does not examine the stories of battle or of victory or defeat, or of heroism, nor attempt to judge the rightness, wrongness, or efficacy of war, but offers a study of the processes, values, rationales, and legislative or Constitutional actions that have defined the structure and composition of American armies since 1776—through wars “great and small” up to and including the engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq through 2007. Military service and national defense are critical elements of American history that bear directly upon national security and public, political, and personal responses to crises.

CHAPTER

1

COLONIAL AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA

The founding documents of the United States, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, established the principles and institutions that defined the role of the military in American life. Although these principles and military institutions were central to the Revolution against England, they reflected one hundred and fifty years of colonial military tradition and experience. At the core of these traditions lay several apparent paradoxes that persist in American culture to the present day. The first is that in most colonies and local communities all free adult white males were involuntarily enrolled in the permanent militia, yet there was a deep distrust of permanent military institutions. The second is that involuntary enlistment in the militia came into conflict with a growing belief, especially during the eighteenth century, in individual freedom and rejection of social hierarchies. A third paradox is that although militia service was officially associated with the status of free white males, increasingly during the eighteenth century, and continuing into the Revolutionary War, it was the poor, the indentured servants, and sometimes former slaves who actually did the fighting, when it came to that. These, however, are broad generalizations whose appropriateness varies from place to place at different times. In the seventeenth century, the Virginia Company expected its male settlers to be armed and prepared to defend themselves. But those men frequently challenged how and when they were to fight, and who would command them. Captain John Smith felt that these men were unreliable as soldiers, and demanded that the Virginia Company provide a mercenary army under his command that would allow

Colonial and Revolutionary America • 9

the settlers to cultivate their plantations in security without interruption. Free white men opposed the enlistments of white male indentured servants and Negroes, while men from both of these groups frequently demanded the right to join militias. But as John Smith had argued, militias tended not to be the best defense in the Chesapeake region, where homes and plantations were scattered across the countryside. It was different in Massachusetts, where close-knit towns made militias more practical. In both Virginia and Massachusetts, colonial statutes assumed that free white men would be armed and ready to fight as part of their respective militias, if called. Pennsylvania was very different in this respect. The political power of the Quakers, and the presence of other pacifist religious groups, such as the Mennonites and Amish, who had been invited there by William Penn with the promise that their pacifist beliefs would be honored, meant that mandatory militia duty for all white males never became associated with citizenship in Pennsylvania. Despite strenuous efforts to change this, Benjamin Franklin and others in Pennsylvania only succeeded in establishing a volunteer militia. The following documents illustrate both differences and similarities with respect to whom was expected or required to perform military service in seventeenthcentury Virginia, eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, and eighteenth-century Massachusetts.

DOCUMENT 1.1 THE FIRST LAWS MADE BY THE ASSEMBLY IN VIRGINIA, ANNO MDCXXIII (1623–24) 9. The governor shall not withdraw the inhabitants from their private labors to any service of his own upon any colour whatsoever and in case the publick service require ymployments of many hands before the holding a General Assemblie to give order for the same, in that case the levying of men shall be done by order of the governor and whole body of the counsell and that in such sorte as to be least burthensome to the people and most free from partialitie. 10. That all the old planters that were here before or came in at the last coming of Sir Thomas Gates they and their posterity shall be exempted from their personal service to the warrs and any publick charge (church duties excepted) that belong particularly to their persons (not exempting their families) except such as shall be ymployd to command in chief. [...] 23. That every dwelling house shall be pallizaded for defence against the Indians.

10 • Colonial and Revolutionary America

24. That no man go or send abroad without a sufficient partie well armed. 25. That men go not to worke in the ground without their arms (and a centinell upon them). [...] 27. That the commander of every plantation take care that there be sufficient of powder and amunition within the plantation under his command and their pieces fixt and their arms compleate. [...] 32. That at the beginning of July next the inhabitants of every corporation shall fall upon their adjoyning salvages as we did the last yeare, those that shall be hurte upon service to be cured at the publique charge; in case any be lamed to be maintained by the country according to his person and quality.

* * * These First Laws of Virginia made it very clear that every colonist had an obligation to assist in defense of the colony and their own household. Laws also provided for some degree of standard armaments for each household, in quantity if not in quality. It is also notable that the community had an obligation to care for those who were hurt, injured, or maimed in their course of defending the community. The 1657–58 law also provided a special exemption to a group of recent settlers, presumably that they might organize and construct their farms and homes—but that ministers and their families were not exempted from service when called upon.

DOCUMENT 1.2 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MARCH 1657–1658 (9TH OF COMMONWEALTH) ACT LIX. Old Virginians freed from Taxes.** IT is enacted and confirmed by the authoritie aforesaid, That all such persons as were here or came in at the last comeing in of Sir Tho: Yates,† shall be exempted from their personall service to the warrs and all publique charges, ministers duties excepted, not exempting their families (excepting such as shall be imployed in cheife.)

Colonial and Revolutionary America • 11

DOCUMENT 1.3 LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MARCH 1658–1659 (10TH OF COMMONWEALTH) ACT XXV. Provision to bee made for Amunition. BEE it enacted that a provident supplie be made of gunn powder and shott to our owne people, and this strictly to bee lookt to by the officers of the militia, (vizt.) That every man able to beare armes have in his house a fixt gunn two pounds of powder and eight pound of shott at least which are to be provided by every man for his family before the last of March next, and whosoever shall faile of makeing such provision to be fined ffiftie pounds of tobacco to bee laied out by the county courts for a common stock of amunition for the county.

* * * The New England Articles of Confederation of 1643 in a very broad sense foreshadowed the adoption of the Articles of Confederation that were adopted by the Revolutionary Government of the United States in 1781. Prominent in both documents was the understanding that the defense of any one element of that union (colony, plantation, or household) was a responsibility and an expense to be borne by all.

DOCUMENT 1.4 NEW ENGLAND ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1643 1. It is by these Confederates agreed that the charge of all just wars, whether offensive or defensive, upon what part or member of this Confederation soever they fall, shall both in men, provisions, and all other disbursements be borne by all the parts of this Confederation in different proportions according to their different ability in manner following, namely, that the Commissioners for each Jurisdiction from time to time, as there shall be occasion, bring a true account and number of all their males, males in every Plantation, or any way belonging to or under their several Jurisdictions, of what quality or condition soever they be, from sixteen to threescore, being inhabitants there. And that according to the different numbers from which from time to time shall be found in each Jurisdiction upon a true and just account, the service of men and all charges of the war be borne by the poll: each Jurisdiction or Plantation being left to their own just course and custom of rating themselves and people according to their different estates with due respects to their qualities and exemptions amongst themselves though the Confederation take no notice of any such privilage: and that according to their different charge of each Jurisdiction and Plantation the whole advantage

12 • Colonial and Revolutionary America

of the war (if it please God so to bless their endeavors) whether it be in lands, goods, or persons, shall be proportionately divided among the said Confederates. 5. It is further agreed, that if any of these Jurisdictions or any Plantation under or in combination with them, be invaded by any enemy whomsoever, upon notice and request of any three magistrates of that Jurisdiction so invaded, the rest of the Confederates without any further meeting or expostulation shall forthwith send aid to the Confederate in danger but in different proportions; namely, the Massachusetts an hundred men sufficiently armed and provided for such a service and journey, and each of the rest, forty five so armed and provided, or any less number, if less be required according to this proportion. But if such Confederate in danger may be supplied by their next Confederates, not exceeding the number hereby agreed, they may crave help there, and seek no further for the present: the charge to be borne as in this article is expressed: and at the return to be victualled and supplied with the powder and shot for their journey (if there be need) by that Jurisdiction which employed or sent for them; But none of the Jurisdictions to exceed these numbers until by a meeting of the Commissioners for this Confederation a greater aid appear necessary. And this proportion to continue till upon knowledge of greater numbers in each Jurisdiction which shall be brought to the next meeting, some other proportion be ordered. But in any such case of sending men for present aid, whether before or after such order or alteration, it is agreed that at the meeting of the Commissioners for this Confederation, the cause of such war or invasion be duly considered: and if it appear that the fault lay in the parties so invaded then that Jurisdiction or Plantation make just satisfaction, both to the invaders whom they have injured, and bear all the charges of the war themselves, without requiring any allowance from the rest of the Confederates towards the same. And further that if any Jurisdiction see any danger of invasion approaching, and there be time for a meeting, that in such a case three magistrates of the Jurisdiction may summon a meeting at such convenient place as themselves shall think meet, to consider and provide against the threatened danger; provided when they are met they may remove to what place they please; only whilst any of these four Confederates have but three magistrates in their Jurisdiction, their requests, or summons, from any of them shall be accounted of equal force with the three mentioned in both the clauses of this article, till there be an increase of magistrates there.

* * * In 1652, Massachusetts adopted an act specifying that militia enlistments were to include “all Scotsmen, Negers and Indians inhabiting with or

Colonial and Revolutionary America • 13

servants to the English.” According to historian Benjamin Quarles, “four years later the legislature prohibited the mustering in of Negroes or Indians, explaining the step as necessary in the interests of ‘the better ordering and settling of severall cases in the military companyes.’”

PENNSYLVANIA’S COLONIAL MILITIA Pennsylvania’s 1671 “Laws of the Duke of York” required that every person who can bear arms from 16 to 60 years of age “be always provided with a convenient proportion of powder and bullet for service for their Mutual Defence, upon a penalty for their neglect . . . That the quantity of powder and shot . . . be at least one pound of powder and 2 pounds of bullet. And if the Inhabitants . . . shall not be found sufficiently provided with arms, His Royal Highness the Governor is willing to furnish them” (Whisker, 1992, vol. III, p. 1). In 1700, Pennsylvania law prohibited “any colored person whatsoever from carrying any guns, swords, pistols, fowling pieces, clubs or other arms or weapons.” This was not repealed until after independence (Whisker, 1992, vol. III, pp. 2–3). DOCUMENT 1.5 PENNSYLVANIA CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES, 1701 Because no People can be truly happy, though under the greatest Enjoyment of civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their Consciences, as to their Religous Profession and Worship: And Almighty God being the only Lord of Conscience, Father of Lights and Spirits, and the Author as well as Object of all divine Knowledge, Faith and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and persuade and convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and declare, That no Person or Persons inhabiting in this Province or Territories, who shall confess and acknowledge one Almighty God, the Creator, Upholder and Ruler of the World; and profess him or themselves obliged to live quietly under the civil Government, shall be, IN ANY CASE, MOLESTED or PREJUDICED in his or their PERSON or ESTATE, because of his or their conscientious Persuasion or Practice, nor be compelled to frequent or maintain any religious Worship, Place or Ministry, contrary to his or their Mind, or to DO or SUFFER any OTHER ACT or THING, contrary to their religious Persuasion.

* * *

14 • Colonial and Revolutionary America

In 1705, the Pennsylvania Assembly passed a voluntary militia act which provided for enlisting “such as are Willing and Desirous to be United for Military Purposes.” Pennsylvania Quakers managed to block the enactment of a mandatory militia law until 1743, when the Governor issued: a proclamation requiring the inhabitants to prepare themselves in the best manner they can, to repel any attack that may be made upon us, and to commission the best qualified to levy, muster and train them . . . obliging them to appear well armed and accoutred at convenient stated times for their instruction in military discipline and whenever else it shall be necessary for the defence of the Province. (Whisker, 1992, vol. III, p. 4)

DOCUMENT 1.6 PENNSYLVANIA MILITIA ACT PASSED BY THE COLONIAL ASSEMBLY, 1755 From and after the Publication of this Act, it shall and may be lawful for the Freemen of this Province to form themselves into Companies, as heretofore they have used in time of War without Law, and for each Company, by Majority of Votes, in the Way of Ballot, to chuse its own Officers, &c . . . for the better ordering and regulating such as are willing and desirous to be united for Military Purposes within the Province . . . Provided, that nothing in this act shall be understood or construed to give any power or authority to the governor or commander-in-chief, and the said officers, to make any articles or rules that shall in the least affect those of the inhabitants of the province who are conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, either in their liberties, persons or estates, nor any other persons of what persuasion or denomination soever, who have not first voluntarily and freely signed the said articles after due consideration as aforesaid. Provided, also, that no regiment, company, or party of volunteers, shall by virtue of this act, be compelled or led more than three days march beyond the inhabited parts of the province; nor detained longer than three weeks in any garrison, without an express engagement for that purpose, first voluntarily entered into and subscribed by every man so to march or remain in garrison (Whisker, 1992, vol. III, pp. 62–63).

[Ed.: The King, however, vetoed this act, stating his objections as follows:] It seems rather calculated to exempt Persons from Military Services than to encourage and promote them. No methods are prescribed for compelling Persons to Associate in Defence of their Country or for obliging those who

Colonial and Revolutionary America • 15

are conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms themselves to find others in their stead, or to provide for such as might by the Executive power be found ready and willing to enlist. The whole, both in respect of Enlistment and of subsistence of those who may be enlisted, is voluntary. The Officers are to be elected by ballot, and no provision is made for that due Subordination, without which all Bodies of Men associated for Military purposes would be absolutely useless. But that these are not to be the only Defective and Mischievous provisions of this Act, for it is enacted, That no Persons under Twenty-one Years of Age shall be Enlisted, by which means many able bodied Men fit for the Service of their Country as Soldiers would be excluded, and no Regiments, Company, or Party shall be compelled or led three days March beyond the Inhabited Parts of the Province, nor be detained against their Wills longer than three weeks in any Garrison, let the necessity of the case be what it will (Whisker, 1992, vol. III, p. 74).

* * * The Assembly finally passed a revised act in 1756–57, accepted by the King which required lists of all male inhabitants above age 17 and under age 55. It also exempted “such persons as are noted in said Lists to belong to or frequent those Religious Societies or Congregations whose Tenets and Principles against bearing Arms.” In 1775, with the British attacks on Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts colony, Americans faced the necessity of creating a fighting force sufficient to repel British occupation and attack and to win independence. The creation of the American armed services derived from pooling existing colonial militia, and local, pioneer home-defenders not affiliated with an organized militia into a to-be-created small “national” regular army and navy. The American Revolution established the precedent that American military forces should comprise a small standing army to be complemented by a larger and more diverse militia as might be needed for national defense. The standing army and the militia were both to be sustained by citizen volunteers—not through forced conscription, that is, the draft. Free adult males over the age of 16 in most jurisdictions were considered members of their local militias, and in this technical sense their service was not voluntary. It was, after all, this militia tradition that linked citizenship with military service. The Declaration of Independence, adopted in 1776, established the causes and context for creating and organizing the military forces of the new government of the United States. It set important guidelines and precedents regarding the relationship between civil and military authority, including the propositions that:

16 • Colonial and Revolutionary America

1. Standing armies should not be maintained among the people in times of peace. 2. The military should not be independent of or superior to civil authority. 3. Armed troops should not be quartered among civilian populations. 4. Military personnel should be accountable for criminal actions against civilians. 5. Americans should not be subject to forced conscription in the (then British) army and navy. The United States came into being with a strong antipathy toward military authority, and with an equally strong sentiment for personal independence and self-government. The guidelines established by the Declaration of Independence continue to influence who serves in the Armed Forces of the United States, and when and why they enter the military services. Key phrases relating to the reasons for a declaration of war and a call to arms have been highlighted in bold type:

DOCUMENT 1.7 MILITARY SERVICE AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ACTION OF SECOND CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, JULY 4, 1776. THE UNANIMOUS DECLARATION OF THE THIRTEEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHEN in the Course of human Events, it becomes necessary for one People to dissolve the Political Bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of the Earth, the separate and equal Station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the Separation. WE hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness — That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed, that whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be

Colonial and Revolutionary America • 17

changed for light and transient Causes; and accordingly all Experience hath shewn, that Mankind are more disposed to suffer, while Evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the Forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long Train of Abuses and Usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object, evinces a Design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their Right, it is their Duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future Security. Such has been the patient Sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the Necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The History of the present King of Great-Britain is a History of repeated Injuries and Usurpations, all having in direct Object the Establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid World. HE has refused for a long Time, after such Dissolutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of the Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all the Dangers of Invasion from without, and the Convulsions within. HE has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their Migrations hither, and raising the Conditions of new Appropriations of Lands. HE has kept among us, in Times of Peace, Standing Armies, without the consent of our Legislatures. HE has affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power. HE has combined with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws; giving his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: FOR quartering large Bodies of Armed Troops among us; FOR protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these States: HE has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and waging War against us. HE has plundered our Seas, ravaged our Coasts, burnt our Towns, and destroyed the Lives of our People. HE is, at this Time, transporting large Armies of foreign Mercenaries to compleat the Works of Death, Desolation, and Tyranny, already begun with fidy, scarcely paralleled in the most bar circumstances of Cruelty and Perfid barous Ages, and totally unworthy of the Head of a civilized Nation. HE has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to become the Executioners of their Friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their Hands.

18 • Colonial and Revolutionary America

HE has excited domestic Insurrections amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the Inhabitants of our Frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known Rule of Warfare, is an undistinguished Destruction, of all Ages, Sexes and Conditions. IN every stage of these Oppressions we have Petitioned for Redress in the most humble Terms: Our repeated Petitions have been answered only by repeated Injury. A Prince, whose Character is thus marked by every act which may define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the Ruler of a free People. NOR have we been wanting in Attentions to our British Brethren. We have warned them from Time to Time of Attempts by their Legislature to extend an unwarrantable Jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the Circumstances of our Emigration and Settlement here. We have appealed to their native Justice and Magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the Ties of our common Kindred to disavow these Usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt our Connections and Correspondence. They too have been deaf to the Voice of Justice and of Consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the Necessity, which denounces our Separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of Mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace, Friends. WE, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, in GENERAL CONGRESS, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly Publish and Declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES; that they are absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political Connection between them and the State of Great-Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as FREE AND INDEPENDENT STATES, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor. John Hancock. GEORGIA, Button Gwinnett, Lyman Hall, Geo. Walton. NORTH-CAROLINA, Wm. Hooper, Joseph Hewes, John Penn. SOUTHCAROLINA, Edward Rutledge, Thos Heyward, junr., Thomas Lynch, junr., Arthur Middleton. MARYLAND, Samuel Chase, Wm. Paca, Thos. Stone, Charles Carroll, of Carrollton. VIRGINIA, George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Ths. Jefferson, Benja. Harrison, Thos. Nelson, jr., Francis Lightfoot Lee, Carter Braxton. PENNSYLVANIA, Robt. Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benja. Franklin, John Morton, Geo. Clymer, Jas. Smith, Geo. Taylor, James Wilson, Geo. Ross. DELAWARE, Caesar Rodney, Geo. Read. NEW-YORK, Wm. Floyd, Phil. Livingston, Frank Lewis, Lewis Morris. NEW-JERSEY, Richd. Stockton, Jno. Witherspoon, Fras. Hopkinson, John Hart, Abra. Clark. NEW-HAMPSHIRE,

Colonial and Revolutionary America • 19

Josiah Bartlett, Wm. Whipple, Matthew Thornton. MASSACHUSETTS-BAY, Saml. Adams, John Adams, Robt. Treat Paine, Elbridge Gerry. RHODE-ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE, C. Step. Hopkins, William Ellery. CONNECTICUT, Roger Sherman, Saml. Huntington, Wm. Williams, Oliver Wolcott. IN CONGRESS, JANUARY 18, 1777.

* * * Although the Articles of Confederation granted the new Congress authority in matters of war and peace, and the authority to raise a Continental army, the national government had no authority to compel anyone to serve, but depended upon volunteers. Volunteers for that army came from the thirteen independent states who competed with federal authorities for volunteers for state militia units from that same pool of human resources. Thus, all military personnel were inherently militia, employed in the service of the United States or under the authority of a particular state.

FIGURE 1.1 “Take Notice: A Call to Join the Troops Now Raising Under General Washington.” What is particularly interesting about this broadside is that it provided the key elements for a recruiting broadside used in World War II. Source: Cushing Memorial Library and Archives, Texas A&M University.

20 • Colonial and Revolutionary America

While the Articles of Confederation granted the Congress authority in matters of war and peace, and the authority to raise a Continental army, the national government had no authority to compel anyone to serve, but depended upon volunteers (Figure 1.1). Volunteers for that army came from the thirteen independent states who competed with federal authorities from the same pool of human resources for the volunteers to fill the ranks of state militia units. Thus, all military personnel were inherently militia, employed in the service of the United States or under the authority of a particular state.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. During the colonial era, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New England each developed their own traditions of military service: 1. How were they similar? 2. How did their differences reflect what was unique about each? 2. What specific passages in the documents reproduced here offer evidence that indicates how colonial authorities determined who was expected to serve, and who was not? 3. What complaints related to military service and the maintenance of armies did the Declaration of Independence describe? What differences can you find between the King’s forces described in the Declaration of Independence and the colonial militia? 4. What is the difference between a militia and an army? 5. What seemed to be the major stimulus or cause for the Laws of Virginia creating defensive forces and imposing a personal discipline relating to defense? Describe the specific provisions in the documents having to do with defending homes. 6. What was the nature or character of the militia organized by Pennsylvania? How did this seem to differ from militia in the other colonies? 7. Did the Declaration of Independence seem to draw upon colonial experiences? If so, in what manner? What “values” seem to be at the core of the Declaration of Independence as it relates to military service?

CHAPTER

2

THE EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD

George Washington as General and Commander in Chief of the Forces of the United States of America, as well as American military experiences during the Revolution, greatly influenced the design and construction of the military created by the new government of the United States of America. The army of the new republic depended for its recruits and officers on volunteer soldiers. Tradition calls these men “citizen-soldiers,” but military organization and structures within the new Republic drew heavily from colonial experiences, and specifically from the insight and recommendations of George Washington. In 1783, Washington drafted a memorandum which described, as he saw them, the “necessities” for maintaining the “national defense” and the preservation of peace. There must be, he observed, a “regular standing force to garrison West Point and critical frontier posts.” Each state, he said, should have a “well trained militia” and each of those militias should be similar in its organization and armaments. The nation and the states should maintain arsenals of military stores, and they should establish academies for the instruction of military training—particularly as that training related to engineering and artillery. Washington was also concerned about maintaining a large standing army. A major grievance of the Declaration of Independence was that the King of England maintained large standing armies among peaceful civilian populations, and that many in those standing armies were mercenary soldiers. Washington objected strongly to the use of mercenaries, or paid armies, who might subvert the liberties of the people they were hired to defend. It was,

22 • The Early National Period

he and many Americans strongly believed, the obligation of the citizen to protect the nation and maintain peace. There was no general military draft in the United States until the Civil War when, in 1862, the Confederacy, and the following year, the Union, approved conscription, but even then the armies of North and South were comprised primarily of volunteers. George Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, written in 1783, was directed to Alexander Hamilton, who chaired the “Committee of Congress on the Peace Establishment.” His concerns reflected the American experience with the militia and home defense, and the more recent experiences and hostility to standing armies and mercenary troops being stationed among civilian populations.

DOCUMENT 2.1 GEORGE WASHINGTON, SENTIMENTS ON A PEACE ESTABLISHMENT A Peace Establishment for the United States of America may in my opinion be classed under four different heads Vizt: First. A regular and standing force, for Garrisoning West Point and such other Posts upon our Northern, Western, and Southern Frontiers, as shall be deemed necessary to awe the Indians, protect our Trade, prevent the encroachment of our Neighbours of Canada and the Florida’s, and guard us at least from surprizes; Also for security of our Magazines. Secondly. A well organized Militia; upon a Plan that will pervade all the States, and introduce similarity in their Establishment Manoeuvres, Exercise and Arms. Thirdly. Establishing Arsenals of all kinds of Military Stores. Fourthly. Accademies, one or more for the Instruction of the Art Military; particularly those Branches of it which respect Engineering and Artillery, which are highly essential, and the knowledge of which, is most difficult to obtain. Also Manufactories of some kinds of Military Stores. Upon each of these, and in the order in which they stand, I shall give my sentiments as concisely as I can, and with that freedom which the Committee have authorized. Altho’ a large standing Army in time of Peace hath ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a Country, yet a few Troops, under certain circumstances, are not only safe, but indispensably necessary. Fortunately for us our relative situation requires but few. The same circumstances which so effectually retarded, and in the end conspired to defeat the attempts of Britain to subdue us, will now powerfully tend to render us secure. Our distance from the European States in a great degree frees us of apprehension, from their

The Early National Period • 23

numerous regular forces and the Insults and dangers which are to be dreaded from their Ambition. But, if our danger from those powers was more imminent, yet we are too poor to maintain a standing Army adequate to our defence, and was our Country more populous and rich, still it could not be done without great oppression of the people. Besides, as soon as we are able to raise funds more than adequate to the discharge of the Debts incurred by the Revolution, it may become a Question worthy of consideration, whether the surplus should not be applied in preparations for building and equipping a Navy, without which, in case of War we could neither protect our Commerce, nor yield that Assistance to each other, which, on such an extent of Sea-Coast, our mutual Safety would require. [Ed.: Materials deleted discuss the allocation of troops,

protection of arsenals, potential conflicts over navigation of the Great Lakes, regulations for the benefit of those in service, relations with French settlements, and the organization of the militia.] Were it not totally unnecessary and superfluous to adduce arguments to prove what is conceded on all hands the Policy and expediency of resting the protection of the Country on a respectable and well established Militia, we might not only shew the propriety of the measure from our peculiar local situation, but we might have recourse to the Histories of Greece and Rome in their most virtuous and Patriotic ages to demonstrate the Utility of such Establishments. Then passing by the Mercinary Armies, which have at one time or another subverted the liberties of all-most all the Countries they have been raised to defend, we might see, with admiration, the Freedom and Independence of Switzerland supported for Centuries, in the midst of powerful and jealous neighbours, by means of a hardy and well organized Militia. We might also derive useful lessons of a similar kind from other Nations of Europe, but I believe it will be found, the People of this Continent are too well acquainted with the Merits of the subject to require information or example. I shall therefore proceed to point out some general outlines of their duty, and conclude this head with a few particular observations on the regulations which I conceive ought to be immediately adopted by the States at the instance and recommendation of Congress. It may be laid down as a primary position, and the basis of our system, that every Citizen who enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a proportion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defence of it, and consequently that the Citizens of America (with a few legal and official exceptions) from 18 to 50 Years of Age should be borne on the Militia Rolls, provided with uniform Arms, and so far accustomed to the use of them, that the Total strength of the Country might be called forth at a Short Notice on any very interesting Emergency, for these purposes they ought to be duly organized into Commands of the same formation; (it is not of very

24 • The Early National Period

great importance, whether the Regiments are large or small, provided a sameness prevails in the strength and composition of them) and I do not know that a better establishment, than that under which the Continental Troops now are, can be adopted. They ought to be regularly Mustered and trained, and to have their Arms and Accoutrements inspected at certain appointed times, not less than once or twice in the course of every [year] but as it is obvious, amongst such a Multitude of People (who may indeed be useful for temporary service) there must be a great number, who from domestic Circumstances, bodily defects, natural awkwardness or disinclination, can never acquire the habits of Soldiers; but on the contrary will injure the appearance of any body of Troops to which they are attached, and as there are a sufficient proportion of able bodied young Men, between the Age of 18 and 25, who, from a natural fondness for Military parade (which passion is almost ever prevalent at that period of life) might easily be enlisted or drafted to form a Corps in every State, capable of resisting any sudden impression which might be attempted by a foreign Enemy, while the remainder of the National forces would have time to Assemble and make preparations for the Field. I would wish therefore, that the former, being considered as a dernier resort, reserved for some great occasion, a judicious system might be adopted for forming and placing the latter on the best possible Establishment. And that while the Men of this description shall be viewed as the Van and flower of the American Forces, ever ready for Action and zealous to be employed whenever it may become necessary in the service of their Country; they should meet with such exemptions, privileges or distinctions, as might tend to keep alive a true Military pride, a nice sense of honour, and a patriotic regard for the public. Such sentiments, indeed, ought to be instilled into our Youth, with their earliest years, to be cherished and inculcated as frequently and forcibly as possible. It is not for me to decide positively, whether it will be ultimately most interesting to the happiness and safety of the United States, to form this Class of Soldiers into a kind of Continental Militia, selecting every 10th, 15th or 20th. Man from the Rolls of each State for the purpose; Organizing, Officering and Commissioning those Corps upon the same principle as is now practiced in the Continental Army. Whether it will be best to comprehend in this body, all the Men fit for service between some given Age and no others, for example between 18 and 25 or some similar description, or whether it will be preferable in every Regiment of the proposed Establishment to have one additional Company inlisted or drafted from the best Men for 3, 5, or 7 years and distinguished by the name of the additional or light Infantry Company, always to be kept complete. The Companies might then be drawn together occasionally and formed into particular Battalions or Regiments under Field Officers appointed for that Service. One or other of these plans I think will be

The Early National Period • 25

found indispensably necessary, if we are in earnest to have an efficient force ready for Action at a moment’s Warning. And I cannot conceal my private sentiment, that the formation of additional, or light Companies will be most consistent with the genius of our Countrymen and perhaps in their opinion most consonant to the spirit of our Constitution. I shall not contend for names or forms, it will be altogether essential, and it will be sufficient that perfect Uniformity should be established throughout the Continent, and pervade, as far as possible, every Corps, whether of standing Troops or Militia, and of whatever denomination they may be. To avoid the confusion of a contrary practice, and to produce the happy consequences which will attend a uniform system of Service, in case Troops from the different parts of the Continent shall ever be brought to Act together again, I would beg leave to propose, that Congress should employ some able hand, to digest a Code of Military Rules and regulations, calculated immediately for the Militia and other Troops of the United States; And as it should seem the present system, by being a little simplified, altered, and improved, might be very well adopted to the purpose; I would take the liberty of recommending, that measures should be immediately taken for the accomplishment of this interesting business, and that an Inspector General should be appointed to superintend the execution of the proposed regulations in the several States.

[Ed.: Pages 391–398 discuss the appointment of an Adjutant General, discipline, organization (two Battalions should form a Regiment, four Regiments, a Brigade, and two Brigades a Division), the maintenance of reserve forces, equipment and the location of magazines, military posts, military academies, closing with:] Happy shall I be, if any thing I have suggested may be found of use in forming an Establishment which will maintain the lasting Peace, Happiness and Independence of the United States.

* * * The Constitution, adopted in 1789, specified that the causes for which the militia might be “called forth” included the preservation or implementation of the laws of the Union, to suppress insurrections, and to repel invasions. This provision must be seen in the context of George Washington’s Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, as well as earlier legislation passed by the Continental Congress in 1776, which some historians say made citizens of “all persons residing within any of the United Colonies, and deriving protection from the laws of the same.”

26 • The Early National Period

Some argue that the concept of “citizen,” at least as far back as ancient Greece, applied exclusively to males who participated in the civic life of the state, which included military service. Citizen armies appear throughout modern western civilization. Suffice it to say that the definition of “citizen” in the early years of the nation’s life was not clear. On the other hand, it was widely assumed that free adult males (over the age of 16) who resided within the territorial limits of the United States owed some form of service to the nation. But to make this a condition of “citizenship” would exclude women, children, and elderly males from citizenship. Nevertheless, the idea that there was some kind of link between military service and citizenship acquired significant power, particularly to those males whose citizenship status was otherwise in question. And it is these men (and then women in the late twentieth century), as much as any, who have insisted on and preserved the concept of citizen-soldier. Until at least the Civil War, volunteer, citizen-soldiers constituted the armies of the United States, with most of those state-based, and for the most part organized and trained under state authority. In time, assisted in part by the founding of the military academies, West Point and Annapolis, that structure began to coalesce into the presence of a small, standing army, under federal authority, employing a professionally trained cadre of officers, complemented in times of crises by a larger, organized force of volunteer, citizen-soldiers derived from state militia. Armies, other than for a small corps of “regulars,” were to be mobilized in times of war and demobilized in times of peace. Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution created the Congressional authority to pass laws necessary for raising military forces. While Congress had the authority to raise and support an army and navy, Congress could make no appropriation of funds for the military for a term longer than two years, a condition that contributed both to Congressional control of the military, and to the relative impermanence of standing or regular military forces. While Congress created the armed forces, the Article II, Section 2 designated the President as the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the State militia when the latter were called into the “actual Service of the United States.” Although Congress obtained the Constitutional authority to create and provide for national military forces, and thus established the broad parameters for military service, the final determination for who served, when, how, and why, depended upon specific legislative actions by Congress, and by state legislative bodies, and upon the allocation of forces by the Commander in Chief. The Constitution assumes the necessity of military forces as a mechanism for the assurance of a more perfect union, and for the protection of life, liberty, and property:

The Early National Period • 27

DOCUMENT 2.2 THE MILITIA, MILITARY SERVICE, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES We the people of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessing of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America. Congress shall have power:

Article I, Section 8; Clause 15–20: To declare War, grant Letters of marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

Article I, Section 10, Clause 3: No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of Tonnage, keep troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

Article II, Section 2, Clause 1: The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any subject

28 • The Early National Period

relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

* * * Two amendments to the Constitution, added in 1791, emphasized the concern regarding the potential infringement by military or militia forces on individual rights including the right to bear arms, and the protection of individual rights in property:

DOCUMENT 2.3 AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, 1791 Amendment II [1791]: A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed.

Amendment III [1791]: No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

* * * On May 2, 1792, Congress approved “An Act to provide for calling forth the militia” which authorized the President of the United States to call to duty the militia of the state or states in an area or region threatened by invasion, attacks by Indians, or by an insurrection. Those called to arms were to receive the same pay and allowances as regular troops of the United States and no one could be compelled to serve more than a three-month tour in any one year. In practice, with the exception of the Civil War, until the twentieth century the response to the “call” remained voluntary, with the concurrence of state authorities. Initial legislation of May 2, 1792 was quickly followed on May 8, by an Act to provide for the “National Defense by establishing a Uniform Militia throughout the United States.” This Act required the enrollment of all male citizens of the states between the ages of 18 and 45 (except those specifically exempted by that legislation or by state authority) who were residents of a community or region into militia units by the captain or commanding officer of the company during the

The Early National Period • 29

forthcoming year. Each of those enrolled were to provide themselves with a “good” musket or flintlock, bayonet, cartridges, powder and ball, and knapsack and be available for “exercise” or service when called. The State militia was to be organized into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions and companies, as directed by the legislature of each state, and the Act prescribed the number of men per company (24 privates), and the number and ranks and rates of officers and non-commissioned for each unit. With relatively minor changes or amendments, these two acts set the responsibilities and the character of military service until the Civil War, and, in some respects, through the nineteenth century.

DOCUMENT 2.4 THE UNIFORM MILITIA ACT, 1792 AN ACT MORE EFFECTUALLY TO PROVIDE FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE BY ESTABLISHING AN UNIFORM MILITIA THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES Second Congress. Sess. I. Ch. 33. May 8, 1792 Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years (except as is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia by the captain or commanding officer of the company, within whose bounds such citizen shall reside, and that within twelve months after the passing of this act. And it shall at all times hereafter be the duty of every such captain or commanding officer of a company to enroll every such citizen, as aforesaid, and also those who shall, from time to time, arrive at the age of eighteen years, or being of the age of eighteen years and under the age of forty-five (except as before excepted) shall come to reside within his bounds; and shall without delay notify such citizen of the said enrollment, by a proper noncommissioned officer of the company, by whom such notice may be proved. That every citizen so enrolled and notified, shall, within six months thereafter, provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder; and shall appear, so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service, except, that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack. That the commissioned officers shall severally be armed with a sword or hanger and espontoon, and that from and after five years from the passing of this act, all muskets for arming the militia

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as herein required, shall be of bores sufficient for balls of the eighteenth part of a pound. And every citizen so enrolled, and providing himself with the arms, ammunition and accoutrements required as aforesaid, shall hold the same exempted from all suits, distresses, executions or sales, for debt or for the payment of taxes. Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the Vice President of the United States; the officers judicial and executive of the government of the United States; the members of both Houses of Congress, and their respective officers; all custom-house officers with their clerks; all post officers, and stage drivers who are employed in the care and conveyance of the mail of the postoffice of the United States; all ferrymen employed at any ferry on the post road; all inspectors of exports; all pilots; all mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States; and all persons who now are or may hereafter be exempted by the laws of the respective states, shall be, and are hereby exempted from militia duty, notwithstanding their being above the age of eighteen, and under the age of forty-five years. Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That out of the militia enrolled, as is herein directed, there shall be formed for each battalion at least one company of grenadiers, light infantry or riflemen; and that to each division there shall be at least one company of artillery, and one troop of horse; there shall be to each company of artillery, one captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four corporals, six gunners, six bombadiers, one drummer, and one fifer. The officers to be armed with a sword or hanger, a fusee, bayonet and belt, with a cartridge-box to contain twelve cartridges; and each private or matross shall furnish himself with all the equipments of a private in the infantry, until proper ordnance and field artillery is provided. There shall be to each troop of horse, one captain, two lieutenants, one cornet, four sergeants, four corporals, one saddler, one farrier, and one trumpeter. The commissioned officers to furnish themselves with good horses of at least fourteen hands and a half high, and to be armed with a sword and pair of pistols, the holsters of which to be covered with bearskin caps. Each dragoon to furnish himself with a serviceable horse, at least fourteen hand and a half high, a good saddle, bridle, malpillion and valise, holsters, and a breast-plate and crupper, a pair of boots and spurs, a pair of pistols, a sabre, and a cartouch-box, to contain twelve cartridges for pistols. That each company of artillery and troop of horse shall be formed of volunteers from the brigade, at the discretion of the commander-in-chief of the state, not exceeding one company of each to a regiment, nor more in number than one eleventh part of the infantry, and shall be uniformly clothed in regimentals, to be furnished at their own expense; and the colour and fashion to be determined by the brigadier commanding the brigade to which they belong.

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Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That there shall be an adjutant-general appointed in each state, whose duty it shall be to distribute all orders from the commander-in-chief of the state to the several corps; to attend all public reviews when the commander-in-chief of the state shall review the militia, or any part thereof; to obey all orders from him relative to carrying into execution and perfecting the system of military discipline established by this act; to furnish blank forms of different returns that may be required, and to explain the principles on which they should be make; to receive from the several officers of the different corps throughout the state, returns of the militia under their command, reporting the actual situation of their arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, their delinquencies, and every other thing which relates to the general advancement of good order and discipline: all which the several officer of the division, brigades, regiments, and battalions, are hereby required to make in the usual manner, so the said adjutant-general may be duly furnished therewith: from all which returns he shall make proper abstracts, and lay the same annually before the commander-in-chief of the state. Sec. 9. And be it further enacted, That if any person, whether officer or soldier, belonging to the militia of any state, and called out into the service of the United States, be wounded or disabled while in actual service, he shall be taken care of and provided for at the public expense. And whereas sundry corps of artillery, cavalry, and infantry now exist in several of the said states, which by the laws, customs, or usages thereof have not been incorporated with, or subject to the general regulations of the militia: Sec. 11. Be it further enacted, That such corps retain their accustomed privileges, subject, nevertheless, to all other duties required by this act, in like manner with the other militia. Approved, May 8, 1792.

* * * The Constitution of the United States and the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 established a number of fundamental policies and principles which for the most part underlie modern military structures and protocol.There was an expectation if not an obligation that all free white males from the age of 18 to 45 were eligible for service in the state militias. The state militias are the antecedents of the National Guard. The Act of 1792 prescribed that each state should have an “adjutant-general” who served under the commanderin-chief of the states’ militia. The adjutant general was responsible for the distribution of orders and directives and for assuring the consistency of

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the militia organizations. They were to represent the state militia in its associations with the national government and to provide a review and oversight of the organization and training of the militia units. The militia of each state was to be organized in similar structure to the other state militias, each into brigades, divisions, and companies including light infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The command structures and armament and accoutrements of the militia in each state were to be similar to that of the other state militias.Those who served in critical public jobs and positions, as in Congress or state officials, as ferrymen, postal officials, and stage drivers, among others, were to be exempt from military service. Significantly, the state and the national governments were responsible for the care of troops injured in military operations. In sum, the military structures of the new republic provided a basic philosophical and structural model for the development of U.S. military systems over the next two centuries. There were, to be sure, controversies and modifications relating to military structures and systems, often having to do with fundamental issues such as volunteer service versus conscription, state versus federal authority, who should serve, and who should be exempt from military service, when a call to arms should be issued, should a standing army or professional military corps be maintained, and the compensation to which those who served might be entitled.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. In what ways did the early leaders of the United States draw on colonial traditions of the militia? What changed with independence insofar as military service was concerned? 2. George Washington, in Sentiments on a Peace Establishment, and Congress, in the Uniform Militia Act of 1792, made explicit references to citizenship in relation to military service: 1. What did they say about this? 2. To what extent can you see those values in the contemporary United States? 3. Do you think that military service and citizenship should be linked? 3. Other than the duties of citizenship, what justifications do you find in these documents for requiring military service? 4. The meaning of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution has been one of the most heated political con-

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troversies in recent decades. Taking into consideration the other documents you have read in Chapters 1 and 2, what do you think this amendment means? 5. What were the key elements of the Constitution that provided for national defense? 6. Describe the key elements of the Militia Act of 1792. In what ways did the Militia Act seem to support or alter basic values and structures of the military force utilized during the American Revolution, and enumerated by the Constitution of 1783? 7. What were the nature of “exemptions” to military service prescribed by the Constitution and the Militia Act of 1792?

CHAPTER

3

VOLUNTEERS, CONSCRIPTION, AND A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY CORPS, 1800–1898 Thomas Jefferson, who succeeded George Washington and John Adams to the Presidency in 1800, believed perhaps even more firmly than his Federalist predecessors that national defense rested primarily upon the shoulders of the armed citizenry, the militia, and the states. But Jefferson’s decision to send an American naval flotilla against the Barbary pirates off the coast of North Africa in 1804 suggested the importance of having a standing army and naval forces ready for action. While Jefferson believed that the maintenance and training of citizen-soldier armies were primarily the business of the states, he advised having a corps of officers trained, in service, and available to supervise the “call to arms” and any subsequent combat. The inveterate inventor and engineer, he also was concerned that the officers and directors of the military forces have special training beyond that relating to arms and drill. For Jefferson, and many of his contemporaries, engineering and military training were complementary. Indeed, the first modern engineers were military engineers, who built fortifications, walls, moats, fortresses, and towers, or conversely, those who destroyed, tunneled under, bridged, scaled, or otherwise circumvented those fortifications. Congress and President Jefferson recognized the synergy of engineering and military training, and in 1802 created the Corps of Engineers to be stationed at West Point, which was to constitute a military academy. The Corps of Engineers was to oversee education of the cadets at the United States Military Academy and was to have first claim on its graduates. Despite the founding of West Point and, in 1845, the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, the real burden of military

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education and training continued to “settle on the shoulders of the civilian colleges of the individual states,” a condition later reinforced by the Morrill Land Grant College Act (1863). Alden Partridge, a member of the first graduating class of the United States Military Academy in 1806, was singularly responsible for formulating the “American System of Education,” which proposed to “combine civilian and military studies in order to produce enlightened and effective citizensoldiers.” He became superintendent of the Academy in 1815 at the age of 29, and designed a curriculum for West Point that would blend technical studies and the liberal arts with military instruction. Partridge became the center of a debate over whether military instruction should be the responsibility of the states, or of the national government. After leaving West Point he founded Norwich Academy in his hometown of Norwich, Vermont, and assisted in the founding of the Virginia Military Institute, and the Citadel, and influenced the founding of numerous other similar institutions, including Louisiana’s State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy, which reopened after the Civil War as Louisiana State University. In time, Alden’s American System contributed to the design of the Morrill Land Grant College Act. Related to the controversy over military training was the issue of whether conscription should be the responsibility of the states or the federal government. During the War of 1812, small regular federal armies supported by larger state militia shouldered the burden of conflict. Using primarily militia troops that outnumbered the British attackers, General William H. Winder failed in the defense of the nation’s capital, while General Samuel Smith’s militia successfully defended Baltimore. At the memorable Battle of New Orleans, General Andrew Jackson’s small army, joined by state militia, mostly from Kentucky and Louisiana, defeated the larger and more experienced British army under General Sir Edward Pakenham. Jackson arrived in New Orleans at the close of 1814 with a small army of possibly 1,500 men exhausted from campaigns in Tennessee, Alabama, the Carolinas and Kentucky against the Creek Indians. An onlooker in the city described Jackson’s appearance as a “down-at-the-heels flatboatman” with a nondescript army. But Jackson immediately declared martial law, enrolled the services of Louisiana and Mississippi militia units, armed a diverse collection of local citizens, including freedmen and three artillery units manned by the crews of pirate and privateer Jean Lafitte, and put citizens and slaves to work preparing defensive earthworks south of the city. In the midst of the frantic preparations 2,000 Kentucky militiamen and scattered groups from other states made their way to the city and joined in the defense. By the time of the main British attack on New Year’s Day, 1815, Jackson had an “army” of 3,000 men on the lines in the city, supported by about

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1,000 men in reserve, and he had three Louisiana militia units patrolling above New Orleans to guard against possible flanking attacks, while another small force of 850 men were sent across the Mississippi River to help secure the approaches from the east and deter ships from passing upstream past the city. The British attacked by land from the south with a force of approximately 7,000, while another 1,200 moved on the east bank against the small American troop under General David Morgan. The Americans won a resounding victory at New Orleans, costing the British some 2,000 troops killed, wounded or captured, while total U.S. casualties included 6 killed and another 65 wounded. This battle seemed to be an affirmation of the citizen-soldier army. However, the difficulties and uncertainties associated with assembling the troop in New Orleans, and the general vulnerability of American coastal defenses and cities, including New York; Washington, DC; Boston, Massachusetts; Mobile, Alabama; and Charleston, South Carolina; throughout the war, suggested some inherent weaknesses in the militia tradition. In recognition of these weaknesses, President Madison proposed that Congress enact a national military conscription law. Congress would not oblige, and one of the nation’s most famous orators, Representative Daniel Webster, delivered the following denunciation of the proposal on the floor of the House of Representatives on December 9, 1814.

DOCUMENT 3.1 DANIEL WEBSTER ON CONSCRIPTION This bill indeed is less undisguised in its object, and less direct in its means, than some of the measures proposed. It is an attempt to exercise the power of forcing the free men of this country into the ranks of an army, for the general purposes of war, under color of a military service. It is a distinct system, introduced for new purposes, and not connected with any power, which the Constitution has conferred on Congress. But, Sir, there is another consideration. The services of the men to be raised under this act are not limited to those cases in which alone this Government is entitled to the aid of the militia of the States. These cases are particularly stated in the Constitution—“to repel invasion, suppress insurrection, or execute the laws.” The question is nothing less, than whether the most essential rights of personal liberty shall be surrendered, and despotism embraced in its worst form. When the present generation of men shall be swept away, and that this Government ever existed shall be a matter of history only, I desire that it may

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then be known, that you have not proceeded in your course unadmonished and unforewarned. Let it then be known, that there were those, who would have stopped you, in the career of your measures, and held you back, as by the skirts of your garments, from the precipice, over which you are plunging, and drawing after you the Government of your Country. Conscription is chosen as the most promising instrument, both of overcoming reluctance to the Service, and of subduing the difficulties which arise from the deficiencies of the Exchequer. The administration asserts the right to fill the ranks of the regular army by compulsion. It contends that it may now take one out of every twenty-five men, and any part or the whole of the rest, whenever its occasions require. Persons thus taken by force, and put into an army, may be compelled to serve there, during the war, or for life. They may be put on any service, at home or abroad, for defense or for invasion, according to the will and pleasure of Government. This power does not grow out of any invasion of the country, or even out of a state of war. It belongs to Government at all times, in peace as well as in war, and is to be exercised under all circumstances, according to its mere discretion. This, Sir, is the amount of the principle contended for by the Secretary of War (James Monroe). Is this, Sir, consistent with the character of a free Government? Is this civil liberty? Is this the real character of our Constitution? No, Sir, indeed it is not. The Constitution is libeled, foully libeled. The people of this country have not established for themselves such a fabric of despotism. They have not purchased at a vast expense of their own treasure and their own blood a Magna Carta to be slaves. Where is it written in the Constitution, in what article or section is it contained, that you may take children from their parents, and parents from their children, and compel them to fight the battles of any war, in which the folly or the wickedness of Government may engage it? Under what concealment has this power lain hidden, which now for the first time comes forth, with a tremendous and baleful aspect, to trample down and destroy the dearest rights of personal liberty? Sir, I almost disdain to go to quotations and references to prove that such an abominable doctrine has no foundation in the Constitution of the country. It is enough to know that that instrument was intended as the basis of a free Government, and that the power contended for is incompatible with any notion of personal liberty. An attempt to maintain this doctrine upon the provisions of the Constitution is an exercise of perverse ingenuity to extract slavery from the substance of a free Government. It is an attempt to show, by proof and argument, that we ourselves are subjects of despotism, and that we have a right to chains and bondage, firmly secured to us and our children, by the provisions of our Government. The supporters of the measures before us act on the principle that it is their task to raise arbitrary powers, by construction, out of a plain written

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charter of National Liberty. It is their pleasing duty to free us of the delusion, which we have fondly cherished, that we are the subjects of a mild, free and limited Government, and to demonstrate by a regular chain of premises and conclusions, that Government possesses over us a power more tyrannical, more arbitrary, more dangerous, more allied to blood and murder, more full of every form of mischief, more productive of every sort and degree of misery, than has been exercised by any civilized Government in modern times. But it is said, that it might happen that any army would not be raised by voluntary enlistment, in which case the power to raise armies would be granted in vain, unless they might be raised by compulsion. If this reasoning could prove any thing, it would equally show, that whenever the legitimate powers of the Constitution should be so badly administered as to cease to answer the great ends intended by them, such new powers may be assumed or usurped, as any existing administration may deem expedient. This is a result of his own reasoning, to which the Secretary does not profess to go. But it is a true result. For if it is to be assumed, that all powers were granted, which might by possibility become necessary, and that Government itself is the judge of this possible necessity, then the powers of Government are precisely what it chooses they should be. The tyranny of Arbitrary Government consists as much in its means as in its end; and it would be a ridiculous and absurd constitution which should be less cautious to guard against abuses in the one case than in the other. All the means and instruments which a free Government exercises, as well as the ends and objects which it pursues, are to partake of its own essential character, and to be conformed to its genuine spirit. A free Government with arbitrary means to administer it is a contradiction; a free Government without adequate provision for personal security is an absurdity; a free Government, with an uncontrolled power of military conscription, is a solecism, at once the most ridiculous and abominable that ever entered into the head of man. Into the paradise of domestic life you enter, not indeed by temptations and sorceries, but by open force and violence. Nor is it, Sir, for the defense of his own house and home, that he who is the subject of military draft is to perform the task allotted to him. You will put him upon a service equally foreign to his interests and abhorrent to his feelings. With his aid you are to push your purposes of conquest. The battles which he is to fight are the battles of invasion; battles which he detests perhaps and abhors, less from the danger and the death that gather over them, and the blood with which they drench the plain, than from the principles in which they have their origin. If, Sir, in this strife he fall—if, while ready to obey every rightful command of Government, he is forced from home against right, not to contend for the defense of his country, but to

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prosecute a miserable and detestable project of invasion, and in that strife he fall, ‘tis murder. It may stalk above the cognizance of human law, but in the sight of Heaven it is murder; and though millions of years may roll away, while his ashes and yours lie mingled together in the earth, the day will yet come, when his spirit and the spirits of his children must be met at the bar of omnipotent justice. May God, in his compassion, shield me from any participation in the enormity of this guilt. A military force cannot be raised, in this manner, but by the means of a military force. If administration has found that it can not form an army without conscription, it will find, if it venture on these experiments, that it can not enforce conscription without an army. The Government was not constituted for such purposes. Framed in the spirit of liberty, and in the love of peace, it has no powers which render it able to enforce such laws. The attempt, if we rashly make it, will fail; and having already thrown away our peace, we may thereby throw away our Government. I express these sentiments here, Sir, because I shall express them to my constituents. Both they and myself live under a Constitution which teaches us, that “the doctrine of non-resistance against arbitrary power and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.” With the same earnestness with which I now exhort you to forbear from these measures, I shall exhort them to exercise their unquestionable right of providing for the security of their own liberties.

* * * The Mexican War again tested the efficacy of waging war with a small regular army supplemented by volunteer, citizen-soldiers. Armed conflict between Texans and Mexican military forces began in the autumn of 1835, at Gonzales, Goliad, and San Antonio, Texas, where Mexico attempted to reassert its authority and control over the restive Texan colonists. Texas declared independence from Mexico on March 2, 1836, while the defenders of the Alamo, all volunteers from Texas and elsewhere, were besieged by the armies of Santa Anna. The Alamo fell on March 6. Texas troops under Colonel James W. Fannin surrendered at Goliad, and on March 27 were massacred by their captors. Finally, with a volunteer citizenarmy, General Sam Houston defeated the Mexican armies under General Santa Anna in the Battle of San Jacinto on April 21, 1836. For the next nine years the Republic of Texas survived continuing conflicts with Mexico, including two brief occupations of San Antonio by Mexican troops in 1842. Indian wars were constant along its ill-defended western frontier, and Texas faced its eastern neighbor, the United States, with some unease. The defense of the Republic of Texas depended, for the

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most part, on poorly organized local militia of all able-bodied white males between the ages of 17 and 50, subject to call in an emergency. With Texas’ admission to the Union as a state in 1845, and the subsequent Mexican War, volunteer citizen-soldier armies including 6,000 Texas Rangers strongly complemented the small army of regular U.S. forces under Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott. Following the decisive battle of Palo Alto in Texas, and Resaca de la Palma in Mexico, Winnfield Scott led American armies into Mexico City. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and the payment of $15 million to Mexico plus the assumption of $3.25 million in debts owed by Mexico to the U.S. resulted in the acquisition of all Mexican territories north of the Rio Grande to the Pacific. In addition to the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, between 1800 and 1860 the U.S. Army engaged in numerous conflicts characterized as “wars” against Indian tribes and in numerous engagements and encounters that did not officially qualify as “wars.” There were no years in which the Army was not engaged in combat. During that period American armies were comprised of volunteers headed by a core of professionally trained officers. The Civil War began with a call for volunteers to arms by the Union and Confederate governments. The call resulted in a comparatively strong response with voluntary enlistments approaching 200,000 men on both sides, despite the fact that Union populations totaled some 20 million, while of the Confederacy’s 9 million, almost 3.5 million were slaves. In terms of human resources and available volunteers for their respective armies the Union held a three-to-one advantage over the Confederacy. Meanwhile, the nation’s Military Academy, West Point, provided most of the 300 generals who headed the armies of both North and South (approximately 180 served the Confederacy), including Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee. The Confederate President, Jefferson Davis, was also a West Point graduate. Following Union losses at Bull Run and elsewhere, in 1861 Congress approved new legislation authorizing and calling 500,000 volunteers to the colors. Meanwhile, as the battles grew bigger and more desperate, in 1862 the Confederate Congress approved a Conscription Act to replenish its diminishing armies (Figure 3.1). The next year the Union followed suit. But conscription in both cases proved problematical, if not an outright failure and liability. The first Confederate Conscription Act in April 1862 provided for the draft of white men aged 18–35, and was inspired in part by the premise that a draft might stimulate more volunteers to come to serve, but it served more to alienate and divide the volunteers already on active duty from the conscripts. The law allowed those called to hire a substitute, exempted those who owned more than twenty slaves, as well as college professors and mail carriers. In September, the Confederacy raised the draft age to 45, and in

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FIGURE 3.1 Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Call for Recruits to the Volunteers and the Militia, August 23, 1862. Union and Confederate armies depended on volunteers raised by the respective states in the early stages of the Civil War. The Confederate States enacted the first conscription acts, followed soon by the Union. Source: Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division.

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1864 to age 50. “Involuntary” recruits comprised perhaps 25–30 percent of Confederate armies east of the Mississippi River by mid-1864, but for the most part Confederate and Union armies, as in the past, were composed of volunteer militia, serving under the authority of variously the Union or Confederate (national) governments, and the remainder under the authority of state governments. On March 3, 1863, with volunteer enlistments declining and the commitments of war growing greater, Congress approved “An Act for enrolling and calling out the national Forces, and for other Purposes.” That Act provided that all male citizens and those who had declared under oath their intention to become citizens between the ages of 20 and 45 were a part of the “national forces” and were liable to be called by the President for military duty. Exemptions included the disabled, administrative officials of the U.S. government, judges, governors, and the son of a dependent widow. Married men between the ages of 35 and 45 were deferred from service until younger and unmarried males had been called “to do military duty.” The Act established enrollment districts, and provided for the identification of deserters and spies. Those assigned to the National Forces remained subject to call for two years following enrollment, and were to serve until the end of the conflict or a term not to exceed three years, whichever came first. Those actually inducted into service could appear, or produce a suitable substitute, or pay a designated sum of money (not to exceed $300) to the Secretary of War for the procurement of a suitable substitute. Both Union and Confederate Conscription Acts suggested that the war might be a “rich man’s war, and a poor man’s fight.” Other provisions of the Act encouraged the re-enlistment of volunteers with the incentive of a $50 bounty, punishment for those who attempted to entice a soldier to desert or who bought, accepted, or possessed military clothes, arms, or accoutrements. As an incentive to deserters to return to their units, the Act offered a “pardon” with full reinstatement for those then absent from duty without permission. It also provided that those accused of criminal actions should be tried by military, not civil courts, and it affirmed the right to a speedy trial for offenders. Commanders were given authority to grant up to a thirty-day furlough to enlisted men for good conduct in the line of duty. While the Confederate and Union Conscription Acts were the first since the Continental Congress rejected British impressment, most of those who served in both the Confederate and Union armies were volunteers.

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DOCUMENT 3.2 CIVIL WAR CONSCRIPTION: UNION, 1863 AN ACT FOR ENROLLING AND CALLING OUT THE NATIONAL FORCES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Thirty-Seventh Congress, Sess. III, Ch. 74, 75. March 3, 1863 Whereas there now exist in the United States an insurrection and rebellion against the authority thereof, and it is, under the Constitution of the United States, the duty of the government to suppress insurrection and rebellion, to guarantee to each State a republican form of government, and to preserve the public tranquillity; and whereas, for these high purposes, a military force is indispensable, to raise and support which all persons ought willingly to contribute; and whereas no service can be more praiseworthy and honorable than that which is rendered for the maintenance of the Constitution and Union, and the consequent preservation of free government: Therefore— Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their intention to become citizens under and in pursuance of the laws thereof, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years, except as hereinafter excepted, are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the Untied States when called out by the President for that purpose. Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That the following persons be, and they are hereby, excepted and exempt from the provisions of this act, and shall not be liable to military duty under the same, to wit: Such as are rejected as physically or mentally unfit for the service; also, First the Vice-President of the United States, the judges of the various courts of the United States, the heads of the various executive departments of the government, and the governors of the several States. Second the only person liable to military duty of a widow dependent upon his labor for support. Third, the only son of aged or infirm parent or parents dependent upon his labor for support. Fourth, where there are two or more sons of aged or infirm parents subject to draft, the father, or if he be dead, the mother, may elect which son shall be exempt. Fifth, the only brother of children not twelve years old, having neither father nor mother dependent upon his labor for support. Sixth, the father of motherless children under twelve years of age dependent upon his labor for support. Seventh, where there are a father and sons in the same family and household, and two of them are in the military service of the United States as non-commissioned officers, musicians, or privates, the residue of such family and household, not exceeding two, shall be exempt. And no persons but such as are here in

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excepted shall be exempt: Provided, however, That no person who has been convicted of any felony shall be enrolled or permitted to serve in said forces. Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the national forces of the United States not now in the military service, enrolled under this act, shall be divided into two classes: the first of which shall comprise all persons subject to do military duty between the ages of twenty and thirty-five years, and all unmarried persons subject to do military duty above the age of thirty-five and under the age of forty-five; the second class shall comprise all other persons subject to do military duty, and they shall not, in any district be called into the service of the United States until those of the first class shall have been called. Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That for greater convenience in enrolling, calling out, and organizing the national forces, and for the arrest of deserters and spies of the enemy, The United States shall be divided into districts, of which the District of Columbia shall constitute one, each territory of the United States shall constitute one or more, as the President shall direct, and each congressional district of the respective states, as fixed by a law of the state next preceding the enrollment, shall constitute one: Provided, That in states which have not by their laws been divided into two or more congressional districts, the president of the United States shall divide the same into so many enrollment districts as he may deem fit and convenient. Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That for each of said districts there shall be appointed by the President a provost-marshal, with the rank, pay, and emoluments of a captain of cavalry, or an officer of said rank shall be detailed by the President, who shall be under the direction and subject to the orders of a provost-marshal-general, appointed or detailed by the President of the United States, whose office shall be at the seat of government, forming a separate bureau of the War Department, and whose rank, pay, and emoluments shall be those of a colonel of cavalry.

[Ed.: Sec. 6–18 established procedures to be followed by the provostmarshal regarding the enrollment of draftees, the prosecution of deserters, the creation of a board of enrollment, the terms and lengths of service, the authority to hire or obtain a substitute for the draftee, bounties to be paid to volunteers, reenlistment bonuses, and requirement for a physical examination. Sec. 19–32 are omitted from the text and relate to consolidations of companies and regiments, courts-martial, the sale or transfer of military clothes, arms, or outfits; enticement to a soldier to desert, punishment for spying, mutiny, or murder, resistance to or obstruction of the draft, an invitation to deserters to return to duty without punishment, procedures in military trials, prohibitions on criminal acts, and an authorization to commanders to grant furloughs for good conduct. Sec. 33–37 empowered the President to implement the draft, assign duty stations, rescinded certain

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previous acts, and set pay and duty obligations, and provided for the treatment of spies.] Approved, March 3, 1863.

* * * The Conscription Act, perhaps combined with an underlying concern that the recently promulgated Emancipation Proclamation declaring the slaves then residing in areas in revolt against the United States (that is, in the Confederacy) to be free, provoked draft riots through many areas of the Union. In New York, where rioting against the draft was accompanied by overt racial violence and attacks, laborers tended to view the National Forces act as a conscription of the poor man to fight the rich man’s war, and as forcing the poor, and mostly immigrant laborer to fight for freeing slaves who in turn would compete for the poor man’s jobs and wages. In the summer of 1864, the Union issued a draft call for an additional 500,000 men under the provisions of the National Forces Act. A significant by-product of the draft riots and manpower shortages was for Union Army recruiters to begin to recruit free black men, from North and South, and to receive male runaway slaves into the Union Army as it fought through the South. By the close of the war, one in eight Union soldiers was black, a significant number of whom had been slaves at the start of the war. The northern free black men who fought in the Civil War were mostly volunteers in one of the several all-black state militia units, such as the Massachusetts 54th, made famous in the late twentieth century by the popular movie Glory. As that film relates, northern blacks had to campaign for the right to join the Union Army. They did so with dual purpose; both out of a desire to help bring an end to slavery, and because they believed military service might earn them full citizenship rights. Still, achieving the right to fight in the Union Army was a much more difficult and complicated struggle for southern slaves and free blacks in the South. Early in the war as Union forces occupied key southern coastal locations at Fortress Monroe, Virginia, the Sea Islands of South Carolina, and New Orleans, Louisiana, runaway slaves flooded the Union camps. Creative anti-slavery generals, such as Benjamin Butler in Virginia, recognized the double value of these runaway slaves. Not only might they aid the Union cause; every southern slave who stopped working for southern slave owners weakened the southern economy. Not having the authority to free such slaves, Butler took the novel position that these slaves were “contraband of war,” and put them to work. Lincoln and his cabinet at first rejected this approach. But Congress supported it, passing two so-called “Confiscation Acts” that laid the groundwork for eventual

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acceptance of runaway slaves into the Union Army and set forth the fundamental principle that would later appear in the Emancipation Proclamation that slaves of rebellious owners would be set free.

DOCUMENT 3.3 SECOND CONFISCATION ACT, 1862 AN ACT TO SUPPRESS INSURRECTION, TO PUNISH TREASON AND REBELLION, TO SEIZE AND CONFISCATE THE PROPERTY OF REBELS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That every person who shall hereafter commit the crime of treason against the United States, and shall be adjudged guilty thereof, shall suffer death, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; or, at the discretion of the court, he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; said fine shall be levied and collected on any or all of the property, real and personal, excluding slaves, of which the said person so convicted was the owner at the time of committing the said crime, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding. SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall hereafter incite, set on foot, assist, or engage in any rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States, or the laws thereof, or shall give aid or comfort thereto, or shall engage in, or give aid and comfort to, any such existing rebellion or insurrection, and be convicted thereof, such person shall be punished by imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten years, or by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, and by the liberation of all his slaves, if any he have; or by both of said punishments, at the discretion of the court. [...] SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the government of the United States, or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army; and all slaves captured from such persons or deserted by them and coming under the control of the government of the United States; and all slaves of such person found on [or] being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterwards occupied by the forces of the United States, shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.. SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That the President of the United States is authorized to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem

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necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion, and for this purpose he may organize and use them in such manner as he may judge best for the public welfare.

[Ed.: Sec. 10 and 12 prohibited the support of slavery, and considered the colonization of freedmen.] * * * African Americans made explicit their belief in the connection between military service and citizenship. As the Civil War came to an end, they flooded federal officials with letters and petitions making just this point. Here is an excerpt from one such petition:

DOCUMENT 3.4 PETITION OF THE COLORED CITIZENS OF NASHVILLE, JANUARY 9TH, 1865 In the contest between the nation and slavery, our unfortunate people have sided, by instinct, with the former. We have little fortune to devote to the national cause, for a hard fate has hitherto forced us to live in poverty, but we do devote to its success, our hopes, our toils, our whole heart, our sacred honor, and our lives. We will work, pray, live, and, if need be, die for the Union, as cheerfully as ever a white patriot died for his country. The color of our skin does not lessen in the least degree, our love either for God or for the land of our birth. [...] Devoted as we are to the principles of justice, of love to all men, and of equal rights on which our Government is based, and which make it the hope of the world. We know the burdens of citizenship, and are ready to bear them. We know the duties of the good citizen, and are ready to perform them cheerfully, and would ask to be put in a position in which we can discharge them more effectually. We do not ask for the privilege of citizenship, wishing to shun the obligations imposed by it. Near 200,000 of our brethren are to-day performing military duty in the ranks of the Union army. Thousands of them have already died in battle, or perished by a cruel martyrdom for the sake of the Union, and we are ready and willing to sacrifice more. But what higher order of citizen is there than the soldier? Or who has a greater trust confided to his hands? If we are called on to do military duty against the rebel armies in the field, why should we be denied the privilege of voting against rebel citizens at the ballot-box? The latter is as necessary to save the Government as the former.

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* * * From the 1860s on, Black soldiers would constitute a significant element of the U.S. Armed Forces. After the Civil War ended, Congress reorganized the regular army and the main focus shifted to the West and Indian Wars. The 1866 Reorganization Act created two segregated cavalry regiments and six infantry regiments of black soldiers, who were then sent west. These soldiers became known as the “Buffalo Soldiers,” a name apparently given to them by the Indians they were sent to fight. By the close of the war, some five million Americans, the great majority of those volunteers, had served in the armies of the North and South, and 600,000 had died in combat or of war-related injuries and disease. Could volunteer citizen armies continue to meet the requirements of national defense in this dawning era of mass armies and modern weapons? In all likelihood, most Americans after the Civil War continued to embrace the ideal that national defense was inherently the responsibility of the citizensoldier, and that the states retained the critical role in the recruitment, training, and retention of those civilian armies. Although at the time it became law, in 1862 as combat accelerated, the Morrill Land Grant College Act for the most part fell out of the public’s view, yet it was to play a major role in reaffirming the role of the volunteer, citizensoldier as a central element of the American military. It reaffirmed and facilitated the “new” Alden Partridge concept that citizen-soldiers should be trained for their military roles. States accepting the donation of public lands as provided under the Act were required to provide within five years of the date of acceptance, at least one college “where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts.” The Land Grant College Act embraced the Jeffersonian democratic and republican view that national defense was inherently the responsibility of the citizen-soldier, and coupled it with the perception that military training was valuable for the male citizen and for the soldier, and that military training helped instill “morally correct behavior in the character of future engineers, farmers, teachers, and attorneys.” Indeed, the ideal male republican citizen was “self-reliant, outwardly moral, mindful of his rights and civic responsibilities, and most importantly, eager and capable of bearing arms in self-defense or for the public good,” as Rod Andrews, Jr. explained in the Long Gray Lines: The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839-1915 (2001, pp. 2–45). Thus the Land Grant College Act institutionalized the prevailing idea that national defense rested primarily upon the shoulders of the armed citizenry, the militia, and the states,

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and that the maintenance and training of citizen-soldier armies were primarily the business of the states—albeit now accommodated and supported by federal land grants. The reality of war, and Partridge’s “American System of Education,” combined with the growing impetus for agricultural and engineering studies in higher education, contributed to the Congressional proviso that Land Grant Colleges should include programs for professional military training. In retrospect, military training coupled with technical engineering and agricultural studies resulted in the production of a citizen-soldier uniquely qualified and trained for service in modern, large-scale, technologically advanced warfare. And Partridge, for his inspiration to the combined civilmilitary training curricula, helped frame the intellectual footing of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).

DOCUMENT 3.5 MORRILL LAND GRANT COLLEGE ACT, 1862 (THE MORRILL ACT) (ACT OF JULY 2, 1862, CH.130, 12 STAT.503, 7 U.S.C.301 ET. SEQ.) Chap. CXXX. — AN ACT Donating Public Lands to the several States and Territories which may provide Colleges for the Benefit of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,(1) That there be granted to the several States,(2) for the purpose hereinafter mentioned, an amount of public land, to be apportioned to each State a quantity equal to thirty thousand acres for each senator and representative in Congress to which the States are respectively entitled by the apportionment under the census of eighteen hundred and sixty:(3) Provided, That no mineral lands shall be selected or purchased under the provisions of this Act. Sec.2.(4) And be it further enacted, That the land aforesaid, after being surveyed, shall be apportioned to the several States in sections or subdivisions of sections, not less than one quarter of a section; and whenever there are public lands in a State subject to sale at private entry at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, the quantity to which said State shall be entitled shall be selected from such lands within the limits of such State, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby directed to issue to each of the States in which there is not the quantity of public lands subject to sale at private entry at one dollar and twenty-five cents per acre, to which said State may be entitled under the provisions of this act, land scrip to the amount in acres for

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the deficiency of its distributive share: said scrip to be sold by said States and the proceeds thereof applied to the uses and purposes prescribed in this Act, and for no other purpose whatsoever: Provided, That in no case shall any State to which land scrip may thus be issued be allowed to locate the same within the limits of any other State, or of any Territory of the United States, but their assignees may thus locate said land scrip upon any of the unappropriated lands of the United States subject to the sale at private entry at one dollar and twenty-five cents, or less, per acre: And provided, further, That not more than one million acres shall be located by such assignees in any one of the States: And provided, further, That no such location shall be made before one year from the passage of this Act. Sec.3.(5) And be it further enacted, That all the expenses of management, superintendence, and taxes from date of selection of said lands, previous to their sales, and all expenses incurred in the management and disbursement of the moneys which may be received therefrom, shall be paid by the States to which they may belong, out of the treasury of said States, so that the entire proceeds of the sale of said lands shall be applied without any diminution whatever to the purposes hereinafter mentioned. Sec.4.(6) That all moneys derived from the sales of lands aforesaid by the States to which lands are apportioned and from the sales of land scrip hereinbefore provided for shall be invested in bonds of the United States or of the States or some other safe bonds;(7) or the same may be invested by the States having no State bonds in any manner after the legislatures of such States shall have assented thereto and engaged that such funds shall yield a fair and reasonable rate of return, to be fixed by the State legislatures, and that the principal thereof shall forever remain unimpaired: (8) Provided, That the moneys so invested or loaned shall constitute a perpetual fund, the capital of which shall remain forever undiminished (except so far as may be provided in section 5 of this Act), and the interest of which shall be inviolably appropriated, by each State which may take and claim the benefit of this Act, to the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts, in such manner as the legislatures of the States may respectively prescribe, in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes on the several pursuits and professions in life. Sec.5.(9) And be it further enacted, That the grant of land and land scrip hereby authorized shall be made on the following conditions, to which, as

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well as to the provisions hereinbefore contained, the previous assent of the several States shall be signified by legislative acts: 1.

2.

3.

4

5

6

7

First. If any portion of the fund invested, as provided by the foregoing section, or any portion of the interest thereon, shall, by any action or contingency, be diminished or lost, it shall be replaced by the State to which it belongs, so that the capital of the fund shall remain forever undiminished; and the annual interest shall be regularly applied without diminution to the purposes mentioned in the fourth section of this act, except that a sum, not exceeding ten per centum upon the amount received by any State under the provisions of this act may be expended for the purchase of lands for sites or experimental farms, whenever authorized by the respective legislatures of said States. Second. No portion of said fund, nor the interest thereon, shall be applied, directly or indirectly, under any pretence whatever, to the purchase, erection, preservation, or repair of any building or buildings. Third. Any State which may take and claim the benefit of the provisions of this act shall provide, within five years from the time of its acceptance as provided in subdivision seven of this section,(10) at least not less than one college, as described in the fourth section of this act, or the grant to such State shall cease; and said State shall be bound to pay the United States the amount received of any lands previously sold; and that the title to purchasers under the State shall be valid. Fourth. An annual report shall be made regarding the progress of each college, recording any improvements and experiments made, with their cost and results, and such other matters, including State industrial and economical statistics, as may be supposed useful; one copy of which shall be transmitted by mail [free](11) by each, to all the other colleges which may be endowed under the provisions of this act, and also one copy to the Secretary of the Interior. Fifth. When lands shall be selected from those which have been raised to double the minimum price, in consequence of railroad grants, they shall be computed to the States at the maximum price, and the number of acres proportionally diminished. Sixth. No State while in a condition of rebellion or insurrection against the government of the United States shall be entitled to the benefit of this act. Seventh. No State shall be entitled to the benefits of this act unless it shall express its acceptance thereof by its legislature within three

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years from July 23, 1866:(12) Provided, That when any Territory shall become a State and be admitted to the Union, such a new State shall be entitled to the benefits of the said act of July two, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, by expressing the acceptance therein required within three years from the date of its admission into the Union, and providing the college or colleges within five years after such acceptance, as prescribed in this act.(13) Sec.6.(14) (Repealed) Sec.7.(15) And be it further enacted, That the land officers shall received the same fees for locating land scrip issued under the provisions of this act as is now allowed for the location of military bounty land warrants under existing laws: Provided, their maximum compensation shall not be thereby increased. Sec.8.(16) And be it further enacted, That the Governors of the several States to which scrip shall be issued under this act shall be required to report annually to Congress all sales made of such script until the whole shall be disposed of, the amount received for the same, and what appropriation has been made of the proceeds.

Endnotes (1) U.S.C. 301. (2) The College of the Virgin Islands and the University of Guam were included as land grant colleges by the Act of June 23, 1972, Public Law 92-318, sec. 506(a) and (b), 86 Stat. 350, 7 U.S.C. 301, note, as follows: “LAND-GRANT STATUS FOR THE COLLEGE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS AND THE UNIVERSITY OF GUAM” Sec. 506(a) The College of the Virgin Islands and the University of Guam shall be considered landgrant colleges established for the benefit of agriculture and mechanic arts in accordance with the provisions of the Act of July 2, 1862, as amended (12 Stat. 503; 7 U.S.C. 301–305, 307, 308). “(b) In lieu of extending to the Virgin Islands and Guam those provisions of the Act of July 2, 1862, as amended, relating to donations of public land or land scrip for the endowment and maintenance of colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts, there is authorized to be appropriated $3,000,000 to the Virgin Islands and $300,000.000 to Guam. Amount appropriated pursuant to this section shall be held and considered to have been granted to the Virgin Islands and Guam subject to the provisions of that Act applicable to the proceeds from the sale of land or land scrip.” Land grants under the Act of July 2, 1862, do not extend to the State of Alaska. Admission of Alaska into the union was accomplished January 3, 1959, upon issuance of Proc. No. 3269, January 3, 1959, 24 F.R. 81, 73 Stat. c.16, as required by sections 1 and 8 (c) of Act of July 7, 1958, Public Law 85-508, 72 Stat. 339, 48 U.S.C. sec. 21, note. For provisions making the land grant under Alaska Statehood provisions in lieu of grant of acreage under 7 U.S.C. see 301 et seq. (declared not to

A Professional Military Corps, 1800–1898 • 53 extend to Alaska), see sec. 6(1) of the Act of July 7, 1958, Public Law 85- 508, 72 Stat. 339, 48 U.S.C., sec 21, note. (3) An exchange of land in the State of Missouri was authorized by the Act of September 4, 1957, Public Law 85-282, sections 1–3, 71 Stat. 607, 7 U.S.C. 301, note, as follows: “That, notwithstanding the provisions of the Act entitled ‘An Act donating public lands to the several States and Territories which may provide colleges for the benefit of agriculture and the mechanic arts,’ approved July 2, 1862, (7 U.S.C., secs. 301–308), the State of Missouri is authorized to convey to the United States all right, title, and interest of such State in and to any land granted to such State under authority of such Act of July 2, 1862, which is located within the exterior boundaries of the national forests situated within such State, and, in exchange therefor, the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized to convey to the State of Missouri all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to not to exceed an equal value of national forest lands (as determined by the Secretary)situated within such State.” Sec. 2. “Any exchange authorized by the first section of this Act shall be made in accordance with the applicable provisions of section 7 or the Act of March 1, 1911, commonly referred to as the Weeks Law (16 U.S.C., sec. 516), and the applicable provisions of the Act entitled ‘An Act to consolidate national forest lands,’ approved March 20, 1922 (16 U.S.C., sec. 485 and 486).” Sec. 3. “Any land conveyed to the State of Missouri under authority of this Act shall, upon acceptance of such conveyance by such State, be held and considered to be granted to such State subject to the provisions of the Act of July 2, 1862, referred to in the first section of this Act.” (4) 7 U.S.C. 302. (5) 7 U.S.C. 303. (6) 7 U.S.C. 304. (7) The Act of April 13, 1926, ch. 130, 44 Stat. 247, substituted “bonds” for “stocks” and “a fair and reasonable rate of return, to be fixed by the State legislatures” for “not less than 5 per centum upon the amount so invested,” before proviso. (8) The Act of March 3, 1883, ch. 102, 22 Stat. 484. added after the words “other safe stocks” the words “or the same may be invested by the States having no State stocks in any other manner after the legislatures of such States shall have assented thereto, and engaged that such funds shall” and substituted “yield” for “yielding,” “principal” for “capital” and “unimpaired” for “undiminished.” (9) 7 U.S.C. 305. (10) Added by the Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 209, 14 Stat. 208. (11) Authority for free mail was repealed by the Act of March 3, 1873, which provided in part: “That all laws and parts of laws permitting the transmission by mail of any free matter whatever be, and the same are hereby, repealed from and after June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and seventy-three.” (12) The Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 209, 14 Stat. 208, added “within three years from July 23, 1866:” in lieu of “within two years from the date of its approval by the President.” (13) Proviso added by the Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 209, 14 Stat. 208. This provision does not apply to Alaska. See note 2 above. Another proviso from the Act of July 23, 1866, which was formerly set out at the end of subdivision seventh and read: “Provided further, That any State which heretofore expressed its acceptance of the act herein referred to shall have the period of five years within which to provide at least

54 • A Professional Military Corps, 1800–1898 one college, as described in the fourth section of said act, after the time for providing said college according to the Act of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, shall have expired”, has been omitted. (14) 7 U.S.C. 306, Sec. 6, which related to time of location of land scrip, was repealed by the Act of December 16, 1930, ch. 14, sec. 1, 46 Stat. 1028. (15) 7 U.S.C. 307. (16) 7 U.S.C. 308.

* * * To be sure, the Morrill Land Grant Colleges, founded for the most part between the close of the Civil War and the turn of the twentieth century, interpreted their authorization and obligation to include military service as a part of the curriculum in very diverse fashions. Some colleges, prominently those in the South, including Louisiana State University, Texas A&M University, and Virginia Polytechnic Institute, required military training of all students and organized the students as a military Corps of Cadets. Others, particularly those in the North and West, made military training an option and a contingency to the overall academic program. The great variation and diversity of military training programs among the Land Grant (and other colleges and universities) contributed to Congressional efforts to bring some order out of chaos beginning in 1866 with the Detail of Army Officers Act, which authorized the Army to assign active duty or retired military officers to Land Grant Colleges as professors of military science and tactics—to be paid by the Army. Land Grant Colleges actively sought the placement of these officers in part simply as a mechanism to have the Federal Government fund a faculty salary position, but it did provide greater uniformity and more professional military training in college military programs. In practice, after the Civil War and in the South following the withdrawal of federal troops from those states, the enrollment and training of citizensoldiers continued to be shaped to a considerable extent by state and local authorities. In Texas particularly, during the Civil War the Mexican border and more western regions had become lawless. Cherokee, Comanche, and Kickapoo Indians resisted U.S. authority and white settlement in south and west Texas, as did armed bandits, horse and cattle rustlers, interlaced with ranch and hacienda warfare. Plans for the establishment of what became Fort Sam Houston on the frontier in San Antonio began in 1870, but construction did not begin until 1876. Troops eventually stationed there had little or no involvement in the later Indian wars, unlike frontier posts such as Fort Stockton and Fort Davis where regular army cavalry and infantry regiments drove the Mescalero Apaches back across the Rio Grande in 1879. The following year Chief Victorio was finally defeated in a battle with

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Mexican troops ending the greatest threat to security of the white settlements in the Southwest. For the most part the close of Indian warfare in Texas and the cessation of border raids had to do with the Texas Rangers. Upon the end of military reconstruction Texas reinstated its mounted state militia, the Rangers, who in turn imposed frontier-style “justice” and peace on the border and in the western regions while, on occasion, nearly embroiling the United States in renewed war with Mexico. Other Ranger units in the Big Bend and in the northwest along the Red River, by 1881, following numerous engagements with Apache and sometimes Kiowa war parties, brought a measure of security to the region. Farther west in the unorganized territories, regular Army troops, volunteers, and veterans of the Civil War, operating from remote frontier forts, enforced the new relocation and “reservations” policies adopted by Congress in 1867, protected the western trails and rail lines, and gave some relief to the miners and settlers pushing westward. Despite the Sioux victory over Colonel George Armstrong Custer, “Custer’s Last Stand” in Montana in 1876 marked the end of their armed resistance. Chief Joseph surrendered the Nez Perce to U.S. troops in Idaho in 1877, and the capture of Geronimo in 1886 ended the fierce resistance by the Apaches of the Southwest. Now, in 1890, Indian warfare was virtually at an end, and the Bureau of Census reported that the United States no longer had a frontier. Congress pegged the size of the regular army at a mere 25,000 men, depending upon the states and their various guard, militia, and Ranger units to maintain necessary levels of security. However, as the western frontier and Indian warfare began to recede, a new frontier, and new threats, began to become apparent. American industrialization brought expanding overseas trade and commerce and increasing contact with foreign nationals and competitors, and with foreign naval and military forces, whose interests rarely coincided with those of the United States. These contacts also revealed a serious disparity between American weaponry and the modernization underway in Europe and the Pacific. In addition, aware of the growing numbers of foreign naval vessels operating off of American coasts, in 1882, Congress authorized the “loan” of Army cannon and special equipment to state militia and to military programs within the Land Grant Colleges, in order that state troops be better trained prepared for combat when and if needed. Moreover, in 1883, in light of the fact that the USS Constitution was still one of the most “powerful” ships in the Navy, Congress initiated the appropriation of additional funds to begin four decades of naval modernization and expansion. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, Congressional appropriations for defense declined, even as lawlessness and labor violence in the cities increased. As the Army began to shift its focus to the urban centers, military

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planners began to rely more heavily on state militia and local guard units. State troops were fully suited to the tasks of controlling internal disturbances and could easily supplement the meager forces available to the regular army. Gradually, rather than seeing state militia as competitors for men and money, the Army began to view the militia as a useful pool of trained reserves. This contributed to the increased attention and support of state militia and college military training programs by Congress. Efforts to modernize and assist state militia programs, however, were somewhat confounded by traditional state vs. federal and volunteer guard vs. regular army antipathies. State volunteer units generally held a condescending view of regular army personnel and abilities, who responded in kind. For example, during Congressional debate in 1897 over a bill to raise the size of the regular army to 104,000 men, one critic noted that: Regulars . . . came from the inferior classes of society and fought only for pay, while the Volunteers, recruited from the best American stock . . . are no hirelings, no mercenaries; they fight for the defense of home and country, for principle and glory, for liberty and the rights of man. In time of peace they follow their usual trades, professions, and occupations. They do not menace our liberties or the stability of our free institutions. (Cosmas, Army for Empire, 1994, pp. 34–35)

Competition and conflict between regular army and the state volunteers essentially ended with the Spanish-American War, clearing the way for the realignment of the state militia as an adjunct to the Army, and its reconstruction as a “national” guard as opposed to a “state” guard.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. In 1814, Congress turned down President Madison’s request for military conscription even as British troops were overrunning Washington, D.C. In 1862/63, both sides in the Civil War adopted conscription. 1. What were the arguments for and against military conscription? 2. Which arguments make the most sense to you for their time? 3. Which view would make most sense to you in today’s world? Why? 2. How did the Confiscation Acts help change the meaning of citizenship in relation to military service?

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3. Both Daniel Webster’s speech of 1814 and the 1865 “Petition of the Colored Citizens of Nashville” refer to the rights of citizens in relation to military service. What “rights” do they claim? 1. Do you find their arguments persuasive? 2. How would you reconcile these quite different views of military service in relation to the rights of citizens? 4. How did Alden Partridge’s emphasis upon fusing military training with academic studies influence American educational development? 5. Under the Morrill Land Grant College Act of 1862, federal policies began to officially link civilian education and military training, eventually leading to the creation of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). 1. Do you see this as a natural evolution of the citizen-soldier tradition? If so, how? 2. Should military training and education at be linked?

CHAPTER

4

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE BUILDING OF MODERN ARMIES, 1898–1916 The Spanish-American War was a pivotal war in many respects. The state militia began the transition to a true National Guard. Home defense became the defense of the nation rather than of the community, or state. The frontier became that uncertain area of contact between the United States and nations other than Indian nations. The war also marked the emergence of the United States as a world power with global ambitions and interactions. Isolationist sentiments faded. Regular army and state militia, while still retaining their historic composition as an army of volunteer, citizen-soldiers, and often retaining state unit designations, nevertheless became armies of the United States. But the war also reaffirmed the volunteer, citizen-soldier tradition. Some 225,000 Americans volunteered for military service in the war against Spain in 1898, joining the very small standing army of 25,000 soldiers whose ranks were being augmented under the authority of the 1897 Act authorizing the increase in size to 104,000 men. The roots of the war lay in hard times and economic depression in Cuba, a depression in part generated by the U.S. tariff of 1894, which imposed very high protective tariffs on imported sugar from Cuba. The tariff was levied in response to America’s own severe Depression of 1893, and it was devised to help protect American sugar growers from damaging competition from Cuba. The loss of its major U.S. market created economic disaster in Cuba, and Cubans regarded their mother country, Spain, as the culprit. In 1895, Cubans revolted against Spain, seeking their independence. The American public, thrilled by the inflammatory descriptions in the new,

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mass-circulation, “yellow-press” newspapers, sympathized strongly with the democratic revolution underway in Cuba. The public was strongly swayed by the “evil actions” of Spanish General Valeriano Weyler, whose army acted vigorously against the insurrection by forcing hostile civilian populations into reconcentration camps, destroying rebel villages and farms, executing prisoners, and generally intimidating civilians. William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal carried lurid stories about “Butcher Weyler,” while Joseph Pulitzer’s World described the “blood on the roadside, blood in the fields, blood on the doorsteps, blood, blood, blood!” Was there “no nation wise enough, brave enough and strong enough to restore peace to this blood smitten land?” Senator Albert Beverage of Indiana urged the U.S. to lead in the regeneration of the world. All the while, President William McKinley remained aloof, pursuing a policy of non-involvement, peace, and quiet diplomacy. President McKinley decided to send the American battleship Maine, with 354 men and four 10-inch cannon plus six 6-inch guns and an assortment of smaller weapons, to Cuba in an effort to discourage Spain and to encourage an early and peaceable solution to the conflict. The Maine sailed into Havana Harbor on January 25, 1898. On February 15, an explosion ripped the Maine apart, sinking it with the loss of most of the crew. Initial reports and a formal court of inquiry concluded that the Maine had been sunk by a submarine mine. The American press and the public determined that the ship was destroyed by Spanish treachery. A wave of “belligerent enthusiasm” swept the United States. Thousands of citizens and State Guard units deluged state and federal authorities volunteering for service against Spain. Congress, in a rare show of accord, overcame its fiscal constraints and appropriated $50 million for the War Department. Several states independently appropriated funds to improve the equipment of their state guard units, some of whom, for example, had been training with Civil War-era cannon and black-powder Remington rifles. Congress declared war on Spain by joint resolution on April 19, stipulating that Cuba should be free and independent, and that the United States had no intention of annexing the island—but there was no mention of other Spanish territories including Puerto Rico, Guam, Hawaii, or the Philippines. On April 22, Congress approved the Volunteer Bill authorizing the President to call 60,000 volunteers to arms for one year of service. Two days later, the levy was raised to 125,000 in order to satisfy state guard and militia units whose individual members refused to volunteer unless the entire unit with their own officers and men were accepted. The Volunteer Bill enabled state troops and militia to become, en masse, a part of the regular Army of the United States—effectively reconstituting them as National Guard as opposed to state militia. Before the conflict had ended, more than 225,000

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state militia were reconstituted as Volunteer Guards and served under the authority of the Commander in Chief. Militia initially mustered at widely scattered posts throughout the United States for training and to await orders. News that a Spanish fleet might be sailing for an attack against coastal cities resulted in the concentration of a large army of more than 30,000 Volunteers, most of them from the Midwestern and New England states, at Chickamauga. Other state militia, including independent cavalry units such as the Rough Riders (Figure 4.1), who had originally mustered in San Antonio, Texas, and were now incorporated as the Army’s 5th Corps, gathered at Tampa for transfer to Cuba and Puerto Rico. The New York militia transferred to Tampa, and served as the 71st Volunteer Infantry with the Army 5th Corps. New York troopers led the march against Spanish forces at Santiago after landing on the southeastern coast of Cuba. While in Tampa troops were ravaged by disease, prominently dysentery and typhoid fever, with more than 4,100 soldiers

FIGURE 4.1 The Rough Riders raised by Theodore Roosevelt came to epitomize the “volunteer.” Source: Library of Congress, Rare Books and Special Collections.

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FIGURE 4.2 One of the “attractions” of volunteer military service was the opportunity to “wear the uniform.” This recruiting poster features U.S. Navy uniforms of the Spanish-American War. Source: Cushing Memorial Library and Archives, Texas A&M University.

reported ill on a single day (July 27, 1898). An estimated 21,000 men, or almost 10 percent of the total called into service, contracted typhoid fever during the war. In the Pacific, the American Asiatic Squadron under Admiral George Dewey met and destroyed a formidable Spanish fleet in the Philippines at Manila on May 1. In Cuba, on July 1, American troops successfully took San Juan Hill and the heights surrounding Santiago Harbor, forcing the Spanish fleet, on July 3, to sail out into the open jaws of the blockading fleet commanded by Rear Admiral William T. Samson and Commodore Winfield Scott Schley. The Spanish army surrendered the city of Santiago on July 16, and the war ended on August 12, with Spain granting Cuba independence, and ceding to the United States Puerto Rico and the island of Guam in the Pacific. U.S. military occupation of Puerto Rico began in 1898, and in 1899 Congress approved the creation of the “Porto Rico Regiment” made up of native Puerto Ricans to replace the regular troops. In separate action, by joint resolution, Congress in July also approved the annexation of the

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Hawaiian Islands. The status of the Philippines was to be determined in a formal peace conference in October. As the war in Cuba moved toward its conclusion, the War Department sent a 21,000-man expeditionary force, comprising some 14,000 California, Washington, Oregon, and other state volunteers with 6,000 regulars from San Francisco to the Philippines to provide aid to the Filipino insurrectionists under Emilio Aguinaldo. Another 60,000 men, mostly Volunteers gathered from Chicamauga and Tampa, were sent to San Francisco to provide reserves and reinforcements for operations in the Philippines. Manila fell to combined American-Filipino forces on August 13, the day after the peace accord with Spain. But as it became clear that Americans sought “law, order, and civilization” for the Philippines, and not immediate independence, tension between the Filipino forces and American troops led to open hostilities in February 1899. Volunteers from San Francisco and elsewhere, including four black regiments transferred from Cuba, were now sent to the Philippines to suppress Aguinaldo’s resistance. A brutal guerrilla war ensued, in some ways foreshadowing the U.S. experience in Vietnam. The extreme racism of U.S. commanders, like General Frederick Funston, toward Filipinos in general led some twenty Black soldiers to mutiny and join Aguinaldo’s cause. Although Aguinaldo surrendered in March 1901, Muslim Filipinos in the southern regions of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago continued to resist U.S. forces. Between 1903 and 1913, General Leonard Wood, commanding the same cavalry unit that had captured Geronimo, in combat with Islamic forces, defended the slaughter of defenseless villagers on the grounds that Muslims desired martyrdom at the hands of Christians. It was, according to historian Gail Buckley, the first war in which “American officers and troops were officially charged with what we would now call war crimes.” In all, there were 44 military trials. All ended in convictions. Some newspapers, as well as satirist Mark Twain, asked whether the U.S. forces had become as culpable as the “Butcher Weyler.” Some Filipinos did support the U.S. mission there. The Army created the “Philippine Scouts,” modeled after the “Indian Scouts,” for those Filipino men who wished to fight on the U.S. side. They would fight for the U.S. in World War I, and were a precursor of the segregated Filipino regiments that would be part of the U.S. Army during World War II. The remnants of that conflict continued into the twenty-first century, with more than 5,000 U.S. troops on the ground in the Sulu Archipelago as late as 2007. Meanwhile, as combat forces were withdrawn from Cuba, other volunteers, including the 1st and 4th Texas Volunteers, and other state militia units from the Gulf coastal states who had been sent at the outbreak of war to Mobile, Alabama, to prepare for a possible second offensive against Cuba, were sent to Havana and Santiago with the American Army of occupation.

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Although state militia operated as a part of the regular Army during the war, the traditional state guard or militia did not wholly disappear from the scene. The Texas governor, for example, independently sent the Texas Rangers to the Mexican border in order to guard against possible attack by pro-Spanish elements. And now, after the war, many Volunteers returned to their home state for service with their old state militia unit. The state militia had clearly been effective, and necessary, in the new role of a national guard. Most of those who fought in the Spanish-American War entered service as part of a volunteer state guard or militia. After the conclusion of hostilities, as in the past, the Army, as well as the nascent National Guard, partially demobilized. But it did not disband the Indian Scouts, the Buffalo Soldier units, the Philippine Scouts, or the Porto Rico Regiment, which were reorganized and retained in the active army. Nevertheless, in 1903, Congress approved the Dick Militia Act, recognizing the National Guard as the nation’s primary military reserve force. More importantly, the Act provided that, while in the service of the United States, National Guard units and officers were to receive equipment, training, and pay and allowances comparable to that accorded the Regular Army. The Act also enabled state militia to receive equipment and training suitable to the duties that would be required when called into service under the authority of the President. The problem was, technically, that the National Guard did not exist until the state militia were first called into the service of the United States. That oversight would soon be corrected as new military crises developed. The Dick Militia Act essentially elevated the “state guard” to the level of a “national guard.” Another significant provision in the Dick Militia Act was the first explicit national recognition of conscientious objection. As we saw in the Pennsylvania militia laws, and in the Union’s Conscription Act during the Civil War, since colonial times there had been ways for those conscientiously opposed to participation in war to be excused. But Section 2 of the Dick Militia Act would set a precedent and inaugurate language with respect to conscientious objection that, with some changes, was preserved in each of the Selective Service Acts of the twentieth century.

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DOCUMENT 4.1 THE DICK MILITIA ACT, 1903 AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE MILITIA, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. FIFTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, SESS II., CH. 196, JANUARY 21, 1903 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the militia shall consist of every able-bodied male citizen of the respective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less than forty-five years of age, and shall be divided into two classes—the organized militia, to be known as the National Guard of the State, Territory, or District of Columbia, or by such other designations as may be given them by the laws of the respective States or Territories, and the remainder to be known as the Reserve Militia. Sec. 2. That the Vice-President of the United States, the officers, judicial and executive, of the Government of the United States, the members and officers of each House of Congress, persons in the military or naval service of the United States, all custom-house officers, with their clerks, postmasters and persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mail, ferrymen employed at any ferry on a post road, artificers and workmen employed in the armories and arsenals of the United States, pilots, mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States, and all persons who are exempted by the laws of the respective States or Territories shall be exempted from militia duty, without regard to age: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be construed to require or compel any member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing who creed forbids its members to participate in war in any form, and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein, in accordance with the creed of said religious organization, to serve in the militia or any other armed or volunteer force under the jurisdiction and authority of the United States. Sec. 3. That the regularly enlisted, organized, and uniformed active militia in the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia who have heretofore participated or shall hereafter participate in the apportionment of the annual appropriation provided by section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as amended, whether known and designated as National Guard, militia, or otherwise, shall constitute the organized militia. The organization, armament, and discipline of the organized militia in the several States and Territories and in the District of Columbia shall be the same as that which is now or may hereafter be

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prescribed for the Regular and Volunteer Armies of the United States, within five years from the date of thee approval of this Act: Provided, That the President of the United States, in time of peace, may by order fix the minimum number of enlisted men in each company, troop, battery, signal corps, engineer corps, and hospital corps: And provided further, That any corps of artillery, cavalry and infantry existing in any of the States at the passage of the Act of May eighth, seventeen hundred and ninety-two, which, by the laws, customs or usages of the said States have been in continuous existence since the passage of said Act under it provisions and under the provisions of Section two hundred and thirty-two and Sections sixteen hundred and twentyfive to sixteen hundred and sixty, both inclusive, of Title sixteen of the Revised Statutes of the United States relating to the Militia, shall be allowed to retain their accustomed privileges, subject nevertheless, to all other duties required by law in like manner as the other Militia. Sec. 4. That whenever the United States is invaded, or in danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States, or the President is unable, with the other forces at his command, to execute the laws of the Union in any part thereof, it shall be lawful for the President to call forth, for a period not exceeding nine months, such number of the militia of the State or of the States or Territories or of the District of Columbia as he may deem necessary to repel such invasion, suppress such rebellion, or to enable him to execute such laws, and to issue his orders for that purpose to such officers of the militia as he may think proper. Sec. 5. That whenever the President calls forth the militia of any State or Territory or of the District of Columbia to be employed in the service of the United States, he may specify in his call the period for which such service is required, not exceeding nine months, and the militia so called shall continue to serve during the term so specified, unless soon discharged by order of the President. Sec. 6. That when the militia of more than one State is called into the actual service of the United States by the President he may, in his discretion, apportion them among such States or Territories or to the District of Columbia according to representative population. Sec. 7. That every officer and enlisted man of the militia who shall be called forth in the manner hereinbefore prescribed and shall be found fit for military service shall be mustered or accepted into the United States service by a duly authorized mustering officer of the United States: Provided, however, That any officer or enlisted man of the militia who shall refuse or neglect to present himself to such mustering officer upon being called forth as herein prescribed shall be subject to trial by court-martial, and shall be punished as such courtmartial may direct.

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Sec. 8. That courts-martial for the trial of officers or men of the militia, when in the service of the United States, shall be composed of militia officers only. Sec. 9. That the militia, when called into the actual service of the United States, shall be subject to the same Rules and Articles of War as the regular troops of the United States. Sec. 10. That the militia, when called into the actual service of the United States, shall, during their time of service, be entitled to the same pay and allowances as are or may be provided by law for the Regular Army. Sec. 11. That when the militia is called into the actual service of the United States, or any portion of the militia is accepted under the provisions of this Act, their pay shall commence from the day of their appearing at the place of company rendezvous. But this provision shall not be construed to authorize any species of expenditure previous to arriving at such places of rendezvous which is not provided by existing laws to be paid after their arrival at such places of rendezvous. Sec. 12. [Omitted.] Sec. 13. [Omitted.] Sec. 14. That whenever it shall appear by the report of inspections, which it shall be the duty of the Secretary of War to cause to be made at least once in each year by officers detailed by him for that purpose, that the organized militia of a State or Territory of the District of Columbia is sufficiently armed, uniformed, and equipped for active duty in the field, the Secretary of War is authorized, on the requisition of the governor of such State or Territory, to pay to the quartermaster-general thereof, or to such other officer of the militia of said State as the said governor may designate and appoint for the purpose, so much of its allotment out of the said annual appropriation under section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes as amended as shall be necessary for the payment, subsistence, and transportation of such portion of said organized militia as shall engage in actual field or camp service for instruction, and the officers and enlisted men of such militia while so engaged shall be entitled to the same pay, subsistence, and transportation or travel allowances as officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades of the Regular Army are or may hereafter be entitled by law, and the officer so designated and appointed shall be regarded as a disbursing officer of the United States, and shall render his account through the War Department to the proper accounting officers of the Treasury for settlement, and he shall be required to give good and sufficient bonds to the United States, in such sums as the Secretary of War may direct, faithfully to account for the safe-keeping and payment of the public moneys so intrusted to him for disbursement. Sec. 15. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for participation by any part of the organized militia of any State or Territory on the

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request of the governor thereof in the encampment, maneuvers, and field instruction of any part of the Regular Army at or near any military post or camp or lake or seacoast defenses of the United States. In such case the organized militia so participating shall receive the same pay, subsistence, and transportation as is provided by law for the officers and men of the Regular Army, to be paid out of the appropriation for the pay, subsistence, and transportation of the Army: Provided, That the command of such military post or camp and of the officers and troops of the United States there stationed shall remain with the regular commander of the post without regard to the rank of the commanding or other officers of the militia temporarily so encamped within its limits or in its vicinity. Sec. 16. That whenever any officer of the organized militia shall, upon recommendation of the governor of any State, Territory, or general commanding the District of Columbia, and when authorized by the President, attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military school or college of the United States such officer shall receive from the annual appropriation for the support of the Army the same travel allowances, and quarters, or commutation of quarters, to which an officer of the Regular Army would be entitled if attending such school or college under orders from proper military authority, and shall also receive commutation of subsistence at the rate of one dollar per day which in actual attendance upon the course of instruction. Sec. 17. [Omitted.] Sec. 18. That each State or Territory furnished with material of war under the provisions of this or former Acts of Congress shall, during the year next preceding each annual allotment of funds, in accordance with section sixteen hundred and sixty-one of the Revised Statutes as amended, have required every company, troop, and battery in its organized militia not excused by the governor of such State or Territory to participate in practice marches or go into camp of instruction at least five consecutive days, and to assemble for drill and instruction at company, battalion, or regimental armories or rendezvous or for target practice not less than twenty-four times, and shall also have required during such year an inspection of each such company, troop, and battery to be made by an office of such militia or an officer of the Regular Army. Sec. 19. That upon the application of the governor of any State or Territory furnished with material of war under the provisions of this Act or former laws of Congress, the Secretary of War may detail one or more officers of the Army to attend any encampment of the organized militia, and to give such instruction and information to the officers and men assembled in such camp as may be requested by the governor. Such officer or officers shall immediately make a report of such encampment to the Secretary of War, who shall furnish a copy thereof to the governor of the State or Territory.

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Sec. 20. That upon application of the governor of any State or Territory furnished with material of war under the provisions of this Act or former laws of Congress, the Secretary of War may, in his discretion, detail one or more officers of the Army to report to the governor of such State or Territory for duty in connection with the organized militia. All such assignments may be revoked at the request of the governor of such State or Territory or at the pleasure of the Secretary of War. Sec. 21. [Omitted.] Sec. 22. That when any officer, noncommissioned officer, or private of the militia is disabled by reason of wounds or disabilities received or incurred in the service of the United States he shall be entitled to all the benefits of the pension laws existing at the time of his service, and in case such officer, noncommissioned officer, or private dies in the service of the United States or in returning to his place of residence after being mustered out of such service, or at any time, in consequence of wounds or disabilities received in such service, his widow and children, if any, shall be entitled to all the benefits of such pension laws. Sec. 23. That for the purpose of securing a list of persons specially qualified to hold commissions in any volunteer force which may hereafter be called for and organized under the authority of Congress, other than a force composed of organized militia, the Secretary of War is authorized from time to time to convene boards of officers at suitable and convenient army posts in different parts of the United States, who shall examine as to their qualifications for the command of troops or for the performance of staff duties all applicants who shall have served in the Regular Army of the United States, in any of the volunteer forces of the United States, or in the organized militia of any State or Territory or district of Columbia, or who, being a citizen of the United States, shall have attended or pursued a regular course of instruction in any military school or college of the United State Army, or shall have graduated from any educational institution to which an officer of the Army or Navy has been detailed as superintendent or professor pursuant to law after having creditably pursued the course of military instruction therein provided. Such examinations shall be under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of War, and shall be especially direct to ascertain the practical capacity of the applicant. The record of previous service of the applicant shall be considered as a part of the examination. Upon the conclusion of each examination the board shall certify to the War Department its judgment as to the fitness of the applicant, stating the office, if any, which it deems him qualified to fill, and, upon approval by the President, the names of the persons certified to be qualified shall be inscribed in a register to be kept in the War Department for that purpose. The persons so certified and registered shall, subject to a physical examination at the time, constitute an eligible class for commissions

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pursuant to such certificates in any volunteer force hereafter called for and organized under the authority of Congress, other than a force composed of organized militia, and the President may [???] authorized persons from this class, to attend and pursue a regular course of study at any military school or college of the United States other than the Military Academy at West Point and to receive from the annual appropriation for the support of the Army the same allowances and commutations as provided in this Act for officers of the organized militia: Provided, That no person shall be entitled to receive a commission as a second lieutenant after he shall have passed the age of thirty; as first lieutenant after he shall have passed the age of thirty-five; as captain after he shall have passed the age of forty; as major after he shall have passed the age of forty-five; as lieutenant-colonel after he shall have passed the age of fifty, or as colonel after he shall have passed the age of fifty-five: And provided further, That such appointments shall be distributed proportionately, as near as may be, among the various States contributing such volunteer force: And provided, That the appointments in this section provided for shall not be deemed to include appointments to any office in any company, troop, battery, battalion, or regiment of the organized militia which volunteers as a body or the officers of which are appointed by the governor of a State or Territory. Sec. 24. That all the volunteer forces of the United States called by authority of Congress shall, except as hereinbefore provided, be organized in the manner provided by the Act entitled “An Act to provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war, and for other purposes,” Approved April twenty-second, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. Sec. 25. That sections sixteen hundred and twenty-five to sixteen hundred and sixty, both included, of title sixteen of the Revised Statutes, and section two hundred and thirty-two thereof, relating to the militia, are hereby repealed. Sec. 26. That this Act shall take effect upon the date of its approval. Approved, January 21, 1903.

* * * When World War I erupted in Europe in August 1914, the regular Army of the United States comprised 127,588 men, and the National Guard numbered only 66,594—at a time when casualties in single battles in Europe sometimes exceeded 100,000 men. In light of the growing conflict, some military men insisted that U.S. military forces were woefully inadequate. But there was no immediate response or sense of imminent danger to the United

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States during the early years of that conflict. The U.S. maintained its neutrality and declined to rebuild its armies. In the absence of Congressional action, General Leonard Wood, in collaboration with a few college presidents and businessmen, independently implemented a somewhat desperate effort to augment the Army’s officer reserve strength by establishing a number of “civilian” military officer training camps. Described as the “Plattsburgh Movement,” in reference to the location of a major encampment at Plattsburgh, New York, the idea was to invite volunteers (limited to business- and professional-class white men only) to spend a summer or six months in an army training program—at their own expense—with the enticement that upon completion of the training the “graduates” would be eligible for a regular or reserve commission. Although the program offered little in terms of preparing for combat in World War I, it established a model for accelerated military training used to convert citizen volunteers into effective soldiers. The end of the traditional state militia and the emergence of the National Guard as a regular adjunct of the Army of the United States came with the National Defense Act approved by Congress on June 3, 1916. The Act replaced the previous cap of 175,000 men on the authorized strength of the Army, raising troop levels to 286,000, and it raised the authorized level of the National Guard to 400,000 men. The Act specifically recognized the State militia as the primary reserve force of the United States Army, provided that the term “National Guard” should apply to all recognized state militia, and authorized the President to mobilize the National Guard during war or national emergency (without approbation of state authorities). While very comprehensive and detailed, the National Defense Act established a framework and organizational structure for the modern American military. The “Army of the United States” was to comprise the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard (while in the service of the United States). . . “and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law.” The Army’s structure included sixty-four Infantry, twenty-five Cavalry, and twenty-one Field artillery regiments, with Coast Artillery, General Staff Corps; Adjutant General, Inspector General, and Judge Advocate General’s departments, Quartermaster Corps, Medical Department, Corps of Engineers, Ordinance Department, Signal Corps, Bureau of Insular Affairs, Militia Bureau, Corps of Cadets, Military Academies, chaplains, and so forth. Each brigade, division, regiment, and company were “sized” and assigned an officer corps, and each Department and program received designated staff officers and responsibilities. The Act itself was a milestone in American military history.

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The terms of the National Defense Act have been slightly edited for conciseness and clarity, but it remains a lengthy and intensive, but pivotal, piece of legislation:

DOCUMENT 4.2 THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT, 1916 AN ACT FOR MAKING FURTHER AND MORE EFFECTUAL PROVISION FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENSE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. SIXTY-FOURTH CONGRESS, SESS. I. CH. 134. JUNE 3, 1916 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Army of the United States shall consist of the Regular Army, the Volunteer Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the National Guard while in the service of the United States, and such other land forces as are now or may hereafter be authorized by law. Sec. 2. Composition of the Regular Army.—The Regular Army of the United States, including the existing organizations, shall consist of sixty-four regiments of Infantry, twenty-five regiments of Cavalry, twenty-one regiments of Field Artillery, a Coast Artillery Corps, the brigade, division, army corps, and army headquarters, with their detachments and troops, a General Staff Corps, an Adjutant General’s Department, an Inspector General’s Department, a Judge Advocate General’s Department, a Quartermaster Corps, a Medical Department, a Corps of Engineers, an Ordnance Department, a signal Corps, the officers of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, the Militia Bureau, the detached officers, the detached noncommissioned officers, the chaplains, the Regular Army Reserve, all organized as hereinafter provided, and the following as now authorized by law: The officers and enlisted men on the retired list; the additional officers; the professors, the Corps of Cadets, the general Army service detachment, and detachments of Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Engineers, and the band of the United States Military Academy; the post noncommissioned staff officers; the recruiting parties, the recruit depot detachments, and unassigned recruits; the service school detachments; the disciplinary guards; the disciplinary organizations; the Indian Scouts; and such other officers and enlisted men as are now or may be hereafter provided for: Provided, That hereafter the enlisted personnel of all organizations of the Regular Army shall at all times be maintained at a strength not below the minimum strength fixed by law: Provided further, That the total enlisted force of the line of the Regular Army, excluding the Philippine Scouts and the enlisted men of the Quartermaster Corps, of the Medical Department, and of the Signal Corps, and the unassigned recruits, shall not at any one time,

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except in the event of actual or threatened war or similar emergency in which the public safety demands it, exceed one hundred and seventy-five thousand men: Provided further, That the unassigned recruits at depots or elsewhere shall at no time, except in time of war, exceed by more than seven per centum the total authorized enlisted strength. Sec. 3. Composition of Brigades, Divisions, and So Forth.—The mobile troops of the Regular Army of the United States shall be organized, as far as practicable, into brigades and divisions. The President is authorized, in time of actual or threatened hostilities, or when in his opinion the interests of the public service demand it, to organize the brigades and divisions into such army corps or armies as may be necessary. [Ed: The remainder of this

section describes the composition of various units provided for in the Act.] Sec. 4. General Officers of the Line. [Ed: This section describes the distinction between general officers of the line and general officers of the staff.] Sec. 5. The General Staff Corps.—The General Staff Corps shall consist of one Chief of Staff, detailed in time of peace from major generals of the line; two Assistants to the Chief of Staff, who shall be general officers of the line, one of whom, not above the grade of brigadier general, shall be the president of the Army War College; ten colonels; ten lieutenant colonels; fifteen majors; and seventeen captains, to be detailed from corresponding grades in the Army, as in this section hereinafter provided . . . [Ed.: Then follows details as to the term and composition of the General Staff Corps.] All officers detailed in said corps shall be exclusively employed in the study of military problems, the preparation of plans for the national defense and the utilization of the military forces in time of war, in investigating and reporting upon the efficiency and state of preparedness of such forces for service in peace or war, or on appropriate general staff duties in connection with troops, including the National Guard, or as military attachés in foreign countries, or on other duties, not of an administrative nature, on which they can be lawfully and properly employed: [Ed.: Then follows recommendations and selections of members of General Staff Corps, and related duties of members, including service to War College, and Coast Artillery.] Sec. 6. The Adjutant General’s Department.—The Adjutant General’s Department shall consist of the Adjutant General with the rank of brigadier general; seven adjutants-general with the rank of colonel; thirteen adjutantsgeneral with the rank of lieutenant colonel; and thirty adjutants-general with the rank of major. Sec. 7. The Inspector General’s Department.—The Inspector General’s Department shall consist of one Inspector General with the rank of brigadier general; four inspectors-general with the rank of colonel; eight inspectorsgeneral with the rank of lieutenant colonel; and sixteen inspectors-general with the rank of major.

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Sec. 8. The Judge Advocate General’s Department.—The Judge Advocate General’s Department shall consist of one Judge Advocate General with the rank of brigadier general; four judge advocates with the rank of colonel; seven judge advocates with the rank of lieutenant colonel; and twenty judge advocates with the rank of major. [Ed.: Then follows an extensive description

of examining board and qualifying examinations, physical fitness, promotions, and detachment from other duties.] Sec. 9. The Quartermaster Corps.—The Quartermaster Corps shall consist of one Quartermaster General with the rank of major general; two assistants to the Quartermaster General with the rank of brigadier general; twenty-one colonels; twenty-four lieutenant colonels; sixty-eight majors; one hundred and eighty captains; and the pay clerks now in active service, who shall hereafter have the rank, pay and allowances of a second lieutenant, and the President is hereby authorized to appoint and commission them, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, second lieutenants in the Quartermaster Corps, United States Army. The total enlisted strength of the Quartermaster Corps and the number in each grade shall be limited and fixed from time to time by the President in accordance with the needs of the Army, and shall consist of quartermaster sergeants, senior grade; quartermaster sergeants; sergeants, first class; sergeants; corporals; cooks; privates, first class; and privates. [Ed: Sec. 10–16 establish the Medical Department, Corps of Engineers, Ordnance Department, Signal Corps, and Veterinary Department, and carefully prescribe the numbers, ranks, and grades of personnel, supplemental pay for certain personnel including doctors and aviators, and status of certain reserve medical and veterinary personnel. The remaining Sections provide a good overview of the organization of the military, and the interrelationships of the reserves, National Guard, Reserve Officers Training Corps, military academy graduates, and regular U.S. military structures and units.] Sec. 17. Composition of Infantry Units.—Each regiment of Infantry shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, fifteen captains, sixteen first lieutenants, fifteen second lieutenants, one headquarters company, one machine-gun company, one supply company, and twelve Infantry companies organized into three battalions of four companies each. [Ed.: There follows a specific listing of the rank and number of commissioned officers, sergeants, corporals, cooks, buglers, mechanics, musicians (if any), and privates attached to each battalion, headquarters company, machinegun company, and supply company.] Sec. 18. Composition of Cavalry Units.—Each regiment of Cavalry shall consist of one colonel, one lieutenant colonel, three majors, fifteen captains, sixteen first lieutenants, sixteen second lieutenants, one headquarters troop, one machine-gun troop, one supply troop, and twelve troops organized into

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three squadrons of four troops each. [Ed.: There follows a listing of the rank and number of officers assigned to each squadron, each headquarters troop, each machine-gun troop, and each supply troop.] Sec. 19. Composition of Field Artillery Units.—The Field Artillery, including mountain artillery, light artillery, horse artillery, heavy artillery (field and siege types), shall consist of one hundred and twenty-six gun or howitzer batteries organized into twenty-one regiments. In time of actual or threatened hostilities the President is authorized to organize such number of ammunition batteries and battalions, depot batteries and battalions, and such artillery parks with such numbers and grades of personnel and such organizations as he may deem necessary. The officers necessary for such organization shall be supplied from the Officers’ Reserve Corps provided by this Act and by temporary appointment as authorized by section eight of the Act of Congress approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and fourteen. The enlisted men necessary for such organizations shall be supplied from the Regular Army Reserve provided by this Act or from the Regular Army. [Ed.: There follows a listing of numbers and ranks of officers attached to each regiment of Field Artillery, gun or howitzer battery, headquarters company, supply company, gun or howitzer battalion, with authority granted to the President to increase the size and numbers of officers and personnel attached to headquarters companies.] Sec. 20. Coast Artillery Corps.—The Coast Artillery Corps shall consist of one Chief of Coast Artillery, with the rank of brigadier general; twenty-four colonels; twenty-four lieutenant colonels; seventy-two majors; three hundred and sixty captains; three hundred and sixty first lieutenants; three hundred and sixty second lieutenants; thirty-one sergeants major, senior grade; sixtyfour sergeants major, junior grade; forty-one master electricians; seventy-two engineers; ninety-nine electrician sergeants, first class; two hundred and seventy-five assistant engineers; ninety-nine electrician sergeants, second class; one hundred and six firemen; ninety-three radio sergeants; sixty-two master gunners; two hundred and sixty-three first sergeants; two hundred and sixty-three supply sergeants; two hundred and sixty-three mess sergeants; two thousand one hundred and four sergeants; three thousand one hundred and fifty-six corporals; five hundred and twenty-six cooks; five hundred and twenty-six mechanics; five hundred and twenty-six buglers; five thousand six hundred and seventy-five privates; and eighteen bands, organized as hereinbefore provided for the Engineer band. The rated men of the Coast Artillery Corps shall consist of casemate electricians; observers, first class; plotters; chief planters; coxswains; chief loaders; observers, second class; gun commanders and gun pointers. The total number of rated men shall not exceed one thousand seven hundred and eighty-four. Coxswains shall receive $9 per month in addition to the pay of their grade.

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Sec. 21. Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry.—The Porto Rico Regiment of Infantry of the United States Army shall hereafter have the same organization, and the same grades and numbers of commissioned officers and enlisted men, as are by this Act or shall hereafter be prescribed by law of other regiments of Infantry of the Army. [Ed.: There follow explanations of

seniority, grades, the filling of vacancies, and preferences for natives of Porto Rico who graduated from the United States Military Academy, and the grandfathering of positions for those on duty prior to the approval of the Act.] Sec. 22. All existing laws pertaining to or affecting the United States Military academy and civilian or military personnel on duty thereat in any capacity whatever, the officers and enlisted men on the retired list, the detached and additional officers under the Act of Congress approved March third, nineteen hundred and eleven, recruiting parties, recruit depots and unassigned recruits, service school detachments, United States disciplinary barracks guards, disciplinary organizations, the Philippine Scouts, and Indian scouts shall continue and remain in force except as herein specifically provided otherwise. Sec. 23. Original Appointments to be Provisional.—Hereafter all appointments of persons other than graduates of the United States Military Academy to the grade of second lieutenant in the Regular Army shall be provisional for a period of two years, at the close of which period such appointments shall be made permanent if the appointees shall have demonstrated, under such regulations as the President may prescribe, their suitability and moral, professional, and physical fitness for such permanent appointment, but should any appointee fail so to demonstrate his suitability and fitness, his appointment shall terminate; and should any officer become eligible for promotion to a vacancy in a higher grade and qualify therefor before the expiration of two years from the date of his original appointment, he shall receive a provisional appointment in such higher grade, which appointment shall be made permanent when he shall have qualified for permanent appointment upon the expiration of two years from the date of his original appointment, or shall terminate if he shall fail so to qualify. Sec. 24. Increase to Be Made in Five Increments.—Except as otherwise specifically provided by this Act, the increases in the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Regular Army provided by this Act shall be made in five annual increments, each of which shall be, in each grade of each arm, corps, and department, as nearly as practicable, one-fifth of the total increase authorized for each arm, corps, and department. [Ed.: There follows instruction on officers promoted to vacancies created or caused by the additions, the date of rank, and preferences for new appointments to be in the following order:] (1) Of cadets graduated from the United States Military

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academy during the preceding fiscal year in which they were graduated; (2) under the provisions of existing law, of enlisted men, including officers of the Philippine Scouts, whose fitness for promotion shall have been determined by competitive examination; (3) of members of the officers’ Reserve Corps between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven years; (4) of commissioned officers of the National Guard between the ages of twenty-one and twentyseven years; (5) of such honor graduates, between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven years, of distinguished colleges as or now or may hereafter be entitled to preference by general orders of the War Department; and (6) of candidates from civil life between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-seven years; and the President is authorized to make the necessary rules and regulations to carry these provisions into effect: Provided, That in the event of actual or threatened war or similar emergency in which the public safety demands it the President is authorized to immediately organize the entire increase authorized by this Act, or so much thereof as he may deem necessary, and when, in the judgment of the President, war becomes imminent, all of said organizations that shall then be below the maximum enlisted strength authorized by law shall be raised forthwith to that strength, and shall be maintained as nearly as possible thereat so long as war, or the imminence of war, shall continue. [Ed.: The section provides for appointments to

vacancies, examinations for promotions, and pay and allowances.] Sec. 25. The Detached Officers.—That on July first, nineteen hundred and sixteen, the line of the Army shall be increased by eight hundred and twentytwo extra officers of the Cavalry, Field Artillery, Coast Artillery Corps, and Infantry arms of the service, of grades from first lieutenant to colonel, inclusive, lawfully available for detachment from their proper arms for duty with the National Guard, or other duty, the usual period of which exceeds one year. [Ed.: The section increases the number on the Detached Officers’ list to allow for assignment to the National Guard, and specific instructions for filling vacancies, eligibility for promotions, and an increase in the number of colonels and other officers as may be recommended by an examining board.] Sec. 26. Retirement of Officers of Philippine Scouts.—Captains and lieutenants of Philippine Scouts who are citizens of the United States shall hereafter be entitled to retirement under the laws governing the retirement of enlisted men of the Regular Army, except that they shall be retired in the grade held by them at the date of retirement, shall be entitled to retirement for disability under the same conditions as officers of the Regular Army, and that they shall receive, as retired pay, the amounts allowed by law, as retired pay and allowances, of master signal electricians of the United States Army, and no more; . . . [Ed.: The remainder of the section provides for reinstatement of those discharged on the retirement lists.]

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Sec. 27. Enlistments in the Regular Army.—On and after the first day of November, nineteen hundred and sixteen, all enlistments in the Regular Army shall be for a term of seven years, the first three years to be in the active service with the organizations of which those enlisted form a part and, except as otherwise provided herein, the last four years in the Regular Army Reserve hereinafter provided for: Provided, That at the expiration of three years’ continuous service with such organizations, either under a first or any subsequent enlistment, any soldier may be reenlisted for another period of seven years, as above provided for, in which event he shall receive his final discharge from his prior enlistment: Provided further, That after the expiration of one year’s honorable service any enlisted man serving within the continental limits of the United States whose company, troop, battery, or detachment commander shall report him as proficient and sufficiently trained may, in the discretion of the Secretary of War, be furloughed to the Regular Army Reserve under such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe, but no man furloughed to the reserve shall be eligible to reenlist in the service until the expiration of his term of seven years; Provided further, That in all enlistments hereafter accomplished under the provisions of this act three years shall be counted as an enlistment period in computing continuousservice pay: Provided Further, That any noncommissioned officer discharged with an excellent character shall be permitted, at the expiration of three years in the active service, to reenlist in the organization from which discharged with the rank and grade held by him at the time of his discharge if he reenlists within twenty days after the date of such discharge: Provided further, That no person under the age of eighteen years shall be enlisted or mustered into the military service of the United States without the written consent of his parents or guardians, provided that such minor has such parents or guardians entitled to his custody and control: And provided further, That the President is authorized in his discretion to utilize the services of postmasters of the second, third, and fourth classes in procuring the enlistment of recruits for the Army, and for each recruit accepted for enlistment in the Army, the postmaster procuring his enlistment shall receive the sum of $5. In addition to military training, soldiers while in the active service shall hereafter be given the opportunity to study and receive instruction upon educational lines of such character as to increase their military efficiency and enable them to return to civil life better equipped for industrial, commercial, and general business occupations. Civilian teachers may be employed to aid the Army officers in giving such instruction, and part of this instruction may consist of vocational education either in agriculture or the mechanic arts. The Secretary of War, with the approval of the President, shall prescribe rules and regulations of conducting the instruction herein provided for, and the Secretary of War shall have the power at all times to suspend, increase,

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or decrease the amount of such instruction offered as may in his judgment be consistent with the requirements of military instruction and service of the soldiers. Sec. 28. Pay of Certain Enlisted Men.—Hereafter the monthly pay of enlisted men of certain grades of the Army created in this Act shall be as follows, namely: [Ed.: A comprehensive pay scale follows]. Sec. 29. Final Discharge of Enlisted Men.—No enlisted man in the Regular Army shall receive his final discharge until the termination of his seven-year term of enlistment except upon reenlistment as provided for in this Act or as provided by law for discharge prior to expiration of term of enlistment, but when an enlisted man is furloughed to the Regular Army Reserve his account shall be closed and he shall be paid in full to the date of such furlough becomes effective, including allowances provided by law for discharged soldiers: Provided, That when by reason of death or disability of a member of the family of an enlisted man occurring after his enlistment members of his family become dependent upon him for support, he may, in the discretion of the Secretary of War, be discharged from the service of the United States or be furloughed to the Regular Army Reserve, upon due proof being made of such condition: Provided further, That when an enlisted man is discharged by purchase while in active service he shall be furloughed to the Regular Army Reserve, unless, in the discretion of the Secretary of War, he is given a final discharge from the Army. Sec, 30. Composition of the Regular Army Reserve.—The Regular Army Reserve shall consist of, first, all enlisted men now in the Army Reserve or who shall hereafter become members of the Army Reserve under the provisions of existing law; second, all enlisted men furloughed to or enlisted in the Regular Army Reserve under the provisions of this Act; and, third, any person holding an honorable discharge from the Regular Army with character reported at least good who is physically qualified for the duties of a soldier and not over forty-five years of age who enlists in the Regular Army Reserve for a period of four years. Sec. 31. The President is authorized to assign members of the Regular Army reserve as reserves to particular organizations of the Regular Army, or to organize the Regular Army Reserve, or any part thereof, into units or detachments of any arm, corps, or department in such manner as he may prescribe, and to assign to such units and detachments officers of the Regular Army or of the Officers’ Reserve Corps herein provided for; and he may summon the Regular Army Reserve or any part hereof for field training for a period not exceeding fifteen days in each year, the reservists to receive travel expenses and pay at the rate of their respective grades in the Regular Army during such periods of training; and in the event to factual or threatened hostilities he may mobilize the Regular Army Reserve in such manner as he

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may determine, and thereafter retain it, or any part thereof, in active service for such period as he may determine the conditions demand; Provided, That all enlistments in the Regular Army, including those in the Regular Army Reserve, which are in force on the date of the outbreak of war shall continue in force for one year, unless sooner terminated by order of the Secretary of War, but nothing herein shall be construed to shorten the time of enlistment prescribed: Provided further, That subject to such regulations as the President may prescribe for their proper identification, and location, and physical condition, the member of the Regular Army Reserve shall be paid semiannually at the rate of $24 a year while in the reserve. Sec. 32. Regular Army Reserve in Time of War.—When mobilized by order of the President, the members of the Regular Army Reserve shall, so long as they may remain in active service, receive the pay and allowances of enlisted men of the Regular Army of like grades: Provided, That any enlisted man who shall have reenlisted in the regular Army Reserve shall receive during such active service the additional pay now provided by law for enlisted men in his arm of service in the second enlistment period; Provided further, That upon reporting for duty, and being found physically fit for service, members of the Regular Army reserve shall receive a sum equal to $3 per month for each month during which they shall have belonged to the reserve, as well as the actual necessary cost of transportation and subsistence from their homes to the places at which they may be ordered to report for duty under such summons: And provided further, That service in the regular Army Reserve shall confer no right to retirement or retired pay, and members of the Regular Army Reserve shall become entitled to pension only through disability incurred while on active duty in the service of the United States. Sec. 33. Use of Other Departments of the Government.—The President may, subject to such rules and regulations as in his judgment may be necessary, utilize the services of members and employees of all departments of the Government of the United States, without expense to the individual reservist, for keeping in touch with, paying, and mobilizing the Regular Army Reserve, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and other reserve organizations. Sec. 34. Reenlistment in Time of War.—For the purpose of utilizing as an auxiliary to the Regular Army reserves the services of men who have had experience and training in the Regular Army, or in the United States Volunteers, outside of the continental limits of the United States, in time of actual or threatened hostilities, and after the President shall, by proclamation, have called upon honorably discharged soldiers of the Regular Army to present themselves for reenlistment therein within a specified period, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed, any person who shall have been discharged honorably from said Army, with character reported as at least good, and who, having been found physically qualified for the duties of a

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soldier, if not over fifty years of age, shall reenlist in the line of said Army, or in the Signal, Quartermaster, or Medical Department thereof, within the period that shall be specified in said proclamation, shall receive on so reenlisting a bounty which shall be computed at the rate of $8 for each month for the first year of the period that shall have elapsed since his last discharge from the Regular Army and the date of his reenlistment therein under the terms of said proclamation; at the rate of $6 per month for the second year of such period; at the rate of $4 per month for the third year of such period; and at the rate of $2 per month for any subsequent year of such period; but no bounty in excess of $300 shall be paid to any person under the terms of this section. Sec. 35. Enlisted Men Prohibited from Civil Employment.—Hereafter no enlisted man in the active service of the united States in the Army, navy, and Marine Corps, respective, whether a non-commissioned officer, musician, or private, shall be detailed, ordered or permitted to leave his post to engage in any pursuit, business, or performance in civil life, for emolument, hire, or otherwise, when the same shall interfere with the customary employment and regular engagement of local civilians in the respective arts, trades, or professions. Sec. 36. Sergeants for Duty with the National Guard.—For the purpose of assisting in the instruction of the personnel and care of property in the hands of the National Guard the Secretary of War is authorized to detail from the Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, Corps of Engineers, Coast Artillery Corps, medical Department, and Signal Corps of the Regular Army not to exceed one thousand sergeants for duty with corresponding organizations of the National Guard and not to exceed one hundred sergeants for duty with the disciplinary organizations at the United States Disciplinary Barracks, who shall be additional to the sergeants authorized by this Act for the corps, companies, troops, batteries, and detachments from which they may be detailed. Sec. 37. The Officers’ Reserve Corps.—For the purpose of securing a reserve of officers available for service as temporary officers in the Regular Army, as provided for in this Act and in section eight of the Act approved April twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and fourteen, as officer of the Quartermaster Corps and other staff corps and departments, as officers for recruit rendezvous and depots, and as officers of volunteers, there shall be organized, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, an Officers’ Reserve Corps of the Regular Army. Said corps shall consist of sections corresponding to the various arms, staff corps, and departments of the Regular Army. Except as otherwise herein provided, a member of the officers’ Reserve Corps shall not be subject to call for service in time of peace, and whenever called upon for

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service shall not, without his consent be so called in a lower grade than that held by him in said reserve corps. [Ed.: The following lengthy text in

Sec. 37 specifies terms of examination and qualification (including age) for appointment to the various ranks, reserves the right of the individual to be returned to their prior post in the Officers’ Reserve Corps, and eliminates the Medical Reserve Corps as a separate entity.] Sec. 38. The Officers’ Reserve Corps in War. In time of actual or threatened hostilities the President may order officers of the Officers’ Reserve Corps, subject to such subsequent physical examinations as he may prescribe, to temporary duty with the Regular Army in grades thereof which can not, for the time being be filled by promotion, or as officers in volunteer or other organizations that may be authorized by law, or as officers at recruit rendezvous and depots, or on such other duty as the President may prescribe. [Ed.: And, the officers shall exercise command appropriate to their grade and rank, and will not be entitled to retirement or retired pay, but only to disability for time in temporary service.] Sec. 39. Instruction of Officers of the Officers’ Reserve Corps.—To the extent provided for from time to time by appropriations for this specific purpose, the Secretary of War is authorized to order reserve officers to duty with troops or at field exercises, or for instruction, for periods not to exceed fifteen days in any one calendar year, and while so serving such officers shall receive the pay and allowances of their respective grades in the Regular Army . . . [Ed.: Provisos are included relating to extension of duty, and that rank or retirement for duty shall not be affected by previous service in the Officers’ Reserve Corps.] Sec. 40. The Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.—The President is hereby authorized to establish and maintain in civil educational institutions a Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, which shall consist of a senior division organized at universities and colleges requiring four years of collegiate study for a degree, including State universities and those State institutions that are required to provide instruction in military tactics under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July second, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, donating lands for the establishment of colleges where the leading object shall be practical instruction in agriculture and the mechanic arts, including military tactics, and a junior division organized at all other public or private educational institutions, except that units of the senior division may be organized at those essentially military schools which do not confer an academic degree but which, as a result of the annual inspection of such institutions by the War Department, are specially designated by the Secretary of War as qualified for units of the senior division, and each division shall consist of units of the several arms or corps in such number and of such strength as the President may prescribe.

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Sec. 41. The President may, upon the application of any established educational institution described in section forty of this Act, establish and maintain at such institution one or more units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps; Provided, That no such unit shall be established or maintained at any such institution until an officer of the Army shall have been detailed as professor of military science and tactics, nor until such institution shall maintain under military instruction one hundred physically fit male students. Sec. 42. The President may, upon the application of any established educational institution in the United States other than a State institution described in section forty of this Act, the authorities of which agree to establish and maintain a two years’ elective or compulsory course of military training as a minimum for its physically fit male student, which course when entered upon by any student shall, as regards such student, be a prerequisite for graduation, establish and maintain at such institution one or more units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps: Provided, That no such unit shall be established or maintained at any such institution until an officer of the Army shall have been detailed as professor of military science and tactics, nor until such institution shall maintain under military instruction at least one hundred physically fit male students. Sec. 43. [Ed.: Authorizes The Secretary of War to prescribe the standard

course of theoretical and practical military training for units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps.] Sec. 44. Eligibility to membership in the Reserve Officers Training Corps shall be limited to students of institutions in which units of such corps may be established who are citizens of the United States, who are not less than fourteen years of age, and whose bodily conditions indicates that they are physically fit to perform military duty, or will be so upon arrival at military age. Sec. 45. The President is hereby authorized to detail for duty at institutions where one or more units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps are maintained such number of enlisted men, either active or retired or of the Regular Army Reserve, as he may deem necessary . . . [Ed.: Qualifications, consent, and pay specifications deleted.] Sec. 46. The President is hereby authorized to detail for duty at institutions where one or more units of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps are maintained such number of enlisted men, either active or retired or of the Regular Army Reserve, as he may deem necessary . . . [Ed.: Qualifications, consent and pay specifications deleted.] Sec. 47. [Ed.: Authorizes the Secretary of War, to issue regulations for maintenance of public animals, arms, uniforms, equipment, and means of transportation at each institution to which property of the United States is issued.]

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Sec. 48. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to maintain camps for the further practical instruction of the members of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, no such camps to be maintained for a period longer than six weeks in any one year, except in time of actual and/or threatened hostilities;

[Ed.: The remaining text provides for transportation and subsistence expenses and for the use of military facilities as may be required.] Sec. 49. The President alone, under such regulations as he may prescribe, is hereby authorized to appoint in the Officers’ Reserve Corps any graduate of the senior division of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps who shall have satisfactorily completed the further training provided for in section fifty of this Act, or any graduate of the junior division who shall have satisfactorily completed the courses of military training prescribed for the senior division and the further training provided for in section fifty of this Act, and shall have participated in such practical instruction subsequent to graduation as the Secretary of War shall prescribe, who shall have arrived at the age of twentyone years and who shall agree, under oath in writing, to serve the United States in the capacity of a reserve officer of the Army during a period of at least ten years from the date of his appointment as such reserve officer, unless sooner discharged by proper authority; but the total number of reserve officers so appointed shall not exceed fifty thousand: Provided, That any graduate qualified under the provisions of this section undergoing a postgraduate course at any institution shall not be eligible for appointment as a reserve officer while undergoing such postgraduate course, but his ultimate eligibility upon completion of such postgraduate course for such appointment shall not be affected because of his having undergone such postgraduate course. Sec. 50. [Ed.: Provides for some ROTC members to receive compensation for further training.] Sec. 51–54. [Ed.: These sections provide an opportunity for individuals who completed military training prior to the approval of the Act to be eligible for appointment to the Officers Reserve Corps, and for their temporary (six month) appointment as second lieutenants with pay, but without eligibility for retirement benefits, and providing that the Secretary of War should maintain lists of those qualified for appointment as commissioned officers, and to maintain camps for training such persons.] Sec. 55. The Enlisted Reserve Corps.—For the purpose of securing an additional reserve of enlisted men for military service with the Engineer, Signal, and Quartermaster Corps and the Ordnance and Medical Departments of the Regular Army, an Enlisted Reserve Corps, to consist of such number of enlisted men of such grade or grades as may be designated by the President from time to time, is hereby authorized, such authorization to be effective on and after the first day of July, nineteen hundred and sixteen. [Ed.: The subsequent text describes enlistment periods, eligibility, the issuance of

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certificates of enlistment, participation in encampments, assignment to Regular Army unites as required, and specifications for pay, allowances, and uniforms, and being subject to the laws and regulations for the government of the Army when called to active duty or for training.] Sec. 56. [Ed.: Provides for equipment and officers to certain schools and colleges other than those described in section forty-seven.] Sec. 57. Composition of the Militia.—The militia of the United States shall consist of all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and all other ablebodied males who have or shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, who shall be more than eighteen years of age and, except as hereinafter provided, not more than forty-five years of age, and said militia shall be divided into three classes, the national Guard, the naval Militia, and the Unorganized Militia. Sec. 58. Composition of the National Guard.—The National Guard shall consist of the regularly enlisted militia between the ages of eighteen and fortyfive years organized, armed, and equipped as hereinafter provided, and of commissioned officers between the ages of twenty-one and sixty-four years. Sec. 59. Exemptions from Militia Duty.—The Vice President of the United States; the officers, judicial and executive, of the Government of the United States and of the several States and Territories; persons in the military or naval service of the United States; customhouse clerks; persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mail; artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy years of the United States; pilots; mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States, shall be exempt from militia duty without regard to age, and all persons who because of religious belief shall claim exemption from military service, if the conscientious holding of such belief by such person shall be established under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, shall be exempted from militia service in a combatant capacity; but no person so exempted shall be exempt from militia service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant. Sec. 60. Organization of National Guard Units.—Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, the organization of the National Guard, including the composition of all units thereof, shall be the same as that which is or may hereafter be prescribed for the Regular Army, subject in time of peace to such general exceptions as may be authorized by the Secretary of War. And the President may prescribe the particular unit or units, as to the branch or arm of service, to be maintained in each State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in order to secure a force which, when combined, shall form complete higher tactical units. Sec. 61. Maintenance of Other Troops by the States.—No State shall maintain troops in time of peace other than as authorized in accordance with

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the organization prescribed under this Act: Provided, That nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as limiting the rights of the States and Territories in the use of the National Guard within their respective borders in time of peace: Provided further, That nothing contained in this Act shall prevent the organization and maintenance of State police or constabulary. Sec. 62. Number of the National Guard.—The number of enlisted men of the National Guard to be organized under this Act within one year from its passage shall be for each State in the proportion of two hundred such men for each Senator and Representative in Congress from such State, and a number to be determined by the President for each Territory and the District of Columbia, and shall be increased each year thereafter in the proportion of not less than fifty per centum until a total peace strength of not less than eight hundred enlisted mean for each Senator and Representative in Congress shall have been reached. [Ed.: The remainder of the section specifies that

states may organize the full number of troops in the National Guard prior to the schedule, and that the President may prescribe the full number of troops required in certain situations, and that the Territories referred to in the act include Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the Canal Zone.] Sec. 63. [Ed.: Describes privileges and duties of “any corps of Artillery, Cavalry, or Infantry” existing in any state at the time the 1792 Militia Act was passed.] Sec. 64. Assignment of National Guard to Brigades and Divisions— For the purpose of maintaining appropriate organization and to assist in instruction and training, . . . [etc.]. Sec. 65. Chiefs of Staff of National Guard Divisions . . . Sec. 66. Adjutants General of States, and So Forth. [Ed.: Prescribes duties and appointment procedures for Adjutants General.] Sec. 67. Appropriation, Apportionment, and Disbursement of Funds for the National Guard. [Ed.: Describes uses of appropriated funds. There follows an extensive statement regarding apportionments, specific uses or programs which funds may support, and accountability for the funds.] Sec. 68. Location of Units.—The States and Territories shall have the right to determine and fix the location of the units and headquarters of the National Guard within their respective borders; Provided, That no organization of the National Guard, members of which shall be entitled to and shall have received compensation under the provisions of this Act, shall be disbanded without the consent of the President, nor, without such consent, shall the commissioned or enlisted strength of any such organization be reduced below the minimum that shall be prescribed therefor by the President. Sec. 69. Enlistments in the National Guard.—Hereafter the period of enlistment in the National Guard shall be for six years, the first three years of which shall be in an active organization and the remaining three years in

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the National Guard Reserve, thereinafter provided for, and the qualifications for enlistment shall be the same as those prescribed for admission to the Regular Army: Provided, That in the National Guard the privilege of continuing in active service during the whole of an enlistment period and of reenlisting in said service shall not be denied by reason of anything contained in this Act. Sec. 70.–127. [Ed.: The final 58 sections of this act (Statutes at Large, Sess.

I, Ch. 134, pp. 201–217 prescribe contracts, oaths, Reserves, pay, procedures for Courts-Martial, etc. and Sec. 128 repeals laws inconsistent with the Act of 1916.] Approved, June 3, 1916.

* * * Of considerable significance to the future development of the National Guard and the strengthening of the military resources of the United States, the National Defense Act also authorized the establishment of an Officers’ Reserve Corps (ORC), comprising officers trained by the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) at qualifying educational institutions—and specifically at the Land Grant Colleges, which already had established military training programs. Qualifying programs had to include a commissioned officer of the United States Army as the “professor of military science and tactics,” and the program had to include physically fit male students who were citizens of the United States and “not less than fourteen years of age.” This created a new and vital source of trained officers for both the National Guard and the regular United States military services. College and University graduates who had successfully completed the ROTC curricula at those colleges could receive direct commissions as Reserve Officers in the Army, Navy, or Marines, and in time in the Air Force. Within the year, the United States would be at war. The inception and approval of the National Defense Act were caused more by an imminent threat of war with Mexico than by the outbreak of war in Europe in August 1914. Even as the United States watched the ominous expansion of the war in Europe, the sinking of the British passenger liner Lusitania with the loss of American lives, and the heightening threat on the high seas, President Wilson maintained a stance of neutrality. While the U.S. was following closely events in Europe, it was also worried about the situation in Mexico where a revolution begun in 1910 ousted a dictator, Porfirio Diaz. By 1914, the revolution was split multiple ways with major revolutionaries, Pancho Villa, Emiliano Zapata, Alvaro Obregon, Venustiano Carranza competing with each other for control. The conflict spilled over

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into the U.S. in 1914 and 1915. On March 9, 1916, Pancho Villa crossed the Rio Grande and raided Columbus, New Mexico, killing 19 Americans. Under the authority of the Act of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson sent Brigadier General John J. Pershing and 9,000 regulars into Mexico in pursuit of Villa, and by late summer of 1916 President Wilson had stationed more than 100,000 National Guard troops along the U.S.–Mexico border from Brownsville, Texas, to Yuma, Arizona—a distance of more than 1,600 miles. Wilson perceived the greater threat to American interests to be the situation in Mexico rather than the war in Europe. Soon, both threats seemed to become one.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. The Dick Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916 reflect both a continuation of the tradition of the citizen-soldier and changes in how the United States would implement this tradition. What do you see in these two laws linking military service with citizenship? 2. The Dick Militia Act of 1903 created the National Guard. What militia traditions did it reaffirm? How did it alter those traditions? 3. What were the key elements of the Dick Militia Act? How does the Act affect conscription and the volunteer? 4. What exemptions from military service, volunteer or otherwise, were specifically recognized by the Dick Militia Act? 5. What were the differences in “Regular” and “Volunteer” forces as described by the Dick Militia Act? 6. What justified the call of the National Guard to active service in the Armies of the United States? 7. What authority did the states have over the National Guard units within the state? 8. What was the basic structure of the American military as provided by the National Defense Act of 1916? How do that structure and those provisions seem to relate to the historical development of the American military?

CHAPTER

5

MODERN WARFARE Universal Military Training, Selective Service, and Conscription, 1916–1940

In January 1916, the German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman sent a secret telegram, intercepted by the United States, to the interim government of President Carranza of Mexico announcing Germany’s intent to begin “unrestricted submarine warfare” and its interest in sustaining American neutrality despite that action. But Germany also suggested that should war come with the United States, Mexico was invited to become an ally, with the understanding that Germany would provide generous financial support, and that Germany would assist Mexico “to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona,” leaving the details to Mexico. The Zimmerman telegram, and the advent of unrestricted submarine warfare accompanied by reports of American ships being sunk, persuaded President Wilson to take the United States into war. Following House and Senate approval, the President signed the Declaration of War on April 6, 1917. The American Army stood at approximately 250,000 men at the time of the Declaration of War and was limited by law to a maximum size of 286,000. In May, Congress approved a Selective Service Act requiring men between the ages of 21 and 30 to register for the draft, and authorized the conscription of those needed by the military. The concept of Selective Service, or as President Wilson called it, a “selection from among the willing,” represented a repudiation of Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood, who had pressed hard for Universal Military Training (UMT). Yet the moderate progressives in Wilson’s administration who favored a selective system hoped to avoid the inequities of both Civil War drafts. Thus, Section 3 of the Act prohibited the payment of bounties or furnishing of substitutes

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in order to avoid service, as had been permitted during the Civil War. Selection, they insisted, would be based on scientific criteria that would preserve the civilian labor force and cause the least disruption to families. Its primary architects, Enoch Crowder and Hugh Scott, saw it as much more than simply a military draft. Properly administered, they and President Wilson believed, Selective Service would both provide men for military service and allow the government to carefully plan and regulate the economy through a complex system of exemptions and deferments.

DOCUMENT 5.1 SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT, 1917 AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE PRESIDENT TO INCREASE TEMPORARILY THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES. SIXTY-FIFTH CONGRESS. SESS. I. CH. 15. MAY 18, 1917. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in view of the existing emergency, which demands the raising of troops in addition to those now available, the President be, and he is hereby, authorized— First. Immediately to raise, organize, officer, and equip all or such number of increments of the Regular Army provided by the National Defense Act approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen, or such parts thereof as he may deem necessary; to raise all organizations of the Regular Army, including those added by such increments, to the maximum enlisted strength authorized by law. Vacancies in the Regular Army created or caused by the addition of increments as herein authorized which can not be filled by promotion may be filled by temporary appointment for the period of the emergency or until replaced by permanent appointments or by provisional appointments made under the provisions of section twenty-three of the National Defense Act, approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen, and hereafter provisional appointments under said section may be terminated whenever it is determined, in the manner prescribed by the President, that the officer has not the suitability and fitness requisite for permanent appointment. Second. To draft into the military service of the United States, organize, and officer, in accordance with the provisions of section one hundred and eleven of said National Defense Act, so far as the provisions of said section may be applicable and not inconsistent with the terms of this Act, any or all members of the national Guard and of the National Guard Reserves, and said members so drafted into the military service of the United States shall serve therein for the period of the existing emergency unless sooner discharged:

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Provided, That when so drafted the organizations or units of the National Guard shall, so far as practicable, retain the State designations of their respective organizations. Third. To raise by draft as herein provided, organize and equip an additional force of five hundred thousand enlisted men, or such part or parts thereof as he may at any time deem necessary, and to provide the necessary officers, line and staff, for said force and for organizations of said other forces, by ordering members of the Officers’ Reserve Corps to temporary duty in accordance with the provisions of section thirty-eight of the National Defense Act approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen; by appointment from the Regular Army, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, from those duly qualified and registered pursuant to section twenty-three of the Act of Congress approved January twenty-first nineteen hundred and three (Thirty-second Statutes at Large, page seven hundred and seventy-five), from the members of the National Guard drafted into the service of the United States, from those who have been graduated from educational institutions at which military instruction is compulsory, or from those who have had honorable service in the Regular Army, the National Guard, or in the volunteer forces, or from the country at large; by assigning retired officers of the Regular Army to active duty with such force with their rank on the retired list and the full pay and allowances of their grade; or by the appointment of retired officers and enlisted men, active or retired, of the Regular Army as commissioned officers in such forces: Provided, That the organization of said force shall be the same as that of the corresponding organizations of the Regular Army: . . . Fourth. The President is further authorized, in his discretion and at such time as he may determine, to raise and begin the training of an additional force of five hundred thousand men organized, officered, and equipped, as provided for the force first mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this section. Fifth. To raise by draft, organize, equip, and officer, as provided in the third paragraph of this section, in addition to and for each of the above forces, such recruit training units as he may deem necessary for the maintenance of such forces at the maximum strength. Sixth. To raise, organize, officer, and maintain during the emergency such number of ammunition batteries and battalions, depot batteries and battalions, and such artillery parks, with such numbers and grades of personnel as he may deem necessary. Such organizations shall be officered in the manner provided in the third paragraph of this section, and enlisted men may be assigned to said organizations from any of the forces herein provided for or raised by selective draft as by this Act provided. Seventh. The President is further authorized to raise and maintain by voluntary enlistment, to organize, and equip, not to exceed four infantry

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divisions, the officers of which shall be selected in the manner provided by paragraph three of section one of this Act: Provided, That the organization of said force shall be the same as that of the corresponding organization of the Regular Army: And provided further, That there shall be no enlistments in said force of men under twenty-five years of age at time of enlisting: And provided further, That no such volunteer force shall be accepted in any unit smaller than a division. Sec. 2. That the enlisted men required to raise and maintain the organizations of the Regular Army and to complete and maintain the organizations embodying the members of the National Guard drafted into the service of the United States, at the maximum legal strength as by this Act provided, shall be raised by voluntary enlistment, or if and whenever the President decides that they can not effectually be so raised or maintained, then by selective draft; and all other forces hereby authorized, except as provided in the seventh paragraph of section one, shall be raised and maintained by selective draft exclusively; but this provision shall not prevent the transfer to any force of training cadres from other forces. Such draft as herein provided shall be based upon liability to military service of all male citizens, or male persons not alien enemies who have declared their intention to become citizens, between the ages of twenty-one and thirty years, both inclusive, and shall take place and be maintained under such regulations as the President may prescribe not inconsistent with the terms of this Act. Quotas for the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, or subdivisions thereof, shall be determined in proportion to the population thereof, and credit shall be given to any State, Territory, District, or subdivision thereof, for the number of men who were in the military service of the United States as members of the National Guard on April first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, or who have since said date entered the military service of the United States from any such State, Territory, District, or subdivision, either as members of the Regular Army of the National Guard. All persons drafted into the service of the United States and all officers accepting commissions in the forces herein provided for shall, from the date of said draft or acceptance, be subject to the laws and regulations governing the Regular Army, except as to promotions, so far as such laws and regulations are applicable to persons whose permanent retention in the military service on the active or retired list is not contemplated by existing law, and those drafted shall be required to serve for the period of the existing emergency unless sooner discharged: Provided, That the President is authorized to raise and maintain by voluntary enlistment or draft, as herein provided, special and technical troops as he may deem necessary, and to embody them into organizations and to officer them as provided in the third paragraph of section one and section nine of this Act. Organizations of the forces herein provide for, except the Regular Army and

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the divisions authorized in the seventh paragraph of section one, shall, as far as the interests of the service permit, be composed of men who come, and of officers who are appointed from, the same State or locality. Sec. 3. No bounty shall be paid to induce any person to enlist in the military service of the United States; and no person liable to military service shall hereafter be permitted or allowed to furnish a substitute for such service; nor shall any substitute be received, enlisted, or enrolled in the military service of the United States; and no such person shall be permitted to escape such service or to be discharged therefrom prior to the expiration of his term of service by the payment of money or any other valuable thing whatsoever as consideration for his release from military service or liability thereto. Sec. 4. That the Vice President of the United States, the officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, regular or duly ordained ministers of religion, students who at the time of the approval of this Act are preparing for the ministry in recognized theological or divinity schools, and all person in the military and naval service of the United States shall be exempt from the selective draft herein prescribed; and nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to require or compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein provided for who is found to be a member of any well-recognized religious sect or organization at present organized and existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form and whose religious convictions are against war or participation therein in accordance with the creed or principles of said religious organizations, but no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant; and the President is hereby authorized to exclude or discharge from said selective draft and from the draft under the second paragraph of section one hereof, or to draft for partial military service only from those liable to draft as in this Act provided, persons of the following classes: County and municipal officials; customhouse clerks; persons employed by the United States in the transmission of the mails; artificers and workmen employed in the armories, arsenals, and navy years of the United States, and such other persons employed in the service of the United States as the President may designate; pilots; mariners actually employed in the sea service of any citizen or merchant within the United States; persons engaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be necessary to the maintenance of the Military Establishment or the effective operation of the military forces or the maintenance of national interest during the emergency; those in a status with respect to persons dependent upon them for support which renders their exclusion or discharge advisable; and those found to be physically or morally deficient. No exemption or exclusion shall continue when a cause therefor no longer exists: Provided,

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That notwithstanding the exemptions enumerated herein, each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia shall be required to supply its quota in the proportion that its population bears to the total population of the United States. The President is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to create and establish throughout the several States and subdivisions thereof and in the Territories and the District of Columbia local boards, and where, in his discretion, practicable and desirable, there shall be created and established one such local board in each county or similar subdivision in each State, and one for approximately each thirty thousand of the population in each city of thirty thousand population or over, according to the last census taken or estimates furnished by the Bureau of Census of the Department of Commerce. Such boards shall be appointed by the President, and shall consist of three or more members, none of whom shall be connected with the Military Establishment, to be chosen from among the local authorities of such subdivisions or from other citizens residing in the subdivision or area in which the respective boards will have jurisdiction under the rules and regulations prescribed by the President. Such boards shall have power within their respective jurisdictions to hear and determine, subject to review as hereinafter provided, all questions of exemption under this Act, and all questions of or claims for including or discharging individuals or classes of individuals from the selective draft, which shall be made under rules and regulations prescribed by the President, except any and every question or claim for including or excluding or discharging persons or classes of persons from the selective draft under the provisions of this Act authorizing the President to exclude or discharge from the selective draft “Persons engaged in industries, including agriculture, found to be necessary to the maintenance of the Military Establishment, or the effective operation of the military forces, or the maintenance of national interest during the emergency.” The President is hereby authorized to establish additional boards, one in each Federal judicial district of the United States, consisting of such number of citizens, not connected with the Military Establishment, as the President may determine, who shall be appointed by the President. The President is hereby authorized, in his discretion to establish more than one such board in any Federal judicial district of the United States, or to establish one such board having jurisdiction of an area extending into more than one Federal judicial district. Such district boards shall review on appeal and affirm, modify, or reverse any decision of any local board having jurisdiction in the area in which any such district board has jurisdiction under the rules and regulations prescribed by the President. Such district boards shall have exclusive original jurisdiction within their respective areas to hear and determine all questions

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or claims for including or excluding or discharging persons or classes of persons from the selective draft, under the provisions of this Act, not included within the original jurisdiction of such local boards.

[Ed.: The following two paragraphs give final appeal and review authority to the President, who shall also make rules and regulations regarding the organization and procedures to be followed by the local and district boards.] Sec. 5. That all male persons between the ages of twenty-one and thirty, both inclusive, shall be subject to registration in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President; and upon proclamation by the President or other public notice given by him or by his direction stating the time and place of such registration it shall be the duty of all persons of the designated ages, except officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army, the Navy, and the National Guard and Naval Militia while in the service of the United States, to present themselves for and submit to registration under the provisions of this Act; and every such person shall be deemed to have notice of the requirements of this Act upon the publication of said proclamation or other notice as aforesaid given by the President or by his direction; and any person who shall willfully fail or refuse to present himself for registration or to submit thereto as herein provided, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon conviction in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year, and shall thereupon be duly registered: Provided, That in the call of the docket precedence shall be given, in courts trying the same, to the trial of criminal proceedings under this Act: Provided further, That persons shall be subject to registration as herein provided who shall have attained their twenty-first birthday and who shall not have attained their thirty-first birthday on or before the day set for the registration, and all persons so registered shall be and remain subject to draft into the forces hereby authorized, unless exempted or excused therefrom as in this Act provided: Provided further, That in the case of temporary absence from actual place of legal residence of any person liable to registration as provided herein such registration may be made by mail under regulations to be prescribed by the President. Sec. 6. That the President is hereby authorized to utilize the service of any or all departments and any or all officers or agents of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and the subdivisions thereof, in the execution of this Act, and all officers and agents of the United States and of the several States, Territories, and subdivisions thereof, and of the District of Columbia, and all persons designated or appointed under regulations prescribed by the President whether such appointments are made by the President himself or by the governor or other

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officer of any State or Territory to perform any duty in the execution of this Act, are hereby required to perform such duty as the President shall order or direct, and all such officers and agents and persons so designated or appointed shall hereby have full authority for all acts done by them in the execution of this Act by the direction of the President.

[Ed.: The remaining text of Sec. 6 establishes penalties for failure to act, making false statements, and neglecting to perform required duties.] Sec. 7. That the qualifications and conditions for voluntary enlistment as herein provided shall be the same as those prescribed by existing law for enlistments in the Regular Army, except that recruits must be between the ages of eighteen and forty years, both inclusive, at the time of their enlistment; and such enlistments shall be for the period of the emergency unless sooner discharged. All enlistments, including those in the Regular Army Reserve, which are in force on the date of the approval of this Act and which would terminate during the emergency shall continue in force during the emergency unless sooner discharged; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to shorten the period of any existing enlistment: Provided, That all persons enlisted or drafted under any of the provisions of this Act shall as far as practicable be grouped into units by States and the political subdivisions of the same: Provided further, That all persons who have enlisted since April first, nineteen hundred and seventeen, either in the Regular Army or in the National Guard, and all persons who have enlisted in the National Guard since June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen, upon their application, shall be discharged upon the termination of the existing emergency. The President may provide for the discharge of any or all enlisted men whose status with respect to dependents renders such discharge advisable; and he may also authorize the employment of any active duty of retired enlisted men of the Regular Army, either with their rank on the retired list or in higher enlisted grades, and such retired enlisted men shall receive the full pay and allowances of the grades in which they are actively employed. Sec. 8. That the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, is authorized to appoint for the period of the existing emergency such general officers of appropriate grades as may be necessary for duty with brigades, divisions, and higher units in which the forces provided for herein may be organized by the President, and general officers of appropriate grade for the several Coast Artillery districts. In so far as such appointments may be made from any of the forces herein provided for, the appointees may be selected irrespective of the grades held by them in such forces. Vacancies in all grades in the Regular Army resulting from the appointment of officers thereof to higher grades in the forces other than the Regular Army herein

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provided for shall be filled by temporary promotions and appointments in the manner prescribed for filling temporary vacancies by section one hundred and fourteen of the National Defense Act approved June third, nineteen hundred and sixteen; and officers appointed under the provisions of this Act to higher grades in the forces other than the Regular Army herein provided for shall not vacate their permanent commissions nor be prejudiced in their relative or lineal standing in the Regular Army. Sec. 9–11. [Ed.: Sec. 9 specifies that appointments shall be for the period

of the emergency, and establishes examination boards for a review of qualifications, and methods for discharge, while Sec. 10 establishes pay and allowances at the scale provided for the Regular Army, and increases the base pay for each scale by specified amounts. Sec. 11 suspends all existing restrictions upon the detail, detachment, and employment of officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army.] Sec. 12. [Ed.: Prohibits the sale of alcoholic liquors in or near military camps, and sets a $1,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than twelve months or both.] Sec. 13. [Ed. : Requires the Secretary of War to suppress and prevent houses of ill fame, brothels, or bawdy houses within such distance of military establishments as he may deem necessary, with a $1,000 fine or imprisonment for not more than twelve months or both.] Sec. 14. That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby suspended during the period of this emergency. Approved, May 18, 1917.

* * * In the summer of 1918, Congress amended the law to cover all males between the ages of 18 and 45. By September 1918, more than 24 million had registered for the draft—approximately one-half of all adult male Americans (Figure 5.1). During the course of the war, 2.8 million men were selected by lottery for service. Not all cooperated. Resistance was widespread in some regions, particularly in the Deep South and Mountain West. U.S. Attorneys in most federal judicial districts reported being overwhelmed by the number of Selective Service violations reported to them. The majority of men who registered requested some form of deferment or exemption. Selective Service Regulations required separate “white” and “colored” quotas for each draft board based on the numbers of each group reported in the Census of 1910. For quota purposes, Selective Service officials considered everyone who was not of African descent (Asians, Mexicans, and American Indians) to be white. Few Blacks requested exemption, with the result that they received

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FIGURE 5.1 Congress approved the Selective Service Act in May 1917. Army recruiters encouraged volunteers to “beat the draft” and join now, and offered special considerations and advancement to volunteers. Source: Library of Congress, Rare Book and Special Collections Division.

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disproportionately fewer exemptions than whites. But due to the reluctance of the Army to train and send Blacks into combat, quotas for Blacks were lower in proportion to their population than those for whites. The Army provided most Black draftees with little or no training, and frequently furloughed them to do farm work at the request of white farmers in the vicinity of Army camps. War planners had at first anticipated equipping a half-million-man army for service in Europe, but before the end of the war in November 1918, more than four million men, including volunteers, and National Guard, had been called into service, and the U.S. had sent three million men to combat in France and England. Tens of millions more, under the coercion of the draft and “work or fight” laws went to work in jobs their draft boards deemed helpful to the war effort. Authorities also stressed the importance of women’s contributions to the war effort, mostly in terms of civilian work. However, the Navy and Marines set an important precedent by enlisting 13,000 women for active duty, giving them the same pay and privileges as men. Calling them “Yeomanettes” and “Marinettes,” the Navy assigned them primarily to clerical support. The first units of the American Expeditionary Force, under the command of General John J. “Blackjack” Pershing, arrived in France in July 1917, and by the end of the summer most of the regular Army, comprising the 1st Division (the “Big Red One”), the 2nd, and 26th Divisions were en route to France. In late October the 42nd “Rainbow Division,” named because it included National Guard units from 26 different states, joined American forces in Europe. These four divisions were actually trained in France. Most of these troops were moved to positions along the Front in October. In the spring of 1918, some 27,500 Americans were the first thrown into combat to help halt a German Spring offensive that had brought the enemy to within 50 miles of Paris. Among these were a few all-Black units that Pershing and other AEF commanders refused to use in combat, so they were loaned to the French, and suffered some of the highest casualty rates of the war. By late summer of 1918, several million Americans were in or on the way to France, and perhaps one million had been in combat. During the German July offensive, American troops took the brunt of attacks at Chateau-Thierry, and then at Soissons, committing some 300,000 men to battle and suffering over 50,000 casualties. Beginning in September through late October 1918, the American First Army, including the American I, IV, and V Corps, with the French 15th Colonial Division, led the counter-offensive at St. Mihiel and into the Argonne Forest bringing the war to a close. Overall, the Army organized, manned, and trained 55 divisions and sent 42 of those to France before the war’s end. None of the American officers in combat in World War I were products of the new Reserve Officers Training Corp program, established under the

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National Defense Act of 1916. That program was not initiated until September 1917, and with the outbreak of war was suspended, and then reactivated in 1920. The first ROTC officers were commissioned in 1924. Most of the American officers were instead products of special officertraining schools (OTS) based on the example of the Plattsburgh training camps. The OTS produced more than 80,000 officers in their special 90-day programs, officers who in turn, with the limited numbers of regular officers in service at the beginning of the war, trained and then led the American armies in combat. In addition, although it had relatively little impact on combat forces, the War Department organized a Student Army Training Corps (SATC) in late 1918, which was designed to accelerate the production of army officers. The program allowed an enrolled student over the age of 18 to register for the draft, be immediately inducted into the Army as a private, and return to class (with pay) to prepare for attending one of the officer training schools. In addition, college classes were condensed and accelerated, enabling a student to complete a degree in less than two years. In retrospect, mobilization in World War I had been a prodigious and remarkably successful effort. It had not been accomplished, however, by sole reliance on volunteer enlistments, although volunteers, including National Guard, Regular Army personnel, and OTS, and SATC enrollments, comprised a considerable portion of the total men in service. To be sure, American officials in World War I, and subsequently in World War II, insisted that Selective Service was less a draft or conscription, and more a process or mechanism for bringing eligible (and willing) American men into service. There was, however, no question but that not all who served in the American armies did so willingly, and that many who did go willingly, did so with the hope of proving their rights to full citizenship. To these men, they were true “citizen-soldiers.” But many returned to a country that did not consider their service sufficient to earn them those rights. When World War I, “the war to end all wars” came to a close, many Americans “came home” mentally, physically, and fiscally. The United States set about demobilization and the pursuit of peace with a passion. The Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles ending the war and commit the United States to membership in the League of Nations, but it did accept a naval disarmament agreement (the Washington Naval Conference) that resulted in the sharp decline of the American Navy. The reality was that war had not been abolished—it was being ignored. Congress slowed demobilization somewhat by approving a new National Defense Act in 1920. The Act provided funding and authority for the maintenance of a peacetime regular Army to include 280,000 enlisted volunteers and 17,700 officers, and included provisos that would expand the National

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Guard and ROTC programs. Indeed, four college ROTC programs, including MIT, the Universities of California and Illinois, and the A&M College of Texas were approved for “air service” training. Nevertheless, the public and media tended to characterize military training programs, including the ROTC, as being “saturated with the ideas of militarism.” Congressional funding for the Army, ROTC, and the Reserves declined sharply. By 1921, Army strength stood at 150,000; in 1926, at 137,000. By 1937, the active-duty Army stood at 118,750 men—when, already, war and destruction were being visited upon Asia and Europe. Traditionally, historians have characterized this period as one of pacifism, isolationism, and disarmament. This is a matter of semantics. The United States remained deeply involved diplomatically and commercially in Latin America and Asia. In the 1920s, the Republican administrations of Harding and Coolidge signed a series of multinational armament treaties, but the public seemed less interested in the rest of the world than in the remarkable economic boom of the 1920s that, except in the rural South, readily absorbed those entering the job market. Complacency and the fiscal conservatism of the government during those years resulted in reduced resources to the military. Nevertheless, during the 1920s, the United States Armed Forces did intervene a number of times in Latin American countries when the interests of U.S. corporations were threatened. Furthermore, the War Department never stopped planning for the next mobilization. In 1926, the Department created a Joint Army–Navy Advisory Committee on Selective Service, and President Coolidge appointed a Civilian President’s Advisory Committee on Selective Service. These two committees worked closely with each other continuously studying and updating legislation that could be sent to Congress on a moment’s notice—including the 1940 Selective Service Act. The domestic situation changed drastically with the stock market crash of 1929 and the advent of the Great Depression. Unemployment spiraled. Many of the destitute were veterans who had fought in World War I. In 1924, Congress had voted to pay each veteran a bonus, but it would not be payable until 1945. In 1932, 15,000 desperate veterans, a “bonus army,” descended on Washington, D.C. demanding immediate payment of their bonus. The bonus army remained camped along the river for almost six weeks until the Hoover Administration ordered General Douglas MacArthur, his liaison, Dwight Eisenhower, and General George Patton to clear the camp. The “bonus army” was dispersed with fixed bayonets and tear gas. Franklin D. Roosevelt promised Americans a New Deal and became President in 1933. The primary objective of New Deal programs was to stabilize the financial and banking structures and put Americans back to work. Some of those programs, and particularly the creation of the

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Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) in 1933, directly affected U.S. military resources. The CCC put young men to work on government-paid salaries approximating those paid military personnel. Organization and the work regimen were similar to those of the peacetime military. Between 1933 and 1941, an average of 350,000 men were “on duty” with the CCC—a significant pool for future military service. Other “relief ” legislation, such as the Weeks Act of 1935 and the Thompson Act of 1937, provided some assistance to the military. The Weeks Act allowed the Army to commission 100 new second lieutenants from 50 colleges and universities nationwide. The Thompson Act funded the opportunity for 1,000 Army reserve officers per year, many otherwise unemployed, to elect to serve one year of active duty—with pay. In 1939 and 1940, in response to German military successes in Europe and ongoing Japanese expansion in Asia, President Roosevelt and Congress acted quickly to place the U.S. on a war footing. The President declared a limited national emergency. Congress approved dramatic increases in appropriations for the War Department, approved expansion of the Navy, and authorized a larger Army. Finally, in September 1940, Congress approved the Selective Training and Service Act, based upon the precedent of the Selective Service Act of 1917. The 1940 Act created the first real peacetime draft and established the Selective Service System as an independent federal agency under the direction of General Lewis B. Hershey. As with the 1917 Act, the motivation for the 1940 Act had as much to do with creating new jobs as it did with war. Its goal, as Hershey wrote, was to “determine who is to serve the nation by training for the armed forces, and who is to serve in industry, agriculture, and government. All must serve.” That month the Army began calling National Guard units to active duty.

DOCUMENT 5.2 SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT, 1940 TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE BY INCREASING THE PERSONNEL OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROVIDING FOR ITS TRAINING. 76TH CONGRESS, 3RD SESS., CH. 720, SEPTEMBER 16, 1940. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the Congress hereby declares that it is imperative to increase and train the personnel of the armed forces of the United States. (b) The Congress further declares that in a free society the obligations and privileges of military training and service should be shared generally in

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accordance with a fair and just system of selective compulsory military training and service. (c) The Congress further declares, in accordance with our traditional military policy as expressed in the National Defense Act of 1916, as amended, that it is essential that the strength and organization of the National Guard, as an integral part of the first-line defenses of this Nation, be at all times maintained and assured. To this end, it is the intent of the Congress that whenever the Congress shall determine that troops are needed for the national security in excess of those of the Regular Army and those in active training and service under section 3 (b), the National Guard of the United States, or such part thereof as may be necessary, shall be ordered to active Federal service and continued therein so long as such necessity exists. Sec. 2. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, it shall be the duty of every male citizen of the United States, and of every male alien residing in the United States, who, on the day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration, is between the ages of twenty-one and thirty-six, to present himself for and submit to registration at such time or times and place or places, and in such manner and in such age group or groups, as shall be determined by rules and regulations prescribed hereunder. Sec. 3. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, every male citizen of the United States, and every male alien residing in the United States who has declared his intention to become such a citizen, between the ages of twentyone and thirty-six at the time fixed for his registration, shall be liable for training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States. The President is authorized from time to time, whether or not a state of war exists, to select and induct into the land and naval forces of the United States for training and service, in the manner provided in this Act, such number of men as in his judgment is required for such forces in the national interest: Provided, That within the limits of the quota determined under section 4 (b) for the subdivision in which he resides, any person, regardless of race or color, between the ages of eighteen and thirty-six, shall be afforded an opportunity to volunteer for induction into the land or naval forces of the United States for the training and service prescribed in subsection (b), but no person who so volunteers shall be inducted for such training and service so long as he is deferred after classification: Provided further, That no man shall be inducted for training and service under this Act unless and until he is acceptable to the land or naval forces for such training and service and his physical and mental fitness for such training and service has been satisfactorily determined: Provided further, That no men shall be inducted for such training and service until adequate provision shall have been made for shelter, sanitary facilities, water supplies, heating and lighting arrangements, medical care and hospital accommodations, for such men, as may be

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determined by the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy, as the case may be, to be essential to public and personal health: Provided further, That except in time of war there shall not be in active training or service in the land forces of the United States at any one time under subsection (b) more than nine hundred thousand men inducted under the provisions of this Act. The men inducted into the land or naval forces for training and service under this Act shall be assigned to camps or units of such forces. (b) Each man inducted under the provisions of subsection (a) shall serve for a training and service period of twelve consecutive months, unless sooner discharged, except that whenever the Congress has declared that the national interest is imperiled, such twelve-month period may be extended by the President to such time as may be necessary in the interests of national defense. (c) Each such man, after the completion of his period of training and service under subsection (b), shall be transferred to a reserve component of the land or naval forces of the United States; and until he attains the age of forty-five, or until the expiration of a period of ten years after such transfer, or until he is discharged from such reserve component, whichever occurs first, he shall be deemed to be a member of such reserve component and shall be subject to such additional training and service as may now or hereafter be prescribed by law: Provided, That any man who completes at least twelve month’ training and service in the land forces under subsection (b), and who thereafter serves satisfactorily in the Regular Army or in the active National Guard for a period of at least two years, shall, in time of peace, be relieved from any liability to serve in any reserve component of the land or Naval forces of the United States and from further liability for the training and service under subsection (b), but nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent any such man, while in a reserve component of such forces, from being ordered or called to active duty in such forces. (d) With respect to the men inducted for training and service under this Act there shall be paid, allowed, and extended the same pay, allowances, pensions, disability and death compensation, and other benefits as are provided by law in the case of other enlistment of like grades and length of service of that component of the land or naval forces to which they are assigned, and after transfer to a reserve component of the land or naval forces as provided in subsection (c) there shall be paid, allowed, and extended with respect to them the same benefits as are provided by law in like cases with respect to other members of such reserve component. Men in such training and service and men who have been so transferred to reserve components shall have an opportunity to qualify for promotion. (e) Persons inducted into the land forces of the United States under this Act shall not be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere

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except in the Territories and possessions of the United States, including the Philippine Islands. (f) Nothing contained in this or any other Act shall be construed as forbidding the payment of compensation by any person, firm, or corporation to persons inducted into the land or naval forces of the United States for training and service under this Act, or to members of the reserve components of such forces now or hereafter on any type of active duty, who, prior to their induction or commencement of active duty, were receiving compensation from such person, firm, or corporation. Sec. 4. (a) The selection of men for training and service under section 3 (other than those who are voluntarily inducted pursuant to this Act) shall be made in an impartial manner, under such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe, from the men who are liable for such training and service and who at the time of selection are registered and classified but not deferred or exempted: Provided, That in the selection and training of men under this Act, and in the interpretation and execution of the provisions of this Act, there shall be no discrimination against any person on account of race or color. (b) Quotas of men to be inducted for training and service under this Act shall be determined for each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia, and for subdivisions thereof, on the basis of the actual number of men in the several States, territories, and the District of Columbia, and the subdivisions thereof, who are liable for such training and service but who are not deferred after classification, except that credits shall be given in fixing such quotas for residents of such subdivisions who are in the land and naval forces of the United States on the date fixed for determining such quotas. After such quotas are fixed, credits shall be given in filling such quotas for residents of such subdivisions who subsequently become members of such forces. Until the actual numbers necessary for determining the quotas are known, the quotas may be based on estimates, and subsequent adjustments therein shall be made when such actual numbers are known. All computations under this subsection shall be made in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe. Sec. 5 (a) Commissioned officers, warrant officers, pay clerks, and enlisted men of the Regular Army, the Navy, the marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Public Health Service, the federally recognized active national Guard, the Officers’ Reserve Corps, the Regular Army Reserve, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, the naval Reserve, and the Marine Corps Reserve; cadets, United States Military Academy; midshipmen, United States Naval Academy; cadets, United States Coast Guard Academy; men who have been accepted for admittance (commencing with the academic year next succeeding such acceptance) to the United States Military Academy as cadets,

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to the United States Naval Academy as midshipmen, or to the United States Coast Guard Academy as cadets, but only during the continuance of such acceptance: cadets of the advanced course, senior division, Reserve Officers’ Training Corps or Naval Reserve Officers’ Training Corps; and diplomatic representatives, technical attaches of foreign embassies and legations, consuls general, consuls, vice consuls, and consular agents of foreign countries, residing in the United States, who are not citizens of the united States, and who have not declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, shall not be required to be registered under section 2 and shall be relieved from liability for training and service under section 3 (b). (b) In time of peace, the following persons shall be relieved from liability to serve in any reserve component of the land or naval forces of the United States and from liability for training and service under section 3 (b)— (1) Any man who shall have satisfactorily served for at least three consecutive years in the Regular Army before or after or partially before and partially after the time fixed for registration under section 2. (2) Any man who as a member of the active National Guard shall have satisfactorily served for at least one year in active Federal service in the Army of the United States, and subsequent thereto for at least two consecutive years in the Regular Army or in the active National Guard, before or after or partially before and partially after the time fixed for registration under section 2. (3) Any man who is in the active National Guard at the time fixed for registration under section 2, and who shall have satisfactorily served therein for at least six consecutive years, before or after or partially before and partially after the time fixed for such registration. (4) Any man who is in the Officers’ Reserve Corps on the eligible list at the time fixed for registration under section 2, and who shall have satisfactorily served therein on the eligible list for at least six consecutive years, before or after or partially before and partially after the time fixed for such registration: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent the persons enumerated in this subsection, while in the reserve components of the land or naval forces of the United States, from being order or called to active duty in such forces.

[Ed.: Sec. 5. (c) (1–2) provides for the deferment from training and service under the Act of: designated public officers such as governors and judges, officers necessary to public health, safety or interests, and 5 (d) for deferment of ministers of religion.]

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(e) The President is authorized . . . to provide for the deferment from training and service under this Act . . . of those men whose employment in industry, agriculture, or other occupations or employment, or whose activity in other endeavors, is found . . . to be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest. The President is also authorized . . . to provide for the deferment from training and service under this Act . . . (1) of those men in a status with respect to persons dependent upon them for support which renders their deferment advisable, and (2) of those men found to be physically, mentally, or morally deficient or defective. No deferment from such training and service shall be made in the case of any individual except upon the basis of the status of such individual, and no such deferment shall be made of individuals by occupational groups or of groups of individuals in any plant or institution. (f ) [Ed.: Provides for deferment of college students to complete the

academic year in which they are enrolled at time of selection.] (g) Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combatant training and service in the land or naval forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. Any such person claiming such exemption from combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board shall, if he is inducted into the land or naval forces under this act, be assigned to noncombatant service as defined by the President, or shall, if he is found to be conscientiously opposed to participation in such noncombatant service, in lieu of such induction, be assigned to work of national importance under civilian direction. [Ed.: There follows a description of appeals processes in claims denied by local boards.] Each person whose claim for exemption from combatant training and service because of conscientious objection is sustained shall be listed by the local board on a register of conscientious objectors. Sec. 6. The President shall have authority to induct into the land and naval forces of the United States under this Act no greater number of men than the Congress shall hereafter make specific appropriation for from time to time. Sec. 7, 8. [Ed.: Section 7 prohibits the payment of a bounty to induce any person to enlist or be inducted into the land or naval forces of the United States, nor could selected individuals avoid training and service by the payment of money or valuables. Sec. 8 relates to the certification and proficiency of training, and the requirement for a physical at the beginning and the close of the period of training and service. Sec. 9 provides that any person in the employment of the United States Government, its Territories, or possession or the District of Columbia would upon the termination of

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service be restored to their previous condition of employment, and that private employers would also restore such persons to their previous employment and condition unless “the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so . . .” Finally, persons inducted would be provided with adequate facilities, and permitted to vote by absentee ballot.] Sec. 9. [Ed: Prescribes methods of purchase or procurement of products and materials. Requires compliance, and the payment by the government of a fair price. Refusal, however, could result in the government taking immediate possession of the plant or facility.] Sec. 10. (a) The President is authorized— (1) to prescribe the necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this Act; (2) to create and establish a Selective Service System, and shall provide for the classification of registrants and of persons who volunteer for induction under this Act on the basis of availability for training and service, and shall establish within the Selective Service System civilian local boards and such other civilian agencies, including appeal boards and agencies of appeal, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. There shall be created one or more local boards in each county or political subdivision corresponding thereto of each State, Territory, and the District of Columbia. Each local board shall consist of three or more members to be appointed by the President, from recommendations made by the respective Governors or comparable executive officials. No member of any such local board shall be a member of the land or naval forces of the United States, but each member of any such local board shall be a civilian who is a citizen of the United States residing in the county or political subdivision corresponding thereto in which such local board has jurisdiction under rules and regulations prescribed by the President. Such local boards, under rules and regulations prescribed by the President, shall have power within their respective jurisdictions to hear and determine, subject to the right of appeal to the appeal boards herein authorized, all questions or claims with respect to inclusion for, or exemption or deferment from, training and service under this Act of all individuals within the jurisdiction of such local boards. The decisions of such local boards shall be final except where an appeal is authorized in accordance with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe. Appeal boards and agencies of appeal within the Selective service System shall be composed of civilians

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who are citizens of the United States. No person who is an officer, member, agent, or employee of the Selective Service System, or of any such local or appeal board or other agency, shall be excepted from registration, or deferred from training and service, as provided for in this Act, by reason of his status as such officer, member, agent, or employee.

[Ed.: the remaining clauses of Sec. 10 provide for the appointment of a Director of Selective Service, compensation and terms of employment for other employees, access to other government agencies, authority to purchase materials from the Public Printer, and a conveyance of authority to the President to delegate authority vested in him under the Act.] Sec. 11. Any person charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of the provisions of this Act . . . who shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform such duty . . . make false, improper, or incorrect registration, classification, physical or mental examination, deferment, induction, enrolment, or muster . . . or who knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another to evade registration or service . . . or who in any manner shall knowingly fail or neglect to perform any duty required . . . or hinder or interfere in any way . . . with the administration of this Act . . . shall, upon conviction in the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment, or if subject to military or naval law may be tried by court martial, and, on conviction, shall suffer such punishment a court martial may direct ... Sec. 12. [Ed.: Establishes the monthly base pay of enlisted men of the

Army and Marine Corps.] Sec. 13, 14, 15. [Ed.: These extend the benefits of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act, approved March 8, 1918, to all persons inducted under this Act and to members of reserve components, state that all persons subject to the Act shall be deemed to have notice of the requirements of the Act upon publication of a Proclamation or other public notice; and the text of Sec. 15, defines ages 21–36, and that the term “United States” denotes the broad geographical area including the several States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico, while land and naval forces includes the aviation units of such forces.] Sec. 16. (a) Except as provided in this Act, all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby suspended to the extent of such conflict for the period in which this Act shall be in service. (b) All the provisions of this Act, except the provisions of section 3 (d), 8 (g), and 12, shall become inoperative and cease to apply after May 15, 1945,

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except as to offenses committed prior to such service, unless this Act is continued in effect by the Congress. (c) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such sums as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act. Sec. 17. This Act shall take effect immediately. Sec. 18. This Act may be cited as the “Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.” Approved, September 16, 1940.

* * * Both the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and the Selective Service Act of 1917 introduced the concept of “selection” whereby federal officials would select a subset of men from among the available resources. Selection also involved, indirectly, selection of men for civilian pursuits deemed consistent with the nation’s wartime needs. Citizenship obligations, in other words, might involve work that was not explicitly military in nature. That nuance in some respects dated back to the Morrill Land Grant College Act of 1862, which imposed elements of military training and technical training in the “agricultural and mechanic” arts as adjuncts of military service. Now, drawing upon the mechanized, chemical, and aerial warfare experiences of World War I, the military “sought not just men, but intelligent, skilled recruits for the various services.” An educated and technically skilled military became an increasingly critical element of national defense and modern warfare. It was thus no coincidence that the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill) of 1944 enabled and stimulated greatly expanded educational opportunities for veterans.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. The concept of Selective Service adopted in 1917, and again in 1940, offered many exemptions and deferments for men engaged in civilian occupations considered essential to the war effort. Do you believe this strengthened or weakened the tradition of the citizen-soldier? Why, or why not? 2. Section 2 of the Dick Militia Act of 1903, Section 59 of the National Defense Act of 1916, Section 4 of the Selective Service Act of 1917, and Section 5 (g) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 provide exemption from military service on the

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grounds of “conscientious objection” to war. Yet there are significant differences. 1. How are they different? 2. What do they suggest to you about how the attitudes of lawmakers toward military service obligations were changing during these years? 3. The National Defense Act of 1916 includes a number of sections that specify policies for a “Porto Rican Regiment,” “Indian Scouts,” and Philippine Scouts.” 1. How were these groups treated differently from each other and from the rest of the Armed Forces? 2. What do you think might explain such policies? 4. In what way, if any, did the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 change the relationship of the National Guard to the Regular Army? 5. How did ROTC figure in the composition of the modern army prescribed by the Act of 1940?

CHAPTER

6

WORLD WAR II, 1940–1947

Social and economic dislocations that followed World War I gave rise to totalitarian regimes harnessed to imperialist ambitions. In the Far East, in 1931, Japan invaded the Chinese province of Manchuria, converting it into a puppet state called Manchukuo, and extended control over Shanghai and northern China. Neither the U.S. nor the League of Nations intervened. Benito Mussolini seized power in Italy in 1922 and established a dictatorial “fascist” regime pledged to restore the grandeur and power of Italy as the successor of the Roman Empire. In October 1935, Italy invaded and annexed Ethiopia, while the United States endorsed neutrality and isolation. Adolph Hitler was elected Chancellor of Germany in January 1933, then installed a National Socialist (Nazi) dictatorship, and in contravention to the post-World War I peace settlements began rearming Germany. Japan seized Peking and expanded its control over large areas of China in 1937, while Adolph Hitler’s Nazi Germany annexed Austria in 1938, seized the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia and then, in 1939, took the rest of that nation. Italy invaded Albania, and Germany attacked Poland. Great Britain and France declared war. Germany reciprocated with a Blitzkrieg that overwhelmed Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France. By the summer of 1940, Germany controlled all of Western Europe. Great Britain finally thwarted an invasion of its home island by defeating the Luftwaffe in a desperate air “Battle of Britain.” In September 1940, Japan, Italy, and Germany signed a mutual defense treaty creating the Axis alliance, and the United States Congress, without enthusiasm, enacted the first peacetime draft in American history. The draft was both a step toward

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military mobilization, and a continuation of economic recovery policies. Eighteen-thousand, six-hundred and thirty-three men were inducted for a one-year service obligation, and another 800,000 reservists (many of them on CCC rosters), were called to active duty. The next year, 1941, Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June, and in August, by only a single vote in the House of Representatives, Congress extended the draft. German submarines sank a U.S. destroyer in September, and another one in October. Congress responded by allowing American merchant vessels to arm for possible attack. In many respects, the United States was at war without accepting the fact. The devastating Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was the first of a series of attacks on U.S. possessions in the Pacific. These included the islands of Midway, Wake, and Guam, followed by the invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese attacked Hong Kong, bombed Singapore, and invaded Malaya. On December 9, Japanese troops attacked Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands, and two weeks later seized Mindanao in the Philippines, followed by an attack on the American fortress at Corregidor. At the very least, the United States was in imminent danger of losing its possessions in the Pacific and, some feared, was facing an actual attack on the West Coast. At the time the United States Army comprised about 1.6 million men, including regulars and reservists, and another 923,842 inducted under Selective Service in 1941. Over the next four years 16.2 million men served in the Armed Forces of the United States, almost one-half of them volunteers (Figures 6.1, 6.2), National Guardsmen, and reservists recalled to duty. Selective Service inducted about 8.5 million into service from 1942 through 1945. In 1941, Franklin Roosevelt issued a call for non-citizens to join the U.S. Armed Forces, and Congress ratified this call in the Second War Powers Act of 1942, promising that non-citizens who serve in active duty in the U.S. Armed Forces would be granted U.S. citizenship. Although Native Americans, African Americans, Latinos, Asian Americans, and other racial minorities continued to see military service as a path to the full benefits of citizenship, official policies complicated the picture. Most Japanese American men of military age who enlisted did so while housed in internment or relocation camps. Tens of thousands of Filipino men accepted the offer of expedited U.S. citizenship in exchange for enlisting in the U.S. Armed Forces, where they would serve in segregated units. Few received the promised citizenship papers. Congress repealed the offer in 1946, but it was restored in 1990, but without the veterans’ benefits. Later, in 2009, Congress approved a $15,000 cash supplementation to surviving Filipino Veterans of World War II who had become U.S. citizens and lived in the U.S.

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FIGURE 6.1 Military recruiters in World War II continued to draw upon the volunteer tradition of the past to encourage enlistment offering “opportunity, special training, professional advancement, and adventure.” This poster uses the recruiting broadside of the revolutionary era presented in Chapter 1. Source: Cushing Memorial Library and Archives, Texas A&M University.

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FIGURE 6.2 Uncle Sam’s “I Want You” broadside was designed by James Montgomery Flagg in 1917, and became the most recognized incentive for military service in both World War I and World War II. Source: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division.

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Army historian Bettie J. Morden describes the situation of AfricanAmerican men and women in the military during World War II: In 1940, the War Department had established a policy of accepting black inductees under a quota that approximated the black proportion of the national population—10 percent. The Selective Service Act of the same year prohibited discrimination based on race or color. Black men and women responded through patriotism and through the encouragement of black leaders who saw in the armed forces a chance to bring about change in the deep-rooted racial practices of segregation and discrimination. The Army had argued that it could not undertake a program for such a major social change while it was in the midst of a war. In consequence, since “official policy permitted separate draft calls and the officially held definition of discrimination neatly excluded segregation—and both went unchallenged in the courts,” the Army continued throughout the war to segregate enlisted blacks and whites in basic training units and in housing. The Army’s training policy, however, provided that blacks and whites would train together in officer candidate schools (beginning in 1942) and in specialist and technical training schools (beginning in 1943). Basic training remained segregated; the Army feared that mixing the races immediately upon entering the service would lead to racial conflict.

In addition to men, Congress approved the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) in 1942, which authorized the Army to enroll 150,000 women between the ages of 21 and 45. Although these women did not have military status, the Army housed, fed, clothed, and trained them to perform a wide range of support functions short of combat. Unlike the Army, the Navy was permitted to enlist women into actual military status through the Naval Reserve, the Marine Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. These women’s units would become respectively, WAVES (Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service), SPARS (Semper Paratus–Always Ready) and the Marine Corps Women’s Reserve. In 1943, Congress replaced the WAAC with the Women’s Army Corps (WAC) (Figure 6.4). In removing the word “auxiliary,” Congress made the Corps part of the military. From then on, WAC enlistees had military status. Like the rest of the Army, all of the Women’s military organizations were racially segregated, with separate units for “white” and “colored.” For a variety of reasons, the WAC never reached its authorized enrollment of 150,000. According to Army historian Morden, their failure to attract more than about 100,000 women was due to “continuous male opposition to women in uniform; the ‘slander campaign,’ which had been rooted in that opposition; and, in the face of labor shortages, competition from industry and from the other women’s military services.” One minority group, many of whose members sought the right to participate in military service, and many of whom did, were nevertheless

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FIGURE 6.3 Irving Berlin’s film This is the Army depicted in this World War II poster captured the spirit of volunteerism, service, and sacrifice during World War II. Source: Cushing Memorial Library and Archives, Texas A&M University.

officially barred. No one knows how many homosexual men and women served in the Armed Forces during World War II. But it is likely that it was War Department policy that helped make them into a self-aware minority group within American society. There had been a few attempts during World War I to identify and ferret out homosexuals from the armed services. But in those years, psychologists could not yet agree on a definition of homosexuality. By World War II, the War Department had employed thousands of psychiatrists whose job was to screen soldiers for personality disorders and sexual “deviance.” Throughout the war, military psychiatrists supplied authorities with a constant stream of names of soldiers whom they recommended be discharged for homosexuality. Many were discharged into the same communities in places like New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. The common experience of wartime service and dishonorable discharge was one basis on which communities of lesbians and gay men began to form. Like other minority groups, these men and women often claimed that their military service should have earned them the rights of equal citizenship. One such veteran, Harry Hay, would organize the first gay rights organization, the Mattachine Society, in Los Angeles in the 1950s.

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FIGURE 6.4 Foreshadowing the modern contemporary military services, The Women’s Army Corps began the first large-scale recruitment of women during World War II. During the war women also poured into the industrial workforce to relieve the shortages of manpower caused by the draft and volunteer service. Source: Cushing Memorial Library and Archives, Texas A&M University.

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With Russian armies approaching Berlin from the east, and the Allies approaching the city from the west, Hitler committed suicide in April 1945. Germany surrendered on May 8. In the Pacific, after an intense and costly “island-hopping” campaign that brought American forces within striking distance of the heavily fortified Japanese mainland, the U.S. brought the war to a close by dropping an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, followed by another one on Nagasaki on August 9. Three days later, Japan surrendered, and American servicemen and women began returning home. In 1946, the draft took only 183,383 new inductees, and none in 1947 (Table 6.1). Almost immediately, the United States resumed its traditional postwar demobilization policies—a demobilization and conversion from war to peace greatly facilitated by the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (better known as the GI Bill) of 1944. By that Act, Congress established the Veterans Administration (VA) as a branch of the government and an essential war agency, with authority equal to that of the Departments of War, Navy, and the Public Health Service. The Act transferred to the Veterans Administration the authority and responsibility for administering veterans’ disability, compensation, pension, or hospitalization and rehabilitation benefits. The VA was also to administer a special veterans’ education program that enabled veterans to enrollment in college and vocational education programs. In addition, the GI Bill established a veterans’ loan program for the purchase or construction of homes, farms, and business property. The Act encouraged and facilitated the return of veterans to the civilian workforce, and it funded job counseling and employment placement services under the supervision of the Veterans Table 6.1 Selective Service: Induction by Years, 1917–1947 Year

Number Inducted Under Selective Service

1917 1918 1919–1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947

516,212 2,294,034 0 18,633 923,842 3,033,361 3,323,970 1,591,942 945,862 183,383 0

Source: Selective Service System.

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Administration. A “readjustment” allowance was also payable to veterans for a maximum of fifty-two weeks if filed for within five years after the termination of hostilities. Studies have revealed that, although the Act contained no explicitly discriminatory language, its home loan, education, and jobs programs primarily benefited white veterans. Racial segregation in housing, racial redlining in the granting of mortgages, discriminatory college admissions policies, and segregation in the job market limited the ability of minority veterans to take advantage of the GI Bill’s benefits.

DOCUMENT 6.1 THE SERVICEMEN’S READJUSTMENT ACT (GI BILL), 1944 TO PROVIDE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AID FOR THE READJUSTMENT IN CIVILIAN LIFE OF RETURNING WORLD WAR II VETERANS. 58 STAT. CHAPTER 268, JUNE 22, 1944. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the “Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944.”

TITLE I CHAPTER I–HOSPITALIZATION, CLAIMS, AND PROCEDURES [Ed.: SEC. 100, 101, and part of 102 omitted] SEC. 102.: . . . Nothing in the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, or any other Act, shall be construed to prevent the transfer or detail of any commissioned, appointed or enlisted personnel from the armed forces to the Veterans Administration subject to agreements between the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy and the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs: Provided, That no such detail shall be made or extend beyond six months after the termination of the war. SEC.103. The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs shall have authority to place officials and employees designated by him in such Army and Navy installations as may be deemed advisable for the purpose of adjudicating disability claims of, and giving aid and advice to, members of the Army and Navy who are about to be discharged or released from active service. SEC. 104. No person shall be discharged or released from active duty in the armed forces until his certificate of discharge or release from active duty and final pay, or a substantial portion thereof, are ready for delivery to him or to his next of kin or legal representative; and no person shall be discharged or

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released from active service on account of disability until and unless he has executed a claim for compensation, pension, or hospitalization, to be filed with the Veterans’ Administration or has signed a statement that he has had explained to him the right to file such claim: Provided, That this section shall not preclude immediate transfer to a veterans’ facility for necessary hospital care, nor preclude the discharge of any person who refuses to sign such claim or statement: And provided further, That refusal or failure to file a claim shall be without prejudice to any right the veteran may subsequently assert. 1.

Any person entitled to a prosthetic appliance shall be entitled, in addition, to necessary fitting and training, including institutional training, in the use of such appliance, whether in a Service or a Veterans’ Administration hospital, or by out-patient treatment, including such service under contract.

SEC. 105. No person in the armed forces shall be required to sign a statement of any nature relating to the origin, incurrence, or aggravation of any disease or injury he may have, and any such statement against his own interest signed at any time, shall be null and void and of no force and effect.

Chapter II—Aid by Veterans’ Organizations [Ed.: Chapter II provides that national officers of veterans’ organizations will be consulted as to rehabilitation activities, and that the role of the American Red Cross is not prejudiced under the terms of this Act.] Chapter III—Reviewing Authority [Ed.: Provides that certain individuals, including those discharged or dismissed from service as a result of general court marshal, or being a conscientious objector are not qualified for the benefits of the Act, and provides processes for review of eligibility.] TITLE II Chapter IV—Education of Veterans Sec. 400. (a) Subsection (f) of section 1, title I, Public Law Numbered 2, Seventy-third Congress, added by the Act of March 24, 1943 (Public Law Numbered 16, Seventy-eighth Congress), is hereby amended to read as follows: “(f) Any person who served in the active military or naval forces on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of hostilities in the present

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war, shall be entitled to vocational rehabilitation subject to the provisions and limitations of Veterans Regulation Numbered 1 (a), as amended, part VII, or to education or training subject to the provisions and limitations of part VIII.” (B) Veterans Regulation Number 1 (a), is hereby amended by adding a new part VIII as follows: “1. Any person who served in the active military or naval service on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of the present war, and who shall have been discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable, and whose education or training was impeded, delayed, interrupted, or interfered with by reason of his entrance into the service, or who desires a refresher or retraining course, and who either shall have served ninety days or more, exclusive of any period he was assigned for a course of education or training under the Army specialized training program or the Navy college training program, which course was a continuation of his civilian course and was pursued to completion, or as a cadet or midshipman at one of the service academies, or shall have been discharged or released from active service by reason of an actual service-incurred injury or disability, shall be eligible for and entitled to receive education or training under this part: Provided, That such course shall be initiated not later than two years after either the date of his discharge or the termination of the present war, whichever is later: Provided further, That no such education or training shall be afforded beyond seven years after the termination of the present war: And provided further, That any such person who was not over 25 years of age at the time he entered the service shall be deemed to have had his education or training impeded, delayed, interrupted, or interfered with. “2. Any such eligible person shall be entitled to education or training, or a refresher or retraining course, at an approved educational or training institution, for a period of one year (or the equivalent thereof in continuous part-time study) or for such lesser time as may be required for the course of instruction chosen by him. Upon satisfactory completion of such course of education or training, according to the regularly prescribed standards and practices of the institutions, except a refresher or retraining course, such person shall be entitled to an additional period or periods of education or training, not to exceed the time such person was in the active service on or after September 16, 1940, and before the termination of the war, exclusive of any period he was assigned for a course of education or training under the Army specialized training program or the Navy college training program, which course was a continuation of his civilian course and was pursued to completion, or as a cadet or midshipman at one of the service academies, but in no event shall the total period of education or training exceed four years: Provided, That his work continues to be satisfactory throughout the period, according to the regularly prescribed standards and practices of the

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institution: Provided, however, That where ever the additional period of instruction shall be extended to the termination of such unexpired quarter or semester. 3. and 4. [Ed.: These clauses explain entitlement to study within or

outside of the state of residency, development of a list of qualifying institutions, and right of Administrator to disenroll students for unsatisfactory conduct or progress.] 5. [Ed.: This section explains how institutions will be reimbursed.] 6. While enrolled in and pursuing a course under this part, such person upon application to the Administrator, shall be paid a subsistence allowance of $50 per month, if without a dependent or dependents, or $75 per month, if he has a dependent or dependents, including regular holidays and leave not exceeding thirty days in a calendar year. Such person attending a course on a part-time basis, and such person receiving compensation for productive labor performed as part of their apprentice or other training on the job at institutions, business or other establishments, shall be entitled to receive such lesser sums, if any, as subsistence or dependency allowances, as may be determined by the Administrator: Provided, That any such person eligible under this part, and within the limitations thereof, may pursue such full time or part-time course or courses as he may elect, without subsistence allowance. 7. Any such person eligible for the benefits of this part, who is also eligible for the benefit of part VII, may elect which benefit he desires: Provided, That, in the event of such election, subsistence allowance hereunder shall not exceed the amount of additional pension payable for training under said part VII. 8. [Ed.: Prohibits U.S. control of participating educational institutions, except where otherwise authorized by law.] 9, 10, 11; and Sec. 401, 402, and 403. [Ed.: Clauses 9, 10, and 11 empower the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs to administer the Act, and to use other facilities and services of the Federal and State governments allowed; to provide guidance and counseling as may be required, and No. 11, defines which “educational and training institutions,” are approved for the program. Sec. 401, 402, and 403, relate to salaries and expenses, medical and hospital, and compensation and pensions, payable; that books, supplies, and equipment provided a trainee or student or deemed the property of that person unless he fails to complete the required work; and changing the date of eligibility for the program from December 6, 1941, to September 16, 1940.]

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TITLE III—LOANS FOR THE PURCHASE OR CONSTRUCTION OF HOMES, FARMS, AND BUSINESS PROPERTY Chapter V—General Provisions for Loans Sec. 500. (a) Any person who shall have served in the active military or naval service of the United States at any time on or after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of the present war and who shall have been discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable after active service of ninety days or more, or by reason of an injury or disability incurred in service in line of duty, shall be eligible for the benefits of this title. Any such veteran may apply within two years after separation from the military or naval forces, or two years after termination of the war, whichever is the later date, but in no event more than five years after the termination of the war, to the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs for the guaranty by the Administrator of not to exceed 50 per centum of a loan or loans for any of the purposes specified in sections 501, 502 and 503: Provided, That the aggregate amount guaranteed shall not exceed $2,000. If the Administrator finds that the veteran is eligible for the benefits of this title and that the loan applied for appears practicable, the Administrator shall guarantee the payment of the part thereof as set forth in this title. (b) Interest for the first year on that part of the loan guaranteed by the Administrator shall be paid by the Administrator out of available appropriations. No security for the guaranty of a loan shall be required except the right to be subrogated to the lien rights of the holder of the obligation which is guaranteed: Provided, That pursuant to regulations to be issued by the Administrator the mortgagor and mortgagee shall agree that before beginning of foreclosure proceedings for default in payment of principal or interest due, the Administrator shall have at least thirty days’ notice with the option of bidding in the property on foreclosure or of refinancing the loan with any other agency or by any other means available. (c) Loans guaranteed by the Administrator under this title shall be payable under such terms and conditions as may be approved by the Administrator: Provided, That the liability under the guaranty, within the limitations of this title, shall decrease or increase pro rata with any decrease or increase of the amount of the unpaid portion of the obligation: Provided further, That loans guaranteed by the Administrator shall bear interest at a rate not exceeding 4 per centum per annum and shall be payable in full in not more than twenty years. The Administrator is authorized and directed to guarantee loans o veterans subject to the provisions of this title on approved applications made to persons, firms, associations, and corporations and to governmental agencies and corporations, either State or Federal.

124 • World War II, 1940–1947

Purchase or Construction of Homes Sec. 501. (a) Any application made by a veteran under this title for the guaranty of a loan to be used in purchasing residential property or in constructing a dwelling on unimproved property owned by him to be occupied as his home may be approved by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs if he finds—[Ed.:

That the proceeds will be used for payment of the property, that terms are in proportion to income, and that the condition of the property is satisfactory, and it is reasonably priced.]

Purchase of Farms and Farm Equipment Sec. 502. Any application made under this title for the guaranty of a loan to be used in purchasing any land, buildings, livestock, equipment, machinery, or implements, or in repairing, altering, or improving any buildings or equipment, to be used in farming operations conducted by the applicant, may be approved by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs if he finds—[Ed.: That

the proceeds will be used for farming operations, that there is reasonable likelihood of success, and that the price to be paid is reasonable.]

Purchase of Business Property Sec. 503. Any application made under this title for the guaranty of a loan to be used in purchasing any business, land, buildings, supplies, equipment, machinery, or tools, to be used by the applicant in pursuing a gainful occupation (other than farming) may be approved by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs if he finds—[Ed.: That the proceeds will be used in a gainful

occupation, there is likelihood of success and the prices are reasonable.] Sec. 504, 505. [Ed.: These are administrative provisions calling for the issuance of appropriate rules and regulations, servicing loans, and eligibility of qualifying veterans for loans under the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act.]

TITLE IV Chapter VI—Employment of Veterans Sec. 600. (a) In the enactment of the provisions of this title Congress declares as its intent and purpose that there shall be an effective job counseling and employment placement service for veterans, and that, to this end, policies shall be promulgated and administered, so as to provide for them the maximum of job opportunity in the field of gainful employment. For the purpose there is hereby created to cooperate with and assist the United States Employment Service, as established by the provisions of the Act of

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June 6, 1933, a Veterans’ Placement Service Board, which shall consist of the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, as Chairman, the Director of the national Selective Service System, and the Administrator of the Federal Security Agency, or whoever may have the responsibility of administering the functions of the United States Employment Service. The Board shall determine all matters of policy relating to the administration of the Veterans’ Employment Service of the United States Employment Service.

[Ed.: The remaining clauses and Sections of Title IV relate to duties of the Board, staff, cooperation with other Federal agencies, and annual estimates and reports of expenses.]

TITLE V Readjustment Allowances for Former Member of the Armed Forces who are Unemployed Sec. 700. (a) Any person who shall have served in the active military or naval service of the United States at any time after September 16, 1940, and prior to the termination of the present war, and who shall have been discharged or released from active service under conditions other than dishonorable, after active service of ninety days or more, or by reason of an injury or disability incurred in service in line of duty, shall be entitled, in accordance with the provisions of this title and regulations issued by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs pursuant thereto, to receive a readjustment allowance as provided herein for each week of unemployment, not to exceed a total of fiftytwo weeks, which (1) begins after the first Sunday of the third calendar month after the date of enactment hereof, and (2) occurs not later than two years after discharge or release or the termination of the war, whichever is the later date: Provided, That no such allowance shall be paid for any period for which he receives increased pension under part VII of Veterans Regulation 1 (a) or a subsistence allowance under part VIII of such regulation: Provided further, That no readjustment allowance shall be payable for any week commencing more than five years after the termination of hostilities in the present war.

[Ed.: The remaining chapters of Title V relate to monetary entitlements, administration of the readjustment provisions, and to claims, court procedures and penalties, and Title VI describes “General Administrative and Penal Provisions,” including reports, definitions of terms, and allowances and procedures for handling adjusted compensation.] * * *

126 • World War II, 1940–1947

The GI Bill was an extremely significant, and with respect to white veterans, successful effort to assist in demobilization, and in the creation of a highly trained, educated, and committed workforce. The Act also provided a substantial “good will,” among Americans that subsequently encouraged many young men and women to volunteer for military service. On the other hand, the discriminatory application of GI Bill benefits may have added impetus to the growing civil rights movements among African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans, beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the 1970s. Many veterans of World War II, and later Korea, became influential civil rights leaders. Not only did they insist that their wartime service entitled them to equal treatment as citizens, they observed that inequitable distribution of GI Bill benefits gave rise to all-white suburbs, decimated the tax base in many urban areas, and made desegregation of schools more difficult. It would take a revolution in U.S. civil rights laws to make possible the fulfillment of the promises made by the GI Bill. While the GI Bill has continued to have a lasting impact upon the American economy and military services, by 1948, demobilization ended, and the anticipated final global peace had already evaporated. The draft was reactivated, military forces were expanded, and arms and equipment modernized. For the next sixty years (1945–2005) defense spending rebounded to a persistent level of 5–10 percent of gross domestic product (Figure 6.5), but never approached the 35 percent levels of World War II—in part due to the fact that the American economy expanded more rapidly than did military expenditures.

Defense Budget as a Percent of GDP 40

Percent of GDP 34.5%

35 30

3.9% (2005)

25 20

Korea (1953) 11.7%

15

Vietnam (1968) 8.9%

Build Up (1986) 6.0% Gulf War (1991) 4.6%

10

GWOT

5 1945

1955

1965

1975

1985

1995

FIGURE 6.5 Defense Spending as a Percentage of GDP.

2005

World War II, 1940–1947 • 127

The post-World War II era is characterized by the overarching threat of a new global conflagration, fueled with atomic weapons and intercontinental missiles, intermittent regional warfare (as in Korea, and Vietnam), recurrent global crises and military engagements, and the continuing deployment of American military forces in disparate and diverse parts of the globe. Concurrently, the character and composition of American military forces changed.

QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. How did the United States procure its 16.2 million person armed services? 2. What incentives existed for military service in the World War II era? 3. What exemptions and exclusions existed? 4. How did minority groups fare in the processes for the procurement of military personnel? 5. Did the benefits and incentives provided veterans under the GI Bill alter previous traditions of volunteer, citizen-soldiers’ selective service? If so, how so? 6. Did World War II and its aftermath seem to alter the character and composition of the American military? If so, how so? 7. Is universal military service a reasonable or inviting alternative to contemporary procurement through volunteers and special incentives? 8. Is it important for the United States to maintain a “standing” military force?

CHAPTER

7

THE COLD WAR: KOREA, VIETNAM, AND THE CHANGING DIMENSIONS OF MILITARY SERVICE The three decades following the end of World War II were unique in terms of the central questions of this book. For the first time in United States history, the draft became what appeared to be a permanent fixture. Whether by coincidence or not, during the same period, the nation engaged in a series of undeclared and non-traditional wars. The “Cold War” and wars in Korea and Vietnam are familiar to most Americans. But during the same period the United States Armed Forces engaged in brief, but significant, combat missions in such disparate places as the Philippines and the Dominican Republic. For every American boy who came of age during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, the draft was a fact of life, as was the possibility of serving on any continent or in any ocean as the United States established hundreds of military bases around the world. And although the Selective Service System primarily drafted men for the Army, and the vast majority of men and women in the Armed Forces were volunteers, we cannot understand who served, how, why, and when, without reference to the draft between 1948 and 1973. Nor can we understand the very explicit relationship that developed during these years between military service and the rights of citizenship without some reference to various civil rights movements in the United States, and to anti-colonial nationalist revolutions throughout the Third World at the same time. At the close of World War II, the Allied powers divided administrative control over occupied German territories into four zones occupied separately by American, Russian, British, and French forces, with Berlin and East Germany, and much of Eastern Europe, including Poland, Bulgaria, and

The Cold War: Korea and Vietnam • 129

Yugoslavia, under the control of the Soviet Union. In the west, the Soviet Union unilaterally annexed the Kurile Islands, and regained the southern half of Sakhalin Island from Japan, while exercising control over Outer Mongolia, part of Manchuria, and northern Korea. The Soviet Union also began to support communist revolts in China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Turkey. The United States countered by implementing the Marshall Plan, devised largely by George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff during World War II, and after the war President Harry S. Truman’s Secretary of State. The Marshall Plan provided large-scale economic relief and support for recovering European economies, and was intended to stabilize the situation in Europe and deter communist incursion. A small part of the U.S. effort to rebuild Europe, seemingly insignificant to many at the time, was the return of the former French colony of Vietnam to France. In retrospect, this was the real beginning of what would twenty years later become the U.S. war in Vietnam. In June 1948, the Soviet Union imposed a blockade on American and Allied access to Berlin, which lay well within the Russian occupation zone. In this context, President Truman initiated three important developments that would shape service in the U.S. Armed Forces for the coming decades. Most famous of these was his executive order to racially integrate the Armed Forces. Second, he called for, and Congress obliged, a renewal of the draft. And third, he commissioned Assistant Secretary of War Gordon Gray to review the armed services manpower resources, and the readiness of the Reserve Forces. The “Gray Board” urgently recommended that each branch of the military forces sustain an organized reserve, and that those Reserve Forces should be integrated with the regular forces, and that the overall mission of the Reserve Forces should be to provide trained units and qualified officers to meet the needs of the active regular forces. By Executive Order on October 15, 1948, President Harry S. Truman directed that the Secretary of Defense and all departments of the Military Establishment should proceed without delay to utilize all regular components of the Armed Forces and to organize and train all reserve individuals and units to meet the anticipated needs of the military forces. That directive began the integration of the Reserves into the “ready” reserves of the Armed Forces. War was an option, but President Truman responded to the Berlin blockade with a Berlin airlift, ferrying supplies and relief to the beleaguered city. In April 1949, the United States joined Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Iceland, and Canada in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) providing that an attack against any member would be considered an attack against all. Russia lifted the blockade in May 1949, but announced in September that it had exploded an atomic weapon. The shadow of war darkened.

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That year civil wars in China swept away the Nationalist forces of General Chiang Kai Chek, and brought to power a communist government headed by Mao Tse-tung. In June 1950, communist North Korean forces struck across the 38th parallel into Korea. The United States committed troops under General Douglas MacArthur to the defense of South Korea, and received support from sixteen members of the United Nations, but the sudden onslaught by thirty-three Chinese divisions changed the dynamics of war to a desperate defense. The fragile post-World War II peace had turned to war in East Asia, and the conflict threatened to expand throughout the world. The United States increased its commitment of troops and money to the defense of South Korea, and to the defense of Europe. In 1950, Congress appropriated $1.5 billion to help build a NATO army, and in 1951, General Dwight D. Eisenhower was recalled to duty and placed in command of NATO forces in Europe. That same year armistice talks began with China and North Korea and continued even while battles were fought for the next two years, finally concluding in an uneasy truce along the 38th parallel. Over the next two decades “engagements” in diverse areas of the world, ranging from Egypt and Israel, to Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to Cuba and Panama, to Nationalist China and Vietnam consumed American dollars and military forces. In 1940, before Pearl Harbor, total expenditures of the federal government were $9 billion, including $1.8 billion for defense, representing approximately 9 percent of the total gross national product. By 1950, government expenditures had risen to $39 billion, of which $13.4 billion, or one-third of total expenditures, were for defense, and some 3.5 million men were in the military services. In 1953, at the height of the Korean War, U.S. military expenditures exceeded $44 billion and almost 60 percent of the total budget. By the close of the Korean War, some 33,642 Americans had died in combat. U.S. military commitments and expenditures for armaments and defense continued to grow. Responding to post-war civil rights movements that were often led by veterans of World War II, the President and military leaders became more sympathetic to the concerns of African Americans and women regarding segregation and unequal treatment in the Armed Forces. In 1948, Harry S. Truman as President and Commander in Chief of American military forces issued an executive order to assure that there “shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” The order, however, did not directly require the Armed Forces to implement racial integration, and top military officials did not initiate racial integration until base commanders began to do so on their own initiatives during the Korean War.

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DOCUMENT 7.1 EXECUTIVE ORDER 9981 ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON EQUALITY OF TREATMENT AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE ARMED FORCES WHEREAS it is essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s defense: NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, and as Commander in Chief of the armed services, it is hereby ordered as follows: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin. This policy shall be put into effect as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. There shall be created in the National Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services, which shall be composed of seven members to be designated by the President. The Committee is authorized on behalf of the President to examine into the rules, procedures and practices of the Armed Services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order. The Committee shall confer and advise the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, and shall make such recommendations to the President and to said Secretaries as in the judgment of the Committee will effectuate the policy hereof. All executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government are authorized and directed to cooperate with the Committee in its work, and to furnish the Committee such information or the services of such persons as the Committee may require in the performance of its duties. When requested by the Committee to do so, persons in the armed services or in any of the executive departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall testify before the Committee and shall make available for use of the Committee such documents and other information as the Committee may require.

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6.

The Committee shall continue to exist until such time as the President shall terminate its existence by Executive order.

* * * In 1955, the United States began sending advisors to the Republic of Vietnam. Somewhat like Korea, Vietnam had been divided into a northern and southern sector, with the northern sector becoming the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, and the south becoming the Republic of Vietnam headed by a titular emperor, Bao Dai, and a prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem. Ho Chi Minh was a popular leader throughout Vietnam dating back to the days of French colonialism. The French lost Vietnam to the Japanese during World War II. With the defeat of Japan, Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnamese independence, espoused the sentiments in the U.S. Declaration of Independence, and sought U.S. recognition of the new nation. Instead, the U.S., with its eye on the economic recovery of Europe, insisted on helping the French in re-establishing Vietnam as a French colony. The French were returned to Vietnam on U.S. naval vessels. The Vietnamese resisted through the guerrilla organization, the Vietminh, under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, and with apparently some support from the Soviet Union. A nine-year war ensued during which the U.S. heavily funded the French effort and provided other assistance through the Central Intelligence Agency. The Vietminh, under General Vo Nguyen Giap, soundly defeated the French in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu. The peace treaty agreed to in Geneva that year provided for a temporary division of Vietnam into north and south, with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh controlling the North, and the sometime former emperor, Bao Dai, in charge of the South. Free elections were to be held in 1956 to establish a national government for all of Vietnam. U.S. intelligence reports in 1955 predicted that Ho Chi Minh would win any national election with perhaps 80 percent of the vote. It was the high point of the Cold War, and given the Soviet Union’s support for Ho, President Eisenhower and his advisors felt they had no choice but to block the 1956 elections. They did so by arranging to place Ngo Dinh Diem in power in a southern Republic of Vietnam. It was then up to Diem to block the elections, which he succeeded in doing. Subsequently, the Vietminh (which consisted primarily of South Vietnamese) and the North Vietnamese worked throughout the South to destabilize the Diem regime, which required ever-increasing amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance. This resulted in the U.S. annually raising the number of military advisors stationed in Vietnam by small increments

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for the next five years. Then, in 1961, the U.S. received an “urgent appeal” for military assistance from South Vietnam and by the close of 1961 had committed some 3,000 troops to combating the insurgency. In 1963 Diem, a Roman Catholic, embarked on a brutal program of repression against the Buddhist majority of the country, and in response, U.S. officials approved his generals’ plan for a coup. In November 1963, just a few weeks before President John F. Kennedy was assassinated, Diem suffered the same fate at the hands of his generals. At that time, the U.S. had 16,000 troops on the ground there. The number of troops in South Vietnam grew to over 23,000 in 1964, rose to 184,000 in 1965, and soared to almost a half-million by 1966 as full-fledged combat with North Vietnam ensued. Between 1960 and 1973 over three million Americans served in Vietnam, and some forces remained in Indochina through mid-1975. The U.S. suffered the loss of over 56,000 lives, including 46,000 killed in action in Vietnam. Public support for the war faded and anti-war sentiment grew. In the years between 1969 and 1973, protests against the war in Vietnam and against the draft accelerated. There were anti-war and anti-draft demonstrations at colleges and universities across the nation. The organization, Vietnam Veterans against the War, exemplified the depth of the discontent, as did the fact that nationwide, enrollments in the Reserve Officers Training Corps dropped from 191,749 in 1966 to 72,459 in 1973. ROTC units had produced over half of all officers who served in Vietnam. Throughout the Cold War era, and in the combat in Vietnam, Regular Army, Army Reserves, and National Guard, and volunteers, as opposed to those enrolled under selective service, comprised a substantially greater part of American personnel in military service. One proposal to increase enlistment was Defense Secretary Robert McNamara’s Project 100,000 in 1966. This project lowered mental and physical standards for enlistment in order to recruit 100,000 so-called “disadvantaged” youth. In the words of a Department of Defense Report: We were convinced that a very high proportion of these men would qualify as fully satisfactory servicemen when exposed to the modern instructional techniques used in the Armed Forces. As a by-product, their service would prepare them for more productive lives when they returned to civilian life.

The recruitment effort focused especially on poor African-American youth, resulting in a 40 percent increase in Black enlistments. Numerous studies of this program show that these men not only tended to remain in the lowest ranks while in the Army, and were more likely to get the most dangerous combat assignments in Vietnam, but there was no measurable benefit to them when they left the service. The program was a public relations disaster

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and fed charges that the poor and men of color were suffering higher casualty rates than other Americans in Vietnam, a charge made by Martin Luther King, Jr., in his famous speech against the war in 1967. Added to such charges was the fact that men who had access to doctors, lawyers, and counselors—in other words, the more economically privileged—could manipulate the policy of exemptions and deferments under the Selective Service System. Further skewing things were student deferments for college students. College and university enrollments ballooned, and some faculty were reluctant to give low grades to draft-age males for fear it would cost the students their deferments, possibly resulting in assignment to Vietnam, and possibly even leading to their deaths. As the draft became a focus of much anti-war sentiment, many directed their ire at General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System. Hershey had served in the Selective Service Administration since the Great Depression. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed him Administrator effective July 31, 1941, and he served in that capacity until February 15, 1970. Much criticism of Hershey accused him of using the draft for political and other purposes not related to providing men for the Army. In some ways, Hershey willingly confirmed such accusations, arguing forcefully that the function of the draft was not only to coerce men into the Army, but into jobs the government wanted them in. He spelled this out in a famous memo released in 1965 known as the “Channeling Memo.” Furthermore, Hershey had approved “punitive inductions” of men who publicly protested the wars in Korea and Vietnam, a practice the Supreme Court would rule illegal.

DOCUMENT 7.2 CHANNELING MANPOWER GENERAL LEWIS B. HERSHEY, DIRECTOR, SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, 1965 One of the major products of the Selective Service classification process is the channeling of manpower into many endeavors and occupations; activities that are in the national interest. This function is a counterpart and amplification of the System’s responsibility to deliver manpower to the armed forces in such a manner as to reduce to a minimum any adverse effect upon the national health, safety, interest, and progress. By identifying and applying this process intelligently the System is able not only to minimize any adverse effect, but to exert an effect beneficial to the national health, safety, and interest. The line dividing the primary function of armed forces manpower procurement from the process of channeling manpower into civilian support is often

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finely drawn. The process of channeling by not taking men from certain activities who are otherwise liable for service, or by giving deferments to qualified men in certain occupations, is actual procurement by inducement of manpower of civilian activities which are manifestly in the national interest . . . Registrants and their employers are encouraged and required to make available to the classifying authorities detailed evidence as to the occupations and activities in which registrants are engaged. It is not necessary for any registrant to specifically request deferment, but his selective service file must contain sufficient current evidence on which can be based a proper determination as to whether he should remain where he is or be made available for service. Since occupational deferments are granted for no more than a year at a time, a process of periodically receiving current information and repeated review assures that every deferred registrant continues to contribute to the overall national good. This reminds him of the basis of his deferment. The skills as well as the activities are periodically reevaluated. A critical skill that is not employed in an essential activity does not qualify for deferment. It is in this atmosphere that the young man registers at age 18 and pressure begins to force his choice. He does not have the inhibitions that a philosophy of universal service in uniform would engender. The door is open for him as a student to qualify if capable in a skill needed by his nation. He has many choices and he is prodded to make a decision. The psychological effect of this circumstantial climate depends upon the individual, his sense of good citizenship, his love of country and its way of life. He can obtain a sense of well being and satisfaction that he is doing as a civilian what will help his country most. This process encourages him to put forth his best effort and removes to some degree the stigma that has been attached to being out of uniform. In the less patriotic and more selfish individual it engenders a sense of fear, uncertainty, and dissatisfaction which motivates him, nevertheless, in the same directions. He complains of the uncertainty which he must endure; he would like to be able to do as he pleases; he would appreciate a certain future with no prospect of military service or civilian contribution, but he complies with the needs of the national health, safety, or interest—or he is denied deferment. Throughout his career as a student, the pressure—the threat of loss of deferment—continues. It continues with equal intensity after graduation. His local board requires periodic reports to find out what he is up to. He is impelled to pursue his skill rather than embark upon some less important enterprise and is encouraged to apply high skill in an essential activity in the national interest. The loss of deferred status is the consequence for the individual who has acquired the skill and either does not use it, or uses it in a nonessential activity.

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* * * Hershey’s “Channeling Memo” generated strong reactions from those who thought he was advocating government-directed military and civilian employment, and those who believed he was criticizing youth for making “wrong choices.” The criticism came on the heels of the Korean War, and the growing engagement of American troops in Vietnam. Hershey became a lightning rod for the rising anti-war sentiments and protests. But, the fact was that the U.S. Military was facing a decline in volunteers, while troop demands were growing dramatically. In 1966, Congress acted to try to resolve the criticism by the preparation and publication of a Congressional Document “clarifying” Hershey’s (and Congress’s) position on volunteers, selective service, and the draft.

DOCUMENT 7.3 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: PRESENT OPERATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AND LOCAL DRAFT BOARDS [DOCUMENT NO. 82, U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC, 1966] The Selective Service System exists to insure the maintenance of the Armed Forces necessary for our defense. To insure that the Nation shall be prepared to raise and support the military forces required, the Congress in the law imposed on all men within liable age the obligation to perform military service. Congress created the Selective Service System to determine through local board classification decisions the order in which men are called to discharge the military obligation. This order is determined by the numbers of men needed by the Armed Forces and by the needs of the civilian society which are met through temporary deferment of the individual’s military service. These two considerations constitute the national interest which governs local board classifications. Under the law and regulations every registrant is deemed available for service (Class I-A) until it is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the local board that he should be temporarily deferred or exempt in the national interest. A registrant who is deferred earns no vested right to the deferment. If the needs of the Armed Forces or pertinent information about the individual convince the local board that his deferment is no longer in the national interest, he again becomes available for the service which he is obligated to perform under the law. During the current build up of the Armed Forces, the demands for

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manpower by the Armed Forces have increased several fold over a year ago. Monthly draft calls have been in the 30,000 to 40,000 range. Enlistments have increased substantially, a major part of them being traceable directly to the existence of the selective service obligation and local board processing. For example, in the last 5 months about 180,000 men have enlisted after they had been examined and found qualified for induction, many of them after induction orders had been mailed. In the same period, local boards provided about 170,000 inductees to the Armed Forces. These increased demands on the Nation’s manpower resource do not permit the continued liberal deferments of a year ago. The available manpower 19–26 has steadily declined through induction, enlistment and failure to qualify under Armed Forces medical, mental, and moral standards. In order to maintain a source for inductions and enlistments the Selective Service System is faced with the necessity of returning to class I-A (available for service) some men currently deferred. The largest deferred categories from which additional manpower can be made available are (1) those men deferred because they do not meet current Armed Forces standards, but who would be qualified under lower standards such as would prevail, for example, in time of war; (2) fathers and persons with other dependents who would suffer extreme hardship if the registrant were inducted; and (3) students. It has been determined that the student population should be screened more closely. To that end, the System is instituting a program similar to that used during and after Korea of considering a student’s standing in his class or his score on a special test which will be made available to any student desiring to take it in May and June of this year. These criteria are advisory only as the law provides that no local board can be required to defer a student solely on the basis of any test score, grades, class standing, and similar criteria.

[Ed.: Hershey’s memorandum then describes the sequences for selection of men to serve, and notes that Armed Forces Examining Stations currently are examining nearly 200,000 registrants each month to determine their status for selection. Next, the memorandum reviews the various Selective Service Classifications (seventeen total) from I-A (Available), to V-A (Being over the Age for Service).] Selective Service is the oldest and most universal method of raising Armed Forces. Modern selective service in the United States dates from September 1940, and has been continuous since that time, except for a brief period from March 1947 to June 1948. Even during the period March 1947 to June 1948, when an active Selective Service System was not in operation, the Congress provided by law for the Office of Selective Service Records to preserve the

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knowledge and methods of selective service. Selective service in the United States is based on the accepted principle of the universal obligation and privilege of citizens to defend the Nation. The present Selective Service System is not an experiment. The history of compulsory military service in this country has made the fact abundantly clear. No system of compulsory service in this country could long endure without the support of the people. The people of the country will support a compulsory system only to the extent that they themselves operate it. The Selective Service System is, therefore, founded upon the grassroots principle, in which boards made up of citizens in each community determine when registrants should be made available for military service. There are more than 4,000 of these local boards located in every community throughout the Nation. More than 40,000 citizens contribute their services without pay as members of these local boards, and in various capacities as advisors to the local boards and to the registrants. The selective service law further recognizes the importance of the decentralization principle by making the Governor of each State the nominal head of selective service within his State. The law further requires a State headquarters in each of the States, and provides for a State director in each to administer the State headquarters and to represent the Governor. The State director and local board members are appointed by the President, upon recommendation of the Governor.

* * * Requests for student deferments rose throughout the course of the Vietnam War, as did claims for draft deferment because of being a conscientious objector. Many requests for deferment on the basis of being a conscientious objector were submitted by men who did not claim affiliation with traditional peace churches. This forced the courts to consider the meaning of the Selective Service Act’s requirement that conscientious objectors base their claims on “religious training and belief.” Others claimed objection only to participation in the Vietnam War, not to all war, as required by the law. Related to both of these issues was the question of how and when individuals came to their opposition to participation in war. Many soldiers did not consider the question until they experienced combat. Could moral opposition to participation in war be rooted in religious training and belief if a soldier arrived at it as a result of combat? Each of these questions would reach the Supreme Court—some several times between 1964 and 1973. The precedent-setting case, to which all subsequent cases involving conscientious objectors referred, was United States v. Seeger. It was a case that began in 1953, but was not finally decided until 1965.

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DOCUMENT 7.4 U.S. SUPREME COURT, UNITED STATES V. SEEGER, 1965 380 U.S. 163 (1965) UNITED STATES v. SEEGER. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 50. Argued November 16–17, 1964. Decided March 8, 1965.* Seeger was convicted in the District Court for the Southern District of New York of having refused to submit to induction in the armed forces. He was originally classified 1-A in 1953 by his local board, but this classification was changed in 1955 to 2-S (student) and he remained in this status until 1958 when he was reclassified 1-A. He first claimed exemption as a conscientious objector in 1957 after successive annual renewals of his student classification. Although he did not adopt verbatim the printed Selective Service System form, he declared that he was conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of his “religious” belief; that he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, “rather than answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’”; that his “skepticism or disbelief in the existence of God” did “not necessarily mean lack of faith in anything whatsoever”; that his was a “belief in and devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith in a purely ethical creed.” R. 69-70, 73. He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual and moral integrity “without belief in God, except in the remotest sense.” R. 73. His belief was found to be sincere, honest, and made in good faith; and his conscientious objection to be based upon individual training and belief, both of which included research in religious and cultural fields. Seeger’s claim, however, was denied solely because it was not based upon a “belief in a relation to a Supreme Being” as required by 6 (j) of the Act. At trial Seeger’s counsel admitted that Seeger’s belief was not in relation to a Supreme Being as commonly understood, but contended that he was entitled to the exemption because “under the present law Mr. Seeger’s position would also include definitions of religion which have been stated more recently,” R. 49, and could be “accommodated” under the definition of religious training and belief in the Act, R. 53. He was convicted and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Supreme Being requirement of the section distinguished “between internally derived and externally compelled beliefs” and was, therefore, an “impermissible classification” under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 326 F.2d 846. The validity of what he believes cannot be questioned. Some theologians, and indeed some examiners, might be tempted to question the existence of

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the registrant’s “Supreme Being” or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government. AS MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS stated in United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944): “Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be incomprehensible to others.” Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because they consider them “incomprehensible.” Their task is to decide whether the beliefs professed by a registrant are sincerely held and whether they are, in his own scheme of things, religious. But we hasten to emphasize that while the “truth” of a belief is not open to question, there remains the significant question whether it is “truly held.” This is the threshold question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case. It is, of course, a question of fact––a prime consideration to the validity of every claim for exemption as a conscientious objector. The Act provides a comprehensive scheme for assisting the Appeal Boards in making this determination, placing at their service the facilities of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and hearing officers. Finally, we would point out that in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), this Court held that: The provision making the decisions of the local boards ‘final’ means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are final even though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant.

APPLICATION OF 6 (J) TO THE INSTANT CASES. As we noted earlier, the statutory definition excepts those registrants whose beliefs are based on a “merely personal moral code.” The records in these cases, however, show that at no time did any one of the applicants suggest that his objection was based on a “merely personal moral code.” Indeed at the outset each of them claimed in his application that his objection was based on a religious belief. We have construed the statutory definition broadly and it follows that any exception to it must be interpreted narrowly. The use by Congress of the words “merely personal” seems to us to restrict the exception to a moral code which is not only personal but which is the sole

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basis for the registrant’s belief and is in no way related to a Supreme Being. It follows, therefore, that if the claimed religious beliefs of the respective registrants in these cases meet the test that we lay down then their objections cannot be based on a “merely personal” moral code. In Seeger, No. 50, the Court of Appeals failed to find sufficient “externally compelled beliefs.” However, it did find that “it would seem impossible to say with assurance that [Seeger] is not bowing to ‘external commands’ in virtually the same sense as is the objector who defers to the will of a supernatural power.” 326 F.2d, at 853. It found little distinction between Jakobson’s devotion to a mystical force of “Godness” and Seeger’s compulsion to “goodness.” Of course, as we have said, the statute does not distinguish between externally and internally derived beliefs. Such a determination would, as the Court of Appeals observed, prove impossible as a practical matter, and we have found that Congress intended no such distinction. The Court of Appeals also found that there was no question of the applicant’s sincerity. He was a product of a devout Roman Catholic home; he was a close student of Quaker beliefs from which he said “much of [his] thought is derived”; he approved of their opposition to war in any form; he devoted his spare hours to the American Friends Service Committee and was assigned to hospital duty. In summary, Seeger professed “religious belief” and “religious faith.” He did not disavow any belief “in a relation to a Supreme Being”; indeed he stated that “the cosmic order does, perhaps, suggest a creative intelligence.” He decried the tremendous “spiritual” price man must pay for his willingness to destroy human life. In light of his beliefs and the unquestioned sincerity with which he held them, we think the Board, had it applied the test we propose today, would have granted him the exemption. We think it clear that the beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers. We are reminded once more of Dr. Tillich’s thoughts: And if that word [God] has not much meaning for you, translate it, and speak of the depths of your life, of the source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously without any reservation. Perhaps, in order to do so, you must forget everything traditional that you have learned about God. Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations 57 (1948). It may be that Seeger did not clearly demonstrate what his beliefs were with regard to the usual understanding of the term “Supreme Being.” But as we have said, Congress did not intend that to be the test.

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* * * The Supreme Court expanded its Seeger ruling in 1970 in the case of Welsh v. United States. In that case, it ruled that even when a claimant insisted that his beliefs were not religious, local draft boards must grant the conscientious objector claim if the beliefs otherwise meet the requirements, and the belief “occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualified for the exemption.” Because of the Vietnam quagmire, and the related unrest at home, Lyndon Johnson chose not to run for reelection in 1968. Republican Richard Nixon was elected on the promise of a “secret plan to end the war,” and a proposal to phase out the draft. In rapid succession during 1969 and 1970, Nixon eliminated student deferments, instituted a draft lottery, and fired Director of Selective Service General Lewis B. Hershey effective February 15, 1970. Getting rid of Hershey probably did not earn President Nixon points with the anti-war movement, but it did remove a flashpoint. The implementation of a “draft lottery” took a great deal of wind out of the sails of the anti-war movement on campuses. Each draft registrant now had a number that told him how likely he was to be drafted. More than half of draft-age men instantly knew they probably would not be drafted. The lottery changed the order of call. In the past, local draft boards called the oldest available men first, or those most likely to pass beyond draft liability. This meant that the older a draft registrant got, the more likely he was to be drafted, but older registrants were also more likely to be politically active. This fueled the anti-war and anti-draft movements. Under the lottery, men with the lowest lottery numbers were called first. With the end of student deferments, this meant the Army immediately began to induct many more 18-year-olds than before. They now drafted many young men before they had formed strong views on the war, or had become politically active. From the start of his presidency in 1969, Richard Nixon was committed to ending the draft. He had two reasons: First, it violated his “small r” republican ideology; and second, he believed the draft was a primary factor fueling the anti-war movement. At the beginning of his term he appointed a commission to study the idea of an All-Volunteer Army. One year later, the Commission enthusiastically endorsed the idea. In 1972, President Nixon further weakened the anti-war movement when he announced that no more draftees would be sent to Vietnam. U.S. forces in Vietnam would henceforth consist solely of volunteers. Six months later, at the beginning of 1973, the President announced he was suspending draft calls and would not ask Congress to renew the President’s authority to induct men under the Selective Service System when it expired June 30, 1973. The All-Volunteer Army had begun.

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DOCUMENT 7.5 SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE, 1970 OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY The White House February 21, 1970 The President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force today recommended prompt enactment of pay increases and other reforms which would allow the elimination of the draft when the present Selective Service Act expires on June 30, 1971. The Commission said it believes “that the nation’s interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective standby draft, than by a mixed force of volunteers and conscripts; that steps should be taken promptly to move in this direction; and that the first indispensable step is to remove the present inequity in the pay of men serving their first term in the armed forces.” The Commission, headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates, wound up nine months’ work by presenting a report to the President which calls for: 1) An increase in basic pay, primarily for first-term servicemen; 2) increases in proficiency and reserve pay; 3) greater recruiting efforts; and 4) other recommended improvements in the management of military personnel. The Commission believes that if these reforms are enacted this year, enough volunteers would be attracted to the service to permit a transition to a wholly voluntary armed force in 1971 with a standby draft available if needed. The standby draft would be activated only by joint resolution of the Congress upon the request of the President. The Commission emphasized that the standby draft, together with the ready reserves, would maintain the nation’s ability to meet any crisis. A return to an all-volunteer force, said the report, would “minimize government interference with the freedom of the individual to determine his own life in accord with his own values, “while removing present inequities for first-term servicemen and promoting the efficiency and dignity of the armed forces. Serious inequity in the pay for first-term servicemen has arisen because conscription has been available to maintain the strength of the armed forces. First term pay has lagged behind pay for the career force since 1948, until it is now about 60 percent of comparable civilian pay. Similarly, the pay of first-term officers has not kept up with that of more experienced officers or comparable civilians.” No attempt was made to judge the size of the armed forces necessary to maintain U.S. defenses. Instead, the Commission accepted a range of

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estimates made for planning purposes which contemplate future U.S. forces somewhere between two million and three million men. The Commission estimates that an all-volunteer force of two and a half million men, roughly the size of the pre-Vietnam force, would require about 325,000 enlistments a year. The best available data indicates that currently about 250,000 men a year are “true” Volunteers who would enlist even in the absence of the draft. To maintain a two and a half million man force, therefore, the Commission foresees the need for about 75,000 additional volunteers annually from among the one and a half million men who each year turn 19 and who meet present physical, mental and moral standards. An all-volunteer force of three million men, approximately the current level, would require about 150,000 additional enlistments each year from the one and a half million man eligible pool. Budget expenses are lower for a force containing conscripts because first-term servicemen are required to serve at low pay rates. If the draft were ended, first-term servicemen would cease to pay the tax-in-kind inherent in conscription. The budget increase, reflecting the higher pay these men would receive, makes it appear that a volunteer force costs more than a partly conscripted force. In practice, the budget increase represents a shift in tax burden, rather than a real cost. An all-volunteer force will lower real costs through reduced turnover and greater efficiency in using manpower. The Commission investigated at length several of the objections frequently raised against an all-volunteer armed force and noted that these objections usually overlook the fact that about two million men in the present force are career personnel or true volunteers. Although some argue that an allvolunteer force would include a disproportionate number of the black and the poor, the Commission said the evidence indicates that an all-volunteer force will not differ significantly in composition from the present mixed force of volunteers and conscripts. Concern expressed about the growth of a separate “military ethos” within an all-volunteer armed force neglect the fact that the nation has already an armed forced manned primarily by volunteers. Eliminating the minority of conscripts and draft-induced volunteers from the lower enlisted and firstterm officer ranks will not affect relations between the military and either civilian authorities or the rest of society.

* * * A major concern for those in favor of an all-volunteer army was the declining morale in the Armed Forces as a result of dissatisfaction with the war in Vietnam. This was exacerbated by an erosion of respect for military personnel in the civilian public. Thus, in the early 1970s, each branch of

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the military embarked on a series of initiatives to improve life for military personnel and raise their status in the public’s eye. One issue that each service addressed in some way was the role of women. Since World War I there had been limited opportunities for women to enlist. Once in the military, the occupational specialties available to them were also limited. Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s, was a popular figure whose reform efforts became legendary. A 1972 memo from Admiral Zumwalt proposed to change conditions for women in the Navy:

DOCUMENT 7.6 EQUAL RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN THE NAVY, 1972 CNO {Z-116} TO: NAVOP UNCLAS//N05350// 071115Z AUG 72 1.

2.

There has been much discussion and debate with respect to equal opportunity for women in our country over the past few years. My position with respect to women in the navy is that they have historically played a significant role in the accomplishment of our naval mission. However, I believe we can do far more than we have in the past in according women equal opportunity to contribute their extensive talents and to achieve full professional status. Moreover, the imminence of an all volunteer force has heightened the importance of women as a vital personnel resource. I foresee that in the near future we may very well have authority to utilize officer and enlisted women on board ships. In view of this possibility we must be in a position to utilize women’s talents to help us achieve the size navy we need under an all volunteer force environment and still maintain the sea shore rotation goals for all naval personnel towards which we have been working. To this end the secretary of the navy and I have established a task force to look at all laws, regulations and policies that must be changed in order to eliminate any disadvantages to women resulting from either legal or attitudinal restrictions. As another step toward ensuring that women in the navy will have equal opportunity to contribute their talents and background to accomplishment of our missions, we are taking the following actions:

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1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

7. 8.

In addition to the enlisted ratings that have recently been opened, authorize limited entry of enlisted women into all ratings. The ultimate goal, assignment of women to ships at sea, will be timed to coincide with full implementation of pending legislation. As an immediate step, a limited number of officer and enlisted women are being assigned to the ship’s company of USS Sanctuary as a pilot program. This program will provide valuable planning information regarding the prospective increased utilization of women at sea. Pending formal changes to navy regulations suspend restrictions regarding women succeeding to command ashore and assign them accordingly. Accept applications from women officers for the chaplain and civil engineer corps, thereby opening all staff corps to women. Expand assignment of technically qualified unrestricted line women to restricted line billets and, at the time of legislative authorization, permit them to request designator changes. Offer various paths of progression to flag rank within the technical, managerial spectrum in essentially the same manner as we are contemplating for male officers. Assign the detailing of unrestricted women officers to their cognizant grade detailers. Increase opportunity for women’s professional growth by: 1. 2.

9.

Equalize selection criteria for naval training by: 1. 2.

3.

eliminating the pattern of assigning women exclusively to certain billets, and assigning qualified women to the full spectrum of challenging billets, including those of briefers, aides, detailers, placement/rating control officers, attaches, service college faculty members, executive assistants, special assistants to cno, maags/missions, senior enlisted advisors, pep, etc.

opening midshipmen programs to women at all NROTC CAMPUSES effective in FY-74 and considering women for selection to joint colleges (national war college/industrial college of the armed forces).

Finally, I enjoin all commanding officers and others in positions of authority to actively reflect the spirit and intent of this message in

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their own command regulations, policies and actions. Specifically, I expect each commanding officer to: 1.

2.

Initiate similar equalization actions in matters within their purview to ensure that women are accorded full trust and responsibility to function in their assigned position or specialty. Be guided by standards of duty, performance and discipline which are truly equitable for both women and men.

In summary, we all must actively work together in order that we may more equitably include women in our one-navy concept. E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., ADMIRAL, U.S. NAVY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

* * * In 1973, as the Army transitioned from a force of mixed draftees and volunteers, the belligerents accepted the terms of the Paris Peace Agreements. The United States began to withdraw forces from South Vietnam. Draft calls came to an end, and the U.S. began downsizing military forces under the Department of Defense Appropriation Act of 1974:

DOCUMENT 7.7 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1974 PUBLIC LAW 93-155 To authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1974 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tacked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces, and the military training student loads, and for other purposes. H.R. 9286. November 16, 1973.

[Ed.: The Defense Appropriation Act of 1973 helps define the parameters and character of the post-Korea, Vietnam, Cold War military establishment that endured with relatively few changes through the close of the twentieth

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century. Titles III—Active Forces, IV—Reserve Forces, and V—Military Training Student Loads only are reproduced in the following text for purposes of illustrating the dimensions of military service during the last quarter of the century. Although not included, specific procurement appropriations for aircraft, missile and “other” weapons, for research, development, test, and evaluation, specific locations for the expenditure of funds relating to anti-ballistic missile program development, and the creation of a “Defense Manpower (Study) Commission” are indicative of the changing character of warfare.]

TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES Sec. 301. (a) For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, and ending June 30, 1974, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an end strength for active duty personnel as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The Army, 803,806 The Navy, 566,320 The Marine Corps, 196,419 The Air Force, 666,357

(b) The end strength for active duty personnel prescribed in subsection (a) of this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, shall be reduced by 43,000. Such reduction shall be apportioned among the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force in such manner as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe, except that in applying any portion of such reduction to any military department, the reduction shall be applied to the maximum extent practicable to the support forces of such military department. The Secretary of Defense shall report to the Congress within 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act on the manner in which this reduction is to be apportioned among the military departments and among the mission categories described in the Military Manpower Requirements Report. This report shall include the rationale for each reduction. (c) The Committee on Armed Services of the House shall report to the House by April 1, 1974, a detailed and independent study on the advisability of maintaining our present military commitment to Europe in view of the current economic and military situation in Europe. Sec. 302. In computing the authorized end strength for the active duty personnel of any component of the Armed Forces for any fiscal year, there shall not be included in the computation members of the Ready Reserve of such component ordered to active duty under the provisions of section 673 of title 10, United States Code, members of the Army National Guard or

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members of the Air National Guard called into Federal service under section 3500 or 8500, as the case may be, of title 10, United States Code, members of the militia of any State called into Federal service under chapter 15 of title 10, United States Code, or persons ordered to active duty for training. Sec. 303. (a) Section 673 of title 10 United States Code, is amended by adding at the end thereof a new subsection as follows: (d) Whenever one or more units of the Ready Reserve are ordered to active duty, the President shall, on the first day of the second fiscal year quarter immediately following the quarter in which the first unit or units are ordered to active duty and on the first day of each succeeding six-month period thereafter, so long as such unit is retained on active duty, submit a report to the Congress regarding the necessity for such units or units being ordered to and retained on active duty. The President shall include in each such report a statement of the mission of each such unit ordered to active duty, an evaluation of such unit’s performance of that mission, where each such unit is being deployed at the time of the report, and such other information regarding each unit as the President deems appropriate. The amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall be effective with respect to any unit of the Ready Reserve ordered to active duty on or after the date of enactment of this Act.

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES Sec. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, and ending June 30, 1974, the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programmed to attain an average strength of not less than the following: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

The Army National Guard of the United States, 379,144 The Army Reserve, 232,591 The Naval Reserve, 119,231 The Marine Corps Reserve, 39,735 The Air National Guard of the United States, 92,291 The Air Force Reserve, 49,773 The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,300

Sec. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training

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or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their consent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever such units or such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such Reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

TITLE V—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS Sec. 501. (a) For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1973, and ending June 30, 1974, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an average military training student load as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

The Army, 89,200 The Navy, 75,800 The Marine Corps, 28,000 The Air Force, 55,100 The Army National Guard of the United States, 19,100 The Army Reserve, 59,900 The Naval Reserve, 17,400 The Marine Corps Reserve, 6,700 The Air National Guard of the United States, 4,600 The Air Force Reserve, 24,300

(b) The average military training student loads for the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force prescribed in subsection (a) of this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1974, shall be reduced consistent with the overall reduction in manpower provided in title III of this Act. Such reduction shall be apportioned among the Army, the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Air Force in such manner as the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe.

[Ed.: Titles VI, Anti-Ballistic Missile Program—Limitations on Deployment; VII—Study Commission, and VIII—General Provisions, are omitted.] Approved November 16, 1973.

* * * The return to a wholly volunteer force was at least in part a reasoned response to the rapidly changing conditions and character of military encounters. Combat in Korea, and Vietnam in particular, contributed to the inception of new air, sea, land tactics that required the close integration and

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cooperation of military forces in the field. Air cavalrymen and helicopters replaced the horsemen of times past. Smart bombs and increasingly sophisticated weaponry displaced the bombardment style of artillery combat. Night vision, personal armaments and flak jackets, and close air, and (at times) sea support changed the character of infantry combat. Combat required smaller numbers of troops, but technically sophisticated and better-trained troops. Apparent threats to national security occurred suddenly and were of increasingly diverse character and in often distant and scattered locales—and required instant response. Military planners now believed that modern warfare no longer gave the United States the time and luxury of converting from peacetime production to war production, or of recruiting and training civilians for combat. Thus the end of the draft in 1973 was less than a cataclysmic event and fit the changing methods of warfare. The size of standing military forces had declined, but their character had changed immeasurably. Table 7.1 briefly indicates the total numbers inducted under Selective Service between 1948 and 1973, when the military services again became fully dependent upon the volunteer. The Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act of 1974 reflected, in part, Congressional response to the public’s discontent with the Vietnam War, but also, it confronted the new realities of global politics and war. The Act helped determine the parameters and character of the postKorea, Vietnam, Cold War military establishment. It defined the character of arms, armament, and military personnel requirements through the close of the twentieth century. In addition to the 1974 Defense Appropriations Act, in 1973 Congress approved the Total Force Policy Act which now fully integrated the National Guard as a major component of the military ready-reserve. In its appropriations of that year, Congress authorized the strength of the active duty personnel as follows: Army, 803,806 Navy, 566,320 Marine Corps, 196,419 Air Force, 666,357 Congress also set the Reserve manpower of the Armed Forces at an average strength of not less than the following for each component: Army National Guard, 379,144 Army Reserve, 232,591 Naval Reserve, 119,231

152 • The Cold War: Korea and Vietnam Table 7.1 Selective Service: Induction by Years, 1948–1973 Year

Number Inducted Under Selective Service

1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973

20,348 9,781 219,771 551,806 438,479 471,806 253,230 152,777 137,940 138,504 142,246 96,153 86,602 118,586 82,060 119,265 112,286 230,991 382,010 228,263 296,406 283,586 162,746 94,092 49,514 646

Source: Selective Service System.

Marine Corps Reserve, 39,735 Air National Guard, 92,291 Air Force Reserve, 49,773 Coast Guard Reserve, 11,300 Finally, Congress authorized student military training capacities (including ROTC) of approximately 390,000 for the combined Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, National Guard, and Reserve forces. The earlier Appropriations Act also established to study and investigate the overall manpower requirements of the Department of Defense for the short and long terms, and to evaluate the most effective utilization and deployment of available human resources.

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Following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam under the Paris peace agreements, North Vietnamese armies struck South Vietnam, seized the capital city, and reunited the country with communist North Vietnam. The war, if it had not been so before, was irrevocably lost, and the character of war had changed markedly. Concurrently, global military commitments actually became greater and more diverse. Although the draft had ended in 1973, registration for the draft continued a few years, and then lapsed for several years in the late 1970s. Then, in 1980, following a series of military and foreign policy crises in such places as Afghanistan and Iran, President Carter chose to renew draft registration, and asked Congress to amend the Selective Service Act to require women, as well as men, to register. Congress declined to include women, which ultimately led to a Supreme Court decision on the question.

DOCUMENT 7.8 U.S. SUPREME COURT, ROSTKER V. GOLDBERG, 1981 453 U.S. 57 (1981), ROSTKER, DIRECTOR OF SELECTIVE SERVICE V. GOLDBERG ET AL. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA. NO. 80-251. ARGUED MARCH 24, 1981. DECIDED JUNE 25, 1981. The Military Selective Service Act (Act) authorizes the President to require the registration for possible military service of males but not females, the purpose of registration being to facilitate any eventual conscription under the Act. Registration for the draft was discontinued by Presidential Proclamation in 1975 (the Act was amended in 1973 to preclude conscription), but as the result of a crisis in Southwestern Asia, President Carter decided in 1980 that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process, and sought Congress’ allocation of funds for that purpose. He also recommended that Congress amend the Act to permit the registration and conscription of women as well as men. Although agreeing that it was necessary to reactivate the registration process, Congress allocated only those funds necessary to register males and declined to amend the Act to permit the registration of women. Thereafter, the President ordered the registration of specified groups of young men. In a lawsuit brought by several men challenging the Act’s constitutionality, a three-judge District Court ultimately held that the Act’s gender-based discrimination violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and enjoined registration under the Act. Held: The Act’s registration provisions do not violate the Fifth Amendment. Congress acted well within its constitutional authority to raise

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and regulate armies and navies when it authorized the registration of men and not women. Pp. 64–83. (a) The customary deference accorded Congress’ judgments is particularly appropriate when, as here, Congress specifically considered the question of the Act’s constitutionality, and perhaps in no area has the Court accorded Congress greater deference than in the area of national defense and military affairs. While Congress is not free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs, this Court must be particularly careful not to substitute its judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or its own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable evaluation by the Legislative Branch. Congress carefully considered whether to register only males for potential conscription or whether to register both sexes, and its broad constitutional authority [453 U.S. 57, 58] cannot be ignored in considering the constitutionality of its studied choice of one alternative in preference to the other. Pp. 64–72. (b) The question of registering women was extensively considered by Congress in hearings held in response to the President’s request for authorization to register women, and its decision to exempt women was not the accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking about women. Since Congress thoroughly reconsidered the question of exempting women from the Act in 1980, the Act’s constitutionality need not be considered solely on the basis of the views expressed by Congress in 1948, when the Act was first enacted in its modern form. Congress’ determination that any future draft would be characterized by a need for combat troops was sufficiently supported by testimony adduced at the hearings so that the courts are not free to make their own judgment on the question. And since women are excluded from combat service by statute or military policy, men and women are simply not similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft, and Congress’ decision to authorize the registration of only men, therefore, does not violate the Due Process Clause. The testimony of executive and military officials before Congress showed that the argument for registering women was based on considerations of equity, but Congress was entitled, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, to focus on the question of military need rather than “equity.” The District Court, undertaking an independent evaluation of the evidence, exceeded its authority in ignoring Congress’ conclusions that whatever the need for women for noncombat roles during mobilization, it could be met by volunteers, and that staffing noncombat positions with women during a mobilization would be positively detrimental to the important goal of military flexibility. Pp. 72–83. 509 F. Supp. 586, reversed. REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., post, p. 83, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 86, filed dissenting opinions, in which BRENNAN, J., joined.

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* * * American men, and not women, must still register for the draft when they turn 18, but otherwise the Selective Service System remained in the background of military planning. Anti-war sentiments fanned during the Vietnam War contributed to Lyndon B. Johnson’s decision not to seek re-election as President in 1968. Richard M. Nixon won the election based in part on an implied promise to end the war in Vietnam by turning the war over to South Vietnam, a process labeled by the media as the “Vietnamization” of the war effort. More than three million American soldiers, most of them volunteers, served in Vietnam between 1960 and January 23, 1973, when a formal cease-fire was signed in Paris. Some troops remained in nearby Indochina into mid-1975. Some 46,000 American soldiers were killed in action during the conflict. “War” had become increasingly unpopular and the recruitment of volunteers for military service increasingly difficult. The Vietnam War also began to change the character of warfare. The now traditional warfare characterized by the Civil War, World War I, and World War II—dominated by large armies in the field in opposition to each other—had given way to the quagmire of war that more closely characterized the American colonial and frontier experiences. In the post-Vietnam War era, military strategists began to consider the realities of a threeday war—the day the war began, the day the war was fought, and the day after the war. U.S. military leaders wanted to maintain small combat-ready, well-trained, quickly deployable Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force elements equipped with the most advanced technology. Special forces, special weapons, satellite and communications surveillance, and preemptive operations became increasingly common. Military operations abroad occurred in almost every year from the end World War II through the close of the century, and after 1973, ranged from Cambodia in Southeast Asia, to Libya, Kosovo, Panama, the Persian Gulf, the Philippines, and Iraq. Warfare became increasingly scattered and diverse. Viet Cong and (NVA) North Vietnamese Army military tactics combined guerilla warfare, ambushes, civilian sanctuaries, regular army offensives, and modern technology (primarily rockets) in a confusing aggregation of combat offensives. Through most of the last half of the twentieth century the United States was engaged in ongoing military operations, most of which involved “irregular” tactics and strategies (see Table 7.2). World peace and national security remained elusive. Americans could not even agree on what these would look like. Challenges to selective service increased in relation to the continuing conflicts, and the perception among many that these were “foreign wars” and non-threatening to the American

156 • The Cold War: Korea and Vietnam Table 7.2 Military Engagements, 1945–2000 Campaign or Expedition

Inclusive Dates

Navy Occupation of Trieste Navy Occupation of Austria Army Occupation of Austria Army Occupation of Germany (exclusive of Berlin) Army Occupation of Berlin Units of the Sixth Fleet (Navy) Army Occupation of Japan Chinese Service Medal Korean Service Lebanon Vietnam (including Thailand) Quemoy and Matsu Islands Taiwan Straits Congo Laos Berlin Thailand Cuba Congo Korea Vietnam Service Cambodia Cambodia Evacuation Mayaguez Operation Iranian/Yemen/Indian Ocean Indian Ocean/Iran (N/MC) Panama El Salvador Lebanon Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury) (Northern Watch) Persian Gulf (Desert Thunder) (Desert Fox) Kosovo/Various Operations

May 1945 to October 1954 May 1945 to October 1955 May 1945 to July 1955 May 1945 to May 1955 May 1945 to October 1990 May 1945 to October 1955 September 1945 to April 1952 September 1945 to April 1957 June 1950 to July 1954 July 1958 to November 1958 July 1958 to July 1965 August 1958 to June 1963 August 1958 to June 1959 July 1960 to September 1962 April 1961 to October 1962 August 1961 to June 1963 May 1962 to August 1962 October 1962 to June 1963 November 1964 June 1950 to July 1954 July 1965 to March 1973 March 1973 to August 1973 April 1975 May 15, 1975 December 1978 to June 1979 November 1979 to October 1981 April 1980 to December 1986 January 1981 to February 1992 August 1982 to December 1987 October 1983 to November 1983 January 1997– November 1998 to December 1998 December 1998 March 1999 to November 1999

Source: Department of Labor, Office of Veterans’ Employment and Training. Adapted from Table 0.1.

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way of life. The primary rationale for the citizen having an obligation to serve as a soldier, and for the implementation of the draft and selective service, was simply that defense of the country was and is a fundamental responsibility of citizenship. In part, the growing disinclination for military service following the Korean War, Vietnam War, and military engagements in Cambodia, the Indian Ocean, and elsewhere had to do with the perception among many that these were not related to real national defense. The passage of time and circumstances slowly began to change that understanding as U.S. interests in Persian Gulf and the Mid-East became threatened. The world was becoming more distinctly a global society, while the realities of that new world were only slowly being absorbed and realized. Jet propulsion, and the ability of citizens to cross the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in a matter of hours instead of weeks, helped changed the global perspective. International communications became instantaneous and widely available through radio, television, and telephone. Trade and commerce, always global since the days of American colonial settlement, had grown increasingly interconnected. Multinational organizations dominated by the United States, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization had emerged as a result of U.S.-managed economic treaties in the immediate aftermath of World War II. The United States by the mid-twentieth century exercised a kind of global economic power through these institutions that was unprecedented in world history. Yet, in the 1970s its economic power was challenged by other international institutions, such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As OPEC countries agreed to limit oil exports to the United States while raising prices, Americans came to realize that their ways of life were intimately tied to petroleum in almost every aspect. Despite the global economic power of the United States, a single act of OPEC demonstrated that it had the ability to cripple the U.S. economy. In this context, it became increasingly difficult to define what the legitimate national security interests of the United States were. The changing nature of what it would mean to defend the nation were sharply reconfigured with the events in the closing decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first. At the same time the character and structures of warfare were also changing, and the human resources required for that warfare were being affected. The United States and other nations began a “Twenty-first-Century Transformation” of their Armed Forces.

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QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. Considering changes in recruitment and training related to racial and ethnic minorities and women since World War II, how do you think the relationship between military service and citizenship is different today for racial and ethnic minorities and women than it was before World War II? 2. What constitutional issues have been raised with respect to the Selective Service System since World War II? 3. What larger social functions did General Lewis B. Hershey believe the Selective Service System should carry out? Do you agree, or disagree, with him? Why? 4. What are the arguments for and against a military draft? How did the existence of the draft affect the War in Vietnam? Do you believe this was good, or bad? Why? 5. What are the criteria for conscientious objector status under the Selective Service System? Do you believe the United States should provide this option? If so, should it require “religious training and belief ”?

CHAPTER

8

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER MILITARY AND POST 9/11 VETERANS EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE

The 1970s in the United States closed the Vietnam Era and began a very difficult transition to new ways of thinking about military service. Understanding this transition, as well as the oil and Iranian hostage crises of the 1970s, is the necessary context for understanding the new paradigm of military service that would characterize U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twentyfirst. At the time of withdrawal from Vietnam, the United States Armed Forces stood at perhaps their lowest point ever in the estimation of many Americans. Military leaders were blamed for strategic and tactical errors in Vietnam. Rank-and-file were accused of having committed atrocities while in combat. Racial discord plagued each of the services. The draft had ended and the All-Volunteer Army (known then as VOLAR) was off to a rocky start. The Armed Forces had to offer huge enlistment bonuses in order to meet their authorized troop levels. Charges of recruitment fraud were rampant, as were charges that recruiters focused primarily on the poorest and most disadvantaged among racial minorities. AWOL (Absent Without Leave) rates, especially in the Army, soared to record highs. By 1974, some Army posts, such as Fort Dix in New Jersey and Fort Ord in California, had adopted assembly-line-like processes, known as Chapter 10 discharges, for quickly discharging unsuitable recruits by the thousands. These administrative discharges were classed as “less than honorable,” a permanent mark that made it more difficult for these men to secure civilian jobs.

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On top of all this, the Commander in Chief, President Richard M. Nixon, stood accused of impeachable offenses in the scandal known as “Watergate.” He would resign just over a year after the last troops withdrew from Vietnam. In the meantime, his Vice President, Spiro T. Agnew, was also forced to resign in a deal to avoid prosecution for having accepted cash bribes while Governor of Maryland. A constitutional amendment had to be hastily passed to allow for the appointment of a replacement Vice President before the President resigned. Under this amendment, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Gerald R. Ford, was appointed to replace Agnew as Vice President of the United States. Shortly thereafter, President Nixon resigned and Gerald Ford assumed the office of President. President Ford would quickly issue two orders he hoped would begin to heal the rifts of Vietnam and Watergate. The first was a pardon of former President Nixon. The second was a conditional amnesty for certain war resisters charged or convicted of violating the Selective Service Act, or unauthorized leave from the military. Neither action had the intended effect. The Nixon pardon only deepened political divisions. Very few war resisters took advantage of the limited amnesty because it required them to admit they had been wrong. These traumas were only exacerbated by the so-called “oil crisis” of 1973–1974, brought on by the actions of OPEC. The price of gasoline leaped to unprecedented highs virtually overnight. Americans sat in long lines at the pumps, often to find the supply exhausted by the time their turn came. The prices of everything associated with petroleum rose. This meant everything made of plastic, nylon, polyester, and other synthetics, as well as anything that was transported by land, water, or air. The economy stalled in the face of a new economic phenomenon called “stagflation”: high inflation amid a stagnant economy. Among other things, this turned the attention of the United States to the Middle East, which controlled much of the world’s oil supply. The United States poured massive amounts of military assistance to the support of undemocratic regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia in efforts to secure favorable supplies of oil at favorable prices. In Iraq, the United States supported Saddam Hussein. In Iran, it was Shah Reza Pahlavi, whom the CIA had placed in power after overthrowing the democratically elected President Mohammad Mossaddeqh in 1953. In 1976, Americans elected Jimmy Carter to replace Gerald Ford as President. President Carter’s support for the Shah of Iran was lukewarm due to Carter’s stated commitment to promoting human rights among allies of the United States. Amid a growing Islamic movement to oust the Shah, the Carter Administration helped to negotiate the Shah’s abdication and secure exile for him in Egypt. But Carter’s humanitarian instincts would backfire

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in this case. The Shah became seriously ill in 1979 and requested permission to enter the United States for medical treatment. Carter agreed citing humanitarian principles. Protests of Carter’s actions erupted in Tehran. Iranian mobs stormed the U.S. embassy and seized American hostages. Carter ordered the military to attempt a rescue, which failed as helicopters stalled in a sandstorm. Many consider the Iranian hostage crisis, and President Carter’s failed rescue attempt, to be the cause of his defeat for reelection in 1980. Whatever the case, the Iranians released the American hostages as Ronald Reagan took the oath of office in January 1981. But crises in the Middle East would continue during the two terms of Ronald Reagan, which increasingly focused U.S. military policy on that region of the world. In June 1982, following an Israeli invasion of Lebanon and an attack on the Palestine Liberation Organization, the U.S. sent Marines into Beirut in an effort to promote stability. A terrorist bombing of a marine barracks in October 1983 killed 241 American soldiers. Meanwhile, open warfare between Iran and Iraq threatened to embroil the United States, the Soviet Union, and the entire Middle East in conflict. With the United States actively supplying Saddam Hussein’s army in its fight with Iran, and the Soviet Union fighting a war for control of Afghanistan, both superpowers were focused on the region. The Soviet Union’s eventual failure in Afghanistan may have been a major contributor to its ultimate demise and the end of the Cold War. The Cold War would end abruptly as the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Alliance began to unravel. In March 1989, the Soviet Union held free elections resulting in the end of the Communist Party’s control. Subsequently, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and East Germany peaceably ended Soviet-Communist control. The Berlin Wall, symbolic of the Cold War, was literally torn down. The Cold War confrontation between East and West, communism and capitalism, the Soviet Union and the United States, had ended. While the end of the Cold War might have lessened the threat of nuclear holocaust and global war, peace was not at hand. A more fragmented world offered more diverse and scattered dangers. In the break-up of the Soviet Union into several independent, and unstable, nations, a huge nuclear arsenal became vulnerable to sabotage or theft. But the attention of the United States was drawn to the Middle East. After warning U.S. official April Glaspie that he was considering taking action against neighboring Kuwait, and receiving no warning against such action, on August 2, 1989, Saddam Hussein sent the Iraqi army across the border. American forces responded with Operation Desert Shield, seeking to stabilize conditions in this volatile region. With a United Nations Security Council authorization, American

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forces, including four Navy battle groups, three Marine expeditionary brigades, four Army divisions, and three Air Force tactical fighter wings, with supporting coalition troops, launched a three-pronged attack against the estimated 650,000-man Iraqi army and within five days forced a withdrawal, and obtained a cease-fire from Iraq. Subsequently, the United States began scaling back its military presence in Europe and in the Persian Gulf, only to confront new threats to world peace in Bosnia, Africa, the Balkans, Philippines, Southeast Asia, and Central America. Even as the Armed Forces faced rapidly changing demands around the world, domestic social issues were forcing military policy-makers to reconsider old questions of “who serves, how, and when.” Racial minorities had made great strides toward full equality within the Armed Services, as had women. Homosexuals now began waging an organized struggle for the right to serve in all Armed Services. It fell to Bill Clinton to address this difficult issue. Clinton was elected President in 1992, replacing the first President George Bush. In one of his first statements as President, Clinton announced he planned to lift the ban on homosexuals in the military. An uproar ensued, during which the President backtracked rapidly. The result was a compromise resulting in congressional passage of a “Homosexual Conduct Policy,” which remained in effect for some time, but it was clearly an issue that had not been fully resolved. The Department of Defense issued what has come to be known as the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy in February 1994. It read, in part: A person’s sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter and is not a bar to service unless manifested by homosexual conduct . . . The Department of Defense has long held that, as a general rule, homosexuality is incompatible with military service because it interferes with the factors critical to combat effectiveness, including unit morale, unit cohesion and individual privacy. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense also recognizes that individuals with a homosexual orientation have served with distinction in the armed services of the United States. Therefore, it is the policy of the Department of Defense to judge the suitability of persons to serve in the armed forces on the basis of their conduct. Homosexual conduct will be grounds for separation from the military services. Sexual orientation is considered a personal and private matter, and homosexual orientation is not a bar to service entry or continued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct.

The policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” made neither opponents nor supporters of allowing homosexuals into the Armed Forces happy, but it remained official policy throughout the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. President Barack Obama, who took office in January 2009, pledged to end it, but nearly a year into his presidency had not yet done so.

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During that year gay men and lesbians continued to be discharged. Some who were prominent in the news were those who held crucial skills related to the military missions in the Middle East, such as Arabic or Farsi language fluency. A government Accountability Office report in 2005 found that the military had discharged almost 800 specialists with critical military skills under this policy. In addition, Department of Defense statistics for fiscal year 2008, which includes six months of the Bush presidency and the first six months of the Obama presidency, show that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” disproportionately affected women and racial minorities. Thus, while women accounted for 15 percent of the Armed Forces, they were more than 30 percent of the 619 discharged under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in FY 2008. Similarly, while the Armed Forces classified 29 percent of its personnel as “non-white,” service members in that category accounted for more than 45 percent of the discharges under “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in FY 2008. There is no way to know how many gay men and lesbians have served in the Armed Forces of the United States throughout its history, but now the Department of Defense officially acknowledges their presence. Women now serve in combat roles and as commanders of regular units. Many racial and ethnic minorities, as well as low-income whites, continue to view military service as an opportunity for upward mobility. Despite continuing inequalities in the Armed Forces based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation, many individuals from those groups continue to see military service as one pathway toward full equality as citizens of the United States. Under President Clinton, the U.S. Armed Forces remained scattered in hundreds of locations around the world, where they were increasingly a lightning rod for anti-American sentiments, often the result of U.S. support for Israel. American forces in the Middle East and Africa were particularly vulnerable. At a seemingly secure area in Saudi Arabia, “car bombers” destroyed the Khobar Tower, killing nineteen American soldiers. In 1998, terrorists bombed two U.S. embassies in Africa. Yugoslav troops seized control of Kosovo in March 1999, and a U.S.-multinational “peace-keeping” force caused Yugoslav troops to withdraw. On September 11, 2001, Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist network based in Iraq and Afghanistan hijacked four American commercial airliners in the United States. Two crashed into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York, and a third into the Pentagon, killing over 3,500 civilians, while a fourth crashed after its passengers attempted to regain control from the hijackers. President George W. Bush sent American troops to join Afghan forces in seeking bin Laden and rooting out Taliban enclaves there, but pulled back the search for bin Laden in order to focus on Iraq and its president, Saddam Hussein.

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Judging by early events in Afghanistan, the character of war had changed markedly in the twenty-first century, which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said necessitated a “21st Century Transformation” of U.S. Armed Forces:

DOCUMENT 8.1 SECRETARY RUMSFELD SPEAKS ON “21ST CENTURY TRANSFORMATION” OF U.S. ARMED FORCES REMARKS AS DELIVERED BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, FORT MCNAIR, WASHINGTON, D.C., THURSDAY, JANUARY 31, 2002 [Ed.: Segments of the speech have been omitted.] SECRETARY RUMSFELD: Be seated. [...] To the students and the faculty of our War College community, distinguished guests, and men and women of the armed forces, just before Christmas I traveled to Afghanistan and the neighboring countries, where I had an opportunity to spend time with our troops in the field. They are remarkable. They’re brave, they’re dedicated, they voluntarily risk their lives in a dangerous corner of the world to defend our freedom and our way of life, and I was grateful to be able to personally tell them that. Among the many, I met with an extraordinary group of men, the Special Forces who’d been involved in the attack on Mazar-e Sharif. Now I’ve said on a number of occasions that the war on terrorism would likely be unlike any war we had fought before. These men surprised us all with their early requests for supplies. They asked for boots, ammunition . . . and horse feed. From the moment they landed in Afghanistan, they began adapting to the circumstances on the ground. They sported beards and traditional scarves. They rode horses—horses that had been trained to run into machine-gun fire, atop saddles that had been fashioned from wood and saddle bags that had been crafted from Afghan carpets. They used pack mules to transport equipment along some of the roughest terrain in the world, riding at night, in darkness, often near mine fields and along narrow mountain trails with drops so sheer that, as one soldier put it, it took him a week to ease the death-grip on his saddle. Many had never been on horseback before. As they linked up and trained with anti-Taliban forces, they learned from their new allies about the realities of war on Afghan soil, and they assisted the Afghans with weapons, with supplies, with food, with tactics and training. And they helped plan the attack on Mazar.

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On the appointed day, one of their teams slipped in and hid well behind the lines, ready to call in airstrikes, and the bomb blasts would be the signal for others to charge. When the moment came, they signaled their targets to the coalition aircraft and looked at their watches. Two minutes and 15 seconds, 10 seconds—and then, out of nowhere, precision-guided bombs began to land on Taliban and al-Qaeda positions. The explosions were deafening, and the timing so precise that, as the soldiers described it, hundreds of Afghan horsemen literally came riding out of the smoke, coming down on the enemy in clouds of dust and flying shrapnel. A few carried RPGs. Some had as little as 10 rounds for their weapons. And they rode boldly— Americans, Afghans, towards the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. It was the first cavalry attack of the 21st century. After the battle one soldier described how he was called over by one of the Afghans who’d been with him, started to pull up his pant leg, and he thought he was going to see a wound. Instead, he looked down and saw a prosthetic limb. The Afghan had ridden into battle with only one good leg. Now, what won the battle for Mazar and set in motion the Taliban’s fall from power was a combination of ingenuity of the Special Forces, the most advanced precision-guided munitions in the U.S. arsenal delivered by U.S. Navy, Air Force and Marine crews, and the courage of the Afghan fighters, some with one leg. That day on the plains of Afghanistan, the 19th century met the 21st century, and they defeated a dangerous and determined adversary, a remarkable achievement. When President Bush called me back to the Pentagon after a quarter of a century, he asked me to come up with a new defense strategy to work with the Department of Defense and the senior military to fashion a new approach. He knew I was an old-timer, but I’ll bet he never imagined for a second that we’d bring back the cavalry. [Laughter.] But really, this is precisely what transformation is about. Here we are in the year 2002, fighting the first war of the 21st century, and the horse cavalry was back and being used, but being used in previously unimaginable ways. It showed that a revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It’s also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting. Our challenge in this new century is a difficult one. It’s really to prepare to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain and what we have to understand will be the unexpected. That may seem on the face of it an impossible task, but it is not. But to accomplish it, we have to put aside the comfortable ways of thinking and planning, take risks and try new things so that we can prepare our forces to deter and defeat adversaries that have not yet emerged to challenges. Well before September 11th, the senior civilian and military leaders of the

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Department of Defense were in the process of doing just that. With the Quadrennial Defense Review, we took a long, hard look at the emerging security environment and we came to the conclusion that a new defense strategy was appropriate. We decided to move away from the “two major theater war” construct for sizing our forces, an approach that called for maintaining two massive occupation forces capable of marching on and occupying capitals of two aggressors at the same time and changing their regimes. This approach served us well in the immediate post-Cold War period, but it really threatened to leave us reasonably prepared for two specific conflicts and under-prepared for the unexpected contingencies of the 21st century. To ensure we have the resources to prepare for the future, and to address the emerging challenges to homeland security, we needed a more realistic and balanced assessment of our near-term warfighting needs. Instead of maintaining two occupation forces, we will place greater emphasis on deterrence in four critical theaters, backed by the ability to swiftly defeat two aggressors at the same time, while preserving the option for one massive counteroffensive to occupy an aggressor’s capital and replace the regime. Since neither aggressor would know which the president would choose for a regime change, the deterrent is undiminished. But by removing the requirement to maintain a second occupation force, as we did under the old strategy, we can free up resources for the future and the various lesser contingencies which we face, have faced, are facing and will most certainly face in the period ahead. To prepare for the future, we also decided to move away from the so-called threat-based strategy that had dominated our country’s defense planning for nearly a half-century and adopt what we characterized as a capability-based strategy, one that focuses less on who might threaten us or where we might be threatened, and more on how we might be threatened and what we need to do to deter and defend against such threats. Instead of building our armed forces around plans to fight this or that country, we need to examine our vulnerabilities, asking ourselves, as Frederick the Great did in his great General Principles of War, what design would I be forming if I were the enemy, and then fashioning our forces as necessary to deter and defeat those threats? For example, we know that because the U.S. has unparalleled land, sea and air power, it makes little sense for potential adversaries to try to build up forces to compete with those strengths. They learned from the Gulf War that challenging our armed forces head-on is foolhardy. So rather than building competing armies, navies and air forces, they will likely seek to challenge us asymmetrically, by looking at our vulnerabilities and building capabilities with which they can, or at least hope, to exploit them. They know, for example, that an open society is vulnerable to new forms of terrorism. They suspect that U.S. space assets and information networks, critical to our security and our economy, are somewhat vulnerable. And they

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are. They see that our ability to project force into the distant corners of the world where they live depends in some cases on vulnerable foreign bases. And they know we have no defense against ballistic missiles on our cities, our people, our forces, or our friends, creating incentives for the development of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Our job is to close off as many of those avenues of potential attack as is possible. We need to prepare for new forms of terrorism, to be sure, but also attacks on U.S. space assets, cyber attacks on our information networks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. At the same time, we must work to build up our own areas of advantage, such as our ability to project military power over long distances, precision strike weapons, and our space, intelligence and undersea warfare capabilities. Before the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington we had decided that to keep the peace and defend freedom in the 21st century our defense strategy and force structure must be focused on achieving six transformational goals: First, to protect the U.S. homeland and our bases overseas. Second, to project and sustain power in distant theaters. Third, to deny our enemies sanctuary, making sure they know that no corner of the world is remote enough, no mountain high enough, no cave or bunker deep enough, no SUV fast enough to protect them from our reach. Fourth, to protect our information networks from attack. Fifth, to use information technology to link up different kinds of U.S. forces so that they can in fact fight jointly. And sixth, to maintain unhindered access to space and protect our space capabilities from enemy attack. Our experience on September 11th, and indeed in the Afghan campaign, have served to reinforce the importance of moving the U.S. defense posture in these directions. Our challenge in the 21st century is to defend our cities and our infrastructure from new forms of attack while projecting force over long distances to fight new and perhaps distant adversaries. To do this, we need rapidly deployable, fully integrated joint forces capable of reaching distant theaters quickly and working with our air and sea forces to strike adversaries swiftly, successfully, and with devastating effect. We need improved intelligence, long-range precision strikes, sea-based platforms to help counter the access denial capabilities of adversaries. . . . In addition to new capabilities, transformation also requires rebalancing existing forces and existing capabilities by adding more of what the Pentagon has come to call low-density, high-demand assets, which is really a euphemism, in plain English, for “our priorities were wrong, and we didn’t buy enough of what we need.” [Laughter.] For example, the experience in Afghanistan showed the effectiveness of

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unmanned aircraft. But it also revealed how few we have and what their weaknesses are. The department has known for some time that it does not have enough manned reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft, commandand-control aircraft, air-defense capabilities, chemical and biological defense units, as well as certain types of special operations forces. But in spite of the shortages of these and other scarce systems, the United States postponed the needed investment while continuing to fund what were, in retrospect, less valuable programs. That needs to change. Moreover, as we change investment priorities, we have to begin shifting the balance in our arsenal between manned and unmanned capabilities between short- and long-range systems, stealthy and non-stealthy systems, between shooters and sensors, and between vulnerable and hardened systems. And we need to make the leap into the information age, which is the critical foundation of our transformation efforts. As we deployed forces and capabilities to defend U.S. territory after September 11th, we found that our new responsibilities in homeland defense have exacerbated these shortages. No U.S. president should be placed in the position where he must choose between protecting our citizens at home and protecting our interests and our forces overseas. We, as a country, must be able to do both. . . . We need to change not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also how we think about war. All the high-tech weapons in the world will not transform U.S. armed forces unless we also transform the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight. Some believe that, with the U.S. in the midst of a dangerous war on terrorism, now is not the time to transform our armed forces. I believe that quite the opposite is true. Now is precisely the time to make changes. The impetus and the urgency added by the events of September 11th powerfully make the case for action. Every day, we are faced with urgent near-term requirements that create pressure to push the future off the table. But September 11th taught us that the future holds many unknown dangers and that we fail to prepare for them at our peril. Our challenge is to make certain that, as time passes and the shock of what befell us that day wears off, we do not simply go back to doing things the way we did them before. The war on terrorism is a transformational event that cries out for us to rethink our activities, each of us to rethink our activities, and put that new thinking into action. [...] Of course, as we transform, we must not make the mistake of assuming that our experience in Afghanistan presents us with a model for the next military campaign.

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Preparing to re-fight the last war is a mistake repeated throughout much of military history, and one we must avoid, and will. But we can glean important lessons from recent experiences that apply to the future. Here are a few worth considering: First, wars in the 21st century will increasingly require all elements of national power: economic, diplomatic, financial, legal, law enforcement, intelligence, as well as overt and covert military operations. Clausewitz said “war is the continuation of politics by other means.” In this new century, many of those means may not be military. Second, the ability of forces to communicate and operate seamlessly on the battlefield will be critical to our success. In Afghanistan, we saw composite teams of U.S. special forces on the ground, working with Navy, Air Force and Marine pilots in the sky, to identify targets, communicate targeting information and coordinate the timing of strikes with devastating consequences for the enemy. The change between what we were able to do before U.S. forces, special forces, were on the ground and after they were on the ground was absolutely dramatic. The lesson of this war is that effectiveness in combat will depend heavily on “jointness,” how well the different branches of our military can communicate and coordinate their efforts on the battlefield. And achieving jointness in wartime requires building that jointness in peacetime. We need to train like we fight and fight like we train, and too often, we don’t. Third, our policy in this war of accepting help from any country on a basis that is comfortable for them and allowing them to characterize what it is they do to help us instead of our characterizing it for them or our saying that we won’t have a country participate unless they could participate in every single respect of this effort, is enabling us to maximize both their cooperation and our effectiveness against the enemy. Fourth, wars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be sure. But they should not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator, and we can’t afford that. Fifth, defending the U.S. requires prevention, self-defense and sometimes preemption. It is not possible to defend against every conceivable kind of attack in every conceivable location at every minute of the day or night. Defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st-century threats may well require that we take the war to the enemy. The best, and in some cases, the only defense, is a good offense. Sixth, rule out nothing, including ground forces. The enemy must understand that we will use every means at our disposal to defeat them, and that we are prepared to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to achieve victory.

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To the extent the United States is seen as leaning back, we weaken the deterrent, we encourage people to engage in acts to our detriment. We need to be leaning forward as a country. Seventh, getting U.S. special forces on the ground early dramatically increased the effectiveness of the air campaign. In Afghanistan, precisionguided bombs from the sky did not achieve their effectiveness until we had boots, and eyes, on the ground to tell the bombers exactly where to aim. And finally, we need to be straight with the American people. We need to tell them the truth. And when you can’t tell them something, we need to tell them that we can’t tell them something. The American people understand what we’re trying to accomplish, what is needed to get the job done, that it’s not easy and that there will be casualties. And they must know that, good news or bad, we will tell it to them straight. Broad bipartisan public support must be rooted in a bond of trust, of understanding and of common purpose. . . . In 1962, during a similar time of upheaval and transformation, as our forces prepared to meet the new challenges of the Cold War, General MacArthur addressed the cadets at West Point, and he said, “Through all this welter of change, your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable: It is to win wars.” The mission of the armed forces remains equally fixed today, equally determined and inviolable. But we must recognize, as that earlier generation did, that we will accomplish it only if we have the wisdom, and the courage and the will to change. Our men and women in uniform are doing a brilliant job in the war on terrorism. We’re grateful to them. We’re proud. And the best way that we can show our appreciation is to make sure that they have the resources, the capabilities and the innovative culture they need not only to win today’s war, but to deter and, if necessary, defeat the aggressors we will surely face in the dangerous century ahead. We are truly fortunate to have each of you—dedicated, determined and devoted—in the service of our great nation. We look across the globe at the young men and women and what they’re doing, and no one can go visit them and not come away with just enormous pride and confidence in the armed services of the United States. Thank you very much. [Applause.] Thank you very much.

* * * Just before Christmas 2001 Rumsfeld had visited with American troops in Afghanistan and neighboring countries. They are “remarkable,” he said. “They’re brave, they’re dedicated, and they voluntarily risk their lives in a dangerous corner of the world to defend our freedom and our way of life.”

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While some question whether American freedom and ways of life require such wars, what may have been most remarkable was that while these soldiers were volunteer “citizens and soldier,” as had been the soldiers of the colonial militia and of the new American republic, many called up from the states as members of the National Guard. These volunteers were fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the remote corners of the Middle East in ways that looked in some ways like the cavalry tactics of the old frontier combined with the new technology of the twenty-first century. It was clear evidence, Rumsfeld argued, that future warfare required forces that could adapt quickly to “new challenges” and unexpected circumstances. Although the “Rumsfeld doctrine” came under intense criticism for its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, it encompasses in many respects the strategic defense philosophies of at least four presidents. The national defense policies of the last two Presidents of the twentieth century and the first two Presidents in the twenty-first century called for the instant response of a small, ready, skilled and well-trained military, equipped with the technology of the twenty-first century—with fast-moving tanks and armament such as UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles), smart bombs, and satellite surveillance systems. These principles may seem contrary to traditional principles of classic war with which most of us are familiar through wars like the U.S. Civil War, and World Wars I and II. And those Americans who fought that kind of warfare in the twenty-first century shared the common bond of their distant frontier forefathers in being both citizens and soldiers. And much like those “volunteers” during colonial times, they had joined out of a wide range of motivations. Now, as then, many have joined in order prove their worth of full equality as citizens. Racial and ethnic minorities, women, gay men, and lesbians have all pointed to their service in recent and ongoing wars in defense of their rights as citizens. As in earlier years, enlistment in the “volunteer” armed forces involves a mix of coercion and volunteerism. It is not exactly correct to call members of colonial and early state militias “volunteers,” since all able-bodied free white men of militia age were automatically enrolled and expected to serve, except in Pennsylvania. The United States no longer automatically enrolls all men of military age into the Armed Forces. So, in a legal sense, all are volunteers. But some who have studied the “All-Volunteer Armed Forces” argue that for many their enlistment is motivated by financial incentives. Those that make this point refer to this phenomenon as “economic conscription.” In March 2003, citing intelligence later shown to be questionable, President George W. Bush, and his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, told Congress and the United Nations that Saddam Hussein was linked to al-Qaeda, and that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Congress authorized the President to take whatever steps were necessary to address

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this apparent threat. The Bush Administration then convinced a coalition of other nations to join an invasion force “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.” Although much of Iraq and Baghdad were in American hands by mid-April, the Iraqi army had melted away and Saddam Hussein had been taken prisoner, the war entered a new prolonged phase of urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism. Many Iraqis clearly did not welcome Americans “as liberators,” as Vice President Richard Cheney had promised. Sectarian violence spread through parts of Baghdad and other major cities. Reminiscent of Vietnam, American soldiers became targets for snipers, who often could not be distinguished from innocent civilians. Initial predictions by the Administration that this would be a short and inexpensive war had been mistaken. The regular Armed Forces did not have sufficient personnel to wage a drawn-out ground war, and so the Department of Defense turned to the Ready-Reserves and National Guard. Where once Guardsmen and Reservists could pretty much count on never being sent into overseas combat, many now were called up for Iraq service. College students and men and women with regular civilian jobs, who thought of the Guard or Reserves as a part-time job, were now being taken from their jobs or out of classes. During the subsequent years of engagement and the loss of more than four thousand lives of American military personnel, those in the active military services of the United States—regular, Reservists, and National Guard—were, as in the beginning, all volunteer, citizen-soldiers. At the start of the twenty-first century, the Rumsfeld Doctrine suggested that the changing character of military operations and resources would contribute to the restructuring and redeployment of American military forces. Traditional Cold War defensive “lines,” posts, and positions held in Europe and Southeast Asia were to be downsized or closed. Rapid response, quick deployment and integrated air, sea, and land operations from “home” bases were to redefine American military operations in the twenty-first century. But this has not occurred to any significant extent. According to Department of Defense reports, as of 2005, the United States had active military personnel in 156 countries. In 63 countries, the United States maintains full military bases, and has a total of 737 military installations of all sorts in foreign countries. Seven of these bases were opened after September 11, 2001. Now, as in the beginning, the U.S. Armed Forces is distinguished by its citizen-soldier, volunteer composition. The terrorism and non-traditional warfare of the twenty-first century resembled warfare on the frontier, where the local, volunteer, civilian militia provided an often effective and ready-response to attack. There were also elements of civil war in these twenty-first-century regional conflicts in that disaffected groups attacked their own people and governmental institutions

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in order to foment internal revolution. There were also totally new elements of warfare. Unlike in earlier frontier campaigns, given the new technology of weapons and warfare, in the twenty-first century, the first day of war, that is the day of the opening attack could, with biological and nuclear weapons, be the devastating, final day of war. Contemporary defense strategy began to focus on prevention and pre-emptive strikes, rather than response. Mobilization, in effect, had become permanent with the start of the Korean War in 1950, but the twenty-first-century version was a mobilization that was increasingly fine-tuned, requiring relatively small, but highly mobile and technologically advanced air, land, and sea components. An essential element of that mobilization would be the highly trained Reserves and National Guard. Those forces became increasingly a fundamental component of the modern army, as were the militia of earlier times. As did the militia, the reserve forces and National Guard personnel pursued the ordinary business of civilian life, ready, in the minuteman tradition, to enter military service when called. Throughout its history, from the days of the colonial militia, the United States relied upon an all-volunteer military supplemented as needed by a draft. In World War I, the draft accounted for approximately one-third of the total force, and in World War II some twothirds of the force were draftees. But, in World War I, voluntary enlistments were halted by law, and again in World War II, in December 1942, voluntary enlistments were stopped in order to let the Selective Service and lottery system work more efficiently, enabling selection of needed human resources. Military conscription in United States history has had an uneven history in terms of public acceptance. It faced widespread hostility in both the North and South during the Civil War. There was significant resistance to the first Selective Service System during World War I, as there was to its later version during the war in Vietnam. Only during World War II was there overwhelming public support for a draft. Following the adoption of the All-Volunteer Army in 1973, there were concerns about the continuing ability of the Armed Forces to recruit and retain the personnel necessary to carry out its mission in a seemingly increasingly volatile and fragmented world. By 2006, some one million active-duty personnel had been sent to Iraq and Afghanistan, many of those having been deployed for two or sometimes three tours of duty ranging from 12 to 15 months. As the wars continued, the pool of volunteers declined. Part of the decline had to do with the post-World War II “baby-boom” and the aging of that segment of the population. By the 1970s, the manpower pool of those aged 18–36 had declined relative to the population of youth and older Americans. Meanwhile, dependence on the Reserves and National Guard rose. Prior to 2001 reservists spent an average of one day per year on

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active duty, and by 2006 they were spending 70 days per year on average. There was a problem. In 2006, Congress began to address the problem with a study entitled “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” prepared by the Congressional Budget Office at the request of the Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations.

DOCUMENT 8.2 THE ALL-VOLUNTEER MILITARY: ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE JULY 2007 THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have required substantial increases in the number of U.S. service members deployed and the frequency with which units are sent overseas. Through December 2006, over 1 million active-duty personnel and 400,000 reserve personnel had been deployed to those theaters. To maintain the forces necessary to conduct those operations, the military must be able to recruit significant numbers of volunteers—in fiscal year 2006, its target was almost 200,000 active-duty recruits. However, all three components of the Army (the active Army, the Army National Guard, and the Army Reserve) have had trouble achieving their recruiting goals in one or more recent years, although they were able to meet or nearly meet their targets for 2006. Those deployments and recruiting problems have raised the following concerns among decision-makers, military analysts, and other observers:

• That the armed forces will not have enough troops available to accomplish their missions, • That military personnel and their families are experiencing significant hardships that the rest of the U.S. population is not sharing, or • That less-affluent people are more likely than other groups to serve in those operations. Although the Department of Defense (DoD) has stated its commitment to maintaining the current all-volunteer force (AVF), others have questioned the viability of such a force in light of the current strains on the military. Some observers have called for reinstituting a military draft as a way to alleviate those strains and to spread the demands of war more evenly throughout society. To shed light on the current discussion, this study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examines various issues surrounding the choice

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between a draft system and an all-volunteer force. It describes the history of conscription in the United States and reviews some of the arguments made for and against the draft, either now or since the draft was last used, during the Vietnam War. The analysis also looks at trends in the AVF since its inception in 1973—particularly the quality of recruits and the average experience level and demographic composition of the force—to see whether predictions about a volunteer military have proved true.(1) The study concludes by discussing the logistics of implementing a new draft system, the potential effects on the structure of the armed forces, and other considerations.

POSSIBLE PROS AND CONS OF A DRAFT AND LESSONS FROM ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

THE

Many of the arguments heard today for or against a draft were articulated earlier, especially in the Vietnam era. In some people’s view, the most powerful arguments center on the roles of the government and the armed forces and on the rights and responsibilities of U.S. citizens. One of the primary rationales for the draft can be put simply: Service in defense of the country is a fundamental responsibility of citizenship. Citizens enjoy protections provided by the government; in turn, the government may require them to contribute to those protections. That view was articulated by such figures as George Washington and justices of the Supreme Court of 1918. Others, however, including President Ronald Reagan and economist Milton Friedman, have stated that a draft is at odds with fundamental democratic or moral principles. Some observers have equated it with involuntary servitude. Those differences of opinion cannot be resolved through empirical study of the issue. Other arguments focus on the potential consequences of using a draft or an all-volunteer force to procure military personnel. Specifically, observers have expressed concerns about the military effectiveness, costs, economic efficiency, and social-justice implications of the two choices.

Effectiveness of the Armed Forces The military’s success in completing its missions rests partly on its ability to get and keep intelligent, capable individuals while maintaining required force levels. Research has consistently linked high scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) and length of time in the service to better performance of military jobs. Whether recruits have earned a high school diploma helps predict whether they will complete their initial term of enlistment and thus affects the average experience level of the force. Critics of the AVF have raised questions about the likelihood that the military could attract enough volunteers in peacetime and wartime to meet

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its requirements and about the quality of those volunteers. They have argued that many people do not want to join the military and that the quality of those who did join would be lower (because they would have fewer skills valuable in the civilian sector) than the quality available through a draft. Proponents of the AVF have countered that historically, many people have volunteered for military service during both peace and war. They argue that others were discouraged from serving during the draft era because military compensation was set at below-market levels. Since the all-volunteer force began, the military has sometimes had trouble recruiting and retaining sufficient volunteers in peacetime, and their quality has varied. However, the AVF has attracted a greater proportion of recruits with high school diplomas or with AFQT scores at or above the median than in the youth population as a whole or than the services obtained through the draft during the Vietnam War. In 2006, 91 percent of recruits were high school graduates, compared with 80 percent of U.S. residents ages 18 to 24. Moreover, 69 percent of recruits scored at or above the 50th percentile (relative to the overall U.S. youth population) on the qualification test. Experience levels in the military have also risen during the years of the AVF, as initial enlistment periods have grown longer, on average, and retention rates have increased.

Costs and Economic Efficiency Supporters have argued that a draft force costs less than an AVF because the military can pay lower wages when it need not try to attract volunteers. The higher personnel costs of an AVF, they contend, could crowd out necessary long-term defense spending on weapons, infrastructure, and other items. Other observers have argued, however, that the full cost of a draft force is higher than the budgetary costs. In effect, the draft imposed an in-kind tax on inductees in that the compensation they received was lower than market wages and generally lower than what they would have required to enlist voluntarily.(2) Those costs—as well as any expenses incurred from people’s efforts to avoid the draft—would have to be added to budgetary costs to calculate the full cost of military personnel under a draft system. According to proponents of the AVF, the full cost is greater with a draft than with a volunteer force. AVF supporters have also argued that because military personnel appear less expensive in a draft force than their true cost, conscripts are substituted for other resources—and thus are overused. There is evidence that budgetary costs have been higher under the AVF than under the Vietnam-era draft system. For example, basic pay for lessexperienced service members nearly doubled between 1971 (two years before the AVF began) and 1975 (two years after), adjusted for inflation. A report by

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the former General Accounting Office estimated that the move to an allvolunteer force added about $3 billion per year to the military’s costs in 1974 dollars (more than $10 billion in 2006 dollars), or about 11 percent of DoD’s spending on its manpower budget accounts in 1974.(3) To CBO’s knowledge, no studies have retrospectively examined the total economic cost of the draft. However, the extra $10 billion paid to service members could also be considered a lower-bound estimate of the in-kind tax on draftees.

Representativeness of the Military Partly because combat entails a higher risk of injury and death than peacetime military service or most civilian employment does, the nation has grappled with the issue of who should fight its wars. Some people believe that the best way to assign that risk to members of society is through a draft system, which can compel citizens from geographically, racially, and economically diverse backgrounds to serve in the military. Through the years, some proponents of the draft have stated that the AVF would create inequities because low-income people or racial minorities would be more likely to join the armed forces than other groups and thus would disproportionately bear the risks associated with military service. Supporters of the AVF have countered that the higher wages associated with a volunteer force—as well as other factors, such as patriotism and a sense of duty—would attract a broad set of volunteers. In that view, if concentrations of certain economic or racial groups did occur in the military, they would result from the free choice of those individuals. The current all-volunteer force is representative of society along many dimensions—although, partly because of the unique demands of military service, it is younger than the population as a whole and has a smaller proportion of women. The typical recruit is about 18 years old, and nearly half of the active-duty force is between the ages of 17 and 24. By comparison, 17to 24-year-olds make up less than one-fifth of civilians of prime working age. Women were barred from constituting more than 2 percent of the military until 1967 and continue to be excluded from some occupations and assignments. They now make up 14 percent of the enlisted force, compared with 50 percent civilians ages 17 to 49. Members of the armed forces are racially and ethnically diverse. Black service members represent the largest minority group in the military. Although their percentage has varied during the years of the AVF, they composed 13 percent of active-duty enlisted recruits in 2005 and 19 percent of the entire active-duty enlisted force in 2006, compared with 14 percent of the 17- to 49-year-old U.S. population.(4) Hispanics, by contrast, are less than proportionally represented in the military. In 2006, they constituted 11 percent of the enlisted force, versus 14 percent of civilians ages 17 to 49.

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To explore whether those groups bear a disproportionate share of combat and fatalities, CBO investigated the racial and ethnic makeup of combat occupations in the military, of deployments in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and of fatalities associated with those operations. CBO found that white service members have a higher representation in combat occupations (75 percent) than in the force as a whole (68 percent), whereas black service members have a lower representation in those occupations (13 percent) than in the overall force (19 percent).(5) The racial and ethnic representation of personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan was similar to that of the overall enlisted force, as of December 2006. Data on fatalities indicate that minorities are not being killed in those operations at greater rates than their representation in the force. Rather, fatalities of white service members have been higher than their representation in the force (76 percent of deaths in those two theaters through December 2006). The socioeconomic backgrounds of service members have been less well documented than other characteristics because data on the household income of recruits before they joined the military are sparse. CBO’s review of previous studies and some new tabulations suggest that people from all income groups are represented in the armed forces.(6) However, CBO’s analysis of data from 2000 indicate that youths from the very highest and lowest income families may be somewhat less likely to serve in the enlisted ranks than other groups are.

Implementation Issues The policies used to implement a draft or an all-volunteer force largely determine whether either system will provide well-qualified recruits who are representative of the nation’s youth. Those policies include medical, moral, and quality standards for new service members and compensation levels for the entire force. Under a draft system, the rules guiding who is inducted and how (for example, through a random lottery or through local draft boards and a system of exemptions) also influence the effectiveness and quality of the force. A draft today could—and most likely would—look very different from that of the Vietnam era. Under the current law governing selective service (the Military Selective Service Act of 1940, as amended), a new draft would be conducted by random lottery, a system that was not adopted until later in the Vietnam War. However, a draft would have trouble producing a force with the same level of experience as a volunteer force. People would probably be drafted for a shorter period than the four- to six-year obligation typical in the AVF, and most draftees would be likely to leave after their initial obligation. The demographics of a draft force, except for age, might be similar

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to those of the current force, depending on the rules used to implement the draft. To illustrate possible changes in the structure of the armed forces, CBO calculated the accessions and continuation rates that would allow the active Army to achieve its desired size of 547,400 personnel by 2012 under either an all-volunteer force or a mix of volunteers and conscripts.(7) [Ed.: That end-

strength goal for 2012 was laid out in DoD’s 2008 Future Years Defense Program.](8) The Army had 73,400 accessions in 2005 and 80,000 in 2006. Continuation rates were 82.4 percent for the active Army as a whole in 2005 and 84.5 percent in 2006. If future continuation rates dropped to a mix of the 2005 and 2006 levels, the Army would need between 86,000 and 90,000 volunteers each year to meet its end-strength goal. If, at the same time, annual accessions dropped to about 74,000 (roughly the 2005 level), the Army would fall almost 50,000 people short of its end-strength objective in 2012. It could meet that goal by drafting up to 27,000 recruits per year to supplement the 74,000 volunteers. However, that approach would require 14,000 more annual accessions than under an AVF and would reduce the average experience level of the force. Further reductions in volunteers—and consequently a greater reliance on draftees—would increase the total number of accessions required each year and decrease the average length of service. Depending on how a draft was implemented, it could either allow or require other changes in the way the military operates. One example is the length of deployments. If all of the Army’s combat occupations were at least partly filled with draftees serving two-year tours of duty (the obligation specified in the Military Selective Service Act), some of those inductees would be available only for deployments of less than a year because their training time would exceed 12 months, CBO estimates. That would exacerbate problems for the Army, which recently lengthened the typical deployment from 12 months to 15 months. The Army would have to either permit shorter deployments or reduce the training time in those occupations. Implementing a draft might allow for more flexibility in compensation, however. Because the draft would be compulsory, DoD might be able to reduce its budgetary costs by paying less, at least to first-term personnel. Finally, the percentage of women in the force might change under a draft. As currently written, the Military Selective Service Act excludes women from being drafted, although they could continue to volunteer. If lawmakers wanted a new draft to cover women as well as men, they would have to amend that law.

NOTES 1. This study focuses on the active component of the military, partly because if a draft was reinstated under current law, no one would be drafted into the reserves (as

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

was also the case during the Vietnam War). Data describing the draft force before 1973 refer only to the active component. The same in-kind tax was imposed on people who volunteered for a particular branch of the service to avoid being drafted into a branch that was more likely to see ground combat. General Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office), Additional Costs of the All-Volunteer Force, FPCD-78-11 (February 1978). The way to measure the additional budgetary cost attributable to an AVF is subject to debate. At one extreme, some analysts might attribute any changes in personnel costs since 1973 to the AVF because those costs would not have to be paid under a system of conscription. At the other extreme, analysts might argue that a draft system should pay market wages and that the cost of doing so should not be ascribed to the AVF. The General Accounting Office’s study attributed the alignment of military pay with market wages to the inception of the AVF. The percentage of black enlisted personnel has consistently been higher in the Army than in the other services. In 2006, black soldiers made up 29 percent of the Army’s enlisted force. Both the white and nonwhite proportions in the force may be understated by a few percentage points because the race of about 6 percent of service members is unknown. Those studies all focus on enlisted personnel. None of the studies examine the socioeconomic backgrounds of people who join the officer corps, apparently because of data limitations. Accessions are recruits who sign contracts with the military and report to basic training. Continuation rates measure the proportion of service members who remain in the military over a specific period regardless of the expiration of their contracts. For details of the methodology that CBO used, see Congressional Budget Office, Recruiting, Retention, and Future Levels of Military Personnel (October 2006). End strength is the number of personnel on active duty on the last day of the fiscal year.

* * * In a sense, the President does have a kind of draft power under Congressional legislation approved in 1983. That is the power to involuntarily extend the enlistment terms of Regular, Reserve, and National Guard troops under certain circumstances. The President used this “stop-loss” policy, as it is informally known, in the second year of the Iraq War, as that mission continued for much longer than military planners had expected. This action drew legal challenges from some affected enlisted personnel. The lawsuit of Emiliano Santiago and the federal court opinion that resulted explain the issues and confirm the legal validity of the policy.

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DOCUMENT 8.3 EMILIANO SANTIAGO V. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; LES BROWNLEE, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (ACTING); RAYMOND BYRNE, ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE OREGON NATIONAL GUARD; DAVID DORAN, CAPTAIN, DETACHMENT ONE, COMPANY D, 113 AVIATION UNIT COMMANDER UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT. - 425 F.3D 549 Argued and Submitted April 6, 2005 Filed May 13, 2005 Amended September 28, 2005. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon; Owen M. Panner, Senior Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-04-01747-OMP. Before CANBY, TALLMAN, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges. ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING AND PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC AND AMENDED OPINION CANBY, Circuit Judge. OPINION Emiliano Santiago, a sergeant in the Army National Guard facing immediate deployment to Afghanistan, appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Santiago’s eight-year enlistment in the Guard was due to expire on June 27, 2004, but shortly before that date his enlistment was extended by a “stop-loss” order when his unit was alerted prior to being ordered to active service. Santiago challenges this application of the government’s “stop-loss” policy on the ground that it violates his enlistment contract and is unauthorized by statute. He also asserts a due process claim. We affirm the district court’s denial of the petition because we conclude that the stop-loss order was authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a), and that it neither violated Santiago’s enlistment agreement nor his right to due process of law. Santiago enlisted in the Army National Guard on June 28, 1996, when he was eighteen years old. He enlisted for a term of eight years. After his enlistment, Santiago completed basic training and advanced individual training, after which he was released from active duty. Since that time, Santiago has been participating in monthly weekend training activities as part of his commitment to the Army National Guard. Santiago currently serves as a sergeant in his Pendleton, Oregon, unit.

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Santiago is an Aircraft Petroleum Specialist, a refueler. He tests petroleum products for safety and then refuels Army aviation equipment. On the civilian side, Santiago lives with his wife in Pasco, Washington, where he works as an electronic technician at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (which is operated by Battelle Memorial Institute for the Department of Energy). On April 17, 2004, the Oregon National Guard received a “mobilization alert order” from the Army National Guard. The order directed the unit stationed in Pendleton to “prepare for a mobilization into federal active service,” but specified that “[t]his is an alert order only” and “[t]he official mobilization order may mobilize less than authorized strength.” In May 2004, the commander of Santiago’s company “announced to the soldiers that the unit was going to deploy, and that the entire unit was under stop loss.” In June 2004, when Santiago’s eight-year term was due to expire, Santiago attended a weekend training session. Santiago “assumed that the weekend training that he attended . . . was his last weekend duty.” On June 11, however, Santiago learned that his enlistment would not end on June 27, the original termination date of his contract, because he was subject to the stoploss order. In October 2004, Santiago’s unit received an order to mobilize for active duty. Pursuant to the mobilization order, Santiago and his unit were instructed to mobilize on January 2, 2005, and depart for Fort Sill, Oklahoma, shortly thereafter for six weeks of training, followed by deployment to Afghanistan for one year in support of “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Santiago retained counsel to challenge the involuntary extension of his enlistment under the stop-loss policy. Santiago’s attorney wrote a letter to Santiago’s unit commander requesting that Santiago be released from further service on the ground that he had fulfilled his contractual obligations. Santiago’s lawyer explained that if no “confirmation of Sgt. Santiago’s discharge [is received] within two weeks . . . this letter constitutes Sgt. Santiago’s attempt to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit to enforce his rights.” The Oregon Military Department replied by letter to Santiago’s lawyer, stating that “[a]s a result of the unit alert, your client’s ETS [estimated termination of service] date was changed to 24 December 2031 and it is scheduled to remain so until his unit is removed from alert status or until demobilization is completed.” The letter also directed that “[r]equests for waivers/exceptions to reserve component unit stop loss should be forwarded through the chain of command.” After learning about the waiver policy, Santiago concluded that it would be futile to seek a waiver or exception. Santiago testified by declaration that his civilian supervisor was “not willing to request an exception to my deployment based upon a ‘negative national security impact’ on my employment.” He also concluded that he could not

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make a claim of personal hardship beyond that which other members of his unit were forced to endure. In January 2005, Santiago reported to Fort Sill to begin his six weeks of training in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan. [...] Enlistment contracts, with exceptions not relevant here, are enforceable under the traditional principles of contract law . . . Santiago relies on the provision of his contract specifying an eight-year term and contends that it requires his separation at the end of that period. He acknowledges that the contract spells out some instances in which his enlistment can be extended (for example, during a declared war), but insists that the extension under the present circumstances, in an alert during an emergency declared by the President, is not among them . . . The enlistment contract clearly contemplates that the terms of enlistment are subject to existing federal laws and regulations that may not be spelled out in the contract. The contract contains a section with the general heading “PARTIAL STATEMENT OF EXISTING UNITED STATES LAWS” and is introduced by a passage stating: Many laws, regulations, and military customs will govern my conduct and require me to do things a civilian does not have to do. The following statements are not promises or guarantees of any kind. They explain some of the present laws affecting the Armed Forces which I cannot change but which Congress can change at any time. There is no question, therefore, that the parties to the contract understood and intended that many laws and regulations not set forth in the contract would govern Santiago’s service, and the reference to changes in the law simply made clear that even subsequently enacted, as well as pre-existing, law would apply. In so providing, the contract was reflecting well-established rules of law applicable to enlistment contracts . . . The statute that authorized the stop-loss order, 10 U.S.C. § 12305, was enacted in 1983. It therefore was one of the federal laws to which Santiago’s enlistment contract was subject when he entered it. As more fully discussed in the next section of this opinion, section 12305(a) authorized the President to suspend the laws relating to separation of any member of the armed forces under specified conditions of national emergency. This presidential power was properly delegated to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, who entered the stop-loss order suspending the separation laws on November 4, 2002. The order was disseminated to personnel

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on November 21, 2002 . . . It was therefore the congressionally-authorized implementation of § 12305, a statute that was in effect at the time Santiago signed his enlistment contract, that caused his term of enlistment to be extended. The contract recognized that federal statutes would apply to the enlistment. It is true that, at the time of Santiago’s enlistment, the emergency conditions specified by Congress in section 12305 for suspension of the separation laws did not yet exist. Those emergency conditions have since come to pass, however, and their existence is not contested on this appeal. That being the case, Congress by section 12305 has authorized the suspension of separation laws. This application of pre-existing federal law does not violate the terms of Santiago’s enlistment contract. Santiago’s enlistment contract contains an even more explicit warning: Laws and regulations that govern military personnel may change without notice to me. Such changes may affect my status, pay, allowances, benefits, and responsibilities as a member of the Armed Forces REGARDLESS of the provisions of this enlistment/reenlistment document. The congressionally-authorized suspension of the separation laws qualifies as a “change” in the law within the meaning of this clause. Without the suspension of those laws, Santiago would have been entitled to be separated in due course at the end of his term of enlistment. With the laws suspended, he could be held under alert and ordered to active duty beyond the term of his enlistment . . . Consequently, we conclude that the military stop-loss policy does not violate the terms of Santiago’s enlistment contract. The next question we must address is whether the stop-loss order as applied to Santiago was authorized by statute. Article I, section 8, clause 14 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” Congress exercised this power, and the laws applying to the various segments of the armed forces are now codified in Title 10 of the United States Code. We conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the military’s stop-loss policy does not exceed the statutory authority conferred on the President by 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a). The parties do not dispute that the purpose of reserve components “is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces.” 10 U.S.C. § 10102. Nor do they dispute that “[i]n time of national emergency declared by the President . . . or when otherwise authorized by law, an authority designated by the Secretary concerned may, without the consent of the persons concerned, order any unit, and any member not

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assigned to a unit organized to serve as a unit, in the Ready Reserve . . . to active duty for not more than 24 consecutive months.” 10 U.S.C. § 12302(a). The President declared a national emergency on September 14, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks in Pennsylvania, at the World Trade Center, and on the Pentagon . . . The President simultaneously delegated to the secretaries of the armed services the authority to order reserves to active duty. See Exec. Order No. 13223, 66 Fed.Reg. 48,201–48,202 (Sept. 14, 2001). We must resolve a narrow question: whether Congress has delegated to the President the authority to apply the stop-loss policy to an individual whose enlistment contract expires after a mobilization alert but prior to a call to active duty. We conclude that the stop-loss policy is authorized by the plain language of section 12305 . . . Section 12305 authorizes the executive branch to implement a stop-loss policy in order to prevent retirement or separation of reserve members who are essential to national security: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, during any period members of a reserve component are serving on active duty pursuant to an order to active duty under authority of section 12301, 12302, or 12304 of this title, the President may suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security of the United States. 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this statutory authority, properly delegated from the President, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Reginald J. Brown, executed on November 4, 2002, the stop-loss order suspending the laws governing separation for Army National Guard units. This stop-loss policy was implemented on November 21 in a directive stating: Generally, all enlistments, reenlistments, extensions, and periods of service for [Army National Guard] soldiers who are members of units alerted or ordered to active duty . . . are extended until further notice. . . . This applies to [Reserve Component] units that are mobilized or have been alerted, but not yet mobilized, at the time this message is published, and to [Reserve Component] units that are alerted or mobil[iz]ed after this message is published. MILPER 03-040, 5 (emphasis added). Because his National Guard unit was alerted prior to his scheduled separation date, the stop-loss policy clearly applies to Santiago. The question is whether the policy is authorized by section 12305(a).

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Santiago’s central contention is that section 12305(a) authorizes the President to delay separation only of members of the reserve components who are on active duty. Because his enlistment would have expired during the period of alert but before his unit was ordered to active duty, Santiago contends that the statute does not authorize application of the stop-loss order to him. Santiago’s interpretation of section 12305(a) is not supported by the statute’s plain words. The limiting clause, “during any period members of a reserve component are serving on active duty pursuant to an order to active duty under authority of section 12301, 12302, or 12304 of this title,” refers only to the period of time during which the President may exercise the power conferred by section 12305(a). That condition is met because the President declared a national emergency in September 2001 and invoked his authority to order reserve units to active duty under section 12302. See Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199. The district court found that members of the Army National Guard have been serving on active duty pursuant to this authority since October 2001. The temporal condition for exercise of the President’s power under section 12305(a) accordingly has been met. The actual operative power conferred on the President by section 12305(a), the power to suspend the laws governing promotion, retirement or separation may be exercised with regard to “any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security,” not merely those who are on active duty. Had Congress intended to limit the President’s power under section 12305(a) so that he could suspend the laws relating only to those members of the armed forces on active duty, it would have been a simple matter for Congress to say so in the statute. It did not. . . . In times of national emergency resulting in the activation of reserve units, it is rational to authorize the President to take special measures to ensure the services of other members of the armed forces whom he deems to be essential to national security. That is what Congress has done in the plain words of section 12305(a). [...] Santiago next argues that his constitutional right to due process of law has been violated by the government’s failure to provide adequate notice that his enlistment could be extended involuntarily for reasons not specified in his enlistment contract. As our earlier discussion of Santiago’s contractual claim makes clear, however, Santiago’s enlistment contract provided notice that subsequently enacted laws and regulations would affect the terms of his contract. Santiago signed an enlistment contract that said “[l]aws and regulations that govern military personnel may change without notice to me.” The contract also states that Santiago “may at any time be ordered to active

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duty involuntarily . . . under any other conditions authorized by law in effect at the time of my enlistment or which may hereafter be enacted into law.” If Santiago’s rights under his enlistment contract have not been violated, it is difficult to see how his constitutional claim which is essentially a variation of his breach of contract claim can prevail. Under these circumstances, the government’s failure to notify Santiago in his enlistment contract of each specific reason that his service might be extended involuntarily does not violate Santiago’s due process rights. Nor does Santiago’s “indefinite extension” violate his due process rights. Santiago’s new ETS date is December 25, 2031, but this date was entered for administrative convenience. The stop-loss policy makes clear that soldiers “will generally be mobilized for an initial period of 12 months, but may be extended for a cumulative period up to, but not to exceed, 24 months.” Accordingly, we reject Santiago’s claims that his right to due process of law was violated. We do not minimize the disruption, hardship and risk that extension of his enlistment is causing Santiago to endure. We also accept the fact that his claim not to be subject to the stop-loss order has been brought in complete good faith. For the reasons we have set forth, however, we conclude that the application of the stop-loss order did not breach his enlistment contract or deprive him of due process of law. We also conclude that it was authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a). The judgment of the district court is accordingly AFFIRMED.

[Ed.: Footnotes and some references have been omitted.] * * * In 2008, the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act which became effective on August 1, 2009 reaffirmed the historic connection between civilians and soldiers. The Act, as had the GI Bill of 1944, and public land distributions to veterans of the past, provided veterans incentives and rewards for military service—primarily in providing educational subsistence. That Act, as had previous “veterans legislation,” stimulated the maintenance and readiness of the National Guard and “ready” military reserves and encouraged public support for the volunteer tradition. A careful reading of Title V of the Appropriations Act of 2008, the “Post9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008,” indicates the complexities associated with Congressional and governmental programming and funding, and, most significantly, the close connection between voluntary military service and citizenship, and in this case of the connection of being at once a productive and useful citizen and, in the same instance, a capable and effective member of the Armed Forces.

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DOCUMENT 8.4 TITLE V—VETERANS EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE ACT This title may be cited as the Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008.

SEC. 5002. FINDINGS Congress makes the following findings: 1.

2.

3.

4. 5.

6.

On September 11, 2001, terrorists attacked the United States, and the brave members of the Armed Forces of the United States were called to the defense of the Nation. Service on active duty in the Armed Forces has been especially arduous for the members of the Armed Forces since September 11, 2001. The United States has a proud history of offering educational assistance to millions of veterans, as demonstrated by the many “G.I. Bills” enacted since World War II. Educational assistance for veterans helps reduce the costs of war, assist veterans in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service, and boost the United States economy, and has a positive effect on recruitment for the Armed Forces. The current educational assistance program for veterans is outmoded and designed for peacetime service in the Armed Forces. The people of the United States greatly value military service and recognize the difficult challenges involved in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service in the Armed Forces. It is in the national interest for the United States to provide veterans who serve on active duty in the Armed Forces after September 11, 2001, with enhanced educational assistance benefits that are worthy of such service and are commensurate with the educational assistance benefits provided by a grateful Nation to veterans of World War II.

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SEC. 5003. EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE FOR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES WHO SERVE AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 (a) Educational Assistance Authorized.— 1 IN GENERAL.— Part III of title 38, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 32 the following new chapter:

[Ed.: Chapter 33—Post-9/11 Educational Assistance defines the specific amendments of Title 38, United States Code, to incorporate the terms of Title V. Chapter 33—Post-9/11 Educational Assistance provisions. The material defines the terms and entitlements to educational assistance, the kind of assistance eligible, duration of the entitlements, and the terms and lengths of service which qualified veterans for Educational Assistance. Generally, eligible veterans were those whose duty commenced on or after September 11, 2001, and served an aggregate of at least 36 months on active duty in the Armed Forces (including service on active duty in entry level and skill training), but there were numerous exceptions and inclusions regarding time in service and just what constituted service. The material included under this heading are also included fiscal housekeeping requirements noting how payments may be affected by specific actions such as when a person is recalled to active duty, when one fails to receive course credit, or pursues studies not qualified under the act. There were specific allowances for distance learning stipends, residence requirements, payments for tuition and educational supplies, directives on how and when, and at what levels payments will be made to recipients. Subchapter III specifies terms of entitlements, which expires at the end of the 15-year period beginning on the date of such individual’s last discharge or release from active duty, determining one’s date of discharge, special rules, regulations, the correction of clerical errors, exceptions, and termination of benefits. There were also limits to the total amount of funds available to state and local agencies which administered the veterans education assistance benefits.]

SEC. 5005. MODIFICATION OF AMOUNT AVAILABLE FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES ADMINISTERING VETERANS EDUCATION BENEFITS Section 3674(a)(4) of title 38, United States Code, is amended by striking “may not exceed” and all that follows through the end and inserting “shall be $19,000,000.”

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[Ed.: Perhaps one of the most unique aspects of the Post-9/11 GI Bill was the provision that eligible veterans whose post-9/11 benefits were otherwise unused could be transferred to specified members of the veteran’s family. This entitlement encouraged the support of the volunteer tradition by the family, the community, the state, and the general public.]

SEC. 5006. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER UNUSED EDUCATION BENEFITS FAMILY MEMBERS FOR CAREER SERVICE MEMBERS

TO

(a) Authority to Transfer Montgomery GI Bill Benefits to a Dependent.— Section 3020 of title 38, United States Code, is amended— (1) by striking the section heading and subsections (a) and (b) and inserting the following: “Sec. 3020. Authority to Transfer Unused Education Benefits to Family Members for Career Service Members. “(a) In General.—Subject to the provisions of this section, the Secretary of Defense may authorize the Secretary concerned, to promote recruitment and retention of members of the Armed Forces, to permit an individual described in subsection (b) who is entitled to basic educational assistance under this subchapter to elect to transfer to one or more of the dependents specified in subsection (c) the unused portion of entitlement to such assistance, subject to the limitation under subsection (d). “(b) Eligible Individuals.—An individual referred to in subsection (a) is any member of the Armed Forces— “(1) who, while serving on active duty or as a member of the Selected Reserve at the time of the approval by the Secretary concerned of the member’s request to transfer entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section, has completed six years of service in the Armed Forces and enters into an agreement to serve at least four more years as a member of the Armed Forces; or “(2) as determined in regulations pursuant to subsection (k).”; (2) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the following: “(d) Limitation on Months of Transfer.— “(1) An individual approved to transfer an entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section may transfer any unused entitlement to one or more of the dependents specified in subsection (c).

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“(2) The total number of months of entitlement transferred by an individual under this section may not exceed 36 months. The Secretary of Defense may prescribe regulations that would limit the months of entitlement that may be transferred under this section to no less than 18 months.” (3) in subsection (f)(1) by striking “without regard to whether” and inserting “only while”; and (4) in subsection (f)(2) by inserting “as long as the individual is serving on active duty or as a member of the Selected Reserve” after “so transferred”; (5) by adding at the end of subsection (f) the following: “(3) Entitlement transferred under this section may not be treated as marital property, or the asset of a marital estate, subject to division in a divorce or other civil proceeding.” (6) in subsection (h)(5) by inserting “may use the benefit without regard to the 10-year delimiting date, but” after “under this section”; and (7) by striking subsection (k) and inserting the following: “(k) Regulations—The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, shall prescribe regulations for purposes of this section. Such regulations shall specify— (1) the manner of authorizing the military departments to offer transfer of entitlements under this section; (2) the eligibility criteria in accordance with subsection (b); (3) the limitations on the amount of entitlement eligible to be transferred; and (4) the manner and effect of an election to modify or revoke a transfer of entitlement under subsection (f )(2).” (b) Authority to Transfer Montgomery GI Bill for the Selected Reserve Benefits to a Dependent.— Chapter 1606 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 16132 the following: “SEC. 16132A. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER UNUSED EDUCATION BENEFITS TO FAMILY MEMBERS.

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“(a) In General—Subject to regulation prescribed by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary concerned may permit a member described in subsection (b) who is entitled to basic educational assistance under this chapter to elect to transfer to one or more of the dependents specified in subsection (c) a portion of such member’s entitlement to such assistance, subject to the limitation under subsection (d). “(b) Eligible Members—A member referred to in subsection (a) is a member of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve who, at the time of the approval of the member’s request to transfer entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section, has completed— “(1) at least six years of service in the Selected Reserve and enters into an agreement to service at least four more years as a member of the armed forces; or “(2) the years of service as determined in regulations pursuant to subsection (j). “(c) Eligible Dependents—A member approved to transfer an entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section may transfer the member’s entitlement as follows: “(1) To the member’s spouse. “(2) To one or more of the member’s children. “(3) To a combination of the individuals referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2). “(d) Limitation on Months of Transfer—The total number of months of entitlement transferred by a member under this section may not exceed 36 months. The Secretary of Defense may prescribe regulations that would limit the months of entitlement that may be transferred under this section to no less than 18 months. “(e) Designation of Transferee—A member transferring an entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section shall— “(1) designate the dependent or dependents to whom such entitlement is being transferred; “(2) designate the number of months of such entitlement to be transferred to each such dependent; and “(3) specify the period for which the transfer shall be effective for each dependent designated under paragraph (1). “(f) Time for Transfer; Revocation and Modification— “(1) Subject to the time limitation for use of entitlement under section 16133, a member approved to transfer entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section may transfer such

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entitlement at any time after the approval of the member’s request to transfer such entitlement. “(2) A member transferring entitlement under this section may modify or revoke at any time the transfer of any unused portion of the entitlement so transferred. The modification or revocation of the transfer of entitlement under this paragraph shall be made by the submittal of written notice of the action to both the Secretary concerned and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. “(3) Entitlement transferred under this section may not be treated as marital property, or the asset of a marital estate, subject to division in a divorce or other civil proceeding.

[Ed.: Approximately three pages of very specific stipulations regarding the transfer of entitlements are deleted from Sec. 16132A.]

“SEC. 16163A. AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER UNUSED EDUCATION BENEFITS TO FAMILY MEMBERS “(a) In General—Subject to the provisions of this section, the Secretary concerned may permit, at such Secretary’s sole dis’retion, a member described in subsection (b) who is entitled to basic educational assistance under this chapter to elect to transfer to one or more of the dependents specified in subsection (c) a portion of such member’s entitlement to such assistance, subject to the limitation under subsection (d). “(b) Eligible Members—A member referred to in subsection (a) is a member of the armed forces who, at the time of the approval of the member’s request to transfer entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section, has completed at least— “(1) six years of service in the armed forces and enters into an agreement to serve at least four more years as a member of the armed forces; or “(2) the years of service as determined in regulations pursuant to section (j). “(c) Eligible Dependents—A member approved to transfer an entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section may transfer the member’s entitlement as follows: “(1) To the member’s spouse. “(2) To one or more of the member’s children. “(3) To a combination of the individuals referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2). “(d) Limitation on Months of Transfer—The total number of months of entitlement transferred by a member under this section may not exceed 36 months. The Secretary of Defense may prescribe regulations that would limit

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the months of entitlement that may be transferred under this section to no less than 18 months. “(e) Designation of Transferee—A member transferring an entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section shall— “(1) designate the dependent or dependents to whom such entitlement is being transferred; “(2) designate the number of months of such entitlement to be transferred to each such dependent; and “(3) specify the period for which the transfer shall be effective for each dependent designated under paragraph (1). “(f) Time for Transfer; Revocation and Modification— “(1) Subject to the time limitation for use of entitlement under section 16164, a member approved to transfer entitlement to basic educational assistance under this section may transfer such entitlement only while serving as a member of the armed forces when the transfer is executed. “(2) A member transferring entitlement under this section may modify or revoke at any time the transfer of any unused portion of the entitlement so transferred. The modification or revocation of the transfer of entitlement under this paragraph shall be made by the submittal of written notice of the action to both the Secretary concerned and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. “(3) Entitlement transferred under this section may not be treated as marital property, or the asset of a marital estate, subject to division in a divorce or other civil proceeding. “(g) Commencement of Use—A dependent to whom entitlement to basic educational assistance is transferred under this section may not commence the use of the transferred entitlement until— “(1) in the case of entitlement transferred to a spouse, the completion by the member making the transfer of at least— “(A) six years of service in the armed forces; or “(B) the years of service as determined in regulations pursuant to subsection (j); or “(2) in the case of entitlement transferred to a child, both— “(A) the completion by the member making the transfer of at least— “(i) ten years of service in the armed forces; or “(ii) the years of service as determined in regulations pursuant to subsection (j); and “(B) either— “(i) the completion by the child of the requirements of a secondary school diploma (or equivalency certificate); or “(ii) the attainment by the child of 18 years of age. “(h) Additional Administrative Matters— “(1) The use of any entitlement to basic educational assistance transferred

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under this section shall be charged against the entitlement of the member making the transfer at the rate of one month for each month of transferred entitlement that is used. “(2) Except as provided under subsection (e)(2) and subject to paragraphs (5) and (6), a dependent to whom entitlement is transferred under this section is entitled to basic educational assistance under this chapter in the same manner as the member from whom the entitlement was transferred. “(3) The monthly rate of educational assistance payable to a dependent to whom entitlement is transferred under this section shall be the monthly amount payable under sections 16162 and 16162a to the member making the transfer. “(4) The death of a member transferring an entitlement under this section shall not affect the use of the entitlement by the dependent to whom the entitlement is transferred. “(5) Notwithstanding section 16164(a)(2), a child to whom entitlement is transferred under this section may use the benefit without regard to the 10year delimiting date, but may not use any entitlement so transferred after attaining the age of 26 years. “(6) The administrative provisions of this chapter shall apply to the use of entitlement transferred under this section, except that the dependent to whom the entitlement is transferred shall be treated as the eligible member for purposes of such provisions. “(7) The purposes for which a dependent to whom entitlement is transferred under this section may use such entitlement shall include the pursuit and completion of the requirements of a secondary school diploma (or equivalency certificate). “(i) Overpayment— “(1) JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY—In the event of an overpayment of basic educational assistance with respect to a dependent to whom entitlement is transferred under this section, the dependent and the member making the transfer shall be jointly and severally liable to the United States for the amount of the overpayment for purposes of section 3685 of title 38. “(2) FAILURE TO COMPLETE SERVICE AGREEMENT—Except as provided in paragraph (3), if an individual transferring entitlement under this section fails to complete the service agreed to by the individual under subsection (b)(1) in accordance with the terms of the agreement of the individual under that subsection, the amount of any transferred entitlement under this section that is used by a dependent of the individual as of the date of such failure shall be treated as an overpayment of educational assistance under paragraph (1). “(3) Paragraph (2) shall not apply in the case of an individual who fails to complete service agreed to by the individual—

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“(A) by reason of the death of the individual; or (B) for a reason referred to in section 16133(b). “(j) Regulations— “(1) The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, shall prescribe regulations for purposes of this section.”

[Ed.: The remaining materials under Title V are primarily “housekeeping” and technical items relating to the kinds of regulations that might be authorized, and required amendments to title 10, and title 38 United States Code.] * * * The changing character of war in the twenty-first century also reflected the changing aspects of life on planet Earth. That life had become much more integrated and interrelated. Human society had become a global society, while the culture and the experiences of that society had not yet made the transition. Older traditional societies and nations had preserved their integrity by maintaining a political and geographic apartness. That world had been substantially eroded by the technology and the wars of the twentieth century. Indeed, the frontiers of the U.S., China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and of every nation touched upon the frontiers of each and every other nation in this new twenty-first-century global society. The technology of the twenty-first century had broken down the communications and walls separating nations and peoples. That same technology also made those traditional nations and societies more vulnerable. Some argue that open societies such as the U.S. are particularly vulnerable. Homeland defense for the U.S. and for most nations had become a global phenomenon. The costs and character of defense in the new global society can be gleaned somewhat from the defense and military appropriations which were, in fact, the primary purpose of the Appropriations Act of 2008. Title V, the Post 9/11 GI Bill, was only a part. The Appropriations Act of 2008 provided specific funds for each branch of the military services, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, National Guard and Reserves, including designated amounts for aircraft, ammunition, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, for “research, development, test and evaluation” and other special needs. The allocations in some respects recalled the Laws of Virginia requiring “every man able to beare armes have in his house a fixt gunn two pounds of powder and eight pound of shot.” Those were the weapons of three hundred years ago. Now, in the twenty-first century the allocation of funds by the Appropriations Act of 2008, and the special needs identified by Congress in those appropriations, illustrate the changing dimensions of

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national defense and the transformations in arms, armaments, and armies of the twenty-first century.

DOCUMENT 8.5 REVOLVING AND MANAGEMENT FUNDS Defense Working Capital Funds: For an additional amount for “Defense Working Capital Funds,” $1,837,450,000, to remain available for obligation until expended. National Defense Sealift Fund: For an additional amount for “National Defense Sealift Fund,” $5,110,000, to remain available for obligation until expended. Defense Health Program: For an additional amount for “Defense Health Program,” $1,413,864,000, of which $957,064,000 shall be for operation and maintenance; of which $91,900,000 is for procurement, to remain available until September 30, 2010; of which $364,900,000 shall be for research, development, test and evaluation, to remain available until September 30, 2009:

Provided, That in addition to amounts otherwise contained in this paragraph, $75,000,000 is hereby appropriated to the “Defense Health Program” for operation and maintenance for psychological health and traumatic brain injury, to remain available until September 30, 2009. Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense: For an additional amount for “Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense,” $65,317,000, to remain available until September 30, 2009. Office of the Inspector General: For an additional amount for “Office of the Inspector General,” $6,394,000, of which $2,000,000 shall be for research, development, test and evaluation, to remain available until September 30, 2009.

[Ed.: Specific allocations were also directed to a Commander’s Emergency Response Fund]: (a) From funds made available for operation and maintenance in this chapter to the Department of Defense, not to exceed $1,226,841,000 may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to fund the Commander’s

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Emergency Response Program, for the purpose of enabling military commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi, Afghan, and Filipino people. (b) Not later than 15 days after the end of each fiscal year quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report regarding the source of funds and the allocation and use of funds during that quarter that were made available pursuant to the authority provided in this section or under any other provision of law for the purposes of the programs under subsection (a).

[Ed.: Authorization was also given the Secretary of Defense to transfer certain funds to a Defense Cooperation Account]: During fiscal year 2008, the Secretary of Defense may transfer not to exceed $6,500,000 of the amounts in or credited to the Defense Cooperation Account, pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2608, to such appropriations or funds of the Department of Defense as the Secretary shall determine for use consistent with the purposes for which such funds were contributed and accepted: Provided, That such amounts shall be available for the same time period as the appropriation to which transferred: Provided further, That the Secretary shall report to the Congress all transfers made pursuant to this authority. Sec. 9106: Of the amount appropriated by this chapter under the heading “Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense,” not to exceed $20,000,000 may be used for the provision of support for counter-drug activities of the Governments of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan, as specified in section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 1998 . . .

[Ed.: Other special categories identified for funding included Military Personnel, Operation, and Maintenance Funds for each branch of the military and for the National Guard and Reserves, as well as funding for Afghanistan Security Forces, and Iraq Security Forces]: Provided further, That the authority to provide assistance under this heading is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign nations:

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Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense may transfer such funds to appropriations for military personnel; operation and maintenance; Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid; procurement; research, development, test and evaluation; and defense working capital funds to accomplish the purposes provided herein: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report not later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal quarter to the congressional defense committees providing assessments of the evolving threats, individual service requirements to counter the threats, the current strategy for predeployment training of members of the Armed Forces on improvised explosive devices, and details on the execution of the Fund: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense may transfer funds provided herein to appropriations for operation and maintenance; procurement; research, development, test and evaluation; and defense working capital funds to accomplish the purpose provided herein: Provided further, That this transfer authority is in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Department of Defense: Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall, not fewer than 15 days prior to making transfers from this appropriation, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

GENERAL PROVISIONS—THIS CHAPTER [Ed.: Sec. 9201–Sec. 9203 are deleted. Congress also directed, under the authority of the fiscal legislation [Sec. 9204] that the Secretary of Defense report on very specific actions and initiatives taken within the zones of hostility and military actions. Those charges denote the complexity of the warfare being waged across the globe.] (a) Not later than December 5, 2008 and every 90 days thereafter through the end of fiscal year 2009, the Secretary of Defense shall set forth in a report to Congress a comprehensive set of performance indicators and measures for progress toward military and political stability in Iraq. (b) The report shall include performance standards and goals for security, economic, and security force training objectives in Iraq together with a notional timetable for achieving these goals. (c) In specific, the report requires, at a minimum, the following: (1) With respect to stability and security in Iraq, the following:

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(A) Key measures of political stability, including the important political milestones that must be achieved over the next several years. (B) The primary indicators of a stable security environment in Iraq, such as number of engagements per day, numbers of trained Iraqi forces, trends relating to numbers and types of ethnic and religious-based hostile encounters, and progress made in the transition of responsibility for the security of Iraqi provinces to the Iraqi Security Forces under the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process. (C) An assessment of the estimated strength of the insurgency in Iraq and the extent to which it is composed of non-Iraqi fighters. (D) A description of all militias operating in Iraq, including the number, size, equipment strength, military effectiveness, sources of support, legal status, and efforts to disarm or reintegrate each militia. (E) Key indicators of economic activity that should be considered the most important for determining the prospects of stability in Iraq, including— (i) unemployment levels; (ii) electricity, water, and oil production rates; and (iii) hunger and poverty levels. (F) The most recent annual budget for the Government of Iraq, including a description of amounts budgeted for support of Iraqi security and police forces and an assessment of how planned funding will impact the training, equipping and overall readiness of those forces. (G) The criteria the Administration will use to determine when it is safe to begin withdrawing United States forces from Iraq. (2) With respect to the training and performance of security forces in Iraq, the following: (A) The training provided Iraqi military and other Ministry of Defense forces and the equipment used by such forces. (B) Key criteria for assessing the capabilities and readiness of the Iraqi military and other Ministry of Defense forces, goals for achieving certain capability and readiness levels (as well as for recruiting, training, and equipping these forces), and the milestones and notional timetable for achieving these goals. (C) The operational readiness status of the Iraqi military forces, including the type, number, size, and organizational structure of Iraq battalions that are— (i) capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations independently without any support from Coalition Forces; (ii) capable of conducting counterinsurgency operations with the support of United States or coalition forces; or (iii) not ready to conduct counterinsurgency operations. (D) The amount and type of support provided by Coalition Forces to the Iraqi Security Forces at each level of operational readiness.

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(E) The number of Iraqi battalions in the Iraqi Army currently conducting operations and the type of operations being conducted. (F) The rates of absenteeism in the Iraqi military forces and the extent to which insurgents have infiltrated such forces. (G) The training provided Iraqi police and other Ministry of Interior forces and the equipment used by such forces. (H) The level and effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces under the Ministry of Defense in provinces where the United States has formally transferred responsibility for the security of the province to the Iraqi Security Forces under the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process. (I) Key criteria for assessing the capabilities and readiness of the Iraqi police and other Ministry of Interior forces, goals for achieving certain capability and readiness levels (as well as for recruiting, training, and equipping), and the milestones and notional timetable for achieving these goals, including— (i) the number of police recruits that have received classroom training and the duration of such instruction; (ii) the number of veteran police officers who have received classroom instruction and the duration of such instruction; (iii) the number of police candidates screened by the Iraqi Police Screening Service, the number of candidates derived from other entry procedures, and the success rates of those groups of candidates; (iv) the number of Iraqi police forces who have received field training by international police trainers and the duration of such instruction; (v) attrition rates and measures of absenteeism and infiltration by insurgents; and (vi) the level and effectiveness of the Iraqi Police and other Ministry of Interior Forces in provinces where the United States has formally transferred responsibility for the security of the province to the Iraqi Security Forces under the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) process. (J) The estimated total number of Iraqi battalions needed for the Iraqi security forces to perform duties now being undertaken by coalition forces, including defending the borders of Iraq and providing adequate levels of law and order throughout Iraq. (K) The effectiveness of the Iraqi military and police officer cadres and the chain of command. (L) The number of United States and coalition advisors needed to support the Iraqi security forces and associated ministries. (M) An assessment, in a classified annex if necessary, of United States military requirements, including planned force rotations, through the end of calendar year 2009.

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SEC. 9205. (a) REPORT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.— Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report that contains individual transition readiness assessments by unit of Iraq and Afghan security forces. The Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees updates of the report required by this subsection every 90 days after the date of the submission of the report until October 1, 2009. The report and updates of the report required by this subsection shall be submitted in classified form. (b) REPORT BY OMB.— (1) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense; the Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq; and the Commander, Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, shall submit to the congressional defense committees not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 90 days thereafter a report on the proposed use of all funds under each of the headings “Iraq Security Forces Fund” and “Afghanistan Security Forces Fund” on a project-by-project basis, for which the obligation of funds is anticipated during the 3-month period from such date, including estimates by the commanders referred to in this paragraph of the costs required to complete each such project. (2) The report required by this subsection shall include the following: (A) The use of all funds on a project-by-project basis for which funds appropriated under the headings referred to in paragraph (1) were obligated prior to the submission of the report, including estimates by the commanders referred to in paragraph (1) of the costs to complete each project. (B) The use of all funds on a project-by-project basis for which funds were appropriated under the headings referred to in paragraph (1) in prior appropriations Acts, or for which funds were made available by transfer, reprogramming, or allocation from other headings in prior appropriations Acts, including estimates by the commanders referred to in paragraph (1) of the costs to complete each project. (C) An estimated total cost to train and equip the Iraq and Afghan security forces, disaggregated by major program and sub-elements by force, arrayed by fiscal year. (c) NOTIFICATION.— The Secretary of Defense shall notify the congressional defense committees of any proposed new projects or transfers of funds between sub-activity groups in excess of $15,000,000 using funds appropriated by this Act under

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the headings “Iraq Security Forces Fund” and “Afghanistan Security Forces Fund.”

SEC. 9206 Funds available to the Department of Defense for operation and maintenance provided in this chapter may be used, notwithstanding any other provision of law, to provide supplies, services, transportation, including airlift and sealift, and other logistical support to coalition forces supporting military and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan:

Provided, That the Secretary of Defense shall provide quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees regarding support provided under this section.

SEC. 9207 Supervision and administration costs associated with a construction project funded with appropriations available for operation and maintenance, “Afghanistan Security Forces Fund” or “Iraq Security Forces Fund” provided in this chapter, and executed in direct support of the Global War on Terrorism only in Iraq and Afghanistan, may be obligated at the time a construction contract is awarded:

Provided, That for the purpose of this section, supervision and administration costs include all in-house Government costs.

SEC. 9208 (INCLUDING TRANSFERS) (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and in addition to amounts otherwise made available by this Act, there is appropriated $1,700,000,000 for the “Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Fund,” to remain available until September 30, 2009. (b) The funds provided by subsection (a) shall be available to the Secretary of Defense to continue technological research and development and upgrades, to procure Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and associated support equipment, and to sustain, transport, and field Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. (c) (1) The Secretary of Defense shall transfer funds provided by subsection (a) to appropriations for operation and maintenance; procurement; and research, development, test and evaluation to accomplish the purposes

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specified in subsection (b). Such transferred funds shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as the appropriation to which they are transferred. (2) The transfer authority provided by this subsection shall be in addition to any other transfer authority available to the Department of Defense. (3) The Secretary of Defense shall, not less than 15 days prior to making any transfer under this subsection, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of the transfer.

SEC. 9209 For the purposes of this Act, the term “congressional defense committees” means the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, the Armed Services Committee of the Senate, the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

* * * The association between education and national defense and military preparedness first came to the fore with the creation of national military academies in the early nineteenth century, followed by the approval of the Morrill Land Grant College Act in 1862. Subsequently, the Selective Service Act of 1917, and the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, followed by the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill) of 1944 reaffirmed and strengthened the connection between citizenship, military service, and education. Title V, the Veterans Educational Assistance Act or “Post 9/11 GI Bill,” signaled the changing character and dimensions of warfare and national defense. The legislation was explicitly a response to “terrorists” attacks against the United States. And it explicitly recognized that the “G.I. Bill” enacted since World War II and educational assistance for veterans “helps reduce the costs of war, assists veterans in readjusting to civilian life after wartime service, . . . boosts the United States economy, and has a positive effect on recruitment for the Armed Forces.” The legislation also implicitly recognized that since the terrorist attack on September 11, there was no longer a distinction between peacetime service in the military and wartime service. War, albeit a different kind of war than had been waged in the past, had become a constant and permanent feature of life. Military service increasingly became intermittent as the nation responded to new crises or situations. Tours of duty in Iraq, or Afghanistan, for example, became

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multiple and for many reservists and National Guard personnel life rotated between civilian and the military phase. Education and technical or “skill” training were paramount features of the continuing support provided the citizen soldiers by the government. Training for modern warfare increasingly reflected the fusion of training required for a life and livelihood as a civilian—coincidentally more closely configuring the character and aptitudes of citizenship and soldiering. An interesting facet of this fusion of being a good citizen with being a good soldier was that the Post 9/11 GI Bill provided that individuals who were judged by the Secretary of Defense as having (or being capable of acquiring) “a skill or specialty in which there is a critical shortage of personnel or for which it is difficult to recruit or to attract and retain in the military” would be entitled to educational “bonus” supplements. In providing that “unused education benefits” could be transferred by the veteran to family members encouraged family and community support and encouragement for voluntary service. The provisions of this new GI Bill were also specifically to be disseminated by the respective Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of Homeland Security. Another aspect of modern warfare, indicated by the appropriations part of Title V, the Post 9/11 GI Bill, was the costs and character of contemporary warfare and national defense. Congress allocated specific funds available to the Army for aircraft procurement ($954,111,000), missile procurement ($561,656,000); weapons and tracked combat vehicle procurement ($5,463, 471,000); supplemental funds for ammunition ($344,900,000), and another $16,337,340,000) for “other procurement.” The Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps and the National Guard received similar allocations for aircraft, missiles, ammunition, vehicles, ships, and supplies. One significant allocation that further emphasized the changing character of warfare was the funds allotted for “Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation.” The weapons and technology of war were changing rapidly—often through managed and directed research and engineering and technological development. And, denoting too perhaps the interface of military and civilian life, Congress allocated funds under the rubric or heading of national defense and military preparedness for health and medical research and development, and for drug interdiction—the latter perhaps recognizing that one of the “weapons” an enemy might use to undermine military preparedness could be the infusion of drugs into the civilian lifestyle. Opium and other drugs were particularly associated with generating resources for the Taliban, and perhaps al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Congress specifically designated the “Governments of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan” as those qualified for financial support for “Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense.” It considered

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a stable and responsible civil life at home—and abroad—essential to American security and national defense. Notably, as if to emphasize the threats and the unique demands of contemporary warfare abroad and the association of world political stability and economic welfare with American security, Congress allotted $1,226,841 to the Department of Defense to fund the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, for the purpose of enabling military commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi, Afghan, and Filipino people.

Contemporary warfare, national defense, global stability and world peace— all related to international security, stability, and the encouragement of a productive and vibrant global economy. Within this context, U. S. national defense policies continued to rest upon the dual persona of the American citizen and soldier. The Post-9/11 GI Bill and the frontier, fragmented, and terrorist style of warfare that often targeted unarmed civilians reaffirmed and strengthened the historic association in the United States of the citizen and soldier. Despite the fact that there seemed to be no end to the conflicts and continuing casualties caused by roadside bombs, car bombs, and suicide bombers, military recruiters have had continued success:

DOCUMENT 8.6 GERRY J. GILMORE, “ALL SERVICES MEET OR EXCEED OCTOBER RECRUITING GOALS,” 2009 American Forces Press Service WASHINGTON, Nov. 13, 2009 —All active-duty and reserve-component military branches met or exceeded their recruiting goals for October, Defense Department officials said. October’s results —the first for fiscal 2010—continue a successful military recruiting mission that experienced a banner year in fiscal 2009. Active and reserve military components notched record recruiting numbers in fiscal 2009 and also signed up the highest-quality recruits since the all-volunteer force began in 1973, Bill Carr, deputy undersecretary of defense for military personnel policy, told Pentagon reporters at an Oct. 13 news conference. Active-duty military recruiting continued its winning ways in October:

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• The Army signed up 6,914 active-duty soldiers in October, making 101 percent of its 6,858 goal. • The Navy signed up 2,926 active-duty sailors in October, making 100 percent of its 2,926 goal. • The Marine Corps signed up 2,851 active-duty Marines in October, making 100 percent of its 2,843 goal. • The Air Force signed up 2,198 active-duty airmen in October, making 100 percent of its 2,198 goal. All four active-duty services also met or exceeded their retention goals for October. All six reserve components met or exceeded their recruiting goals in October:

• The Army National Guard had 4,425 accessions, making 112 percent of its 3,947 goal. • The Army Reserve had 3,348 accessions, making 125 percent of its 2,675 goal. • The Navy Reserve had 671 accessions, making 100 percent of its 671 goal. • The Marine Corps Reserve had 1,132 accessions, making 144 percent of its 787 goal. • The Air National Guard had 698 accessions, making 124 percent of its 562 goal. • The Air Force Reserve had 1,083 accessions, making 100 percent of its 1,083 goal. Attrition losses for the reserve components are not available, pending corrections and resubmissions from services, officials said. Carr acknowledged that the current economic downturn probably is having a positive effect on recruiting, but he also pointed to the efforts of military recruiters for the results in fiscal 2009, noting that the military deployed a robust bonus program in which 40 percent of recruits received an average bonus of $14,000. And last year’s success should positively affect the military’s recruiting mission in fiscal 2010, Carr added. “You just don’t start recruiting from zero. . . . You would start with the number [of recruits] that are under contract to report for training in the months ahead,” Carr pointed out. For example, the Army’s active-duty recruiting goal for fiscal 2010 is about 74,500 soldiers, Maj. Gen. Donald M. Campbell Jr., chief of Army Recruiting Command, told Pentagon reporters at the Oct. 13 news conference.

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However, Campbell said, the Army had signed up about 30,000 new active soldiers through delayed-entry programs. And these troops, he said, will count toward the Army’s fiscal 2010 recruiting goal.

* * * While the branches of the military had consistently filled their quotas, in the past several decades the available pool of volunteers had been shrinking. Part of that was surely attributed to public discontent with the changing locales and character of modern warfare, part to changing demographics, and part to a perception among some that the threats to national security were being overstated. The 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon did generate a surge in volunteers for military service, and a sense that the threat from foreign enemies was very real. That perception began to fade as “winning” seemed elusive and casualties among U.S. and Allied forces continued to rise. But insofar as the United States was concerned, the one great constant was the character of American military forces. They were volunteers, and generally selected on the basis of skills, training, and education for their role in the armed services. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, who served in that post under both President George W. Bush and President Barack H. Obama, stressed that it was the “people part” of national defense that was America’s greatest asset. In his presentation of the administration’s 2010 Defense Budget before the House Armed Service Committee on Wednesday, May 13, 2008, Gates stressed that the proposed budget was a reform budget that reflected lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan while addressing “the range of other potential threats around the world, now and in the future.” The “all-volunteer force,” he said, “represents America’s greatest strategic asset.”

DOCUMENT 8.7 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES, “AMERICA’S GREATEST ASSET” As you may know, I was in Afghanistan last week. As we increase our presence there—and refocus our efforts with a new strategy—I wanted to get a sense from the ground level of the challenges and needs so that we can give our troops the equipment and support to be successful and come home safely. Indeed, listening to our troops and commanders—unvarnished and unscripted—has from the moment I took this job been the greatest single source for ideas on what the Department needs to do both operationally and institutionally. As I told a group of soldiers on Thursday, they have done their

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job. Now it is time for us in Washington to do ours. In many respects, this budget builds on all the meetings I have had with troops and commanders, and all that I have learned over the past two-and-a-half years—all underpinning this budget’s three principal objectives: First, to reaffirm our commitment to take care of the all-volunteer force, which, in my view, represents America’s greatest strategic asset; as Admiral Mullen says, “If we don’t get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter.” Second, to rebalance this department’s programs in order to institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars we are in and the scenarios we are most likely to face in the years ahead, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies; and Third, in order to do this, we must reform how and what we buy, meaning a fundamental overhaul of our approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting. From these priorities flow a number of strategic considerations, more of which are included in my submitted testimony. The base budget request is for $533.8 billion for FY10—a four percent increase over the FY09 enacted level. After inflation, that is 2.1 percent real growth. In addition, the Department’s budget request includes $130 billion to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan. I know that there has been discussion about whether this is, in fact, sufficient to maintain our defense posture—especially during a time of war. I believe that it is. Indeed, I have warned in the past that our nation must not do what we have done after previous times of conflict and slash defense spending. I can assure you that I will do everything in my power to prevent that from happening on my watch. This budget is intended to help steer the Department of Defense toward an acquisition and procurement strategy that is sustainable over the long term—that matches real requirements to needed and feasible capabilities. As you know, this year we have funded the costs of the wars through the regular budgeting process—as opposed to emergency supplementals. By presenting this budget together, we hope to give a more accurate picture of the costs of the wars and also create a more unified budget process to decrease some of the churn usually associated with funding for the Defense Department. This budget aims to alter many programs, and many of the fundamental ways that the Department of Defense runs its budgeting, acquisition, and procurement processes. In this respect, three key points come to mind about the strategic thinking behind these decisions. First of all, sustainability. By that, I mean sustainability in light of current and potential fiscal constraints. It is simply not reasonable to expect the

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defense budget to continue increasing at the same rate it has over the last number of years. We should be able to secure our nation with a base budget of more than a half a trillion dollars—and I believe this budget focuses money where it can more effectively do just that. I also mean sustainability of individual programs. Acquisition priorities have changed from defense secretary to defense secretary, administration to administration, and congress to congress. Eliminating waste, ending “requirements creep,” terminating programs that go too far outside the line, and bringing annual costs for individual programs down to more reasonable levels will reduce this friction. Second, balance. We have to be prepared for the wars we are most likely to fight—not just the wars we have been traditionally best suited to fight, or threats we conjure up from potential adversaries who, in the real world, also have finite resources. As I’ve said before, even when considering challenges from nation-states with modern militaries, the answer is not necessarily buying more technologically advanced versions of what we built—on land, in the air, or at sea—to stop the Soviets during the Cold War. Finally, there are all the lessons learned from the last eight years—on the battlefield and, perhaps just as importantly, institutionally back at the Pentagon. The responsibility of this department first and foremost is to fight and win wars—not just constantly prepare for them. In that respect, the conflicts we are in have revealed numerous problems that I am working to improve; and this budget makes real headway in that respect. At the end of the day, this budget is less about numbers than it is about how the military thinks about the nature of warfare and prepares for the future. About how we take care of our people and institutionalize support for the warfighter for the long term. About the role of the services and how we can buy weapons as jointly as we fight. About reforming our requirements and acquisition processes. I know that some of you will take issue with individual decisions. I would ask, however, that you look beyond specific programs, and instead at the full range of what we are trying to do—at the totality of the decisions and how they will change the way we prepare for and fight wars in the future. As you consider this budget and specific programs, I would caution that each program decision is zero sum: a dollar spent for capabilities excess to our real needs is a dollar taken from a capability we do need—often to sustain our men and women in combat and bring them home safely. Once again, I thank you for your ongoing support of our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions.

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QUESTIONS AND ISSUES 1. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the United States has been engaged in fighting prolonged wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Without a draft to augment the all-volunteer forces as in previous lengthy wars, the military has called up the National Guard and the Reserves, and has implemented “stop-loss” policies that force its personnel to serve multiple tours in combat areas. Given the current multiple missions of the Armed Forces, how do you view the occasional calls for re-instituting the draft? 2. What do you think the nation owes its military veterans? With significantly higher pay and benefits than their predecessors who served between 1940 and 1973 received, should today’s veterans of the all-volunteer Armed Forces receive benefits comparable to those in the original GI Bill? 3. What are your views on the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy towards gays and lesbians in the military, adopted during the presidency of Bill Clinton? Is this a civil rights issue equivalent to racial integration and equal treatment of women in the Armed Forces? Why, or why not? 4. Consider the character of modern warfare as exemplified by the combat and engagements of the past several decades. How is it that the “citizen-soldier” continues to characterize the core of American military personnel? 5. Why is education now, and in the past, so relevant to military preparedness and national defense? 6. Identify key legislation since the founding of the United States that exemplifies the association between an educated citizenry and national defense. 7. Compare and contrast the provisions and rationale of the GI Bill of 1944, and the Post 9/11 GI Bill of 2008.

CHAPTER

9

CITIZEN AND SOLDIER

Throughout American history war has been the rule and peace the exception. This study focuses on the fundamental, but timely and timeless question of how, when, and why the United States has raised an army. The focus is on the relationship between military service and citizenship beginning with the colonial era and ending with the first year of the Obama Presidency. Basic questions have guided the selection of documents and the editors’ efforts to establish the historical context for understanding and evaluating the relationship and history of citizenship and military service: • How, when, and why has the nation raised an army? • How has it drawn upon the human resources available for military service? • Why have some citizens served and others have not? • Do all citizens, male and female, who are of appropriate age and physical and mental fitness have an obligation to serve? • Should willingness to serve be a condition for naturalized citizenship? As the title of this book suggests, the guiding principle has been the concept of the citizen-soldier. To put it more broadly, the reader may notice that some of these questions are ones of historical fact—those that ask how, when, and why—while others—those that ask why and should—call for the reader to apply personal values, judgments, and beliefs to his or her understanding of the documents. The editors of this book share a common

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understanding of the how, and when of this history, while their different personal histories, values, and beliefs may lead to different answers regarding the why and should a situation have developed, a law passed, or what the significance of that event or action may have been. Students, teachers, and the general public will similarly reach different answers and conclusions. The historical study of the relationship between citizenship and military service will enhance one’s understanding of American history in general, and of our military, political, and social experiences in particular.

HOW, WHEN, AND WHY HAS THE NATION RAISED AN ARMY? The simple answer to the when and why is: always, and at least officially for defense. We might more precisely ask: how, when, and why has the nation called up and enlarged its Armed Forces for real or potential combat duty? For there has never been a time when the nation did not have an army, and the justification for it has always been for defense against threats to the security or strategic interests of the nation, or during the colonial era for defense of communities. But beyond this simple—or simplistic answer—lies a much more complex one. Before the twentieth century most U.S. wars were Indian Wars fought to secure the right of Europeans to settle the land or to defend established settlements. The First Laws of Virginia in 1623 recognized the citizen-soldier as the basic resource for the colonists’ protection. Other laws soon followed establishing regularly organized colonial militia—predecessors of the later day state and National Guard. During the 169 years of colonial North America before the Revolutionary War, virtually every military engagement involved one or more Indian tribes, even when, as in the French and Indian War, it also involved a European nation. Forty-eight of the seventy military engagements before 1900, as noted in Table 0.I, involved conflicts between the original inhabitants of this continent or conflicts with earlier settlers of Hawaii. Thus, from the beginning we are faced with the difficulty of defining the concept of national defense and national security, and asking whether American wars have sometimes crossed the line from defense to conquest. From the Pequot War in early colonial Massachusetts, to Wounded Knee in 1890, many of the Indian Wars were preemptive wars intended to disarm tribes before they could attack white settlers—not unlike the preemptive strike against Iraq in 2003. The Indian Wars generally fell into two categories. In one, the United States forces responded to attacks initiated by Indians, as in the Black Hawk War of 1832. In the other, the United States waged wars of territorial conquest, as in those commanded by Andrew Jackson and William Henry Harrison leading up to the War of 1812, and in some of the later wars of the Great Plains. It is easy to think of the first kind

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as national defense and the second as purely offensive. Yet, Jackson and Harrison both saw their campaigns as contributing to the defense of the Nation. If we look simply at where the nation most frequently deployed its Armed Forces during its first century, it seems clear that Americans as a nation primarily saw national defense, home defense, or security as requiring them to subdue or remove Indian tribes. Most of the Indian Wars involved relatively small-scale conflicts, none of which called for significant enlargement of the Armed Forces, although the United States did seek to establish a protective line of defense with forts, posts, and garrisons along its western fringes. The major wars—those that required mobilization of forces significantly larger than the existing standing army—were between the United States and foreign nations other than Indian nations. The Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 were both fought against the British expressly for the defense of the rights and freedoms of Americans. One can argue, as many pacifists would, that there were other ways to defend these rights. Nevertheless, Americans fought these wars in response to British attacks. In that sense, they can readily be considered “defensive” wars. It is not difficult to make the case that the militiamen of Concord and Lexington fought in defense of their homes, or if you accept the legitimacy of war under some circumstances, that the British occupation and burning of Washington, DC, justified a military response that was clearly in defense of the homeland. The justification for the War with Mexico was, and is, a hotly debated topic. Was it a war to defend the United States against an aggressive Mexican dictator who threatened the security of Americans on the border, or was it a war of conquest? President Polk would have it both ways. He had declared that under his administration the United States would extend its territory to the Pacific Ocean. Defeat of Santa Anna and his Mexican army made this possible. On the other hand, Polk would tell Congress that Mexican forces had fired first on the United States Army, making General Zachary Taylor’s military response a defense of the nation. The Civil War involved a variety of justifications and causes for war. It reaffirmed and heightened the revolutionary values of liberty and justice by seeking an end to the injustice of slavery. It was also, in a sense, a defensive war. Although both sides could be considered aggressors in the opening battle at Fort Sumter—the South in blockading the Fort, and the North in attempting to break the blockade—both sides clearly believed they were fighting in defense of their homeland. But for the North, at least, the Civil War became something more than defense of the Nation. With the Emancipation Proclamation, it became a moral cause for the abolition of slavery, which turned wavering European nations toward support of the North. It also gave a sense of moral fervor to Union troops to match the

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intensity of the Confederates, who were literally fighting to expel invaders from their homeland. The moral cause, the sense that some men would give their lives so that others might be free, was something new in war. In the Revolutionary War, soldiers fought for high moral principles, but it was for their own rights, not the rights of others. And so, with the Civil War the United States established the principle that war might be fought for more than conquest or defense of the homeland. War could be altruistic. It might be one more way in which the United States could fulfill Puritan John Winthrop’s wish that America would be “a city upon a hill,” a beacon of hope to the rest of the world. The idea that the United States fights wars not simply for defense of its homeland and the security of its citizens, but in order to secure justice and freedom for people everywhere, greatly complicates our ability to understand so many American wars after the Civil War. Is America’s national defense somehow tied to the freedom of those in other lands? It is one of the central questions of the Cold War. But it arises far earlier—in 1898, if not before. In hindsight, it is clear that the Spanish-American War had nothing to do with actual defense of the homeland. But is defense of American interests, or to establish American values in foreign lands legitimately “national defense?” More importantly, is defense of American economic or strategic interests abroad a reasonable definition of “national defense?” Long before the battleship the Maine exploded in Havana Harbor, the American press had been hounding the United States government to support revolutionaries in Cuba in their struggles against Spain. The United States had a moral obligation, they argued, to help liberate the Cuban people from Spanish oppression. They made it a moral crusade, although it is also important to understand the economic interests the United States had there as well. When President McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war, it was to retaliate against Spain for sinking the Maine. But very quickly, as the United States sent its Armed Forces into Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the President justified war on the grounds that it would bring freedom and democracy to Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos. Critics, however, then and now point out that economic self-interest was likely a major, if unspoken, factor in McKinley’s decision. It was, say the critics, the start of an American global empire. But if the United States was becoming a global empire or power, what then is the meaning of “national defense?” Does it then mean defense of the nation’s global interests anywhere in the world that they are threatened? What does “national security” mean if the well-being of some, or all, Americans depends upon the security of perceived American interests abroad? The altruistic and the imperial explanations are not mutually exclusive. One can argue, and many do, that U.S. military and economic power around

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the world protects not only Americans, but guarantees freedom and prosperity for millions in other lands. Others argue that the prosperity and freedom that American power secures for Americans is the cause of much conflict and poverty around the world, which may also make Americans more vulnerable. It is beyond the purpose of this book to debate this point, but we raise it simply in order to illustrate the difficulty of defining “national defense” and “national security” for the United States in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. We face this difficulty in considering almost all of the wars in which the United States has fought since 1900. Critics of the War in Vietnam have questioned whether that war had anything to do with the defense or security of the United States. Transcripts of tape recordings from the White House of President Lyndon B. Johnson indicate that the President himself was unsure of this. On the other hand, both Johnson and President Richard M. Nixon frequently made public statements that American soldiers were giving their lives so that the Vietnamese could have freedom and democracy. These were noble public expressions that could obscure other purposes of the war, such as stopping the global spread of communism and helping the United States ultimately win the Cold War against the Soviet Union. Whether this constituted “defense” of the homeland, or an effective guarantee of national security, continues to be debated. National defense was clearly the issue in World War II following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and again in 2002 when the United States believed that Afghanistan harbored al-Qaeda and aided and abetted the attacks of September 11, 2001. It is not difficult to call these wars “defensive,” even if you believe they were unnecessary. Nevertheless, those who took the United States into those wars justified them in part on grounds they were defending the rights of citizens in other countries. See especially Donald Rumsfeld’s speech describing his visits with American soldiers in Afghanistan. Similarly, even though the intelligence turned out to be faulty, Congress approved the invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the grounds that its president, Saddam Hussein, had accumulated weapons of mass destruction. It can thus be called a war of national defense, in that it was intended to protect United States’ strategic and economic interests in the region. But the Bush Administration also justified it on altruistic bases, arguing that disarming, or eliminating, the regime of Saddam Hussein would help protect Israel. After the invasion turned into a lengthy war, the President and many Americans justified it as a campaign to bring freedom and democracy to the people of Iraq. Perhaps the strongest case for altruism or making the world safe for democracy as a motive for war can be made in the case of Bosnia, where President Bill Clinton intervened militarily in order to stop the so-called

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“ethnic cleansing” among Christians and Muslims in that region. Similarly, President George H. W. Bush justified the 1989 invasion of Iraq on the grounds that the United States needed to protect the smaller nation of Kuwait, which Saddam Hussein had invaded. Skeptics charged that the real reason was to protect U.S. oil interests in the Middle East. Even if true, the question remains whether protection of the supply of oil to the United States, whose economy is highly dependent on oil, is legitimately part of the defense of the United States. Whether it be in reaction to attacks and for national defense, to make the world safe for democracy, or to protect perceived American interests abroad whatever they may be, war and mobilization of the Armed Forces has been a constant for the United States in recent times and in times past. International treaties and organizations such as NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), the European Union, SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization) all factor into military responses to global situations or issues. Some degree of military mobilization and preparedness has been the norm since colonial times.

HOW HAS THE NATION DRAWN UPON HUMAN RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE? This question first requires that we consider what Americans considered appropriate human resources for military service at a given time in the nation’s history. As the early colonial documents show, nearly all able-bodied male members of a community were voluntarily or otherwise enrolled in the local militia, which could be called up to join with other militia in military campaigns that went beyond the immediate defense of the community. Sixteen was a common age for the start of this military obligation, while 45 or 50 might be an upper age limit, depending on a man’s health and physical abilities. But there were important variations in the militia requirements of the various colonies. The New England militia were the classic model. In Virginia, however, because of the scattered nature of settlements authorities supplemented the militia with a small army of paid regulars, and exempted men from militia duty if it would interfere with their tending to their farms or plantations. We must also consider which men authorities considered to be eligible members of the community. Most colonies had white indentured servants and African slaves, who in some cases were enrolled in militias, but in most cases were not. This changed over time in each colony. In addition, Pennsylvania exempted Quakers, Mennonites, and Amish from militia duty because of their religious objections to war. Nevertheless, in general, membership in the militia signaled a man’s status as a free and independent member of the community—a citizen. An important question to consider, then, is what the citizen status of women was.

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Not all soldiers in either the colonial or early national periods were members of the militia. Paid volunteers could be recruited into the regular army, as was the case when a young George Washington led a regiment of “regulars” in a failed campaign against the French and Indians at Fort Duquesne (now Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) in 1754. A similar mix of militiamen and volunteer “regulars” served under Washington in the Revolutionary War. The U.S. Constitution would recognize this distinction between militias and the regular Army (and Navy), giving Congress the authority to establish rules and regulations for the Armed Forces of the United States, but giving the President the authority to call up the state militias for federal service to quell insurrections or repel invasions. The Dick Militia Act in 1903 would restructure state militia as the National Guard. Other than that very significant change, the Armed Forces of the United States have retained this basic two-level system, with the state militia or National Guard under the jurisdiction of the states except when federalized by the President, and the regular Army, Navy, or, in modern times, Air Force, under the jurisdiction of Congress and the President. It is the state militia or National Guard units that have the most direct link to the historical concept of the citizen soldier. The Dick Militia Act restates the obligations of male citizens in much the same terms as the rules for the early colonial militia: “[T]he militia shall consist of every ablebodied male citizen of the respective States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and every able-bodied male of foreign birth who has declared his intention to become a citizen, who is more than eighteen and less than fortyfive years of age.” For the regular Army, Navy, and Air Force, the question of citizenship in relation to service has a more complicated history. As we have seen, the Selective Service laws of the twentieth century stated that ablebodied males of certain ages who are citizens of the United States, or those of foreign birth who have declared an intention to become citizens, may be required to perform military service. The United States Supreme Court has affirmed that Congress has the power to establish such a requirement. However, with the exception of naturalized citizens, there is no standing principle that in the absence of an act of Congress, citizenship necessarily entails military service. What, then, is the connection between citizenship and those men and women who have served as volunteers in one of the United States’ Armed Forces? And what is the citizenship status of those who either refuse to serve, or are prohibited from serving? These are the central concerns of the remaining questions.

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WHY HAVE SOME CITIZENS SERVED, AND OTHERS HAVE NOT? This question has several elements to it. First, who has been required to perform military service? Second, who has had the right to serve? And third, who has volunteered to serve, and what were their motives? There are other ways to ask these questions. For example, what, if any, service does the nation rightfully expect of its citizens? And, are there valid national defense reasons for excluding some citizens from military service? Is it morally acceptable for the nation to require men to fight in wars that violate their personal beliefs and values? Conversely, is the nation justified in commanding service from those who find particular wars, or all wars, to be immoral? Consider first that the nation’s laws have always included either explicitly or implicitly the principle that the potential military manpower of the nation consists of all able-bodied male citizens who are within prescribed age limits. This is the militia concept. The nation has never called this entire pool of men to service. Instead, Congress has sometimes enacted a draft when the pool of volunteers for the regular Armed Forces has not been sufficient. Recall, however, the speech of Daniel Webster against conscription at a time when the nation’s survival was in jeopardy and it seemed there were insufficient volunteers and militia to fight the war successfully. He thought that military conscription would surrender “the most essential rights of personal liberty.” He then asked: “Where is it written in the Constitution . . . that you may take children from their parents, and parents from their children, and compel them to fight the battles of any war, in which the folly or the wickedness of Government may engage it?” By the time of the Civil War, such arguments proved powerless to stop either the Confederacy or the Union from enacting draft laws. They were insufficient to persuade the United States Supreme Court to declare the Selective Service Act of 1917 unconstitutional. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s rulings, conscription raises profound questions about the personal rights, liberties, and freedoms of citizens, as Daniel Webster so eloquently pointed out. It also raises questions of equity and fairness. Each draft law has been selective to some extent. Consider the provisions of the Confederate law that exempted men who owned 20 or more slaves, or the Union law that permitted men of means to purchase substitutes. Selective Service laws of the twentieth century attempted to rectify these issues of equity, but many have questioned their success in these attempts. Witness the political fallout from General Hershey’s “Channeling Memorandum.” Furthermore, in the 1970s, men challenged the fairness of a draft law that did not apply equally to women. The Supreme Court dismissed this concern in the Rostker decision, spelling out in clear language the principle that Congress is justified in restricting

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rights that would otherwise be guaranteed by the Constitution when national security is at stake. At the same time, many women were demanding the right to enlist in all branches of the Armed Forces with access to the same occupational specialties as men. Even though women’s access to various jobs in the Armed Forces has broadened considerably, in 2010 military policy continued to restrict the assignments of women. Finally, conscription raises knotty questions about religious freedom when it either requires men to serve in violation of their consciences, or requires them to ground their objections to war in religious beliefs. The Supreme Court again struggled to balance First Amendment rights and national defense in the Seeger and Welsh cases. Few would argue that these are ideal solutions, whatever their views on the morality of war. The end of the draft in 1973 resolved these questions for the time being. In the decades since the draft ended, the question of “who serves when not all serve?” as one federal commission asked, has been studied and discussed thoroughly. In the absence of conscription this question becomes one of motivations. Why have men and women enlisted? Clearly this has changed with the times. The Revolutionary War is an interesting comparison with today’s volunteer military. The “regulars” under George Washington’s command volunteered for a wide variety of reasons. Some were motivated by a strong commitment to the cause. Others joined because they sought adventure, were escaping from unpleasant domestic conditions, or even because they needed the small pittance of allowance and pay received by soldiers. Some were former slaves hoping to prove their worthiness as men in the new democracy. Consider then the several documents in Chapter 8 relating to recruitment and retention in the all-volunteer force during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Note that the recession was good for recruitment and retention, resulting in “the highest quality recruits since the all-volunteer force began in 1973.” But the 2007 report of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “The All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance,” finds that the poor and minorities were not overrepresented, even if many joined because of the excellent pay, benefits, and career opportunities they might not find in civilian job markets. As in Washington’s time, there are a myriad of motivations for individuals to enlist in the Armed Forces. There are always those who join because they believe in the immediate cause of any given military mission. They are people like Pat Tillman, who gave up a promising career in the National Football League to join the fight in Afghanistan. (And, like Tillman, some become disillusioned with the cause once in battle.) Surely, tens of thousands joined the Union Army during the Civil War in order to fight against slavery, just as other tens of thousands joined the Confederate Army to defend their homeland. Yet, even the Armies of the Civil War could not

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attract sufficient numbers without a draft. Although we cannot know for sure, it seems very likely that few of America’s wars could have been fought solely with volunteers who had joined out of passion for the specific cause of that war. To that kind of volunteer must be added first the recruit who joins simply because his country calls, and he feels it his duty whether or not he feels passion for the particular cause. Next must be added those who are drawn to the excitement and adventure of war, even attracted, perhaps intoxicated by the danger. Finally, military service has offered a living, and a pathway to upward mobility and a sense of purpose in life. For the most disadvantaged in society, military service has long provided such a pathway. This is the other side of the citizen-soldier equation. What does the nation owe to those who have served in its Armed Forces? Racial minorities—African Americans, Native Americans, Mexican Americans, Asian Americans, and others—have a long history of fighting in America’s wars and then coming home and demanding equal rights as citizens, citing their military service as meriting the full benefits of citizenship. As the “Colored Citizens of Nashville” wrote in 1865: Thousands of [our brethren] have already died in battle . . . for the sake of the Union, and we are ready and willing to sacrifice more. But what higher order of citizen is there than the soldier? . . . If we are called upon to do military duty . . . why should we be denied the privilege of voting?

So there we have it both ways: the citizen as soldier; the soldier as citizen. This much is clear in the historical record. But what of the citizenship rights of those who refuse to serve when called, or those who are denied the opportunity to serve? The documents we have presented here do not offer a simple answer, and we leave it for you, the reader, to ponder. Does a naturalborn citizen of the United States have a right to refuse service in a war he or she believes to be immoral, or unjustified on some other grounds? If so, why does the nation apply a different standard to naturalized citizens who must swear to their willingness to fight for the country? If not, do they therefore forfeit their rights as citizens? And finally, consider those, such as homosexuals, who are denied the right to serve. Daniel Choi, a highly decorated combat veteran, respected commander in the Army National Guard, and graduate of West Point was involuntarily discharged for announcing on TV that he was in a gay relationship. Commander Choi argues that his discharge violates his rights as a citizen of the United States. The defenders of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy argue that permitting openly gay or lesbian members to serve in the military undermines morale and esprit de corps to the detriment of the nation’s security. In considering this case, try assuming that both sides are correct—that Choi’s rights as a citizen have been violated; and that permitting homosexuals to serve in the Armed Forces harms the

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security of the nation. It is very possible that by the time this book reaches its readers, Congress and the President will have repealed the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. The larger question of individual rights versus national security, of which this is only a specific example, will remain. Benjamin Franklin famously wrote that “those who would give up a little liberty for a little security deserve neither.” But the opposing view would have it that the rights of any single individual should not be permitted to undermine the safety of a whole community, or a whole nation. These are the competing interests that Americans have always had to consider when thinking about citizenship, military service, the security of our homes, and defense of the nation. They are not easy, and perhaps it is good that each successive generation of citizens of the United States has had to weigh these interests and answer these questions in light of the particular challenges of their time. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the character of warfare is changing, but as in times past the United States continues to rely primarily upon the volunteer citizen-soldier as its most important military resource.

DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

THE FIRST LAWS MADE BY THE ASSEMBLY IN VIRGINIA, ANNO MDCXXII (1623–24) Source: John D. Cushing, Compiler, The First Laws of the State of Virginia, Wilmington, DE: M. Glazier, 1978, Vol. I.

LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MARCH 1658–1659 (10TH OF COMMONWEALTH) Source: John D. Cushing, Compiler, The First Laws of the State of Virginia, Wilmington, DE: M. Glazier, 1978, Vol. II.

NEW ENGLAND ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1643 Source: Yale Law School, The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_Century/art/1613.asp.

PENNSYLVANIA CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES, 1701 Source: James B. Whisker, The Militia (Vol. III), Lewiston, New York: E. Mellen Press, 1992.

GEORGE WASHINGTON, SENTIMENTS ON A PEACE ESTABLISHMENT Source: John C. Fitzpatrick (Ed.), Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799, George Washington Bicentennial Commission, July 1938, Vol. 26, pp. 374–398.

THE UNIFORM MILITIA ACT, 1792 Source: Second Congress, Session I, Chapter 33 (May 8, 1792).

224 • Documentary Sources

DANIEL WEBSTER ON CONSCRIPTION Source: U.S. House of Representatives: Educational Resources: U.S. Congressional Documents and Debates [go to http://search.house.gov/htbin/search] “Say No to Conscription,” Daniel Webster speech of December 9, 1814, posted by Congressman Ron Paul, in Speech to House of Representatives, May 9, 2002.

CIVIL WAR CONSCRIPTION: UNION, 1863 Source: 37th Congress, Session III, Chapters 74, 75 (March 3, 1863).

SECOND CONFISCATION ACT, 1862 Source: 38th Congress, Session I, (July 17, 1862).

PETITION OF THE COLORED CITIZENS OF NASHVILLE, JANUARY 9TH, 1865 Source: Unidentified newspaper clipping of Andrew Tait et al. to the Union Convention of Tennessee, 9 Jan. 1865, enclosed in Col. R. D. Mussey to Capt. C. P. Brown, 23 Jan. 1865, Letters Received, ser. 925, Dept. of the Cumberland, U.S. Army Continental Commands, Record Group 393 Pt. 1, National Archives. And Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861–1867, Series II, The Black Military Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1982), pp. 811–812.

MORRILL LAND GRANT COLLEGE ACT, 1862 (THE MORRILL ACT) Source: 38th Congress, Session I, 12 Stat. 503, 7 U.S.C. 301).

THE DICK MILITIA ACT, 1903 Source: 57th Congress, Session II, Chapter 196, January 21, 1903.

THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT, 1916 Source: 64th Congress, Session I, Chapter 134, June 3, 1916.

SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT, 1917 Source: 65th Congress, Session I, Chapter 15, May 18, 1917.

SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT, 1940 Source: 76th Congress, Session III, Chapter 720, September 16, 1940.

THE SERVICEMEN’S READJUSTMENT ACT (GI BILL), 1944 Source: 58 Statute, Chapter 268, June 22, 1944, 58 Statutes, Chapter 268, June 22, 1944.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9981 Source: Harry Truman, The White House, July 26, 1948.

Documentary Sources • 225

CHANNELING MANPOWER Source: General Lewis B. Hershey, 1965.

SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: PRESENT OPERATIONS OF THE SYSTEM AND LOCAL DRAFT BOARDS Source: Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, Document No. 82, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1966.

U.S. SUPREME COURT, UNITED STATES V. SEEGER, 1965 Source: 380 U.S. 163, 1965.

SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE, 1970 Source: Office of the White House Secretary, February 21, 1970.

SECRETARY RUMSFELD SPEAKS ON “21ST CENTURY TRANSFORMATION” OF U.S. ARMED FORCES Source: Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (Speech), “21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces,” U.S. Department of Defense, Speeches Archives (January 31, 2002), http://www.defenselink.mil/ Speeches Archives.

THE ALL-VOLUNTEER MILITARY: ISSUES AND PERFORMANCE Source: http//www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=8313.

EMILIANO SANTIAGO V. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; LES BROWNLEE, SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (ACTING); RAYMOND BYRNE, ACTING ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE OREGON NATIONAL GUARD; DAVID DORAN, CAPTAIN, DETACHMENT ONE, COMPANY D, 113 AVIATION UNIT COMMANDER Source: United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. 425 F.3d 549 Argued and Submitted April 6, 2005 Filed May 13, 2005 Amended September 28, 2005, http:// cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F3/425/549/587483.

TITLE V—VETERANS EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE ACT Source: Title V. Supplemental Appropriation Act (2008).

REVOLVING AND MANAGEMENT FUNDS Source: Defense Working Capital Funds.

226 • Documentary Sources

GERRY J. GILMORE, “ALL SERVICES MEET OR EXCEED OCTOBER RECRUITING GOALS,” 2009 Source: U.S. Department of Defense, News, November 13, 2009, http://www. defenselink.mil/news.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT M. GATES, “AMERICA’S GREATEST ASSET” Source: “Opening Statement on the FY 2020 Budget to the House Armed Services Committee,” Washington, D.C., May 13, 2009, http://www.defenselionk.mil/ Speeches Archives.

SUGGESTED READING

Ambrose, Stephen. Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Germany. New York: Touchstone, 1998. Anderson, David. The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004. Anderson, Martin, with Barbara Honegger. The Military Draft: Selected Readings on Conscription. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1982. Andrews, Jr., Rod. Long Gray Lines: The Southern Military School Tradition, 1839–1915. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. Appy, Christian G. Working Class War: American Combat Soldiers and Vietnam. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993. Ayers, Leonard P. The War with Germany: A Statistical Summary. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1919. Beaumont, Roger. Joint Military Operations: A Short History. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993. Beaumont, Roger and Martin Edmonds. War in the Next Decade. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1974. Bernardo, Joseph, and Eugene H. Bacon. American Military Policy: Its Development Since 1775. Harrisburg, PA: Military Services Publishing, 1955. Berube, Allan. Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War Two. New York: The Free Press, 1990. Binkin, Martin, and Shirley J. Bach. Women and the Military. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1977. Boot, Max. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Boyne, Walter J. Clash of Wings: World War II in the Air. New York: Simon and Schuster/ Touchstone Books, 1994. Brands, H. W., Jr. The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. ——. Into the Labyrinth: The United States and the Middle East, 1945–1993. New York: McGraw Hill, 1994. ——. Lone Star Nation: How a Ragged Army of Volunteers Won the Battle for the Independence of Texas. New York: Doubleday, 2004. Brands, H. W., Jr. with Darren J. Pierson and Reynolds S. Kiefer. The Use of Force after the Cold War. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000.

228 • Suggested Reading Britten, Thomas A. American Indians in World War I: At Home and at War. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1999. Chambers, John Whiteclay II. To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America. New York: The Free Press, 1987. ——. The Oxford Companion to American Military History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Clifford, John Garry. The Citizen Soldier: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913–1920. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1972. Clowse, Barbara B. Brainpower for the Cold War: The Sputnik Crises and National Defense Education Act of 1958. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981. Coffman, Edward M. The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986. ——. The Regulars: The American Army, 1898–1941. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2004. Cosmas, Graham A. An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish American War, 2nd edn, Shippending, PA: White Mare Publishing Co., 1994. Dawson, Joseph G. The Late 19th Century U.S. Army, 1865–1898: A Research Guide. New York: Greenwood Press, 1990. Derthick, Martha. The National Guard in Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. Doubler, Michael D. I Am the Guard: History of the Army National Guard. Foreword by Gen. John W. Veasey, Jr. Arlington, VA: Army National Guard, 2001. Estes, Steve. Ask and Tell: Gay and Lesbian Veterans Speak Out. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007. Feinman, Ilene. Citizenship Rites: Feminist Soldiers and Feminist Antimilitarists. New York: New York University Press, 2000. Flynn, George. The Draft, 1940–1973. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1993. Franke, Volker: Preparing for Peace: Military Identity: Value Orientations, and Professional Military Education. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. Gaddis, John L. The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Gatewood, Willard B. “Smoked Yankees” and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898–1902. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1987. Gershick, Zsa Zsa. Secret Service: Untold Stories of Lesbians in the Military. Los Angeles: Alyson Books, 2005. Glatthaar, Joseph T. Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers. New York: The Free Press, 1990. Griffith, Robert K. The Army’s Transition to the All-Volunteer Force, 1968–1974. Army Historical Series, Washington, DC: 1997. Gross, Robert A. The Minutemen and their World. New York: Hill and Wang, 1976. Holm, Tom. Strong Hearts, Wounded Souls: Native American Veterans of the Vietnam War. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996. Karston, Peter, Ed. The Military in America: From the Colonial Era to the Present. New York: The Free Press, 1974. Keegan, John. The Face of Battle. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1993. Keim, Albert, and Grant M. Stoltzfus. The Politics of Conscience: The Historic Peace Churches and America at War, 1917–1955. Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press, 1988. Kellogg, Walter Guest. The Conscientious Objector. New York: Garland Press, 1972. LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–1980. 7th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993. MacCloskey, Reserve Officers Training Corps. New York: R. Rosen Press, 1965. Mariscal, George. Aztlan and Vietnam: Chicano and Chicana Experiences of the War. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Mershon, Sherie, and Steven L. Schlossman. Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. Miller, Edward S. War Plan ORANGE: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991. Millett, Allan, and Peter Maslowski. For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States. New York: Free Press, 1994. Morden, Bettie J. The Women’s Army Corps, 1945–1978. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2000.

Suggested Reading • 229 Moskos, Charles C., and John Sibley Butler. All that We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way. New York: Basic Books, 1996. Moskos, Charles C., and John Whiteclay Chambers II, eds. The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993. Moy, Timothy, War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military, 1920–1940. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2001. Nalty, Bernard C., and Morris J. MacGregor. Blacks in the Military: Essential Documents. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1981. Neiberg, Michael S. Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. Odom, William O. After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1999. Olson, Kenneth W. The GI Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1974. Pearlman, Michael. Warmaking and American Democracy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999. Perret, Geoffrey. A Country Made by War: From the Revolution to Vietnam—The Story of America’s Rise to Power. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. The Report of the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force. New York: Macmillan, 1970. Roosevelt, Theodore. The Rough Riders. New York: Scribner, 1902; Reprinted New York: De Capo Press, 1990. Rostker, Bernard. I Want You! The Evolution of the All-Volunteer Force. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. Segal, David R. Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989. Shenk, Gerald E. Work or Fight! Race, Gender, and the Draft in World War I. New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2005. Slotkin, Richard. Lost Battalions: The Great War and the Crisis of American Nationality. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2005. Tan, Samuel K. The Filipino-American War, 1899–1913. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2002. Watson, Cynthia Ann. U.S. Military Service: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio Press, 2007. Watson, Mark S. The War Department: Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1950. Whisker, James B. The Militia. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992. Zeigler, Sara L., and Gregory G. Gunderson. Moving Beyond G.I. Jane: Women and the U.S. Military. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005.

INDEX

Adams, John 34 Agnew, Spiro T. 160 Air Force 1, 162, 196–204, 205, 218 African Americans 9, 12–13,47, 96, 112, 126, 130, 133, 221; See also black soldiers, buffalo soldiers. African slaves 217 Afghanistan 153, 159, 161, 163–164, 170–171, 204–205, 216, 220; Operation Enduring Freedom, 5 Africa 162–163 Aguinaldo, Emilio 62 Alabama 35 Alamo 39 Albania 111 All-Volunteer Army 142, 143–144, 159, 171, 173–180, 220 All-Volunteer Military: Issues and Performance 174–180, 220 Allies 118,128–129 Al-Qaeda 171, 205, 216 American Expeditionary Force 98 American Revolution 1, 2 American System of Education 35 Amish 9, 216–217 Andrews, Rod, Jr. 48 Annapolis 26, 34 Arabic 163 Apache 55 Appropriations Act of 2008 19–204

Arapaho Conflict. See Cheyenne and Arapaho Conflict. Argonne Forest 98 Arizona 88 Articles of Confederation 1, 11, 20 Army 1; 69, 98, 100–101, 115, 161, 196–204, 218; V Corps, 60; I Corps; 1st Division; 98; 1st Texas Volunteers; IV Corps; 4th Texas Volunteers; 42nd Division; Regular Army 99, 133; Reserves 7, 129, 133; 71st Volunteer Infantry, 60; 26th Division; Army Occupation: Berlin, 4; Germany, 4; Japan, 4; Argentina Intervention, 3 Arickaree Indians, 2 Articles of Confederation 1 Asia 96, 100 Asian Americans 112, 221 Austria 111 Axis Alliance 111 Baghdad 171 Balkans 162 Baltimore 35 Bao Dai 132 Bannock Indian War 3 Barbary pirates 34 Battle of Britain 111 Battle of New Orleans 35 Belgium 111

Index • 231 Berlin 118, 128–129; airlift, 129; blockade, 129; Wall, 161 Beveridge, Albert 59 Big Bend 55 Bleeding Kansas 2 Black Hawk War 2, 213 black soldiers 62, 96, 98, 133; See also Buffalo Soldiers Blitzkrieg 111 Nicaragua: Occupation 3; Marines Intervene 3 Bolivia: Army cocaine raid, 5 Bonus army 100 Bosnia 162, 216 Boxer Rebellion/China, 3 British occupation, 214 Brownsville, Texas 87 Buckley, Gail 62 Buddhist 133 Buffalo Soldiers 48 Bulgaria 128, 161 Bull Run 40 Bush, George H. W. 162, 217 Bush, George W. 162, 163, 171, 216 Butler, Benjamin 45 California 2, 3, 62, 159 Cambodia 4, 155, 157; Evacuation, 4 Campaign against the Cheyenne 3 Campaigns Against Indians of far Northwest 3 Canada 129 Carolinas 35 Carranza, Venustiano 86, 88 Carter, James (Jimmy) Earl 153, 160–161 Cayuse Indian War 2 Central America 162 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 132, 160 Chancellor of Germany 111 Channeling Manpower 134–136 Chateau-Thierry 98 Cheney, Richard 172 Cherokee, 54; Cherokee Revolt and Removal, 2 Chesapeake 9 Cheyenne and Arapaho Conflict 2; See also Campaign against the Cheyenne. Chicamauga 62 Chief Joseph 55 Chief Victorio 54 Chiang Kai Chek 130

China 111, 129–130, 196; Marine occupation, 4; Marines intervene, 5, Nationalist Revolt, 4 Chinese Service Medal 4 Chippewa Conflict 3 Choi, Daniel 221 Christians 62, 216 Civil War 3, 6, 22, 26, 40–48, 55, 63, 155, 171, 214, 215, 219; draft, 88 Civil War conscription: Union (1863) 43–45 Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) 101, 111 Clinton William J. (Bill) 162–163, 216 Coast Guard 1; Reserve 115 Coeur d’Alene Conflict. See Spokane, Coeur d’Alene and Paloos Conflict. Cold War 6, 128, 132, 151, 161, 172, 216 Colored Citizens of Nashville. See Petition of Colored Citizens of Nashville. Coolidge, Calvin 100 Columbus, New Mexico 87 Comanche, 54. See Kiowa and Comanche Expedition. Communist Party 161, 216 Commander in Chief 26, 60 Concord 15, 214 Confederate Conscription Act 40, 42 Confederacy 22, 40–41, 219, 220 Confederate government 40 Confiscation Acts 45 Conflict with Chili/Venezuela, 3. See also Cuban Revolt 3. Congress 26, 32, 40, 55, 59, 61, 88, 99, 101, 111–112, 171, 180, 216, 218–219 conscientious objector 63, 138 conscription 36–39, 42, 63, 219 Constitution 1, 8, 25–26, 31 Continental Army 20 Continental Congress 25 Corps of Cadets 54 Corps of Engineers 34 Corregidor 112 Cosmas, Graham A. 56 Creek Indians 35; Creek Indian War, 2 Crowder, Enoch 88 Cuba 58, 59, 61–62, 130, 215; intervention in Civil War 3; occupation 4; Marines intervene 3; Custer, George Armstrong 55 Custer’s Last Stand 55 Czechoslovakia 111, 129–130, 161

232 • Index Daniel Webster on Conscription 36–39 Davis, Jefferson 40 Declaration of Independence 10, 15–19, 21, 132 Declaration of War 88 Denmark 111 Department of Defense 163, 172, 206; Appropriation Authorization Act (1974), 147–150, 151; Revolving and Management Funds, 197–204 Depression of 1893, 58 Detail of Army Officers Act 54 Diaz, Porfirio 86 Dick Militia Act 63, 64–69, 218 Dominican Republic 4, 128; and Battle of Santo Domingo, 4; Marines intervene, 3; 4; Marine occupation, 4; Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 162–163, 221–222 draft, 128–129, 134, 142, 153–155, 173, 219; lottery, 142; riots, 45 Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, Defense 205 East Asia 130 East Germany 128, 161 Egypt 130 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 100, 130, 132 El Salvador 5; civil war 5; naval intervention, 4; Emancipation Proclamation 45, 214 Emiliano Santiago v. Donald H. Rumsfeld 181–187 England, 98, 196. See also United Kingdom, Great Britain. Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women in the Navy (1972) 145–147 Ethiopia 111 Europe 55, 69, 87, 98, 101, 128, 214 European Union 217 Executive Order 9981: Establishing the President’s Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces 131–132 expedition against: California Indians, 2; Indians in Washington Territory 3; Sioux 3 Fannin, James W. 39 Farsi 163 Federalist 34 Fever River Expedition 2 Filipino 112, 215; insurrectionists 62; veterans 112

First Laws of Virginia 9–11, 213 Florida Indian War 2 Florida or Third Seminole War 2 Ford, Gerald R. 160 foreign nationals 9 Fort Davis 54 Fort Dix 159 Fort Duquesne 218 Fort Ord 159 Fort Sam Houston 54 Fort Stockton 54 Fort Sumter 214 Fortress Monroe, Virginia 45 France 96, 98, 111, 129, 132 Franklin, Benjamin 9, 222 French and Indian War 213 Funston, Frederick 62 Gates, Robert M. 208–210 gay, 116, 163, 171, 221. See also homosexual, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. German 88, 98, 101 Germany 88, 111 GI Bill: See Serviceman’s Readjustment Act Gilbert Islands 112 Gilmore, Gerry J.: All Services Meet or Exceed October Recruiting Goals (2009) 206–208 Glaspie, April 161 Glory 45 Goliad 39 Gonzales 39 Grant, Ulysses S. 40 Gray, Gordon 129 Great Britain 111, 129, 196 Great Depression 100, 134 Great Plains 213 Greece 4, 26, 129 Grenada: Operation Urgent Fury, 5 Guam 59, 112; Guam occupation 3 Guatemala: intervention 4 Haiti: bombing 4; intervention 3; occupation 4; Operation Uphold Democracy 5 Harding, Warren G. 100 Harper’s Ferry 2 Harrison, William Henry 213–214 Havana 59, 62; Havana Harbor, 59, 215 Hawaii 59, 62 Hay, Harry 116 Heatherly Indian Troubles 2

Index • 233 Hershey, Lewis B. 134–136, 142. See also Channeling Manpower. Hiroshima 118 Hitler, Adolph 111–112, 118 Ho Chi Minh 132 Homeland security 10, 196 homosexual 162, 221; Conduct Policy, 162 Honduras 3–5 Hong Kong 112 House of Representatives 36 Houston, Sam 39 Hungary 129–130, 161 Hussein, Saddam, 160–161, 163, 171–172, 216–217 Iceland 129 Idaho 55 Illinois Indians 1 immigrants 1 indentured servants 1, 9 Indiana 59 Indians. See Native Americans and specific tribes. Indian Ocean 4, 157; Iran, 4 Indian Scouts 62 Indian Wars 2, 3, 213; Wars of the Great Plains 54–55 Indochina 155 integration 130 International Monetary Fund, 157 Iran 4, 5, 153, 159–161 Iraq 7, 155, 160–161, 163, 171–173, 204, 213, 216–217; Iraqi Freedom 6; Operation Northern Watch 6 Islamic 160 Israel 130, 161, 216 Italy 111, 129 Jackson, Andrew 35, 213–214 Jamestown 8 Japan 111, 132 Jefferson, Thomas 34, 48 Johnson, Lyndon B. 142, 155, 216 Kazakhstan 205 Kennedy, John F. 133 Kentucky 35 Kickapoo 54 King, Martin Luther 134 Kiowa and Comanche Expedition 3 Klamath and Salmon River Indian War 2 Khobar Tower 163

Korea 132; and Russo-Japanese War 3; Service 4 Korean War 4, 6, 126–130, 132, 150–151, 157, 173 Kosovo 5, 155, 163 Kuwait 161, 217 Kyrgyzstan 205 Lafitte, Jean 35 Land Grant Colleges 35, 48–54, 86; See also Morrill Land Grant College Act Latin America 100 Latinos 112, 126 Laws of the Duke of York 13 Laws of Virginia 9–11 League of Nations 111 Lebanon 5, 161 LeFevre Indian War 2 lesbian 116, 163, 171, 221 Lexington 15, 214 Liberia 5 Libya 155; Naval air invasion 5; Naval air attacks 5 Libyan area 5 Lincoln, Abraham 45 Los Angeles 116 Louisiana 35, 36 Louisiana State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy 35 Louisiana State University 35, 54, Lusitania 86 Luxembourg 129 MacArthur, Douglas 100, 130 Madison, James 36 Maine USS 59, 215 Makin 112 Malaya 112 Manchukuo 111 Manchuria 111, 129 Manilla 62 Mao Tse-tung 130 Marine Corps 1, 98, 161–162, 196–204; Beirut 161; China 5; Dominican Republic 4; Hawaii 3; Honduras 4; Korea 4; Reserves 115; Sino-Japanese War 3; Zaire 6–7 Marinettes 98. See women. Marshall, George C. 129 Marshall Plan 129 Marti Revolt. See El Salvador. martial law 35 Maryland 160

234 • Index Massachusetts 9, 12, 15, 36, 45 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 100 Mattachine Society 116 Mayaguez Operation 4 Mayflower Compact 6 McKinley, William 59, 215 McNamara, Robert 133 Mennonites 9, 216–217 Mescalero Apaches 54 Mexican Americans 221 Mexico 86–88, 96; Border Conflicts 3; Revolution 4; Naval and Marine interventions 4; War 2, 39–40, 214 Mexico City 40 Middle East 160–16, 163, 171 Midway 112 militia 9, 15, 28, 31–32, 35, 36, 40, 48, 56, 58–60, 173, 217–219; The Militia, Military Service, and the Constitution of the United States, 27–28. See also Uniform Militia Act, 1792 military engagements 1–5, 156; and See specific wars or battles. military establishment 129 Military Reconstruction 3 Mindanao 62, 112 Mississippi 35 Mississippi River 36 Missouri 2 Mobile, Alabama 36, 62 Modoc Indian War/California and Oregon 3 Morden, Bettie J. 115 Morrill Land Grant College Act, 1862 35, 49–54, 109, 204 Mossaddeqh, Mohammad 160 Muslim 62, 216 Mussolini, Benito 111 Nagasaki 118 National Guard 1, 7, 31, 86, 98–99, 151, 173, 213 National Socialist (NAZI) 111 Nationalist China 130 Native Americans 1, 12–13, 48, 54–55, 96, 112, 126, 221 National Defense Act (1916) 70, 71–86; (1920) 99 National Football League 220 National Guard 58–59, 63, 69, 70, 86, 99, 101, 133, 171–172, 180, 187, 196–205, 218, 221

National Forces 42, 45 Navajo: Expedition 3; Resistance, 2 Navy 198, 101, 162, 205, 218; Asiatic Squadron 61; Occupation: Austria 4; Berlin 4; Germany 4; Sixth Fleet 5; Trieste 4 Negroes. See African Americans, black soldiers, Buffalo Soldiers. Netherlands 111, 129 New Deal 100 New England 60; Articles of Confederation, 1643, 11–12; Militia, 217 New Mexico 2, 88 New Orleans 35–36, 45 New York 36, 116 Nez Perce 55; Indian War 3 Ngo Dinh Diem 132 Nicaragua: Intervention 3; Marines Intervene 3; Occupation 4 Nixon, Richard M. 142, 155, 159, 216 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 129, 217 North Korea 130 North Vietnam. See Vietnam. Norway 111, 129 Norwich Academy 35 Norwich, Vermont 35 Obama, Barack Hussein 162, 163, 212 Obregon, Alvaro 86 Officers Reserve Corps (ORC) 86 Officer Training School (OTS) 99 Operation Desert Shield 161 Operation Northern Watch 5 Operation Iraqi Freedom 5 Oregon 62; Indian War 2; Territory 2, 3 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 157, 160 Osage Indian War 2 Osama bin Laden 163 Outer Mongolia 129 Pacific Ocean 55, 61–62, 117, 214 Packenham, Sir Edward 35 Pahlavi, Shah Reza 160 Pakistan 205 Palestine Liberation Organization 161 Palo Alto 40 Panama 4–5, 130, 155; General Strike 4; Just Cause 5; Marines Intervene 3; Military Police 4; General strike 4

Index • 235 Pancho Villa: border incursions 4 Paris Peace Agreements 147 Partridge, Alden 35, 48 Patton, George 100 Pawnee expedition 2 peacetime draft 4 Pearl Harbor 112, 130, 216 Pecos Expedition 3 Peking 111 Penn, William 9 Pennsylvania 2, 9, 14, 63; Charter of Privileges (1701) 13–14 Pentagon 163 Peoria Indian War 2 Pequot War 213 Pershing, John J. 87 Persian Gulf 155; Desert Fox 5; Desert Thunder 5; Earnest Will 5; Intercept 5; Southern Watch 5; Vigilant Sentinel 5 Petition of the Colored Citizens of Nashville 47, 221 Philippines 59, 62, 112, 128, 155, 162, 215; air cover 5; Huk Rebellion, 4; Sulu Balikatan operations 5. See also Filipino. Philippine Scouts 62–63 Pilgrims 6 Pitt River Expedition/California 2 Pittsburg, Pennsylvania 218 Plattsburgh Movement 70, 99; New York 70 Poland 128, 161 Polk, James K. 214 Porto Rico Regiment 61, 63 Portugal 129 Post 9/11 Veterans Education Assistance Act of 2008, 187–196 Powell, Colin 171 Public Health Service 118 Puerto Rico 59–62, 215; independence rebellion 4; Occupation 3; Regiment 61. See also Porto Rico Regiment Pulitzer, Joseph 59 Quakers 9, 14, 216–217 Quarles, Benjamin 13 Racial Segregation 119 Rangers 55. See also Texas Rangers Ready-Reserves 172 Reagan, Ronald 161 Republic of Texas 39

Resaca de la Palma 40 Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) 86, 98–100, 133. See also Morrill Land Grant College Act. Reserves 7, 129, 133, 173, 180; Ready-Reserves 173 Revolutionary War 8, 15, 213–215, 218, 220 Rio Grande 40, 54 Rogue River Indian War/ Oregon Territory 2 Roman Catholic 133 Romania 161 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 100–101, 112, 134 Roosevelt, Theodore 88 Rostker v. Goldberg (1981) 153–155, 219 Rough Riders 60 Rumsfeld, Donald 164–170, 172, 181–187, 216 Russia 128–129, 196; interventions against Bolsheviks 4. See also Soviet Union. Russo-Japanese War. See Korea. Rwanda: Operation Distance Runner 5 Sabine Disturbance/Louisiana 2 St. Mihiel 98 Sakhalin Island 129 Samson, William T. 61 San Antonio, Texas 39, 54 San Francisco 62, 116 San Jacinto, Battle of 39 San Juan Hill 61 Santiago 60, 62 Santa Anna, Antonio López de 39, 214 Santiago, Emiliano 180–187 Satellite surveillance 171 Sauk & Fox Indian War 2 Saudi Arabia 163 Schley, Winfield Scott 61 Scotsmen 12 Scott, Hugh 89 Scott, Winfield 40 Sea Islands of South Carolina 45 secession 3 Second Confiscation Act (1862) 46–47 Second Seminole War 2 Second War Powers Act (1942) 112 Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on “21st Century Transformation of U.S. Armed Forces” 164–170

236 • Index Secretary of War 42 Secretary of Defense 129, 205; Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “America’s Greatest Asset 208–210 Selective Service 63, 99–100, 112, 128–129, 142, 155, 160, 173, 218; Act of 1917, 88, 89–96, 101, 109, 204,219; Act of 1940 100–109, 204; Channeling Manpower 134–136, 219; induction (1917–1947) 118; induction (1948–1973) 152; Selective Service System: Present Operations of the System and Local Draft Boards 136–138; Regulations 96 Seminole War 2 Semper Paratus-Always Ready (SPARS) 115 Serviceman’s Readjustment Act (GI Bill, 1944) 109, 118, 119–125, 204 Shanghai 111 Shay’s Rebellion 2 Singapore 112 Sino-Japanese War 3 Sioux Indian Conflict 2. See also Wounded Knee. Sixth Fleet 5 slaves 8 smart bombs 171 Smith, John 8 Smith, Samuel 35 Snake Indians. See Winna’s Expedition. Somalia: Operation Restore Hope 5 Soissons 98 South Korea 130 South Vietnam. See Vietnam. Southwest 55 Southeast Asia 162; Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) 217 Southwest Asia: Desert Shield/Desert Storm 5 Soviet Union 112, 129, 132, 161, 216. See also Russia. Spain 58, 215 Spanish-American War 3, 56, 58, 215 Spokane, Coeur d’Alene and Paloos Conflict 3 Student Army Training Corps (SATC) 99 student deferments 138 Sudetenland 111 Sulu Archipelago 62 Summary of the Report of the Presidential Commission on an

All-Volunteer Armed Force (1970) 143–144 Supreme Court 138–142, 153–154, 218–220 Tajikistan 205 Taliban 163, 171 Tampa 60, 62 Tarawa 112 Taylor, Zachary 40, 214 Tecumseh/Indian Wars of Indiana Territory 2 Tennessee 35 Texas 63, 88; A&M University 54, 100; Indian Wars 2; Rangers 40, 54, 63; revolt from Mexico 2, 39–40; Texas and New Mexico Territory Indian War 2. Third Seminole War. See Florida Indian War. Thompson Act (1937) 100 Tillman, Pat 220 Toledo War 28 Total Force Policy Act (1973) 151 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 40 Treaty of Versailles 99 Tripoli 1 Truman, Harry S. 129–132 Turkey 4 Turkmenistan 205 Twin Towers 163 typhoid 60–61 Uniform Militia Act (1792) 29–31 Union 22, 220; Army 45, 220. See also Civil War. Union Army 45, 220 Union Conscription Acts 42–45 United Kingdom 196 United Nations Security Council 161 United States v. Seeger 138–142, 220 United States Military Academy. See Annapolis, West Point Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) 171 Universal military training 8, 88 University of California 100 University of Illinois 100 U.S. Tariff of 1894 58 USS Constitution 55 Valeriano Weyler 59 Veterans Administration 118

Index • 237 Veterans Educational Assistance Act. See Post 9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act. Viet Cong 155 Vietnam 4, 6, 62, 128–130, 132, 142, 150, 155, 157, 159, 171, 173, 216; Democratic Republic of Vietnam 132; North Vietnam 133; Republic of Vietnam 132; South Vietnam 133, 147; Veterans Against the War 133 Vietminh 132 Villa, Pancho 86 Virgin Islands 5 Virginia 217; Laws of Virginia 9–11 Virginia Company 8 Vo Nguyen Giap 132 Virginia Polytechnic Instiutute 54 volunteers 20, 59–60, 62–63, 171. See also All-Volunteer Army; All-Volunteer military. Wake Island 112 War of 1812 2, 214 War against Arickaree Indians 2 War against Filipino Resistance 3 War Department 62, 99, 101, 116, 118 War in Muslim Mindanao-Philippines 3 War of 1812 35 War with Mexico. See Mexico; Texas. War with Northwest Territory Indians 2 War with Tripoli 2 Warsaw Alliance 161 Washington 62 Washington, D.C. 100, 214 Washington, George 21, 34, 218, 220; Sentiments on a Peace, 22–25 Washington Naval Conference 99 Watergate 160 Webster, Daniel 36–39, 219 Weeks Act (1935) 101 Welsh v. United States 142

West Point 21, 40, 221 Wichita Expedition 3 Wilson, Woodrow 86–89 Winder, William H. 35 Winthrop, John 215 Winna’s Expedition Against Snake Indians 2 Winnebago expedition 2. See LeFevre Indian War women 1, 9, 98, 115, 130, 145–147, 162–163, 171, 217, 219 Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES) 115 Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) 115 Women’s Army Corps (WAC) 115 Wood, Leonard 62, 70, 88 World 59 World Bank 157 World Trade Center 163 World Trade Organization 157 World War I 4, 6, 69, 98–99, 109, 111, 116, 155, 171, 173 World War II 4, 6, 99, 116, 155, 157, 171, 173, 204, 216 Wounded Knee/Expedition Against Sioux 3, 213 Wyoming Valley War, Pennsylvania 2 Yakima Expedition 2 yellow press 59 Yugoslavia 129, 163; against Serbs in Dalmatia 4 Yuma, Arizona 87 Zaire (Congo) 5 Zapata, Emiliano 86 Zimmerman, Arthur 88 Zumwalt, E. R. Jr.: Equal Rights for Women in the Navy, 1972 145–147