China's Policy Towards Territorial Disputes: The Case of the South China Sea Islands (International Politics in Asia Series)

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARDS TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Since 1949 and the founding of the People’s Republic, China’s boundaries have been relatively ill-defined and territorial disputes have provided a potent source of conflict in China’s relations with its neighbours. The Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian disputes of the 1950s and the 1960s ended in stalemate, but a new arena of conflict has developed in the 1970s and 1980s: the Paracel and Spratly Islands, with their potentially rich and accessible petroleum resources. This book, based on a wealth of primary materials in the Chinese language, is the first to make a thorough and overall investigation of China’s policy towards these islands. It discusses the battle against South Vietnam for the Paracels in 1974; the war with Vietnam over the Spratly Islands in 1987; the conflicts with the Philippines and Malaysia; and the relationship between the territorial dispute and China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. The book also discusses the influence of China’s policy towards territorial disputes in general. The Author: Chi-kin Lo is Managing Editor of the Ming Pao Daily News, Hong Kong.

International Politics in Asia Series Edited by Michael Leifer, London School of Economics China and the Arms Trade Ann Gilks and Gerald Segal Soviet Foreign Policy in Southeast Asia Leszek Buszynski ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia Michael Leifer

CHINA’S POLICY TOWARDS TERRITORIAL DISPUTES The Case of the South China Sea Islands

CHI-KIN LO

ROUTLEDGE London and New York

First published 1989 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 1989 Chi-kin Lo All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Lo, Chi-kin 1958– China’s policy towards territorial disputes: the case of the South China Sea islands.—(Politics in Asia series). 1. South China Sea. Islands. Territorial claims. Disputes. Policies of Chinese government. China. Government I. Title II. Series 341.4´2 ISBN 0-203-16866-6 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-203-26390-1 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-00927-8 (Print Edition) Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Lo, Chi-kin. China’s policy towards territorial disputes: the case of the South China Sea Islands/Chi-kin Lo. p.cm.—(Politics in Asia series) Based on the author’s thesis (Ph.D.—London School of Economics and Political Science, 1986) Includes index. Bibliography: p. ISBN 0-415-00927-8 (U.S.) 1. Paracel Islands—International status. 2. Spratly Islands—International status. 3. China—Foreign relations—1976– I. Title. II. Series. JX4084.P28L8 1989 341.2´9–dc19 88–39819 CIP

For Bik-may

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

ix

Introduction

1

Irredentist interpretation

3

Geopolitical interpretation

7

The disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands

10

Organization of the research

17

Notes

18

China’s Claim to the Paracels and Spratlys

25

Claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands before the 1970s

26

Claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands since the 1970s

33

Claims to maritime space in the South China Sea

39

Summary

48

Notes

49

The Paracels Operation

53

The battle for the Paracels

55

South Vietnamese ‘provocations’

58

Contest for maritime rights

60

Geopolitical interests

63

vii

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Summary

78

Notes

79

The Dispute with Hanoi, 1974–78

85

Aftermath of the battle for the Paracels

86

Le Duan’s visit to China in September 1975

93

Escalation of the dispute, 1976–77

99

Summary

105

Notes

107

The Dispute with Hanoi, 1978–84

111

Reactivation of the dispute

111

Propaganda exchanges

114

Military build-up in the Paracels

120

China’s offshore oil interests in the South China 127 Sea

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Summary

133

Notes

134

The Disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia

139

Seeds of the dispute with the Philippines

140

The Philippines’ claim in 1971

145

Marcos’ visit to China in 1975

149

Developments in the late 1970s

152

The dispute with Malaysia

155

Summary

159

Notes

160

The Idea of Joint Development

163

The idea of joint development

165

viii

Chapter 8

The dispute in the East China Sea

169

Joint development in the South China Sea?

175

Summary

181

Notes

182

Conclusion

185

Notes

196

Bibliography

199

Index

209

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is based on the Ph.D. thesis that was completed during my study at the London School of Economics and Political Science from 1984 to 1986. I am indebted to my supervisors, Dr. Michael Leifer and Mr. Michael B.Yahuda, for their supervision of my research and invaluable advice on the contents of my thesis. Special thanks are due to my wife, Bik-may. She has not only given me love and support that were so much needed during the years of research, but has also made immense contribution to the preparation of this book. Lo, Chi-kin July 1988 Hong Kong

x

Chapter One INTRODUCTION

With the founding of the People’s Republic (PRC) in 1949, one of the most important historical legacies inherited by the new government was the relatively ill-defined boundaries of China. It has been noted that “(t)he traditional frontiers” of the Chinese empire “were often not lines but zones of intermixture between Chinese settlements and the customary habitats of nomadic peoples owing a vague allegiance to the Chinese emperor.” (1) Even taking into account the boundary treaties and treaties of cession of territories that foreign powers had imposed during the nineteenth century, China’s boundaries were far from well-defined when the Communist Party assumed power. The status of the boundaries was made even more uncertain by the decision of the new Chinese government to reserve for itself the right to “recognize, abrogate, revise, or renegotiate” those treaties and agreements concluded between the Nationalist Chinese government and foreign governments. (2) In practice, as the territorial disputes during the 1950s and the early 1960s revealed, China adopted a similar approach towards those “unequal treaties” signed between Qing (Ching) China and foreign powers in the nineteenth century, although this position was not explicitly stated until 1963. (3) Despite a number of boundary agreements that were signed in the early 1960s, disputes over many parts of China’s boundaries have remained unsettled. In fact, since 1949, China has quarrelled with nearly every one of its neighbours over disputed territories. The significance of territorial disputes for China’s relations with its neighbours has been underlined by the major military operations that it has undertaken in disputed territories: over the Sino-Indian border in 1962; over the

2 INTRODUCTION

Sino-Soviet border in 1969; and over the Paracel Islands in 1974. (4) To date, territorial dispute has remained a potent source of conflict in China’s difficult relations with its major neighbours —the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam. As a consequence, territorial dispute has been an important area of investigation for students of China’s foreign relations. Considerable academic interest has been attracted to a number of questions concerning China’s policies towards territorial disputes. What are the factors which have played a major role in these policies? Why did China undertake military operations to assert its territorial claims in some instances but not in others? Were these operations simply dependent on China’s capabilities and the local military balance? Why has China displayed different attitudes towards different disputes at the same time and different attitudes towards the same dispute at different times? (For example, during the early 1960s, China treated the territorial dispute with India in a different manner from territorial disputes with other Himalayan countries. And China’s attitude towards the territorial dispute with India itself underwent significant changes from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s.) Have these differences been simply due to variations in local circumstances, or differing behaviour on the part of the contending parties? The overall objective of this research is to pose the above questions with particular reference to the territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Although there are a large number of existing studies of China’s policies towards territorial disputes, most of them are based on research into the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Indian border disputes. Since the early 1970s, these disputes have entered into a state of stalemate and, as I shall point out below, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands have become the major active territorial issue for China. A study of China’s handling of these disputes during the 1970s and the early 1980s should therefore improve our general understanding of China’s policies towards territorial disputes and may even shed new light on these policies. As mentioned above, there are a large number of existing studies of China’s policies towards territorial disputes. There also exists a smaller body of literature on the disputes over the

INTRODUCTION 3

Paracel and Spratly Islands. A review of these studies is therefore appropriate before indicating the organization of this research later in the chapter. Such a review will also help to explain how this research is to be organized. IRREDENTIST INTERPRETATION In earlier days, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962, a popular interpretation of China’s policies towards territorial disputes was that they were dictated by insatiable irredentist ambitions. It has been claimed that it is the belief of the Chinese that “territory once won for civilization must not be given back to barbarism; therefore, territory which was once Chinese must forever remain so, and, if lost, must be recovered at the first opportunity.” (5) As a logical extrapolation of the above claim, one of the major aims of China’s foreign policy has been “to regain the full territory and standing of the Chinese Empire at its peak”. (6) To a certain extent, the theoretical basis of this irredentist interpretation is rooted in a more general interpretation of China’s foreign policy provided by some historians, like Fairbank and FitzGerald. They believe in the existence of a Chinese traditional ‘world order’, or a traditional view of ‘their place in the world’ (7) , and that this historical legacy continues to exert an important influence on China’s foreign policy today. In FitzGerald’s words, “(t) he Chinese view of the world has not fundamentally changed: it has been adjusted to take account of the modern world, but only so far as to permit China to occupy, still, the central place in the picture.” (8) As regards empirical evidence in support of the irredentist interpretation, the most notable must be a history book published in China in the early 1950s and a remark made by Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) in the late 1930s. In 1960, an Indian student brought back from China a manual published in 1954 entitled A Brief History of Modern China. Included in the book was a map which showed Outer Mongolia, Hong Kong, and Macao as integral parts of China and also indicated those Chinese territories “taken by the imperialists during the Old Democratic Revolutionary Era (1840–1919)”. Those territories included the southeastern part of Kazakhstan and and the

4 INTRODUCTION

eastern parts of Kirghizia and Tadzhikistan; the Soviet Far East north of the Amur River; the Soviet Maritime Province; the island of Sakhalin; Korea; the Ryukyu Islands; Taiwan; the Sulu Islands in the Philippine archipelago; Malaya; Thailand; Burma; the Andaman Islands, Assam and the Northeast Frontier Agency; Bhutan; Sikkim; Nepal; and Ladakh. (9) Although China later denied that this map was official, some observers still believe it to be at least a sign of how extensive China’s irredentist goals could be. (10) By comparison, Mao’s remark made in 1939 is less breathtaking. In an edition of The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party published not long after 1949, which probably explains why Tsarist Russia’s encroachments were not included, Mao said: In defeating China in war, the imperialist states have taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territories. Japan took away Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukyu Islands, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur; Britain seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, and Hong Kong; France occupied Annam, and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao. (11) Like the history book mentioned above, Mao’s remark is believed to have lent weight to the irredentist interpretation of China’s territorial policies. While the irredentist interpretation seems to provide a simple and powerful interpretation of China’s policies towards territorial disputes, there exist a number of important reservations. First of all, it is questionable whether a Sinocentric ‘world order’ is an accurate description of the Chinese view of their place in the world for the whole length of pre-modern Chinese history. (12) Even if it is, such a view would have collapsed or been modified to a significant extent at the beginning of the twentieth century. To take this view as the basis for a general interpretation of China’s foreign policy today is certainly problematic. As Yahuda has pointed out, although “the legacy of the imperial or feudal past is far from negligible… (t) he dominant historical experiences of the leaders who founded the PRC were, first, those of the nationalist awakening

INTRODUCTION 5

of the Chinese people attendant upon the collapse of the traditional order, and second, the revolutionary struggles which ultimately brought those leaders to supreme power.” (13) Even Schwartz, who himself believes in the existence of a traditional Chinese view of the ‘world order’, has warned that such a view “was fundamentally undermined in the twentieth century”, and that “we should be extremely skeptical of assertions that assign it great causal weight in explaining present or future Chinese policies” (emphasis in original). (14) The above observations probably apply to China’s policies towards territorial disputes as well. With the experience of humiliation at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialists in the last hundred years or so, Chinese leaders have realized that in the modern nationalist era, territorial integrity within clearly defined borders is an imperative for national security and independence. In fact, notwithstanding the ‘unofficial’ history book and Mao’s ‘edited’ remark, by the foundation of the PRC in 1949, China had already come to accept the independence of former tributaries like Korea, the small Himalayan countries and those in Southeast Asia. (15) As far as China’s official positions are concerned, its unfulfilled territorial claims are limited. As regards land borders, its major claims include: along the Sino-Soviet border, the islands at the confluence of the Ussuri and Amur rivers, and an area of about 41,000 square kilometres in the Pamir region (16); along the Sino-Indian border, Aksai Chin in Ladakh with an area of about 33,000 square kilometres in dispute. China’s claim to the area bordering India’s Northeast Frontier Agency, which amounts to about 90,000 square kilometres, has remained ambiguous. While it does not recognize the legal validity of the MacMahon Line, the control it established in 1962 roughly runs along that Line. It is possible that China views this area as a potential bargaining counter for Aksai Chin. (17) As regards mid-ocean islands, China’s unfulfilled territorial goals are to control the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, and the Diaoyudao (Senkaku Islands) in the East China Sea. The PRC government also claims the Pratas and Macclesfield Bank in the South China Sea. The Pratas are currently under the control of the Taiwanese (Republic of China, ROC) government. The dispute over them may be understood as part of the unresolved struggle between

6 INTRODUCTION

the two rival Chinese governments for control over the entirety of China. Macclesfield Bank, however, is permanently submerged and the question of exercising control over it is not a practical matter. It may be argued that how China behaves in a territorial dispute is at least equally, if not more, important than what it actually claims. In this respect, the irredentist interpretation is even less convincing. As pointed out above, the irredentist interpretation was especially popular in the immdiate aftermath of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. The war was then considered as a classic example of China invading a neighbouring country as a direct result of its irredentist ambitions. (18) However, the conventional wisdom that China was the principal culprit in that conflict was seriously challenged by later studies. While Lamb and Woodman have questioned the legal validity of India’s positions in the border dispute (19), Maxwell’s well-researched India’s China War (20), based on Indian primary sources, has powerfully demonstrated that New Delhi’s inflexibility and imprudence should bear a large part of the responsibility for the outbreak of the border war. The irredentist interpretation may also find it difficult to explain why Chinese troops retreated to the MacMahon Line after their decisive victory. In fact, use of force is but one of many variants of China’s behaviour in territorial disputes. There have also been occasions when China has maintained a low profile over a dispute: for example, towards India and the Soviet Union in the 1950s; towards Japan over the Diaoyudao since the early 1970s; and with the Philippines and Malaysia over the Spratly Islands since the early 1970s. It has also sought to apply political pressure on the adversary party to the dispute: for example, towards the Soviet Union in the 1960s; towards Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands from the mid-1970s onwards. Finally, it reached a peaceful boundary agreement with neighbours such as Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan during the early 1960s. The above variants in China’s behaviour suggest that a simple direct relationship between what it claims and how it behaves in a territorial dispute does not exist. Given a particular claim in a territorial dispute, there could be a range of options available

INTRODUCTION 7

to China in handling it. To account for the particular course of action chosen by China, it is therefore necessary to enquire into other dimensions of interest involved. Many studies have actually done so, providing a much better understanding of China’s policies towards territorial disputes. These studies will be considered next. GEOPOLITICAL INTERPRETATION Probably because of the complex nature of the subject, very few attempts have been made to generalize about China’s policies towards territorial disputes. (21) Not surprisingly, most attention has been paid to the two most dramatic disputes: those over the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet borders. These studies differ in their methodologies, outlooks, and emphases. None the less, a general theme may be derived from their observations; that is, China’s behaviour in these disputes had been influenced primarily by its leaders’ perception of geopolitical interests. The important role played by China’s geopolitical interests in its policies towrds the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border disputes was most apparent in the military operations that it undertook. Most major studies agree that China’s decisions to launch military operations along the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet borders in 1962 and 1969 respectively were motivated less by the desire to control the territories under dispute than by the concern to deter perceived threats to its security. And the perception of threats to its security depended not only on local situations along the borders but also on how they were related to changes in geopolitical circumstances at the regional and/or global levels. For example, a military build-up on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border had been taking place since the breakdown of border talks in 1964. Yet, as Wich has convincingly argued, it was only after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 that China decided to initiate the border crisis. (22) Following its polemic against the Soviet Union on the border issue in late 1968, China began to conduct more aggressive patrolling in the disputed areas from January 1969 onwards, thus setting the course for the military confrontation two months later. (23) China’s behaviour was a response to Western

8 INTRODUCTION

countries’ relative acquiescence in and the Socialist countries’ endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. By choosing the time and place to fight a limited border war, China wanted to make a political point: it was not another Czechoslovakia, and was ready to face the Soviet challenge to its security. (24) In the case of the Sino-Indian border war of 1962 of the source of the perceived threat to China’s security was even further away from the border itself. There is no doubt that China was irritated by India’s ‘forward policy’. (25) However, the scale of China’s offensive military operation suggests that higher interests were at stake. The year 1962 was a difficult one for China. Besides the problems left over by the Great Leap Forward, there were troubles involving the Soviet Union in Xinjiang and threats by the Nationalist government in Taiwan to attack the mainland. China was then in a panicky mood, fearing an external threat at a time of internal weakness. India’s ‘forward policy’ and Indian press speculation over China facing a war on two fronts led it to believe that India was most probably colluding with the U.S. and the Soviet Union, in seeking to exploit its internal vulnerabilities. (26) Corresponding to the situation along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969, China probably believed that the best way to deter a prospective enemy was to attack. (27) The military offensive was not only designed to expel Indian troops from the territory under dispute, but also to deter the more dangerous enemies (‘U.S. imperialists’ and ‘Soviet revisionists’) from exploiting its internal problems. Although less obvious, China’s geopolitical interests had also played an important role in the diplomatic dimension of its policies towards the border disputes. As Ginsburgs and Pinkele have ably demonstrated, during the 1950s and the early 1960s, China had played an intricate game with the Soviet Union over the border issue. (28) As Sino-Soviet relations gradually deteriorated, the border dispute became a convenient stick with which to beat the Soviet Union on the diplomatic front. For example, while China demanded that the Soviet Union acknowledge that the treaties signed between Tsarist Russia and Qing China in the nineteenth century were “unequal”, it did not actually claim the territories ‘lost’ through these treaties. In fact, as Gary Scott has observed, in general, “political considerations,

INTRODUCTION 9

apparently more frequently than legal ones, motivate the PRC in the application of this concept (of unequal treaties).” (29) In the case of the Sino-Indian border dispute, in order to recruit India into an antiimperialist united front, China sought to play down the dispute during most of the 1950s. However, as the dispute gradually escalated during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, China continuously reviewed Nehru’s role in international politics. As pointed out above, by the time China launched its military action in 1962, India was not only seen as a trouble-maker in itself but also as collaborator with the U.S. and the Soviet Union. ‘Indian reactionaries’ joined ‘U.S. imperialists’ and ‘Soviet revisionists’ as the targets of polemical attacks in Chinese media. The concern over the geopolitical implications of the troubles over the borders with India and the Soviet Union was probably a major reason for China’s rush into peaceful boundary agreements with other neighbours. After a number of such agreements were signed during the early 1960s, China was then able to turn the tables to apply diplomatic pressure on its two chief adversaries. In 1964, China tried to put the Soviet Union and India in the dock by claiming that: among all our neighbours it is only the leaders of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and the reactionary nationalists of India who have deliberately created border disputes with China. The Chinese Government has satisfactorily settled complicated boundary questions, which were legacies from the past, both with all its fraternal socialist neighbours, except the Soviet Union, and with its nationalist neighbours such as Burma, Nepal, Pakistan, Afghanistan, with the exception of India. (30) In sum, the studies discussed above show that in order to account for China’s behaviour in territorial disputes, the interpretation of geopolitical interests appears to have provided fruitful results. A certain pattern of close relationship between China’s geopolitical interests and its policies towards territorial disputes during the 1950s and the 1960s may be discerned. As China’s major geopolitical concern was the threat to its security by one or both of the two superpowers, its handling of a

10 INTRODUCTION

territorial dispute was often designed as part of the larger strategy to counter such a threat. The Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border clashes were two examples of where China chose to fight limited border wars so as to deter perceived threats from one or both of the two superpowers. On the diplomatic front, pressure on the Soviet Union or India over territorial disputes was applied when China wanted to register its displeasure with behaviour regarded as detrimental to its geopolitical interests. At the same time, other countries sharing boundaries with China were inadvertently ‘rewarded’ with concessions and/or peaceful boundary agreements for their ‘usefulness’ in such a diplomatic ploy. THE DISPUTES OVER THE PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS As discussed above, most of the important observations about the relationship between China’s geopolitical interests and its policies towards territorial disputes are based on studies of the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border disputes. As far as territorial disputes are concerned, these two certainly dominated China’s attention during the 1950s and the 1960s. None the less, as pointed out earlier, since the beginning of the 1970s, these two disputes have entered into a state of stalemate and that the major active territorial issue for China has been the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The Paracel archipelago is a group of 15 islands and several sand banks and reefs. They are situated less than 150 nautical miles from the southern coast of China’s Hainan Island, and about 240 nautical miles from Da Nang in Vietnam. The Spratly archipelago, if it can be so called, is a group of more than 100 islets, reefs, shoals, and sand banks scattered over a large area in the southern part of the South China Sea. The archipelago stretches for more than 500 nautical miles from north to south. By nearest-point measures, it is less than 100 nautical miles from the coast of either Philippine Palawan or Malaysian Borneo. It is about 350 nautical miles east of the southern coast of Vietnam and about 400 nautical miles south of the Paracel archipelago. (31)

INTRODUCTION 11

Before the 1970s, the Paracel and Spratly Islands were only specks on a political map of little international significance. They were occupied briefly and used as submarine bases by the Japanese Navy during the Pacific War. Japanese troops were withdrawn from the islands at the end of the war. Both the Nationalist Chinese government and the French colonial administration in Vietnam immediately revived their pre-war claims to the islands. When the PRC and the Republic of (South) Vietnam (RVN) were established in 1949 and 1955 respectively, both of them immediately endorsed those claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Meanwhile, the Nationalist Chinese government in Taiwan maintained a claim in the name of ROC. The Democratic Republic of (North) Vietnam (DRV), however, did not lay any claim to the islands at the time. (Changes in Hanoi’s position in the 1970s will be examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.) However, during the 1950s and the 1960s, these states were not active in pursuing their claims. It is believed that the South Vietnamese (RVN) government followed the practice of the French colonial administration in sending regular patrols to the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands. On the other hand, the Chinese (PRC) government began to set up permanent settlements in the Amphitrite Group of the Paracel Islands in late 1955. The first garrison from the ROC, since its retreat to Taiwan, to be established in the Spratly Islands arrived in 1956. Since then, Taiwanese troops have been permanently stationed on the largest island of the archipelago, Itu Aba. (32) Given that these were the only significant activities to take place in more than two decades after the withdrawal of Japanese troops, their international repercussions in the region were relatively minor. The picture changed rapidly with the coming of the 1970s. A combination of political, economic, and legal factors were responsible for that change. On the political scene, with the U.S. decision to withdraw militarily from mainland Southeast Asia, concern had grown over a shift in the strategic balance in the region between the two superpowers. Among others, the security of sea-lanes in the South China Sea became an outstanding issue. (33) The strategic importance of the Paracel and Spratly Islands had already been demonstrated by the Japanese Navy’s activities during the Pacific War. In terms of

12 INTRODUCTION

economic interest, survey reports prepared by the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) suggested that vast reserves of oil were likely to be found under the seabed of the South China Sea. (34) The importance of such a possibility was highlighted by the first international oil crisis in 1973. The significance of both political and economic factors was reinforced by a third one: debate on a new Convention on the Law of the Sea. Although that Convention was not concluded until 1982, by the mid-1970s the trend had already become clear that coastal and island states would seek to expand significantly their maritime rights in adjacent sea areas. The semi-enclosed nature of the South China Sea meant that an intense contest for maritime rights would probably take place. (35) Geomorphologically speaking, most of the Paracel and Spratly Islands are sitting literally mid-ocean where the floor depth drops immediately to almost 1,000 metres around the Paracel archipelago and to about 3,000 metres at some points north-east of the Spratly archipelago. Therefore, ownership of the two archipelagoes would not be likely to affect to any significant extent the littoral countries’ share of the continental shelf of the South China Sea. (36) Still, as Hungdah Chiu has observed, the islands “could be the basis for claiming a large sea area as either territorial sea or economic zone, including the seabed beneath”. (37) And as pointed out by Katchen, the Spratly Islands are so widely scattered that “the main sealanes through the South China Sea will fall in the territorial or archipelagic waters of either China or Vietnam should either nation possess all of the Spratlys and choose to assert itself, In addition, the Palawan Passage between the Spratly Islands and the Philippines would fall within the territorial waters of the Philippines on the basis of the islands it now possesses, should it decide to make the claim.” (38) Against the above background, claims to and occupation of the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1970s and the early 1980s became far more active than before. In 1971, the Philippine government stated an official claim to sovereignty over some islands of the Spratly archipelago. Later in 1979, that claim was extended to the waters in between these islands. After the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Hanoi succeeded to the claim of the

INTRODUCTION 13

former South Vietnamese government to sovereignty over both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes. By the end of the 1970s, Malaysia had joined the contest for part of the Spratlys. These competing claims have been accompanied by active occupation. During 1968–71, Philippine forces occupied five islands in the Spratly archipelago. Their control was later expanded to seven or eight islands in total by the early 1980s. In 1974, Chinese forces expelled the South Vietnamese from the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands. After having lost the battle for the Paracels, the South Vietnamese government immediately sent troops to occupy six islands of the Spratly archipelago. These were later taken over by Hanoi at the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. In 1980, Amboyna Cay of the Spratly group fell under the control of Vietnamese forces. And in 1983, the Malaysian government took its first action in asserting a claim to part of the Spratly archipelago by occupying Swallow Reef. (All the above claims and counter-claims, and acts of occupation, will be discussed in detail in later chapters.) Due to the above developments, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands have emerged as an issue with significant implications for China’s foreign relations in the South China Sea. As pointed out earlier, an assessment of China’s handling of the disputes during the 1970s and the early 1980s should improve our general understanding of China’s policies towards territorial disputes and may even shed new light on these policies. However, China’s policy towards these disputes has been relatively neglected in the literature. Of the small number of studies that have been undertaken, most of them fall into either of two categories: (1) an examination of the legal validity of China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands (39); and (2) attempts to account for China’s decision to seize the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands by force in 1974. (40) Those studies of China’s claims have been overwhelmingly in favour of its position. For example, it has been argued by Cheng Huan that “China’s historical claim is so well documented and for so many years back into the very ancient past, that it would be well nigh impossible for any other country to make a meaningful counter-claim.” (41) This view has been echoed by Tao Cheng’s assertion that “it is probably safe to say that the Chinese position in the South China Sea islands dispute

14 INTRODUCTION

is a ‘superior claim’…Both Chinese contentions are strong: the ancient title based on ‘immemorial possession’ or discovery-occupation and the confirmation of the title repeatedly by subsequent international agreements.” (42) It has to be pointed out that the majority of these studies have been undertaken by overseas Chinese, who were not necessarily free from bias when selecting information for examination; the arguments of the South Vietnamese government have often been rejected without close scrutiny. In this respect, the study undertaken by Chiu and Park may be said to be the most comprehensive and balanced on the legal status of the islands. They also have come out in favour of China’s position by arguing that China had at least an inchoate title to the islands before Vietnam or French Indochina laid claim to them. As the latter failed to take any “final and decisive sovereign act” to frustrate such a title in the 1930s, Chiu and Park have maintained that “China has a stronger claim to the sovereignty of the Paracels and Spratlys than does Vietnam.” (43) It is not the purpose of the present research to examine the legal validity of China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Of concern are the practical implications of the above-mentioned studies for China’s policy towards the disputes. The practical implications are in fact very limited. Ironically, despite most of the existing studies having found in favour of China’s position over the islands, it appears that China has been most reluctant to subject the disputes to international legal arbitration. As pointed out earlier, China’s claim in a territorial dispute does not necessarily help one to understand how it behaves. In this respect, the other group of studies, on China’s Paracels operation, should be more interesting. Some of the specific aspects of the operation raised in these studies will be dealt with in Chapter 3. The question to be asked here is: what have these studies revealed about China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in general? Unfortunately, the answer is once again inconclusive. Most of the studies of China’s Paracels operation were undertaken not long after the battle was fought. (44) Consequently, their general implications for China’s policy towards the disputes are seriously limited on at least two counts.

INTRODUCTION 15

First, certain crucial information for understanding China’s policy during the early 1970s, for example, the state of Sino-Vietnamese relations at that juncture, was not available to the authors at the time of writing. Without such information, their analyses are less than specific or conclusive. Second, since these studies were undertaken shortly after the battle for the Paracels, they have inevitably missed many important developments which have taken place during the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a result, they have been unable to produce a comprehensive analysis of China’s overall policy towards the disputes. Above all, what is conspicuously missing from these studies is not information but an overall perspective. The issues raised in the earlier sections on irredentism and geopolitical interests have hardly been dealt with. In view of the above remarks, Samuels’ Contest for the South China Sea makes an important contribution to the subject under discussion here. Despite the general nature of its title, Samuels’ work is basically a study of China’s overall policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and, in fact, the first major study in the English language on the subject. In his book, Samuels tries to account for China’s policy towards the disputes in terms of its ocean policy. The evolution of the contest for the South China Sea is traced against the background of the rise and fall of China’s seapower from times as early as the Han Period (1st century AD). Based on an extensive survey of the “historical record of China’s early involvement with its southern maritime frontier” (45), Samuels believes that China’s interest in the South China Sea, including the islands there, expanded or contracted according to its will and capacity to become a maritime power. Samuels then argues that as China’s “position as a coastal state and maritime power in Asia” was shaped “by the emergence of a new and broadly assertive Chinese ocean policy” in the early 1970s, the “new ocean policy provided the central rationale for China’s claim to the islands of the South China Sea.” (46) In conclusion, “the occupation of the Paracel Islands and persistent claim to the Spratly Archipelago affirm the growth of China as a major maritime power in Asia, one of whose principal goals is to reassert an historic presence in the southern maritime frontier.” ( )

16 INTRODUCTION

Samuels must be commended for the wealth of background information about the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands that has been collected in his study. However, his meticulous handling of historical data has not been matched by the treatment of developments in the more recent period. Although Samuels’ study was published in 1982, it has not dealt with China’s handling of the disputes after the battle for the Paracels, except in a very sketchy manner. This is regrettable since, as mentioned above, the many important developments during the late 1970s and the early 1980s should have provided more material with which to analyse and assess China’s policy. Samuels’ central theme is also problematic. In the first place, it is debatable whether China has ever had a coherent ocean policy, especially before the 1980s. It is believed that for most of the time during the 1970s, the Chinese ‘maritimists’ faced strong opposition and there is no evidence that they won the day then. (48) (The issue will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, with particular reference to China’s decision to launch the Paracels operation.) In fact, although shrouded under the cloak of a’new and broadly assertive ocean policy’, Samuels’ approach to China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands is a modified version of the irredentist interpretation. The interpretation is modified in the sense that as Samuels argues that China wants “to reassert an historical presence at the southern maritime frontier”, its irredentist goals include not only the land (the islands), but also the waters. It is therefore not surprising that some of the drawbacks of the irredentist interpretation as discussed earlier may be found in Samuels’ study. For example, he has failed to distinguish between China’s claims and behaviour in the disputes. As his own historical records have clearly shown, China’s claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands were established long before the 1970s. The ‘ocean policy’, if it ever existed, can hardly be regarded as providing “the central rationale for China’s claims to the islands in the South China Sea”. Also, like the border disputes during the 1950s and 19 60s, there were many variations in China’s behaviour in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1970s and early 1980s. Besides the forceful takeover of the Crescent Group of the

INTRODUCTION 17

Paracel Islands in 1974 and the bitter dispute with Vietnam since the mid-1970s, China has kept a low profile over the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia. In his study, Samuels has largely ignored China’s handling of the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia, and therefore failed to take into account the wide range of variations in China’s behaviour. This is probably due to the fact that China’s more conciliatory attitude towards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia cannot be easily explained by the goal of reasserting an historical presence in the South China Sea. ORGANIZATION OF THE RESEARCH In view of the above discussion, the irredentist interpretation has not been able to account for China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. As discussed earlier, an alternative to the irredentist interpretation, that of geopolitical interests, has provided a better understanding of China’s policies towards the border disputes during the 1950s and 1960s. In this research, the geopolitical interpretation will be put to the test in the context of the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. The central task of this research is to find out what were the effects of China’s geopolitical interests on its policy towards the disputes during the 1970s and the early 1980s, and how important they were. In doing so, two related issues will also be looked into. First, it is now well known that Chinese leaders have often differed among themselves over the general question of China’s geopolitical interests. (49) The possibility of such differences affecting China’s behaviour in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands cannot be excluded. Therefore, insofar as such a possibility exists in specific instances, it will be examined closely. Second, in order to assess the importance of China’s geopolitical interests for its policy towards the dispute, there is the need to find out if there were other factors which also had a significant influence on the policy. As pointed out at the beginning of this section, the primacy of geopolitical interests in China’s policies towards territorial disputes is borne out by studies on border disputes which were active during the 1950s

18 INTRODUCTION

and 1960s. Many new elements in then. While it may be argued that the continuing shifts in China’s global strategic alignment since China’s foreign relations have appeared since the beginning of the 1970s have arisen out of geopolitical thinking similar to that in the earlier decades (50), the campaign for economic modernization since the late 1970s has certainly opened up a new dimension in China’s foreign relations. (51) In face of these developments, were geopolitical interests still the major source of China’s policy towards the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1970s and the early 1980s? To draw on the lessons of existing studies of the subject as reviewed above, a comprehensive investigation of various aspects of China’s policy towards the disputes will be underaken in this research. For the purposes of organization of materials and clarity in discussion, the investigation will be carried out by examining in turn: (1) China’s claims to the Paracels and Spratlys (Chapter 2); (2) the decision to launch the Paracels operation in 1974 (Chapter 3); (3) its handling of the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands (Chapters 4 and 5); and (4) its handling of the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over parts of the Spratlys (Chapters 6 and 7). Needless to say, these various aspects of China’s policy towards the disputes are interrelated. The general questions about China’s territorial policies posed at the beginning of this chapter will be discussed during the examination of each of the above aspects. In doing so, these questions will serve as the common threads which run through this investigation to provide a general assessment of China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. NOTES 1. Harold C.Hinton, Communist China in World Politics, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966:273. 2. “The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People Political Consultative Conference,” in A.P. Blaustein (ed.), Fundamental Legal Documents of Communist China, New Jersey: Rothman and Co., 1962.

INTRODUCTION 19

3. “A Comment on the Statement of the Communist Party of the U.S. A.,” Peking Review, 1963, Nos.10–11:58–62. For an analysis of the statement, see George Ginsburgs and Carl F. Pinkele, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949– 64, New York: Praeger, 1978, Ch.2. 4. There is a qualitative difference between China’s use of force over Tibet and the Taiwan Straits, and that over disputed territories. In the former cases, no other existing state power claims sovereignty over the territories concerned. For China, they are issues of unification and separatism, rather than territorial disputes. In the case of the Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, in declaratory principle, China undertook the military operation because of Vietnam’s border ‘violations’. However, it is obvious that the war did not arise from border incidents but from developments in Indochina. 5. C.P.FitzGerald, “The Chinese View of Foreign Relations,” The World Today. January 1963:9–17. 6. C.P.FitzGerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World. London: Oxford University Press, 1964:68–72. 7. Ibid., and J.K.Fairbank (ed.) The Chinese World Order, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968, and “China’s World Order: The Tradition of Chinese Foreign Relations,” Encounter, December 1968:14–20. 8. See Note 6. 9. Hinton, Communist China, 332–333. 10. See, for example, Francis Watson, The Frontiers of China, London: Chatto and Windus, 1966; Guy Searls, “Communist China’s Border Policy: Dragon Throne Imperialism?” Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol.2, No.12 (15 April 1963); and G.N.Patterson, Peking Versus Delhi. London: Faber and Faber, 1963. An interesting point to note is that Soviet authors have always dwelt on these sources, for example, Vladimir Yasenev and Yevgeny Stepanov, China’s Frontiers; From Traditional Imperialism to Hegemonism Today, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1981. 11. Quoted in Searls, “Communist China,” p.3. 12. Wang Gungwu, China and the World Since 1949, London: Macmillan, 1977, Chs.1–2. 13. Michael B.Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs, London: Croom Helm, 1978:23. 14. B.J.Schwartz, “The Chinese Perception of World Order, Past and Present,” in Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order, pp.276–288. 15. Yahuda, China’s Role, 1978:26. 16. Luke T.Chang, China’s Boundary Treaties and Frontiers Disputes, New York: Oceana Publications, 1982. For China’s negotiating positions on the dispute during the 1970s, see China News

20 INTRODUCTION

17.

18.

19.

20. 21.

22.

23. 24.

Analysis, 31 August 1979. For more recent positions of China on the dispute, see Li Huichuan, “The Crux of the Sino-Soviet Boundary Question,” China and the World (1), Beijing: Beijing Review, 1982, pp.46–73. L.T.Chang, China’s Boundary, Ch.4. For China’s official positions in the negotiations during the late 1950s and the early 1960s, see The Sino-Indian Boundary Question (enlarged edition), Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1962. For China’s positions in recent negotiations, see J.F. Elkin and B. Fredericks, “Sino-Indian Border Talks—The Views from New Delhi,” Asian Survey, Vol.23, No.10 (Oct. 1983):1128–1139. Watson, The Frontiers; and Patterson, Peking. See also Margaret W. Fisher et al., Himalayan Battleground, New York: Praeger, 1963. Not surprisingly, many Indian authors hold a similar view. For example, V.B.Karnik (ed.), China Invades India, Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1963; and G.N.Rao, The India-China Border: A Reappraisal, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1968. A.Lamb, The China-Indian Border, London: Chatham House, 1964; and Dorothy Woodman, Himalayan Frontiers, London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1969. Neville Maxwell, India’s China War, London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1970. There are actually very few major works on China’s policies towards territorial disputes in general. See Watson, The Frontiers, and Chang, China’s Boundary. The best attempts to generalize the relationship between China’s policies towards territorial disputes and its geopolitical interests may be found as parts of major works on its foreign policy in general. For example, see Hinton, Communist China, Chs.11–12; and I.C.Ojha, Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition, Boston: Beacon, 1969, Ch.6. Richard Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis Politics, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980. There are also other accounts of how the 2 March 1969 border clashes broke out. Best among them are T.W.Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: Background, Development and the 1969 Clashes, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1970; and N. Maxwell, “The Chinese Account of 1969 Fighting at Chenpao,” China Quarterly, No.56 (Oct.-Dec. 1973):730– 739. However, Wich’s study stands above the others as it goes beyond the more immediate events and has done an excellent job putting China’s actions into perspective. Wich, Sino-Soviet Crisis, p.274. Michael B.Yahuda, China’s Foreign Policy After Mao: Towards the End of Isolationism, London: Macmillan, 1983:118; and Gerald Segal, Defending China, London: Oxford University Press,

INTRODUCTION 21

25. 26.

27. 28.

29. 30.

31.

32.

1985:179–180. Wich has also suggested the objective of demonstrating the social-imperialist character of the Soviet Union. For an account of India’s ‘forward policy’, seeMaxwell, “The Chinese Account,” 1970. Allen S.Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975; and Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus. Ginsburgs and Pinkele, Territorial Dispute. See also John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, London: Oxford University Press, 1968. Gary Scott, Chinese Treaties, New York: Oceana Publications, 1975:96. Peking Review, 8 May 1964. It should be pointed out that boundary agreements do not necessarily imply an end to territorial disputes. The Sino-Vietnamese dispute is an obvious case in point. Also, troubles along Sino-Mongolian and Sino-Burmese borders have not totally disappeared despite the boundary agreements. Information about the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the above discussion is mainly based on Marwyn S.Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, New York: Methuen, 1982, Appendix F: A basic gazetteer. There are conflicting versions about who did occupy the islands and when. As regards the Paracel Islands, Samuels (Contest, p.77) and Dieter Heinzig (Disputed Islands in the South China Sea, Wiesbaden: Orro Harrassowitz, 1976:32–36) believe that Chinese troops took positions on the islands as early as 1950. According to David G. Muller, Jr. (China as a Maritime Power, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), however, Chinese settlement on the islands did not take place until late 1955 (p.80). I tend to take Muller’s account because he is supported by declassified intelligence reports of the U.S. Ministry of Defense (See Declasssified Documents Reference System, 1981:7B) and a dossier published by Vietnam Courier in 1981, The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes. Furthermore, despite the claim of Samuels and Heinzig, there are no other reports on any Chinese activities in the Paracel Islands between 1950 and 1956. On the other hand, Heinzig has maintained that the South Vietnamese government did not control any island of the Paracel group before the battle in 1974 (Disputed Islands, p.34). He has been contradicted by both Samuels (Contest, p.87) and Muller (Maritime Power, p.80), who, however, have differed among themselves on the exact date of South Vietnamese settlement in the Paracel Islands.

22 INTRODUCTION

33.

34.

35.

36.

37. 38.

As regards the Spratly Islands, Heinzig thought that no Taiwanese troops were stationed there before the 1970s (Disputed Islands, pp.35–36). He is probably wrong because the other authors have been unanimous that Taiwanese troops have been stationed in Itu Aba since 1956. Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World; Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia, The Netherlands: Sitjhoff and Noordhorf, 1978; and “The Security of Sea-lanes in Southeast Asia,” in Robert O’Neill (ed.) Security in East Asia, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984. An informative and interesting discussion of these reports can be found in Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil and Asia: Conflict Ahead? New York: Columbia University Press, 1977:42–46. Corazon M.Siddayao, The Off-shore Petroleum Resources of South-east Asia: Potential Conflict Situations and Related Economic Considerations, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978; Choon-ho Park, “The South China Sea Disputes: Who Owns the Islands and the Natural Resources,” Ocean Development and International Law Journal, 1978:27–59; Peter Polomka, Ocean Politics in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978; Joo-jock Lim, Geostrategy and the South China Sea Basin, Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979; Yong Leng Lee, Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea (revised edition), Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1980; and Phiphat Tangsubkul, ASEAN and the Law of the Sea, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982. Hungdah Chiu, “South China Sea Islands: Implications for Delimiting the Seabed and Future Shipping Routes,” China Quarterly, No.72 (December 1977):743–765; and Jeanette Greenfield, China and the Law of the Sea, Air and Environment, Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhorf, 1979. Chiu, “South China Sea Islands,” 1977. Martin H.Katchen, “The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: ‘Dangerous Ground’ for Asian Peace,” Asian Survey, Vol.17, No.12 (December 1977):1167–1181. In September 1979, Philippine President Marcos signed the Presidential Decree No.1596 (backdated to June 1978). The Decree proclaims Philippines’ sovereignty over a large area of the waters of the Spratly archipelago. However, the Decree has not made clear whether those waters are regarded as territorial waters or archipelagic waters. Since Philippines’ existing claim to territorial waters amounts to only 12 nautical miles measured from the base-lines, the latter seems more likely. Philippines’ claims made in 1971 and 1979 will be further examined in Chapter 6.

INTRODUCTION 23

39. Cheng Huan, “A Matter of Legality,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 1974; Teng Szuyu, “The Issue of the Sovereignty of the Various Islands of the South China Sea,” and Yeh Han-ming and Wu Jui-ch’ing, “The Issue of the Restoration of Sovereignty Over the Islands of the Southern Sea from an Examination of Historical Records and Maps,” both in Ming Pao Monthly, May 1974; Tao Cheng, “The Dispute over the South China Sea Islands,” Texas International Law Journal, Vol.10 (1975):265–277; Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol.3 (1975):1–28; and Heinzig, Disputed Islands. 40. Jay Long, “The Paracel Incident: Implications for Chinese Policy,” Asian Affairs (New York), March-April 1974:229–239; John F. Copper, “China’s Claims to South China Sea Islands,” China Report (New Delhi), May-June 1974:10–15; Lai-to Lee, “The PRC and the South China Sea,” Current Scene (Hong Kong), February 1977:1– 12. A more recent analysis of China’s Paracels operation appears in Segal, Defending China, 1985, Ch.11. However, Segal is mainly interested in the implications of the operation for China’s military thinking and defence policy. Accordingly, he has not looked into the dispute over the islands in detail. 41. Cheng Huan, “A Matter”. 42. Tao Cheng, “The Dispute”. 43. Chiu and Park, “Legal Status”. 44. As pointed out in Note 40, Segal’s study differs from the others. 45. Samuels, Contest, pp. 6–7. 46. Ibid., p.112. . Ibid., p.150. 48. Muller, Maritime Power. See also Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 49. Thomas M.Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle, Santa Monica: Rand Research Report, 1977; Kenneth Lieberthal, “The Foreign Policy Debate in Peking as Seen Through Allegorical Articles, 1973–76,” China Quarterly, No.71 (September 1977):528–554, and “The Background in Chinese Politics,” in Herbert J.Ellison (ed.), The Sino-Soviet Conflict: A Global Perspective, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982; and Harry Harding, “The Domestic Politics of China’s Global Posture, 1973–78,” in Thomas Fingar and the Stanford Journal of International Studies (eds), China’s Quest for Independence; Policy Evolution in the 1970s, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980. For an alternative perspective, see Greg O’Leary, The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy, London: Croom Helm, 1980.

24 INTRODUCTION

50. Yahuda, China’s Role, 1983; and Harry Harding, “Change and Continuity in Chinese Foreign Policy,” Problems of Communism, March-April 1983:1–19. 51. In his latest book, Yahuda (1983) has distinguished between the geopolitical and societal dimensions of China’s foreign policy. Although he thinks that the geopolitical dimension has changed little since Mao’s death, he believes that the societal dimension has witnessed significant changes as the result of China’s new approach towards economic development since the late 1970s. Undoubtedly, the effects of the recent changes in China’s domestic economic strategies on its foreign policy are still under-studied.

Chapter Two CHINA’S CLAIM TO THE PARACELS AND SPRATLYS

The objective of this chapter is to examine China’s claims to the Paracels and Spratlys, which are made up of two different but inter-related sets. First, a claim to sovereignty over the islands; second, claims to jurisdiction over maritime space in the South China Sea. In the South China Sea, China actually claims sovereignty over four different island groups—Paracels, Spratlys, Pratas, and Macclesfield Bank. The issue of sovereignty over the Pratas and Macclesfield Bank is less controversial and relatively unimportant. Sovereignty over them has been contested only by the two rival Chinese governments, which are in competition for authority over the whole of China. Accordingly, the dispute over the two island groups has not had any significant impact on international relations in the region. Moreover, the value of the Pratas and Macclesfield Bank is limited. The Pratas consist of only one islet and two small banks. They are situated much closer to China (about 170 nautical miles southeast of Hong Kong) than to either Vietnam or to the Philippines, and are at present occupied by Taiwanese naval units. The Macclesfield Bank is in fact a wholly submerged atoll and, as pointed out by Chiu and Park, as far as international law goes, “it is questionable whether what lies underwater may be owned”. (1) In contrast, as indicated in the last chapter, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands are far more controversial and have wider implications for international relations in the region. The discussion below will focus therefore on China’s claims to the Paracels and Spratlys. As pointed out in the last chapter, although studies on the legal status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands have been

26 CLAIMS

undertaken by many authors, the practical implications of these studies for China’s policy towards the dispute over the islands are limited. It is also not the purpose of this research to assess the legal validity of China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea. Accordingly, in this chapter, discussion will be limited to the following issues: (1) the content and nature of China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands before the 1970s; and (2) the impact of the changes in the political environment of the South China Sea during the 1970s and the early 1980s on China’s claims to (a) the Paracel and Spratly Islands; and (b) jurisdiction over maritime space in the South China Sea consequent upon those claims. CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS BEFORE THE 197OS The first public sign of the PRC’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands can be identified as early as 1950. In May 1950, Philippine President Quirino was reported to have said that the occupation of Spratly Islands ‘by an enemy’ would be detrimental to the Philippines’ security. (2) In response, the People’s Daily reported that “competent quarters” in Beijing (Peking) had denounced the remark as “preposterous propaganda” by the Philippine government, and that: (the) People’s Republic of China will never allow the Nansha Islands or any other land which belongs to China, to be encroached upon by any foreign power. (3) The report did not mention the Paracel Islands and was carried in a news item rather than in an official statement. It can be interpreted as a ‘proportionate’ response to the imprecise remark by Quirino. The official position of the PRC government on the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was stated publicly for the first time in a lengthy statement on the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference and the U.S.-British Draft Treaty with Japan. Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), in the capacity of China’s Foreign Minister, stated that

CLAIMS 27

the Draft Treaty stipulated that Japan should renounce all rights to Nan Wai (Spratly) Island and Si Sha Islands (Paracels), but again deliberately makes no mention of the problem of restoring sovereignty over them. As a matter of fact, just like all the Nan Sha Islands (Spratlys), Chung Sha Islands (Macclesfield Bank) and Tung Sha Islands (Pratas), Si Sha Islands and Nan Wei Island have always been China’s territory. (4) At the San Francisco Conference, the Vietnamese delegation, represented by the Bao Dai government, also stated its claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. (5) The Beijing government was not invited to the conference, but its position was stated on its behalf by the Soviet delegation. The Soviet delegation proposed that: Japan recognises full sovereignty over the Chinese People’s Republic over Manchuria, the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all islands adjacent to it, the Pen(g) huletao Islands (the Pescadores), the Tun(g) shatsuntao (the Pratas Islands), as well as over the islands of Sishatsuntao and Chun(g) shatsuntao (the Paracel Islands, the group of the Amphitrites, and the shoal of Maxfield {sic}), and Nanshatsuntao including the Spratly, and renounces all right, title and claim to the territories named herein. (6) It is obvious from the above quotation that the Soviet delegation was rather confused about the nomenclature of the island groups in the South China Sea. It so happened that the statement was rejected by the conference. None the less, it served the purpose of not leaving the Vietnamese delegation’s position unopposed. At the time, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands could not have been high on the political agenda of China. Its hands were then full of urgent issues like Korea, Taiwan, and Tibet. Its infant navy lacked the capability to assert sovereignty over the islands. It was not until August 1955 that China sent its first survey team to the Amphitrite Group of the Paracel Islands, settling people there by the end of the year. (7)

28 CLAIMS

Before the 1970s, China had to tolerate Vietnam’s presence in the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands, then represented by the government of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), established after the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina. Such toleration in no way meant that South Vietnam’s position in the Paracel Islands was acceptable to China. In March 1957, the New China News Agency (NCNA) denounced the South Vietnamese troops’ illegal occupation of Kanchuan (Robert) Island and continued occupation of several others nearby Kanchuan Island, including Chinyin (Money) Island and Sanhu (Pattle) Island. (8) And in March 1959, when 82 Chinese fishermen were arrested by South Vietnamese troops in the Crescent Group, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested that “the South Vietnam Navy has openly violated China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty” and reaffirmed that the “Hsisha (Paracel) Islands are part of China’s territory.” (9) Earlier in 1956, China had also reaffirmed its claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. At a press conference on 19 May 1956, the Philippine Foreign Minister, Carlos Garcia, made a general comment that some of the Spratly Islands should rightly belong to the Philippines because of their proximity. On 26 May 1956, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded by stating that: Taiping Island (Itu Aba) and Nanwei Island in the South China Sea together with the small islands in their vicinity, are known in aggregate as the Nansha Islands. These islands have always been a part of Chinese territory. The People’s Republic of China has indisputable, legitimate sovereignty over the islands…. The pretext put forth by the Philippine Government to cover its attempt to invade and occupy China’s territory, the Nansha Islands, is utterly untenable. (10) Garcia’s press conference also prompted a counter-claim from the South Vietnamese government. In the summer of 1956, the

CLAIMS 29

South Vietnamese government sent naval units to some of the Spratly Islands, planting flags and setting up landmarks, as symbols of occupation. The South Vietnamese claim and actions were similarly denounced by China. (11) Besides the above explicit claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, implicit ones can also be found in many public pronouncements by the Chinese government during the 1950s and the 1960s. For example, in September 1958, a section of the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea stated that: This provision applies to all territories of the People’s Republic of China, including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Islands, the Tungsha (Dongsha) Islands, the Hsisha (Xisha) Islands, the Chungsha (Zhongsha) Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas. (12) Throughout the 1960s, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands remained relatively dormant. Nevertheless, from May 1959 to December 1971, China issued more than 200 warnings to the United States for violating the territorial airspace and waters of the Paracel Islands. (13) The other implications of these warnings will be discussed later. What is relevant to our discussion here is that China kept itself fully alert to the disputes even during a period of relative tranquility. China’s argument supporting its claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was essentially historical. Explaining Zhou Enlai’s statement of September 1951, a People’s China commentary claimed that records in Chinese history regarding the Paracel and Spratly Islands date back to the Sung Dynasty. Coins belonging to Emperor Yung-lo of the Ming Dynasty were discovered in a coral reef there just before the War of Resistance of Japanese Aggression. (14) The commentary went on to argue that in the modern era, the Chinese government of the Qing Dynasty had taken positive

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action to assert China’s sovereignty over the islands. For example, it was claimed that in 1883, the German government had sent surveyors to the Spratly Islands, but withdrew them on the protest of the Qing government. And in 1907, the Qing government despatched senior military personnel to survey the South China Sea islands. “These are all historical facts testifying to Chinese sovereignty over the islands,” said the commentary. Strictly speaking, the above events do not represent conclusive evidence in support of China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands. Yet, with the advantage of comprehensive historical records, China could well argue that Chinese people were the first to discover and exploit the islands. As Chiu and Park have argued, China could therefore claim an ‘inchoate title’ to the islands, which would only be overridden by other countries’ decisive acts of exercising sovereignty over the islands. (15) Although China did not put its case in legal language, its argument was very much in line with Chiu and Park’s reasoning. The above-quoted People’s China commentary went on to point out that French Indochina’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands made in the 1930s had all been rejected by China’s Nationalist government. The islands were then occupied in succession, for short periods, by French and Japanese troops, but they were all taken over by China’s Nationalist government at the end of the Second World War after Japan’s surrender. China therefore maintained that its right to the islands had not been decisively eroded by other countries’ claims. In the above argument, the Communist government had willingly acknowledged the close identity between its position and that of its predecessor on the issue of sovereignty over the islands. In Zhou Enlai’s statement of August 1951, besides claiming that the Paracel and Spratly Islands (as well as the Pratas and Macclesfield Bank) “have always been China’s territory”, it was also pointed out that although the islands had been occupied by Japan for some time during the war of aggression waged by Japanese imperialists, they were all taken over by the then Chinese government, following Japan’s surrender (emphasis added). (16)

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Unlike the 1970s, China did not have to face serious counter-claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1950s and the 1960s. During this period, only once in 1956 was the historical argument for China’s sovereignty over the islands put forward again in a systematic manner, by a professor of history at Beijing University. (17) His argument was nearly identical to that of the People’s China commentary of 1951, except that more references to ancient Chinese works were cited. China’s perception of the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1950s and the 1960s was dominated by the American factor. This much is obvious from the many Chinese comments on the disputes that were produced during this period. In 1950, when the “competent quarters” in Beijing denounced Philippine President Quirino’s remark regarding the Spratly Islands, they also said that the remark “is clearly the product of instructions from the U.S. government”. (18) In 1951, the above-mentioned People’s China commentary charged that “American imperialism has been deliberately planning to grab the Nansha Islands.” (19) Another NCNA commentary accused the provision of the U.S.-British Draft Treaty with Japan on the Paracel and Spratly Islands as “a secret deal between the U.S. and French governments”, in which “Chinese territory has been traded off like petty cash”. (20) This perception of U.S. involvement in the disputes was also reflected in China’s response to the claims and actions of the Philippine and South Vietnamese governments in 1956 and 1959. In June 1956, an Observer in the People’s Daily quoted the Commander of U.S. Seventh Fleet as saying that he objected to China exercising sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. (21) The Philippine government’s interest in the islands was viewed as being encouraged by the United States. Similarly, when China denounced South Vietnamese troop activities in the Spratly Islands in August 1956, it was said that ” (i) t is obvious that this act has been instigated by the U.S.” (22) In March 1959, the Philippine government’s interest in the Spratly Islands was once again described in a Peking Review commentary as a “U.S. plot of using certain ambitious elements in the Philippines for a grab at China’s Nansha Islands”. (23) And South Vietnamese troops’ arrest of 82 Chinese fishermen was denounced as the “latest

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outrage of the South Vietnamese authorities…perpetrated under the direction of the U.S. imperialists”. (24) Furthermore, the perceived U.S. involvement in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was viewed by China as part of the former’s general strategy of containing China and threatening its security. As mentioned above, China’s first public position on the disputes was incorporated in Zhou Enlai’s lengthy statement on the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference. In general, that statement maintained that: the convening of the San Francisco Conference under the compulsion of the United States Government to the exclusion of the People’s Republic of China is for the purpose of creating division among the Allied Powers at war with Japan, and organizing a new bloc of aggression in the Far East. (25) Accordingly, U.S. involvement in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was often associated with its other activities in the Far East, in particular with the issue of Taiwan. For example, the day after Zhou Enlai’s statement on the San Francisco Peace Conference had been issued, a People’s Daily editorial said: The People’s Republic of China does not allow any encroachment upon its sacred sovereignty over Taiwan, Penghu, and the Paracel and Spratly Islands. (26) Nearly a decade later, in 1959, a similar view was stated in a pamphlet entitled On the Question of Our Country’s Territorial Waters: The U.S. imperialists not only militarily invade Taiwan, but also support its lackeys, like the Philippines and South Vietnam, in their attempt to invade our South China Sea islands, including the Nansha Islands. (27) It was therefore no coincidence that warnings against violation of territorial airspace and waters of the Paracel Islands had all been directed against activities of U.S. airplanes and vessels.

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They were additional signs showing that the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands were viewed by China to be closely associated with the perceived U.S. strategy of containing and dividing China. From the evidence examined above, in the eyes of China, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands had not been an isolated issue from the very beginning. However, significant changes occurred in the environment of the South China Sea as well as in China’s global and regional strategies during the 1970s and the early 1980s. The next two sections will consider whether these changes brought about any new development in China’s claims in the South China Sea. CLAIMS TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL AND SPRATLY ISLANDS SINCE THE 1970S After years of relative silence during the 1960s, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands revived in the early 1970s. Throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s, they progressively intensified. This development took place against a background of significant changes in the global strategic balance, in China’s foreign relations in the region, as well as the coastal states’ growing awareness of their maritime rights in the South China Sea. How these complex changes influenced China’s handling of the disputes with Saigon, Hanoi, Manila, and Kuala Lumpur respectively during 1974–84 will be examined in later chapters. This chapter will focus on the impact of these changes on China’s claims to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and to jurisdiction over maritime space in the South China Sea. First, let us consider China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. From the statements quoted below, it is very clear that China’s position on this issue remained unchanged throughout the 1970s and the early 1980s. In July 1971, in response to the Philippine government’s first official claim to sovereignty over some of the Spratly Islands, China’s position was reaffirmed by Huang Yongsheng (Huang Yungsheng), then General Chief of Staff, at a dinner for a visiting North Korean delegation:

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The Nansha Islands and the Hsisha Islands have always been China’s territory. The People’s Republic of China has indisputable legitimate sovereignty over these islands and absolutely allows no country to encroach upon this sovereignty right under whatever pretext and in whatever form. The Philippine Government must immediately stop its encroachment upon China’s territory and withdraw all its personnel from the Nansha Islands. (28) (As will be further explored in Chapter 6, the tone of the above statement would not seem to be in tune with China’s concurrent policy of seeking rapprochement with the U.S. and could reflect domestic difference over such a policy. Suffice it to point out here, the claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands was certainly not out of line with China’s position as conveyed by later statements to be quoted below.) In 1974, during and after the battle for the Paracels, the above position was reaffirmed in a number of statements issued by China. For example, The Government of the People’s Republic of China hereby reiterates that the Nansha, Hsisha, Chungsha and Tungsha Islands are all part of China’s territory. The People’s Republic of China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands. The natural resources in the sea areas around them also belong to China…. The Chinese government will never tolerate any infringement on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty by the Saigon authorities. (29) In 1976, in response to reports on attempts by a Swedish-Filipino oil consortium to explore the Reed Bank Area (also known as the Dangerous Area of the Spratlys), China once again stated that: The Nansha Islands as well as the Hsisha, Chungsha and Tungsha Islands have always been part of China’s territory. The Government of the People’s Republic of China has time and again declared that China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent sea areas and that the resources there belong to

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China…Any foreign country’s claim to sovereignty over any of the Nansha Islands is illegal and null and void. (30) During 1979–80, in a heated debate with Hanoi over the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, China produced numerous statements and documents to reassert its position. The master document is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs paper titled China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha (Hsisha) and Nansha Islands, published in January 1980. In conclusion, the document reaffirms: That the Xisha and Nansha Islands have been China’s territory since ancient times is fully proved by legal evidence…The Vietnamese authorities’ illegal occupation of part of China’s Nansha Islands and their territorial claim to China’s Xisha and Nansha Islands can only serve to reveal their regional hegemonist and aggressor expansionist ambitions. China’s sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands is indisputable. (31) In September 1979, when Philippine President Marcos signed Presidential Decree No.1596 proclaiming sovereignty over 53 islands of the Spratly group, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that: Like the Xisha, Zhongsha (Macclesfield Bank) and Dongsha (Pratas) Islands, the Nansha Islands have always been part of China’s territory. China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and surrounding sea areas, and the natural resources thereof belong to China. China’s lawful sovereignty over the Nansha Islands brooks no infringement by any country on any pretext by any means. Encroachment upon any part of the Nansha Islands and exploitation or any other activities undertaken in these areas by any foreign country are illegal and impermissible. (32) In 1983, in the aftermath of Malaysian troops’ occupation of Swallow Reef, part of the Southern Shoals of the Spratly Islands, a spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that

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“China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha Islands and the nearby waters, and that the natural resources in these areas belong to China.” (33) The above statements have been quoted exhaustively so as to ilustrate the consistency in China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Despite significant changes in the political environment of the South China Sea and China’s foreign relations from the 1950s to the 1970s, the claim had remained firm and unchanging. China’s argument in support of its claim has also changed little, being based on historical rights to the islands. An authoritative article arguing China’s case, titled “South China Sea Islands, Chinese Territory Since Ancient Times” and published in both the People’s Daily and Peking Review in late 1975 (34), was an expanded version of the argument presented earlier in the 1950s. The only difference was that in 1975, Chinese ‘discovery’ of the South China Sea islands was traced back to the early years of the third century. The 1980 Foreign Ministry document further expanded upon the 1975 article, with even more references to ancient Chinese publications to support the case that “China was the first to discover, develop and administer” the Paracel and Spratly Islands. (35) There is also another purpose in quoting China’s statements above exhaustively. Despite the consistency in China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, some general observations about the effect of new developments since the early 1970s on its policy towards the disputes may be drawn from the manner in which China asserted its claim. First of all, the perceived U.S. involvement in the disputes had gone. Symptomatic of this change was the end to warnings against U.S. violations of territorial airspace and waters of the Paracel Islands from the beginning of 1972. No longer were statements on China’s sovereignty over the islands accompanied by accusations of U.S. instigation of counter-claims by other countries. This omission was the result of China’s revision of the view of the U.S. presence in the region as a major threat to its security. As perceived U.S. involvement in the disputes vanished, China’s view of the relation between the disputes and the question of Taiwan also changed. In the 1950s, both issues were

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associated with the general strategy of the U.S. to contain China. In the 1970s, with the rapprochement between China and the U. S., and the former’s adoption of a less confrontational policy towards Taiwan, the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands became an issue that Beijing attempted to exploit to appeal for unity with Taipei (Taibei) on a nationalist theme. From time to time, the mutuality of interests between the two rival Chinese governments over the islands was stressed in China’s statements or documents. For example, in the statement of 4 February 1974, it is said that: Hsisha as well as Nansha, Chungsha and Tungsha Islands have always been China’s territory. This is an indisputable fact, and is maintained by all Chinese (emphasis added). (36) In the 1980 Foreign Ministry document, it was noted in the section on “China’s Struggle in Defence of its Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands” that: For years the Taiwan authorities of China have maintained a military garrison on Taiping (Itu Aba) Island, the biggest among the Nansha Islands (emphasis added). (37) In August 1980, Beijing’s RadioService to Taiwan produced a three-part newletter on developments on the Paracel Islands since 1974. The purpose of the newsletter was to publicize how Beijing had successfully defended China’s sovereignty over the islands against South Vietnamese aggression, and the major developments since then. In fact, besides its nationalist appeal, China’s endorsement of Taiwan’s position on the Paracel and Spratly Islands serves another practical purpose because Taiwanese troops are stationed on Itu Aba. As David Muller has observed, 11 it is quite possible that Beijing considered the troops from Taiwan to be legitimate Chinese occupation forces, implicitly enforcing PRC claims” (emphasis in original). (38) The second observation that may be made about China’s statements quoted above is that despite the consistency in its claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the

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tone of the statements has varied. For example, Vietnam’s occupation of some of the Spratly Islands and its claim to both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes were explicitly denounced by the 1980 Foreign Ministry document. In comparison, China’s statements issued in 1979 and 1983 respectively on the Philippine and Malaysian claims to some of the Spratly Islands were more restrained. These statements only reiterated China’s sovereignty over the islands in general and did not mention the Philippines or Malaysia by name. This difference in emphasis was a reflection of the impact of changes in China’s foreign relations in the region on its policy towards the disputes. As discussed earlier, in the 1950s, all the other countries contesting for the islands, including South Vietnam and the Philippines, were viewed by China as accomplices in a U. S.-instigated plot. During the 1970s, as Soviet penetration became China’s principal security concern in the region, a once simple picture had been replaced by a more complex one. First, the Philippines was no longer the ally of a principal adversary. It assumed a new, positive role in China’s anti-Soviet united front. The same consideration applied to Malaysia which joined the contest for the Spratlys later. Such a situation presented a dilemma for China. On the one hand, it wanted to avoid serious conflict with these countries. On the other hand, it had no intention of conceding its claim to sovereignty over the islands. Accordingly, statements were issued reaffirming its claim but in a restrained tone. In contrast, during the 1970s, Hanoi’s role had been transformed from China’s ally to its arch-rival in the region. By the late 1970s, China was not restrained in publicly denouncing Hanoi’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This accounted for the difference in the tone of different statements as quoted above. The evolution of the above situation did not take place overnight and much more can be, and should be, said about developments in China’s disputes with various contending parties during the 1970s and the early 1980s. These will be treated in greater detail in later chapters. The third observation that may be made about statements on China’s claims in the South China Sea quoted above is that since 1974, additional claims to ‘adjacent sea areas’, or ‘surrounding

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sea areas’, or ‘nearby waters’ of the islands, and the resources thereof, have been included. This was certainly a very important development. It shows that since the early 1970s, China has been no less aware of its maritime rights in the South China Sea than the other littoral states. With its entry into the United Nations in 1971, the People’s Republic of China began to participate in the work of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the United Nations Seabed Committee). China became an active member of that Committee and an enthusiastic supporter of convening the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). It appears from China’s statement on the Philippines’ claim to sovereignty over some of the Spratly Islands in 1971 that, by then, it was not yet fully aware of the implications of the dispute over the islands for its maritime rights in the South China Sea. Its participation in the United Nations Seabed Committee during 1972–73 certainly changed that. From 1974 onwards, claims to maritime space in the South China Sea have always been included in China’s statements on the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Due to its importance and complexity, this new development needs further detailed discussion in the next section. CLAIMS TO MARITIME SPACE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA First of all, it should be pointed out that discussion of China’s claims to maritime space in the South China Sea has been made difficult by the lack of specific statements about China’s position. To date, the only clear and specific statement of China’s positions on a major maritime issue is the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, issued on 4 September 1958. (39) In July 1973, China submitted a working paper to the United Nations Seabed Committee. (40) That working paper dealt with three major maritime issues: territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf. Unfortunately, it is no more than an exposition of general principles, and short of clear and specific provisions concerning China’s own claims. It should also be

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borne in mind that, during the early and mid-1970s, China had exploited the United Nations Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III as useful international forums in which to make political attacks on the two superpowers, in particular the Soviet Union. Some of the positions in China’s general statements on maritime issues made in the context were not necessarily maintained in later years. For example, the 1973 working paper states that: A coastal State is entitled to reasonably define the breadth and limits of its territorial sea according to its economic development and national security and having due regard to the legitimate interests of its neighbouring countries and convenience of international navigation, and shall give publicity thereto. (41) According to this provision, there should not be a univeral maximum limit to the breadth of a country’s territorial sea. However, when the Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982, set a maximum limit for the breadth of a country’s territorial sea at 12 nautical miles, the Chinese delegation signed without registering any opposition or reservation. This does not mean that the 1973 working paper is totally useless for discussion here. As will be argued below, China’s positions in that working paper were probably drafted with careful consideration about the dispute in the East China Sea. They should also have reference value for an understanding of China’s claims to maritime space in the South China Sea. First, China’s claim to territorial sea will be considered. On 4 September 1958, the Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea was issued. It maintained that: The breadth of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China shall be twelve nautical miles. (42) As regards the baseline of China’s territorial sea, it was stated to be: the line composed of the straight lines connecting the base-points on the mainland coast and on the outermost of the coastal islands. (43)

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As pointed out earlier, China had made clear that the Declaration would apply to “all territories of the People’s Republic of China”, including the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Yet China has not provided full information as to how the baseline of its territorial sea is to be drawn. It would not be too difficult for outsiders to construct a hypothetical baseline for China’s mainland coast. Indeed, the Geographer of the U.S. Department of State has already done so. (44) The situation of the South China Sea is, however, more problematic. From the Declaration itself, it is not clear whether the archipelagic principle would be applied to the two island groups, Paracels and Spratlys, to define their respective territorial seas. Based on the many warnings that the Chinese government issued against U.S. violation of China’s territorial airspace and waters in the Paracels during the 1960s, the Geographer of the U.S. Department of State has been able to construct a hypothetical baseline for the north-eastern half of the archipelago (45), that is, the Amphitrite Group, which was then already under China’s control. It is composed of straight lines linking the outermost points of the islands of the Amphitrite Group. The hypothetical baseline for the Amphitrite Group as constructed by the Geographer of the U.S. Department of State was based on China’s practice before the 1970s. Such a practice was endorsed by the working paper the Chinese delegation submitted to the United Nations Seabed Committee in 1973. The working paper stated that: An archipelago or an island chain consisting of islands close to each other may be taken as an integral whole in defining the limits of the territorial sea around it. (46) However, according to the 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea, the application of the archipelagic priciple is limited to archipelago states only. The Chinese delegation did not raise any reservation about this point when it signed the Convention. It is not clear whether China had then changed its mind, or had sought to keep its reservation private. If China were able to apply the archipelagic principle to the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands as well for measuring

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their respective territorial seas, a large section of the South China Sea, lying within the limits of straight baselines linking the outermost points of the two island groups respectively, would become China’s internal waters. Geographically speaking, the Paracel Islands are quite closely knit so that a baseline composed of straight lines linking the outermost points of the archipelago would not enable China to control an extensive sea area as its internal waters. The snag lies with the Spratly Islands. They are so widely scattered that if the baseline is composed of straight lines linking the outermost points of the archipelago, a large section of the South China Sea would fall under China’s jurisdiction as its internal waters. It is difficult to pass any conclusive judgement on whether China has such an ambition in mind as long as it refrains from making clear how the baselines of the two island groups are to be drawn. It has a number of reasons for not doing so. First, the Spratly Islands are so widely scattered and tiny in individual size that they defy any logical system of straight baselines linking the outermost points of the archipelago.( ) Second, if China manages to construct a hypothetical baseline for the Spratlys based on the archipelagic principle, the potential political consequences would be serious. As mentioned in the last chapter, some of the Spratly Islands lie very close to the coasts of southern Vietnam, Philippine Palawan, and Malaysian Borneo. This would mean that China’s ‘internal waters’ within the Spratly archipelago would overlap to a significant extent with the EEZs, or the sea areas above the continental shelves, of the surrounding coastal states. Third, China is not in control of any of the Spratly Islands. There is therefore no reason for China to initiate conflict with the other coastal states without the immediate prospect of bringing any more waters under its jurisdiction. There is also the possibility that China’s claims to maritime space in the South China Sea go beyond the waters lying between and around the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Such a possibility is raised in maps produced in China. Since the early 1950s, in most of the maps produced in China, a line, keyed as the ‘national boundary’ of China, has been drawn to enclose a vast area of waters in the South China Sea. It looks like a large tongue extending from the coast of southern China sweeping

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along the western coast of the Philippine Palawan and the eastern coast of Vietnam, and reaching the northern coast of Malaysian Borneo. As Marwyn Samuels has remarked, “at least on the map, the South China Sea would become a Chinese lake.” (48) If China does intend to claim such a large area of the South China Sea as its internal waters, it would be alarming to the coastal states and maritime states alike. However, there is conflicting evidence, vis-a-vis the maps, as regards China’s real intention. In the 1958 Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, it is clearly stated that: the Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands, the Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands…are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas (emphasis added). (49) This position is indirectly supported by another paragraph of the Declaration which claims that “Pohai (Bohai) Bay and Chiungchow (Zhongzhou) Straits, are Chinese inland waters.” By ‘inland waters’, China means those waters lying within the baseline, which can also be described as ‘internal waters’. As far as international law is concerned, there is no difference between the regimes of ‘inland waters’ or ‘internal waters’. It may be more appropriate to describe the Bohai Bay and Zhongzhou Straits as ‘internal waters’ since they, like the South China Sea, are not literally enclosed by land. In any case, the implication of this provision is that if China did intend to claim the South China Sea as its internal waters, it would have made a similar statement in the Declaration. Moreover, in practice, China has always treated the South China Sea as the high seas. As mentioned above, the numerous warnings issued against U.S. activities in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands referred to violation of China’s ‘territorial sea’ rather than ‘internal waters’. And those warnings were issued only when U.S. vessels intruded into sea areas within the 12-mile limit of the coasts of the islands. If the line of ‘national boundary’ in the maps produced in China does not represent a claim to the sea area enclosed as China’s ‘internal waters’, the puzzle of the meaning of the line remains to be solved. An additional confusion arising from the

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line is that it is always open-ended. In the maps, it stops short at the northeastern corner of Taiwan Island. It is also open-ended in the Tonkin Gulf, and in the sea area near the Natuna Islands of Indonesia. A possible interpretation of the meaning of the line is that it has been drawn to indicate that islands lying within its enclosure belong to China. However, as the line is open-ended, it leaves the Diaoyudao (Tiao-yu Islands or Senkakus in Japanese) out of its reach, and does not exclude the Natuna Islands of Indonesia. It is not consistent with existing positions of China on these islands. There are two other possible answers to the puzzle, which are more plausible and not incompatible with each other. The first is that China itself does not attach any clear and specific meaning to the line of ‘national boundary’. It is so drawn to represent, in a broad stroke, China’s claim to sovereignty over the island groups—Paracels, Spratlys, Pratas, and Macclesfield Bank—in the South China Sea. The second is that China has deliberately left its position ambiguous so as to retain flexibility for future negotiations about the distribution of maritime rights among coastal states in the South China Sea. In fact, the latter point is probably the consideration which underlies China’s positions as regards other maritime issues in the South China Sea as well. To date, China has not made any specific claim to the continental shelf or EEZ in the South China Sea. On the question of the continental shelf, in the 1973 working paper China stated that: By virtue of the principle that the continental shelf is the natural prolongation of the continental territory, a coastal State may reasonably define, according to its specific geographical conditions, the limits of the continental shelf under its exclusive jurisdiction beyond its territorial sea or economic zone. The maximum limits of such continental shelf may be determined among States through consultations. (50) There are three important points that can be observed from the above position. (51) The first is the stress on the principle that the continental shelf is the natural prolongation of the

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“continental territory”. There is no reference to the criteria of 200-metre depth or exploitation provided in Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. Second, China does not consider that there should be a univeral maximum limit to the continental shelf. It appears that China considers that the continental shelf of a country can be as wide as the distance between its coast and the continental slope, no matter how large that is. Third, if a continental shelf is shared by two or more countries, the working paper suggests that the division of the continental shelf should be settled among the countries concerned through consultations. The working paper does not specify what principle should be adopted as the basis for consultations. None the less, no reference is made to the most commonly adopted principle of equidistance. The implication is that China does not consider the principle of equidistance as the most appropriate criterion for division of continental shelf between adjacent or opposing countries. China probably had the dispute in the East China Sea in mind when the above position was formulated. China and Japan are in dispute over the sovereignty of the Diaoyudao (Senkakus) as well as the division of the continental shelf lying between them. Based on the above position, China would argue that division of the continental shelf in the East China Sea between the two countries should be based on the principle of natural prolongation of the “continental territory”, rather than on the principle of equidistance. As the continental shelf in the East China Sea is the natural prolongation of mainland China, the larger section of the shelf should belong to China. Similarly, the 1973 working paper’s position on the question of exclusive economic zone was probably based on considerations about the dispute in the East China Sea. The working paper states that: A coastal State may reasonably define an exclusive economic zone (hereinafter referred to as the economic zone) beyond and adjacent to its territorial sea in accordance with its geographical and qeological conditions, the state of its natural resources and its needs of national economic development.

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The outer limit of the economic zone may not, in maximum, exceed 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline of the territorial sea (emphasis added). (52)

What is unusual about China’s position on EEZs is that “geological conditions” have been included as criteria for defining the EEZ of a country. (It should be noted, by the way, that “geological conditions” were not included by the 1973 working paper as criteria for defining territorial sea.) This is probably a supplement to China’s arguments for claiming the larger part of the East China Sea. It was probably formulated in anticipation of a situation in which Japan might assert its claim to the EEZ in the East China Sea instead of the continental shelf. In such a case, China could no longer depend on the principle of natural prolongation of the continental territory to reject Japan’s claim. It might have to accept the equidistance rule for drawing the maritime boundary in the East China Sea. As Hungdah Chiu has pointed out, “even though the shelf is the natural prolongation of China’s continental territory and not that of Japan…unless the delimitation of economic zone takes into consideration this geological element, China would have to share the continental shelf with Japan in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea by the equidistance rule.” (53) If China did intend to limit the potential claims of Japan to maritime space in the East China Sea by the 1973 working paper, it might, at the same time, have reduced its own room for manoeuvre in the South China Sea. According to the principle of natural prolongation, China can only claim a narrow strip of continental shelf along its southern coast. Even if it can establish sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the other parts of the continental shelf in the South China Sea, based on the principle of natural prolongation of the continental territory, should belong to the other coastal states. By the same reasoning, the width of the EEZs generated by the islands would also be limited by their “geological conditions”. The above considerations probably explain why China has so far said nothing about its continental shelf or EEZ in the South China Sea. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, it appears that China has been more concerned about its rights to the

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continental shelf in the East China Sea. On the one hand, the environment in the East China Sea has been more favourable to China. The prospect for oil exploration and exploitation there is better and China has a stronger case in its claim to the continental shelf. Last but not least, the political situation is less complicated. The chance of reaching a negotiated settlement with Japan is much greater than that with the other coastal states in the South China Sea. On the other hand, as with its claim to territorial sea, since China is not yet in control of any of the Spratly Islands, it would not wish to hasten to proclaim hypothetical claims to maritime space in the South China Sea. Despite the above, China would have been reluctant to have foregone its maritime rights in the South China Sea. That is probably why it has laid equivocal claims to “surrounding sea areas” of the Paracel and Spratly Islands and the resources thereof in statements issued since 1974. In practice, China’s positions are no less confusing. It has not raised any opposition to Malaysia’s claim to the continental shelf off Sarawak and Sabah, on which some of the Spratly Islands lie. However, there have been other occasions when China has issued protests against “encroachment” upon adjacent sea areas of the islands rather than on the islands themselves. For example, China protested against the exploration activities of a Swedish-Filipino oil consortium in the Reed Bank Area in 1976. These activities occurred in the shallow sea area of the Spratly archipelago rather than on the islands themselves. Another protest took place in July 1980, when the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed an agreement on joint exploration of the continental shelf of southern Vietnam. China considered that such exploration activities might intrude into the “surrounding sea areas” of the Spratly Islands. It issued a statement on 21 July 1980 to denounce the agreement. The statement said that the Chinese government had indisputable sovereignty over the surrounding sea areas of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and that “the resources in these areas naturally belong to China”. (54) We have to await clarification by China of the exact meaning of the term “surrounding sea areas”. There is a strong reason to believe that we may have to put up with China’s ambiguous claims to maritime space in the South China Sea for the foreseeable future. By laying such ambiguous claims, China

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leaves itself greater flexibility for future negotiations with other coastal states over its maritime rights. This is not very dissimilar from its approach to the dispute in the East China Sea. Although China has laid claim to the continental shelf there, it has not specified the limit of its claim. It would rather seek to settle the issue with Japan through “consultations”. Given the more complicated political situation in the South China Sea, and China’s lack of presence in the Spratly Islands, its negotations with other coastal states can hardly take place for some time to come. SUMMARY China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands can be traced back to the early 1950s. Its argument in support of the claim was essentially historical. In the political context of the 1950s, the competing claims of other countries to sovereignty over the islands were seen as attempts by the ‘U.S. imperialists’ to encroach upon China’s territory. They were perceived to be an integral part of the U.S. strategy of containing China and threatening its security. Despite important changes in the political environment of the South China Sea as well as in China’s global and regional strategies from the 1950s to the 1970s, its claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands remained unchanged. The argument in support of that claim also changed little. However, China’s view of U.S. involvement in the disputes was no longer held. Its principal security concern in the region became dominated by the fear of Soviet penetration. The tone of statements on counter-claims by the pro-Western governments, Manila and Kuala Lumpur, became correspondingly more restrained. None the less, this does not mean that China’s basic position on the issue of sovereignty over the islands has changed in any sense. The most important development regarding China’s claims in the South China Sea during the 1970s has been the emergence of its claims to maritime space. Since 1974, China’s statements on the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands have always included the claim to “surrounding sea areas” (or “adjacent sea areas”, or “nearby waters”) of the islands and the resources

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thereof. Yet China has remained highly equivocal over its claims to maritime space in the South China Sea. Although it appears that the claims are not as ambitious as the line of “national boundary” in maps produced in China would imply, the application of the archipelagic principle on the island groups to define their territorial seas would still leave China with claims to jurisdiction over a large area of the South China Sea. In addition, it is still not clear if China intends to lay additional claims to the continental shelf and EEZ. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, China was more concerned about the dispute over the continental shelf in the East China Sea and its position as regards that dispute might have limited its room for manoeuvre in the South China Sea. To conlcude this chapter, it should be pointed out that the above discussion has sought to illustrate the fallacy of the simplistic view that China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has arisen from its interest in its maritime rights in the South China Sea. The claim to sovereignty had existed long before China’s equivocal claims to maritime space in the South China Sea were put forward. This assessment will form an important background for the discussion in subsequent chapters of China’s handling of the disputes with various contending parties during 1974–84. NOTES 1. Hungdah Chiu and Choo-ho Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol.3 (1975), No.1:1–28. 2. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East (BBC, SWB, FE), May 1950. 3. People’s Daily, 26 May 1950. 4. Supplement to People’s China, 1 September 1951:1–6. Instead of the more commonly used Hsisha at the time, the transliteration of the Chinese name for Paracel here is Sisha. It has not been used again in China’s English publications. 5. Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, New York and London: Methuen, 1982, p.79. 6. Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty with Japan, Record of Proceedings, Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1951, p.119.

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7. As pointed out in the last chapter, there exist different accounts on who occupied the Paracel and Spratly Islands and when. I have also explained why the version in David Muller’s China as a Maritime Power (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984) is probably more accurate. I am following his version here. 8. NCNA, 7 March 1957. 9. Peking Review, 3 March 1959. 10. NCNA, 30 May 1956. 11. People’s Daily, 30 August 1956. 12. Peking Review, 9 September 1958:21. 13. “Xisha and Nanshas have been Chinese territory since ancient times,” People’s Daily, 7 April 1980. 14. “Notes on the Nanwei and Sisha Islands,” Supplement to People’s China, 1 September 1951:7. As pointed out in Note 4, Sisha means Hsisha (Wade-Giles) or Xisha (Pinyin). 15. See Note 1. 16. See Note 4. 17. Shao Hsun-cheng, “Chinese Islands in the South China Sea,” People’s China, 1 July 1956:25–27. 18. See Note 3. 19. See Note 14. 20. NCNA, 22 August 1951. 21. People’s Daily, 28 June 1956. 22. See Note 11. 23. See Note 9. 24. Ibid. 25. See Note 4. 26. People’s Daily, 16 August 1951. 27. Fu Chu, On the Question of Our Country’s Territorial Waters, Beijing, 1959. 28. NCNA, 17 July 1971. 29. Peking Review, 18 January 1974:3. 30. Peking Review, No.25, 1976:4. 31. Beijing Review, 18 February 1980:24. 32. Beijing Review, 5 October 1979:6. 33. Beijing Review, No.39, 1983:8. 34. Shih Ti-tsu, “South China Sea Islands, Chinese Territory Since Ancient Times,” People’s Daily, 25 November 1975, and Peking Review, 12 December 1975:10–15. 35. See Note 31, p.18. 36. Peking Review, February 1974:3. 37. See Note 31, p.19. 38. Muller, Maritime Power, pp.220–221. 39. See Note 12.

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40. Documents of the United Nations, A/AC.138/SC.II/L/34., 16 July 1973. 41. Ibid. 42. See Note 12. 43. Ibid. 44. The Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, Limits in the Seas, No.43 (1 July 1972), “Straight Baselines: People’s Republic of China”, p.3. 45. Ibid. 46. See Note 40. The view as given in U.S. Department of State Limits in the Seas, p.4. 48. Samuels, Contest, p.87. 49. See Note 12. 50. See Note 40. 51. Hungdah Chiu, Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia, Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, School of Law, University of Maryland, 1977, No.1. 52. See Note 40. 53. See Note 51. 54. Beijing Review, No.31, 1980:8.

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Chapter Three THE PARACELS OPERATION

The battle for the Paracels in January 1974 took many people by surprise, not least the Western world and the South Vietnamese themselves. As a Newsweek writer commented in the aftermath of the battle, the Chinese action was “clearly at odds with the flexible, pragmatic approach to foreign policy that has been the recent hallmark of Premier Chou En-lai”. (1) It was also reported that “Western diplomats in Saigon have been hard pressed to find an explanation for China’s current move to assert sovereignty there (Paracels).” (2) Only days before the battle broke out, a South Vietnamese pro-government publication, Vietnam Report, praised President Nguyen Van Thieu for his tough posture against China and saw the Chinese government’s statement of 11 January 1974 as a “golden opportunity” for the South Vietnamese government to gain from “the right of representation of the entire nation”. (3) There was no sign of fear of military action being taken by China. As we shall see below, the lack of preparedness of the South Vietnamese forces made it easier for China to secure a victory in the battle. With the benefit of hindsight, China’s action was not accidental in view of its long-standing and firm claim to sovereignty over the islands, as explored in the last chapter. Indeed, the South Vietnamese government looked naive or negligent in not taking the Chinese government’s statement of 11 January 1974 seriously. From another point of view, however, the South Vietnamese government might be excused for its carelessness. Its administrative decision in September 1973 to incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy Province served to trigger the battle. But it had taken many similar administrative decisions

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before during the 1950s and 1960s. (4) These decisions had not prompted any serious protest from China, not to mention military action. If not then, why in 1974? The basic objective of China’s Paracels operation is not difficult to identify: to capture the islands which had always been regarded as its legitimate territory. As Jay Long remarked in the immediate aftermath of the battle, “Peking may well have concluded that the time was ripe with respect to the Paracels (though presumably not yet for the Spratlys), and plucked the fruit.” (5) This view has been echoed by Gerald Segal who wrote more than ten years later: ” (China’s) basic objective had not changed. The Xisha action, like the take-over of the Tibet twenty-five years earlier was essentially a result of Beijing’s desire to compel others to accept its definition of Chinese territory.” (6) Yet the basic objective in itself is not sufficient as an explanation for China’s Paracels operation. Despite the consistency and firmness of China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, no military action had been taken before. The more challenging, and interesting, question is: why, suddenly in January 1974, did China see fit to assert its claim to the Paracel Islands in such a forceful manner? As discussed in Chapter 1, China’s policies towards territorial disputes have always been influenced by geopolitical interests besides territorial gain per se. Therefore, a useful approach to understanding fully China’s calculations behind the Paracels operation is to explore the relationship between the operation and its geopolitical interests at the time. That is the purpose of this chapter. None the less, before doing so, it may be useful to examine two other possible (and not incompatible) explanations for China’s action. The first has been put forward by the Chinese government itself. Its official explanation for the Paracels operation is that it was a self-defensive counter-attack against South Vietnamese provocations. (7) The other is the suggestion that China’s action was a response to the ongoing debate on the Law of the Sea and the emerging contest for maritime rights. (8) The seizure of the Paracel Islands was a stepping stone to control over maritime resources in the adjacent sea areas. Before

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examining these explanations, a brief account is provided of the battle for the Paracels. THE BATTLE FOR THE PARACELS As mentioned above, the battle for the Paracels may be said to have been triggered off by the South Vietnamese government’s administrative decision to incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy Province in September 1973. The decision was made upon the recommendation of the National Petroleum Board, which in turn was the result of granting oil concessions to a number of international oil companies and consortia for exploration off the shores of South Vietnam in July 1973. (9) Four months elapsed before China responded. On 11 January 1974, a statement was issued, which read partly as follows: Not long ago, the Saigon authorities of South Vietnam made a brazen announcement putting more than ten islands of China’s Nansha Islands, including Nanwei and Taiping, under the administration of South Vietnam’s Phuoc Tuy Province. This is a wanton infringement of China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty…. The government of the People’s Republic of China hereby reiterates that the Nansha, Hsisha, Chungsha, and Tungsha Islands are all part of China’s territory. The PRC has indisputable sovereignty over these islands. The natural resources in the sea areas around them also belong to China. The decision of the Saigon authorities to incorporate Nanwei, Taiping and other islands in the Nansha Islands into South Vietnam is illegal and null and void. The Chinese government will never tolerate any infringement on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty by the Saigon authorities. (10) In a statement released a few days later, the Foreign Ministry of South Vietnam rejected China’s claim. (11) At the same time, it was reported that Chinese fishermen had been sent to three islands of the Paracels, hitherto held by Vietnamese forces, to carry out activities like ‘setting up huts’, ‘displaying Chinese flags’, and ‘digging tombs’. These activities were described by

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the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Voung Van Bac, as “a threat to the security of the region”. South Vietnamese vessels and troops were subsequently sent to the Paracels, where they soon confronted Chinese gunboats. Not surprisingly, both China and South Vietnam have accused each other of firing the first shot. Independent observers have tended to believe that it was the South Vietnamese troops who did so. A Reuter report of 17 January 1974 recorded that South Vietnamese sailors and militiamen fired at Chinese who raised a PRC flag on Robert Island. (12) This report was corroborated by a later one in the International Herald Tribune which said that President Thieu ordered the first shot in reaction to “provocative” actions by the Chinese. (13) The Tokyo Shimbun also reported that a ” (Japanese) government source is taking the position that it is the ‘South Vietnamese side that started’ the dispute this time.” (14) However, given the tense situation then surrounding the islands, the question of who fired the first shot is probably not that important. The likely scenario was that during 16 to 18 January 1974, skirmishes took place between Chinese and South Vietnamese vessels which played a game of hide-and-seek in between the islands and islets. These skirmishes finally led to serious fighting in the early hours of 19 January 1974. Within two days, South Vietnamese forces were defeated and withdrew from the Paracel Islands. They were overwhelmed by the superior Chinese forces. Military sources in South Vietnam claimed that 14 Chinese warships, including four guided missile destroyers, were deployed. They were said to have been covered by four Chinese MiG-21 and MiG-23 jet fighters. The South Vietnamese report of the strength of China’s order of battle was probably exaggerated. Independent observers believed that Styx missiles were not used and only MiG-19s had been flown by the Chinese. (15) None the less, the Chinese forces were heavily armed. They easily outnumbered and outgunned their South Vietnamese opponents. China gave its own account of the battle in a statement of 19 January 1974. (16) It was so drafted as to imply that the South Vietnamese had fired first. For example, while the South Vietnamese spokesperson claimed that Chinese troops landed on the Paracel Islands at 8:30 a.m. on 19 January 1974, and

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opened fire at 10:22 a.m., China’s statement gave 7 a.m. and 10:20 a.m. as the times at which corresponding South Vietnamese military actions took place respectively. Besides, China’s statement did not mention any use of airpower on its side but rather accused the South Vietnamese of its use. After it had lost the battle, the South Vietnamese government launched diplomatic efforts to save its position over the islands. It took its case to the United Nations Security Council and appealed to the signatories of the Paris Agreements of 1973. These efforts did not have any effect. Even South Vietnam’s closest ally, the U.S., remained neutral throughout the battle. For example, the 7th Fleet were ordered to keep out of the vicinity. The South Vietnamese government’s appeal for the rescue of its troops who were missing in the sea was ignored. And if an alleged South Vietnamese Foreign Ministry document made public by Hanoi in 1981 is genuine, U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, “look(ed) upon the conflict on the subject of the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands as a marginal problem, even an inconvenience, within the framework of the joint efforts with Communist China to contain North Vietnam”. (17) The South Vietnamese government’s diplomatic efforts were therefore a complete failure and the control of the Paracel Islands was settled in less than 48 hours. Concerned about its position in the Spratly Islands, the South Vietnamese government sent troops to six of them to consolidate its claim to sovereignty there. This initiative gave rise to a flurry of protests from both the Taiwanese and Philippine governments. The Chinese government’s warning came later on 4 February 1974. In a strongly worded statement, it stated that the South Vietnamese actions were a wanton infringement on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and a new military provocation against the Chinese people…The government of the People’s Republic of China definitely will not tolerate infringement on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty by the Saigon authorities on any pretext. (18) Almost certainly because of the complexity of the dispute over the Spratly Islands and the limitations in its military capability,

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China’s warning this time was not translated into action. By mid-February, the danger of conflict had gradually subsided. SOUTH VIETNAMESE ‘PROVOCATIONS’ China’s official version of the Paracels operation is that it was a self-defensive counter-attack against South Vietnamese provocations. The provocations were understood to include the South Vietnamese government’s administrative decision in September 1973, and its military activities in the Paracels in January 1974. However, a closer look at the events as described above reveals that these ‘provocations’ were no more than a convenient excuse for China’s military operation. As regards the administrative decision in September 1973 to incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy Province, similar decisions had been taken by the South Vietnamese government during the 1950s and the 1960s, some of which had passed without even a protest. If an administrative decision as such constituted a serious provocation, the South Vietnamese government’s actual presence on the Paracel Islands since the 1950s should have long been considered as intolerable. In its statements, China had tried to portray the South Vietnamese troops as having intruded on the islands in January 1974. In reality, as pointed out in Chapter 1, control of the islands had always been shared between the Chinese and South Vietnamese governments since the 1950s. China’s own statements in the 1950s had already acknowledged this fact. For example, in March 1957, New China News Agency (NCNA) denounced South Vietnam’s “illegal occupation of Kanchuan (Robert) Island, and continued occupation of several others nearby Kanchuan Island, including Chinyin (Money) Island, and Sanhu (Pattle) Island” (emphasis added) . (1.9) This occupation was again indirectly confirmed by a People’s Daily article in March 1977. (20) While denouncing Jiang Qing’s (Chiang Ching’s) exploitation of the success of the operation for her personal political advantage, the article reported that in 1970, during a visit to Hainan Island, Jiang had talked about ‘chucking the enemy’ out of some islands of the Paracels by sending people’s militia there.

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Hence, for nearly twenty years, China had been willing to tolerate the existence of South Vietnamese personnel on the Paracel Islands. Could an administrative decision as trivial as that of September 1973 have been more provocative than actual occupation of any of the islands? Moreover, China took four months to respond to the administrative decision. Judging from the rapid sequence of events that followed, the condemnation of the decision was simply an opening diplomatic shot. This brings us to the second point: South Vietnam’s military provocation. From the evidence available, it was the South Vietnamese, rather than the Chinese, who were caught by surprise by the rapid development of events after China’s statement of 11 January 1974. It is possible that the South Vietnamese government had sent military reinforcements to the Paracel Islands after the Chinese statement. But it was near to and on those islands, hitherto held by South Vietnamese forces, that they faced Chinese fishing boats and fishermen. A reasonable guess is that those fishing boats and fishermen were deliberately sent by China to provoke the South Vietnamese into action. It is not impossible that the South Vietnamese troops fired first, but the Paracels operation was obviously premeditated. The whole episode bears a certain resemblance to what took place along the Sino-Soviet border in March 1969. (21) Soviet troops were provoked by a small number of Chinese patrols, and were then ambushed by more numerous regular Chinese forces. The South Vietnamese clearly miscalculated the situation. In an article entitled “From Peking with Love” published in Vietnam Report, which reflected the views of the South Vietnamese government, the decision of Nguyen Van Thieu to order “the Navy to turn the Chinese craft away ‘by force if necessary’”, was warmly praised. (22) It transpired that the South Vietnamese troops were no match for the Chinese. They paid a high price for ‘attacking’ some Chinese ‘fishing boats’. In short, China’s version of ‘self-defence’ is no more than self-justification. David G. Muller has provided one of the best verdicts on the battle: “Saigon’s 1973 declaration of sovereignty was nothing new and realistically meant little in terms of South Vietnam’s ability to fortify and maintain the islands…. Perhaps,

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in a tactical sense, the Chinese did counter-attack. Strategically, however, the (South) Vietnamese were set up.” (23) CONTEST FOR MARITIME RIGHTS The battle for the Paracels took place against the background of active debate on the Law of the Sea. The United Nations Seabed Committee had just completed its work in 1973. It was followed by the opening session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) at the end of the year. It seemed likely that the existing Law of the Sea would be subject to drastic changes as coastal and island states sought to expand their maritime rights to a significant extent. The contest for the maritime frontiers of the world had assumed a new intensity by the early 1970s. In the context of the South China Sea, a serious contest was highly likely because its semi-enclosed nature would give rise to overlapping claims by coastal states. Advocacy of the archipelagic principle by Indonesia and the Philippines, and the position of Malaysia and Indonesia on the customary legal status of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore signalled the beginning of this contest. The contest was fuelled also by the prospect of the discovery of abundant petroleum reserves in the seabed of the South China Sea. As mentioned above, some observers have therefore seen the battle for the Paracels as the result of a scramble for oil. This could have been true for the South Vietnamese government as it had been feverishly looking for oil so as to strengthen its bargaining position with Western countries for more financial aid. As mentioned above, the administrative decision to incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy Province was actually made upon the recommendation of the National Petroleum Board. However, to assume the same for China would be problematic. As L.T.Lee has pointd out, an economic imperative for China to undertake exploration in the South China Sea would not have appeared urgent in the early 1970s, as onshore production was still booming. (24) Selig Harrison had also argued that ” (i) t would be an over-simplification to suggest that a desire for petroleum riches is the governing factor accounting for China’s determined

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posture with respect to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.” (25) He pointed out that the technological problems posed by the water depths around the Paracel and Spratly Islands would limit Chinese offshore oil exploration to the shallow sea areas in the Tonkin Gulf near Hainan Island, in the “decades immediately ahead”. Harrison was writing before China’s adoption of the ‘open-door’ policy in late 1978, which opened up opportunities for co-operation with foreign oil corporations for exploitation in deep water areas. However, this development does not deny the validity of Harrison’s argument for the historical context of 1973–74. In 1974, the sea areas around Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands had yet to undergo detailed seismic surveys, let alone serious companies had participated in China’s plan for oil exploration drilling. (26) Even after the foreign exploration in the South China Sea, by the early 1980s their activities were still limited to the shallow sea areas in the Tonkin Gulf and off Hainan Island. China’s statements themselves also appeared to minimize the role of the oil factor. They chose to denounce the South Vietnamese government’s administrative decision to incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy Province, rather than its grant of concessions to international oil companies in the adjacent sea areas of the Spratly Islands. While the oil factor might not have played an important role in the decision to launch the Paracels operation, China was obviously aware of the battle’s significance for its maritime rights in the South China Sea in general. As pointed out in the last chapter, Beijing’s interest in maritime issues had expanded markedly during 1972–73 as a result of entry into the United Nations and participation in its Seabed Committee. It was during the battle for the Paracels that China, for the first time, laid claim to the adjacent sea areas of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and the resources thereof. As quoted above, the statement of 11 January 1974 claimed that ” (t) he natural resources in the sea areas around them (the South China Sea islands) also belong to China.” (27) In the statement of 4 February 1974, China claimed that it enjoyed indisputable sovereignty over both the South China Sea islands and the sea areas around them. (28)

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At the same time, these statements indicate that China was probably more concerned about its long-term interests in maritime rights in the South China Sea rather than any immediate needs. First, China’s claims to maritime space were equivocal. They employed the undefined term “surrounding sea areas”. The major reasons behind the ambiguity of China’s claims to maritime space in the South China Sea have already been discussed in the previous chapter. In brief, they were due to the fact that its position on the dispute in the East China Sea had limited its room for manoeuvre in the South China Sea. In addition, China wished to avoid serious conflict with other coastal states arising from overlapping claims to maritime space. Accordingly, it tried to appear conciliatory at the same time as it laid claim to surrounding sea areas of the Paracel and Spratly Islands. A gesture expressing such a conciliatory attitude was contained in the second of two statements which were both released on 4 February 1974. The first was directed at the South Vietnamese reiterating China’s sovereign rights to the Spratly Islands and the sea areas around them. The second was directed at the Japanese and South Korean governments, stating that: the question of how to divide the continental shelf in the East China Sea should be decided by China and the other countries concerned through consultations (emphasis added). (29) This second statement represented a far more moderate stance than that directed at the South Vietnamese government. The concurrence in the timing of the two statements seems to have been deliberate. It was a significant hint at the difference between China’s positions on the question of sovereignty over the islands (including the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, and the Diaoyudao) and the question of maritime rights consequent upon that sovereignty. China would be firm on the first question, whereas on the second it was willing to consult with other countries concerned. This approach was in line with its position in the working paper presented to the United Nations Seabed Committee. (See the discussion in the last chapter.) As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this fine distinction between the issue of sovereignty over the islands and the related

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maritime rights contained the embryo of the idea of “joint development” that would appear several years later. It may be suggested, therefore, that while the battle for the Paracels had improved China’s position in future bargaining over maritime rights in the South China Sea, China also took pains to appear conciliatory over those issues. It is doubtful if the Paracels operation was launched primarily as a means to serve notice of China’s active participation in the contest for maritime rights. China’s general concern with maritime rights in the South China Sea could have been a secondary incentive for the Paracels operation, but as will be argued below, the more important incentive was most probably its geopolitical interests. GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS The battle for the Paracels took place against the background of significant changes in China’s global posture as well as the strategic situation of the region. At the global level, after the intense debate on China’s strategic posture within the leadership during 1968–71, the line which finally prevailed was to identify the Soviet Union as the principal threat to China’s security and to seek rapprochement with the United States. (30) The ascendance of this “revolutionary diplomatic line of Chairman Mao” was symbolized by Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China in July 1971, and the downfall of Lin Biao in September that year. In the context of Southeast Asia, which had always been an area of major security concern to China, its responses to developments in the strategic balance in the region followed those changes in its global posture. Before the 1970s, when the U.S. was viewed as the principal enemy, the activities of its Navy in the Pacific and alliances with countries in the region were perceived as serious threats to China’s security. Accordingly, the pro-Western governments in the region were looked upon as accomplices in the U.S. plot of containment. For example, when the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was set up in 1967, it was denounced by China as an “alliance of U. S. stooges”, and “a military alliance directed specifically against China” in the name of “economic co-operation”. (31)

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With the rapprochement in Sino-U.S. relations and the military withdrawal of the U.S. from Indochina during the early 1970s, China’s perception of the strategic situation of the region changed rapidly. The U.S. presence in Southeast Asia was no longer viewed as a major threat to China’s security. Rather, China was worried that the United States’ military withdrawal from Indochina might weaken the latter’s commitments in the region in general, and therefore open up opportunities for an increase in Soviet influence. China’s diplomatic response was unambiguous. On the one hand, it did not wish to see the U.S. position in Indochina collapse too quickly. The Paris Agreements of January 1973 were heartily endorsed by China as a serious contribution to peace in the region. And when North Vietnamese leaders Le Duan and Pham Van Dong visited Beijing in July 1973, they were urged by Chinese leaders to hold off for several years before attempting to liberate the South. (32) Concurrently, China began to promote better relations with pro-Western governments in the region. They were no longer represented as ‘U.S. stooges’ but potential allies in a united front against ‘Soviet hegemonism’. Accordingly, the proposal by ASEAN’s Foreign Ministers in November 1971 for making Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) was endorsed by China. In contrast, the earlier Soviet proposal for an ‘Asian Collective Security System’ was denounced as “nothing but a trap for setting up a military ring of encirclement against China and for political control and economic plunder of Asian countries”. (33) If previous experience of China’s military operations is any guide (34), it is inconceivable that the Paracels operation was totally unrelated to the developments outlined above. In fact, some authors have attempted to explore such a relationship. For example, both Harrison and Lee have suggested that the Paracels operation should be viewed as an element in China’s regional policy. In particular, they have stressed the strategic importance of the South China Sea for China. (35) Copper has been more specific. Writing in the immediate aftermath of the battle for the Paracels, he argued that ” (i) f Peking could gain some measure of control over the South China Sea, it would give China an edge in dealing with Soviet naval power. It might enable Peking to break the Soviet Union’s encirclement of China.

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Or at least the ruling hierarchy in China might perceive this advantage.” (36) As pointed out in Chapter 1, the above-mentioned studies were undertaken not long after the battle for the Paracels and limited by the information available at the time of writing. Therefore, although they have provided some interesting insights into China’s calculations over the Paracels operation, these are only sketched in a tentative and speculative manner. There is also no clear-cut answer as to why China chose to launch the Paracels operation in January 1974 and not earlier. The link between China’s desire to contain Soviet naval power in the South China Sea and the timing of the Paracels operation is still missing. With the benefit of more information on the state of Sino-Vietnamese relations during the early 1970s, it may be argued that such a link is provided by developments as regards these relations in late 1973. In the following subsections, the complex geopolitical considerations which lay behind China’s Paracels operation will be examined. Strategic importance of the Paracel Islands China’s concern over Soviet naval activities in the South China Sea may have begun as early as the late 1960s. In 1968, a Soviet naval squadron moved into the Indian Ocean for the first time, soon after the British government had decided to accelerate the withdrawal of its military presence from Southeast Asia. It appeared that the Soviet Union was happy to fill any power vacuum that might appear in the region. In 1971, the Soviet-India Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance further enhanced its influence in the Indian Ocean. To link elements of its Pacific fleet in the Indian Ocean with those in Northeast Asia, concentrated at the port of Vladivostok, secure sea-lanes in the South China Sea were of considerable strategic importance to the Soviet Union. That importance was highlighted by a controversy over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore in the early 1970s. The major coastal states in the straits, Indonesia and Malaysia, wanted to assert rights of jurisdiction over them. In a joint statement on safety of navigation (also signed by Singapore, which, however,

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expressed its reservations over Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s claim) on 16 November 1971, they declared that: the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia agreed that the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not international straits while fully recognizing their use for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocent passage. (37) The Soviet Union reacted strongly to the Indonesian and Malaysian position. (38) Taking the opportunity of a meeting with Japan’s Deputy Foreign Minister in March 1972, the Soviet Ambassador made known the view of his government that it regarded the Straits as an international waterway that should be kept open for free passage by all shipping. Besides a general concern with passage through straits, the Soviet diplomatic intervention reflected the particular value of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore to the Soviet Union. To maintain a linked naval presence in the Indian Ocean and West Pacific was important for the Soviet Union’s surveillance of U. S. naval activities in the area, as well as for emergency measures if, for example, the trans-Siberian railway supply line was interdicted in conflict with China. Of course, besides strategic considerations, maintaining a naval presence in the South China Sea had a symbolic political value for the superpower status of the Soviet Union. The Soviet diplomatic intervention also reflected the vulnerability of its Navy in the South China Sea. Unlike the U. S., Southeast Asia on the whole was an unfriendly environment for the Soviet Navy. It could not rely on bilateral consultation and co-operation with the majority of the resident states. That was why free passage through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore was so vital. In fact, that was also why Vietnam was so important to the Soviet Union’s strategic interests in Southeast Asia. As we shall see later, a fear of strategic co-operation between Hanoi and Moscow was one of the important factors that motivated China in launching the Paracels operation. China was fully aware of the controversy over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. In the debate on straits used for

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international navigation in the United Nations Seabed Committee and UNCLOS III, the issue of accessibility to straits was described by China as an example of how the superpowers had tried to encroach upon the sovereign rights of other countries. Accordingly, China quickly expressed its support for the position of Malaysia and Indonesia on the legal regime of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The Soviet diplomatic manoeuvre in Japan was immediately denounced as a “conspiracy between Soviet social-imperialism and the reactionary Sato government of Japan”. (39) The warning against Soviet intentions as regards the Straits was frequently repeated in later years. For example, in early 1974, a People’s Daily article denounced a host of Soviet activities in Southeast Asia. In particular, it warned that: the Soviet revisionists harbour aggressive designs on the ports of Southeast Asian countries and the Malacca Strait…. Their smug calculation is to secure for their Vladivostok based Pacific Fleet free passage via the Sea of Japan through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean and then to link this up with the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea Fleets in an attempt to establish hegemony in these vast areas. (40) According to some observers, China’s heightened awareness of the threat posed by Soviet naval activities in ite neighbouring sea areas during the early 1970s was the result of the ascendancy of ‘maritimists’ in the Chinese leadership. (41) This is believed to be symbolized by the return to the political scene of some important ‘maritimist’ figures, including Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping) and Su Zhenhua (Su Chen-hua). Su, an ardent supporter of professionalization and modernization of the PLA Navy, was purged during the Cultural Revolution. In mid-1972, he was re-appointed to his former post, Political Commissar of the PLA Navy. It is now well known that serious differences over the question of professionalization and modernization of the PLA, including the Navy, existed within the Chinese leadership. Before the purge of the Gang of Four, naval construction programmes faced serious obstruction. Introduction of new uniforms in the

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Navy also aroused fierce attacks by the radicals, which put the leadership of the Navy in a difficult political position. (42) It would therefore be risky to over-indulge in the theory of the ‘ascendancy of the maritimists’. In any case, China’s concern over Soviet naval activities in the South China Sea was certainly not limited to media propaganda. According to an unconfirmed Pentagon source, China began the construction of a naval base in the Amphitrite Group of the Paracels at the beginning of the 1970s. (43) It is indeed not surprising that, in the wake of the United States’ military withdrawal from Indochina, China immediately took note of the strategic role that might be played by the South China Sea islands. The Paracel and Spratly Islands had been used by both the Japanese and U.S. Navies during the Second World War and the Vietnam War respectively. If previous experience was any guide, the islands could play an important role in either surveillance or control of the main sea-lanes in the South China Sea. There is no doubt that the strategic advantage of acquiring control over the Paracel Islands could have been a strong incentive for China to launch the Paracels operation. The remaining question is the one posed earlier: why did China choose that particular moment to launch the operation? To answer this question, an examination of Sino-Vietnamese relations is necessary. Sino-Vietnamese relations The state of Sino-Vietnamese relations has played a crucial role in China’s perception of the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This was because after the United States’ military withdrawal from Indochina, it was believed to be only a matter of time before North Vietnam would defeat the South. Thus arose the delicate prospect of Hanoi succeeding to Saigon’s claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and taking over control of the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands hitherto occupied by South Vietnamese forces. If Hanoi were to remain a fraternal ally of China, it would not pose any new threat. However, this was not to be the case, at least not in China’s eyes. In the couple of years before the battle for the Paracels,

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Sino-Vietnamese relations had been deteriorating and this factor certainly made an important contribution to China’s decision to launch the Paracels operation. It is now well known that, even during the 1950s and the 1960s, Sino-Vietnamese relations were never as warm and fraternal as the two countries claimed them to be. (44) Yet before the 1970s, China and North Vietnam had shared a common strategic objective in Southeast Asia: the defeat of the U.S. in Indochina in particular, and the reduction of U.S. influence in the region in general. Although they might have differed in the means to achieve these ends, or in the assessment of the role of the Soviet Union in their pursuit, or in the perception of the power and ultimate purposes of the U.S., they had managed to maintain relatively amiable relations. Those relations had suffered ups and downs from time to time, but not irreparable damage. The irreparable damage to Sino-Vietnamese relations was inflicted when in 1971 Nixon was invited to visit China. Hanoi counts this episode as the second major sell-out by China in the thirty years of struggle for independence and liberation. (45) In fact, the consequences of this second sell-out were in many ways far more serious than those of the first. In contrast to the so-called first sell-out by China at the Geneva Conference on Indochina in 1954, Hanoi did not even formally endorse the visit as a polite gesture. More importantly, Sino-Vietnamese relations continued to go downhill. From 1972 onwards, Mao’s pictures disappeared from shops in Hanoi. Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam began to be ill-treated. The activities of the Sino-Vietnamese Friendship Association and the publication of Hanoi’s only Chinese language daily were suspended in early 1974. (46) Before the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, the two countries had managed to put up a front of friendship in public, but strains were continuously growing. The emergence of territorial disputes was a significant indication of such strains. Territorial disputes can be of symptomatic and symbolic significance in international relations, especially between communist countries. They arouse strong emotions and always touch the sensitive nerves of governments. As territorial disputes fall within the sphere of national interests, they are also more intractable and accordingly symbolic of irreparable

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deteriorations in relations between communist countries, which usually affirm a commitment to proletarian internationalism. This was true of Sino-Soviet relations during the 1960s, and Sino-Vietnamese relations presented yet another example during the 1970s. Territorial disputes between China and North Vietnam began to arise soon after the turning point in their relationship during 1971–72. Taking together into consideration different accounts, 1973 was probably the year that border tensions began to become a major concern. Hanoi charged in 1979 that “from 1973 onwards, the Chinese authorities were increasing their acts of provocation and territorial encroachment in the northern border provinces.” ( ) China counter-charged that the North Vietnamese had made an about-turn on boundary issues after 1974 and began to create tension along the border. In practice, China started to record Vietnamese border provocations from the beginning of 1974. (48) This implies that the tension along the border must have already been felt as early as 1973. Hoang Van Hoan, who defected from Vietnam to China in 1979, also agreed that North Vietnam’s “provocations” and “creation of tension” along the border “began in 1973–74”. (49) The issue of territorial disputes reached a crucial point when the North Vietnamese government formally requested talks on the division of the Tonkin Gulf in a note to the Chinese government on 26 December 1973. (50) As regards the Paracel and Spratly Islands, no official dispute over them was indicated before 1974. As a matter of fact, China claims to hold a number of documents which record Hanoi’s recognition of China’s sovereignty over the islands, explicitly or implicitly, before 1974. As China recalled during 1979–80 (51), as early as 15 June 1956, the North Vietnamese Vice-Foreign Minister, Ung Van Khiem, and the Acting Director of the Asian Department of the North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, Le Loc, acknowledged explicitly that the Paracel and Spratly Islands were “historically part of Chinese territory”. This acknowledgement was probably sought by China itself in the aftermath of the row over sovereignty over the Spratly Islands initiated by the Philippines’ expression of its interests in the islands. Hanoi has never denied this recollection.

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In September 1958, when the Chinese government issued its Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea, which included the islands as China’s territories, Pham Van Dong sent a note to Zhou Enlai, recognizing and supporting the Declaration. The facsimile of the note was reproduced in Chinese documents published in the late 1970s. Hanoi has not denied the existence of the note but has argued that it referred to the issue of territorial waters only and did not amount to recognition of China’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. (52) Throughout the 1960s, China had issued numerous warnings against U.S. violations of the territorial sea and airspace of the Paracel Islands. Hanoi had endorsed or acquiesced in face of these warnings. In May 1965, the North Vietnamese themselves stated that the “U.S. President Lyndon Johnson… designate(d) …a part of the sea area of the Chinese People’s Republic in the Tay Sa (Paracel) archipelago as a combat area of the U.S. armed forces.” (53) In addition, China had also alleged that in textbooks and maps published in North Vietnam before 1974, the Paracel and Spratly Islands were always acknowledged as China’s territories. Hanoi has not denied these reports but has defended its position as being conditioned by the force of historical circumstances. (54) In other words, Hanoi has admitted that it had concealed its real intention towards the islands before 1975 because of the need for China’s support during the Vietnam War. It is difficult to tell if China knew of Hanoi’s real intentions before the battle for the Paracels. It appears that although sovereignty over the islands was not in dispute publicly, the Chinese had skilfully led the North Vietnamese officials to recognizing China’s sovereignty over the islands, which could be used to support its position in future arguments. By 1973, the gathering momentum of troubles over the land border, and the raising of the issue of division of the Tonkin Gulf, could have made China suspicious of Hanoi’s position on the islands as well. It would not appear to have been accidental that China’s reply to Hanoi’s request for talks on the Tonkin Gulf was delivered just one day before it launched the Paracels operation. The operation took place more than four months after the South Vietnamese government’s administrative decision. Whether the decision to launch the operation was taken before or after having received the request for talks from Hanoi cannot be ascertained.

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Nevertheless, the timing of the operation and the diplomatic reply was probably meant to be a signal to Hanoi. There were different possible interpretations of the signal. The operation could have been intended as an example by which China let Hanoi know that it was ready to use force to defend its territory, if necessary. It was, however, more likely that China wanted to draw a line between the issues of the Tonkin Gulf and the South China Sea islands. By agreeing to talk about the division of the Tonkin Gulf, China indicated that it considered the issue an open one. By contrast, China had always considered that its sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was “indisputable” and “non-negotiable”. The timing of the operation as an indirect warning would not have been necessary if China had not been suspicious of Hanoi’s intentions. On the other hand, the content of the reply illustrated that the shadow of the Soviet Union had been cast over China’s perception of its territorial disputes with North Vietnam. In the reply, China had demanded that “no third country be allowed to conduct prospecting in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf.” (55) The third country could hardly be any other than the Soviet Union. In a similar vein, China could not accept the possibility of a Soviet presence on the Paracel Islands, which were less than one hundred and fifty nautical miles south of Hainan Island, and controlled sea-lanes vital to China’s security. Knitting the above threads together, China’s geopolitical considerations behind the Paracels operation seem quite clear. During the early 1970s, China’s concern with the Soviet presence in the region, especially its naval activities in the South China Sea, had been growing. With the deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations, and the possibility of North Vietnam moving closer politically to the Soviet Union, China was worried that some of the Paracel Islands, which commanded sea-lanes vital to any naval activity, might eventually become subject to the influence or control of the Soviet Union. By late 1973, a sense of urgency was further instilled by the increase in border incidents and the emergence of a dispute over the division of the Tonkin Gulf. The complete takeover of the Paracel Islands was an attempt to strengthen China’s strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the South China Sea.

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That China had directed its action to the Paracel Islands but not the Spratly Islands in 1974 is not difficult to explain. First of all, the Paracel Islands were closer to China. As far as defence was concerned, they were more essential than the Spratly Islands. Moreover, as the Spratly Islands were farther away, China would have found it more difficult to undertake military action there. China lacked the capability to provide any air cover over the Spratly Islands, and there would have been serious logistical problems in holding the islands even if it could have won a brief naval battle. Finally, the situation of the Spratly Islands was more complicated. Taiwanese and Philippine troops were also stationed there. Military confrontations could spill over and widen. Relations with Taiwan and the Philippines were more sensitive so that much higher political risks would have been involved. From another point of view, the Philippines and Taiwan themselves would also keep an eye on Soviet naval activities in the region. Hence, although the South Vietnamese government’s administrative decision concerned the Spratly Islands, China chose to initiate actions in the Paracels. In fact, some governments in the region might have already recognized China’s calculations behind the Paracels operation at the time of the battle although they kept their observations private until some years later. For example, it was not until 1981 that Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ghazali Shafie, remarked in public that ” (i) n 1973, perhaps knowing that in the demise of the Vietnam leader, Ho Chi Minh, Chinese influence in Hanoi would be lost for a long while, China wrested the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam… China had not wanted to lose the opportunity of securing the Paracels before Hanoi had won the day.” (56) Also, in 1979, Hanoi alleged that in 1974, a Chinese top leader told a visiting British Prime Minister that “China had to take Hoang Sa (Paracels) otherwise the Soviet Union would take it.” (57) Such an allegation can hardly be confirmed, but it suggests that at the time of the battle, Hanoi and Moscow might have already seen China’s initiative as a move against the Soviet Union. If they had, they were probably not far from the truth.

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The radicals’ decision? The above analysis has sought to demonstrate how the Paracels operation served China’s geopolitical interests. However, it is now well known that China’s foreign policy was the subject of intense domestic debate around the time of the battle for the Paracels. It is therefore necessary to examine whether such a debate affected China’s decision to launch the operation. In the early 1970s, although the Chinese leadership had probably agreed upon the need to contain the Soviet threat to China’s security, different sections of the leadership were in serious disagreement about what constituted the best way to fulfill such a need. (58) At least three issues were under debate. First, how important was the alignment with the U.S. to China’s security? It appears that the radicals, who were later labelled as the associates of the ‘Gang of Four’ after their purge, were more sceptical of the value of rapprochement with the United States. Second, how confrontational should Sino-Soviet relations be? The radicals, in opposition to professional diplomats in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, probably took a hard line on this question. Any softening of China’s stance against the Soviet Union could be regarded as a sign of weakness. Third, the radicals viewed the nature of the Soviet threat to China’s security as mainly political. They therefore placed greater stress on mass mobilization, political education, and people’s militia as against the strategy of modernization and professionalization of regular military units advocated by the Armed Forces. In view of these controversies, there is the suspicion that the radicals’ hand was behind the Paracels operation. (59) In many ways the operation appeared to fall in line with the radicals’ political views. First of all, the operation was carried out against an ally of the United States. It could have put China’s recent efforts at improving relations with the U.S. and pro-Western governments in the region in jeopardy. Second, the operation was in line with a tough stance against the Soviet Union. In fact, in early 1974, the radicals’ influence on handling of Sino-Soviet relations seemed to reach a high point. In January, five alleged Soviet spies were arrested. The arrest was given wide publicity in the Chinese media. In March, a Soviet helicopter strayed over the Chinese border in Xinjiang Province. Its crew were captured

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and immediately charged with espionage. Third, in the aftermath of the battle, the Paracels operation was hailed by the radicals-controlled media as an example of the important role played by the people’s militia in national defence. The success of the operation was even used as an argument against the need to modernize PLA. (60) Since the decision-making process in Chinese foreign policy has been largely obscure for outside observers, it is difficult to prove or disprove the above suspicion. Nevertheless, on closer examination of China’s behaviour in the Paracels operation, it is possible to pass the judgement that the case of the radicals’ dominant role in the operation does not look particularly convincing. As regards relations with the ASEAN countries in the region, China was obviously aware of the possible political repercussions of the Paracels operation. However, China’s management of it showed that these repercussions were not considered unfavourable and that attempts were made to minimize them. A massive propaganda camapign did not follow the battle. Although the Chinese press did expend some space on the battle, it did not compare with the voluminous propaganda generated in the aftermath of the clashes over the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet borders during the 1960s. Most of the press reports on the battle were for domestic consumption, rather than directed at a foreign audience. (The detailed analysis of press items during 1974–75 will be dealt with in the next chapter when the dispute with Hanoi is discussed.) Moreover, as pointed out earlier, China tried to appear conciliatory on the question of maritime rights in the South China Sea, which directly concerned the interests of some of the ASEAN countries. As a matter of fact, by concluding the battle quickly and by controlling its propaganda in the immediate aftermath, China was successful in limiting possible damage to its policy of improving relations with the ASEAN countries. As L.T.Lee has observed, ” (t) here is little evidence that disquieting events of early 1974 significantly hampered the process of improving relations, indeed they may have made regularization of ties more imperative.” (61) The battle for the Paracels was followed shortly by the visit of Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak to China in May 1974, which resulted in the formal

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establishment of diplomatic relations. And rather unexpectedly, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, even stated publicly that the Paracel Islands “should belong to China”. (62) It is doubtful if this comment represented the considered position of the Indonesian government, but at the very least, it indicated that the battle had not aroused deep suspicion or fear among the ASEAN governments. As regards relations with the U.S., China had probably made the right calculation. The conduct of the U.S. government during the battle demonstrated that it was indifferent to the naval defeat of South Vietnam. It certainly did not want the battle to complicate the recent process of rapprochement with China, which was important to both its global and regional policies. Moreover, it was doubtful if the U.S. government could react decisively to the battle as it was then hamstrung by the Watergate crisis and the constraints imposed by Congress. An interesting U.S. connection with the battle is that an American observer from its embassy in Saigon was captured along with other South Vietnamese troops by the Chinese. What the American observer was doing during the battle was a question that the U.S. government was not prepared to answer. China handled the case with care. It did not make any fuss about the presence of the American observer. He was among the first batch of captives to be released. As regards relations with the Soviet Union, it was doubtful if any section of the Chinese leadership would have raised serious objections to an operation which strengthened China’s strategic position in the South China Sea, provided that such an operation did not entail unnecessary risks. That the opponent in the battle for the Paracels was a weak and isolated South Vietnam certainly minimized such risks. Besides, China was not actually engaged in direct confrontation with the Soviet Union. It can be argued that the only major political loss for China as a result of the Paracels operation was the exacerbated deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations. This is an issue to be examined in detail in the next two chapters. None the less, it should be pointed out that China’s awareness of this possibility could have been another reason for its control of the post-operation propaganda.

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As regards the radicals’ exploitation of the success of the operation to support their political views, given their control of the Chinese media, this would have been possible irrespective of whether or not they themselves had made the decision to launch the operation. In fact, even with limited information about decision-making in China, it does not appear likely that the radicals played a major role in military affairs at the time of the operation. Since the downfall of Lin Biao (Lin Piao), the radicals’ influence in the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) had been minimal, which was probably where the decision to launch the Paracels operation was made. Ye Jianying (Yeh Chien-ying), concurrently holding the post of Minister of Defence, had been in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the MAC since Lin’s demise. Deng Xiaoping, who was re-appointed to both the Politburo and MAC in December 1973, had quickly asserted his influence over military affairs. It was he who masterminded the rotation of commanders of military regions in early 1974. As a reasonable guess, these two men, who were opponents to the radicals, probably played an important role in the decision to launch the Paracels operation. (63) Moreover, despite the radicals’ emphasis on the role played by the people’s militia in the Paracels operation, it was obviously executed by the PLA Navy. As mentioned above, the then Political Commissar of PLA Navy, Su Zhenhua, was a close associate of Deng. Incidentally, after the arrest of the ‘Gang of Four’ in October 1976, Su was sent to Shanghai, the bastion of radicals, to maintain order and stability. In sum, it is doubtful whether there was any serious internal division over the Paracels operation. By acquiring control over the entirety of the Paracel Islands, China made significant strategic gains in the South China Sea at minimal political costs. It appears that the operation pleased, or at least did not displease any particular section of the Chinese leadership. In addition, the operation was launched under the banner of defence of territorial integrity. No section would take the political risk of opposing such an operation if success was certain. As Segal has observed, “Had the campaign dragged on, or met setbacks, then recrimination and debate might well have surfaced. But as it was, the Xisha campaign was a smashing success, thereby

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encouraging domestic bandwagon.” (64)

groups

to

jump

on

the

Xisha

SUMMARY Nearly two decades of relative tranquility over the Paracel and Spratly Islands were broken by the battle for the Paracels. While China’s basic objective in capturing what had long been regarded as its legitimate territory is not in doubt, this objective in itself is not sufficient as an explanation for China’s decision to launch the operation in January 1974. For China had tolerated the existence of South Vietnamese personnel on the Paracel Islands for many years. Why did China seek to realize its claim to sovereignty over the islands in such a forceful manner at that particular time? This chapter has looked into three possible answers to this question. The first is China’s own official version of the Paracels operation as a “self-defensive counter-attack” against South Vietnamese provocations. From the evidence examined, it is clear that China was the party which precipitated the confrontation, taking advantage of South Vietnam’s military weakness and political isolation. South Vietnamese troops were provoked into action and then soundly defeated by well-prepared and superior Chinese forces. China’s official version of its action was no more than a pretext for the premeditated Paracels operation. The second concerns the contest for maritime rights. China’s statements issued during and in the immediate aftermath of the battle show that it was fully aware of the significance of the disputes over the islands for maritime rights in the South China Sea. However, at the same time, China’s statements also indicate that it saw the two issues in a different light. Its sovereignty over the islands was represented as “indisputable” and “non-negotiable”. But as regards the issue of maritime rights, China’s stand was ambiguous in substance and conciliatory in tone. Therefore, while the outcome of the battle would certainly strengthen China’s position in future bargaining over maritime rights, they constituted at best a secondary incentive. This chapter has argued that the most plausible rationale for the Paracels operation was that it constituted China’s s response

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to changes in the strategic situation of the South China Sea. By the early 1970s, China’s concern with the increase in Soviet influence in the region, including Soviet naval activities in the South China Sea, had been growing. In this context, the strategic value of the mid-ocean islands, which commanded major sealanes, was highlighted. The concurrent deterioration of Sino-Vietnamese relations and emergence of territorial disputes between the two countries linked the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands to China’s concern with the Soviet threat to its security. The Paracels operation was launched to forego any future possibility of Soviet influence in these islands via the co-operation of Hanoi. It constituted an exercise in denial. On the other hand, the possible damage caused by the battle to diplomatic relations with the U.S. and the ASEAN countries had been minimized by China’s prudence in handling the operation. The battle for the Paracels was concluded quickly without public bravado so as to limit unfavourable political repercussions. It appeared that China had made the right calculation of the reactions of the U.S. and ASEAN governments, which were indifferent to the defeat of South Vietnam. The only significant political loss to China was probably the aggravation of tension with Hanoi (which will be examined in detail in the next two chapters). On the whole, the battle for the Paracels proved to be a successful attempt at improving China’s strategic position in the South China Sea at minimal political costs. On this question, there was apparently no serious disagreement within the Chinese leadership. While the moderates and military leaders were probably the ones who made the decision to launch the operation, the radicals took advantage of its success for their political propaganda. The Chinese leadership also appeared to be unanimous about carrying out the operation in a low-key manner so as to maximize the gains from the operation. NOTES 1. Quoted by M.S.Samuels, in Contest for the South China Sea, New York and London: Methuen, 1982, pp.110–111. 2. New York Times, 20 January 1974.

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3. Nguyen Van Phong, “From Peking with Love,” Vietnam Report, 15 January 1974, pp.1–2. 4. Hungdah Chiu and Choon-ho Park, “Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands,” Ocean Development and International Law Journal, Vol.3 (1975) No.1:1–28. 5. Jay H.Long, “The Paracels Incident: Implications for Chinese Policy,” Asian Affairs (New York), March/April 1974:229–239. 6. Gerald Segal, Defending China, London: Oxford University Press, 1985, p.199. 7. For the major statements issued by China during the battle, see Peking Review, 18 January 1974:3; 25 January 1974:4; and 8 February 1974:3. 8. Long, Paracels Incident; and Michael Morrow, “Today Hsisha, Tomorrow…?” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 January 1974. 9. Samuels, Contest, p.99. 10. Peking Review, 18 January 1974:3. 11. Statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RVN, 16 January 1974, Vietnam Report, 15 January 1974:7. 12. Reuter, 17 January 1974. 13. International Herald Tribune, 22 January 1974. 14. Quoted by Tao Cheng, “The Dispute Over the South China Sea Islands,” Texas International Law Journal, Vol.10 (1975):265–277, note 28. 15. David G.Muller, China as a Maritime Power, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, p.153. At the time, China did not possess any MiG-23 aircraft; see Military Balance, 1973–75. 16. Peking Review, 25 January 1974:4. 17. Vietnam Courier, The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes, Hanoi, 1981, p.. 18. Peking Review, 8 February 1974:4. 19. New China News Agency (NCNA), 7 March 1957. 20. People’s Daily, 17 March 1977. 21. Nhu Phong, “Some Reflections on ‘Ping Nam Mieh Pei’,” Vietnam Report, 15 February 1974:6–7. See also T.W.Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute; Background, Development and the 1969 Clashes, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1970; and Neville Maxwell, “The Chinese Account of 1969 Fighting at Chenpao (Report from China),” China Quarterly, No.56 (October-December 1973):730–739. 22. See Note 3. 23. Muller, Maritime Power, p.154. 24. L.T.Lee, “The PRC and the South China Sea,” Current Scene (Hong Kong), Vol.15, No.2 (February 1977):1–12.

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25. Selig S. Harrison, China, Oil and Asia; Conflict Ahead? New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, Ch.8. 26. Samuels, Contest, p.112. 27. See Note 10. 28. See Note 18. 29. See Note 18. 30. For analyses of the debate, see Thomas M. Gottleib, Chinese Foreign Policy. Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle, Santa Monica: Rand Report, 1977; Michael B.Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs, London: Croom Helm, 1978, Ch.8; and Greg O’Leary, The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy, London: Croom Helm, 1980. 31. Peking Review, 18 August 1967:39–40. 32. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations Over the Last 30 Years (White Book on Vietnam-China relations), Hanoi, 1979, p.58. 33. Peking Review, 18 July 1969:23–24. 34. For general analyses of China’s thinking behind military operations, see Allen S.Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975; Melvin Gurtov and Byoong-Moo Hwang, China Under Threat, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980; and Segal, Defending China. 35. Lee, “The PRC,” and Harrison, China, Oil and Asia. 36. John Copper, “China’s Claim to the South China Sea Islands,” China Report (New Delhi), Vol.10, No.3 (May-June 1974):10–15. 37. Joint Statement of the Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, 16 November 1971, in Michael Leifer, International Straits of the World: Malacca, Singapore, and Indonesia, The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978, p.204. 38. Leifer, International Straits, pp.107–108. 39. Peking Review, 17 March 1972:20–21. 40. People’s Daily, 14 March 1974. 41. Segal, Defending China, and Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982. 42. For example, see Muller, Maritime Power, Ch.11 and Ch.14. 43. David Jenkins, “Trouble Over Oil and Waters,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 August 1979:24–30. 44. One of the earliest studies on the differences between the Chinese and Vietnamese communist leaderships is D.S. Zagoria’s Vietnam Triangle, New York: Pegasus, 1976. More recent works which are useful include David W.P. Elliott (ed.), The Third Indochina Conflict, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981; Daniel S.Papp, Vietnam; The View From Moscow, Peking, Washington, North

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45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53.

55. 56.

57.

58.

59. 60. 61.

Carolina: McFarland, 1981; and Eugene K. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, New York: Praeger, 1984. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Vietnam-China relations. John Gittings, “On China,” Vietnam South East Asia International, Vol.14, Nos.4–6; and Carlyle Thayer, “The DRV in 1974: The Politics of Transition,” Asian Survey, 1975:61–69. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Vietnam-China relations, pp.59–60. “Han Nianlong’s Speech,” Beijing Review, 25 May 1979. Hoang Van Hoan, “Distortion of Facts About Friendship Between Vietnam and China,” Beijing Review, 7 December 1979. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Vietnam-China relations, p.60. The following discussion is mainly based on the Chinese Foreign Ministry document, “China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over Xisha and Nansha Islands,” Beijing Review, 1980, No.7:15–24. Vietnam Courier, p.46. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East (BBC, SWB, FE), 1855/A3/1. . “Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xiannian’s Talks with Premier Pham Van Dong (10 June 1977),” Beijing Review, 30 March 1979:17–22. See Note 50. Tan Sri M.Ghazali Shafie, ASEAN: Contributor in Stability and Development, Address at the Conference on “ASEAN-Today and Tommorow,” Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston, November 1981, p. 5. BBC, SWB, FE/6234/A3/11. According to public official records, no British Prime Minister visited China in 1974. The Vietnamese were probably referring to a visit by Edward Heath, who had already stepped down after the general election in February 1974. The following discussion is drawn heavily from Harry Harding, “The Domestic Politics of China’s Global Posture,” in Thomas Fingar and Stanford Journal of International Studies (eds.), China’s Quest for Independence; Policy Evolution in the 1970s, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980, pp.93–146; and Kenneth Liberthal, “The Background in Chinese Politics,” in Herbert J. Ellison (ed.), The Sino-Soviet Conflict; A Global Perspective, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1982, pp.3–28. For example, see Lieberthal in Ellison (ed.), Sino-Soviet Conflict, p.19; and Financial Times, 21 January 1974. Harding in Fingar and Stanford Journal of International Studies (eds.), China’s Quest, p.121. See also Muller, Maritime Power, p.201. Lee, “The PRC”.

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62. BBC, SWB, FE/4519/A3/1–3. 63. The analysis here is supported by the latest Chinese official disclosure about Ye and Deng’s role in the Paracels operation. In memory of Ye after his death in October 1986, a Xinhua article recalls that “in January 1974, Ye Jianying was entrusted by Mao and Zhou to direct together with Deng Xiaoping the battle of self-defence on China’s Xisha Islands and recovered the islands once occupied by the reactionary South Vietnamese troops.” See BBC, SWB, FE/8405/BII/5-14. 64. Segal, Defending China, p.208.

84

Chapter Four THE DISPUTE WITH HANOI, 1974–78

In the last chapter, it was pointed out that before the naval battle for the Paracels, North Vietnam had appeared to recognize China’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Such an attitude began to change right after the battle. (See later sections for further discussion.) In the following decade, Hanoi emerged as Beijing’s major contender for sovereignty over the islands. The objective of this chapter is to examine how China handled the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during 1974–78, that is, from the battle for the Paracels to the public breakdown in Sino-Vietnamese relations. This was an interesting period because although Sino-Vietnamese relations came under increasing strain, the dispute over the islands was kept out of contemporary official public records. Yet retrospective accounts published by both sides during 1979–80 (1) show that a great deal took place within this period. With the help of these accounts, it is possible to interpret some signals which might have been obscure to observers at the time. During 1974–78, three stages of development may be discerned in Hanoi’s challenge to China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. First, in the immediate aftermath of the battle for the Paracels, Hanoi departed from its previous position of recognizing China’s sovereignty over them. However, it did not lay any official claim to the islands. The second stage began when Le Duan, leading the first Vietnamese party and government delegation to China after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, raised the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands with Beijing for the first time. At that time, Hanoi’s approach to the dispute was still cautious and

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low-key. Finally in early 1977, Hanoi departed from the above approach and the situation was set for serious confrontation between the two countries over the islands in the post-1978 era. The following discussion will outline how the above stages evolved. The central questions to be dealt with in this chapter are: how did China respond to Hanoi’s challenge to its claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during 1974– 78, and what were the factors responsible for such responses? AFTERMATH OF THE BATTLE FOR THE PARACELS Right after the battle for the Paracels, an Agence France Presse (AFP) report quoted “authorized” North Vietnamese sources as saying that the preservation of territorial sovereignty was a “sacred cause” for every people, and that disputes over territories required careful examination. According to the report, the sources also said that such disputes should be settled by negotiation and in a spirit of equality, mutual respect, friendship, and good neighbourliness. (2) While such a comment did not amount to a formal claim to the islands, this was the first time that North Vietnamese officials had publicly departed from China’s position on the issue of sovereignty over the islands. It was a signal marking the beginning of a difficult territorial dispute between the two Communist neighbours. If anyone had any doubts about the authenticity of the AFP report, several days later an official of the National Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam echoed the position of the “authorized” North Vietnamese sources. On the first anniversary of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements, Tran Binh, Charge d’Affaires of the NLF in Beijing, told a press conference that: The question of sovereignty over their territories is a sacred issue for every people. As to the problem of conflict over territories bequeathed by history, these are complex questions which need careful examination. The problem, the Paracels incident, must be solved by peaceful negotiations on the basis of equality, mutual respect and friendship. (3)

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Thus, the difference between the positions of China and North Vietnam on the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands emerged first right after the battle for the Paracels. However, before the Vietnam War ended in 1975, it appeared that neither North Vietnam, nor its Communist ally in the South, had made any formal claim to the islands. It has been suggested that after the battle, Hanoi sent a letter to Beijing thanking it for defending the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’s territory. Beijing’s alleged reply was that it was defending China’s territory. (4) The credibility of such a report is in doubt because no trace of the alleged exchange of letters can be found in any of the retrospective accounts about the dispute over the islands that were published by either China or Vietnam in later years. It sounds more reasonable to suggest that while the war in South Vietnam was going on and Hanoi still needed support from China, it probably contained any indication of ambition towards the islands. In 1981, the Vietnamese, reflecting on their reaction to the battle for the Paracels, frankly admitted that: The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of {sic} South Vietnam and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, for their part, had to swallow the bitter pill: the final stage of the anti-American struggle was approaching, and the liberation of southern Vietnam had to take precedence over all other considerations. (5) From the evidence available, despite the differences in their positions, China and North Vietnam managed to avoid an official dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands before the end of the Vietnam War. When talks on the division of the Tonkin Gulf were held from August to November 1974, the dispute over the islands was kept off the agenda. On the North Vietnamese side, Hanoi was still deeply involved in the anti-U. S. struggle. As the above quotation indicates, “the liberation of southern Vietnam had to take precedence over all other considerations. ” It had therefore kept quiet about the islands. By comparison, China was less quiet about the islands, because the battle for the Paracels had been exploited by the radicals for their domestic political propaganda. Once the battle was over, Jiang Qing immediately dispatched her ‘personal

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envoy’, Chang Yongmei, to visit the Paracel Islands and convey her personal greetings to the military units stationed there. Poems were subsequently written by Chang to glorify, albeit subtly, Jiang’s personal role in the battle. (6) Later, novels were written by the more renowned writer, Hao Ran, and a photographic exhibition on the Paracel Islands was held as part of commemorative activities on National Day in October 1974. (7) The publication of these works was probably unrelated to the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Their overall purpose was to promote the personal reputation of Jiang Qing as well as the radicals’ political views; for example, stress on the important role played by the people’s militia in the Paracels operation (although the PLA Navy was mainly responsible). Besides the above-described activities, throughout 1974, numerous reports on the ‘active participation’ of PLA and militia units and personnel on the Paracel Islands in various political campaigns spearheaded by the radicals appeared in the Chinese press. In a study by Alan Liu on the radicals’, or Gang of Four’s, influence in the PLA(8), military units were ranked according to the frequency of their ‘political activities’ being reported in People’s Daily between January 1974 and October 1976. In his study, the units on the Paracel Islands received high ranking in 1974 as well as in 1976. Liu’s interpretation of the findings was that PLA units on the Paracel Islands belonged to the category of “reliable clients” (as compared with “reliable and regular clients” and “unreliable clients”) of the radicals. Liu’s interpretation is open to question as the People’s Daily reports on “political activities” of military units did not necessarily mean that they were actually enthusiastic about the political campaigns. The frequency of reports on particular PLA units was not necessarily an index of how close they were to the radicals. It also depended on the prestige and image of the units concerned. The conclusive victory in the battle for the Paracels gave the PLA units there high national prestige, which the radicals would have wanted to exploit for their political campaigns. This argument is supported by the fact that PLA and militia units and personnel on the Paracel Islands were also frequently referred to in commemorative articles on Army Day, National Day, and New Year Day, that appeared in the Chinese

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press. Not all of these articles served the particular political interests of the radicals. Notwithstanding Liu’s interpretation of his findings, they do inform us that a significant section of Chinese press coverage on the Paracel Islands in 1974, like the artists’ work, formed part of the radicals’ propaganda in domestic politics. Discounting the radicals’ political propaganda in the Chinese press, China’s attitude towards the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in 1974 was on the whole a cautious one. As described above, the majority of the artists’ works and press reports concerning the Paracel Islands were only directed at a domestic audience. Unlike the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet border clashes in the 1960s, massive propaganda upholding China’s sovereignty over the islands and meant for foreign consumption was not produced in the aftermath of the Paracels operation. China’s cautious attitude is not difficult to explain. In the first place, according to China, Hanoi’s recognition of its sovereignty over the islands was still on the record. In addition, as pointed out in Chapter 3, when China launched the Paracels operation, it had sent a message to Hanoi that it saw the issues of division of the Tonkin Gulf and sovereignty over the South China Sea islands in a different light. For China, the division of the Tonkin Gulf was an unsettled issue, and it was willing to hold talks with North Vietnam to find a solution. In contrast, China’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was regarded as “indisputable” and “non-negotiable”. As long as Hanoi did not make any noise about the islands, China had no reason to make the first move to acknowledge the existence of a dispute. Furthermore, although Sino-Vietnamese relations had been deteriorating since Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, Beijing was probably still hopeful that Hanoi would go on practising a balanced policy in its relations with China and the Soviet Union. In an internal report on the world situation to party cadres in March 1973, Zhou Enlai predicted that: The Soviet revisionists will intensify economic aid to the Vietnamese people after the Vietnamese war comes to the end to countervail our influence in Vietnam…. The Vietnamese comrades will continue promoting a

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‘Sino-Soviet balance’. This depends on how good a job we do. Of course, our aid is devoid of any conditions and is sincere and selfless. (9) By “the Vietnamese war comes to the end”, Zhou was referring to the signing of the Paris Agreements in 1973. It appeared that by then, China did not expect that North Vietnam could take over the South in the immediate future. Or, at least, this was China’s subjective wish. As pointed out in Chapter 3, China did not want to see the United States’ influence in Indochina collapse too quickly for fear it might encourage the rapid growth of a Soviet presence. When North Vietnamese leaders Le Duan and Pham Van Dong visited China in July 1973, they were urged to hold off several years before pushing for the liberation of the South. (10) China probably believed that as long as Hanoi’s ultimate goal of taking over the South was unrealized, it would continue to seek a balanced position between China and the Soviet Union so as to maximize support from both of them. At the time, China’s policy towards North Vietnam was to provide it with an incentive to stay on a ‘middle road’ course between China and the Soviet Union. According to Hanoi’s White Book on thirty years of Vietnam-China relations published in 1979, in order to show its goodwill, China “promised to continue for five years to give Vietnam annually an amount of aid equal to that of 1973”. (11) In this context, well aware of the strain already existing in Sino-Vietnamese relations, China would have wished to avoid confronting Hanoi over another sensitive issue such as the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Quite reasonably, it left the initiative in the dispute to Hanoi. Hanoi might have taken that initiative by the end of 1974. This speculation is supported by the appearance in December 1974 and January 1975 of a number of articles and reports in the Chinese media which were probably directed at a foreign, rather than a domestic, audience. On 6 December 1974, an ‘academic’ article titled “Relics in Hsishas” was published in Guangming Ribao. (12) It reported on archaeological findings by a Chinese survey team in the Paracels. While the article might have been part of the campaign for patriotic archaeology, its value for foreign consumption was indicated by the swift release of its English translation by the NCNA. Although it did not directly

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approach the question of sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, the article was unmistakably an attempt to argue China’s historical rights to them. In January 1975, in commemoration of the first anniversary of the battle for the Paracels, an NCNA correspondent reported the development of the islands under China’s administration in the previous year. (13) This was followed by another report in the People’s Daily of 26 January 1975. (14) The latter report was actually an account of how the crew of a Chinese vessel had co-ordinated the rescue of an East German vessel in the adjacent sea areas of the Paracel Islands. The rescue was carried out with the co-operation of vessels from other countries including the Philippines, Singapore, and West Germany. The implicit message of the story was that China’s sovereignty over the islands had been recognized internationally. Why these articles and reports should have appeared at that particular juncture remains a puzzle. A possible explanation is that China was responding to the Sino-Vietnamese talks on the division of the Tonkin Gulf, which had just concluded in November 1974. Although the dispute over the South China Sea islands was not formally raised in the talks, China might have already found Hanoi’s general position on other territorial issues intractable. At the same time, incidents along the land border had become more frequent. Against this background, these articles and reports could have been a signal to forewarn Hanoi against any further territorial ambition towards the South China Sea islands. It was also possible that China was responding to other gestures by the North Vietnamese. While Hanoi had not made any formal claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, it might have made ‘informal’ gestures. For example, in an interview with a Thai reporter in October 1974, Hoang Tung, a member of the Central Committee of Vietnam’s Laodong Party and editor-in-chief of Nhan Dan, said that “China is not a country of this region and China should not have as much offshore waters as it has claimed.” (15) Given the important official positions occupied by Tung, his remarks must carry weight. China could have felt that it was necessary to respond to them.

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There was a time lag between the above-mentioned articles and reports, and the Sino-Vietnamese talks on the Tonkin Gulf and Tung’s remarks. China might have been cautious of confronting the North Vietnamese immediately; it may have waited for the more appropriate moment, like the first anniversary of the battle for the Paracels, to assert its claim to sovereignty over the islands. No matter what had prompted the articles and reports, they were largely defensive in nature. Both the presentation and messages conveyed were rather low-key. The issue of sovereignty over the islands was approached only in an indirect manner. There was no rhetoric and the question of the Spratly Islands was avoided. It is obvious that at this stage, China did not intend to confront Hanoi over the islands. This approach was in line with China’s diplomatic priorities as regards Sino-Vietnamese relations as discussed above. However, as the end of the Vietnam War drew closer, it appeared that China began to reappraise its policy towards the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. From February until September 1975, when Le Duan visited China, the Paracel Islands were hardly mentioned in the Chinese press. In contrast to the events of 1974, the PLA and militia units and personnel on the Paracel Islands were not called upon to demonstrate their ‘support’ for political campaigns. Alan Liu has interpreted this as suggesting that the PLA units on the Paracel Islands were only ‘reliable’ but not ‘regular’ clients of the radicals. Their support was sought only when the radicals were really in need, as later in 1976. (16) The limitation of Liu’s interpretation is that it does not take into account foreign policy considerations. In fact, not only were the military units on the Paracel Islands no longer called upon to demonstrate their ‘support’ for domestic political campaigns, China also chose to remain silent in the face of successive foreign challenges, first by Saigon and then by Hanoi, to its claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In February 1975, Saigon published a White Paper on Vietnam’s sovereignty over the islands. (17) China did not make any public response. Then, in April 1975, on the eve of liberating Saigon, the Vietnamese Communist forces took over six islands of the Spratly group, which had been hitherto under the South Vietnamese gvoernment’s control. This was duly reported by

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the official Vietnamese News Agency (VNA) in Hanoi as the liberation of “six beloved islands of the fatherland”. (18) On 15 May 1975, in a map published in Hanoi’s military newspaper, Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the Spratly Islands were marked as part of Vietnam’s territory. (19) Given the status of the newspaper, this was obviously another gesture to publicize Hanoi’s claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Again, China did not make any public response. Without doubt, during these months China was watching developments in Indochina closely, and carefully assessing their implications for its dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. It left its next move in the dispute to the time when Le Duan formally raised the issue of sovereignty over the islands with Chinese leaders in September 1975. LE DUAN’S VISIT TO CHINA IN SEPTEMBER 1975 It was during Le Duan’s visit to China in September 1975 that the Vietnamese Communists raised the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands with their Chinese counterparts officially for the first time. China’s immediate official response was rather imprecise. According to Beijing’s record which was published four years later, Le Duan was told by Deng Xiaoping that: Disputes existed between us over Xisha and Nansha island groups. The position of each party is clear on the issue. Our position is that we have adequate evidence to prove that both Xisha(s) and Nansha(s) have belonged to China since ancient times…. We may discuss this question in the future. (20)

At first sight, it seems that Deng had agreed to bilateral talks on the islands. This was probably also the understanding of the Vietnamese at the time. Later in 1979, after their request for talks on the islands had been repeatedly turned down by China during 1976–78, the Vietnamese accused China of having gone back on its word. (21) In defence of its position, China then

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interpreted Deng’s words as meaning that “discussion was necessary in view of the occupation of some of China’s Nansha Islands by the Vietnamese authorities.” (22) With the benefit of hindsight, it may be suggested that this interpretation of Deng’s words had already been conveyed by an important article that had been published in the Chinese press in November 1975. Once again, the article first appeared as an ‘academic’ work in Guangming Ribao, under the title of “South China Sea Islands: Chinese Territory Since Ancient Times”. (23) Its political importance was confirmed by swift reproduction in both People’s Daily and Peking Review. (24) In many ways, the article was qualitatively different from Chinese press coverage of the Paracel Islands in the previous two years. Instead of mere reporting, it was a detailed exposition of the case for China’s sovereignty over the South China Sea islands. For the first time in nearly twenty years, Beijing put together documentary sources in a systematic way to prove China’s historical rights to the islands. The article was an attempt to substantiate Deng’s claim that “we have adequate evidence to prove that both Xisha(s) and Nansha(s) have belonged to China since ancient times.” On the other hand, for the first time in the Chinese press for nearly two years, the article reaffirmed China’s claim to sovereignty over both the Paracel and Spratly archipelagoes. The significance of this initiative was underlined by the concluding paragraph of the article which stated that: The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan, and all islands belonging to China will certainly return to the embrace of the motherland (emphasis added). (25) Given the context of the article, although the Spratly Islands were not named, the above quotation was meant to inform Hanoi that, for Beijing, the crux of the dispute was “the occupation of some of China’s Nansha Islands by the Vietnamese authorities”. That China was unwilling to hold talks with Vietnam over the question of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was not inconsistent with its long-standing position. China had reaffirmed in many statements that its sovereignty over the

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islands was “indisputable” and “non-negotiable”. As we shall see in later chapters, China has also refrained from talks with other contestants like the Philippines or Malaysia over the Spratly Islands. In order to gain a full picture of China’s response to Duan raising the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, other gestures have to be taken into account. A few days before Duan’s arrival in Beijing, the Paracel Islands ‘resurfaced’ in the Chinese press after months of absence. The People’s Daily carried six large photographs of the islands. (26) Just one day after Duan left Beijing, People’s Daily once again published a picture of Chinese militia forces on the Paracel Islands. (27) And in the fall of 1975, greatly expanded naval exercises were conducted by Chinese forces in the South China Sea. (28) To put these gestures into perspective, they should be compared with the response over the Spratlys during Philippine President Marcos’ visit to China in June 1975. The implications of Marcos’ visit to China in 1975 for the Sino-Philippine dispute over the Spratly Islands will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. In brief, Marcos was reassured by Deng Xiaoping that China would seek a peaceful solution to their dispute over the Spratly Islands through normal diplomatic channels. (29) No Chinese propaganda on the islands preceded or followed Marcos’ visit, and no military exercise was conducted by Chinese forces in the South China Sea. It can be said that, in comparison, Duan had received a relatively harsher response than Marcos. What had been responsible for the distinction between Vietnam and the Philippines in the eyes of the Chinese leaders? In terms of occupation of the islands, Vietnam should have been no more of a villain than the Philippines. Both had occupied five or six islands in the Spratly group. In terms of exploration and exploitation, the Philipines was far more active than Vietnam at the time. After taking over the South, Hanoi had cancelled contracts signed between the former South Vietnamese government and foreign oil corporations for exploration of shallow sea areas off the southern coast of Vietnam. In contrast, the Philippines has made progress in exploration and exploitation of the Reed Bank Area of the Spratlys in co-operation with foreign oil corporations. In terms

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of posturing, there was no evidence that Vietnam was more aggressive or provocative than the Philippines. As Chang Pao-min has observed, “throughout 1975–76, Hanoi appeared to be adopting a relatively low-key approach to the issue, and whatever official references had been made to the Chinese claim of sovereignty over these offshore islands (Paracels and Spratlys) were often indirect if not vague, and were almost invariably confined to the Spratlys (over) which it had more effective control.” (30) In view of the above discussion, one has to look beyond the dispute itself to find out what might have been responsible for the distinction drawn between Vietnam and the Philippines in the eyes of Chinese leaders. The most likely answer is the relative roles played by Vietnam and the Philippines in relation to China’s geopolitical interests in the region. In the last chapter, it was pointed out that by the mid-1970s, China’s principal security concern in the region was the growth of a Soviet presence, including its naval activities in the South China Sea. It was the worry about the possibility that some of the Paracel Islands might fall under the influence of the Soviet Union, via the co-operation of Hanoi, that had been mainly responsible for China’s decision to launch the Paracels operation in January 1974. It was also pointed out earlier in this chapter that during 1973–74, China was probably still hopeful tht Hanoi would sustain a balanced position between China and the Soviet Union. That hope was based on the premise that, as long as the war in South Vietnam was going on, Hanoi would still need maximum support from both of its Communist allies. The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 dispelled such an expectation. The rapid collapse of the United States’ position in Indochina exacerbated China’s fear of the growth of Soviet influence in the region. In this context, China looked upon the close relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union with even greater suspicion. China was worried that if Hanoi was not constrained by the priority of war in Sotuh Vietnam, it might edge closer to the Soviet Union. Such a worry was not totally unfounded. Later in 1976, reflecting on Vietnam’s relations with China and the Soviet Union, Hoang Tung told a Western reporter that “the good relationship with the U.S.S.R. plays a very important role for Vietnam today. It is precisely in the

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interests of Vietnam that the Soviet Union has a strong desire to reduce Chinese influence in this part of the world…. Just on these questions, we begin to lean more and more to the Soviet Union.”(31) Not long after the Vietnam War had been over, Beijing’s concern over the close relationship between Vietnam and the Soviet Union was frequently expressed in the Chinese press. For example, in a People’s Daily article titled “Repulse Wolf at the Gate, Guard Against Tiger at the Back Door”, Jen Kuping, the pen name for the author of many authoritative articles on China’s foreign policy during 1975–76, warned that: If the Soviet revisionists are allowed to crack open the door and get a foothold today, then they will advance further tomorrow. They will make the most to expand their influence and steadily grab the natural resources, ports, straits and military bases in Southeast Asia. (32) Although Vietnam was not named in the above quotation, where could the Soviet Union “get a foothold” in Southeast Asia besides Vietnam? And in which country other than Vietnam could the Soviet Union obtain the use of “military bases”? The pro-Beijing newspapers in Hong Kong were even more explicit. For example, Ta Kung Pao (Hong Kong) published a long article in the summer of 1975 with a detailed account of China’s concern over possible Soviet use of air and naval facilities in Vietnam in specific terms. (33) China’s anxiety about Vietnam acting as a Soviet Trojan horse in the region led it to depart from the cautious attitude advocated by Zhou Enlai two years earlier. After the end of the Vietnam War, it became more obsessed with Hanoi’s attitude towards the Soviet Union. When Le Duan visited China in September 1975, fierce disagreement over the question of hegemonism (in effect the international role of Soviet Union) between Beijing and Hanoi was more apparent. In the face of the Chinese leaders’ condemnation of hegemonism, Vietnamese leaders publicly heaped praise upon the Soviet Union for its support of their liberation struggle, and its progressive role in world affairs.

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At the same time, China undertook a number of diplomatic measures to contain Hanoi’s influence in the region. First, it quickened the pace of normalization of relations with the governments of ASEAN, towards which Hanoi was still antagonistic. Not long after the end of the Vietnam War, diplomatic relations were established with Thailand and the Philippines respectively. Moreover, China had developed particularly close relations with the new Khmer Rouge government in Kampuchea, which was also fiercely anti-Soviet. A Kampuchean delegation to China in August 1975 was received in a much warmer manner than had been a Vietnamese delegation in September. The Khmer Rouge government, which had already demonstrated its rivalry with Hanoi over offshore islands, was then cultivated as a potential client for containing Hanoi’s influence in the region. Last, but not least, China began to turn the screw of economic aid on Vietnam. As pointed out earlier, China promised in 1973 to continue annually for five years to give Vietnam an amount of aid equal to the high level of 1973. However, grant aid was stopped from 1975 onwards. (34) And China’s promise of $300 million loan aid per year for Vietnam’s five-year plan beginning in 1976 was only half of what Hanoi had requested. (35) In the face of the above developments, Le Duan’s visit to China in September 1975 was doomed to failure. His delegation left China without hosting the usual reciprocal banquet, and no joint communique was signed. In contrast, he was warmly received at the next stop, the Soviet Union, whose government promised a substantial amount of aid for Vietnam’s coming five-year plan. (36) Therefore, China’s harsher response to Le Duan in the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands should not be viewed as an isolated gesture. It formed an integral part of a diplomatic package designed to contain Vietnam’s influence in the region, and to bring pressure upon Vietnam to dissociate itself from the Soviet Union. While Hanoi was cautious and low-key towards the dispute itself, China’s attitude towards it had become a practical means with which to show displeasure at Hanoi’s unfavourable role bearing on China’s geopolitical interests in the region.

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ESCALATION OF THE DISPUTE, 1976–77 The Pandora’s box was opened after Le Duan’s visit to China in September 1975. Once the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was raised at the official level, China no longer felt inhibited in producing propaganda about the islands. While Vietnam remained cautious towards the dispute in 1976, China took the initiative in its propaganda campaign. From early 1976 onwards, China resumed its press coverage of the Paracel Islands. As Alan Liu has observed, reports on political activities of the PLA and militia units and personnel on the Paracel Islands once again appeared frequently in the Chinese press. In fact, a qualitative change in the press coverage also took place. Besides reports on political activities, there were also reports regarding the defence of the islands and surrounding sea areas. For example, in May 1976, a report in the People’s Daily quoted a radar officer on the Paracel Islands as saying that more than a hundred aircraft flew close by every day, some of them “enemy aircraft”. (37) The report, however, did not specify which country’s aircraft were regarded as “enemy aircraft”. Later, in August 1976, it was reported in People’s Daily that, one month previously, a foreign vessel was “thrown out” of the territorial waters of the Paracel Islands. (38) Again, the country to which the vessel belonged was not specified. Chinese propaganda about the South China Sea islands became particularly intense in the aftermath of a new row over the Spratly Islands in 1976. In June, oil exploration activities by a Swedish-Filipino oil consortium in the Reed Bank Area were reported. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam issued a statement on 5 June reiterating “its sovereignty with regard to the Truong Sa (Spratly) Islands”, and reserved for itself “the right to protect that sovereignty”. (39) China issued its statement on 14 June 1976. (40) The first half of the statement was similar to others released before. It asserted that the “Nansha Islands as well as the Hsisha, Chungsha and Tungsha Islands have always been part of China’s territory”, and that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China has time and again declared that China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and their adjacent sea areas and that the resources

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there belong to China.” What was unusual was the second half of the statement. It reads: Any foreign country’s armed invasion and occupation of any of the Nansha Islands or exploration and exploitation of oil and other resources in the Nansha Islands area constitute encroachments on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and are impermissible. Any foreign country’s claim to sovereignty over any of the Nansha Islands is illegal and null and void. While the statement should have been a protest directed against Philippine activities in the Spratlys, the blanket term of “any foreign country” was used. The choice of term appears to have been deliberate as China also chose to issue its statement after the Vietnamese had issued theirs. The implicit message in its statement was that Vietnam’s “armed invasion and occupation” of some of the Spratly Islands was “impermissible”; and the Vietnamese claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands was “illegal and null and void”. During July-August 1976, NCNA released a series of reports on the Paracel Islands. (41) These included reports on the development of the islands under Chinese administration, activities of Chinese fishermen on the islands, as well as archaelogical findings by Chinese survey teams. Chinese propaganda about the islands continued right into early 1977. A particularly provocative article appeared in People’s Daily in March 1977. (42) The article, written by the Chinese Navy, explicitly identified Beijing’s goal of “recovering” China’s “sacred territory”, the Spratly Islands. As pointed out above, throughout 1976, Vietnam had adopted a relatively low-key approach to the dispute. It appears that by early 1977, Vietnam finally lost patience with China’s propaganda and decided to respond in kind. A number of developments in late 1976 and early 1977 could have contributed to this decision. The Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (formerly known as Vietnam’s Lao Dong (Workers) Party) was held in December 1976. Hoang Van Hoan, a founding member of the Indochinese Communist Party and once a close associate of Ho Chi Minh, was removed from the Politburo. As

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Hoan was the oldest member of the Politburo at the time, such a move was seen as not unusual but part of the process of bringing in new blood to the top of the Communist leadership. (43) In fact, Hoan was probably purged with a few other less prominent Central Committee members for their alleged pro-China political attitudes. The significance of such a purge only became obvious later when the Sino-Vitnamese conflict became public and Hoan defected to China in 1979. The purge cleared the way for a tougher response to China’s regional policy. Then, in April 1977, a large-scale offensive along the Vietnam-Kampuchea border was launched by the forces of Democratic Kampuchea. For some time, Hanoi had suspected Phnom Penh of being an accomplice of Beijing in a plot to encircle and weaken Vietnam. The intransigence of Phnom Penh in the border dispute, which culminated in the offensive in April 1977, exacerbated Hanoi’s suspicions. (44) When its request for talks on the Paracel and Spratly Islands was once again turned down by China in April 1977(45), Hanoi finally decided to play tough with China over the islands. Hanoi fired its first warning shot in May 1977. On 12 May, it issued a statement on the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and the continental shelf of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. (46) Hanoi’s claims to maritime space in the South China Sea were extensive. It proclaimed a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and a contiguous zone of 24 nautical miles, both measured from linked straight baselines; an EEZ of 200 nautical miles, and a continental shelf of 200 nautical miles or more, up to the outer edge of the continental margin. The statement specifically referred to the Paracel and Spratly Islands as Vietnam’s territory, and declared that they should have their own territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, and continental shelves. The statement was a recipe for head-on confrontation with China. It was probably for this reason that the statement had not been issued earlier. Between mid-1975 and early 1977, Hanoi might have waited to see how the dispute with China over the Paracel and Spratly Islands would develop. By early 1977, it would have come to the conclusion that no easy solution was in sight. By then, Hanoi’s mind was made up to take on the Chinese.

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The statement on Hanoi’s claims to maritime space in the South China Sea was followed shortly by Vietnam’s Defence Minister Vo Nguyen Giap’s visit to China in early June 1977. One day before his departure for China, Giap had ordered a taskforce of twenty-nine vessels to carry out combined sea-air exercise in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands.( ) A few days later, on 9 June, an editorial in Quan Doi Nhan Dan demanded that: every organizational structure in the armed forces from the headquarters to the unit, must be combat ready...where it may be stationed—at the border, on an offshore island, or in a city (emphasis added). (48) Hanoi’s show of force was certainly not missed by the Chinese leadership. In an internal report on the world situation to party cadres by the end of July 1977, China’s Foreign Minister, Huang Hua, warned that: If Vietnam should disregard the historical facts and invade Hsisha(s), the central government has already instructed our garrison troops there that any invasion of Hsisha(s) by any troops of any country, or any harassment of the islands, would be a challenge to China’s sovereignty and will be resolutely dealt with, and any invaders thoroughly and completely annihilated.(49) Huang’s warning indicates that the possibility of a fight with Vietnam over the islands was very much in the minds of the Chinese leadership during the summer of 1977. It appeared that China finally decided to back off from head-on confrontation with Vietnam. In the last few months of 1977, offensive propaganda about the disputed islands virtually disappeared from the Chinese media. On closer inspection, China’s attempt to lower the temperature of the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was part of a large diplomatic package to defuse tension between the two countries. During a meeting with Pham Van Dong on 10 July 1977, China’s Vice-Premier Li Xiannian (Li Hsien-nien) urged the Vietnamese side to take steps to reduce tension between the two countries, including the dispute over

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the Paracel and Spratly Islands. (50) As regards territorial issues in general, China and Vietnam agreed to re-open boundary talks in in October 1977. At the same time, China offered itself as a mediator in the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. High-level Kampuchean and Vietnamese delegations were subsequently received by Beijing in October and November 1977 respectively. China’s diplomatic gestures could have meant many things. They could have been a genuine attempt to save the friendship between the two countries. Or, more likely, China might have considered that while it would be desirable to contain Vietnam’s influence in the region, it would not be in China’s best interests to engage in an all-out confrontation. In either case, China’s diplomatic gestures probably came too late. Domestic turbulence and a leadership struggle in 1976 might have hampered China’s ability to employ fine tuning in diplomacy at an earlier time. To a certain extent, Vietnam did reciprocate Chin’s conciliatory gestures in 1977. For example, two weeks after Pham Van Dong had returned to Hanoi, Quan Doi Nhan Dan published an article in late June praising Vietnam-China friendship and soliarity. [The article was immediately reported by NCNA. (51)] However, these conciliatory gestures were too few and too late to do away with deepseated suspicions on either side. For instance, while China offered itself as a mediator in the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea, its unbalanced relations with the two countries rendered such an offer unrealistic. In fact, privately, Chinese leaders thought that Vietnam was the one to blame for the conflict. In Huang Hua’s speech to party cadres as quoted above, Kampuchea was portrayed as the victim in the conflict. Huang listed four causes of the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. Besides the historical border dispute, the others were the Vietnamese ‘big brother attitude’ after liberation; infiltration of Kampuchean ‘revolutionary units’ by ‘Soviet revisionists’; and ideological differences between the Vietnamese and Kampuchean leaderships over the question of anti-revisionism. On the last point, Huang added that Kampuchea was anti-revisionist but Vietnam was not. In other words, Vietnam was on the wrong side of the political equation. In his speech, Huang also stated

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China’s four-point stand on the conflict. Besides offering itself as a mediator, China called upon both sdes to stop all armed conflict, and pledged not to take sides itself. However, at the same time, China pledged to support Kampuchea and her people against Soviet revisionist social-imperialism and will not watch indifferently any intervention in Kampuchea sovereignty or coveting of Kampuchean territory by social-imperialism. We will support Kampuchea and her people in their struggle and in their actions to protect Kampuchea’s territorial integrity and national sovereignty by giving all possible assistance. (52) In view of the above quotation, China’s so-called neutral stand was therefore a dubious one. It is difficult to judge if China’s offer as a mediator in the conflict between Kampuchea and Vietnam wsa deliberately disingenuous. As discussed above, it was possible that China did seek to contain the deterioration in its relations with Vietnam. Under such circumstances, China had to refrain from taking too partisan a stand on the dispute between Kampuchea and Vietnam. But as Huang’s speech reveals, given China’s much closer relations with Kampuchea, its capacity to act as an impartial and effective mediator between Vietnam and Kampuchea was very much limited. Similarly, the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands proved to be another intractable problem for Sino-Vietnamese relations. In the above-mentioned meeting between Li Xiannian and Pham Van Dong in June 1977, Li reasserted that “(t)hese islands have always been Chinese territory, and this is supported by numerous historical records.” This is the familiar long-standing position of China. None the less, Li went on to accuse the Vietnamese of an about-face as regards the issue of sovereignty over the islands. He pointed out that ” (i) n the past the Vietnamese comrades, too, recognized that these islands were Chinese territory,” and stressed that “(o) wing to your action, the Nansha and Xisha Islands, over which there never was any issue, have now become a major subject of dispute in Sino-Vietnamese relations.” At the end, Li demanded that “the

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Vietnamese comrades will return to their original stand on this question.” (53) Not surprisingly, as the boundary talks opened in November 1977, the dispute over the islands soon became one of the obstacles to progress. The two sides could not agree upon whether the dispute should be included in the agenda. In a retrospective account published in 1979, Hanoi accused China of trying to sabotage the talks by demanding that Vietnam give up “its sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes as a pre-condition for the discussion of other issues”. (54) This is probably an exaggeration of China’s position at the time. The more plausible reconstruction is that China simply refused to discuss the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Once again, this was in line with China’s long-standing claim that its sovereignty over the islands was “indisputable” and “non-negotiable”, and had already been reaffirmed by Li Xiannian during his meeting with Pham Van Dong. In view of the above, the informal ‘truce’ between China and Vietnam as regards the dispute over the islands could have contributed little to resolving it. Once Sino-Vietnamese relations took another downturn in 1978, the ‘truce’ was immediately broken and the dispute was revived with even more passion and vigour. SUMMARY This chapter has outlined the development of Hanoi’s challenge to China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during 1974–78, and the latter’s responses. The changes in the nature of China’s responses show that they depended more on its diplomatic priorities concerning Sino-Vietnamese relations during those years, than on Hanoi’s attitude towards the dispute itself. During 1974 and early 1975, despite propaganda meant for domestic political consumption, China had maintained a low profile on the dispute. This was probably because Hanoi itself had been quiet about it and was not in control of any of the contested islands. In addition, Beijing at the time was still hopeful that Hanoi would maintain a balanced position between

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China and the Soviet Union, and did not wish to jeopardize its still relatively stable relations with Hanoi. Accordingly, it was not prepared to confront Hanoi over the islands. When the Vietnamese raised the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands with the Chinese officially for the first time in September 1975, they received a rather unpleasant response. In fact, at the time, the Vietnamese attitude towards the dispute was still very much low key. What was mainly responsible for China’s unpleasant response was probably its changing calculation of Vietnam’s role in relation to its geopolitical interests in the region. At the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, Vietnam began to be perceived by China as a potential Soviet Trojan horse in the region. Steps were taken to try to contain Vietnam’s influence. China’s harsher response towards the Vietnamese in raising the issue of sovereignty over the islands was but one of such steps. Throughout 1976 and early 1977, Vietnam’s requests for talks on the Paracel and Spratly Islands were repeatedly rejected by China. In addition, in the Chinese media, quite an aggressive posture on the dispute was maintained. It is difficult to judge if such a posture was deliberately maintained to bring pressure upon Vietnam, or it merely reflected an undermining of China’s ability to employ fine tuning in diplomacy as a result of the succession crisis and intense domestic political struggles. In any case, by mid-1977, China probably came to recognize that it was not in its best interests to engage in an all-out confrontation rontation with Vietnam. When Vietnam decided to play tough towards the dispute in May-June 1977, China offered conciliatory gestures in return. Again, these gestures were part of a larger diplomatic package to defuse the tension between the two countries. At the same time, China also offered itself as a mediator in the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict, and proposed holding boundary talks. In the last few months of 1977, offensive propaganda about the Paracel and Spratly Islands disappeared from the Chinese media. From the above account, it can be seen that during 1974–78, China’s policy towards the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was guided by its diplomatic priorities as regards Sino-Vietnamese relations, which in turn depended on China’s perception of Hanoi’s role in relation to its geopolitical

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interests in the region. As we shall see in Chapter 6, these factors also played an important role in China’s handling of the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over the Spratly Islands. The next chapter will continue examining China’s handling of the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during 1978–84. NOTES 1. On the Vietnamese side, the most detailed account can be found in Vietnam Courier, The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes, Hanoi, 1981. Also useful is Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations Over the the Last 30 Years (White Book on Vietnam-China relations), Hanoi, 1979. On the Chinese side, see “Xisha and Nansha Islands Belong to China,” Beijing Review, 25 May 1979:23–26; “Hanoi Goes Back on Its Word,” Beijing Review, 24 August 1979:24– 26; and “China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands,” Beijing Review, 18 February 1980:15–24. 2. Quoted in Eugene K. Lawson, The Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, New York: Praeger, 1984, p.278. 3. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East (BBC, SWB, FE) , 4517/A3/1. 4. Quoted in Lawson, Sino-Vietnamese Conflict, p.279. 5. Vietnam Courier, p.33. 6. People’s Daily, 17 March 1977. 7. Hsinhua Yueh-pao, March 1978, pp.190–194. 8. Alan P.L.Liu, “The ‘Gang of Four’ and the Chinese PLA, “Asian Survey, Vol.19, No.9 (September 1979):817–837. 9. “Chou En-lai’s Report on the International Situation,” Issues and Studies (Taipei), Vol.13, no.l (January 1977):113–127. 10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Vietnam-China relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p.58. 11. Ibid., pp.49 and 58. 12. Guangming Ribao, 6 December 1974. 13. BBC, SWB, FE/4816/A3/6. 14. People’s Daily, 26 January 1975. 15. “Vietnam’s Hegemonistic Logic,” Beijing Review, 18 May 1979:14– 17. 16. See Note 8. 17. Republic of Vietnam, Vietnam’s Sovereignty Over the Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) Archipelagoes, Saigon, 1975. 18. BBC, SWB, FE/4897/A3/3.

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19. “Xisha and Nansha Islands Belong to China,” Beijing Review, 25 May 1979:23. 20. “On China’s Sovereignty Over Xisha and Nansha Islands,” Beijing Review, 24 August 1979:24. 21. BBC, SWB, FE/6139/A3/1, 9 August 1979. 22. See Note 20. 23. Guangming Ribao, 25 November 1975. 24. People’s Daily, 26 November 1975, and Peking Review. 12 December 1975:10–15. 25. Ibid. 26. People’s Daily, 18 September 1975. 27. People’s Daily, 29 September 1975. 28. Fox Butterfield, “Spratly Islands Causing Concern,” New York Times, 25 January 1976. 29. BBC, SWB, FE/5767/A3/4, 18 March 1978. 30. Chang Pao-min, “The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute,” Asia Pacific Community, Spring 1980:130–165. 31. Quoted in “Facts About Sino-Vietnamese Relations,” in China and the World (1), Beijing: Beijing Review, p. 118. 32. Peking Review, No.32, 1975:11–12. 33. Marwyn S. Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, New York and London: Methuen, 1982, p.109. 34. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Vietnam-China relations, p.71. The Chinese government has not refuted the Vietnamese charge but explained that it was in a difficult position during 1975–76. See “On Hanoi’s White Book,” Beijing Review, 23 Nov 1979:18–20; 30 Nov:11–15; 7 Dec:8–10. 35. Francois Nivolon, “Vietnam on the Aid Trail,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 December 1977. 36. Ibid. 37. People’s Daily, 15 May 1976. 38. People’s Daily, 10 August 1976. 39. BBC, SWB, FE/5228/A3/3. 40. Peking Review, No.25, 1976:4. 41. BBC, SWB, FE/5234/A3/7; 5237/A3/3; 5256/A3/5; and NCNA, 31 August 1976, People’s Daily, 2 August 1976; 3 August; and 10 August. 42. People’s Daily, 15 March 1977. 43. Far Eastern Economic Review, 31 December 1976. 44. Stephen P.Heder, “The Kampuchean-Vietnamese Conflict,” in David W.P.Elliott (ed.), The Third Indochina Conflict, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, pp.21–67. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Vietnam-China relations, pp.67–68; and

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45.

46.

48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54.

Who Has Destroyed Vietnamese-Chinese Friendship? Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1983. Huang Hua, “Problems with Indochina, Albania, and Yugoslavia (30 July 1977),” in King C. Chen (ed.), China and the Three Worlds, London: Macmillan, 1979, pp.268–274. “SRV Government’s Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone, and the Continental Shelf of Vietnam,” Vietnam Courier, No.61 (1977):4–5. Chao Chien, “Peiping-Moscow Confrontation in Indochina,” Issues and Studies (Taipei), Vol.14 No.3 (March 1978):59–72. BBC, SWB, FE/5538/B/4. See Note 45. “Memorandum on Vice-Premier Li Xiannian’s Talks with Premier Pham Van Dong (10 June 1977),” Beijing Review, 30 March 1979:17– 22. BBC, SWB, FE/5544/A3/1. See Note 45. See Note 50. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Book on Vietnam-China relations, p. 80.

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Chapter Five THE DISPUTE WITH HANOI, 1978–84

In the last chapter, it was suggested that during 1974–78, diplomatic priorities arising from geopolitical considerations had exercised a major influence on China’s policy towards the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. By the end of 1977, as part of a diplomatic package to reduce the tension between the two countries, China sought an informal ‘truce’ over the dispute. This ‘truce’ broke down during 1978 as Sino-Vietnamese relations rapidly took another downturn and the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was revived with new vigour and passion. As we shall see below, by the end of 1978, the dispute had become a public, official issue. Diplomatic manoeuvre and subtle signalling were then replaced by propaganda exchanges and a measure of military confrontation. The object of this chapter is to examine how China responded to the new situation between 1978–84. The central question is similar to that posed in the last chapter: what were the considerations which had the major influence on China’s policy towards the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands? REACTIVATION OF THE DISPUTE How and why Sino-Vietnamese relations broke down so rapidly and dramatically in 1978 are questions still without conclusive answers. As pointed out in the last chapter, by the end of 1977, China was still presenting itself as a possible mediator in the conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea. When Le Duan visited China in November 1977, a front of friendship was put

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up by both sides. After large-scale armed clashes had broken out along the Vietnam-Kampuchea border at the end of 1977, officially, China still attempted to maintain an even-handed stance. Yet quite suddenly, Sino-Vietnamese relations broke down in the aftermath of the row over the status and position of Chinese residents in Vietnam, which was made public in April 1978. That row was followed by China’s cessation of all economic aid to Vietnam. Then the Sino-Soviet dimension to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict was revealed when in June Vietnam joined the Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and in November signed a Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union. Before then, in August, China had signed a peace treaty with Japan and in December diplomatic relations were established with the United States. At the end of 1978, both China and Vietnam stepped up their accusations of border violations against one another. And finally, in the aftermath of Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, China decided to teach its southern neighbour a ‘lesson’, despatching its troops across the China-Vietnam border in February 1979 to conduct a punitive expedition. It is beyond the scope of this research to deal with the complex process of the public breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations during 1978–79. (1) What is relevant to our discussion here is: what role did the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands play in that process? From the evidence available, the dispute probably did not play a primary role. As described above, Sino-Vietnamese relations had been dominated by other issues before the dispute over the islands became a public one. It was not until the last week of 1978 that China issued a public statement reiterating its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. (2) Having said that, it is important to recognize the significant secondary effects of the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands on Sino-Vietnamese relations. Indeed, the public breakdown of Sino-Vietnamese relations was foreshadowed by the revival of Chinese propaganda about the South China Sea islands in March 1978. On the occasion of celebrations to mark the 80th birthday of Zhou Enlai, the NCNA correspondent recalled Zhou’s concern with the Paracel Islands and his instruction in 1960 that “every one of the Xisha Islands is our territory although they are small in size.” The correspondent

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also recalled how, in 1974, the Chinese Navy gave “due punishment to the South Vietnamese armed forces dispatched by the Saigon authorities to intrude into the Xisha Islands, thereby successfully defending the territory and sovereignty of the motherland”. (3) As Sino-Vietnamese relations continued to deteriorate rapidly over the following months, Chinese propaganda about the South China Sea islands also intensified. For example, in early October 1978, Beijing radio service produced a feature on the PLA units on the Paracel Islands. This was immediately reproduced in Vietnamese the next day. (4) At the end of 1978, the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was finally turned into a public official issue. On 29 December 1978, China issued a statement reaffirming that: the Nansha Islands have always been a part of China and that any incursion into and occupation of these islands, or attempt at development or the undertaking of any other activities in these areas by any foreign country constitute encroachment on China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and will not be permitted. (5) That warning led to the first public and direct exchange of official statements between Beijing and Hanoi over the disputed islands. On 30 December 1978, Hanoi issued a statement dismissing China’s earlier one as an “arrogant allegation”, and “once again asserts Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands as inviolable”. (6) Why the Chinese statement should have appeared at that particular juncture is an interesting question. It should be noted that at about the same time, China also issued a number of other statements on Vietnamese ‘provocations’ along the China-Vietnam border. Chang Pao-min has suggested that the Vietnamese government initiated most of the incidents along the China-Vietnam border so as to draw the Soviet Union to their aid. (7) However, China’s statements on border incidents were not necessarily simply direct reactions to more frequent Vietnamese ‘provocations’. It is more likely that these statements, as well as those on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, were used to serve wider political purposes. By the end of 1978, it might have become obvious to China that Vietnam was ready

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to launch a massive attack on the Khmer Rouge regime. As a reasonable guess, China’s statements on disputed border and islands could have been an attempt to raise the stakes for Vietnam so as to deter it from seeking to overthrow China’s ally. On the other hand, with the benefit of hindsight, it is equally plausible that these statements were merely propaganda paving the way for China’s later military intervention to ‘punish’ Vietnam’s aggression against Kampuchea. Notwithstanding China’s intention(s) behind the statement of 29 December 1978, from the beginning of 1979 onwards, the rules of the game as regards its dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands were definitely changed. The rest of this chapter will examine how China played the new game during 1979–84. PROPAGANDA EXCHANGES The exchange of official statements between China and Vietnam at the end of 1978, as regards the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, was followed by intensive propaganda exchanges during 1979–80. These exchanges had a reciprocal quality. To follow up the Vietnamese government’s statement of 30 December 1978, Nhan Dan denounced China’s “piratical act” of taking over the Paracel Islands in January 1974. (8) This was rebuked by a commentary in People’s Daily, which recalled Hanoi’s recognition of China’s sovereignty over the islands during the 1950s and the 1960s. (9) In the aftermath of the border war in February-March 1979, bilateral talks on a wide range of issues regarding Sino-Vietnamese relations were held from late April onwards. For the first time, the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was discussed at the negotiating table. However, there appeared to be little room for negotiation. At the talks, Han Nianlong (Han Nienlung), China’s chief delegate, demanded that: the Vietnamese side revert(s) to its previous position of recognizing the fact and respect(s) China’s sovereignty over the two island groups (Paracels and Spratlys) and

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withdraw all personnel from the islands in the Nansha group which it has occupied. (10)

Before long, the Vietnamese side took the debate away from the negotiating table and also affirmed a position that left no room for real negotiation. In May 1979, for the first time since the dispute arose, the Vietnamese government published documentary evidence to argue Vietnam’s historical rights to the Paracel and Spratly Islands. (11) In response, a NCNA commentary pointed out that the North Vietnamese government had always recognized China’s sovereignty over the islands before 1975. (12) Once again, the commentary condemned the about-face of Hanoi on the issue. At the end of July 1979, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated documents to substantiate the NCNA commentary. (13) These were facsimiles of past Vietnamese letters and statements indicating recognition of China’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. This prompted another statement by the Vietnamese government reaffirming its sovereign rights to the islands. (14) The ‘battle’ of documents reached a high point when, in September 1979, the Vietnamese government published its first White Book, entitled Vietnam’s Sovereignty Over Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes. (15) This White Book listed nineteen items of evidence to support its title. Five of the nineteen items were maps and historical records published in Vietnam between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. Thirteen others were decrees, administrative decisions, and statements made by the former French colonial government and the South Vietnamese government. The last item dealt with the actual act of occupation of some of the Spratly Islands by the Vietnam People’s Army in April 1975. This is a remarkable document because it vividly demonstrates that Hanoi and its comrades in the south had never made any official claim to the disputed islands before 1975. In 1979, the Vietnamese government was obliged to fall back on the earlier positions of French and South Vietnamese governments to support its nascent claim. Accordingly, China’s accusation of Hanoi’s about-face appeared to have been vindicated.

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China’s reply to Vietnam’s first White Book was a document published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in January 1980. (16) The document, with the title China’s Indisputable Sovereignty Over Xisha and Nansha Islands. was based upon three arguments. First, the document argued that the Chinese were the first to discover, develop, and administer the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Hence China’s historical rights to the islands. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the case of China’s historical rights to the Paracel and Spratly Islands has been examined by authors like Hungdah Chiu, Choon-ho Park, and Marwyn Samuels. In brief, it is generally agreed among them that it is questionable whether China, or any other countries including Vietnam, had ever clearly established sovereignty over either of the island groups. There is also no evidence of permanent settlement in the islands before the Second World War. However, China may be in a stronger position than others to claim an ‘inchoate’ title to the islands, especially the Paracel Islands. In this respect, China certainly enjoyed the advantage of having richer and more complete historical records. The Foreign Ministry document was able to trace Chinese activities in the islands back to as early as the Han Dynasty. In terms of historical evidence, the document was even more exhaustive and comprehensive than the ‘academic’ works produced in the 1950s and the 1970s. Second, the above-mentioned documents alleged to be evidence of North Vietnam’s recognition of China’s sovereignty over the islands before 1974 were incorporated into the Foreign Ministry document. As indicated above, the Chinese government also enjoyed the advantage in this argument, as Hanoi seemed unable to deny the charge of an about-face. The third argument of the Foreign Ministry document was a novel one. The document claimed that Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes as mentioned in the historical records cited by the Vietnamese White Book were not the same as the Paracels and Spratlys. They were rather some scattered island groups near Vietnam’s coast. Throughout 1980, the above arguments of the Foreign Ministry document were reproduced and elaborated in numerous articles in a wide range of publications, including

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People’s Daily, Guangming Ribao, Red Flag (Hongqi), and World Knowledge (Shijie Zishi). As the ‘battle’ of documents was going on, China also took a number of symbolic actions to assert its sovereignty over the South China Sea islands. On 23 July 1979, the Civil Aviation Authority of China proclaimed four danger zones in the areas around the southern part of Hainan Island and the northern part of the Paracel Islands. (17) The danger zones covered parts of the high seas and cut across the important busy air corridor, Amber One. (The Amber One air corridor is the shortest air lane between Bangkok and Hong Kong, which crosses Vietnam and passes directly between Hainan Island and the Paracels.) The purpose of China’s proclamation was obscure to observers. It was suggested that the proclamation might have been intended to create trouble for Vietnam, which earned a hefty overflight charge from airlines for use of the Amber One air corridor. (18) But the more likely motive was to force international airlines to negotiate with China as the sovereign power in the area for a safe air route. Probably because of this, Vietnam found it necessary to react. On 3 September 1979, a statement was issued by its Foreign Ministry, which resolutely rejects that arrogant and illegal action of the Chinese side. The Chinese authorities must strictly respect Vietnam’s territorial sovereignty over the air space and waters of the Hoang Sa Archipelago, honour the principle of free flights over the international waters and respect the common interests of all countries in internationa1 air transports, particularly those of the countries now using regular air routes over these areas. (19) During 1979–80, China took a number of similar symbolic actions. In July 1979, two temporary navigation beacons were established by the Chinese on reefs of the Paracels. By the end of the year, a civil aviation beacon was established on Lincoln Island (Dongdao). In May 1980, lighthouses were set up, and permanent navigation beacons were being built to replace the temporary ones established earlier. These beacons and lighthouses were not urgently needed. They were built in a rush during 1979–80, because they could serve as symbols of China’s

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sovereignty over the Paracel Islands. Also, in the long run, actual jurisdiction over navigation and overflight in the area of the islands would be useful for gaining wider international acceptance of China’s sovereignty. (20) As mentioned above, the propaganda exchange enjoyed a reciprocal quality. While China was responding to Vietnam’s propaganda offensive, it was initiating its own propaganda at the same time. Emotion was running high on both sides, and this could have been the most important driving force behind the outpour of propaganda. The practical implications of such exercises were limited, however. They could only aggravate the tension between the two coutnries. But given the state of hostility between China and Vietnam at the time, such a consideration was probably not at all important. While China was willing to let the propaganda exchanges damage its relations with Vietnam, it was, however, aware of their possible side effects on its relations with other governments in the region. For example, China had avoided the sensitive issue of maritime rights in the South China Sea. China’s propaganda was limited to its claim to sovereignty over the islands. This was done probably to minimize the suspicions of other coastal states about China’s ultimate ambitions in the South China Sea. Moreover, China had availed itself of opportunities to stress the mutuality of interest between itself and Taiwan over the dispute. For example, in the 1980 Foreign Ministry document, in the section on “China’s Struggle in Defence of its Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands”, Beijing noted that: For years, the Taiwan authorities of China have maintained a military garrison on Taiping Island (Itu Aba), the biggest among the Nansha Islands (emphasis added). (21) As pointed out in Chapter 2, Beijing probably appreciated the Taiwan troops on Itu Aba as a useful Chinese presence in the Spratlys. Beijing’s acknowledgement of Taipei’s authority over other South China Sea islands was also expressed in two administrative decisions during 1983–84. In April 1983, Beijing publicized the standardized geographical names (based on the

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pinyin system) of the South China Sea islands. In May 1984, the National People’s Congress of China established the Hainan administrative region, which took over the responsibility of jurisdiction over the South China Sea islands from the Guangdong (Kwangtung) Province. In both instances, the Pratas, which were under the control of Taiwanese forces, were left out of the administrative decisions. (22) Besides identifying the similarity between its position and that of Taiwan on the dispute over the South China Sea islands, China had also attempted to make the dispute a basis for a nationalist appeal to the people of Taiwan. For example, in August 1980, Beijing radio service produced a three-part newsletter on the South China Sea islands, which was broadcast to Taiwan in particular. (23) The newsletter reported developments in the Paracels under Chinese administration in the past two years, and also recalled the capture of a Vietnamese reconnaissance boat in April 1979. The Vietnamese challenge to China’s sovereignty over the islands had become a convenient basis of communication for Beijing’s nationalist appeal to the people of Taiwan. Despite the above interesting side effects, the propaganda exchanges were on the whole an emotional exercise. From the beginning of 1981 onwards, China’s interest in the propaganda exchange began to wane. In the next few years, it only showed a lukewarm reaction to any new propaganda offensives from Hanoi. For example, in November 1981, Vietnam Courier published a dossier on Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, representing the most elaborate version of the Vietnamese case so far. (24) The dossier was later adapted into Hanoi’s second White Book on the issue, published in January 1982. (25) China’s reply was a delayed, low-key NCNA commentary released in June 1982. (26) The commentary merely repeated the arguments of the Foreign Ministry document of 1980, but in an abridged manner. Later in November 1982, Vietnam gave publicity to baselines of its territorial waters. (27) Because of the situation of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the baselines of these islands were not covered by Vietnam’s public statement. However, once again, Vietnam reaffirmed its claim to sovereignty over the islands. While China issued a statement to reject Vietnam’s claim (28), it was not followed by massive

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propaganda as during 1979–80. And in 1984, when the tenth anniversary of the battle for the Paracels was marked by a number of provocative articles in the Vietnamese press (29), the Chinese propaganda machine simply kept its powder dry. In fact, as China’s interest in the propaganda exchange waned, it paid more and more attention to the military aspect of the dispute. During 1979–84, China had significantly expanded its military presence in the Paracels. As we shall see below, China’s moves in this respect were more reflective of those considerations underlying its policy towards the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. MILITARY BUILD-UP IN THE PARACELS It was pointed out in the last chapter that not long after the end of the Vietnam War, China had begun to pay more attention to the defence of the Paracel Islands and their surrounding sea areas. However, it appeared that it was only after the public breakdown in Sino-Vietnamese relations that China began significantly to increase its military presence on the islands. In the aftermath of the border war in 1979, combined Chinese air and naval exercises were conducted near Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands. (30) Since then, Chinese military exercises in the South China Sea have become regular activities in the spring of every year. There has not been any official account of changes in the Chinese military presence in the Paracels over the years, but it was certainly strengthened by a number of construction works carried out during 1979–82. In 1979, an airstrip was built in the Paracels, and an air route between them and Hainan Island was opened in August. By 1980, the Chinese were running a twice-weekly flight between them. At the same time, a helicopter service was established between Woody (Yongxing) Island, the largest in the archipelago, and Pattle (Shanhu) Island, which lies at its western edge. The harbour at Woody Island was rebuilt and expanded in 1979. Later in 1982, a new, large harbour was constructed by the PLA Navy at Triton (Zhongjian) Island, the southernmost island of the archipelago. (31) All together, the air service and the reconstructed and newly constructed

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harbours would have effectively linked up Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands, and different points within the archipelago. At the same time, reports of Chinese military activities in the Paracels had become more frequent than before. In March 1979, People’s Daily reported the activities of women militia on the islands. (32) In September 1979, Beijing radio service reported that a PLA Navy signal company on the islands kept watch on the ships that sailed nearby. (33) In February 1980, a delegation from Guangdong Province visited the islands during Chinese New Year to send its best wishes to the PLA units stationed there. (34) In August 1981, Guangdong radio service praised the vigilance of the PLA units guarding the Paracel Islands. (35) And soon after Vietnam published its second White Book on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the PLA Chief of General Staff, Yang Dezhi, and his deputy, Yang Yong, paid a visit to the Paracel Islands in February 1982. (36) Finally, in August 1982, PLA units stationed at the islands were formally commended by the Central Military Commission and given awards. (37) There are strong reasons to believe that the above reports were not merely part of a propaganda exercise. In fact, a number of military incidents did occur in the vicinity of the Paracel Islands during those years. For example, in April 1979, Beijing lodged a formal protest with Hanoi at the intrusion into the territorial waters of the Paracel Islands by the Vietnamese vessels. (38) In the protest note, China alleged that “three boat-loads of military personnel armed with bazookas, light machine guns, sub-machine guns and transceivers” intruded into the sea areas of the Paracel Islands and carried out “reconnaissance at a point some 500 metres from rom the coast”. The vessels were also accused of having fired at a Chinese patrol boat. In the event, one Vietnamese vessel was said to have been captured. (39) Another reported military incident took place in March 1982. On 5 March 1982, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry announced that it had arrested a number of Chinese armed vessels operating under the disguise of fishing boats in ‘vietnamese waters’ in the Tonkin Gulf. (40) China protested against the Vietnamese attack on the fishing boats and condemned it as a deliberate act aggravating Sino-Vietnamese tensions. (41) The protest note also gave the exact position of where the incident took place as 107 degrees 50 minutes north and 17 degrees 40 minutes east. If

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the given description of the position was correct, the incident actually took place outside the Tonkin Gulf on the high seas. What was unusual about the incident was that the Chinese seemed to be able to anticipate it. In mid-February 1982, Guangdong radio service reported that Guangzhou (Canton) trawlers had set out to fish around the Paracel Islands. (42) The ‘fishing boats’ arrested by the Vietnamese were probably those that had set out from Guangzhou. The Chinese broadcast beforehand could be used to support the later argument that the vessels arrested were genuine fishing boats. (If the incident was really premediatated, it could mean that China was trying to challenge Vietnam’s claim to sovereignty over the waters in the Tonkin Gulf beyond the line of equidistance between the coasts of the two countries. The question of the division of the Tonkin Gulf will be further considered in a later section.) Only five days after that incident, China retaliated by capturing a Vietnamese vessel. (43) The vessel was accused of having carried out reconnaissance activities off the Paracel Islands. Whether the Vietnamese vessel was really captured inside the territorial waters of the Paracel Islands is difficult to ascertain, but the arrest and counter-arrest were indicative of the level of tension existing in that area. It appears that by late 1982, China had already designated the waters around the Paracel Islands as a restricted military zone. Orders to shoot at foreign vessels might have been given. In October 1982, a Hong Kong fisherman was reported to have been shot by accident. (44) There are a number of possible reasons behind China’s military build-up in the Paracels. The first was that it was a direct reaction to rising tension in the South China Sea. It was quite inconceivable that Vietnam would have mounted an attack on the Paracel Islands by itself. However, China might have been concerned about the threat posed in the area by the Soviet Navy. For some time during the 1970s, China had become worried that the Soviet Navy might gain access to military bases and facilities in Vietnam. This looked like a self-fulfilling prophecy when China went all out to weaken Vietnam during 1978–79. (45) Not long after the Sino-Vietnamese conflict had become public, in May 1978, a Soviet naval task force including a modern cruiser and two destroyers steamed out of Vladivostok to conduct manoeuvres in the South China Sea. It was reported that “China

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began keeping a sharp watch on it (Soviet task force) to see if it would approach the Paracels, perhaps with the aim of supporting a Vietnamese action to drive Chinese troops off the islands.” (46) At the height of the Sino-Vietnamese war during February-March 1979, a Soviet naval task force of 14 vessels was reported to have “entered Vietnamese waters for the first time and several ships later dropped anchor at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay”. Then, in mid-April, long-range Soviet reconnaissance aircraft flew over the South China Sea. This was soon followed by Soviet submarines entering Cam Ranh Bay in May, and the setting up of a Soviet electronic listening post in Vietnam. ( ) It was doubtful if the Soviet Navy had ever seriously contemplated military action against the Paracel Islands on behalf of its Vietnamese ally. However, China was sensible to prepare for the worst case scenario. The visit by Yang Dezhi and Yang Yong to the Paracel Islands in February 1982 actually coincided with a visit by Soviet Chief of Staff Ogarkov to Vietnam. It was a demonstration of China’s military preparedness against any possible Vietnam-Soviet attack on the islands. Besides its defensive role, it was also possible that China’s increased military presence in the Paracels was contemplated as a jumping off board for further advance towards the southern part of the South China Sea, in particular for a military offensive against the Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group. During the early 1980s, China’s naval capability markedly expanded. Besides its formidable fleet of coastal patrol boats, the PLA Navy demonstrated its ability to undertake distant waters missions by sending a task force to the South Pacific in 1980 to monitor an inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) test flight. China launched its first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine in early 1981, and successfully tested a submarine-launched ballistic missile in October 1982. (48) Not surprisingly, concern about how China would put its expanding Navy to use had grown at the same time. For example, Bruce Swanson has observed that “operationally, the navy will be employed periodically as a political instrument to exert limited pressure in sensitive adjacent sea areas such as the South China Sea…. This might involve making good Chinese claims on

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various South China Sea islands, especially those occupied by Vietnam in the Spratly Islands.” (49) As a matter of fact, in May 1983, Chinese long-distance training ships including a supply vessel and a transport ship made a symbolic trip to the James Shoal (Tsengmu Reef). The trip was enthusiastically reported by the Chinese press. (50) Then, in November 1984, the Commander of the PLA Navy, Liu Huaqing, called for the build-up of a strong Chinese Navy so as to defend China’s 6,000-strong islands and millions of square kilometres of territorial waters, which, presumably, included those in the South China Sea. (51) Vietnam was the country which most often sounded warnings about China’s ambitions in the South China Sea. For example, in January 1981, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry authorized reproduction of an article on relations with China, published in the Soviet journal Mezhunarodnaya Zhizu. The article suggested that “according to Chinese maps, the southern maritime frontier of China encompasses economically important areas and the continental shelves of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines etc.” (52) In January 1984, recalling the battle for the Paracels, Quan Doi Nhan Dan warned that “these islands may be used by China not only to control the entire fishing activities in the region and the important maritime lanes from the U.S.A. and Japan to the ASEAN countries, India, and even to the Middle East, but also to implement its long-term strategy to expand southwards by sea.” (53) In particular, Vietnam was concerned about a possible Chinese attack on the islands of the Spratly group under its control. From 1979 onwards, reports in Hanoi on the defence of the Spratly Islands became more frequent. For example, in June 1980, Hanoi radio service reported that “hundreds of enemy aircraft and warships coming to reconnoitre the Spratly archipelago have been detected.” (54) In October 1980, Hanoi radio service once again reported that Vietnamese soldiers on the Spratly Islands had been busy in defence preparation as “the enemy has constantly kept an owlish eye on the islands by lying in wait offshore and flying aircraft (nearby) in an attempt to launch a hit-and-run attack against us.” (55) The Spratly naval group and army unit were given awards in March 1981 and June 1982 respectively. (56)

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Despite the concern of Hanoi and some independent observers, it was not very likely that China’s military build-up in the Paracels was linked particularly to any further advance southwards. The chance of a Chinese military operation against Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group was actually quite slight. China had serious military, as well as political limitations, which would have obstructed a military adventure in the Spratlys. In many ways, these limitations were similar to those which had restrained any attempt to take over the Spratly Islands in 1974. On the military side, although the naval capability of China had improved significantly in the decade since 1974, its fleet was still not well equipped for distant waters missions. As mentioned above, the backbone of the PLA Navy was coastal patrol boats. Most of China’s naval vessels were fitted with only obsolete equipment and technology. Due to financial constraints, despite a lot of ‘window shopping’ during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, China had failed to make any substantial purchases of military equipment from the West. The PLA Navy had then shifted the emphasis of its programme of modernization to training. (57) Moreover, China only possessed a weak naval airforce, consisting mainly of out-dated MiG-17s and MiG-19s. The nearest island of the Spratly group was some 1,000 kilometres from Hainan Island. A Chinese operation in the Spratlys would therefore have lacked any effective air cover and the Vietnamese would have enjoyed clear air superiority. Even if the Chinese could have taken over some islands in an offensive, it would have been nearly impossible to hold them. Another disadvantageous factor in China’s calculations would have been the possible reaction of the Soviet Navy in the South China Sea to such an initiative. The credibility of the Soviet Union as a fraternal ally of Vietnam had already been strained by the Sino-Vietnamese border war during February-March 1979. The Soviet Union would probably have reacted more strongly if China had launched a new attack on Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group. When some Chinese naval vessels cruised around the Spratly Islands in the autumn of 1980, they were immediately shadowed by Soviet vessels that operated from Cam Ranh Bay. (58)

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On the political side, it has been pointed out in Chapter 3 that in 1974, China was constrained from attacking Saigon-held islands of the Spratly group because it had to be careful about the reactions of other occupants of the archipelago, Taiwan and the Philippines, as well as that of other Southeast Asian countries, especially Malaysia and Indonesia. Such constraint was still there in the early 1980s, perhaps even stronger. Given the bitter struggle with Vietnam, the goodwill and friendship of other Southeast Asian governments were more important than ever. Vietnam’s propaganda about China’s ambition in the South China Sea as described above had actually fallen on some sympathetic ears in Southeast Asia. For example, in October 1981, Hanoi radio reported in English that” (i) n its commentary on 6 October, the Indonesian press agency, PAI, pointed out that everyone in the ASEAN countries knows that Peking has regarded parts of their territories as its lost lands and the Eastern Sea (South China Sea) as its own pond.” (59) Later, in 1982, the Indonesian nationalist newspaper, Merdeka, also criticized Tokyo and Washington for being silent in face of the battle for the Paracels in January 1974. (60) China was certainly not unaware of such feelings. As David Jenkins has pointed out, “if Peking were to seize the five (sic) Vietnamese-held islands in the (Spratly) group—which is certainly within its military capability —it would also cause grave disquiet in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, quite apart from any anger and humiliation for Hanoi. For this very reason, however, China might well feel that any gains that might result from such a move would be more than outweighed by the damage that would be done to China-ASEAN relations.” (61) In sum, the balance sheet, in both military and political terms, of a ‘Spratlys operation’ was highly unfavourable to China. It was not impossible that China’s military build-up in the Paracels was a preparatory step for such an operation in the long run. But it is doubtful if this was a serious objective in the early 1980s. The more immediate objective of China’s military build-up in the Paracels, besides defence of the islands themselves, was probably defence of its growing offshore oil interests in the South China Sea. The next section will examine the implications of China’s offshore oil interests in the South China Sea for its

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policy towards the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. CHINA’S OFFSHORE OIL INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA China’s oil exploration programme in the South China Sea can be traced back to the early 1970s. In 1972, China began to purchase oil rigs from abroad as well as to build its own at the Dalian Shipyard. (62) In 1974, plans were made to carry out comprehensive surveys of the more promising continental shelf areas along China’s coast: the western and central Yellow Sea, the East China Sea as far as the edge of the continental shelf just west of the Ryukus, the waters off the coast east and west of Hong Kong, the western and central Tonkin Gulf, the waters off Hainan Island, and the area of the Paracel Islands. Exploratory wells were then drilled in the South China Sea, with one in the Paracels in 1976 and one in Pearl River Estuary in 1977. (63) However, for a number of reasons, China’s offshore oil exploration programme did not begin in earnest until 1977. Before then, there was little sense of urgency as onshore oil production wsa still booming. On the other hand, China lacked the expertise and technology for offshore oil exploration. Large-scale importation of foreign technology or co-operation with foreign corporations was then blocked by the ideological challenge of the radicals. (64) During 1976–77, important changes in economic and political circumstances took place, which activated China’s offshore oil exploration programme. In 1976, oil production in China had increased by 13%. Although this figure would have represented quite a healthy growth in production in other countries, this was the first time in ten years that the annual rate of growth had been below 20%. (65) The rate of growth in 1977 was expected to be even lower. These figures could have alerted the Chinese leadership to the possibility that the onshore oil production boom was coming to an end. However, the more important stimulating factor probably arose from domestic political changes. By the end of 1976, an important leadership change took place as the result of the death of Mao Zedong and the arrest of the ‘Gang of Four’. Economic

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modernization became the first priority of the new leadership. A series of meetings related to petroleum production was held during 1976–77. In December 1976, a National Crude Oil Enterprises Conference and a Chemical Industry and Oil Refinery Conference were held. In May 1977, a’Learn from Daqing Conference’ was held. At this conference, the new leadership pledged that China should build “some ten more oil fields as big as Daqing within this century”. Subsequently, an oil exploration and production equipment group was sent to the U.S. and Japan in July 1977 to survey the latest techniques. It was reported that the group expressed a particular interest in offshore exploration and drilling. (66) The turning point for China’s offshore oil exploration programme in the South China Sea came at the beginning of 1979. More favourable changes in political and economic circumstances had taken place. Politically, after two years of intensive debate, the ‘open door’ policy was formally adopted by the third plenary session of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party at the end of 1978. The policy removed any remaining serious political barriers to large-scale importation of foreign capital and technology. Then, in early 1979, the oil price in the international market reached a new high as a result of the Islamic revolution in Iran. At the same time, three major oil discoveries were made in the South China Sea: south of Hainan Island, at the Pearl River Estuary, and at the eastern part of the Tonkin Gulf. (67) The combination of domestic and external factors, political and economic, paved the way for co-operation between China and foreign oil exploration in the South China Sea. Beginning in mid-1979, China signed contracts with 48 oil corporations from 13 foreign countries to conduct detailed surveys of delineated zones off much of China’s coast. In the South China Sea, these areas included the Pearl River Estuary, the Yingge Sea (waters lying in the central part of the Tonkin Gulf, southwest of Hainan Island), and the northern part of the Tonkin Gulf. In May 1980, Total Chine of France became the first Western oil corporation to sign a contract with China for oil exploration in the South China Sea. (68) In 1981, based on results of seismic surveys carried out a year before, China declared confidently that “quite abundant” offshore oil reserves had been

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confirmed. In February 1982, after the promulgation of Regulations on the Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Co-operation with Foreign Enterprises, and the establishment of the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOON), open bidding for oil concession areas along China’s coast was formally invited. Under the CNOON, four regional companies were set up, two of which supervised the exploration of the eastern and western South China Sea respectively. (69) By the end of 1983, it was reported that 15 contracts had been signed with successful bidders. (70) China’s growing offshore oil interests in the South China Sea had important effects, both long-term and short-term, on its policy towards the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. In the long run, China’s interests in the Spratlys would be further enhanced; hence the increase in the potential for conflict with Vietnam over the islands. For example, in response to an agreement signed between Vietnam and the Soviet Union for joint prospecting of the continental shelf of southern Vietnam, China issued a protest statement condemning the agreement as a violation of its sovereignty over the “surrounding sea areas” of the Spratly Islands. (71) Also, in August 1982, Huang Jiqing, President of the Geological Society of China, was quoted by NCNA as saying that “geological tests would be carried out around the Xisha and Nansha Islands in the South China Sea which show very good prospects for oil deposits.” (72) It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that military and political constraints had prevented China from launching attacks on Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group. Nevertheless, China’s growing offshore oil interests in the South China Sea had introduced a new element of tension in its dispute with Vietnam over the islands. And as such interests continued to grow in the early 1980s, the risk of conflict in the long run would have increased. In the short run, China’s military build-up in the Paracels had become more necessary than ever as this formed an important part of the defence of its oil exploration programme in the South China Sea in face of Vietnam’s hostility. Besides the general problem of poor bilateral relations, there were at least three causes for Vietnam’s hostility. In the first place, the delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf was still under dispute. The two rounds of

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talks in 1974 and 1977–78 had not produced any solution. The central issue was the meaning of a line stipulated by the Sino-French Convention of 1887, drawn along the meridian of 108 degrees 3 minutes 13 seconds east. In the original text, the line was meant to divide the ownership of islands in the Tonkin Gulf between China and French Indochina. Hanoi considered that this line should also be used for delimiting the waters of the Tonkin Gulf between China and Vietnam. If accepted, although the gross area of the waters under Vietnam’s jurisdiction would not have expanded significantly, it would be in control of the area most promising for oil exploration, the Yingge Basin. (73) It was therefore not surprising that China did not accept Vietnam’s position. China argued that the meaning of the line in the 1887 Convention should be restricted to the division of ownership of islands in the Tonkin Gulf. As mentioned in Chapter 3, by the end of 1973, Hanoi had requested Beijing to hold talks on the division of the Gulf. In its reply to Hanoi’s request, China demanded that no prospecting be carried out in a “neutral area” of 20,000 square kilometres of the Gulf, pending the final solution. (74) The area was believed to be formed by the 18–20th parallels and the 107 to 108 degrees meridians. (75) This area corresponded roughly with the Yingge Basin. It appears that Hanoi had accepted China’s demand in 1974 and observed it since then. In 1979, when blocks for seismic surveys in the Tonkin Gulf were drawn up by China, their western edge went as far as the 108 degrees meridian. In other words, China had taken care not to breach the “neutral area”, but the line of the 1887 Convention, drawn along the 108 degrees 3 minutes 13 seconds meridian was crossed. In addition, the survey blocks at the northern and southern ends of the Tonkin Gulf crossed the line of equidistance between the baselines of China and Vietnam. To Vietnam, it might have looked as if China was cheating. While China did not accept the line of 1887 Convention for delimiting the Tonkin Gulf, neither had it observed the line of equidistance for such a purpose. Second, China had broken a rule laid down by itself in 1974, when it demanded that no third country be allowed to conduct prospecting in the Tonkin Gulf. By then, China was obviously trying to block Soviet exploration of the area through its participation in a joint prospecting programme with Vietnam.

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It appears that Hanoi had deferred to this demand of China and had not invited foreign oil companies to explore the Tonkin Gulf. However, in 1979, seismic survey blocks in the Tonkin Gulf were granted by the Chinese government to a number of Western oil corporations. In particular, blocks nearest to disputed areas were granted to U.S. oil companies. This could have been a deliberate political manoeuvre by China to involve the U.S. in its conflict with Vietnam and to create more diplomatic difficulties for Vietnam. To a certain extent, Vietnam was justified in feeling cheated. Vietnam could also have resented China’s oil exploration activities in the South China Sea on a third count. According to its statement on Vietnam’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental shelf of 12 May 1977, besides claiming sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, the Vietnamese government also claimed a 12-mile territorial sea around the archipelago, and jurisdiction over the surrounding continental shelf and 200-mile EEZ. This meant that its claimed jurisdiction over the surrounding sea areas of the Paracel Islands could extend right up to the southern coast of Hainan Island. For Vietnam, granting prospecting blocks in the waters lying between Hainan Island and the Paracels, without its own consent, constituted another violation of Vietnam’s maritime rights. On a number of occasions, Vietnam had protested against China’s oil exploration activities in the South China Sea and warned against Western oil corporations’ participation. On 13 December 1979, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry issued the following statement: According to foreign sources, China has recently signed contracts with U.S. and other (foreign) companies for the exploration for oil and natural gas in the Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf and around the Hoang Sa (Paracel) archipelago. By doing so, the Chinese side has violated Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Hoang Sa archipelago, and other areas in the Bac Bo Gulf…. The Foreign Ministry of Socialist Republic of Vietnam sternly condemns the illegal action of the Chinese authorities which violates Vietnam’s sovereignty in the Bac

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Bo Gulf and around the Hoang Sa archipelago. The SRV is resolved to defend its territorial sovereignty and all natural resources in its territorial sea and continental shelf. Those foreign companies which conduct exploration and exploitation in the Vietnamese territorial sea and continental shelf without Vietnam’s consent must bear all consequences of their wrongdoings. (76) Further warnings were also issued in later years. For example, when Vietnam issued a statement in January 1980 in response to the Chinese Foreign Ministry document on the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the issue of oil exploration was taken up in specific terms. The statement warned that: All surveys and scientific researches conducted by any foreign country, whether they are basic surveys or surveys on the natural resources in the territorial seas, the EEZs as well as the continental shelves of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes, without the agreement of the SRV government, are illegal. (77) Then, in 1982, in response to China’s invitation of bid for oil concession areas in the South China Sea, an official statement of Vietnam warned that: Vietnam will firmly defend its sacred sovereignty, and will not tolerate any encroachment on the resources held in its territorial waters and continental shelf. Those foreign companies prospecting for oil in Vietnam’s territorial waters and continental shelf without permission from the Vietnamese government will have to bear full responsibility for all consequences arising from their illegal activities. (78) Vietnam’s warnings were not confined to oral or published statements. In July 1979, shots were fired at two oil-rig supply vessels of an American oil corporation, Amoco, in the Tonkin Gulf by Vietnamese gunboats. (79) Vietnam’s forceful reaction might have had some impact on China’s oil exploration programme in the South China Sea. The seismic survey of the

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Tonkin Gulf, which was originally due to begin in July 1979, was postponed by half a year. (80) The postponement allowed China more time to strengthen its military presence in the area, including that in the Paracels. In 1982, as bidding for oil concession areas in the South China Sea began, tension flared up again. Besides the arrest and counter-arrest which took place in the waters near the Paracel Islands as described above, another shooting incident also broke out in the Tonkin Gulf. (81) This time, China was militarily better prepared. Its oil business went on as scheduled. It was acknowledged in the Chinese media that patrolling oil exploration and drilling areas and escorting drilling ships was becoming an increasingly important task for the PLA Navy. (82) Without doubt, the units stationed on the Paracel Islands would be sharing the burden of this important task. In other words, besides their established strategic value of watching over major sea-lanes in the South China Sea, by the early 1980s, the islands had assumed a new importance as a result of China’s growing offshore oil interests in the nearby sea areas. SUMMARY With the public breakdown in Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1978, the rules of the game as regards their dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands were changed. Diplomatic manoeuvre and subtle signalling, which were the major characteristics of the dispute during 1974–77, were then replaced by propaganda exchanges and limited military confrontation. China’s interest in the propaganda exchanges was rather short-lived. After the ‘battle’ of documents and a number of symbolic actions to assert its sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, from the beginning of 1981 onwards, China’s propaganda about the South China Sea islands became less forceful. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the more important development in China’s policy towards the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was actually its military build-up in the Paracels. Besides the obvious role of defence of the islands themselves, observers were concerned about other possible motives behind such a build-up; in particular, the

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possibility of an attack on Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group. It has been argued in this chapter that such a possibility was actually quite slight. Due to various military and political constraints, a ‘Spratlys operation’ could hardly have been an immediate objective of China’s military build-up in the Paracels. By the early 1980s, the PLA Navy was not yet prepared for such an operation. Moreover, China would have wished to avoid prejudicing its relations with other Southeast Asian countries by not undertaking such a military adventure. From the evidence examined, it appears that China’s military build-up in the Paracels was more closely related to its oil exploration activities in the South China Sea. After years of debate and delay, such activities finally took off in 1979 with the assistance of foreign capital and technology. Detailed seismic surveys of the northern part of the South China Sea were carried out in 1980, and open bidding for concession areas in the Tonkin Gulf, the Yingge Sea, and the waters between Hainan Island and the Paracel Islands were invited from foreign oil corporations in 1982. China’s oil exploration activities in the South China Sea brought about strong protests and military threats from Vietnam. Shooting incidents took place in the Tonkin Gulf in 1979 and 1982. Consequently, the Paracel Islands assumed new importance in China’s defence of its oil exploration activities in the nearby sea areas. Until the early 1980s, such activities had been restricted to the northern part of the South China Sea. However, as China’s offshore oil interests continue to grow, the attraction of moving southwards may well grow at the same time. NOTES 1. For an overview of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1978–79, see D. W.P.Elliott (ed.), The Third Indochina Conflict, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981; Sheldon W.Simon, “China, Vietnam and ASEAN: The Politics of Polarization,” Asian Survey, Vol.19, No.12 (December 1979):1171–1180; Bruce Burton, “Contending Explanations of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War,” International Journal, Autumn 1979:699–722; and William J.Duiker, China and

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2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Vietnam: End of a Friendship, Seminar on Vietnam, Indochina and Southeast Asia: Into the 1980s, The Hague, Netherlands, 1980. There are also many useful works on specific issues. On the border war, see Daniel Tretiak, “China’s Vietnam War and its Consequences, “China Quarterly, December 1979:740–767; and Gerald Segal, Defending China, London: Oxford University Press, 1985, Ch.12. On the issue of Chinese residents in Vietnam, see Pao-min Chang, Beijing. Hanoi and the Overseas Chinese, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for China Studies: China Research Monograph 24, 1982. On the territorial disputes, see P-M Chang, “The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute,” Asian Pacific Community, Spring 1980, No.8:130–165. On geopolitical implications, see Michael Leifer, “Post Mortem on the Third Indochina War,” The World Today, June 1979:249–258; and Vietnam Southeast Asia International, Vol.13, Nos.1–3 (January-March 1979). For views sympathetic with the position of Vietnam, see Wilfred Burchett, The China Cambodia Vietnam Triangle, London: Zed Press, 1981; and Grant Evans and Kevin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at War, London: Verso, 1984. For China’s point of view, a number of ‘internal’ documents have been published by Issues and Studies (Taipei). For example, “An Outline for Educating Our Militia in Combat Readiness,” Vol.16, No.1 (January 1980):91–104; “Keng Piao (Geng Biao)’s Report on the Situation of the Indochina Peninsula,” Vol.17, No.1 (January 1981):78–96; and “Two Speeches: Teng Hsiao-p’ing (Deng Xiaoping) and Han Nien-lung (Han Nianlong) Lecture on Vietnam,” Vol.16, No.8 (August 1980):90–97. Beijing Review, 5 January 1979:2. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East Series (BBC, SWB, FE),5771/A3/3 (23 March 1978). BBC, SWB, FE/5935/A3/3 (6 October 1978) and 5941/A3/6 (13 October 1978). See Note 2. BBC, SWB, FE/6004/A3/1 (1 January 1979). P-M Chang, “The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute”. BBC, SWB, FE/6008/A3/6 (5 January 1979). People’s Daily, 9 January 1979. “Han Nianlong’s Speech,” Beijing Review, 25 May 1979. BBC, SWB, FE/6120/A3/6–12 (19 May 1979). BBC, SWB, FE/6116/A3/5 (15 May 1979). BBC, SWB, FE/6189/A3/1. (9 August 1979). Ibid. BBC, SWB, FE/6234/A3/1–9 (2 October 1979). Beijing Review, 1980, No.7:15–24.

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17. Nayan Chanda, “Same Show, New Theatre,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 21 September 1979:12–14 and John McBeth, “Amber One May Be Grounded,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1979:21–22. 18. Chanda, “Same Show”. 19. BBC, SWB, FE/6211/A3/1 (5 September 1979) and 6285/A3/12 (30 November 1979). 20. BBC, SWB, FE/6438/A3/7 (6 June 1980) and 6494/A3/6 (11 August 1980). 21. See Note 16. It should also be noted that from the beginning of 1979 onwards, Beijing has changed its posture on the question of Taiwan by calling for ‘re-unification’ instead of ‘liberation’. 22. People’s Daily, 25 April 1983, and BBC, SWB, FE/7655/C/4 (29 May 1984). 23. See Note 20. 24. Vietnam Courier, The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes, Hanoi, 1981. 25. BBC, SWB, FE/6919/A3/1; 6921/A3/1; 6922/A3/1; 6924/A3/1; 6926/A3/1; and 6927/A3/1. 26. Beijing Review, 1982, No.28:13. 27. BBC, SWB, FE/7183/A3/1 (15 November 1982) and 7184/A3/2 (16 November 1982). 28. Beijing Review, 1982, No.49:10. 29. BBC, SWB, FE/75/A3/2 (23 January 1984) and 7548/A3/1 (24 January 1984). 30. See Note 18. 31. See Note 20; and BBC, SWB, FE/7057/A3/8 (21 June 1982). 32. People’s Daily, 9 March 1979. 33. BBC, SWB, FE/6232/A3/1 (29 September 1979). 34. People’s Daily, 16 February 1980. 35. BBC, SWB, FE/6792/A3/8 (4 August 1981). 36. BBC, SWB, FE/6953/A3/6 (13 February 1982). 37. People’s Daily, 13 and 15 August 1982. 38. BBC, SWB, FE/6093/A3/1 (17 April 1979). 39. In the protest note, the capturing of the Vietnamese vessel was not mentioned. It was later revealed by Chinese broadcasts in 1980. See BBC, SWB, FE/6494/A3/1. 40. BBC, SWB, FE/6971/A3/3 (6 March 1982). 41. BBC, SWB, FE/6973/A3/1 (9 March 1982). 42. BBC, SWB, FE/6962/A3/6 (22 February 1982). 43. . People’s Daily, 11 March 1982. 44. . BBC, SWB, FE/7190/A3/6 (23 November 1982) . 45. . Nayan Chanda, “A Prophecy Self-fulfilled,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 June 1979:19–21.

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46. . David Bonavia, “Straight Talk from Peking,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 June 1978:10–11. . See Note 45. 48. . David G.Muller, China as a Maritime Power, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, Ch.11; and Bruce Swanson, Eighth Voyage of the Dragon, Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1982, Ch.22. 49. . Swanson, Eighth Voyage. 50. . People’s Daily, 14 June 1983 and 19 July 1983. 51. . People’s Daily, 24 November 1984. 52. . BBC, SWB, FE/6619/A3/4. 53. . BBC, SWB, FE/75/A3/2 (23 January 1984). 54. . BBC, SWB, FE/6438/A3/8 (6 June 1980). 55. . Nayan Chanda, “Too Close for Comfort,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 November 1980:26–29. 56. . BBC, SWB, FE/6663/A3/10; 7044/A3/1. 57. . See Note 48. 58. . See Note 55. 59. . BBC, SWB, FE/6851/A3/5 (12 October 1981). 60. . Quoted in Wayne Bert, “Chinese Relations with Burma and Indonesia,” Asian Survey, Vol.15, No.6 (June 1975):484–485. 61. . David Jenkins, “Trouble Over Oil and Waters,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 August 1981:24–30. 62. . Muller, Maritime Power, p.197–8; and China Trade Report, September 1975 (Vol.l3):4. 63. . Muller, Maritime Power, p.193; and China Trade Report, September 1977 (Vol.l5):3. 64. . Muller, Maritime Power, p.193. For an analysis of China’s domestic debate on this issue in general, see Allen S. Whiting, Chinese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1970s, Ann Arbor, Michigan: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1979. 65. . China Trade Report, February 1977:5. 66. . Jan-Olaf Willums, “China’s Offshore Petroleum,” Chinese Business Review, Vol.4, No.4 (July-August 1977):6–14. 67. . Phijit Chong, “Quickening Oil Search,” China Trade Report, January 1980:2. 68. Beijing Review, 19 December 1983:5–6. 69. Beijing Review, 22 February 1982:5–6. 70. Beijing Review. 4 April 1984:19–22. 71. Beijing Review, 1980, No.31:8. 72. BBC, SWB, FE/7123/A3/6. 73. For a general description of the issue, see P-M Chang, “The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute”; and George Kent and Mark Valencia (eds.), Marine Policy in Southeast Asia, Berkeley:

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74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82.

University of California Press, 1985, Ch.5. A useful companion to the work of Kent and Valencia is Joseph R. Morgan and Mark J. Valencia (eds.), Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, The Truth About Vietnam-China Relations Over the Last 30 Years, Hanoi, 1979, p.60. Nayan Chanda, “China Calls in the Foreign Rigs,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1979:21. BBC, SWB, FE/6298/A3/1. BBC, SWB, FE/6316/A3/1. BBC, SWB, FE/7141/A3/6. George Lauriat and Melinda Liu, “Pouring Trouble on Oily Waters,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1979:19–21. Ibid. Richard Breeze, “A New Gulf Flashpoint,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 June 1982:26–28. Ibid.; and BBC, SWB, FE/7154/A3/7 (12 October 1982).

Chapter Six THE DISPUTES WITH THE PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA

The last three chapters have examined China’s Paracels operation and its handling of the dispute with Hanoi over both the Paracel and Spratly Islands during 1974–84. The major finding of these chapters is that China’s behaviour was guided by a complex interplay between its long-standing objective of ‘recovering’ the islands and its leaders’ perception of China’s geopolitical interests. The basic objective of the Paracels operation in January 1974 was no doubt to ‘recover’ what had long been regarded as China’s legitimate territory. None the less, the timing of the operation was related closely to China’s concern with the perceived Soviet threat to its security. The Paracels operation was almost certainly motivated by a concern with the growth of a Soviet naval presence in the South China Sea and with the prospective role of Hanoi in the geopolitics of the region. The latter factor continued to influence China’s handling of the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the decade that followed. China’s attitude towards that dispute gradually hardened as the gap widened between the two countries’ strategic interests and their bilateral relations deteriorated. Before 1978, the expression of China’s contention with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands was coded in subtle media signals and diplomatic gestures. From late 1978 onwards, these signals were replaced by open propaganda exchanges and limited military confrontation. There are two other countries also involved in the disputes over the Spratly Islands, the Philippines and Malaysia. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, they had been targets of China’s efforts to organize a united front in the region against Soviet,

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and later, Vietnamese ‘hegemonism’. If geopolitical considerations had an important influence on China’s policy towards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over the Spratly Islands, one would expect that diplomatic and military confrontation would not have been the major manner of its handling of these disputes. In fact, during 1974–84, China sought to contain the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over the Spratly Islands, stressing the importance of peaceful solutions. The major task of this chapter is to examine in detail how China handled these disputes. In order to illustrate the impact of China’s changing geopolitical perceptions and interests during the early 1970s on its handling of them, its reaction to the Philippines’ expressed interest in the Spratly Islands during the 1950s will be described first. Then, its handling of the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia respectively during the 1970s and the early 1980s will be considered. SEEDS OF THE DISPUTE WITH THE PHILIPPINES Although the Philippine government did not officially state a claim to sovereignty over some of the islands of the Spratly group until 1971, seeds of the claim had been sown as early as the Second World War. During that war, some islands of the Spratly group had been used by the Japanese Navy to support military operations in Southeast Asia. In the post-war era, the newly independent Republic of the Philippines expressed a measure of concern about the possible use of these islands by hostile powers. It has been noted that in 1946, “the Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Philippines advocated that the ‘New Southern Islands’ (a term used by the Japanese for all the islands in the South China Sea) be given to his country”, although it was not made clear on what legal grounds such a territorial assertion was being made. (1) Nothing further emerged until May 1950 when Philippine President Elpidio Quirino was reported to have said that the occupation of the Spratly Islands “by an enemy” would be detrimental to the Philippines’ security. (2) In response, the New China News Agency (NCNA) recorded that “competent quarters” in Beijing

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had denounced the “preposterous propaganda of the Philippine Government in regard to Chinese territory” as “the product of instructions from the U.S. Government”. (3) It was doubtful if Quirino’s remark represented a serious claim by the Philippine government to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. In the event, the brief exchange between Beijing and Manila in 1950 did not give rise to any major controversy and the issue soon died down. During the 1950s, the Philippine government’s interest in the Spratly Islands was sustained through the activities of private individuals. In 1955, an American, Morton F.Mead, who had been discharged from the U.S.Army in Manila in 1946, claimed that he had discovered the ‘Kingdom of Humanity’ in the South China Sea in 1945. (4) Upon learning of this story, President Magsaysay directed the Philippine Air Force (PAF) to make a search for the Kingdom. After a series of reconnaissance flights over the Spratly Islands, PAF reported that there were no indications that any of the islands were inhabited. Despite these negative findings, Manila was, once again, made aware of the strategic importance of the islands due to their proximity to the Philippines. It was reported that Philippines Vice-President Carlos P. Garcia, concurrently Secretary of Foreign Affairs, recommended to President Magsaysay that the Philippines laid claim to the islands. However, protests were promptly heard from the Taiwan government. (5) As a result, the Philippines’ interest in the islands temporarily lapsed. It appears that China did not take any notice of these developments during 1955. It only became involved in a serious dispute with the Philippines a year later, when the latter’s interest in the Spratly Islands was revived through the activities of another individual. On 15 May 1956, the Philippine government received a letter from a Filipino citizen, Tomas A. Cloma, who claimed to have discovered a group of islands in the South China Sea, lying some 400 kilometres west of Palawan Island. Cloma claimed ownership over a territory composed of “islands, sand cays, sand bars, coral reefs, and fishing ground with a total area of about 64,976 square nautical miles”; based on the rights of discovery and/or occupation. He named the territory ‘Freedomland’ (Kalayaan). In a ‘Map of Freedomland’ attached to Cloma’s letter, all the major islands, including Spratly Island, Itu Aba, Nam Yit, and Thitu, were included. (6)

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On 21 May 1956, Cloma sent the Philippine government a second letter, trying to solicit its support for his claim. In his letter, Cloma acknowledged that “the claim was made by ‘citizens of the Philippines’ and not on behalf of the Government of the Philippines”. (7) But he went on to point out that this would “have the consequent effect of the territory becoming part of the Philippines”. For this reason it was hoped and requested that “the Philippine Government support, back, and protect our claim”. (8) Cloma was obviously aware that there might exist competing claims to the islands. He ended his letter therefore by advising the Philippine government not to “present another claim to the United Nations because this might have the effect of encouraging and inviting opposition from other countries”. (9) Due to its experience during the previous year, the Philippine government had become well aware of competing claims by other countries. It therefore approached the Taiwan government to discuss the issue. (10) Beijing no longer remained silent. On 29 May 1956, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on China’s sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. (11) Besides reiterating China’s “indisputable” and “legitimate” sovereignty over the islands, the statement attacked the reported remark of Carlos Garcia at an earlier press conference that the Spratly Islands “should rightly” belong to the Philippines by reason of proximity. The Chinese statement denounced this remark as an “utterly untenable pretext put forth by the Philippine government to cover its attempt to invade and occupy China’s territory”. In June 1956, the Philippine government’s position on the Spratly Islands was further attacked in the Chinese press. Shao Hsun-cheng, a Professor of History at Beijing University, wrote about China’s historical rights to the islands. (12) Another article in People’s Daily deplored the so-called ‘discovery’ of the Spratly Islands by Cloma. It was pointed out that the Spratly Islands had become part of China even before Magellan had discovered the Philippines. (13) Furthermore, an observer in People’s Daily alleged that the Philippine government’s interest in the Spratly Islands was encouraged by the United States. (14) In addition to Beijing, Saigon and Taipei had also protested to Manila. In the face of this barrage of protests, the Philippine

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government refrained from unequivocally endorsing Cloma’s claim. In a formal reply to Cloma in December 1956, the Philippine government adopted a vague and equivocal position on the issue. First, it drew a distinction between what was ‘internationally’ known as the Spratly group and by Cloma’s own map, Spratly Island itself was the islands newly ‘discovered’ by Cloma; although included in ‘Freedomland’. Then, the Philippine government considered that “with the exclusion of those belonging to the seven-island group known internationally as the Spratlys”, the other islands, islets, coral reefs, shoals, and sand cays as included in Cloma’s territory of ‘Freedomland’ were hitherto unoccupied and uninhabited. Accordingly, “they are open to economic exploitation and settlement by Filipino nationals who have as much right under international law as nationals of any other country to carry on such activities, as long as the exclusive sovereignty of any country over them has not been established in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law, or recognized by the international community of nations.” (15) As the Philippine government was well aware of the claims by Saigon, Taipei, and Beijing to the islands, the above position implied that it did not recognize that any of the above governments’ claims had been established “in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law, or recognized by the international community of nations”. In this way, the Philippine government kept its options on the issue wide open. On the other hand, it had stopped short of fulfilling Cloma’s request for support, backing, and protection. Direct confrontation between the Philippine government and other competing parties was avoided. As regards the “seven-island group known internationally as the Spratlys”, the Philippine government was similarly equivocal. It considered these islands to be “under the de facto trusteeship of the victorious Allied Powers of the Second World War”, because after Japan had renounced all its rights, title, and claim to the Spratly Islands at the 1951 San Francisco Conference, no territorial settlement had been made by the Allied Powers. The Philippine government therefore considered that the islands were “equally open to economic exploitation and settlement by nationals or any members of the Allied Powers on

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the basis of equality of opportunity and treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters relating thereto”. (16) In other words, the Philippines or its nationals were free to exploit the Spratly group, which had been redefined and very much reduced in size by the Philippine government. By reducing the Spratlys to a seven-island group and subjecting its sovereignty to the decision of the Allied Powers, the Philippine government had retained for itself in principle a large degree of freedom of initiative in either ‘Freedomland’ or the Spratly Islands. In the row during 1956, China and the Philippines did share one feature in common if for different reasons; that is, they failed to take any action besides stating their positions. By contrast, the other two contestants, Taiwan and South Vietnam, were active in taking symbolic actions to assert their sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. Taipei sent troops to the islands, drove Cloma’s men out of the area, and removed markers previously set up by Cloma. The Taiwanese troops were also there to stay. From late 1956 until the late 1960s, a Taiwanese garrison on Itu Aba, the largest island of the Spratly group, remained as the only continuous official presence in the archipelago. In the summer of 1956, the South Vietnamese government also sent its naval forces to some of the islands of the Spratly group to set up markers and plant flags. (17) However, they did not set up any permanent settlement there. As discussed above, the Philippine government had deliberately adopted an equivocal position on the issue of sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (including so-called ‘Freedomland’) so as to avoid any direct confrontation with other countries. In face of the above actions taken by Taipei and Saigon, Manila had kept quiet. It failed to ‘support’, ‘back’, or ‘protect’ Cloma and his men when they were thrown out of the Spratly Islands. Unlike the Philippines, China failed to take any direct action to back up its claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands not because of ambiguities in its claim but more likely because of the limitation in its naval capability. In fact, the South Vietnamese government’s action was immediately denounced by China. (18) It is, however, interesting to note that Beijing remained silent over Taipei’s move to station a garrison on Itu Aba. Beijing probably believed that a Chinese presence in the

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archipelago was advantageous to its claim in the long run. As discussed in earlier chapters, such a mutuality of interest between the two rival Chinese governments over the question of sovereignty over the South China Sea islands became even more evident in the 1970s. At the end of 1956, China did not publicly respond to the Philippine government’s reply to Cloma as outlined above. Either it was quietly satisfied with the status quo of the Spratly Islands, that is, the presence of Taiwanese troops in the archipelago, or simply the reply did not immediately catch the attention of China. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, during the 1950s, the expressed interests of South Vietnam and the Philippines in the Spratly Islands were perceived as part of a plot by the United States to contain and divide China. In the wider struggle against U.S. ‘imperialism’, the disputes over the islands in the South China Sea were but a side show to the conflicts over Korea, Taiwan, and Indochina. Like many other territorial disputes, China was content to reaffirm its position in the dispute over the Spratly Islands and to wait for a more opportune moment to deal with it. THE PHILIPPINES’ CLAIM IN 1971 On 10 July 1971, President Ferdinand Marcos issued a statement which, for the first time, articulated an official claim by the Philippines to part of the Spratlys. (19) In the statement, three issues about the Spratly Islands were raised. First, because of the proximity of Itu Aba (called Ligaw by the Philippine government) to the Philippines, the presence of Taiwanese troops (or, in fact, troops of any foreign power) constituted a “serious threat” to Philippines’ national security. Second, the Philippine government reaffirmed that the Spratlys were considered to be under the de facto trusteeship of the Allied Powers. Therefore no state might introduce troops on any of those islands without the permission and consent of the Allied Powers. Third, the Philippine government reiterated its position of 1956, that is, some 53 islands of ‘Freedomland’, which were distinct from the Spratlys, had been discovered by a Philippine citizen, Tomas Cloma, and they were regarded as res nullius. What was different this time was that the Philippine

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government announced that it was already in “effective occupation and control” of some of these islands, including Pagasa (Thitu) [in Samuels’ version, Thitu is Parola], Lawak (Nanshan), and Patag (Flat Island). Occupation of the islands is believed to have taken place in 1968. Since then, the above three arguments have formed the basis of the Philippine government’s claim to part of the Spratlys. Later, in 1976, in connection with drilling in the Reed Bank Area, the Philippine government further justified its oil exploration activities there by another and new argument: its rights to the continental shelf. (20) In fact, none of the above arguments stand rigorous examination. In the first place, a security concern in itself is not a sufficient basis for a claim to sovereign rights. As Shao Hsun-cheng, the Chinese historian mentioned above, had argued, by employing the principle of proximity, any country could lay claim to the territories of any neighbouring countries. (21) As regards the distinction between the Spratlys and Freedomland’, the Philippine government had failed to specify which islands actually belonged to ‘Freedomland’. In Cloma’s original map of ‘Freedomland’, virtually the entire Spratly archipelago had been included. In Marcos’ statement of July 1981, it appeared that Itu Aba was still regarded as part of the Spratlys. (Eight years later, Itu Aba was also formally claimed by the Philippine government. This will be discussed in a later section.) One of the islands which had been occupied by Philippine troops, Thitu, was even farther away from the Philippines than Itu between ‘Freedomland’ and the Spratlys had been Aba. It was therefore not clear where the boundary drawn. As the exact boundary between so-called ‘Freedomland’ and the Spratlys had not been defined, the question of which islands were supposed to be under the de facto trusteeship of the Allied Powers was also unclear. The Philippine government had failed also to produce any evidence of a formal agreement among the Allied Powers on the issue. And this point in the Filipino case has not been corroborated by any independent work in the existing literature. The argument based on rights to the continental shelf by the Philippines is also a tenuous one. Although the Reed Bank Area is a shallow sea, it is separated from Palawan by a deep trench,

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and would not appear to form a natural part of the continental shelf of the Philippines. From the geomorphological point of view, the continental shelf of the South China Sea lies to the north and south of it, and along the coasts of Vietnam and peninsular Malaysia. The Paracel and Spratly Islands lie on the slope and rise of the shelf. The Philippine islands are surrounded by deep water of the Palawan Trough and Luzon Trough to the west, and the Manila Trench to the east. They are therefore distinct from the integral shelf area of the South China Sea. (22) If the Philippine government had really believed in what it had maintained in 1971, it should have claimed the islands during the 1950s, when these arguments were first put forward. It would seem evident that economic incentives were at work in the early 1970s. The oil factor presumably played a very important role in Manila’s claim in 1971. In the late 1960s, initial seismic surveys carried out by the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) suggested a strong possibility of commercial fields throughout the region. In 1970, seismic and aeromagnetic surveys for the Palawan area were completed. In March the following year, test drilling had begun in an area 50 miles west of Palawan. (23) As the Philippine government’s oil exploration activities took off during 1970–71, it was natural that attention be paid to the hitherto deserted Spratlys area, where abundant oil reserves were believed to lie. It was not coincidental that when the minority leader of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, Ramon V.Mitra, called the attention of the government to the islands, he also pointed out that these islands “sit in the middle of what is believed to be a rich offshore deposit”. (24) Conveniently, arguments of ‘discovery’ and ‘trusteeship’ of the 1950s were revived to support the new official claim. The proximity of some of the islands to the Philippines was very important not so much because of security concerns but because they could be occupied with relative ease by Philippine troops. In the event, notwithstanding the strength of the arguments, it was effective occupation of the islands that really mattered. China’s response to Marcos’ statement of July 1971 was something of an enigma. It was not conveyed through the normal channels or by the appropriate person. China’s claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands was reiterated by Huang

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Yongsheng, PLA Chief of General Staff, at a dinner reception for a North Korean delegation: The Nansha Islands and the Hsisha (Xisha) Islands have always been China’s territory. The People’s Republic of China has indisputable sovereignty over these islands and absolutely allows no country to encroach upon this sovereignty right under whatever pretext and in whatever form. The Philippine government must immediately stop its encroachment upon China’s territory and withdraw all its personnel from the Nansha Islands. (25) The curious point about the above pronouncement is that it was not issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affaris as would normally have been the case. It should be noted that the summer of 1971 was a sensitive moment for rapprochement in Sino-U.S. relations. On the one hand, Kissinger’s secret visit to China took place in July 1971. On the other, the power struggle between Mao Zedong/Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao reached a decisive point. It is believed that Lin Biao and his close associates, including Huang Yongsheng, were opposed to the policy of rapprochement with the U.S. (26) It is therefore not impossible that Huang’s statement was part of an effort to stall that rapprochement by fiercely attacking an ally of the United States (the Philipines). There is also an interesting parallel between Huang’s statement and a speech he made one year earlier. In June 1970, Huang spoke to a rally in Pyongyang, in which he ruled out improvement in Sino-U.S. relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence because of U.S. interference in internal Chinese affairs by maintaining armed forces in Taiwan. (27) That Huang chose to attack the Philippines during a dinner with North Korean guests could be interpreted as of symbolic significance. With limited evidence available, it is impossible to prove or disprove the above speculation. Lin Biao and his associates were soon purged in late 1971. As the rapprochement with the U.S. went ahead unimpeded, China’s relations with the Philippines also underwent improvement. In fact, the Philippines was one of the more responsive of the Southeast Asian countries to China’s search for better bilateral relations. In March 1972, a

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breakthrough in Sino-Philippine relations was achieved during a visit to China by Governor Romualdez, special envoy and brother-in-law of President Marcos. In September 1974, Imelda Marcos, also as special envoy of President Marcos, visited China. The visit was remarkably successful. Imelda Marcos was warmly received, her stay was extended, and finally, she was granted an unanticipated meeting with Mao Zedong. A number of economic agreements were signed and above all, the groundwork for the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the Philippines was prepared. Diplomatic relations were established during President Marcos’ official visit to China in June 1975. MARCOS’ VISIT TO CHINA IN 1975 As the process of normalization of relations went ahead, signs of China’s conciliatory approach towards the Philippines over the dispute over part of the Spratlys began to become apparent. Shortly after the battle for the Paracels in January 1974, the South Vietnamese government had sent troops to occupy six of the Spratly Islands, so as to be able to defend them against the possibility of another Chinese assault. This time, the South Vietnamese government’s action was opposed by the Philippine and Taiwanese governments. Protest notes were exchanged between Manila, Taipei, and Saigon. While the Philippine government sent protest notes to Saigon and Taipei respectively on 5 February 1974, troops were sent to occupy three more islands of the Spratly group: Kota (West York), Likas (North Cay), and Parola (Northeast Cay) [in Samuels’ version, Parola is Thitu]. (28) As mentioned in Chapter 3, China issued a strongly worded statement in response to the South Vietnamese government’s action. However, it did not make any comment at all on the Philippine government’s claim and action. This was a significant contrast to its swift and uncompromising responses to similar situation during the 1950s. Marcos’ visit to China took place in June 1975. This was probably the first time that the issue of the Spratly Islands had ever been discussed formally between China and the Philippines at such a high level. The visit ended with a joint communique announcing the establishment of diplomatic

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relations between the two governments. The issue of the Spratly Islands was not mentioned in the joint communique. In later years, part of the content of the discussions about the issue was made public. In 1976, when a new row over the Philippines’ exploration activities in the Reed Bank Area broke out, Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo confirmed that the dispute over the Spratly Islands had been brought up during Marcos’ visit to China in 1975. He did not indicate if any agreement had been reached but was confident enough to say that he saw “no problem with the People’s Republic of China over the Spratlys”. (29) More about these discussions was revealed to the outside world in 1978. In March 1978, China’s Vice-Premier Li Xiannian visited Manila. Just before his arrival, there were foreign press reports of the Philippine government’s occupation of a seventh island in the Spratly group, Panata Island. (30) The reports prompted an angry reaction from President Marcos. At the press conference after Li’s visit, Marcos accused “distorted” foreign reports of putting the Philippine government in an embarrassing position. Marcos revealed that during his meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1975, it was already agreed that any conflict about any of the islands in the South China Sea would be settled in “a true (possibly ‘through’) diplomatic—normal diplomatic—channels, which means by negotiation and in an atmosphere of friendship and co-operation(sic)”. (31) Despite the agreement on a peaceful solution to the dispute, many questions were simply left unanswered. First, it was not clear if there had been any agreement on the distinction between ‘Freedomland’ and the Spratlys. From Marcos’ comments at the press conference, the agreement covered “any conflict about any of the islands in the South China Sea”. This suggested that there was probably no agreement on this question which explains why Marcos referred to “any of the islands in the South China Sea” instead of to the names of specific island groups. Moreover, while the two governments agreed on a peaceful solution to the dispute over the islands, it was not clear whether the question of surrounding sea areas had been discussed as well. For example, the row over the Reed Bank Area in 1976 was about the shallow sea area rather than the islands themselves. As regards this issue, the positions of both the Chinese and

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Philippine governments were then ambiguous. On the side of the Philippines, it was not clear if Manila was claiming the area as an integral part of ‘Freedomland’, or as part of its continental shelf. This was only made clear in Presidential Decree No.1596 issued in September 1979. (See Section 6.5 for details.) On the Chinese side, while Beijing had always claimed sovereign rights to “surrounding sea areas” of the islands in statements since 1974, the boundary of the “surrounding sea areas” had never been defined. (For details, see earlier discussion in Chapter 2.) Before 1976, the Philippine government might have thought that its exploration activities in the Reed Bank Area would not be disputed by the Chinese government. As regards the substantive issue, that is, sovereignty over the islands, there was no sign that either of the governments had shifted its position. As a matter of fact, after Marcos’ visit, no further talks were held between the two sides to find a solution to the dispute. In sum, the agreement on a “peaceful solution” to the dispute was a way of avoiding conflict rather than resolving it. As matters stood, the Philippines was the side which had benefited from such an agreement. This was because, in practice, the agreement allowed the Philippines to continue occupying some islands of the Spratly group without active opposition from China. But China’s acquiescence did not imply that it was happy with the status quo. In an internal speech to party cadres in July 1977, China’s Foreign Minister Huang Hua warned that “no exploitation of resources on the Nansha Islands and their surrounding seabeds is valid without China’s consent.” In the meantime, “other countries” might exploit the area as they liked, but Huang added, “we will confiscate all of them in due time.” (32) By then, the Philippines was the only country that was actively engaged in exploiting resources in the Spratlys, and therefore the only appropriate target for Huang’s speech. If the Philippine government had been able to read Huang’s speech, it would have understood that China would seek to settle the account at some time in the future. Yet China was constrained from doing so largely because of geopolitical considerations as described in earlier chapters. The Philippines was not unaware of the limitations on China’s policy towards the dispute over the Spratly Islands. It actually

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took advantage of the situation to significantly expand its presence in the Spratlys during the late 1970s. In the next section, developments during the late 1970s and China’s responses to them will be examined. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATE 1970S In the aftermath of the row over the Reed Bank Area in 1976, there were reports that an exchange of fire had taken place between Communist Vietnamese and Philippine troops in the Spratlys. (33) (The former were despatched in effect to replace those of the fallen Saigon regime.) As a result of this incident, President Marcos ordered a reinforcement of Philippine troops in the area. A military command known as Westcom was set up in Palawan to oversee the security of the Philippineoccupied islands. An airstrip was built in Pagasa to accommodate regular visits by Philippine fighter and transport planes. This was to ensure that the Philippine government would command military superiority in the airspace over the islands under its control. By early 1978, the number of Philippine troops in the Spratly Islands had already increased to nearly one thousand, which outnumbered the three hundred and fifty Vietnamese troops in the archipelago by a large margin. (34) During the late 1970s, the Philippine government took at least one more island under its control. As mentioned above, it occupied Panata Island in early 1978. In May 1980, it protested that Malaysia had established a guardhouse on Commodore Reef. This was later found to be untrue. In fact, the Malaysians had only established a marker there. In August 1980, Philippine troops moved onto the reef and removed the marker. Prescott believes that the troops left after the operation but there are no other reports to prove or disprove whether or not the Philippine troops had stayed. (35) At the same time, the Philippine government had taken legal measures to further consolidate its claim to sovereignty over part of the Spratlys. In September 1979, Marcos signed Presidential Decree No.1596 proclaiming Philippines’ sovereignty over ‘Kalayaan Island Group’ (Freedomland), which effectively covers a large section of the Spratly archipelago. (36) The area claimed coincided roughly with that

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alleged to have been discovered by Cloma in the 1950s. Although Spratly Island itself was left out of the net of ‘Kalayaan Island Group’, most of the other important islands, like Itu Aba, Thitu, and Amboyna Cay, were included. In the decree, three reasons were cited to support the Philippine government’s claim. First, the island group formed part of the continental margin of the Philippine archipelago. Second, it did not legally belong to any other state and the Philippines should own the islands “by reason of history, indispensable need, and effective occupation and control established in accordance with international law”. Third, although other states had laid claim to some of these islands, their claim had lapsed by abandonment. The arguments employed by the Philippine government in the Presidential Decree No.1596 were basically the same as those of Marcos’ statement of July 1971. It is therefore not necessary to re-examine their merits here. What was important about the decree was that it confirmed earlier suspicions about the Philippine government’s ambitions in the South China Sea: that the so-called ‘Kalayaan Island Group’ encompassed a large section of the Spratly archipelago. The Presidential Decree No.1596 not only formally proclaimed Philippines’ sovereignty over the islands that it had effectively occupied. It also claimed the islands then under effective occupation of Taiwanese and Vietnamese troops, including Itu Aba, the largest island of the archipelago, and Amboyna Cay. As regards oil exploration of the Spratlys, in 1976, the Philippine government had invited a consortium led by the Salen Company of Sweden to drill on the Templar Bank (part of the Reed Bank Area). As pointed out in Chapter 4, Vietnam protested immediately and China’s statement against Vietnam’s claims at this point was so worded as to apply possibly to the Philippines as well. Despite these protests, exploration was carried on during the late 1970s. Salen was later joined by Amoco (an American oil corporation) in drilling on the Reed Bank proper. Until November 1981, at least six wells had been drilled. Although commerical quantities of oil were not discovered, preliminary results confirmed the existence of good source and reservoir rocks under the Reed Bank. After November 1981, the Philippine government decided to keep the results of further exploration a secret. (37)

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As discussed in Chapter 4, China’s statement on the Philippines’ exploration of the Reed Bank Area in June 1976 was probably directed primarily at Vietnam rather than the Philippines. For the statement did not condemn the Philippine government in specific terms but rather condemned ‘any’ foreign country’s claim to and/or occupation of the Spratly Islands. In addition, the statement was also timed to follow the Vietnamese one (issued in the name of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam). In fact, although the Philippines’ exploration of the Reed Bank Area continued during the late 1970s, no further protest was heard from China. In effect, the only protest that China issued against the Philippines’ claim and action in the Spratlys was made in September 1979, in response to Marcos’ Presidential Decree No.1596. (For the text of the protest statement, see Chapter 2.) An interesting question is why China responded to a Presidential Decree but not to acts of actual occupation. In March 1978, on the eve of the visit by China’s Vice-Premier Li Xiannian to the Philippines, news broke that Philippine troops had recently occupied Panata Island of the Spratly group. China remained conspicuously silent. During Li’s stay in Manila, he went as far as to reassure his hosts that no trouble would ensue over the Spratly Islands between China and the landed on Commodore Reef in August 1980, China Philippines. (38) Similarly, when Philippine troops also remained silent. The most plausible explanation for China’s behaviour seems to lie in the nature of Marcos’ Presidential Decree. As compared with news reports of occupation of the islands, which Manila usually neither confirmed nor denied, the Presidential Decree was a public, official proclamation of Philippines’ sovereignty over part of the Spratlys. China would have felt it necessary to put on public record that it opposed such a position. In the long run, it was sensible for China to respond to public, official claims by other countries, including the Philippines, so that its position in future arguments would not be seriously prejudiced by appearing to have acquiesced to assertions of sovereignty. Moreover, China’s statement in September 1979 was very low-key compared with other statements and protests directed at Vietnam around that time. Similar to its stand during the row over the Reed Bank Area in 1976, the statement was merely a

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general reiteration of China’s sovereign rights over the Spratly Islands and did not condemn the Philippines in specific terms. Based on the above discussion, a number of observations may be drawn about China’s policy towards the dispute with the Philippines over part of the Spratlys during the 1970s. First, as a result of changing perceptions of its geopolitical interests in the early 1970s, China moderated its previous tough posture against Philippine interest in the Spratly Islands. Throughout the 1970s, the primary importance of China’s geopolitical considerations was underlined by its conciliatory attitude towards the dispute. Such an attitude was demonstrated by the assurance of a “peaceful solution” to the dispute which China gave to President Marcos in 1975, and by its silence on the expansion of the Philippines’ presence in the Spratlys thereafter. Despite that conciliatory attitude, China remained sensitive to any public, official claims by the Philippines to the Spratlys. Its response to Marcos’ Presidential Decree No.1596 issued in September 1979 indicated that its long-standing objective of “recovering” the islands remained very much intact. THE DISPUTE WITH MALAYSIA Malaysia was the last state to join in the contest for the Spratlys. Its claim to some islands of the Spratly group did not surface until December 1979, when Kuala Lumpur published an official map of Malaysia’s continental shelf. On the map, a number of islands and reefs of the Spratly group were marked as Malaysia’s territory, including Amboyna Cay (Pulak Kecil Amboyna), Commodore Reef (Terumba Laksamana), and Swallow Reef (Terumba Layang-Layang). (39) The first two were claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, China, and Taiwan. Swallow Reef was claimed by all the others except the Philippines. To a certain extent, Malaysia’s claim came as a surprise since it had appeared to be a disinterested onlooker to the multilateral dispute over the Spratly Islands before the publication of the above-mentioned map. It was reported that once in 1975, Malaysia had raised a protest against Chinese maps in which the ‘national boundary’ of China in the South China Sea was drawn right up to the coasts of Sarawak and Sabah. (40) (The

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possible interpretation of such a line of ‘national boundary’ in Chinese maps and its implications for China’s claims to maritime space in the South China Sea have already been discussed in Chapter 2.) However, Malaysia did not then lay claim to any specific island of the Spratly group. Its protest was seen only as a defence of its maritime rights in the area. Amboyna Cay, an island claimed by Malaysia in its 1979 map, had been occupied by South Vietnamese forces in 1975, and was later taken over by Hanoi. Malaysia did not raise any objection to these actions. Also, Marcos’ Presidential Decree No.1596 proclaiming Philippines’ sovereignty over the ‘Kalayaan Island Group’ was issued only a few months before the map of Malaysia’s continental shelf was published. It appears that Malaysia did not issue any protest against the Presidential Decree. Moreover, it was not made clear on what legal grounds Malaysia had laid claim to the above-named islands and reefs. The context in which the claim was publicized suggested that Malaysia had claimed them as part of its continental shelf. In 1964, Malaysia had become a party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. In 1966, a Continental Shelf Act was adopted which proclaimed Malaysia’s right to the continental shelves of peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak, and Sabah, up to a water depth of 200 meters or to the depth of exploitation. (41) The islands and reefs included in the Malaysian map were all lying on the continental shelf of Sabah. On 19 May 1983, Malaysia’s Deputy Minister in charge of legal matters was reported to have said that Malaysia’s rights to Amboyna Cay were a simple matter of geography. A few days later, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kadir Sheik Fadzir, was reported to have said that Malaysia had conducted a survey of the location of Amboyna Cay and it had been found to be in Malaysian waters. (42) These remarks supported the suggestion that Malaysia claimed some of the islands of the Spratly group because they formed part of its continental shelf. However, later developments have indicated that the above suggestion might not be wholly correct. In the summer of 1983, Malaysia sent troops to occupy Swallow Reef. There were conflicting reports as to exactly when occupation took place.

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According to the Far Eastern Economic Review, it took place in June 1983 under the cover of an eight-day exercise codenamed Starfish and held under the Five-Power Defence Arrangements. (43) However, in another report, a spokesperson of Malaysia’s Defence Ministry said that occupation of the atoll took place in late August. (44) It is possible that Malaysian troops made use of the five-power exercise to acquaint themselves with the atoll and then undertook the decisive act of occupation afterwards. It is also possible that Malaysia put the official date of occupation at a later time than it actually took place so as not to embarrass the other countries involved in the exercise. The occupation of Swallow Reef was first reported by Malaysia’s press on 4 September 1983. A protest was immediately heard from Vietnam. (45) To defend its action, Malaysia’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on 9 September 1983 claiming that Swallow Reef “has always been and is part of the territory of Malaysia”. The statement went on to remind the Vietnamese government of its violation of Malaysia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity by occupying Amboyna Cay. While the statement made clear that “the Malaysian Government has no claim whatsoever over (the) ‘Spratly Islands’,” Amboyna Cay, on the other hand, “had always been and is part of the territory of Malaysia”.(46) In this statement, it appeared that Malaysia’s claim to Swallow Reef and Amboyna Cay was based on historical rights rather than as part of its continental shelf. Presumably, Malaysia’s claim to sovereignty over Commodore Reef was based on a similar argument. Unfortunately, Malaysia did not explain why these islands and reefs “had always been” part of its territory. What concerns us most here is how China responded to Malaysia’s claim. A parallel with its handling of the dispute with the Philippines during the late 1970s may be drawn. On the one hand, China’s response was cautious and low-key. On the other, there was no sign that it was ready to give up its own claim. In particular, China remained sensitive to a public, official challenge to its own claim. China’s cautious and low-key approach was apparent in its reaction to the publication of the 1979 map of Malaysia’s continental shelf. In early 1980, both Vietnam and the Philippines issued and publicized their protests to the map.

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China chose to keep its protest private. The existence of the protest was only revealed to the outside world by Malaysia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs when he replied to a question in the National Assembly in June 1980. He did not disclose any detail about the content of the protest. ( ) China’s first public, official protest at Malaysia’s claim to some of the islands of the Spratly group was made in September 1983. (48) The situation was similar to that when Philippines’ Presidential Decree No.1596 was issued in September 1979. China did not respond immediately to reports about Malaysian troops’ occupation of Swallow Reef. Only after Malaysia had issued a statement on its sovereign rights over Swallow Reef did China issue its own. Once again, China felt it necessary to put on public record that it was opposed to Malaysia’s public, official claim. And as in its 1979 statement on the Philippines’ Presidential Decree, China only reaffirmed its claim to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (including Swallow Reef) in general, and did not denounce Malaysia in specific terms. In view of the above conduct, China’s policy towards the dispute with Malaysia over some of the islands of the Spratly group would seem to have been similar to that adopted towards the dispute with the Philippines. The similarity is hardly surprising given that similar geopolitical considerations were behind China’s policy towards managing the disputes. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, Malaysia occupied a similar position to the Philippines in China’s strategy of containing Vietnam’s influence in the region. Accordingly, the dispute over the Spratly Islands was pushed to the background. Therefore, what is interesting is not so much China’s conciliatory approach towards the dispute with Malaysia but rather its reiteration of sovereignty over the islands when this was felt necessary. This lends support to another argument presented in earlier chapters, especially Chapter 2. That is, notwithstanding China’s conciliatory approach at times towards disputes with some governments, there is no reason to believe that it has ever given up its basic position on the issue of sovereignty. The signficant implication of such an argument is that China has been constantly balancing various dimensions of its interests as regards disputes over the South China Sea islands. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, China might have

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considered it expedient to shelve the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia because of its wider geopolitical interests. But it is certainly possible that the balance of interests may change some day in the future, and hence bring about changes in policy accordingly. The early 1980s had already witnessed the growth of another particular dimension of interest: China’s offshore oil interests in the South China Sea. How this affected China’s policy towards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over parts of the Spratlys will be the subject of the next chapter. SUMMARY This chapter has examined the disputes between China and the Philippines and Malaysia over parts of the Spratlys. Before the 1970s, neither the Philippines nor Malaysia had taken any serious initiative over the Spratlys. Nevertheless, for the Philippines, the seeds of dispute with China were sown as early as the 1950s. As a result of the activities of a Philippine citizen, Tomas Cloma, the Philippine government had argued that ‘Freedomland’, a group of some 53 islets, cays, reefs, and sand bars, were distinct physically from the Spratlys, and had been discovered by Cloma. The Spratlys were then considered to be under the de facto trusteeship of the Allied Powers. In this manner, the Philippine government denied that any other government enjoyed sovereignty over the Spratlys, including so-called ‘Freedomland’. However, the Philippine government had stopped short of claiming that sovereignty for itself, although reserving the rights of its citizens to exploit their resources and settle there. The Philippine government’s formal claim was articulated in July 1971. China’s response to the claim was probably complicated by domestic political struggles. Huang Yongsheng, a close associate of Lin Biao and opposed to rapprochement with the U.S., had seized the opportunity to attack the Philippines, a close ally of the United States. None the less, as Lin Biao and his associates were purged in late 1971, the profound changes in China’s perception of its geopolitical interests in the region were soon manifested in its policy towards the dispute with the Philippines over the Spratly Islands. The Philippines, like other

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ASEAN countries, became an important target for China’s united front strategy against Soviet influence in the region. From 1972 onwards, China adopted a conciliatory approach towards the dispute with the Philippines. During Marcos’ visit to China in June 1975, it was agreed between the two governments that the dispute would be solved in a peaceful manner. In reality, such an agreement served as a green light for the Philippines’ continuing occupation of some of the islands of the Spratly group. Taking advantage of the conflict between China and Vietnam, the Philippines significantly expanded its presence in the Spratlys during the late 1970s. China’s policy towards the dispute with the Philippines over part of the Spratlys during the 1970s was in accord with an observation outlined in earlier chapters on the Sino-Vietnamese dispute over the South China Sea islands. That is, geopolitical considerations had played a major part in China’s policy towards the disputes over the islands. This observation is further supported by China’s responses to Malaysia’s claim to some islands of the Spratly group during the early 1980s. As in the case of the dispute with the Philippines, China adopted a conciliatory approach towards the dispute with Malaysia, for Malaysia occupied a similar position to the Philippines in China’s strategy of containing Vietnam’s influence in the region. In Chapter 5, it has been argued that, by the early 1980s, China’s expanding offshore oil interests in the South China Sea were beginning to play a more important role in its policy towards the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. How this factor affected China’s policy towards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia will be discussed in the next chapter. NOTES 1. Tao Cheng, “The Dispute Over the South China Sea Islands,” Texas International Law Journal, Vol.10 (1975), p.270. 2. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East Series (BBC, SWB, FE), No.57 (28 May 1950):26. 3. Supplement to People’s China, 1 September 1951:7.

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4. A.V.H. Hartendorp, History of Industry and Trade of the Philippines; The Magsaysay Administration, Manila: Philippine Education Co., 1961, pp.209–211. 5. Ibid. 6. Marwyn S.Samuels, Contest for the South China Sea, New York and London: Methuen, 1982, pp.81–86. For a map showing the extent of Cloma’s claim, see Joseph R.Morgan and Mark J.Valencia (eds.), Atlas for Marine Policy in Southeast Asian Seas, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983, p.51. 7. “Government States Position on Imbroglio Over Isles,” New Philippines, February 1974:6–11. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Hartendorp, History. 11. New China News Agency (NCNA), 30 May 1956. 12. Shao Hsun-cheng, “Chinese Islands in the South China Sea,” People’s China, 1 July 1956:25–27. 13. People’s Daily, 5 June 1956. 14. People’s Daily, 28 June 1956. 15. New Philippines, “Government States Position”, p.7. 16. Ibid. 17. People’s Daily, 30 August 1956. 18. Ibid. 19. New Philippines, “Government States Position”, p.10. 20. Corazon M. Siddayao, The Offshore Petroleum Resources of Southeast Asia; Potential Conflict Situations and Related Economic Considerations, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, p.89; Straits Times (Singapore), 16 June 1976. 21. Shao Hsuan-cheng, “Chinese Islands”. 22. Jeanette Greenfield, China and the Law of the Sea, Air and Environment, The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979, pp.148–158. 23. Samuels, Contest, p.91. 24. New Philippines, “Government States Position”, p.11. 25. NCNA, 16 July 1971. 26. Michael B.Yahuda, China’s Role in World Affairs, London: Croom Helm, 1978, pp.220–224. See also P.H.Chang, Power and Policy in China, London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978, pp.198– 9. 27. Peking Review, 1970, No.27. 28. New Philippines, “Government States Position”, and Samuels, Contest, p.90. 29. BBC, SWB, FE/5238/A3/1 (19 June 1976). 30. BBC, SWB, FE/5761/A3/11 (1 March 1978).

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31. BBC, SWB, FE/5767/A3/4 (18 March 1978). 32. “Huang Hua’s Report on the World Situation,” Issues and Studies (Taipei), Vol.13, No.11-Vol.14, No.3 (November 1977-March 1978). 33. Rodney Tasker, “Stake-out in the Spratlys,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 24 February 1978. 34. Ibid. 35. BBC, SWB, FE/6496/A3/9 (13 August 1980); and J.R.V. Prescott, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World, London and New York: Methuen, 1985, p.222. 36. Haydee B.Yorac, “The Philippine Claim to the Spratly Island Group,” Philippine Law Journal, Vol.58, 2nd Quarter (June 1983):42–68. 37. George Kent and Mark Valencia (eds.), Marine Policy in Southeast Asia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, Ch.5. 38. BBC, SWB, FE/5766/A3/1 (17 March 1978). 39. Alan J.Day (ed.), Border and Territorial Disputes, London: Longman, 1982, p.126. 40. BBC, SWB, FE/6394/A3/9 (14 April 1980). 41. The Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, Limits in the Sea, No.36 (revised edition, 1985), p.111. 42. Prescott, Maritime Political Boundaries, p.222. 43. K. Das, “Perched on a Claim,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1983:40–41; New Straits Times, 9 September 1983. 44. BBC, SWB, FE/7434/A3/1 (9 September 1983). 45. Ibid.; and Das, “Perched”. 46. Statement of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, 9 September 1983. 47. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, June 1980, p.212. 48. Beijing Review, 1983, No.39:8.

Chapter Seven THE IDEA OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT

In the last chapter, the emphasis of the discussion was on the relationship between China’s geopolitical interests in the region, and how that affected its policy towards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over parts of the Spratlys. As discussed in Chapter 5 dealing with China’s policy towards the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, its growing offshore oil interests in the South China Sea began to play an increasingly important role during the early 1980s. It is logical to expect that such interests would also have had a growing influence on China’s policy towards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia. It is the major task of the present chapter to enquire in what way such interests may have affected its policy. China’s interest in offshore oil grew concurrently with the intensification of the contest for maritime rights in the South China Sea. By the early 1970s, the governments of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia had already pressed claims to their countries’ respective continental shelves. (1) However, the most important development for the contest over the waters around the Spratly Islands was the growing global practice during the 1970s of establishing exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Although the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was only concluded in 1982, during the late 1970s, it had already produced negotiating texts which acknowledged the right of a coastal state to establish an EEZ with a breadth of up to 200 nautical miles measured from baselines drawn along its coast. During the late 1970s and the early 1980s, one by one, coastal states in the South China Sea proclaimed their rights to 200-mile EEZs. Vietnam was the first

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to do so in May 1977. (See the discussion about Hanoi’s statement on Vietnam’s territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone in Chapter 4.) In September 1979, Philippines’ President Marcos signed Presidential Decree No.1599 proclaiming the establishment of a 200-mile EEZ around the islands of the Philippines. (2) In March and April 1980, the Indonesian and Malaysian governments followed suit and proclaimed their rights to 200-mile EEZs respectively. (3) In the cases of the Philippines and Indonesia, the archipelagic principle was also applied so that the outer boundaries of their EEZs would penetrate even further into the waters of the semi-enclosed South China Sea. Although the greater part of the Spratlys are deep water areas, the above-described claims to EEZs, which do not take into account geomorphological features, had the potential effect of dividing up the whole archipelago. In the contest for maritime rights in the sea areas surrounding the Spratly Islands, China would have been the most frustrated party because it did not have any physical presence in the archipelago. In face of the unilateral claims by other coastal states to maritime space in the South China Sea and the growth of its own offshore oil interests, there would have been greater pressure on China to gain a foothold in the Spratlys. In Chapter 5, it was pointed out that China’s growing offshore oil interests in the South China Sea had been an important reason for its military build-up in the Paracels during the early 1980s. At the same time, such interests had increased the potential of military confrontation between China and Vietnam over the Spratly Islands. However, because of geopolitical considerations as discussed in earlier chapters, military pressure could not be similarly applied to the two other parties to the dispute over the Spratlys, namely, the Philippines and Malaysia. China had to look for an alternative approach. During the early 1980s, there were signs that the practice of joint development was a likely candidate for such an alternative approach. This chapter will consider China’s attitude towards the idea of joint development and enquire how useful such an idea might be in handling its disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over part of the Spratlys.

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THE IDEA OF JOINT DEVELOPMENT The idea of joint development is certainly not a Chinese invention. There are a number of examples of the application of the idea to solving disputes over claims to maritime space in the Asian region. For example, in November 1970, a non-governmental Japan-South Korea-Taiwan Liaison Committee was established by business people from the three countries for research into and development of resources in the East China Sea. After diplomatic relations had been established between Tokyo and Beijing in September 1972, Taiwan was left out of the picture. But co-operation between Japan and South Korea continued. In January 1974, the governments of the two countries signed an agreement on joint development of the continental shelf in the East China Sea covering an area of about 82,000 square kilometres south of Cheju Island. (4) In the South China Sea, there is also the example of the agreement between the Thai and Malaysian governments to set up a joint body (with the unwieldy title of the Joint Authority for the Exploitation of the Non-Living Resources of the Seabed) responsible for developing oil and gas deposits in contested waters in the Gulf of Thailand. The initial agreement on setting up the body was reached in February 1978, and the final agreement concluded in June 1980. (5) This outcome was the result of the common desire on both sides to avoid conflicts over overlapping oil concessions granted by the two governments in the early 1970s. Therefore, the idea of joint development is not unprecedented as a means of reconciling overlapping claims to maritime space between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. To a certain extent, this practice has been a product of the nature of disputes over claims to maritime space. The Law of the Sea (LOS) is still an evolving institution. Despite eight long years of negotiation, the LOS Convention adopted in 1982, but not yet ratified, is not free from ambiguities. One notable example is the issue of how to delimit a continental shelf or EEZ between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. The LOS Convention simply provides that such delimitation “shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in order to

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achieve an equitable solution”. (6) What may be considered “an equitable solution” is, however, subject to different interpretations. It is natural that governments tend to accept only those interpretations which are favourable to their own claims. (As we shall see later, this has been the case in the dispute between China and Japan over the delimitation of the continental shelf in the East China Sea.) In a situation in which overlapping claims to maritime space between states with opposite or adjacent coasts cover a large area of waters, it may be more advantageous for the governments concerned to agree on joint development of the sea areas under dispute than remain locked in a stalemate. China was slow to accept the idea of joint development. Not surprisingly, it was hostile to the above-mentioned schemes of joint development in the East China Sea, which excluded its participation. In December 1970, it denounced the establishment of the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan Liaison Committee for research into and development of resources in the East China Sea. (7) Throughout the 1970s, China repeatedly protested at the efforts of Japan and South Korea to jointly develop the continental shelf in the East China Sea south of Cheju Island. (8) At the same time, China was also reluctant to enter into similar ventures itself. It was reported that in January 1973, Japan’s then Minister of International Trade and Industry, Yasuhiro Nakasone, proposed to China joint development of the continental shelf in the East China Sea. The Chinese side was then unwilling to consider such an arrangement. (9) By the late 1970s, a change in China’s attitude towards joint development had taken place. During 1979–80, at the meetings of UNCLOS III, China proposed the incorporation of a clause on the continental shelf into the LOS Convention suggesting joint development as an interim alternative to boundary resolution. (10) The proposal did not materialize. The LOS Convention adopted in 1982 only provides that pending agreement on the delimitation of the continental shelf (and the EEZ as well), “the States concerned, in spirit of understanding and co-operation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, and during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement.” (11) At the signing ceremony of the LOS

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Convention, the Chinese delegation stated that it was not totally satisfied with this particular provision. (12) The above-described change in China’s attitude towards joint development was not accidental. Growth in its interest in offshore oil during the late 1970s was undoubtedly an important driving force behind the search for solutions to disputes over claims to maritime space in neighbouring sea areas. None the less, as pointed out in Chapter 5, it was the adoption of the ‘open-door’ policy in late 1978 which removed the political barriers to China’s acceptance of co-operation with foreign capital and technologies in developing its offshore oil resources. In line with this policy, joint development of disputed sea areas was no longer looked upon as an affront to China’s sovereignty. Just as in many other cases, once the idea of joint development had been accepted by the Chinese leadership, it was soon elevated to the level of a high principle. In a collection of Deng Xiaoping’s speeches and talks published in 1984, Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, it appears that Deng himself had taken an active interest in the idea. In February 1984, during a meeting with a delegation from the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University, Deng spoke about the ‘new’ approach to territorial disputes: I have also considered the possibility of resolving certain territorial disputes by having the countries concerned jointly develop the disputed areas before discussing the question of sovereignty. New approaches should be sought to solve such prob1ems according to realities. (13) Later, in October 1984, at the Third Plenary Session of the Central Advisory Committee of the Communist Party of China, Deng mentioned the idea again: International disputes that are not handled right can reach the flash point. I asked them (foreign guests) whether the policy of “one country, two systems” could be adopted in some cases and the policy of “joint development” in others…. We Chinese stand for peace and hope to solve disputes by peaceful means. What kind of peaceful means?

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“One country, two systems” and “joint development”. Everyone says this is a new and very interesting idea. (14) As pointed out above, the idea of joint development is certainly not a Chinese invention. What might be novel about Deng’s remarks was that he seemed to suggest even wider scope for application of the idea, covering not only disputes over claims to maritime space but also territorial disputes. As a reasonable guess, Deng probably had the disputes over the island groups in the East and South China Sea in mind, suggesting joint development of the islands’ surrounding sea areas while leaving aside the issue of sovereignty. To a certain extent, such an interpretation was indirectly confirmed by a senior Chinese official in Hong Kong. During a meeting with local students, Xu Jiatun, Director of the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) and member of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, quoted and explained Deng’s words in the following way: “Joint development” refers to the solution of such problems on the Diaoyudao dispute. Since it cannot be solved for the moment, we can join hands in the development, leaving it for our next generations to solve. (15) The implications of the above-quoted remarks is that by the early 1980s, China was willing to shelve the dispute over sovereignty over some island groups in order to join hands with other contesting countries to develop their surrounding sea areas. By comparison, the dispute over the Diaoyudao (Senkakus) and continental shelf in the East China Sea was much less complex than the one over the Spratly Islands and their surrounding sea areas in the South China Sea. Relations between Beijing and Tokyo were much better than those between the former and Hanoi. Although Beijing had relatively better relations with Manila and Kuala Lumpur, they were none the less very delicate, especially those with Kuala Lumpur. They shared similar (but not identical) geopolitical interests as regards the ‘threat’ posed by the Vietnam-Soviet Union alliance to the region, but were still divided ideologically and politically on a

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wide range of issues (e.g. on the link between China’s Communist Party and Malaya Communist Party; on the role of the Khmer Rouge in the future of Kampuchea). (16) It was therefore sensible for China to look on the dispute over the Diaoyudao as one where the idea of joint development could be tried out first. Nevertheless, in the long run, it is logical to assume that China might also consider the possibility of applying the idea to the dispute over the Spratlys in the South China Sea. For example, in April 1984, a Western scholar visiting China was told by officials of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences that they would like to see the dispute with the Philippine government over the Spratly Islands be handled in a similar way to that over the Diaoyudao. (17) In the case of the dispute in the East China Sea, some preliminary efforts at joint development have already been undertaken. It is worthwhile to look at them first in the next section. Lessons drawn from these efforts may shed light on how useful the idea could be in dealing with the disputes in the South China Sea, which will be discussed in the section after next. THE DISPUTE IN THE EAST CHINA SEA The dispute over the Diaoyudao in the East China Sea is a subject for a major study in itself. Since it is not the subject of this research, the following discussion will be limited to the relevance of the idea of joint development to the dispute in question. The following paragraphs will provide a brief account of the characteristics of the dispute and then examine developments during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, when the Chinese and Japanese governments began to explore the possibility of joint development in the surrounding sea areas of the Diaoyudao. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the validity of either side’s claim to the islands. The Diaoyudao is an island group consisting of eight small, uninhabited islands, lying 118 miles northeast of Taiwan. The island group did not become a focus of active contention until the early 1970s when the U.S. government, hitherto administering the islands since the end of the Second World War, agreed to ‘return’ them to Japan under the Okinawa Reversion Agreement. This gave rise to protests by both the

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governments of the PRC and ROC, and a movement was launched by overseas Chinese to ‘defend’ the islands. In September 1970, Japan’s Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi made a statement claiming the Diaoyudao (called by the Japanese as Senkakus) as Japanese territory. This claim was refuted by the Chinese government’s statement of December 1970 (which, as mentioned above, also denounced the establishment of the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan Liaison Committee to jointly explore the East China Sea). In June 1971, the islands were formally ‘returned’ to Japan by the U.S. government. In December of the same year, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued another statement, denouncing the above agreement, which ‘returned’ the Diaoyudao to Japan, as “utterly illegal”. (18) The Japanese government’s claim to the islands was based on the right of discovery, and effective occupation of the islands since the late nineteenth century. The Chinese government claimed the islands on the basis of historical rights. According to its own records, Chinese occupation and administration of the islands dated back to the Ming Dynasty in the sixteenth century. Moreover, the Chinese government argued that the islands were part of Taiwan, and ceded to Japan under the terms of the “unequal” Treaty of Shimonoseki signed in 1895. As the post-war Potsdam agreement, to which the Japanese government had later pledged its consent, stipulated that Taiwan should be returned to China, the Diaoyudao should be returned as well. This argument was refuted by the Japanese government, which claimed that the Diaoyudao were never included in the Treaty of Shimonoseki. (19) Similar to the situation in the South China Sea, ownership of the Diaoyudao could have significant implications for the dispute over claims to maritime space in the East China Sea between China and Japan. As pointed out in Chapter 2, in the working paper submitted to the United Nations Seabed Committee in 1973, China proposed that the continental shelf of a state should be defined as the natural prolongation of the continental territory and that there should not be a universal maximum limit to the breadth of the continental shelf. While China proposed that states adjacent or opposite to each other should jointly delimit the jurisdiction of the continental shelf through consultation, it did not endorse the principle of

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equidistance. In later years, at the meeting of UNCLOS III, China made its position clearer by suggesting that delimitation of continental shelf between states with adjacent or opposite coasts should be determined through negotiations between the parties concerned on the basis of equity, taking into account all factors concerned; the median line approach was acceptable only when in accordance with equitable principles. (20) At the meetings of UNCLOS III, Japan took a different position from China on the issue of delimitation of continental shelves between states with adjacent or opposite coasts. It proposed that the outer limit of the continental shelf of a state should not exceed a maximum distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea of the state; and that the delimitation of the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to states with adjacent or opposite coasts should be determined by agreement between them, taking into account the principle of equidistance. Japan also maintained that failing such an agreement, no state was entitled to extend its sovereign rights over the continental shelf beyond the median line. (21) Not surprisingly, the general position of both countries on the issue of delimitation of continental shelf between states with adjacent or opposite coasts was so designed as to give them a favourable share of the continental shelf in the East China Sea. According to China’s position, the continental shelf in the East China Sea, which stretches from China’s coasts right up to the Okinawa Trough just west of the Ryukus of Japan, should be regarded as the natural prolongation of the continental territory of China and therefore belongs to it. According to Japan’s position, however, the continental shelf should be divided along the median line between the baselines for measuring the territorial seas of the two countries. If geomorphological features are taken into account for delimiting the continental shelf, Japan’s case would be weakened by the presence of the Okinawa Trough. As the Diaoyudao lie right at the edge of the continental shelf of the East China Sea, between Taiwan Island of China and Ryukus of Japan, ownership of the Diaoyudao would be regarded by Japan as an important factor for strengthening its claim to the continental shelf. In fact, if the Diaoyudao are used as outposts for drawing the baselines of the

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Japanese coasts and the median-line principle is adopted at the same time, Japan would be entitled to the greater part of the continental shelf in the East China Sea. In view of the above considerations, that the Diaoyudao suddenly became a focus of serious contention in the early 1970s is not difficult to understand. Like the contest for the islands in the South China Sea, this was partly the result of the ECAFE seismic survey reports, which suggested the existence of rich oil deposits in the continental shelf in the East China Sea. Equally important, it was due to the littoral states’ acute awareness of their maritime rights as the result of growing interest at the prospect of a new Convention on the Law of the Sea. Despite the fiery statements issued by China during 1970–71 (22), the controversy between Beijing and Tokyo over the Diaoyudao soon subsided when they established diplomatic relations in September 1972. In the decade that followed, the issue remained relatively dormant except for a bizarre episode in 1978. In April 1978, a number of Chinese ‘fishing boats’ sailed near the Diaoyudao, and their crew held up placards which declared China’s sovereignty over the islands. When the Japanese government raised protests at the incident, they were initially rejected by the Chinese side. However, Chinese officials later admitted that the incident was a “misunderstanding”, and promised that it would never happen again. It is believed by some observers that the incident was associated with the ongoing negotiations over the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. (23) However, the real motive behind the incident has remained obscure. In any case, the fishing boat issue was certainly left behind by the Chinese and Japanese governments when Deng Xiaoping, in his capacity as China’s Vice-Premier, visited Japan in October 1978 to sign the Peace Treaty. At a press conference in Tokyo, Deng told reporters that the two governments had agreed to shelve the dispute over the Diaoyudao when they established diplomatic relations in 1972, and had reached the same understanding again when they signed the Peace Treaty. On the prospects for settling the dispute, Deng said that: It is true that two sides maintain different views on this guestion…. It does not matter if this question is shelved for

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some time, say, ten years. Our generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all. (24) Despite the shelving of the dispute over sovereignty over the Diaoyudao, the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf in the East China Sea continued to be an irritant in Sino-Japanese relations. As mentioned above, on 30 January 1974, the Japanese and South Korean governments signed an agreement to explore jointly an area of about 82,000 square kilometres south of Cheju Island in the East China Sea. A protest statement was issued by the Chinese government a few days later, which demanded that “the question of how to divide the continental shelf in the East China Sea should be decided by China and the other countries through consultations.” As pointed out in Chapter 3, the protest contained an element of conciliation since China stressed the need for consultations besides asserting its claim to the continental shelf. Still, China’s opposition caused the Japanese government to have second thoughts about going ahead with the agreement with South Korea. The agreement was not submitted to the Japanese Diet for ratification until May 1977. (The South Korean side had already ratified the agreement in July 1974.) Once again, the Chinese government promptly sent a protest statement to Tokyo. A further protest was registered when the agreement was finally ratified by the Japanese Diet in June 1978. (25) The above account illustrates that although Japan had hesitated, it went ahead after all with the agreement with South Korea to develop jointly part of the continental shelf in the East China Sea despite China’s protests. By the late 1970s, China would have felt that words of protest were no longer enough and active measures to defend its maritime rights in the East China Sea were necessary. It was at this juncture that China began to propose to Japan joint development of the surrounding sea areas of the Diaoyudao. In September 1979, during a visit to Tokyo, China’s Vice-Premier Gu Mu publicly suggested that the dispute over the Diaoyudao should be shelved while the two countries undertook to jointly develop oil resources in the surrounding

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sea areas. (26) After several months of deliberation, the Japanese government responded positively to the idea. In June 1980, Japan’s Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira told the House of Representatives Commerce and Industry Committee that Japan was “ready to discuss with China possible oil exploration and development off the Senkaku Islands”. (27) It was obvious that China was ready for Japan’s response as the NCNA immediately reported that consultation would take place “at an opportune moment”. (28) Later, another Chinese Vice-Premier, Yao Yilin, went further by suggesting that the United States might be invited to participate in this joint venture. (29) There was an air of optimism after these initial exchanges of encouraging signals. Such high expectations were soon dashed when the two governments took a more serious look at the matter during two-day working-level talks held in Beijing in November 1980. Although it was reported that the Chinese government did take a positive attitude towards joint Sino-Japanese development of the continental shelf in the East China Sea, the vast gap between the positions of both sides on the delimitation of the continental shelf (as described above) blocked further progress. In addition, the existence of the Japan-South Korean agreement was a source of friction. (30) In fact, while the Chinese and Japanese governments were contemplating the idea of joint development, joint drilling and test exploration of the continental shelf by the Japanese and South Koreans had already started in May 1980. The Japanese were still bound by economic and legal imperatives to their agreement with the South Koreans, which was strongly resented by the Chinese government. The less than successful attempts by the Chinese and Japanese governments to realize the idea of joint development in the surrounding sea areas of the Diaoyudao indicated that the idea was far from problem-free. Regarding the dispute in the East China Sea, there were at least two important sources of difficulty. First, the gap in the positions of the two governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the East China Sea was too wide to be bridged. Irrespective of the dispute over the Diaoyudao, the adoption of different principles by the two governments for the delimitation of the continental shelf was a serious enough problem in itself. Shelving the dispute over the

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Diaoyudao did not mean that the problem could be easily resolved. For the idea of joint development to be successful, the gap between overlapping claims to maritime space should not be too wide; otherwise both sides to the dispute might feel that they would have to make too great a compromise. In the context of the East China Sea, the Japanese could feel that the Chinese themselves were unable to exploit the continental shelf without the assistance of foreign capital and technologies. If the area covered by joint development of the continental shelf extended right up to the Okinawa Trough, the Japanese would have felt that the Chinese would gain a lot without actually giving away anything. Whereas for the Chinese government, if joint development was limited to the continental shelf on the Chinese side of the median line between the baselines of the two countries, it would consider itself to be the only party making a concession, and thus be afraid that the case of its claim to the continental shelf extending over the Japanese side of the median line might be weakened in the long run. Second, the existence of a third party to the dispute can be a serious obstacle to joint development. This is especially so when that third party is on friendly terms with one side but not with the other. In the example of the East China Sea, the South Korean government was not recognized by Beijing. If any plan for joint development in the East China Sea were to involve any Korean representation, Beijing could only accept the North Korean government. The only chance of Beijing being willing and able to co-operate with Seoul, and of Tokyo co-operating with Pyongyang, would be if Seoul and Pyongyang were willing to participate together in a four-party agreement. This prospect was, however, not permitted by the political situation in the early 1980s. JOINT DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA? As mentioned above, some officials of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences had indicated that Beijing would like to see the dispute with the Philippines over part of the Spratlys handled in a way similar to that contemplated over the Diaoyudao. This indication suggests that China might have considered

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proposing the idea of joint development to the Philippines as well. In fact, if the Chinese government did want to try the idea out in the South China Sea, the Philippine and Malaysian governments were the only possible invitees to any venture in joint development. As Mark Valencia has observed, “Perhaps one of the best candidates for joint development would be portions of the Spratly area. If Vietnam and the Chinese province of Taiwan could somehow be excluded from the Spratly issue, China, the Philippines, and Malaysia could undertake joint exploration there, perhaps in areas farthest from Vietnamese-claimed islands.” (31) Although there have not been any indications that the Chinese government has ever proposed such an idea, in public or in private, to the Philippine or Malaysian governments, it is still worthwhile discussing such a scenario because it might be a serious possibility in the future. Below, the hypothetical question will be discussed: would the Chinese government have been successful if it had asked the Philippine and Malaysian governments to join hands in developing the surrounding sea areas of the Spratlys? To start with, we can assume that China would have to overcome difficulties similar to those which it had faced in the dispute with Japan over the Diaoyudao and continental shelf in the East China Sea. The above quotation by Valencia echoes one of the serious problems which has been discussed in the last section: the existence of a third, or in the case of the Spratly Islands, a fourth or even fifth, party to the dispute. Since the Philippine and Malaysian governments do not have formal diplomatic relations with Taipei, it might be easier for them to ignore Taiwan in any project of joint development. However, there were no strong incentives for them to ally with China in order to isolate Vietnam. In the long run, the Philippine and Malaysian governments (and probably other ASEAN governments as well) almost certainly regard Vietnam as a less formidable competitor for resources in the Spratlys than China. They would be apprehensive about the consequences of having China’s presence and influence extend right up to their own front doorsteps. As a matter of fact, both the Philippines and Malaysia had already reached an understanding with Vietnam that their

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disagreements over the Spratly Islands would be settled peacefully and through diplomatic channels. In early 1978, during a visit to the Philippines by Nguyen Duy Trinh, Vietnam’s Vice-Premier and concurrently Foreign Minister, the two sides agreed in writing that “any conflict, any disagreement, any misunderstanding will be settled diplomatically in a spirit of friendship and co-operation.” It was later confirmed by Philippines’ President Marcos that the above understanding covered the dispute over the Spratlys. (32) {There was also speculation that Hanoi had offered to recognize Manila’s sovereignty over the Philippines-occupied islands of the Spratly group in exchange for the latter’s recognition of Hanoi’s sovereignty over the Vietnamese-occupied islands. (33) Such speculation was disproved by a Vietnamese protest to the Philippines in September 1979 which reaffirmed Vietnam’s claim to the “entirety” of the Spratly Islands. (34) } As regards the dispute between Vietnam and Malaysia over some of the islands of the Spratly group, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach raised the issue of the Spratly Islands with the Malaysian government during a visit to Kuala Lumpur in May 1980. Although the Malaysian government did not consider that the time was suitable for negotiations on the issue, presumably because of the situation in Kampuchea (35), Vietnam was recognized as a party to the dispute. In the aftermath of Malaysia’s occupation of Swallow Reef in September 1983, the Vietnamese and Malaysian governments agreed that they would settle their conflicting claims to some of the islands in the South China Sea through negotiations. (36) In view of the above, it would therefore be highly unlikely that either the Philippines or Malaysia would turn their backs on Vietnam to do a deal with China, unless very drastic changes in the regional environment occurred. The situation has been complicated also by the fact that the Spratly Islands can hardly be regarded as irrelevant to delimitation of maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. In the context of the East China Sea, some observers have argued that there is a strong case for denying the Diaoyudao any continental shelf beyond their territorial sea of 12 nautical miles, because of their geological features, size, and conditions for economic activities. Accordingly, “the territorial dispute (over

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the Diaoyudao) can then be wholly detached from the continental shelf issue. However, the territorial issue is eventually resoved…. the disputing states would be unable to take advantage of the islets’ strategic location in claiming any portion of the seabed of the East China Sea beyond their territorial sea.” (37) However, the same cannot be said about the Spratly Islands. Even if the Spratly Islands do not generate their own continental shelves or EEZs, due to the large number of the islets and the diversity in their geographical locations, their territorial seas would still cover a large section of the South China Sea. Without a solution to the dispute over the islands, it is difficult to see how a solution to delimitation of maritime boundaries in their surrounding sea areas could be reached. And as Prescott has pointed out, any solution to the dispute over sovereignty over the Spratly Islands has to involve both China and Vietnam; otherwise the danger of conflict would have been increased rather than decreased. (38) Another lesson drawn from the example of the dispute in the East China Sea is whether the difference in positions of the governments on their claims to maritime space would be too large to be bridged. In the context of the dispute in the South China Sea, it is difficult to give a definite answer because, until the early 1980s, China itself had remained ambiguous about its claims to maritime space in the South China Sea. If China’s claims were based on the line of ‘national boundary’ as marked in Chinese maps (see Chapter 2 for greater detail), the gap would certainly be too big. That line of ‘national boundary’ encloses not only the territorial waters of the Spratly Islands, but also the waters lying above the continental shelf of Malaysian Sabah and Sarawak, as well as those within the treaty limits of the Philippines. Even if China’s claims did not follow this line of ‘national boundary’ and were based only on territorial waters generated by the islets of the Spratly group, they could still be very extensive due to the reasons discussed above. In Chapter 2, it has been pointed out that China might have chosen to remain ambiguous about these issues so as to retain flexibility for future negotiations and bargaining. If this observation is correct, China could be said to have been caught in a dilemma. The above issues are not minor ones that can be simply set aside. The idea of joint development could never

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become a practical possibility until China makes clear its own positions on these issues. The dilemma for China is that if it opted for the minimum position, its position might effectively forego its right to explore certain parts of the South China Sea in the long run. The above problems can be said to be the political and legal barriers to realization of the idea of joint development in the South China Sea. In fact, an additional and probably the most crucial problem for joint development between China, and the Philippines and Malaysia, arises from the rational calculations of economic advantage and disadvantage of the latter two states involved in the dispute: that is, whether the result of their calculations in any way favours the idea. In the example of the dispute in the East China Sea, harmonious relations with China were highly valued by the Japanese government for a variety of reasons. In the first place, the relations brought about a stable balance of power in the region. In consequence, the security situation of Japan was improved. The relations also opened up useful business opportunities for Japanese industry. Furthermore, during the late 1970s, China was playing a more and more important role as a supplier of energy to Japan. That was why the Japanese government had always taken China’s position on the continental shelf in the East China Sea into serious consideration. An indication of such consideration was the long delay in ratification of the Japan-South Korea agreement by the Japanese Diet. Because of China’s position on the dispute over the Diaoyudao and continental shelf of the East China Sea, pending its solution, the Japanese government refrained from exploring the Diaoyudao and their adjacent sea areas, for fear of provoking China. For example, in May 1979, the Okinawa Development Agency constructed a heliport on one of the disputed islands. When this was strongly opposed by the Chinese government, the Japanese government backed down and the heliport was abandoned. (39) In view of the above factors, it was not surprising that the Japanese government was more receptive to the idea of joint development with China in the East China Sea. Since it was not prepared to take any unilateral action towards the Diaoyudao and the surrounding sea areas, joint

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development provided the Japanese government with the benefit of a chance to explore the areas. Such economic incentives present for the Japanese government in the East China Sea were, however, not present for other governments involved in the dispute over the Spratly Islands. As pointed out in earlier chapters and the opening section of this chapter, by the late 1970s, all the participants in the contest for the Spratly Islands and their surrounding sea areas had already taken unilateral actions of occupation and/or exploration, and would continue to do so whenever and wherever possible. In fact, the Philippine government, supposedly the most likely candidate for joint development of the Spratlys with China, had been the most active in taking unilateral actions of occupation and exploration. (See Chapter 6 for greater detail.) The Chinese government had no direct sanctions to employ against the Philippine government, nor any other government, to stop exploration activities on the Spratly Islands or their surrounding sea areas. Similarly, during the early 1980s, the Malaysian government was more interested in pursuing its unilateral claims in the South China Sea than in seeking co-operation with other countries in developing the area. For example, concurrent with its control of Swallow Reef in 1983, the airforce base on Labuan off Sabah was upgraded and more offshore patrol boats were purchased. (40) In sum, the Philippine or Malaysian governments did not feel any need to join hands with the Chinese government in exploring or exploiting the islands or sea areas already under their effective occupation. From China’s conciliatory approach towards the disputes with them during the late 1970s, the Philippines and Malaysia must have understood that their exploration activities did not need Beijing’s consent since no retaliation would be forthcoming. Moreover, since the Chinese government itself did not have any permanent physical presence on the Spratly Islands, it had nothing to offer in any scheme of joint development. This further limited its ability to attract the Philippine or Malaysian governments into any such venture, for in such ventures, the Chinese government would stand as the obvious net beneficiary. To sum up, besides the political as well as legal barriers that the Chinese government would face when proposing the idea

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of joint development of the Spratly Islands to the Philippine and/or Malaysian governments, its fatal handicap was the lack of significant economic or other leverage to either attract others to join hands with it or to discourage others from pursuing unilateral actions. SUMMARY In the last chapter, the speech of Huang Hua, former Chinese Foreign Minister, in 1977 was quoted, in which he warned that while other countries might exploit the Spratlys in the meantime, the Chinese government “will confiscate all of them in due time”. Despite the warning, the speech reflected the rather relaxed mood of the Chinese government. It did not feel anxious to solve the dispute. By the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the mood had changed. While the contest for maritime resources in the South China Sea was becoming ever more intensive, China’s interest in offshore oil was also rapidly developing. Pressure on China to look for a means to defend its maritime resource interests in the South China Sea was growing. To a significant extent, the endorsement of the idea of joint development was the outcome of such pressure. In fact, for China, the idea of joint development was not limited to handling the dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. It was intended as a general method to dissociate the usually more intractable territorial disputes over island groups from overlapping claims to maritime space in their adjacent sea areas. In fact, the idea of joint development probably has a higher chance of success in the East China Sea than in the South China Sea. That was why China first proposed the idea to Japan. Preliminary efforts to explore the idea were undertaken during 1979–80. Early results showed that serious problems existed. Legally, the positions of the two sides on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the East China Sea were too far apart. Politically, there existed a third party to the dispute, South Korea, which had already signed an agreement with Japan to explore a certain area of the East China Sea. China, whose claim to the continental shelf of the East China Sea covered the area of joint Japan-South Korean development, was not prepared to co-operate with South Korea.

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In the context of the Spratly Islands, China certainly would not propose the idea of joint development to Vietnam. As discussed in Chapter 5, as its interest in offshore oil in the South China Sea grew during the late 1970s and the early 1980s, China had adopted a military approach towards the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Nevertheless, the Philippines and Malaysia were still possible candidates for co-operation with China in any scheme of joint development of the Spratlys. Although until the early 1980s, China had yet to propose the idea to the Philippines and/or Malaysia, there were signs that it hoped to handle the disputes with them over the Spratly Islands in a similar way to that. over the Diaoyudao. However, if the idea of joint development was evidently unsuccessful in the East China Sea, it would be even more so in the South China Sea. The legal and political obstacles to joint development in the East China Sea can be found also in the context of the Spratly Islands. Even if the Philippines and Malaysia were willing to ignore Taiwan, they would not necessarily be prepared to isolate Vietnam on behalf of China. Moreover, China had to make clear its own claims to maritime space in the South China Sea before any reconciliation of the conflicting claims could be seriously contemplated. But above all, it was the lack of on the part of China that made the idea of joint development look rather empty. For joint development to work, China would need to offer more than a vague formula. NOTES 1. The Office of Geographer, U.S. Department of State, Limits in the Sea, No.36 (revised edition, 1985). 2. For the text of the decree, see Yong Leng Lee, Southeast Asia and the Law of the Sea (revised edition), Singapore University Press, 1980, Appendix F. 3. For texts of the proclamations, see Lee, ibid., Appendix D and E. 4. Ying-jeou Ma, Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea, Baltimore: University of Maryland, Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1984, Ch.2. 5. Hugh Peyman, “Oil Search Under a Hazy Border,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 June 1980, p.52.

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6. UN Doc. A/CONF.62/122, 7 October 1982. 7. Peking Review, 11 December 1970:15–16. 8. Peking Review, 8 February 1974:3; 17 June 1977:16–17; and 26 June 1978:25. 9. Wolf Mendl, Issues in Japan’s China Policy, London: Macmillan, 1978, pp.88–92. 10. George Kent and Mark Valencia (eds.), Marine Policy in Southeast Asia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, p.187. 11. See Note 6. 12. People’s Daily, 4 May 1982 and 11 December 1982. 13. Deng Xiaoping, Build Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1985, p.24. 14. Ibid., p.56. 15. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East Series (BBC, SWB, FE) 7873/A3/1. 16. For analyses of problems in Sino-Malaysian relations, see T.Tajima, “China and Southeast Asia: Strategic Interests and Policy Prospects,” Adelphi Papers, No.178; and John Wong, The Political Economy of China’s Changing Relations with Southeast Asia, London: Macmillan, 1984, Ch.4. 17. This point was personally relayed to me by Mr. Michael Yahuda. 18. Peking Review, 7 January 1972:12. 19. R.K.Jain, China and Japan 1949–80 (second edition), Atlantic Highlands, N.J. : Humanities Press, 1981, Ch.8. 20. Ma, Legal Problems, Ch.2. 21. Ibid. 22. Like Huang Yongsheng’s statement on the Spratly Islands in July 1971, these statements may also reflect domestic politcal struggle over the policy of rapprochement with the U.S. and its allies. However, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the domestic background of China’s policy towards the dispute over the Diaoyudao. 23. Jain, China and Japan, Ch.8; see also Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: the Senkaku Incident Prelude,” Asian Survey, Vol.18 (1978), p.1235. 24. Peking Review, 3 November 1978:16. 25. See Note 8. 26. George Lauriat and Melinda Liu, “Pouring on Oily Waters,” Far Eastern Economic 28 September 1979, pp.19–21. 27. BBC, SWB, FE/6468/A3/2 (30 April 1980). 28. Ibid. 29. David G.Muller, Jr., China as a Maritime Power, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984, pp.216–217. 30. BBC, SWB, FE/6588/A3/3 (29 November 1980).

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31. Kent and Valencia, Marine Policy, p.187. 32. BBC, SWB, FE/5767/A3/4 (18 March 1978). 33. William J.Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Sa igon, Ohio University: Center for International Studies, 1980. 34. Vietnam Courier, The Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes, Hanoi, 1981, pp.58–59. 35. Foreign Affairs Malaysia, December 1980, p.2. 36. BBC, SWB, FE/75/A3/5 (6 October 1983). 37. See, for example, Ma, Legal Problems; and Jeanette Greenfield, China and the Law of the Sea, Air and Environment, The Netherlands: Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1979, pp.126–143. 38. J.R.V.Prescott, “Maritime Jurisdictional Issues,” in Kent and Valencia, Marine Policy, Ch.3. 39. Jain, China and Japan, Ch.8. 40. K.Das, “Perched on a Claim,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 September 1983, pp.40–41.

Chapter Eight CONCLUSION

As outlined in Chapter 1, the point of departure of this research is the observation that there is no simple direct relationship between what China claims and how it behaves in a territorial dispute. In any claim to territory, a range of options are available to China for prosecuting the dispute in question. This observation may be confirmed by examining China’s behaviour in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1970s and the early 1980s. As indicated in the discussion in Chapter 2, throughout these years, China’s claim to sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has remained consistent and firm. However, despite the consistency in China’s expression of claim, it has not always managed the disputes in the same manner. In January 1974, it launched a military operation to take over the Crescent Group of the Paracel archipelago, hitherto under the control of South Vietnamese forces. At the same time, it did not specifically challenge the Philippines’ claim to sovereignty over some of the Spratly Islands and also continued to maintain a low profile over the dispute with the Philippines (and that with Malaysia after 1979) in the following decade. China’s attitude towards managing the dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has also changed over time. In the aftermath of the battle for the Paracels, Hanoi for the first time publicly expressed its difference with China over the issue of sovereignty over the islands. China then avoided a public row with Hanoi. Not long after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, however, China decided to confront Hanoi over the dispute. That dispute gradually escalated over the next few years, turning bitter and

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virulent as Sino-Vietnamese relations broke down in public during 1978–79. The central task of this research has been to find out what factors accounted for the behaviour of China in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. From the evidence examined in previous chapters, there is a strong case in favour of the primary role played by geopolitical interests in shaping China’s behaviour. Geopolitical interests would appear to have been behind all of China’s major decisions over the disputes during the 1970s and the early 1980s. The first major decision made by China was to launch the Paracels operation in January 1974. China’s own official version of the operation as a self-defensive counter-attack against South Vietnamese provocations (which are understood to have been Saigon’s administrative decision to incorporate the Spratly Islands into Phuoc Tuy Province in September 1973, and its reinforcement of a military presence in the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands in January 1974) can hardly stand. Four months elapsed before China condemned the administrative decision in a statement of 11 January 1974, which preceded the battle. From independent press reports in the week following that statement, as examined in Chapter 3, it was China which took the initiative in sending ‘fishing boats’ to provoke the South Vietnamese to despatch military reinforcement. With the benefit of hindsight, the South Vietnamese forces were set up by the Chinese. They were provoked and then defeated by well-prepared Chinese naval and air forces in the area. As pointed out in Chapter 3, at the time, some Western observers were puzzled by the apparent contradiction between China’s forceful assertion of its claim to the Paracel Islands and its concurrent “flexible and pragmatic” approach towards relations with Western and Third World countries. In fact, because such an approach was part of a wider scheme to promote an anti-Soviet united front, the decision to launch the Paracels operation should not be so difficult to understand. The operation constituted a military move to strengthen China’s strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the South China Sea. For China, the urgency of such an operation arose from a number of developments in the region during the early 1970s.

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In the first place, the U.S. had begun to withdraw militarily from Indochina and its commitment in the region in general was perceived by China to be weakening. China was concerned that the Soviet Union would take advantage of such an opportunity to expand its presence in the region, including naval activities in the South China Sea. At the same time, Sino-Vietnamese relations had been gradually deteriorating and China’s fear of Hanoi moving closer politically to the Soviet Union grew accordingly. During the early 1970s, incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border increased, and by the end of 1973, Hanoi sent a request to China for talks on the division of the Tonkin Gulf. The Soviet factor played an important role in China’s perception of these issues. In its reply to Hanoi’s request for talks on the division of the Tonkin Gulf, which was delivered just one day before the Paracels operation was launched, China agreed to hold the talks but demanded that no third country should be allowed to carry out mineral prospecting in the Tonkin Gulf before a final agreement was reached. The ‘third country’ could have been none other than the Soviet Union. It was likely that Hanoi’s request for talks on the Tonkin Gulf and the increase in border incidents alerted China to the possibility of unfavourable developments in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. With the military withdrawal of the U.S. from Indochina after January 1973, it was believed to be only a matter of time before the North Vietnamese would take over the South. China was probably concerned with the possible scenario that if the Crescent Group of the Paracel Islands, then controlled by South Vietnamese forces, were to fall under the control of Hanoi, the Soviet Union might gain an important strategic foothold in the South China Sea. Such a possibility had to be prevented; hence the Paracels operation. Although the immediate purpose of the operation was to eliminate the physical presence of South Vietnamese personnel in the Paracel Islands, the more important objective probably lay in the longer-term purpose: to deny strategic advantage to the principal adversary (the Soviet Union) and its ally (North Vietnam). In view of the above calculation, the Paracels operation and the “flexible and pragmatic” approach towards relations with Western and Third World countries were opposite sides of the

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same coin of China’s geopolitical perspective: to counter the perceived Soviet threat to its security. China was obviously aware of the possible unfavourable effects of the Paracels operation on its concurrent “flexible and pragmatic” approach towards foreign relations. These effects were successfully limited by a number of calculated moves. On the one hand, it made the correct assessment that the U.S., although nominally an ally of South Vietnam, would not intervene in the battle for the Paracels on the latter’s behalf because of the much higher strategic stakes involved in the recent rapprochement in Sino-U. S. relations. On the other hand, China handled the Paracels operation very carefully so as not to arouse hostile reactions from the ASEAN governments, which were themselves important targets in creating an anti-Soviet united front. The operation was concluded quickly, and was not followed by massive propaganda. In its statements on the battle, China also coupled a firm claim to sovereignty over the islands with a more flexible posture towards the attendant issues of maritime rights in order to placate the fears of other coastal states of the South China Sea. On the whole, China was successful in limiting possible unfavourable political repercussions from the operation. The diplomatic efforts of the South Vietnamese government to bring the battle to the attention of the international community did not lead anywhere. And the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Malaysia (the first ASEAN country to do so) went ahead unimpeded in May 1974. From the evidence available, it would appear that there was no serious disagreement on the strategic and diplomatic considerations as outlined above. It is known that Lin Biao and his associates were once opposed to rapprochement with the United States. In July 1971, Huang Yongsheng, a close ally of Lin, fiercely attacked the Philippines for its claim to sovereignty over part of the Spratlys. The attack was made at a critical moment in the rapprochement process of Sino-U.S. relations. It is therefore not impossible that by trying to promote a tough line on the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in which two allies of the U.S. (South Vietnam and the Philippines) were involved, Lin and his associates attempted to stall such a process. In any case, they were soon purged in late 1971. Since

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1972, China has been consistent in its conciliatory approach towards the dispute with the Philippines over part of the Spratlys. After the downfall of Lin Biao, the radicals led by the ‘Gang of Four’ continued to warn against too close a relationship between China and the West, and against appeasement of the Soviet Union. There was the speculation that the decision to launch the Paracels operation was influenced by them. However, although the radicals were quick to glorify the Paracels operation in the media under their control, they were not actually in a position to have had a decisive influence on the operation. Their presence in the Military Affairs Commission and their role in the PLA was limited. Moreover, from the above analysis of China’s handling of the aftermath of the Paracels operation, it is obvious that the leadership was careful not to damage the “flexible and pragmatic” line in foreign policy promoted by Zhou Enlai. In fact, China’s geopolitical considerations as revealed by the Paracels operation continued to play a predominant role in its handling of the disputes with various contending parties in the decade after the battle for the Paracels. As regards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over parts of the Spratlys, these considerations account for China’s low-key approach. As the dispute could have strained China’s relations with the Philippines and Malaysia, and there was no obvious solution in sight which was satisfactory to the contending parties, the best course of action for China was to set these disputes aside. In order not to complicate them, China had also refrained from stating or asserting its claims to maritime space in the South China Sea. After all, such claims would depend to a significant extent on ownership of the islands under dispute, and China was not in physical control of any of the Spratly Islands. The dispute with Hanoi over the Paracel and Spratly Islands presented China with an even more complicated problem. At the time when Hanoi first challenged China’s position on the islands in the aftermath of the battle for the Paracels, China probably still hoped that Hanoi could maintain a balanced position between it and the Soviet Union. This was not impossible as long as the Vietnam War went on. As a matter of fact, both China and Vietnam were then happy to set the dispute

190 CONCLUSION

over the Paracel and Spratly Islands aside. However, the unexpected early conclusion of the Vietnam War in April 1975 soon thrust the conflict between the geopolitical interests of China and Vietnam to the fore. Vietnam was strongly opposed to the U.S. presence in the region which it still perceived as threatening and was therefore prepared to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union against China’s wishes. A shift in China’s attitude towards the dispute then took place. In September 1975, Le Duan led the first Vietnamese party and government delegation to China since the end of the Vietnam War. When Le Duan proposed bilateral talks on the islands during his visit, he was bluntly rejected. Over the following two years, the dispute escalated as Sino-Vietnamese relations in general deteriorated. Although China officially refused to talk to Vietnam over the islands, it continued to criticize the latter’s position on the dispute through media propaganda. It is therefore not surprising that the dispute developed into an especially bitter one when the Sino-Vietnamese conflict was finally brought into the public domain during 1978–79. In sum, geopolitical interests were instrumental in China’s ever-hardening attitude towards the dispute with Hanoi in the decade after the battle for the Paracels. In view of the above findings, despite the variations and changes in China’s behaviour in the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1970s and the early 1980s, the major considerations underpinning its actions remained relatively constant. First, China was not prepared to give up its claim to sovereignty over the islands. Second, the actions adopted were so chosen as to serve best its geopolitical interests which were dominatd by the central question of how to contain the influence of the Soviet Union in the region. While the above conclusion provides a useful interpretation of China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1970s and the early 1980s, it is also in accord with the general observation of many studies about China’s policies towards the border disputes in the 1950s and the 1960s as discussed in Chapter 1. That is, these policies had been dependent on China’s perception of its geopolitical interests which in particular concerned the threat of one or both of the superpowers to its security. However, one must be

CONCLUSION 191

cautious in predicting that the above conclusion will be valid in the future as well. This is especially so because many significant general changes in China’s foreign policy have been taking place in recent years. The most prominent among them include China’s working accommodation with the Soviet Union, and the growing impact of the campaign for economic modernization on its foreign relations. Since these changes are still developing, it is impossible for this research to make a conclusive assessment of their effects on China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of their possible effects is possible and also desirable. The first development is China’s new approach towards relations with the Soviet Union. Since 1982, China has adjusted its relations with the two superpowers by dropping the radical anti-Soviet line which was so predominant in China’s foreign relations during the 1970s. In October 1982, Sino-Soviet ‘consultations’ on normalization of bilateral relations, which had been suspended by Beijing for more than two years as a protest at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were re-opened in Beijing. Since then, the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations has changed decisively through the termination of polemical exchanges, a rapid expansion in volume of trade, and a significant increase in the flow of official and unofficial contacts between the two countries. (1) China’s new global posture, expressed in its changed attitude towards relations with the Soviet Union, was summarized by Hu Yaobang in his report to the Twelfth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in September 1982 as “adhering to an independent foreign policy”. (2) The phrase has been interpreted by Chinese leaders to mean that China determines its policy “independently on the merits of each case”. (3) In the context of relations with the two superpowers, it means that “we (China) will not refrain from improving relations with them (the two superpowers) because we oppose their hegemonism, nor will we give up our anti-hegemonist stand because we want to improve relations with them, nor will we try to improve our relations with one of them at the expense of the other.” (4) In practice, while significant, albeit still limited, improvements in Sino-Soviet relations have been achieved in recent years, China has also managed to keep its relations with the U.S. friendly and close.

192 CONCLUSION

The full implications of China’s new approach towards relations with the Soviet Union for its policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands are yet to be made manifest. To be sure, China’s concern over the Soviet threat to its security has remained. China has continued to point out to the Soviet Union that there are three major obstacles to ‘normalization’ of relations between the two countries: the massive concentration of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia; the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan; and Soviet support for Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea. All these obstacles actually concern China’s security interests. China still considers Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea and the close tie between Vietnam and the Soviet Union as a serious threat to its security. This implies that the basic consideration underpinning China’s attitude towards the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has remained unchanged. Although Vietnam has indicated its intention to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea by 1990, it is still hostile to China and maintains a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Sino-Vietnamese relations will probably remain poor, and the state of their dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands will hardly change in the foreseeable future. Despite the above assessment, recent improvements in Sino-Soviet relations also have other implications for China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands in the long run. It has been suggested that China is a regional power (in Asia) “without a regional policy”. (5) Leaving aside the difficult question of how to define what “a regional policy” means, it is probably correct to argue that during the 1970s, China’s policy towards the region of Southeast Asia was shaped more by an overall concern with the Soviet threat to its security than by local circumstances. However, one of the major characteristics of China’s “independent foreign policy” has been an insistence on determining its policy “independently on the merits of each case”. In line with this priority, China has managed to limit its conflict with the Soviet Union to specific questions, above all, the three obstacles to normalization of bilateral relations. As a result, there have been some subtle changes in China’s approach towards the general issue of the

CONCLUSION 193

strategic balance in Southeast Asia. By only demanding a halt to support for Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea, China could be seen to be acknowledging the right of the Soviet Union to maintain a presence of a kind in Vietnam and therefore in the region. At the same time, China’s declared precondition for restoring ‘friendly’ relations with Vietnam now focuses on the latter’s occupation of Kampuchea rather than its tie with the Soviet Union. Of course, China may well understand that Soviet-Vietnamese relations could not remain the same if the Soviet Union withdraws its support for Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea. China’s focus on Vietnam’s occupation of Kamuchea may well be a subtle way of seeking to deny a Soviet role in Indochina altogether. None the less, the emphasis of China’s global foreign policy has shifted from active all-out confrontation with the Soviet Union at various levels to maintaining a peaceful environment for economic construction. In the context of Southeast Asia, China appears to have dropped its perception of a rapidly increasing Soviet influence and therefore the belief in the need for an active policy to curb such influence. Rather, a stable balance of power among the various alignments (the Soviet Union and Vietnam, the U.S. and pro-Western countries including Japan, and, of course, China itself) is probably acceptable to China now if such a balance can ensure peace and order in the region. Vietnam’s behaviour is unacceptable, however, because it has launched an open armed aggression against a country friendly to China and created instability in the region. Whether the Soviet Union will drop its support for Vietnam’s occupation of Kampuchea is, in China’s eyes, a litmus test of its willingness to accept what might be called a stable balance of power in the region. Hence, in the short run, China’s major concern in the region may still be the threat to its security posed by the Soviet Union-Vietnam alliance; but in the long run, if China and the Soviet Union can manage to limit their conflict to specific issues, there is the possibility that China’s policy towards other issues in the region will no longer be as closely tied to the Soviet factor as before. So far, there is not enough evidence to say how strong such a possibility is. However, it is certainly one that must be

194 CONCLUSION

taken into consideration for any future examination of China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. By comparison, the effects of the campaign for economic modernization on China’s policy towards the disputes have been more immediate. This is probably because of the nature of the disputes. The economic stakes involved in them are high. Although the economic value of the islands themselves is limited, ownership of them has significant implications for jurisdiction over maritime resources in the adjacent sea areas. With the new emphasis on economic modernization in the late 1970s, China was inevitably attracted to the potentially rich petroleum resources of the South China Sea. The adoption of the ‘open-door’ policy by the end of 1978 was crucial for the take-off of China’s offshore oil development programmes in the South China Sea, because foreign capital and technology were essential for these programmes. Under the influence of the goal of economic modernization and the ‘open-door’ policy, China’s offshore oil interests in the South China Sea have been growing fast since the late 1970s. It is not surprising that, according to the findings of Chapters 5 and 7, the influence of such interests on China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands has been growing as well. Despite the growing influence of China’s offshore oil interests in the South China Sea on its policy towards the disputes, they have to be put into perspective. As the discussion in Chapters 5 and 7 has shown, such interests have not displaced China’s geopolitical interests but rather worked within the framework of the latter. The effects of offshore oil interests on China’s handling of the dispute with Vietnam have been different from those on its handling of the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia. In the case of the dispute with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, the growth of China’s offshore oil interests in the South China Sea increased the tempo of the dispute. As China launched its offshore oil development programmes in the Tonkin Gulf and the waters around Hainan Island during the early 1980s, tension in these sea areas as well as the waters around the Paracel Islands quickly rose. Other factors being equal, the possibility of more serious conflict over the Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group will probably

CONCLUSION 195

increase as the desire of China to gain access to the sea areas further south in the South China Sea continue to grow. So far, such a desire has been contained by military and political constraints as analysed in Chapter 5. None the less, as China’s military modernization progresses and its stature as a major power in the region grows, the threat to the Vietnamese-held islands of the Spratly group will inevitably grow. By contrast, geopolitical interests continue to restrain China from pursuing an active policy towards the disputes with the Philippines and Malaysia over parts of the Spratlys. Yet as the oil exploitation activities of the Philippines and Malaysia in the waters around the Spratly Islands go on, China may have to act before it is too late. To draw on the example of the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Diaoyudao and the dispute over the division of the continental shelf in the East China Sea, ‘joint development’ with the Philippines and Malaysia in the waters around the Spratly Islands could be a desirable option for China. At present, the practical prospect of the idea of joint development may be very limited because there is no strong incentive for the Philippines and Malaysia to join hands with China to develop the waters near their territories. The significance of the idea lies rather in the long-term message it conveys. That is, under the influence of the goal of economic modernization and the ‘open-door’ policy, China has been exploring new approaches towards the disputes over mid-ocean islands, including the dispute over the Spratly Islands. China’s advocacy of ‘joint development’ was certainly unthinkable a decade ago. As China’s campaign for economic modernization progresses, the unthinkable may become a matter of practical consideration. To sum up, China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands during the 1970s and the early 1980s had been in general underpinned by two factors: first, its long-standing and consistent claim to sovereignty over the islands; and second, its perception of geopolitical interests in the region. Throughout these years, the latter factor was expressed in a strategy to deny an increase in the Soviet influence. Together with other existing studies of China’s policies towards border disputes during the 1950s and the 1960s (as reviewed in Chapter 1), the above conclusion lends weight to the belief that changing geopolitical considerations have brought about

196 CONCLUSION

variations of China’s behaviour in territorial disputes. This also means that China’s manner of handling territorial disputes in the future may also vary according to geopolitical considerations. However, the validity of the above conclusion for China’s policies towards territorial disputes in the future will depend on the development of some new elements in its general foreign policy, which began to appear in the early 1980s. These include the greater emphasis on the independent assessment of regional affairs on their own merits; and the effects of the campaign for economic modernization on China’s foreign relations. This research is unable to pass a conclusive judgement on the significance of these new elements for China’s policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. None the less, there are signs that, as China’s offshore oil interests in the South China Sea have grown since the early 1980s, the goal of economic modernization and the ‘open-door’ policy have begun to have a growing impact on that policy. As yet, they have worked within the framework of geopolitical interests rather than outside it. From another angle of view, China’s economic goals cannot be pursued without regard to the international security environment which is largely beyond China’s control. Therefore, as long as China has to respond to external threats to its security, the important role of geopolitical considerations in its policy towards the disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands is unlikely to be reduced. NOTES 1. For further analysis of China’s new relations with the two superpowers, see Carol Lee Hamrin, “China Reassesses the Superpowers,” Pacific Affairs, Vol.56, No.2 (Summer 1983):209– 231; and Jonathan D.Pollack, “China and the Global Strategic Balance,” in Harry Harding (ed.), China’s Foreign Relations in the 1980s, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984:146–176. 2. Beijing Review, 13 September 1982:29–33. 3. “Independent Foreign Policy,” China and the World (5), Beijing: Beijing Review, 1985:7. 4. Ibid.:17.

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5. Steven I.Levine, “China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power,” in Harding, China’s Foreign Relations, p.107.

198

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3. Newspapers and Serials British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East Series China News Analysis China Trade Report Chinese Business Review Declassified Documents Reference System Far Eastern Economic Review Financial Times International Herald Tribune Limits in the Sea (The Office of the Geographer, U.S. Department of State) Military Balance New Philippines New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) Straits Times (Singapore) Vietnam Report (Saigon) Vietnam Southeast Asia International

208

INDEX

Aichi, Kiichi 170 Amber One air corridor 117 Asian Collective Security System 64 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 22, 63–64, 75, 79, 82, 97, 124, 126, 134, 159, 176, 188, 203, 205

offshore oil exploration programme 127 Paracels Operation 13, 15, 17, 23 , 51–54, 57–58, 61, 63–66, 68, 71, 73–78, 83, 87–88, 95, 138, 186–189 revolutionary diplomatic line of Chairman Mao 63 China, Republic of (ROC) 5, 10, 26, 27, 29, 32–34, 39–41, 51, 55, 56, 99, 149, 169, 202 Nationalist Chinese government ix, 10 Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 169, 175 Chinese Communist Party 3, 128, 168, 191 Cloma, Tomas 141–145, 152, 158, 160 Committee for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 112

Borneo 10, 42–43 Cam Ranh Bay 123, 125 Cheju Island 166, 173 China National Offshore Oil Corporation 128 China, People’s Republic of (PRC) 26, 27, 29, 32–34, 39–41, 51, 55, 56, 99, 149, 202 “unequal treaties” ix ‘open door’ policy 128 anti-Soviet united front 38, 186, 188 Chemical Industry and Oil Refinery Conference 128 Great Leap Forward 7 irredentism 14 Learn from Daqing Conference 128 Military Affairs commision 76, 189 National Crude Oil Enterprises Conference 127

Da Nang 9 Daqing 128 Deng Xiaoping 67– 77, 83, 92–94, 135, 149, 167, 168, 172, 183, 200 Diaoyudao (Senkakus) 4–5, 44–45, 62, 168, 169–177, 179, 182–183, 195

209

210 INDEX

East China Sea 4, 40, 45–47, 49, 62, 127, 164–166, 168–179, 181–182, 195, 202 Japan-South Korea-Taiwan Liaison Committee 164–166, 170 Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) 11, 146, 172 Fadzir, Kadir Sheik 155 Five-Power Defence Arrangements 156 Garcia, Carlos 27, 141–141 Geneva Conference on Indochina 27, 69 Gu Mu 173 Hainan Island 9, 57, 61, 72, 117, 120, 125, 127–128, 131, 134, 194 Han Nianlong 82, 113, 135 Ho Chi Minh 73, 100 Hoang Tung 90, 96 Hoang Van Hoan 70, 82, 100 Hu Yaobang 191 Huang Hua 101–102, 108, 150, 161, 180 Huang Yongsheng 33, 147, 158, 183, 188 Jiang Qing 57, 87 Johnson, Lyndon 71 Khmer Rouge 97, 169 Kissinger, Henry 56, 63, 147 Labuan 180 Law of the Sea 11, 22, 39–41, 54, 60, 162, 164, 172, 182, 184, 197, 200– 202, 203 archipelagic principle 41, 42, 49, 60, 164

Convention on Law of the Sea 41, 197 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf 44 negotiating texts 162 UNCLOS III 39, 60, 66, 162, 166, 170–171 Le Duan 64, 83, 89, 91–92, 96–98, 109, 190 Le Loc 70 Li Xiannian 82, 103, 104, 108, 149, 153 Lin Biao 63, 76, 147, 158–159, 188 Liu Huaqing 124 Luzon Trough 146 Macclesfield Bank 4–5, 24, 27, 35, 44 Magsaysay 141, 160, 201 Malaysia 5, 12, 16–17, 38, 47, 60, 65– 67, 73, 75, 81, 94, 106, 124, 126, 138–139, 146, 151, 154, 155–159, 161, 162–164, 176–177, 179–182, 184–184, 188–189, 194–195, 197 Malik, Adam 75 Manila Trench 146 Mao Zedong 2–4, 20, 24, 63, 69, 83, 127, 147–1, 201, 203 Marcos, Ferdinand 22, 35, 94, 144– 145, 147, ix–155, 159, 164, 177 Marcos, Imelda ix Mead, Morton F. 141 Mitra, Ramon V. 146 Nakasone, Yasuhiro 166 National Liberation Front (NLF) 85 Natuna Islands 44 Nehru 8 Nixon, Richard 69, 88 Ohira, Masayoshi 173 Okinawa Reversion Agreement 169 Okinawa Trough 171, 175

INDEX 211

Palawan 10–11, 42, 141, 146, 151 Palawan Trough 146 Paracel (Xisha) Islands 1, 10, 12, 15, 21, 26–29, 32, 35–37, 41–43, 54, 55, 56–58, 61–62, 65, 68, 71–73, 75, 77–78, 83, 87, 88–91, 93–95, 98-99, 101, 112–113, 116–117, 120–123, 131, 133, 134, 186–187, 194 Amphitrite Group 10, 27, 41, 68 Crescent Group 10, 12, 16, 27, 41, 68, 184–187 Dongdao 117 Money (Chinyin) Island 27, 57 Pattle (Sanhu) Island 27, 57 Robert (Kanchuan) Island 27, 55, 57 Woody (Yongxing) Island 120 Paris Agreements of 1973 56, 64 Pearl River Estuary 127–128 Pham Van Dong 64, 70, 82, 89, 102– 104, 108 Philippines 5, 11, 16–17, 22, 24–26, 27, 30–32, 38, 39, 60, 70, 73, 90, 94– 95, 97, 106, 124, 126, 138–141, 143–161, 162–164, 175–182, 184, 188–189, 194–195, 201, 207 Philippines Presidential Decree No.1596 22, 35, 152–153, 155, 157 Presidential Decree No.1599 164 Potsdam Agreement 170 Pratas 4, 24, 27, 29, 35, 44, 119 Qing dynasty 29 Quirino, Elipido 26, 30, 139–141 Razak, Tun Abdul 75 Romualdez ix Romulo, Carlos 149 Sabah 47, 155, 178, 180 San Francisco Peace Conference of 1951 26, 32

Sarawak 47, 155, 178 Senkakus 44–45, 168, 170 Shafie, Ghazali 73, 82, 203 Sino-Indian border ix–2, 4, 7–8, 19, 205 Aksai Chin 4 Ladakh 3–4 MacMahon Line 4–5 Northeast Frontier Agency 4 Sino-Indian border talks 19 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty 172 Sino-Soviet border 1, 4, 6–7, 9, 20, 58, 80, 88, 192, 202 Sino-Vietnamese border 125, 187 Spratly (Nansha) Islands 1–2, 4–5, 9–17, 21, 22, 24, 26–39, 41–43, 46– 50, 51–55, 57, 60–62, 68, 70–73, 77–79, 82, 83, 85–89, 91–94, 98– 107, 109–116, 118–121, 123–125, 129, 132–133, 138, 139–144, 147– 149, 151, 153-157, 159, 162–164, 168–169, 176–183, 184–186, 187– 196, 204–205 Amboyna Cay 12, 152, 154–156 Itu Aba (Taiping) 21, 27, 37, 55, 118, 141, 143–145, 152 James Shoal (Tsengmu Reef) 124 Spratly (Nanwei) Island 27, 50, 55, 141, 142, 152, 161 Swallow Reef 12, 35, 154, 156– 157, 177, 180 Straits of Malacca and Singapore 60, 65–67 Su Zhenhua 67, 77 Taiwan 3, 7, 10, 18, 27, 29, 32, 35– 37, 44, 73, 93, 118–119, 126, 135, 141–141, 143, 144, 147, 154, 164– 166, 169–170, 171, 176, 182 Tonkin Gulf 44, 61, 70–72, 86, 88, 90–91, 121–122, 127–130, 132, 133–134, 187, 194 Tran Binh 85

212 INDEX

Treaty of Shimonoseki 170 Ung Van Khiem 70 United Nations Seabed Committee 39, 41, 60, 62, 66, 170 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (DRV) 10, 81, 86, 206 North Vietnam 68-70, 72, 86, 89, 116, 187 Vietnam, Republic of 27, 81, 86, 100, 106, 107, 131, 137, 197 National Petroleum Board 55, 60 South Vietnam 27, 32, 38, 55–58, 73, 76, 78–79, 85, 86, 98, 143– 144, 153, 188 Vietnam, Socialist Republic of 81, 100, 197 Vo Nguyen Giap 101 Voung Van Bac 55 Xu Jiatun 168 Yang Dezhi 121, 123 Yang Yong 121, 123 Yao Yilin 174 Ye Jianying 76, 83 Yingge Sea 128, 134 Zhou Enlai 26, 29–29, 32, 70, 83, 89, 96, 112, 147, 189 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 64