BETWEEN TWO AGES
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BETWEEN TWO AGES
By the same author Political Controls in the Soviet Army (editor and contributor) The Permanent Purge—Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (with Carl J. Friedrich) The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics Africa and the Communist World (editor and contributor) Political Power: USA/USSR (with Samuel P. Huntington) Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics (editor and contributor)
BETWEEN TWO AGES America's Role in the Technetronic Era
Zbigniew Brzezinski THE
VIKING
PRESS
/
NEW
YORK
Copyright © 1970 by Zbigniew Brzezinski All rights reserved First published in 1970 by The Viking Press, Inc. 625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 Published simultaneously in Canada by The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited SBN 670-16041-5 Library of Congress catalog card number: 76-104162 Printed in U.SA. by H. Wolff Book Mfg. Co. Prepared under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University
Portions of this book appeared in Encounter in different form
For Ian, Mark, and Mika
Acknowledgments
Though this book deals with communism only in part—and then primarily in relation to the broader issues with which I am concerned—the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University provided m e with invaluable research assistance and with a congenial and stimulating setting. My colleagues at the Institute little realize h o w very helpful they have been in the gradual process of shaping my ideas, testing m y views, and enlarging m y perspectives. The manuscript was read and criticized by a number of friends and colleagues. I am especially grateful to Professor Samuel P. Huntington for his trenchant criticisms and very helpful recommendations; to Professor Albert A. Mavrinac, w h o maintained our friendly tradition of his questioning m y arguments and of forcing m e to rethink some of my propositions; to Mrs. Christine Dodson, the former Administrative Assistant of the Research Institute, w h o prepared a very constructive and highly perceptive chapter-length critique of the entire draft; and to Professor Alexander Erlich for steering m e away from some economic pitfalls. I am also most obliged and grateful to Miss Sophia Sluzar, currently the Administrative Assistant, w h o very ably supervised the over-all preparation of the manuscript and w h o earlier was instrumental in preparing the tables and assembling the needed data. Miss Toby Trister, m y research assistant, was indefatigable in exposing m y inaccuracies, in filling bibliographic gaps, and in completing the research. Miss Dorothy Rodnite, Miss Michelle Elwyn, and Mr. Myron Gutmann amiably and efficiently—even w h e n under great pressures of t i m e — d e v o t e d their energies to the completion of the manuscript. T o all of them I o w e a debt which I am pleased to acknowledge.
vii
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Acknowledgments
I also wish to note my obligation to Mr. Marshall Best of The Viking Press, on whose experience and wise counsel I often relied, and to Mr. Stanley Hochman for his sensitive editorial assistance. A special mention is due to my wife. In all my writing I have never come across a more conscientious reader, a more ferocious critic, and a more determined—dare I say obstinate?—perfectionist. I have no hesitation in saying, though only now I say it with relief, that any merit this essay may have is in large measure due to her efforts. Z.B. October 1969
MMMM Contents Introduction Part I.
The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution
3
T h e Onset of t h e Technetronic Age
9
New Social Patterns • Social Explosion/Implosion • Global Absorption T h e Ambivalent Disseminator The American Impact • New Imperialism? Global Ghettos Prospects for Change • The Subjective Transformation • The Political Vacuum Global Fragmentation and Unification Fragmented Congestion • Toward a Planetary Consciousness Part II.
The Age of Volatile Belief
24 35
52
63
T h e Quest for a Universal Vision
65
The Universal Religions • The National Identity • Ideological Universalism T u r b u l e n c e within Institutionalized Beliefs
75
Institutional Marxism • Organized Christianity - Privatization of Belief Histrionics as History in Transition Escape from Reason • The Political • Historical Discontinuity
Dimension ix
x }
Contents Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology
m
The Quest for Equality • Syncretic Belief P a r t III.
C o m m u n i s m : T h e Problem of Relevance T h e Stalinist Paradox The Necessity of Stalinism • Imperial Pacification T h e Bureaucratization of Boredom The Innovative Relationship • Defensive Orthodoxy • Perspective on Tomorrow The Soviet Future Internal Dilemmas • Alternative Paths • The Problem of Vitality Sectarian Communism Phases • Assimilated Communisms • China and Global Revolution
P a r t IV.
T h e American Transition
125
138
154
176
195
T h e Third American Revolution
ig8
The Pace and Thrust of Progress • The Uncertainty of Progress • The Futility of Politics The New Left Reaction
222
Infantile Ideology • Revolutionaries in Search of Revolution • The Historic Function of the Militant Left T h e Crisis of Liberalism The Liberal Janus • The Price of Victorious Skepticism • The End of Liberal Democracy? P a r t V.
123
America a n d t h e W o r l d T h e American F u t u r e Participatory Pluralism • Change in Cultural Formation • Rational Humanism
236
255 256
Contents International Prospects The Revolutionary Process • USA/USSR • Policy Implications A C o m m u n i t y of the Developed Nations Western Europe and Japan • Structure and Focus • The Communist States • Ris&s and Advantages
{ xi 274
293
Notes
311
Index
3^5
Introduction Perhaps the time is past for the comprehensive "grand" vision. In some ways, it was a necessary substitute for ignorance, a compensation in breadth for the lack of depth in mans understanding of his world. But even if this is so, the result of more knowledge may be greater ignorance—or, at least, the feeling of ignorance—about where we are and where we are heading, and particularly where we should head, than was true when in fact we knew less but thought we knew more. I am not sure that this need be so. In any case, I am not satisfied with the fragmented, microscopic understanding of the parts, and I feel the need for some—even if crude—approximation of a larger perspective. This book is an effort to provide such a perspective. It is an attempt to define the meaning—within a dynamic framework—of a major aspect of our contemporary reality: the emerging global political process which increasingly blurs the traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics. In working toward that definition, I shall focus particularly on the meaning for the United States of the emergence of this process, seeking to draw implications from an examination of the forces that are molding it. Time and space shape our perception of reality. The specific moment and the particular setting dictate the way international estimates and priorities are defined. Sometimes, when the moment is historically "ripe," the setting and the time may coalesce to provide a special insight. A perceptive formula is easier to articulate in a moment of special stress. Conditions of war, crisis, tension are in that sense particularly fertile. The situation of crisis permits xiii
xiv }
Introduction
sharper value judgments, in keeping with man's ancient proclivity for dividing his reality into good and evil. (Marxist dialectic is clearly in this tradition, and it infuses moral dichotomy into every assessment.) But short of that critical condition—which in its most extreme form involves the alternatives of war or peace— global politics do not lend themselves to pat formulations and clear-cut predictions, even in a setting of extensive change. As a result—in most times—it is extraordinarily difficult to liberate oneself from the confining influence of the immediate and to perceive—from a detached perspective—the broader sweep of events. Any abstract attempt to arrive at a capsule formula is bound to contain a measure of distortion. The influences that condition relations among states and the broad evolution of international affairs are too various. Nonetheless, as long as we are aware that any such formulation inescapably contains a germ of falsehood— and hence must be tentative—the attempt represents an advance toward at least a partial understanding. The alternative is capitulation to complexity: the admission that no sense can be extracted from what is happening. The consequent triumph of ignorance exacts its own tribute in the form of unstable and reactive policies, the substitution of slogans for thought, the rigid adherence to generalized formulas made in another age and in response to circumstances that are different in essence from our own, even if superficially similar. Today, the most industrially advanced countries (in the first instance, the United States) are beginning to emerge from the industrial stage of their development. They are entering an age in which technology and especially electronics—hence my neologism "technetronic"*—are increasingly becoming the principal determinants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of society. And precisely because today change is so rapid and so complex, it is perhaps more important than ever before that our conduct of foreign affairs be guided by a sense of history—and to speak of history in this • To be more fully discussed in Part I.
Introduction
{
xv
is to speak simultaneously of the past and of the future. Since it focuses on international affairs, this book is at most only a very partial response to the need for a more comprehensive assessment. It is not an attempt to sum up the human condition, to c o m b i n e philosophy and science, to provide answers to more p e r p l e x i n g questions concerning our reality. It is much more m o d e s t than that, and yet I am uneasily aware that it is already much too ambitious, because it unavoidably touches on all these issues. The book is divided into five major parts. The first deals with the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on world affairs in general, discussing more specifically the ambiguous position of the principal disseminator of that revolution—the United States—and analyzing the effects of the revolution on the so-called Third World. The second part examines how the foregoing considerations have affected the content, style, and format of man's political outlook on his global reality, with particular reference to the changing role of ideology. The third part assesses the contemporary relevance of communism to problems of modernity, looking first at the experience of the Soviet Union and then examining the over-all condition of international communism as a movement that once sought to combine internationalism and humanism. The fourth part focuses on the United States, a society that is both a social pioneer and a guinea pig for mankind; it seeks to define the thrust of change and the historical meaning of the current American transition. The fifth part outlines in very broad terms the general directions that America might take in order to make an effective response to the previously discussed foreign and domestic dilemmas. Having said what the book does attempt, it might be helpful to the reader also to indicate what it does not attempt. First of all, it is not an exercise in "futurology"; it is an effort to make sense of present trends, to develop a dynamic perspective on what is happening. Secondly, it is not a policy book, in the sense that its object is not to develop systematically a coherent series of context
xvi !
Introduction
prescriptions and programs. In Part V, however, it does try to indicate the general directions toward which America should and, in some respects, may head. In the course of developing these theses, I have expanded on some of the ideas initially advanced in my article "America in the Technetronic Age," published in Encounter, January 1968, which gave rise to considerable controversy. I should add that not only have I tried to amplify and clarify some of the rather condensed points made in that article, but I have significantly revised some of my views in the light of constructive criticisms made by my colleagues. Moreover, that article addressed itself to only one aspect (discussed primarily in Part I) of the much larger canvas that I have tried to paint in this volume. It is my hope that this essay will help to provide the reader with a better grasp of the nature of the political world we live in, of the forces shaping it, of the directions it is pursuing. In that sense, it might perhaps contribute to a sharper perception of the new political processes enveloping our world and move beyond the more traditional forms of examining international politics. I hope, too, that the tentative propositions, the generalizations, and the theses advanced here—though necessarily speculative, arbitrary, and in very many respects inescapably inadequate—may contribute to the increasing discussion of America's role in the world. In the course of the work, I have expressed my own opinions and exposed my prejudices. This effort is, therefore, more in the nature of a "think piece," backed by evidence, than of a systematic exercise in social-science methodology.* * In this respect, I share the view of Barrington Moore, Jr., that "when we set the dominant body of current thinking against important figures in the nineteenth century, the following differences emerge. First of all, the critical spirit has all but disappeared. Second, modern sociology, and perhaps to a lesser extent also modern political science, economics, and psychology, are ahistorical. Third, modem social science tends to be abstract and formal. In research, social science today displays considerable technical virtuosity. But this virtuosity has been gained at the expense of content. Modem sociology has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago" (Political Power and Social Theory, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, p. 123).
Introduction
{ xvii
Finally, let me end this introduction with a confession that somewhat anticipates my argument: an apocalyptic-minded reader may find my thesis uncongenial because my view of Americas role in the world is still an optimistic one. I say "still" because I am greatly troubled by the dilemmas we face at home and abroad, and even more so by the social and philosophical implications of the direction of change in our time. Nonetheless, my optimism is real. Although I do not mean to minimize the gravity of America's problems—their catalogue is long, the dilemmas are acute, and the signs of a meaningful response are at most ambivalent—I truly believe that this society has the capacity, the talent, the wealth, and, increasingly, the will to surmount the difficulties inherent in this current historic transition.
BETWEEN TWO AGES "Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap. . . . There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence." — H E R M A N N HESSE,
Steppentvolf
PART I
The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution The paradox of our time is that humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented. That is the principal thrust of contemporary change. Time and space have become so compressed that global politics manifest a tendency toward larger, more interwoven forms of cooperation as well as toward the dissolution of established institutional and ideological loyalties. Humanity is becoming more integral and intimate even as the differences in the condition of the separate societies are widening. Under these circumstances proximity, instead of promoting u nity, gives rise to tensions prompted by a new sense of global congestion. A new pattern of international politics is emerging. The world is ceasing to be an arena in which relatively self-contained, "sovereign," and homogeneous nations interact, collaborate, clash, or make war. International politics, in the original sense of the term, were born when groups of people began to identify themselves— a nd others—in mutually exclusive terms (territory, language, 3
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{4
symbols, beliefs), and when that identification became in turn the dominant factor in relations between these groups. The concept of national interest—based on geographical factors, traditional animosities or friendships, economics, and security considerations—implied a degree of autonomy and specificity that was possible only so long as nations were sufficiently separated in time and space to have both the room to maneuver and the distance needed to maintain separate identity. During the classical era of international politics, weapons, communications, economics, and ideology were all essentially national in scope. With the invention of modern artillery, weaponry required national arsenals and standing armies; in more recent times it could be effectively and rapidly deployed by one nation against the frontiers of another. Communications, especially since the invention of the steam engine and the resulting age of railroads, reinforced national integration by making it possible to move people and goods across most nations in a period of time rarely exceeding two days. National economies, frequently resting on autarkic principles, stimulated both the awareness and the development of collective vested interest, protected by tariff walls. Nationalism so personalized community feelings that the nation became an extension of the ego.* All four factors mentioned above are now becoming global. Weapons of total destructive power can be applied at any point on the globe in a matter of minutes—in less time, in fact, than it takes for the police in a major city to respond to an emergency call. The entire globe is in closer reach and touch than a middlesized European power was to its own capital fifty years ago. Transnational ties are gaining in importance, while the claims of nationalism, though still intense, are nonetheless becoming diluted. This change, naturally, has gone furthest in the most ad* This was a major change from the earlier feudal age. At that time weapons were largely personal, communications were very limited and primarily oral, the economy was primitive and rural, and ideology stressed direct, religionbased obeisance to a personally known chief. These conditions thus reinforced and reflected a more fragmented "intranational" political process.
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution
.{ 5
countries, but no country is now immune to it. The conseis a new era—an era of the global political process. Yet though the process is global, real unity of mankind remains remote. The contemporary world is undergoing a change in many respects similar to that prompted by the earlier appearance of large population centers. The growth of such centers weakened intimate and direct lines of authority and contributed to the appearance of many conflicting and crosscutting allegiances. A typical city dweller identifies himself simultaneously with a variety of groups—occupational, religious, leisure, political— and only rarely operates in an environment that is exclusively dominated by a single system of values and a unilinear personal commitment. American metropolitan politics are typically messy: special-interest and pressure groups, ethnic communities, political organizations, religious institutions, major industrial or financial forces, and even the criminal underworld interact in a pattern that simultaneously includes continuous limited warfare and accommodation. Global polities are acquiring some analogous characteristics. Nations of different sizes and developmentally in different historical epochs interact, creating friction, variable patterns of accommodation, and changing alignments. While the formal rules of the game maintain the illusion that it is played only by those players called "states"—and, when war breaks out, the states become the only significant players—short of war the game is truly played on a much more informal basis, with much more mixed participation. Some states possess overwhelming power; others, the "mini-states," are overshadowed by multimillion-dollar international corporations, major banks and financial interests, transnational organizations of religious or ideological character, and the emerging international institutions that in some cases represent" the interests of the minor players (for example, the ^ N ) or in other cases mask the power of the major ones (for example, the Warsaw Pact or SEATO). The methods for coping with international conflicts are hence vanced
quence
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{6
becoming similar to those for dealing with urban discord. A characteristic feature of concentrated humanity is the routinization of conflict. Direct violence becomes increasingly regulated and restricted, and ultimately comes to be considered as a deviation from the norm. Organized mechanisms, in the form of uniformed, salaried personnel, are established to confine violence to socially tolerable limits. A certain measure of crime is accepted as unavoidable; for the sake of order, therefore, organized crime is generally preferred to anarchic violence, thus indirectly and informally becoming an extension of order. The routinization of conflict on a global scale has been the goal of statesmen for many decades. Agreements, conventions, and pacts have sought to govern it. None of these could prove effective in a system of relatively distinctive and sovereign units; but the appearance of rapid communications, which created not only physical proximity but also instant awareness of distant events, and the onset of the nuclear age, which for the first time made truly destructive global power available to at least two states, fundamentally altered the pattern of international conflict. On the one hand these factors depressed its level, and on the other they heightened its potential and increased its scope. Urban underworld wars do not give rise to much moral revulsion nor are they seen as major threats to social peace. Only outbreaks of violence directed at that peace, as represented by human life and major vested interests—banks, shops, or private property, for example—are resolutely combated. Similarly, in the more advanced portions of the world there is a tendency among the establishment and the middle class of the "global city" to be indifferent to Third World conflicts and to view them as necessary attributes of a low level of development—provided, of course, that such conflicts do not feed back into the relations among the more powerful states. Wars in the Third World thus seem tolerable as long as their international scale is contained at a level that does not seem to threaten major interests.* * . . during the post-1945 years, the development of nuclear weapons, the formation of power blocs and multilateral alliance systems, and the in-
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution
.
{ 7
In our time the routinization of conflict has also meant a shift from sustained warfare to sporadic outbreaks of violence. Sustained, prolonged warfare was made possible by the industrial age. In earlier times armies confronted each other, fought pitched, head-on battles, and, like gladiators of old, scored decisive victories or went down in defeat. The industrial age permitted societies to mobilize their manpower and resources for prolonged but indecisive struggles resembling classical wrestling and requiring both skill and endurance. Nuclear weapons—never used in conflict between nuclear powers—pose the possibility of such mutual annihilation that they tend to freeze their possessors into passive restraint, with sporadic outbreaks of violence occurring on the peripheries of the confrontation. Though, in the past, violence tended to result in the use of maximum available power, today those states possessing maximum power strive to employ a minimum in the assertion of their interests. Since the appearance of nuclear weapons, relations between the superpowers have been governed by a rudimentary code of restraint forged by trial and error in the course of confrontations ranging from Korea through Berlin to Cuba. It is likely that in the absence of these weapons war would long since have broken out between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their destructive power has thus had a basic effect on the degree to which force is applied in the relations among states, compelling an unprecedented degree of prudence in the behavior of the most creasing financial cost of modem warfare, have all been factors inhibiting the outbreak of formal warfare between the advanced, industrial nations. The majority of 'conflicts' during these years have taken place in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the so-called Third World. And a large number of them have followed on or been associated with the break-up of colonial empires, whether Ottoman, British, French or lapanese, and the subsequent emergence of new states which are often small, poor and insecure" (David Wood, "Conflict in the Twentieth Century," Adelphi Papers, June 1968, P- 19) • The above study contains a list of eighty conflicts that have occurred in the years 1945-1967. All but eight of these conflicts involved Third World participants on both sides. The analogy with metropolitan politics is also made by Theodore H. Von Laue in his thoughtful book The Global City (New York, 1969). Von Laue }s particularly stimulating in his analysis of the impact of the Western metropolitan" system on world politics during the last century.
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{27
powerful states. Within the fragile framework in which the contemporary transformation of our reality occurs, nuclear weapons have thus created an entirely novel system of deterrence from the reliance on overwhelming power. In the case of urban politics, the weakness of accepted and respected immediate authority is compensated for by the sense of higher allegiance to the nation, as represented by the institutional expression of state power. The global city lacks that higher dimension—and much of the contemporary search for order is an attempt to create it, or to find some equilibrium short of it. Otherwise, however, global politics are similarly characterized by the confusing pattern of involvement, congestion, and interaction, which cumulatively, though gradually, undermines the exclusiveness and the primacy of those hitherto relatively watertight compartments, the nation-states. In the process, international politics gradually become a much more intimate and overlapping process. Eras are historical abstractions. They are also an intellectual convenience: they are meant to be milestones on a road that over a period of time changes imperceptibly and yet quite profoundly. It is a matter of arbitrary judgment when one era ends and a new one begins; neither the end nor the beginning can be clearly and sharply defined. On the formal plane, politics as a global process operate much as they did in the past, but the inner reality of that process is increasingly shaped by forces whose influence or scope transcend national lines.
The Onset of the Technetronic Age
{1 9
/mMM 1. The Onset of the Technetronic Age The impact of science and technology on man and his so-' ciety, especially in the more advanced countries of the world, is becoming the major source of contemporary change. Recent years have seen a proliferation of exciting and challenging literature on the future. In the United States, in Western Europe, and, to a lesser degree, in Japan and in the Soviet Union, a number of systematic, scholarly efforts have been made to project, predict, and grasp what the future holds for us. The transformation that is now taking place, especially in America, is already creating a society increasingly unlike its industrial predecessor. 1 The post-industrial society is becoming a "technetronic" society: 0 a society that is shaped culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of technology and electronics—particularly in the area of computers and communications. The industrial process is no longer the principal determinant of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, and the values of society. In the industrial society technical knowledge was applied primarily to one specific end: the acceleration and improvement of production techniques. Social consequences were a later by-product of this paramount concern. In the technetronic society scientific and technical knowledge, in addi* The term "post-industrial" is used by Daniel Bell, who has done much of the pioneering thinking on the subject. However, I prefer to use the neologism "technetronic," because it conveys more directly the character of the principal impulses for change in our time. Similarly, the term "industrial" described what otherwise could have been called the "post-agricultural" age.
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{29
tion to enhancing production capabilities, quickly spills over to affect almost all aspects of life directly. Accordingly, both the growing capacity for the instant calculation of the most complex interactions and the increasing availability of biochemical means of human control augment the potential scope of consciously chosen direction, and thereby also the pressures to direct, to choose, and to change. Reliance on these new techniques of calculation and communication enhances the social importance of human intelligence and the immediate relevance of learning. The need to integrate social change is heightened by the increased ability to decipher the patterns of change; this in turn increases the significance of basic assumptions concerning the nature of man and the desirability of one or another form of social organization. Science thereby intensifies rather than diminishes the relevance of values, but it demands that they be cast in terms that go beyond the more crude ideologies of the industrial age. (This theme is developed further in Part II.)
New Social Patterns For Norbert Wiener, "the locus of an earlier industrial revolution before the main industrial revolution" is to be found in the fifteenth-century research pertaining to navigation (the nautical compass), as well as in the development of gunpowder and printing.2 Today the functional equivalent of navigation is the thrust into space, which requires a rapid computing capacity beyond the means of the human brain; the equivalent of gunpowder is modern nuclear physics, and that of printing is television and longrange instant communications. The consequence of this new technetronic revolution is the progressive emergence of a society that increasingly differs from the industrial one in a variety of economic, political, and social aspects. The following examples may be briefly cited to summarize some of the contrasts: (1) In an industrial society the mode of production shifts from
The Onset of the Technetronic Age
{
11
agriculture to industry, with the use of human and animal muscle supplanted by machine operation. In the technetronic society industrial employment yields to services, with automation and cybernetics replacing the operation of machines by individuals. (2) Problems of employment and unemployment—to say nothing of the prior urbanization of the post-rural labor force—dominate the relationship between employers, labor, and the market in the industrial society, and the assurance of minimum welfare to the new industrial masses is a source of major concern. In the emerging new society questions relating to the obsolescence of skills, security, vacations, leisure, and profit sharing dominate the relationship, and the psychic well-being of millions of relatively secure but potentially aimless lower-middle-class blue-collar workers becomes a growing problem. (3) Breaking down traditional barriers to education, and thus creating the basic point of departure for social advancement, is a major goal of social reformers in the industrial society. Education, available for limited and specific periods of time, is initially concerned with overcoming illiteracy and subsequently with technical training, based largely on written, sequential reasoning. In the technetronic society not only is education universal but advanced training is available to almost all who have the basic talents, and there is far greater emphasis on quality selection. The essential problem is to discover the most effective techniques for the rational exploitation of social talent. The latest communication and calculating techniques are employed in this task. The educational process becomes a lengthier one and is increasingly reliant on audio-visual aids. In addition, the flow of new knowledge necessitates more and more frequent refresher studies. (4) In the industrial society social leadership shifts from the traditional rural-aristocratic to an urban-plutocratic elite. Newly acquired wealth is its foundation, and intense competition the outlet—as well as the stimulus—for its energy. In the technetronic society plutocratic pre-eminence is challenged by the political leadership, which is itself increasingly permeated by individuals
I:
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possessing special skills and intellectual talents. Knowledge becomes a tool of power and the effective mobilization of talent an important way to acquire power. (5) The university in an industrial society—in contrast to the situation in medieval times—is an aloof ivory tower, the repository of irrelevant, even if respected, wisdom, and for a brief time the fountainhead for budding members of the established social elite. In the technetronic society the university becomes an intensely involved "think tank," the source of much sustained political planning and social innovation. (6) The turmoil inherent in the shift from a rigidly traditional rural society to an urban one engenders an inclination to seek total answers to social dilemmas, thus causing ideologies to thrive in the industrializing society. (The American exception to this rule was due to the absence of a feudal tradition, a point well developed by Louis Hartz.) In the industrial age literacy makes for static interrelated conceptual thinking, congenial to ideological systems. In the technetronic society audio-visual communications prompt more changeable, disparate views of reality, not compressible into formal systems, even as the requirements of science and the new computative techniques place a premium on mathematical logic and systematic reasoning. The resulting tension is felt most acutely by scientists, with the consequence that some seek to confine reason to science while expressing their emotions through politics. Moreover, the increasing ability to reduce social conflicts to quantifiable and measurable dimensions reinforces the trend toward a more pragmatic approach to social problems, while it simultaneously stimulates new concerns with preserving "humane" values. (7) In the industrial society, as the hitherto passive masses become active there are intense political conflicts over such matters as disenfranchisement and the right to vote. The issue of political participation is a crucial one. In the technetronic age the question is increasingly one of ensuring real participation in decisions that seem too complex and too far removed from the aver-
The Onset of the Technetronic Age
{ 1 13
age citizen. Political alienation becomes a problem. Similarly, the issue of political equality of the sexes gives way to a struggle for the sexual equality of women. In the industrial society woman the operator of machines—ceases to be physically inferior to the male, a consideration of some importance in rural life, and begins to demand her political rights. In the emerging technetronic society automation threatens both males and females, intellectual talent is computable, the "pill" encourages sexual equality, and women begin to claim complete equality. (8) The newly enfranchised masses are organized in the industrial society by trade unions and political parties and unified by relatively simple and somewhat ideological programs. Moreover, political attitudes are influenced by appeals to nationalist sentiments, communicated through the massive increase of newspapers employing, naturally, the readers' national language. In the technetronic society the trend seems to be toward aggregating the individual support of millions of unorganized citizens, who are easily within the reach of magnetic and attractive personalities, and effectively exploiting the latest communication techniques to manipulate emotions and control reason. Reliance on television—and hence the tendency to replace language with imagery, which is international rather than national, and to include war coverage or scenes of hunger in places as distant as, for example, India—creates a somewhat more cosmopolitan, though highly impressionistic, involvement in global affairs. (9) Economic power in the early phase of industrialization tends to be personalized, by either great entrepreneurs like Henry Ford or bureaucratic industrial officials like Kaganovich, or Mine (in Stalinist Poland). The tendency toward depersonalization of economic power is stimulated in the next stage by the appearance of a highly complex interdependence between governmental institutions (including the military), scientific establishments, and industrial organizations. As economic power becomes inseparably linked with political power, it becomes more invisible and the sense of individual futility increases.
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(10) In an industrial society the acquisition of goods and the accumulation of personal wealth become forms of social attainment for an unprecedentedly large number of people. In the technetronic society the adaptation of science to humane ends and a growing concern with the quality of life become both possible and increasingly a moral imperative for a large number of citizens, especially the young. Eventually, these changes and many others, including some that more directly affect the personality and quality of the human being himself, will make the technetronic society as different from the industrial as the industrial was from the agrarian.* And just as the shift from an agrarian economy and feudal politics toward an industrial society and political systems based on the individual's emotional identification with the nation-state gave rise to contemporary international politics, so the appearance of the technetronic society reflects the onset of a new relationship between man and his expanded global reality.
Social
Explosion/Implosion
This new relationship is a tense one: man has still to define it conceptually and thereby render it comprehensible to himself. Our expanded global reality is simultaneously fragmenting and thrusting itself in upon us. The result of the coincident explosion and implosion is not only insecurity and tension but also an entirely novel perception of what many still call international affairs. Life seems to lack cohesion as environment rapidly alters and human beings become increasingly manipulable and malleable. Everything seems more transitory and temporary: external reality 0 Bell defines the "five dimensions of the post-industrial society" as involving the following: ( l ) The creation of a service economy. ( 2 ) The pre-eminence of the professional and technical class. ( 3 ) The centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and policy formulation in the society. ( 4 ) The possibility of self-sustaining technological growth. ( 5 ) The creation of a new "intellectual technology.' (Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Indicators of Social Change, Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore, eds., New York, 1968, pp. 152-53-)
The Onset of the Technetronic Age
{ 1 15
more fluid than solid, the human being more synthetic than authentic. Even our senses perceive an entirely novel "reality"—one of our own making but nevertheless, in terms of our sensations, quite "real." * More important, there is already widespread concern about the possibility of biological and chemical tampering with what has until now been considered the immutable essence of man. Human conduct, some argue, can be predetermined and subjected to deliberate control. Man is increasingly acquiring the capacity to determine the sex of his children, to affect through drugs the extent of their intelligence, and to modify and control their personalities. Speaking of a future at most only decades away, an experimenter in intelligence control asserted, "I foresee the time when we shall have the means and therefore, inevitably, the temptation to manipulate the behavior and intellectual functioning of all the people through environmental and biochemical manipulation of the brain." 3 Thus it is an open question whether technology and science will in fact increase the options open to the individual. Under the headline "Study Terms Technology a Boon to Individualism," 4 The New York Times reported the preliminary conclusions of a Harvard project on the social significance of science. Its participants were quoted as concluding that "most Americans have a greater range of personal choice, wider experience and a more highly developed sense of self-worth than ever before." This may be so, but a judgment of this sort rests essentially on an intuitive —and comparative—insight into the present and past states of mind of Americans. In this connection a word of warning from an acute observer is highly relevant: "It behooves us to examine carefully the degree of validity, as measured by actual behavior, of the statement that a benefit of technology will be to increase the number of options and alternatives the individual can choose 0
Charles R. DeCarlo, in "Computer Technology" (Toward the Year 2018, New York, 1968, p. 102), describes the use of "holography" to create the sensation of living presence—as well as the actuality of conversations—by long-range laser beams from a satellite.
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{35
from. In principle, it could; in fact, the individual may use any number of psychological devices to avoid the discomfort of information overload, and thereby keep the range of alternatives to which he responds much narrower than that which technology in principle makes available to him." 5 In other words, the real questions are how the individual will exploit the options, to what extent he will be intellectually and psychologically prepared to exploit them, and in what way society as a whole will create a favorable setting for taking advantage of these options. Their availability is not of itself proof of a greater sense of freedom or selfworth. Instead of accepting himself as a spontaneous given, man in the most advanced societies may become more concerned with conscious self-analysis according to external, explicit criteria: What is my IQ? What are my aptitudes, personality traits, capabilities, attractions, and negative features? The "internal man"— spontaneously accepting his own spontaneity—will more and more be challenged by the "external man"—consciously seeking his selfconscious image; and the transition from one to the other may not be easy. It will also give rise to difficult problems in determining the legitimate scope of social control. The possibility of extensive chemical mind control, the danger of loss of individuality inherent in extensive transplantation, the feasibility of manipulating the genetic structure will call for the social definition of common criteria of use and restraint. As the previously cited writer put it, ". . . while the chemical affects the individual, the person is significant to himself and to society in his social context —at work, at home, at play. The consequences are social consequences. In deciding how to deal with such alterers of the ego and of experience (and consequently alterers of the personality after the experience), and in deciding how to deal with the 'changed' human beings, we will have to face new questions such as 'Who am I?' 'When am I who?' 'Who are they in relation to me?'" 6 Moreover, man will increasingly be living in man-made and rapidly man-altered environments. By the end of this century
The Onset of the Technetronic Age
{ 17
approximately two-thirds of the people in the advanced countries will live in cities.0 Urban growth has so far been primarily the by-product of accidental economic convenience, of the magnetic attraction of population centers, and of the flight of many from rural poverty and exploitation. It has not been deliberately designed to improve the quality of life. The impact of "accidental" cities is already contributing to the depersonalization of individual life as the kinship structure contracts and enduring relations of friendship become more difficult to maintain. Julian Huxley was perhaps guilty of only slight exaggeration when he warned that "overcrowding in animals leads to distorted neurotic and downright pathological behavior. We can be sure that the same is true in principle of people. City life today is definitely leading to mass mental disease, to growing vandalism and possible eruptions of mass violence." f 7 The problem of identity is likely to be complicated by a generation gap, intensified by the dissolution of traditional ties and values derived from extended family and enduring community relationships. The dialogue between the generations is becoming a dialogue of the deaf. It no longer operates within the conservativeliberal or nationalist-internationalist framework. The breakdown in communication between the generations—so vividly evident during the student revolts of 1968—was rooted in the irrelevance of the old symbols to many younger people. Debate implies the acceptance of a common frame of reference and language; since these were lacking, debate became increasingly impossible. Though currently the clash is over values—with many of the * In 1900 there were 10 cities with populations of one million or more; in !955 the number had grown to 61; in 1965 there were over 100 cities with populations of one million or more. Today in Australia and Oceania threequarters of the people live in cities; in America and Europe (the USSR included) one-half do; in Africa and Asia one-fifth live in cities. T G. N. Carstairs, in ''Why Is Man Aggressive?" (Impact of Science on Soctety, April-June 1968, p. 90), argues that population growth, crowding, and social oppression all contribute to irrational and intensified aggression. Experiments on rats seem to bear this out; observation of human behavior in large cities seems to warrant a similar conclusion. For a cri du cceur against mis congested condition from a French sociologist, see Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, New York, 1965, p. 321.
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{37
young rejecting those of their elders, who in turn contend that the young have evaded the responsibility of articulating theirs— in the future the clash between generations will be also over expertise. Within a few years the rebels in the more advanced countries who today have the most visibility will be joined by a new generation making its claim to power in government and business: a generation trained to reason logically; as accustomed to exploiting electronic aids to human reasoning as we have been to using machines to increase our own mobility; expressing itself in a language that functionally relates to these aids; accepting as routine managerial processes current innovations such as planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS) and the appearance in high business echelons of "top computer executives." 8 As the older elite defends what it considers not only its own vested interests but more basically its own way of life, the resulting clash could generate even more intense conceptual issues.
Global
Absorption
But while our immediate reality is being fragmented, global reality increasingly absorbs the individual, involves him, and even occasionally overwhelms him. Communications are the obvious, already much discussed, immediate cause. The changes wrought by communications and computers make for an extraordinarily interwoven society whose members are in continuous and close audio-visual contact—constantly interacting, instantly sharing the most intense social experiences, and prompted to increased personal involvement in even the most distant problems. The new generation no longer defines the world exclusively on the basis of reading, either of ideologically structured analyses or of extensive descriptions; it also experiences and senses it vicariously through audio-visual communications. This form of communicating reality is growing more rapidly—especially in the advanced countries 0 • For example, Hermann Meyn, in his Massen-medien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin, 1966), provides data showing cumulatively that an
The Onset of the Technetronic Age
{
1
9
—than the traditional written medium, and it provides the principal source of news for the masses (see Tables 1-3). "By 1985 distance will be no excuse for delayed information from any part of the world to the powerful urban nerve centers that will mark the major concentrations of the people on earth/' 9 Global telephone dialing that in the more advanced states will include instant visual contact and a global television-satellite system that will enable some states to "invade" private homes in other countries* will create unprecedented global intimacy. The new reality, however, will not be that of a "global village/' McLuhans striking analogy overlooks the personal stability, interpersonal intimacy, implicitly shared values, and traditions that were important ingredients of the primitive village. A more appropriate analogy is that of the "global city"—a nervous, agitated, tense, and fragmented web of interdependent relations. That interdependence, however, is better characterized by interaction than by intimacy. Instant communications are already creating something akin to a global nervous system. Occasional malfunctions of this nervous system—because of blackouts or breakdowns —will be all the more unsettling, precisely because the mutual confidence and reciprocally reinforcing stability that are characteristic of village intimacy will be absent from the process of that "nervous" interaction. Man's intensified involvement in global affairs is reflected in, and doubtless shaped by, the changing character of what has until now been considered local news. Television has joined newspapers in expanding the immediate horizons of the viewer or reader to the point where "local" increasingly means "national," and global affairs compete for attention on an unprecedented scale. Physical and moral immunity to "foreign" events cannot be average West German over the age of fifteen read each day for fifteen minutes, listened to the radio for one and one-half hours, and watched television for one hour and ten minutes. It is estimated that within a decade television satellites will carry sufficient power to transmit programs directly to receivers, without the intermediary of receiving-transmitting stations.
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{20
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The Onset of the Technetronic Age
TABLE 2 . ABSOLUTE INCREASE PER 1 0 0 0 POPULATION IN RADIO, TELEVISION, AND NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION, 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 6
United States Canada Sweden United Kingdom West Germany Czechoslovakia France USSR Argentina Japan Brazil Algeria India
Radios +393 + 150 + 10
TV
Newspapers - 1 4 — 10
+66 +67 + 121
+ 11 + 172 + 10 +80 + 124
+43
+ 11 - 2 6
+ 130 + 109 + 110
+25 +52 -4
+59
+ 141
+61
+ 102 - 2 7
+ 118
+ 119 +12
+69 —21
+25 +75 + 8
+ 8
+2
—
TABLE 3. APPROXIMATE U S E OF MEDIA FOR EACH OF THE FOUR AUDIENCE GROUPS
Per cent of U.S. population that:
Mass Majority
Peripheral Mass
College Graduates
(50-60%)
(20-40%)
(10-25%)
Read any nonfiction books in the last year 15 Read one issue a month of Harpers, National Re% 2 view, etc. Read one issue a month of Time, Newsweek, or 10 U.S. News 5 Read one issue a month of 50 25 Look, Life, or Post 80 70 Read a daily newspaper X X Read the New York Times Read national or interna10 20 tional news first in paper Want more foreign news in 10 20 paper 60 70 Listen to radio daily 60 50 Hear radio news daily 80 75 Use television daily 45 45 Watch TV news 60 35 Favor TV as news medium 5 15 Favor news as TV show Source: Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, p. 47. These most part derived from data in John Robinson, Public World Affairs, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1967.
Elites (less than 1%)
30
50
10
25
45
70
65 90 5
30 95 50
30
50
30 85 65 65 45
50
20
30
? ? ? ? ?
50 figures are for the Information about
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{22
very effectively maintained under circumstances in which there are both a growing intellectual awareness of global interdependence and the electronic intrusion of global events into the home. This condition also makes for a novel perception of foreign affairs. Even in the recent past one learned about international politics through the study of history and geography, as well as by reading newspapers. This contributed to a highly structured, even rigid, approach, in which it was convenient to categorize events or nations in somewhat ideological terms. Today, however, foreign affairs intrude upon a child or adolescent in the advanced countries in the form of disparate, sporadic, isolated—but involving—events: catastrophes and acts of violence both abroad and at home become intermeshed, and though they may elicit either positive or negative reactions, these are no longer in the neatly compartmentalized categories of "we" and "they." Television in particular contributes to a "blurred," much more impressionistic —and also involved—attitude toward world affairs.10 Anyone who teaches international politics senses a great change in the attitude of the young along these lines. Such direct global intrusion and interaction, however, does not make for better "understanding" of our contemporary affairs. On the contrary, it can be argued that in some respects "understanding"—in the sense of possessing the subjective confidence that one can evaluate events on the basis of some organized principle —is today much more difficult for most people to attain. Instant but vicarious participation in events evokes uncertainty, especially as it becomes more and more apparent that established analytical categories no longer adequately encompass the new circumstances.* The science explosion—the most rapidly expanding aspect of ° To provide one simple example, for about twenty years anticommunism provided the grand organizational principle for many Americans. How then fit into that setting events such as the confrontation between Moscow and Peking, and, once one had become accustomed to think of Moscow as more "liberal," between Moscow and Prague?
The Onset of the Technetronic Age
{ 1 23
our entire reality, growing more rapidly than population, industry, and cities—intensifies, rather than reduces, these feelings of insecurity. It is simply impossible for the average citizen and even for men of intellect to assimilate and meaningfully organize the flow of knowledge for themselves. In every scientific field complaints are mounting that the torrential outpouring of published reports, scientific papers, and scholarly articles and the proliferation of professional journals make it impossible for individuals to avoid becoming either narrow-gauged specialists or superficial generalists.* The sharing of new common perspectives thus becomes more difficult as knowledge expands; in addition, traditional perspectives such as those provided by primitive myths or, more recently, by certain historically conditioned ideologies can no longer be sustained. The threat of intellectual fragmentation, posed by the gap between the pace in the expansion of knowledge and the rate of its assimilation, raises a perplexing question concerning the prospects for mankind's intellectual unity. It has generally been assumed that the modern world, shaped increasingly by the industrial and urban revolutions, will become more homogeneous in its outlook. This may be so, but it could be the homogeneity of insecurity, of uncertainty, and of intellectual anarchy. The result, therefore, would not necessarily be a more stable environment. 0 It is estimated, for example, that NASA employs some fifteen thousand special technical terms—all of which are compiled in its own thesaurus (CTN Bulletin [Centres d'etudes des consequences generales des grandes techniques nouvelles, Paris], June 1968, p. 6). It is also estimated that "the number of books published has about doubled every twenty years since 1450, and some 30 million have by now been published; the projected figure is 60 million by 1980" (Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, New York, !966, p. 12) and that "science alone sees the publishing of 100,000 journals a year, in more than 60 languages, a figure doubling every 15 years" (Glenn T. Seaborg, "Uneasy World Gains Power over Destiny," The New York Times, January 6, 1969).
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{24
2. The Ambivalent Disseminator
The United States is the principal global disseminator of the technetronic revolution. It is American society that is currently having the greatest impact on all other societies, prompting a far-reaching cumulative transformation in their outlook and mores. At various stages in history different societies have served as a catalyst for change by stimulating imitation and adaptation in others. What in the remote past Athens and Rome were to the Mediterranean world, or China to much of Asia, France has more recently been to Europe. French letters, arts, and political ideas exercised a magnetic attraction, and the French Revolution was perhaps the single most powerful stimulant to the rise of populist nationalism during the nineteenth century. In spite of its domestic tensions—indeed, in some respects because of them (see Part IV)—the United States is the innovative and creative society of today. It is also a major disruptive influence on the world scene. In fact communism, which many Americans see as the principal cause of unrest, primarily capitalizes on frustrations and aspirations, whose major source is the American impact on the rest of the world. The United States is the focus of global attention, emulation, envy, admiration, and animosity. No other society evokes feelings of such intensity; no other society's internal affairs—including America's racial and urban violence—are scrutinized with such attention; no other society's politics are followed with such avid interest—so much so that to many foreign nationals United States domestic politics have be-
The Ambivalent
Disseminator
{ 25
come an essential extension of their own; no other society so massively disseminates its own way of life and its values by means of movies, television, multimillion-copy foreign editions of its national magazines, or simply by its products; no other society is the object of such contradictory assessments.
The American Impact Initially, the impact of America on the world was largely idealistic: America was associated with freedom. Later the influence became more materialistic: America was seen as the land of opportunity, crassly defined in terms of dollars. Today similar material advantages can be sought elsewhere at lower personal risk, and the assassinations of the Kennedys and of Martin Luther King, as well as racial and social tensions, not to speak of Vietnam, have somewhat tarnished America's identification with freedom. Instead, Americas influence is in the first instance scientific and technological, and it is a function of the scientific, technological, and educational lead of the United States.* Scientific and technological development is a dynamic process. It depends in the first instance on the resources committed to it, the personnel available for it, the educational base that supports it, and—last but not least—the freedom of scientific innovation. In all four respects the American position is advantageous; contemporary America spends more on science and devotes greater resources to research than any other society.! * As a sweeping generalization, it can be said that Rome exported law; England, parliamentary party democracy; France, culture and republican nationalism; the contemporary United States, technological-scientific innovation and mass culture derived from high consumption. t According to a 1968 congressional report, "Current spending on research and development in the United States amounts to some $24 billion annually —about two-thirds financed by the Federal Government—in contrast to a mere $6 billion in all of Western Europe/* The Soviet figure has been estimated to be in the vicinity of 8 billion rubles, but, American costs being higher, one ruble buys approximately $3 of research. In 1962, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( O E C D ) , the United States was spending $93.70 per capita on research and development;
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{26
In addition, the American people enjoy access to education on a scale greater than that of most other advanced societies. (See Tables 4 and 5.) At the beginning of the 1960s the United States had more than 66 per cent of its 15-19 age group enrolled in educational institutions; comparable figures for France and West Germany were about 31 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. The combined populations of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are equal to that of the United States—roughly two hundred million. But in the United States 43 per cent of collegeage people are actually enrolled, whereas only 7 to 15 per cent are enrolled in the four countries (Italy having the low figure and France the high). The Soviet percentage was approximately half that of the American. In actual numbers there are close to seven million college students in the United States and only about one and a half million in the four European countries. At the more advanced level of the 20-24 age bracket, the American figure was 12 per cent while that for West Germany, the top Western European country, was about 5 per cent. For the 5-19 age bracket, the American and the Western European levels were roughly even (about 80 per cent), and the Soviet Union trailed with 57 per cent. 11 Britain $33.50; France $23.60; and Germany $20.10. As a percentage of gross national product, the United States' expenditure on research and development amounted to 3.1; Britain's to 2.2; France's to 1.5; Poland's to 1.6; Germany's to 1.3; and the Soviet Union's to 2.2. The number of scientists, engineers, and technicians engaged in research and development totaled 1,159,500 in the United States; 211,100 in Britain; 111,200 in France; 142,200 in Germany; 53,800 in Belgium and Holland; and somewhere over 1,000,000 in the Soviet Union (C. Freeman and A. Young, The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union, OECD, 1965, pp. 71-72, 124. Source for Poland: a speech by A. Werblan, published by Polish Press Agency, October 15, 1968. The Poles expect to reach 2.5 per cent only by 1975. For a higher estimate of Soviet scientific manpower, see Scientific Policy in the USSR, a special report by the OECD, 1969, especially pp. 642-47). On a global scale, the United States accounts for roughly one-third of the world's total supply of scientific manpower ("The Scientific Brain Drain from the Developing Countries to the United States," Twenty-third Report by the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 1968, p. 3; hereafter cited as Report . . .).
The Ambivalent
Disseminator
TABLE 4 . ACCESS TO HIGHER-LEVEL EDUCATION PER OF TOTAL POPULATION ( 1 9 5 0 , 1 9 6 5 )
{ 25
100,000
Absolute Increase United States West Germany France Japan USSR Poland India Indonesia Brazil Algeria
1950
1965
1,508 256
2,840 632 1,042 1,140
+ i,332 +376
1,674 800
+981 +327 + 171 +87
334 471 693 473 113
(1963)
284
8
(1963)
95 189 68
1950-1965
+708 +669
+9i 98 + 16 52 Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1967, Table 2.10, pp. 185-99. TABLE 5 . NUMBER OF GRADUATES FROM HIGHER-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS PER 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 OF TOTAL POPULATION ( 1 9 6 4 )
United States (1965) West Germany France Japan USSR Source: UNESCO Statistical
349 109 96 233 177 Yearbook, 1967, Table
Poland India (1962) Indonesia Brazil Algeria 2.14, pp. 259-68.
81 45 — 25 —
As a result, the United States possesses a pyramid of educated social talent whose wide base is capable of providing effective support to the leading and creative apex. This is true even though in many respects American education is often intellectually deficient, especially in comparison with the more rigorous standards of Western European and Japanese secondary institutions. Nonetheless, the broad base of relatively trained people enables rapid adaptation, development, and social application of scientific innovation or discovery.* While no precise estimates are possible, * America's scientific lead is particularly strong in the so-called frontier industries that involve the most advanced fields of science. It has been estimated that approximately 80 per cent of all scientific and technical discoveries made during the past few decades originated in the United States. About 79 per cent of the world's computers operate in the United States. America's lead in lasers is even more marked. The International Atomic Energy Agency has estimated (in its report Power and Research Reactors in Member States, Vienna, 1969) that by 1975 the United States will utilize more nuclear power for peaceful uses than the next eleven states combined (including Japan, all of Western Europe, Canada, and the Soviet Union).
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{47
some experts have suggested that a present-day society would experience difficulties in rapid modernization if less than 10 per cent of its population in the appropriate age bracket had higher education and less than 30 per cent had lower education. Moreover, both the organizational structure and the intellectual atmosphere in the American scientific world favor experimentation and rapid social adaptation. In a special report on American scientific policies, submitted in early 1968, a group of experts connected with OECD concluded that Americas scientific and technical enterprise is deeply rooted in American tradition and To measure innovating performance, OECD analysts checked to see where one hundred and thirty-nine selected inventions were first used. Nine industrial sectors that depend heavily on innovation were surveyed (i.e., computers, semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, plastics, iron and steel, machine tools, non-ferrous metals, scientific instruments, and synthetic fibers). The results showed that in the last twenty years the United States has had the highest rate of innovation, since approximately 60 per cent of the one hundred and thirty-nine inventions were first put to use in the United States (15 per cent in Great Britain, 9 per cent in Germany, 4 per cent in Switzerland, 3 per cent in Sweden). The United States collects 50-60 per cent of all OECD-area receipts for patents, licenses, etc.; the United States predominates in trade performance, accounting for about 30 per cent of the world's export in research-intensive product groups (J. Richardson and Ford Parks, "Why Europe Lags Behind," Science fournal, Vol. 4, August 1968, pp. 8 1 86). It is striking to note, for example, that while Western Europe still slightly exceeds the United States in the number of patents registered annually, industrial application of patents is roughly eight times higher in the United States. American leadership is also marked in pure science. In an unusually assertive—but not inaccurate—report, the National Academy of Sciences stated in late 1968 that the United States enjoys world leadership in mathematics, citing as evidence that 50 per cent of the prestigious Fields Medals awarded since 1945 went to Americans, that American mathematicians play the leading role in international mathematics congresses (delivering more than 33 per cent of all scientific papers), and that American mathematical research is cited most frequently in foreign mathematics journals ( T h e New York Times, November 24, 1968). American preponderance in Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Medicine has also become more marked. Thus, between the years 1901 and 1939 the United States and Canada won 13 prizes, while France, Germany, Italy, Benelux, and the United Kingdom won a total of 82, Scandinavia won 8, the USSR won 4, and Japan won none. Between 1940 and 1967 the respective figures were 42, 50, 6, 8, and 2.
The Ambivalent
Disseminator
{25
history. 0 Competitiveness and the emphasis on quick exploitation have resulted in a quick spin-off of the enormous defense and space research efforts into the economy as a whole, in contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union, where the economic byproducts of almost as large-scale a research effort have so far been negligible. It is noteworthy that "the Russians themselves estimate that the productivity of their researchers is only about half the Americans' and that innovations take two or three times as long to be put into effect." 12 This climate and the concomitant rewards for creative attainments result in a magnetic pull (the "brain drain") from which America clearly benefits. America offers to many trained scientists, even from advanced countries, not only greater material rewards but a unique opportunity for the maximum fulfillment of their talents. In the past Western writers and artists gravitated primarily toward Paris. More recently the Soviet Union and China have exercised some ideological attraction, but in neither case did it involve the movement of significant percentages of scientific elites. Though immigrating scientists initially think of America as a platform for creative work, and not as a national society to 0 "Since the first hours of the Republic, the right of citizens to the 'pursuit of happiness,' formulated in the Declaration of Independence, has been one of the mainsprings of American society; it is also the foundation of a social policy inspired by the prospect of new benefits issued from the scientific and technical enterprise. How can one fail to hope that these benefits, which have in fact contributed so much to national defense or the race for world prestige, will make an essential contribution to the achievement of other great national goals? It is this propulsion which has given science, the mother of knowledge, the appearance of a veritable national resource. The enterprise is indissolubly linked to the goals of American society, which is trying to build its future on the progress of science and technology. In this capacity, this society as a whole is a consumer of scientific knowledge, which is used for diverse ends: in the last century, to increase agricultural productivity and to facilitate territorial development, and then to back the national defense effort, to safeguard public health and to explore space. These are activities which have an impact on the destiny of the whole nation, and it seems natural that all skills should be mobilized to cooperate. In this way industry and the universities and private organizations are associated with the Government project" (conclusion of a report prepared by the Secretariat of the OECD, January 1968, as quoted by The New York Times, January 1968, p. 10).
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{30
which they are transferring political allegiance, in most cases that allegiance is later obtained through assimilation. Americas professional attraction for the global scientific elite is without historic precedent in either scale or scope. * Though this attraction is likely to decline for Europeans (particularly because of America's domestic problems and partially because of Europe's own scientific advance), the success of J. J. Servan-Schreiber's book, The American Challenge, reflects the basic inclination of concerned Europeans to accept the argument that the United States comes closest to being the only truly modern society in terms of the organization and scale of its economic market, business administration, research and development, and education. (In contrast, the structure of American government is viewed as strikingly antiquated.) European sensitivity in this area is conditioned not only by fear of a widening American technological lead but very much by the increasing presence on the European markets of large American firms that exploit their economic advantages of scale and superior organization to gradually acquire controlling interests in key frontier industries. The presence of these firms, the emergence under their aegis of something akin to a new international corporate elite, the stimulation given by their presence to the adoption of American business practices and training, the deepening awareness that the so-called technol0 In the words of E. Piore, vice president and chief scientist of I.B.M., "The United States has become the intellectual center of the world—the center of the arts, the sciences, and economics" ("Towards the Year 2000," Daedalus, Summer 1967, p. 958). It is symptomatic that in the early 1960s, 44 per cent of the Pakistani students studying at institutions of higher education in fifteen foreign countries were studying in the United States; 59 per cent of the Indians; 32 per cent of the Indonesians; 56 per cent of the Burmese; 90 per cent of the Filipinos; 64 per cent of the Thais; and 26 per cent of the Ceylonese (Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, New York, 1968, p. 1773). In 1967 the United States granted 10,690 M.D.s at its own universities, and admitted in the same year as permanent immigrants 3457 physicians (Report. . . , p. 3). In that same year 10,506 scientific, engineering, and medical personnel from the developed countries emigrated to the United States ("The BrainDrain of Scientists, Engineers and Physicians from the Developing Countries to the United States," Hearing before a Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1968, pp. 2, 96; hereafter cited as Hearing . . .).
The Ambivalent
Disseminator
{ 2 5
ogy gap is in reality also a management and education gap 13 — all have contributed both to a positive appraisal of American "technostructure" by the European business and scientific elite and to the desire to adapt some of America's experience. Less tangible but no less pervasive is the American impact on mass culture, youth mores, and life styles. The higher the level of per-capita income in a country, the more applicable seems the term "Americanization." This indicates that the external forms of characteristic contemporary American behavior are not so much culturally determined as they are an expression of a certain level of urban, technical, and economic development. Nonetheless, to the extent that these forms were first applied in America and then "exported" abroad, they became symbolic of the American impact and of the innovation-emulation relationship prevailing between America and the rest of the world. What makes America unique in our time is that confrontation with the new is part of the daily American experience. For better or for worse, the rest of the world learns what is in store for it by observing what happens in the United States: whether it be the latest scientific discoveries in space and medicine or the electric toothbrush in the bathroom; pop art or LSD; air conditioning or air pollution; old-age problems or juvenile delinquency. The evidence is more elusive in such matters as style, music, values, and social mores, but there too the term "Americanization" obviously implies a specific source. Similarly, foreign students returning from American universities have prompted an organizational and intellectual revolution in the academic life of their countries. Changes in the academic life of Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and more recently France, and to an even greater extent in the less developed countries, can be traced to the influence of American educational institutions. Given developments in modern communications, it is only a matter of time before students at Columbia University and, say, the University of Teheran will be watching the same lecturer simultaneously. This is all the more likely because American society, more than
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{32
any other, "communicates" with the entire globe.14 Roughly sixtyfive per cent of all world communications originate in this country. Moreover, the United States has been most active in the promotion of a global communications system by means of satellites, and it is pioneering the development of a world-wide information grid. 0 It is expected that such a grid will come into being by about 1975.15 For the first time in history the cumulative knowledge of mankind will be made accessible on a global scale—and it will be almost instantaneously available in response to demand.
New
Imperialism?
All of these factors make for a novel relationship between the United States and the world. There are imperial overtones to it, and yet in its essence the relationship is quite different from the traditional imperial structure. To be sure, the fact that in the aftermath of World War II a number of nations were directly dependent on the United States in matters of security, politics, and economics created a system that in many respects, including that of scale, superficially resembled the British, Roman, and Chinese empires of the past. 16 The more than a million American troops stationed on some four hundred major and almost three thousand minor United States military bases scattered all over the globe, the forty-two nations tied to the United States by security pacts, the American military missions training the officers and troops of many other national armies, and the approximately two hundred thousand United States civilian government employees in foreign posts all make for striking analogies to the great classical imperial systems.17 Nevertheless, the concept of "imperial" shields rather than reveals a relationship between America and the world that is both * It is estimated (by the Institute for Politics and Planning, Arlington, Virginia) that the volume of digital communication will shortly exceed human conversation across the Adantic; it has already done so in the United States. Moreover, within the next decade the value of information export from the United States to Europe will exceed the value of material exports.
The Ambivalent
Disseminator
{25
more complex and more intimate. The "imperial" aspect of the relationship was, in the first instance, a transitory and rather spontaneous response to the vacuum created by World War II and to the subsequent felt threat from communism. Moreover, it was neither formally structured nor explicitly legitimized. The "empire" was at most an informal system marked by the pretense of equality and noninterference. This made it easier for the "imperial" attributes to recede once conditions changed. By the late 1960s, with a few exceptions the earlier direct political-military dependence on the United States had declined (often in spite of political efforts by the United States to maintain it). Its place had been filled by the more pervasive but less tangible influence of American economic presence and innovation as they originated directly from the United States or were stimulated abroad by American foreign investment (the latter annually yielding a product considerably in excess of the gross national product of most major countries). 18 In effect, ". . . American influence has a porous and almost invisible quality. It works through the interpenetration of economic institutions, the sympathetic harmony of political leaders and parties, the shared concepts of sophisticated intellectuals, the mating of bureaucratic interests. It is, in other words, something new in the world, and not yet well understood." 19 It is the novelty of America's relationship with the world— complex, intimate, and porous—that the more orthodox, especially Marxist, analyses of imperialism fail to encompass. To see that relationship merely as the expression of an imperial drive is to ignore the part played in it by the crucial dimension of the technological-scientific revolution. That revolution not only captivates the imagination of mankind (who can fail to be moved by the spectacle of man reaching the moon?) but inescapably compels imitation of the more advanced by the less advanced and stimulates the export of new techniques, methods, and organizational skills from the former to the latter. There is no doubt that this results in an asymmetrical relationship, but the content of
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{34
that asymmetry must be examined before it is called imperialism. Like every society, America no doubt prefers to be more rather than less advanced; yet it is also striking that no other country has made so great an effort, governmentally and privately, through business and especially through foundations, to export its knowhow, to make public its space findings, to promote new agricultural techniques, to improve educational facilities, to control population growth, to improve health care, and so on. All of this has imperial overtones, and yet it is misleading to label it as such.20 Indeed, unable to understand fully what is happening in their own society, Americans find it difficult to comprehend the global impact that that society has had in its unique role as disseminator of the technetronic revolution. This impact is contradictory: it both promotes and undermines American interests as defined by American policymakers; it helps to advance the cause of cooperation on a larger scale even as it disrupts existing social or economic fabrics; it both lays the groundwork for well-being and stability and enhances the forces working for instability and revolution. Unlike traditional imperialistic powers, which relied heavily on the principle of divide et impera (practiced with striking similarity by the British in India and more recently by the Russians in Eastern Europe), America has striven to promote regionalism both in Europe and in Latin America. Yet in so doing, it is helping to create larger entities that are more capable of resisting its influence and of competing with it economically. Implicitly and often explicitly modeled on the American pattern, modernization makes for potentially greater economic well-being, but in the process it disrupts existing institutions, undermines prevailing mores, and stimulates resentment that focuses directly on the source of change—America. The result is an acute tension between the kind of global stability and order that America subjectively seeks and the instability, impatience, and frustration that America unconsciously promotes. The United States has emerged as the first global society in history. It is a society increasingly difficult to delineate in terms
Global Ghettos
{41
of its outer cultural and economic boundaries. Moreover, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future America will cease to exercise the innovative stimulus that is characteristic of its current relationship with the world. By the end of this century (extrapolating from current trends) only some thirteen countries are likely to reach the 1965 level of the per-capita gross national product of the United States.-1 Unless there is major scientific and economic stagnation or a political crisis (see Part IV), at the end of the century America will still be a significant force for global change, whether or not the dominant subjective mood is pro- or anti-American.
M » 3. Global Ghettos
The Third World is a victim of the technetronic revolution. Whether the less developed countries grow rapidly or slowly, or not at all, almost inevitably many of them will continue to be dominated by intensifying feelings of psychological deprivation. In a world electronically intermeshed, absolute or relative underdevelopment will be intolerable, especially as the more advanced countries begin to move beyond that industrial era into which the less developed countries have as yet to enter. It is thus no longer a matter of the "revolution of rising expectations." The Third World today confronts the specter of insatiable aspirations. At one time in history seemingly insoluble problems prompted fatalism because they were thought to be part of a universal condition. Today similar problems stimulate frustration because they are seen as a particular phenomenon by which others, more for-
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{36
tunate, are not afflicted. The plight of the urban ghettos in the United States provides an appropriate analogy to the global position of the less developed countries, particularly in Africa and Asia. Their problem is not that of the absence of change. 0 In some cases it is not even that of insufficiently rapid change, because in recent years several underdeveloped countries have attained impressive and sustained rates of growth (South Korea, Taiwan, and Ghana, for example). Rather, their problem arises from an intensifying feeling of relative deprivation of which they are made more acutely aware by the spread of education and communications. As a result, passive resignation may give way to active explosions of undirected anger.
Prospects for Change It is extremely difficult to predict the economic and political development of the underdeveloped countries. Some of them, especially in Latin America, may make respectable progress and may, within the next two decades, reach the economic levels of the currently more advanced states. Islands of development may increasingly dot the maps of Asia and Africa, assuming that there is relative peace and political stability in the region as a whole. But the over-all prognosis is not hopeful. Medium projections for several of the more important underdeveloped countries point to a per-capita annual gross national product in 1985 of $107 for Nigeria, $134 for Pakistan, $112 for Indonesia, $169 for India, $185 for China, $295 for the United Arab Republic, and $372 for Brazil. 0 "The growth rate of these countries during the Development Decade has not reached the annual figure of 5 per cent which was set as the minimum target. Actually the average rate for fifty-four countries, representing 87 per cent of the population of the developing world as a whole, was only 4.5 per cent per annum from i960 to 1965. . . . Among the fifty-four countries mentioned, there is a group of eighteen with an average growth rate of 7.3 per cent per annum, while the rate for fifteen countries was scarcely 2.7 per cent per annum. . . . Between these two extremes there were twenty-one countries whose average growth rate was 4.9 per cent" ("Towards a Global Strategy of Development,' a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, 1968, p. 5).
Global Ghettos
{41
(By way of contrast, the prospective per-capita figure for 1985 for the United States is $6510, for Japan $3080, for the USSR $2660, and for Israel $2978.)22 What is even more striking is that while the per-capita GNP in the above advanced countries is likely to double during the years 1965-1985, for a single Nigerian the per-capita GNP will have increased by only $14, for a Pakistani by $43, for an Indonesian by $12, for an Indian by $70, for a Chinese by $88, for an Egyptian by $129, and for a Brazilian by $92 during the same two decades of development. The threat of overpopulation to economic growth—indeed to existence itself—has been widely discussed in recent years. That threat, it should be added, involves a crucial social-political dimension. Overpopulation contributes to the breakup of landholdings and thereby further stratifies and complicates the rural class structure, widening disparities and intensifying class conflicts. Staggering problems of unemployment are also highly probable. According to the International Labor Organization, by 1980 the labor force of Asia's developing nations will have increased from 663 million to 938 million. During this same period the number of new jobs in these countries will increase by only 142 million, according to projections of current growth rates. 23 Even if it is assumed that the problem of overpopulation will be met by greater acceptance of birth control, the economic picture in terms of the per-capita GNP for underdeveloped countries becomes only marginally brighter when it is compared with the figures projected for the more advanced societies. For example, in the unlikely event that by 1985 Indonesia's population will not have increased since 1965, its per-capita GNP will be approximately $200 instead of the projected $112; under similar circumstances, for Pakistan it will be $250 instead of the projected $134, and for the United Arab Republic almost $500 instead of $295. Since some population growth is unavoidable, the above figures actually represent unattainable levels, even though they are in themselves singularly unimpressive when compared with the figures for the more advanced portions of the world.
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{38
To point to these figures is not to exclude the probability that progress will be made in some fields. It is probably true that "the picture of the world in 1985, despite the large pockets of poverty that will still exist, is far from grim. Indeed, by 1985 mass starvation, mass homelessness, and the rampant spread of diseases that have historically decimated entire populations will be generally eliminated. Although the underdeveloped countries will still be comparatively poor, they will have greater and more immediate access to worldwide transportation and communications systems and to the provision of drugs, medical care, food, shelter and clothing through international assistance in the event of disaster. The surplus commodity production of the United States will be an important element in the feeding of underprivileged nations." 24 One may assume that the appearance of greater international planning in terms of international commodity agreements, transport arrangements, health regulations, finance, and education will make for more orderly and deliberate approaches to the problems posed by backwardness, slow growth, and the widening disparity in standards of living. The increasing communications intimacy will permit instant responses to sudden emergencies and allow for continuous long-distance visual consultations by specialists. In the event of need, aid could be mobilized and ferried across the globe in no more time than is now needed to respond to an internal national calamity—or even an urban one. The agricultural revolution in Asia is already challenging the recently fashionable predictions of mass hunger and starvation. Mass educational campaigns and the introduction of new cereals and fertilizers have prompted an impressive upsurge in productivity. Within the next few years Pakistan, the Philippines, and Turkey may become grain-exporting states; Thailand and Burma already have. The cumulative effect of such successes may well be to "bolster the confidence of national leaders in their ability to handle other seemingly insoluble problems. It may also strengthen the faith in modern technology and its potential for improving the well-being of their people." 25
Global Ghettos
{41
Yet even allowing for these more hopeful developments, the fact remains that though the material conditions of life in the Third World are in some respects improving, these improvements cannot keep pace with the factors that make for psychic change. The basic revolutionary change is being brought about by education and communications. That change, necessary and desirable to stimulate an attitude receptive to innovation (for example, the acceptance by peasants of fertilizers), also prompts an intense awareness of inadequacy and backwardness. In this regard, a comparison of the contemporary socio-economic transformation of the Third World with that of Russia at about the turn of the century is revealing. In Russia the industrial revolution outpaced mass education; literacy followed—rather than preceded—material change. 0 The revolutionary movements, particularly the Marxist one, strove to close the gap by politically educating—hence radicalizing—the masses. Today in the Third World a subjective revolution is preceding change in the objective environment and creating a state of unrest, uneasiness, anger, anguish, and outrage. Indeed, it has been observed that "the faster * Between 1887 and 1904, Russian coal-mining output rose by 400 per cent (from 5 million to 21.5 million tons) and iron smelting by 500 per cent; between 1861 and 1870, 5833 miles of railway were constructed, and between 1891 and 1900, 13,920 miles. "Coal production in Russia rose 40 percent in the period 1909-1913, as against a growth rate of 24 percent in the United States, 28 percent in Germany, 7 percent in Britain, and 9 percent in France in the same period. In the case of pig iron, Russian output rose by 61 percent in the period 1909-1913, while the rate of increase in the United States was 20 percent, in Germany 33 percent, in Britain 8 percent, and in France 46 percent. Although the economic backwardness of Russia had not disappeared on the eve of the war, it was clearly disappearing. The standard of living was not high, but it was rising. In the twenty years preceding the war the population of Russia increased by about 40 percent, while the domestic consumption of goods more than doubled" (S. Pushkarev, The Emergence of Modern Russia 1801-1917, New York, 1963, p. 280). Yet on the eve of World War I there were only 117,000 students in higher education in a country of some 160 million people, and 56 per cent of the people were illiterate (Pushkarev, pp. 286, 292). Of the children in the 8 - 1 1 age bracket, 49 per cent were not receiving any education, while the percentage of literates among military inductees rose between 1874 and 1913 at a rate of only slightly more than one per cent per annum (A. G. Rashin, Formirovanie Rabochego Klassa Rossii, Moscow, 1958, p. 582).
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{40
the enlightenment of the population, the more frequent the overthrow of the government/' * This gap between awakening mass consciousness and material reality appears to be widening. In the years 1958-1965 the income per capita of an Indian rose from $64 to $86 \ and that of an Indonesian from $81 to $85; the income of an Algerian declined from $236 to $195-26 The percentage of the economically active population in fields other than agriculture grew substantially only in Algeria (from 10 per cent to 18 per cent). Housing, physicians per thousand inhabitants, and personal consumption did not show significant advances for the major backward areas. In some they even showed a decrease. 27 (See Table 6.)
The Subjective
Transformation
Although objective conditions changed slowly, the subjective environment altered rapidly. Spectacular advances came primarily in two fields: communications and education. The number of radios in India quadrupled between 1958 and 1966 (from 1.5 million to 6.4 million); elsewhere in the Third World the figures have doubled or tripled. The television age is only beginning in these regions, but both transistor radios and television will no doubt become generally available there in the next two decades. \ 0 "For 66 nations, for example, the correlation between the proportion of children in primary schools and the frequency of revolution was -.84. In contrast, for 70 nations the correlation between the rate of change in primary enrollment and political instability was .61'* (Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven and London, 1968, p. 47). t It should be noted that these are average figures. "A survey for 1965-66 indicated that half of India's population was living on R14.6 or less per month (about lotf in U.S. currency per day). . . . In short the very low average income does not begin to plumb the depths of misery in India" (Myrdal, p. 565). } The Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission estimated that community television for all the five hundred and sixty thousand villages in India could be transmitted by satellite in five years at a cost of only $200 million ( T h e New York Times, August 15, 1968). In September 1969 the United States concluded an agreement with India for the creation by 1972 of a satellite that will provide television programs on agriculture and birth control for approximately five thousand villages in four Hindi-speaking states (see also our earlier discussion of the American impact).
Global Ghettos
{ 41
Access to higher education has also grown rapidly: in India between 1958 and 1963 the increase was roughly 50 per cent (from 900,000 to 1.3 million students), and by 1968 there were about 1.9 million students in 2749 colleges and 80 universities; in Indonesia the increase was 30 per cent (from 50,000 to 65,000) between 1958 and 1964; and in the United Arab Republic it was more than 50 per cent (83,000 to 145,000) during the same half decade. Enrollment in India's primary schools jumped from 18.5 million in 1951 to 51.5 million in 1966, according to UNESCO statistics. (See Table 7.) Increased access to education gives rise to its own specific problems. On the one hand, access to advanced training, particularly of a technical nature, is too limited to sustain extensive and intensive modernization. 0 The Third World is still woefully backward in intermediate technical education. On the other hand, the capacity of many of the less developed countries to absorb trained personnel is inadequate; the result is a class of dissatisfied college graduates, composed especially of those from the legal and liberalarts faculties, who are unable to obtain gainful employment compatible with their expanded expectations. Although this problem is already acute in several countries,28 it could be made worse by the introduction of automation into the overmanned factories and bureaucracies of the less developed countries, f The problem is aggravated by the frequently low level of what is officially described as higher education. According to one ad* See the tables on page 27, as well as the more extensive comparisons between the Third World and the United States and Western Europe (both current figures and projections for the year 2000) contained in Higher Education, Committee on Higher Education, London, 1963, especially Appendixes I and V. t "As the scientific processing of information will be under way in the urban centers of Asia, Africa and Latin America by 1985, large numbers of clerks, runners, sorters, and filers that today account for the weight of public and private bureaucracy in India, Nigeria or Brazil will begin to be threatened with displacement and the insecurities of unemployment" (The United States and the World in the 1985 Era, p. 91). It is estimated that by 1970 roughly one-half of Ceylon's expected one million unemployed will have certificates of higher education ("The International Report," The Economist, June 15, 1968, p . . 4 7 )
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic TABLE
Revolution.{42
6 PER CENT OF POPULATION PER-CAPITA G N P
IN U . S .
DOLLARS
EMPLOYED
OUTSIDE AGRICULTURE
Increase
1958
1966
(in percentages)
Increase
1950
i960
(in percentages)
U n i t e d States
2,602
3,842
48
90.4
93-5
31
West Germany
1,077
2,004
86
742
86.6
12.4
France
1,SOI
2,052
58
72.5 (1954)
(1961)
Italy
1,182
598
Soviet U n i o n Poland
1,100
1,500 (>965) 1,100
800
7.7
80.2 (1962)
98
60.5
71.8 (1962)
36
(1951) 52.0
11.3
60.8
8.8
(1959) 38
42.8
—
61.4
3-8
46.6
(1965) Czechoslovakia
—
—
Japan
344
986
187
India
72
105
46
Indonesia United
84
95 (1963)
13
179 (1965) 333
49
80.5
191
(1965) 740
—
27.0
271
(1951)
(1961)
—
0.1
320
—
—
(1961)
Arab
Republic Brazil
120 310
7
PER CENT OF POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OVER 2 0 , 0 0 0
37-3 (1947) 5I.9
43-3
0.6
48.4
-3-5
AVERAGE: NUMBER OF PERSONS
INHABITANTS
PER ROOM
Increase i960
(in p e r c e n t a g e s )
1950
i960
5-5 6.I
0.7
0.7 0.9
0.0
—
1.0
1.0
0.0
(1954) 1.3
(1962)
(195O
(1961)
U n i t e d States
41.4
46.9
West Germany
4I.5
47-6
France
33-3 (I954)
Italy
41.2
—
—
(1951) Soviet U n i o n Poland
Increase
1950
—
85-5
35-5 (1959) 31-9
—
6.4
1.1
—
—
(in percentages)
—
—0.2 —
(1956) 1-7
—
(1961) Czechoslovakia Japan
21.0
25-3
(1947)
(1961)
—
72.0
4-3
1.5
1-3
— 0.2
(1961) —
—
1.2 (1963) 2.6
—
India
12.0
—
—
—
Indonesia
(1951) 91 (1955)
—
—
—
—
—
29.1
0.0
—
1.6
—
8.0
13
1-3
0.0
—
United Arab Republic Brazil
29.1 (1947)
0955)
20.1
28.1
Global Ghettos TABLE
{41
7 N U M B E R OF STUDENTS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING
NUMBER OF RADIOS
Increase
Increase
(in per1958
1965
centages)
1966
centages) 63
3,042,200
5,526,325
161,000,000
262,700,000
173.320
372,929
»i5
15,263,000
27,400,000
79
186,101
174
10,646,000
15,861,000
49
216,248
509,764 300,940
39
6,112,000
11,163,000
2,178,900
3,860,500
77
36,667,000
76,800,000
83 109
111,820
251,864
5.593,000
25
141,687
125 190
4,465,000
48,805
3,317,000
3,829,000
15
Japan
566,551
1,116,430
97
14,610,000
24,787,000
70
India
913,380
1,310,000
43
1,560,000
6,485,000
316
49.557
(1963) 65,635
32
631,000
1,250,000
98
113
792,000
1,613,000
104
U n i t e d States West
Germany
France Italy Soviet
Union
Poland Czechoslovakia
Indonesia
81.6
(in per1958
(1964) United
Arab
Republic
83.251
177,123
(1965) Brazil
86,868
155.78I
79
4,000,000
88
7,500,000 (1964)
N U M B E R OF TELEVISION RECEIVERS
N U M B E R OF TELEPHONES Increase
Increase (in per-
(in per-
centages)
1958
1966
centages)
74,100,000
47
66,630,000
98,789,000
48
12,720,000
499
5,090,102
9,532.417
87
989,000
7,471,000
655
3,703,578
6,554,441
Italy
1,098,000
6,855,000
524
2,988,465
77 116
Soviet U n i o n
1,767,000
19,000,000
975
2,370,000
6,467,597 4,459.ooo (1965) 1,411,481
U n i t e d States West Germany France
Poland Czechoslovakia Japan India
1958
1966
50,250,000 2,125,000
88 216
85,000
2,540,000
2888
446,236
328,000
2,375,000
624
1,582,852
100
1,600,000
19,002,000
1088
789,679 4.334,602
16,011,745
269
400
4,000
900
367,000
926,617
153
4,600
—
90,968
116,332
28
185,452
335,000
81
928,117
1.431,653
54
(1962) Indonesia
—
United Arab Republic
128,000
375,000
193
(1962) Brazil
700,000
2,500,000
Sources for Tables 6 and 7: UN Statistical
257
Yearbooks,
1960-1967; UNESCO Yearbook,
1967.
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{44
mittedly
impressionistic
estimate,
perhaps
but perceptive
5 per cent
account,
the mass
in
are receiving decent training
by
recognizable
. . .
In
Indian
generous
institutions of higher e d u c a t i o n standards.
of
"At a
students
world
of
most
places
academic
standards have fallen so l o w that they can hardly b e said to survived."29
This
condition
is
by
no
means
limited
" T e a c h i n g i n S o u t h A s i a n s c h o o l s at all l e v e l s t e n d s t o independent
thinking
experimental
bent
and
of m i n d
the
growth
of
that
discourage
insufficiently 30
scale."
l a r l y i n L a t i n A m e r i c a : " B y n o w it is f u l l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t tion in Latin A m e r i c a has f u n d a m e n t a l
and
development.
. . . T h e South Asian p e o p l e s are not m e r e l y b e i n g on a huge
India.
inquisitive
t h a t is s o e s s e n t i a l f o r
educated; they are being miseducated
have
to
shortcomings,
Simieduca-
that
there
is a h i g h illiteracy rate, a n d t h a t t h e e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m b e a r s relation to the requirements of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , quite from
the
serious
respects."
31
deficiencies
that
exist
in
other
basic
" E d u c a t i o n " of this sort contributes to t h e
no
apart
cultural
emergence
of a n i n a d e q u a t e l y trained class of y o u n g e r p e o p l e w h o s e
frustra-
tions, increasing radicalism, a n d susceptibility to Utopian
appeals
have
many
gentsia
of
parallels the
in
more
those
of
the
backward
nineteenth-century
regions
of
Europe,
intelli-
particularly
Russia and the Balkans. T o obtain quality education, a small percentage of the
students
—either b e c a u s e they are unusually gifted a n d can obtain arships, or b e c a u s e t h e y c o m e f r o m w e a l t h y f a m i l i e s — g o
scholabroad.
A s a result, t h e y are t e m p t e d to adapt to foreign styles a n d
modes
of life, a n d e v e n t o r e m a i n a b r o a d ; in effect, t h e y o p t o u t of own
society
either
by
emigrating
simply by never returning. the
Chinese
United centage
students
States chose was
21,
respectively.32
It
studying
internally
on
1967, for example, sciences
and
for Korea a
and
staggering
Pakistan
fact
that
their return, 26 per cent
engineering
not to return to Taiwan;
and is
In
for India it w a s
the
their
15
in
the
or of the
per-
and
13,
underdeveloped
countries s u p p l i e d almost exactly one-half of the total n u m b e r engineers, scientists, a n d m e d i c a l personnel w h o e m i g r a t e d to
of the
Global Ghettos U n i t e d States in the year e n d i n g J u n e 1967: 10,254 It is e x p e c t e d
{ 41
o u t
20,760
that this proportion will actually rise in t h e
33
years
to c o m e . 3 4 A t the s a m e time, m a n y of those w h o d o return to their native lands d o so after having b e c o m e "immersed in values an
educational
advanced
system
which
country and may
prepares
individuals
to
unfit t h e m for d e v e l o p i n g
priate personality for a n active life in their o w n
fit an
and
in
community
3 5
T h e c u m u l a t i v e effect of these factors m a k e s for a h i g h l y bulent a n d extremely a m o r p h o u s political pattern. W i t h o u t ing for specific differences a m o n g Third W o r l d
an
appro-
tur-
allow-
c o u n t r i e s , it
can
b e said in g e n e r a l t e r m s that t h e political p y r a m i d in t h e less
de-
v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s h a s at its b a s e t h e p e a s a n t m a s s e s , still p r i m a r i l y engaged
in
manual
labor
and
largely
illiterate*
but
no
longer
parochially restricted to their immediate environment, since sistor radios establish
intimate
contact with
the national
a n d help d e v e l o p awareness of their material or national tion; f
next
in
order
is
a
rapidly
increasing
urban
tran-
society depriva-
population,!
0 As of i960, approximately 70 per cent of the males over 15 and 90 per cent of the females over 15 in Pakistan were illiterate; in India the percentages were 60 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively; in Indonesia 40 per cent and 70 per cent; and in Burma 20 per cent and 60 per cent. In Latin America in i960, 35.6 per cent of the males and 42.6 per cent of the females in Brazil were illiterate; in Argentina 7.5 per cent and 9.7 per cent; in Chile 15.1 per cent and 17.6 per cent; in Peru 25.6 per cent and 52.4 per cent; and in Venezuela 30.2 per cent and 38.3 per cent (Myrdal, pp. 540, 1672; UN Statistical Yearbook, 1965). t It is therefore too late to suggest that since participation is running ahead of the effective institutionalization of political processes, it might be desirable —in order to prevent chaos—to either limit or delay programs that stimulate higher levels of participation—for instance, by slowing down drives against illiteracy so that literacy does not outpace economic and political development. Even if the latter were practicable, the dissemination of transistor radios (and soon television) is beginning to have the same politically activizing effect that literacy had on the urban proletariat of the late nineteenth century. Thus, Frantz Fanon quite correctly observed in his Studies in a Dying Colonialism (New York, 1965) that "since 1956 the purchase of a radio in Algeria has meant, not the adoption of a modern technique for getting news, but the obtaining of access to the only means of entering into communication with the Revolution, of living with it" (p. 83). t Cities with populations of over a hundred thousand have been increasing in Asia at a rate three times that of the general population growth of the countries concerned (Myrdal, p. 469).
I: The Global composed dwellers
to
a
large
Impact extent
which
per c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n people
of
who
during
the
first-generation
Revolution.{46
post-peasant
city
sources of authority;36 t h e n c o m e s
searching for n e w
pseudo-intelligentsia,
of the Technetronic
accounts
for
roughly
a n d is c o m p o s e d
last d e c a d e
have
two
to
of relatively
acquired
young
some
a d v a n c e d e d u c a t i o n — o f t e n of v e r y p o o r professional
formal
quality—and
who, because they live badly and feel that society does not t h e m the opportunity to w h i c h t h e y are entitled,
or p r e v e n t
reforms
(some
Latin
( I r a n ) , or American
sus-
pyramid
is a r e l a t i v e l y w e l l - e d u c a t e d b u t n a r r o w - g a u g e d e l i t e class, gling to achieve b o t h stability a n d progress
offer
are highly
ceptible to militant x e n o p h o b i c causes; at the top of the
to delay
strug-
sometimes countries),
b e c a u s e , a s a B r a z i l i a n s c h o l a r p u t it, t h e y " w a n t it t h a t w a y . order
to
maintain
their
privileges,
they
are
a
three
dependent
on
In the
perpetuation of the status quo."37 T h e s e privileges are either those of p r o p e r t y or, m o r e f r e q u e n t l y in t h e c a s e of t h e n e w nations,
of
bureaucratic position. T h e ghettos of the global city have, accordingly, s o m e to the racial slums
of the
problem
absence
is n o t
the
United
States.
In American
of d e v e l o p m e n t
parallels cities
or change;
it
the
stems
from the perception b y the poor that e v e n rapid c h a n g e will c h a n g e m u c h for m a n y in the near future, a n d f r o m their realization
that
those
who
are
richer
are
themselves
not
growing becoming
morally u n e a s y over the material gap. This c o m b i n a t i o n of
factors
creates a sense of acute deprivation that results in intensified litical hostility t o w a r d that hostility in the
the
outside
United
world.38
States w a s
The
made
possible by
crease in the n u m b e r of black Americans receiving higher tion and therefore capable
of providing o n
a socially
the
grievances.
number
of
black
Another
Americans
factor w a s living
in
the rapid cities0
and
of in-
educa-
significant
scale the e n e r g i z i n g l e a d e r s h i p for t h e expression of hitherto pressed
po-
mobilization
growth
sup-
in
the
therefore
re-
0 The proportion of all Negroes living in the North and West almost quadrupled from 1910 to i960, when 73 per cent of all Negroes resided in urban areas and thus represented a more urbanized population than the whites,
Global Ghettos leased
from
the
lethargy
of
traditional,
{41
white-dominated
existence and brought into direct contact with the white nity,
which,
although
essentially
conservative,
has
become
c r e a s i n g l y a m b i v a l e n t i n its v a l u e s . W i t h i n this c o n t e x t , at reform contributed
rural
commu-
to further tension and friction,
in-
attempts prompting
some, in the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t y , to adopt a reactionary
posture
against change, and others, especially a m o n g the deprived, to
ar-
g u e that n o c h a n g e w a s m e a n i n g f u l within the f r a m e w o r k of
the
existing
system.
A m e r i c a n racial slums h a v e g r o w n in a pattern not unlike e x p a n s i o n of t h e h u g e i m p o v e r i s h e d u r b a n c e n t e r s of Asia. from the South have reaction
tended
to their poverty
to m o v e
and
to northern
felt injustice
than
the
Blacks
cities m o r e because
of
actual e m p l o y m e n t available there. T h e rate of u n e m p l o y m e n t l a r g e A m e r i c a n cities is s e v e r a l t i m e s m o r e t h a n t h e n a t i o n a l age. In Asia, cities inhabited b y impoverished
and
opportunities
"Instead West,
of
but
standing
urbanization
poverty." The
because
of rural poverty
as a s y m p t o m in
South
Asia
of
growth,
is
an
aver-
and
employ-
insecurity.
as it w a s
aspect
of
in
39
parallel
between
the
ghettos
of
the
global
city
and
U n i t e d States "integration" h a s so far t e n d e d to m e a n t h e
also
of t h e d o m i n a n t means
community,
the
in w h i c h
loss
community; of
talent
and
the less educated,
however, expertise more
their to
prevailassimila-
the
militant
black
"pseudo-
intelligentsia" increasingly provides charismatic leadership to
lished
by
exploiting
social
elites of
reverse the
racism.
Third
In
World
like m a n n e r , have
tended
the
selective
assimilation of a f e w individuals w h o can c o n f o r m to the ing norms
the
problems
f a c e d b y t h e intellectual political elite of t h e T h i r d W o r l d . I n
masses
the
continued
racial slums of the U n i t e d States c a n b e e x t e n d e d to t h e
tion
in
unproductive
masses h a v e g r o w n rapidly in recent years not b e c a u s e of ment
in the
the to
the
estabemulate
only 70 per cent of whom resided in urban areas (Philip M. Hauser, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro," in The Negro American, Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark, eds., Boston, 1965, pp. 74-75)-
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{48
the life styles of the m o r e a d v a n c e d world, a n d to e m i g r a t e
into
it e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r v i c a r i o u s l y .
The Political The
Vacuum
resulting v a c u u m
ligentsia, w h o s e v i e w s Frantz
Fanon,
Regis
teenth-century
is
filled
by
an indigenous
pseudo-intel-
are influenced by doctrines advocated Debray,
European
Che
Guevara,
Marxism,
and
originally
others.
Nine-
addressed
u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t o n l y r e c e n t l y d i v o r c e d f r o m r u r a l life, is
to
global
ghettos.
"The revolutionary
an
roman-
tically a d a p t e d to t h e conditions of industrially b a c k w a r d tieth-century
by
twen-
i n t e l l e c t u a l is
virtually universal p h e n o m e n o n in modernizing societies. 'No is as i n c l i n e d least within served.
to foster violence
the
Indian
as a d i s g r u n t l e d
context,' Hoselitz
'It i s t h e s e p e r s o n s
who
compose
and the
intellectual,
Weiner cadres
demagogues
and
who
become
leaders
of
at
have
ob-
the
less
of
responsible political parties, w h o m a k e u p the narrower of
entourage
millenarian
and
m e s s i a n i c m o v e m e n t s , all of w h i c h m a y , w h e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y ripe,
threaten
political
stability/
In
Iran
extremists
of
both
left a n d the right w e r e m o r e likely than m o d e r a t e s to b e
educated."
Given
this
products
context,
external
aid,
designed
c o m e the specific c o n d i t i o n of b a c k w a r d n e s s a n d poverty,
prove sion. and
the In
point of
objective
the
private
urban
friction, a n d — e v e n
situation—stimulates ghettos
of
the
becomes
it h e l p s
to
im-
further subjective
United
States,
governmental been
ever, they h a v e o f t e n b e c o m e targets of w h i t e charges that
funds
advance
blacks; w h e n
administered
for specific d e v e l o p m e n t black
militancy.
On
has been the formula used
by
ten-
how-
designed
administered
over-
have
by the
programs
when
to
blacks,
resented
aid
be
4 0
emotional
an additional
is the
of the city, to c o m e f r o m t h e m i d d l e e c o n o m i c strata, a n d to better
a
one
the
programs global
whites by
the
have
scale,
been
used
to
"neocolonialism"
to stimulate suspicion
by the
of the political m o t i v e s of e c o n o m i c aid f r o m the a d v a n c e d
masses coun-
Global Ghettos tries;* graft, corruption, made
by
donor
and
countries
inefficiency have
against
the
been
recipients
{41
the of
charges economic
assistance. T h e shift toward e c o n o m i c assistance on an international is a r e s p o n s e
to
this
danger—at
least in part.
It p o s e s
basis
another
danger, h o w e v e r . A i d c a n at best b e only a partial response to condition roots.
that has profoundly
Economic
assistance
the recipient country's
can
psychological be
emotional
as w e l l
effective only
resources
as
if, i n
material addition,
are mobilized
s e n s e o f p o p u l a r e n t h u s i a s m a n d p u r p o s e is c r e a t e d . T h i s
and
t o u t i l i z e f o r e i g n a i d i n t e l l i g e n t l y . S u c h l e a d e r s h i p is rare;
terests a n d
advice,
and
thus
stimulates
difficulties f a c e d b y the U n i t e d
a
requires
n a t i v e l e a d e r s h i p t h a t k n o w s b o t h h o w t o stir t h e m a s s e s a n d
it d o e s e x i s t it f r e q u e n t l y t e n d s t o b e u n r e s p o n s i v e
a
how
where
to foreign
foreign resentment.
inThe
States in d e a l i n g w i t h N a s s e r
or
A y u b Khan, w h o w e r e not only promoting but also responding
to
the emotionalism of their o w n masses, are cases in point. M o r e o v e r , e v e n if t h o s e i n a u t h o r i t y a r e d e t e r m i n e d t o
promote
social change, they are f a c e d w i t h the intractable fact that reality can b e c h a n g e d only very gradually, lization o n b e h a l f of c h a n g e
can be
attained
while
popular
only b y
their mobi-
stimulating
mass enthusiasm a n d emotion. T h e rulers thus confront a
dilemma.
* On a more sophisticated level, the economic system of the advanced countries is condemned as inherently incapable of providing true assistance. "Thus, Furtado [the Latin American economist] points out, the corporation is designed to fit the needs of profit-making in an advanced economy, and when one tries to transplant its technology to impoverished, developing lands, furious contradictions result. The newest machines save manpower— a blessing in the US and a curse in a country with rampant underemployment. Mass production requires a huge market nonexistent in an archaic agricultural society. So, Furtado concludes, the very structure of economic life in the new nations—forced upon them in the last century—makes it difficult for them to absorb the benefits of scientific and technical progress on those rare occasions where they might have the opportunity to do so. Thus, the rich nations specialize in activities which make work easier, goods more abundant, leisure more widespread, and living standards higher. The poor nations are left with the grubby tasks of primary production and with a stagnant or declining market; they must sell cheap and buy dear from the booming factories" (Michael Harrington, American Power in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1967, p. 9 ) .
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic
To
admit
the
reality
of
the
slowness
of
change
Revolution.{50 to
deprive
themselves of the support of the masses a n d to yield the
is
political
initiative to radical d e m a g o g u e s ; to mobilize the masses on of
unattainable
goals
is t o
court
an
eventual
behalf
explosion—unless
that mobilization b e c o m e s a vehicle for subordinating the to centralized,
bureaucratic
control
of
the
sort
that
masses
communist
leaders provide most effectively. Furthermore, to obtain the port
of
the
the
reform
planners often h a v e to "tread most warily in order not to
disrupt
the traditional social order
contain
loopholes The
propertied
of
all sorts
distance
and
and
between
more
educated
groups,
sup-
. . . they permit the laws to even
let t h e m
promise
and
remain
attainment
unenforced/'41 thus
tends
to
widen. T h e p r o s p e c t is t h a t f e e l i n g s of i n t e n s i v e r e s e n t m e n t w i l l
most
likely g r o w as the g a p b e t w e e n the Third W o r l d
and the
oped world widens. * Indeed,
intensify as
they will probably
devel-
the year 2000 the spectrum expands and ranges from the f e w advanced Japan,
post-industrial
Sweden,
states
(only
then
2000
vanced
will
to the
approaching
States), to the ten to by
technetronic
Canada),
have
fifteen
the
the
those
primitive
containing
present
states,
levels
to the
still in t h e p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s t a g e , a n d in extremely
(the
or
so
United
mature
levels
of
States,
industrial
the
United
currently u n d e r d e v e l o p e d states
reached
early-industrial
states
dozen
conditions.
of
the
large
finally The
currently
group
less
(about
third
and
fourth
population
that ad-
sixty)
to those remaining
t h e majority of t h e world's
by
most
still
groups, and
ex-
p e r i e n c i n g at b e s t o n l y partially effective progress, will in all likelihood
be
the
centers
tension, and extremism
of
volatile
political
activity,
resentment,
42
I n t h a t c o n t e x t , it is difficult t o c o n c e i v e h o w d e m o c r a t i c 0
institu-
In 1965 the per-capita production of the developed world exceeded that of the less developed by twelve times; it is estimated that by the year 2000 the proportion will be eighteen times greater (Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000, New York, 1967, p. 142). In 1965 Illinois alone had a larger gross product than all of Africa; California, more than all of China.
Global Ghettos tions
(derived largely from Western experience but typical
of the m o r e stable a n d w e a l t h y W e s t e r n n a t i o n s ) a
{41
country
like
India—or
how
they
will
only
will endure
develop
in
elsewhere.*
" M u c h will d e p e n d o n the p a c e of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t 43
a n d in this r e s p e c t the o m e n s are far f r o m favorable."
itself,
The
likely
c o n s e q u e n c e is s p o r a d i c t u r b u l e n c e i n i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s a n d turn toward more
personal
internally
dictatorships.
oriented,
though
The
latter will
socially
radical,
be
based
unifying
a on
doc-
trines in the h o p e that the c o m b i n a t i o n of x e n o p h o b i a
and
cha-
risma m a y provide the m i n i m u m stability necessary for
imposing
social-economic modernization from above. As in the case of u r b a n ghettos in the U n i t e d States, this make
for
advanced
a
tenser
world.
relationship
The
with
latter has
the
in recent
more
prosperous
years
come
to
may and
accept
— a t l e a s t as a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , a n d still g r u d g i n g l y — a
moral
obligation
Third
World.
to
This
assist "new
materially morality"
W a r rivalry, w h i c h
made
the
was
the
development
doubtless
two
developed
of
the
stimulated camps
by
Cold
compete
in
p r o v i d i n g a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e b a c k w a r d n a t i o n s . I t is f a r f r o m
cer-
t a i n t h a t t h e s e f e e l i n g s o f c o n s c i e n c e w i l l p e r s i s t if t h e C o l d
War
wanes;f
they
certainly will not
if E a s t - W e s t
rivalry
is
replaced
b y intensifying N o r t h - S o u t h animosity. T h e p e o p l e s of t h e oped
world
may
well
take
refuge
in
the
self-serving
that the irrational fanaticism of t h e leaders of t h e g l o b a l precludes cooperation. the further widening mankind, which
devel-
argument ghettos
Such a negative posture will ensure of the
is f o r t h e
gulf
first
both
a n d a m o r e bitter split
among
time beginning to live in
subjec-
tive intimacy. 0 "Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both" (Huntington, pp. 136-37). t This has been duly noted by some Third World spokesmen. The Algerian delegate to the UN Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva said in July 1966, "Even as the detente in the Cold War has permitted an attenuation of the conflict between blocs with different social systems, one must fear that the East-West opposition will revolve on its axis and become an antagonism of North against South" (cited by Harrington, p. 20).
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic
Revolution.{52
4. Global Fragmentation and Unification T h e c u m u l a t i v e effect of t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c r e v o l u t i o n is tradictory. O n the o n e h a n d , this revolution marks the of a g l o b a l c o m m u n i t y ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it f r a g m e n t s and
detaches
revolution
it f r o m
is w i d e n i n g
its t r a d i t i o n a l the spectrum
moorings.
The
of t h e h u m a n
con-
beginnings humanity
technetronic condition.
It
intensifies t h e g u l f in t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n o f m a n k i n d e v e n as it contracts m a n k i n d s subjective tolerance of that disparity. T h o u g h differences a m o n g societies gradually d e v e l o p e d in the c o u r s e of h u m a n h i s t o r y , it w a s n o t until t h e i n d u s t r i a l
revolution
t h a t t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s b e c a m e sharp. T o d a y s o m e n a t i o n s still live under many
conditions
not
unlike
live in circumstances
those no
of
pre-Christian
better than
those
times,
of
the
A g e s . Y e t s o o n a f e w w i l l l i v e i n w a y s s o n e w t h a t it is n o w cult to imagine could of
be
the social a n d personal ramifications.
a profound
mankind.
technetronic
The
three-way
coexistence
societies,
each
of
split in the
attitudes
agrarian,
industrial,
providing
different
and
Middle diffi-
The
result
and
views
and
new
perspectives
life, w o u l d m a k e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m o r e difficult at t h e v e r y t i m e b e c o m e s m o r e p o s s i b l e , a n d it w o u l d r e n d e r t h e g l o b a l o f c e r t a i n n o r m s l e s s l i k e l y e v e n a s it b e c o m e s m o r e
Fragmented This weak
it
acceptance
imperative.
Congestion
three-way fabric of
on
global
social
split
could
further
and political order
and
strain
the
result in
and, therefore, possibly international chaos. G r o w i n g the Third W o r l d w o u l d very likely involve racist a n d
already domestic
anarchy
in
nationalist
Global Fragmentation and Unification passions.
At
the
very
least,
this w o u l d
create
major
{61
pockets
disruption and chaos in the world; at worst, Third W o r l d bility
could
draw
the
more
developed
nations
into
of
insta-
potentially
antagonistic forms of i n v o l v e m e n t that c o u l d h a v e the s a m e
effect
on American-Soviet relations as Balkan conflicts h a d o n the
Euro-
p e a n o r d e r p r i o r t o W o r l d W a r I. In the m o s t a d v a n c e d w o r l d the tension b e t w e e n "internal" "external" m a n — b e t w e e n
m a n p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h his inner
ing a n d his relationship to the infinite, a n d m a n d e e p l y in his e n v i r o n m e n t a n d c o m m i t t e d to s h a p i n g w h a t h e to be
finite—prompts
involved recognizes
a n a c u t e crisis of p h i l o s o p h i c , religious,
p s y c h i c i d e n t i t y ; this crisis is a g g r a v a t e d b y
the fear that
malleability m a y permit w h a t w a s previously considered ble
in
man
knowledge
to
poses
uncertainty
be
undermined.
the
danger
increasing
w h a t is k n o w n .
and
mean-
in
The
explosion
immuta-
in
scientific
of
intellectual
fragmentation,
direct
proportion
to
T h e result, especially in the
the
and
mans
with
expansion
United
States
Part I V for a m o r e e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n ) , is a n a c c e l e r a t i n g
in
(see
search
for n e w social and political forms. T h e i m p a c t of the U n i t e d States as t h e flects
these
searches
conflicting
for global
to preventing
tendencies.
stability
and
revolutionary
first
Though
devotes
upheavals,
global society the
United
its e n o r m o u s
its
social
violent
antagonism
to
itself,
it
sets
off
resources
impact
w o r l d is u n s e t t l i n g , i n n o v a t i v e , a n d c r e a t i v e . E v e n
as it
expectations
on
be
met
until
well
unification of other since
the
1960s
into
the
next
societies—not
become
century.
only
Washington's
It
because
the
provokes that
m e a s u r e d b y A m e r i c a n standards a n d that in most countries not
re-
States
are can-
accelerates
the
regionalism
has
professed
foreign-policy
formula but also because other nations see in unification the
best
w e a p o n f o r c o m b a t i n g A m e r i c a n i n f l u e n c e . I n its r o l e as t h e
first
g l o b a l society, it t h u s unifies, c h a n g e s , stimulates, a n d o t h e r s — o f t e n a g a i n s t its o w n tion" thus
creates
common
i m m e d i a t e interests.
aspirations
and
highly
challenges
"Americanizadifferentiated
reactions. In the Third W o r l d the effect of U n i t e d
S t a t e s i n f l u e n c e is
to
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic
intensify social contradictions tions. M a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
and
Revolution.{54
conflict b e t w e e n
and education create
the
genera-
expectations—
for w h i c h t h e m a t e r i a l w e a l t h of A m e r i c a p r o v i d e s a v a g u e dard—that simply cannot b e m e t b y most societies. Since communications pected
that
traditional
nor education
political
can be
tensions
will
contained,
mount
as
neither
it is t o b e
purely
In
advanced world the contemporary challenge increasingly o n the identity of m a n , but in the Third W o r l d social tion looms as the principal
problem—one
which
nationalism
is
the
focuses
fragmenta-
is i n a
historic
societies' only slowly m a t u r i n g sense
their global responsibility for h e l p i n g d e v e l o p the Third Even
ex-
parochial,
attitudes yield to broader global perspectives.
race with the advanced
stan-
subject
to
contradictory
of
World.
influences.
Na-
tionalism has never been stronger and has never before
enjoyed
such extensive, aroused, and conscious support from the
popular
m a s s e s as w e l l as f r o m t h e intelligentsia. T h e i n t e r a c t i o n of nationstates still d e t e r m i n e s m a t t e r s a f f e c t i n g w a r a n d p e a c e , a n d
mans
p r i m a r y s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is still o n t h e b a s i s of n a t i o n a l i s m . non-Russian
The
states in the Soviet U n i o n are p e r h a p s the only
c e p t i o n to nationalism's successful dissolution of colonial Yet precisely because
this is so, n a t i o n a l i s m
compelling force that determines in our time. T h o u g h
is c e a s i n g t o b e
the b r o a d character of
still t h e s o u r c e of m a n y
pered by the growing recognition,
ex-
empires.
t e n s i o n s , it is
shared even
the
change tem-
by the most
na-
tionalist elites, that t o d a y regional a n d continental c o o p e r a t i o n necessary success
to the
fulfillment of
of n a t i o n a l i s m
makes
many the
nation
n o longer the vital subject, of d y n a m i c Because confusing, stricted
he
finds
and
impersonal
and
himself
familiar
living
purely
in
The
a principal
The
object,
but
a
congested, man
seeks
national
overlapping, solace
community
o b v i o u s o n e to turn to, a n d a definition of w h a t a n a t i o n a l m u n i t y is m a y w e l l b e c o m e tional cooperation was
a compromise
develops. dictated
m o r e restrictive as b r o a d e r For by
is
goals.
processes.
environment,
intimacy.
national
many
peoples
economics,
by
the
in
re-
is
the com-
transna-
nation-state
security,
and
by
Global Fragmentation and Unification other factors. A n
optimum
balance was
eventually
{61
struck,
often
a f t e r c e n t u r i e s o f c o n f l i c t . T o d a y t h e b a l a n c e is b e c o m i n g tled,
because
emerging,
newer
and
the
and
larger
effective
cohesive units into m u c h
frameworks
integration
of
of
unset-
cooperation
much
are
smaller,
l a r g e r w h o l e s is b e c o m i n g
more
increasingly
possible b e c a u s e of computers, cybernetics, communications,
and
so on. As a consequence, the F l e m i n g s a n d the W a l l o o n s in
Belgium,
the French and English Canadians in Canada, the Scots a n d W e l s h in t h e U n i t e d and
the
Slovenes
Czechoslovakia tionalities
Kingdom,
in Yugoslavia,
are
in the
the Basques in Spain, the and the
claiming—and
Soviet
Union
Czechs
some
of t h e
the
various
and
and
the
Croats
Slovaks
non-Russian
in na-
linguistic-ethnic
groups in India m a y soon c l a i m — t h a t their particular
nation-state
n o l o n g e r c o r r e s p o n d s t o h i s t o r i c a l n e e d . O n a h i g h e r p l a n e it h a s been
rendered
(Common
superfluous
Market)
intimate linguistic come
by
Europe,
or
some
other
regional
arrangement, while on a lower plane a and
religious
community
the impact of the implosion-explosion
more
is r e q u i r e d t o characteristic
overof
the
T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t is t h u s n o t a r e t u r n t o t h e e m o t i o n s o r t o
the
global metropolis.
ecstatic style of nineteenth-century nationalism, e v e n t h o u g h
there
a r e m a n y s u p e r f i c i a l a n a l o g i e s t o it. I t t a k e s p l a c e , b y a n d
large,
in a context that r e c o g n i z e s the current necessity for b r o a d e r operation
on
a
level
above
the
national.
It a c c e p t s
as
the functional integration of regions a n d e v e n of w h o l e
an
continents.
It is a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e d e s i r e for a m o r e d e f i n e d s e n s e of ality
in
an
increasingly
impersonal
world,
and
utility of s o m e of the existing state structures.
of
the
personchanged
This can even
s a i d of G a u l l i s m , w h i c h h a s o f t e n b e e n d e s c r i b e d as a
was
to construct
a Europe
that w o u l d
be
be
throwback
to nineteenth-century nationalism. Nevertheless, Gaullism's ambition
co-
ideal
major
"European"
and not dominated b y an external h e g e m o n y , though, to b e
sure,
F r a n c e w o u l d e x e r c i s e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p i n it. T h e "new" nationalism has m a n y elements of the old
national-
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{56 ism, especially in s o m e of the n e w still
a radical,
feelings
but
changing
force
also prompting
nations. There
creatively
ethnic
nationalism
mobilizing
exclusiveness
and
conflicts.*
Y e t it is g e n e r a l l y t r u e , a s t h e a u t h o r o f a s u g g e s t i v e p a p e r that "the vision a n d objectives of society
[have]
the
past
Renaissance
five
which
guided
man's
Today
concepts
behavior
for
the
h u n d r e d years." T h e nation-state as a f u n d a m e n t a l
of man's organized force:
have
notes,
changed.
a n e w c o n c e p t o f m a n a n d his w o r l d is c h a l l e n g i n g t h e of
life has
"International
banks
ceased and
to be
the
principal
multinational
unit
creative
corporations
are
acting a n d p l a n n i n g in terms that are far in a d v a n c e of the tical
concepts
of
gradually yielding
the
nation-state."44
its s o v e r e i g n t y ,
But
as
the
is
community
poli-
nation-state
the psychological
o f t h e n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y is rising, a n d t h e a t t e m p t t o an equilibrium b e t w e e n t h e imperatives of the n e w
is
importance establish
international-
ism and the n e e d for a m o r e intimate national c o m m u n i t y
is
the
source of frictions a n d conflicts. T h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h a t e q u i l i b r i u m is b e i n g m a d e m o r e cult b y the scientific a n d technological
innovations in
diffi-
weaponry.
It is i r o n i c t o r e c a l l t h a t i n 1 8 7 8 F r i e d r i c h E n g e l s , c o m m e n t i n g the
Franco-Prussian
reached
such
a stage
War, of
proclaimed perfection
that
that
"weapons
further
used
progress
on
have which
w o u l d h a v e a n y r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g i n f l u e n c e is n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e . "
45
N o t only h a v e n e w w e a p o n s b e e n d e v e l o p e d but s o m e of the basic concepts
of
geography
and
strategy
have
been
fundamentally
altered; s p a c e a n d w e a t h e r control h a v e r e p l a c e d S u e z or
Gibral-
tar as k e y e l e m e n t s of strategy.
0 . . . In spite of all the parallels to European nationalism, the new nationalism in South Asia is something very different. It differs in many more respects and for more fundamental reasons than appears from the qualifications just listed. The fundamental reason is that an historical process that in Europe spans centuries is telescoped within a few decades and that the order of the happenings is deranged. . . . Nationalism there is needed to provide the impulse for change—indeed, for all the necessary changes, and concurrently. The difficulties in this syncopation of policies, the historical necessity of which is seen by all the enlightened intellectual and political leaders in the region, are immense" (Myrdal, pp. 2118-19).
Global Fragmentation and Unification In
addition
powerful
to
and
improved
more
rocketry,
accurate
well include automated
multi-missiles,
bombs,
or m a n n e d
future
{ 61
and
more
developments
space warships,
may
deep-sea
in-
stallations, c h e m i c a l a n d biological w e a p o n s , d e a t h rays, a n d other with.*
forms
of
These
of one-sided,
warfare—even
new
weapons
relatively
the
could
weather
may
be
either encourage
"inexpensive"
victory;
still
tampered
expectations
permit
proxy
con-
tests that will b e decisive in their strategic political o u t c o m e will b e fought b y only a f e w h u m a n beings
(as in the Battle
Britain) or e v e n b y robots in outer space;46 or s i m p l y create mutual instability that the b r e a k d o w n evitable,
in spite of
mans
rational
but
of p e a c e
recognition
will b e c o m e of
the
of
such in-
futility
of
war. I n a d d i t i o n , it m a y b e p o s s i b l e — a n d
tempting—to
exploit
for
strategic-political p u r p o s e s the fruits of research o n t h e brain on
human
behavior.
Gordon
specializing in p r o b l e m s
J.
F.
MacDonald,
a
and
geophysicist
of warfare, has written that
accurately
timed, artificially e x c i t e d electronic strokes "could l e a d to a
pat-
tern of oscillations that p r o d u c e relatively h i g h p o w e r levels
over
certain regions of the earth. a system
that
would
very large populations riod.
. . .
. . .
seriously
impair
the
develop
brain performance
in selected regions over an e x t e n d e d
N o matter h o w d e e p l y disturbing the thought of
the environment to manipulate to some,
In this w a y , o n e c o u l d
the technology
behavior for national
permitting
using
advantages
such use will very
develop within the next f e w decades."
of pe-
probably
47
Such technology will b e available primarily, and to b e g i n
with
° As one specialist noted, "By the year 2018, technology will make available to the leaders of the major nations a variety of techniques for conducting secret warfare, of which only a bare minimum of the security forces need be appraised. One nation may attack a competitor covertly by bacteriological means, thoroughly weakening the population (though with a minimum of fatalities) before taking over with its own overt armed forces. Alternatively, techniques of weather modification could be employed to produce prolonged periods of drought or storm, thereby weakening a nation's capacity and forcing it to accept the demands of the competitor" (Gordon J. F. MacDonald, "Space," in Toward the Year 2018, p. 34).
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{58 exclusively, to the most advanced countries.*
B u t it is likely
that
in the c o m i n g d e c a d e s s o m e states in the T h i r d W o r l d will taken
major
steps
toward
highly
destructive
using
it a g a i n s t t h e
acquiring—or
weaponry. major
Even
powers
if
will
they
without
have
are
acquired—
not
bringing
have
capable about
of
their
o w n extinction, t h e y m a y b e a b l e a n d t e m p t e d to u s e it in "underworld" wars a m o n g themselves. T h e question t h e n arises such wars would a
direct
threat
be interpreted by the major powers
to
the
fabric of
peace,
and
whether
whether
as a
posing
joint
sponse by them w o u l d be effectively m o u n t e d and imposed.
reThe
a b s e n c e of a c c e p t e d global institutions c o u l d temporarily b e
over-
c o m e b y ad
meet
hoc
arrangements
and agreements designed to
s p e c i f i c t h r e a t s , b u t i t is c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t i n s o m e c a s e s t h e r e n o t b e sufficient u n a n i m i t y to p e r m i t joint reactions. T h e annihilation
of
some
lesser
states thus remains
at least
will
mutual a
possi-
bility.
Toward a Planetary Yet chaos
it w o u l d are
the
be
Consciousness wrong
dominant
c o n s c i e n c e is f o r t h e
first
to
conclude
realities
of
our
that
fragmentation
time.
A
global
mans
human
t i m e b e g i n n i n g to m a n i f e s t itself.
c o n s c i e n c e is a n a t u r a l e x t e n s i o n of t h e l o n g p r o c e s s of personal horizons. In the course of time, m a n s
and
This
widening self-identi-
fication
e x p a n d e d f r o m his family to his village, to his tribe, to his
region,
to
his
nation;
(before World War
more
recently
I I it w a s
it
spread
not as c u s t o m a r y
to
his
continent
a s it is n o w
university s t u d e n t s or intellectuals to d e s c r i b e t h e m s e l v e s
for
merely
as E u r o p e a n s or A s i a n s ) .
* This has led one concerned scholar to comment, "Whether it is used to kill, hurt, nauseate, paralyze, cause hallucination, or to terrify military personnel and civilians, the systematic use of biological and chemical warfare will require the resolution of major moral and ethical problems" (Donald N. Michael, "Some Speculations on the Social Impact of Technology," mimeographed text of address to the Columbia University Seminar on Technology and Social Change, p. 6 ) .
Global Fragmentation and Unification During
the
transnational
last
three
European
centuries aristocracy
the
fading
and
the
of
the
{ 61
essentially
successive
ization of the Christian church, of socialism,
a n d of
national-
communism
h a v e m e a n t that in recent times most significant political
activity
has t e n d e d to b e confined within national compartments. we
are
again
but now
witnessing
the
they are c o m p o s e d
emergence
of
Today
transnational
elites,
of international businessmen,
schol-
ars, p r o f e s s i o n a l m e n , a n d p u b l i c officials. T h e ties of t h e s e elites cut
across
national
boundaries,
their perspectives
new
are
confined b y national traditions, a n d their interests are m o r e tional
than
national.
These
global
communities
are
not
func-
gaining
s t r e n g t h a n d , a s w a s t r u e i n t h e M i d d l e A g e s , it is l i k e l y t h a t fore l o n g the social elites of m o s t of the m o r e a d v a n c e d will be The
highly
creation
internationalist of
the
global
countries
or globalist in spirit a n d
information
grid,
outlook.
facilitating
continuous intellectual interaction a n d t h e p o o l i n g of will further enhance the present trend toward
almost
knowledge,
international
fessional elites a n d t o w a r d the e m e r g e n c e of a c o m m o n
pro-
scientific
l a n g u a g e (in effect, the functional equivalent of L a t i n ) . This, ever, could create a dangerous tically
activated
masses,
whose
gap between
them
and
"nativism"—exploited
nationalist political leaders—could
work
against the
in be-
how-
the
poli-
by
more
"cosmopoli-
tan" elites. Increasingly,
the
intellectual
elites
tend
to
think
in
terms
g l o b a l p r o b l e m s . O n e s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t o f t h i s p r o c e s s is t h e in w h i c h c o n t e m p o r a r y d i l e m m a s are identified: the n e e d to
of way
over-
c o m e technical backwardness, to eliminate poverty, to extend
in-
ternational cooperation in e d u c a t i o n a n d health, to prevent
over-
population, to develop effective peace-keeping machinery.*
These
° "We are discovering the need for coordination at the world level, for looking ahead so that the pieces can be fitted together more precisely. This has brought us to the beginning of global planning. FAO is a pioneer: its Indicative World Plan is the first such attempt, the prototype version of which will be ready in 1969. The ILO is working hard on a World Employment Plan. "The U.N.'s Center for Development Planning, Projections and Policies (CDPPP) is preparing what could well be called the framework for a master
I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{60 are all g l o b a l issues. O n l y thirty y e a r s a g o t h e y w e r e s i m p l y
not
in the forefront of p u b l i c attention, w h i c h w a s riveted at t h e on much
more
specific regional, national,
or territorial
T h e technetronic revolution creates conditions that make
possible
global
suffering in general. social
and
availability
Indeed,
economic of
the
responses
these
needs
a rudimentary
institutions means
to
to
has
conflicts.
increasingly
and
to
human
f r a m e w o r k of
already
cooperate
taken
globally
time
global
shape.*
The
intensifies
the
s e n s e of o b l i g a t i o n t o act. C o n s c i e n c e is e a s i l y p a c i f i e d b y a ing of
futility. A n
uneasy
conscience
is u s u a l l y
one
t h a t it c a n a c t d i f f e r e n t l y . T h e s e n s e o f p r o x i m i t y , t h e
that
to stimulate
an
outlook
that
views
knows
immediacy
of suffering, t h e g l o b a l l y destructive character of m o d e r n all h e l p
feel-
mankind
weapons
as
a
com-
munity. I t is a h o p e f u l which the public
sign
in this c o n n e c t i o n
measures
going a constructive change. present,
territorial
that the
yardsticks
international competition
are
In the recent past, a n d e v e n in
expansion,
population,
and
vague
c l a i m s of cultural a n d i d e o l o g i c a l superiority, as w e l l as
ally these are g i v i n g w a y to rivalry in G N P
military
come and
and consumption
data, educational
scientific attainments,
of h e a l t h a n d nutrition,
research
and
even
and
influence.
figures,
development, national
scores, to s a y n o t h i n g of t h e s p a c e race b e t w e e n
have
Gradu-
per-capita
opportunities,
competitive
the
national
p o w e r in general a n d victory in direct contests in particular, provided the criteria for m e a s u r i n g status a n d
by
under-
in-
creative standards Olympic
the two
super-
powers. T o a n y o n e living in 1914 the current international
rivalry
plan covering all such activities. This is part of the task imposed on it by assembly resolutions which request the secretary-general, in plain words, to prepare future development efforts which are an improvement on the present development decade" (Jan Tinbergen, "The Way Out of the Labyrinth," Ceres (FAO Review), Vol. i, No. 3, May-June 1968, p. 20). * To list but a few: a world health organization, a world food and agricultural organization, a world labor organization, a world educational and cultural organization, a world bank, a global meteorological organization, an international atomic-energy agency, an international civil-aviation organization, an international agency for the peaceful uses of outer space, an agency for tapping the ocean beds, etc.
Global Fragmentation and Unification
{ 61
in p r o d u c i n g m o r e impressive charts a n d in defining n e w for measuring
national
status
would
be
well-nigh
indices
incomprehen-
sible; at that t i m e nationalist geopolitics p r o v i d e d
a more
direct
appeal. Today
a
different
orientation
is
becoming
dominant.
Social
p r o b l e m s are s e e n less as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e
of d e l i b e r a t e evil
and
more
both
and
as
the
ignorance;
unintended
solutions
are
b u t in t h e u s e of m a n s edge. Increasingly,
by-products not
sought
of
in
accumulated
complexity
emotional
simplifications
social and scientific
it is f e l t t h a t t h e v a r i a t i o n s i n b o t h
knowl-
scientific
d e v e l o p m e n t a n d the h u m a n p s y c h e d o not lend t h e m s e l v e s to doctrinal solutions f o r m u l a t e d in a d v a n c e ; in addition, t h e pated consequences
of t h e d i s c o v e r i e s of s c i e n c e h a v e
unanticiproduced,
especially in the m o r e a d v a n c e d countries, an awareness that basic issues facing m a n
have
survival,
international
irrespective
of
a common
significance for
internal
diversity.
T h e c o n c e r n w i t h i d e o l o g y is y i e l d i n g t o a p r e o c c u p a t i o n e c o l o g y . Its b e g i n n i n g s
c a n b e s e e n in the u n p r e c e d e n t e d
with public
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h m a t t e r s s u c h as air a n d w a t e r p o l l u t i o n , ine, overpopulation, and weather,
radiation, a n d the control of disease,
as w e l l as in t h e increasingly
the
human
famdrugs,
non-nationalistic
ap-
p r o a c h e s to t h e exploration of s p a c e or of t h e o c e a n b e d . T h e r e already widespread
consensus
that functional
planning
is
a b l e a n d t h a t it is t h e o n l y w a y t o c o p e w i t h t h e v a r i o u s
ecologi-
cal threats.48 Furthermore, g i v e n the continuing a d v a n c e s in p u t e r s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , t h e r e is r e a s o n t o e x p e c t t h a t technology
will m a k e
such
planning
more
multi-spectral analysis from earth satellites space race)
The
new
focus. still
in
addition,
( a b y - p r o d u c t of
global
neither
of
the in
resources. consciousness,
however,
is o n l y
beginning
a n i n f l u e n t i a l f o r c e . It still lacks i d e n t i t y , c o h e s i o n ,
Much
com-
modern
h o l d s out t h e p r o m i s e of m o r e effective p l a n n i n g
regard to earth
become
feasible;
is
desir-
humanity—indeed,
shares
nor
is
prepared
the to
majority support
of it.
to and
humanity— Science
t e c h n o l o g y are still u s e d t o b u t t r e s s i d e o l o g i c a l c l a i m s , t o
and
fortify
I:
The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{62
national
aspirations,
and
M o s t states are s p e n d i n g
to
reward
more
on
narrowly arms than
national on
interests.
social
services,
and the foreign-aid allotment of the t w o m o s t p o w e r f u l
states
highly disproportionate to their asserted global missions.*
is
Indeed,
it c a n b e a r g u e d t h a t i n s o m e r e s p e c t s t h e d i v i d e d , i s o l a t e d ,
and
c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d w o r l d of old h a d m o r e inner c o h e s i o n a n d
en-
joyed
greater h a r m o n y
than the volatile
global
reality
of
today.
Established cultures, d e e p l y entrenched traditional religions,
and
distinctive
and
firm
national
identities
provided
a
stable
framework
moorings; distance and time w e r e the insulators against
cessive friction b e t w e e n the compartments. T o d a y the
is d i s i n t e g r a t i n g a n d t h e i n s u l a n t s a r e d i s s o l v i n g . T h e n e w unity has yet to
find
its o w n
structure, consensus,
and
ex-
framework global
harmony.
° It was estimated that in 1966 global arms spending was 40 per cent greater than the world's outlays for education and was more than three times greater than the world's public-health budget. In that same year the total foreign aid extended by the United States was approximately $4 billion, by the Soviet Union approximately $330 million (both sets of figures from "World Military Expenditures, 1966-1967," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1968, especially pp. 9 - 1 2 ) .
AMAMM
P A R T II
The Age of Volatile Belief T h e a g e of v o l a t i l e b e l i e f is i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e
im-
of
ideologies
and
o u t l o o k s o n life. W h a t m a n t h i n k s is c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o w h a t
man
pact
the
technetronic
revolution
on
experiences.
T h e relationship b e t w e e n
interacting:
experience
the
interpretation
seems
increasingly
of
affects
to b e
that
tured, changing perspectives.
t h e t w o is n o t c a u s a l
thought,
experience.
existing
Today
of highly
and
thought
the
dominant
individualistic,
pattern unstruc-
beliefs, the
result
of the m e r g e r of ideas a n d institutions, n o longer a p p e a r to
many
as vital a n d so
heavily
to
relevant, the
while
Institutionalized
but
conditions
the skepticism
undermining
of
that has
institutionalized
contributed beliefs
now
clashes with the n e w emphasis on passion and involvement.
The
r e s u l t f o r m a n y is a n e r a o f f a d s , o f r a p i d l y s h i f t i n g b e l i e f s ,
with
emotions providing for s o m e the unifying c e m e n t previously
sup-
plied b y institutions a n d with the f a d e d revolutionary slogans the past providing the n e e d e d inspiration for facing an
of
altogether
different future. 63
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
Several b r o a d phases can b e discerned in the formation of collective
human
consciousness
that
conditions
our
reality a n d provides the f r a m e w o r k for intellectually that reality. T h e in
establishing
occupation with source
of
perspective
and
linked
man's
his inner life to a universal
a standard
God-given,
that
of b e h a v i o r
the line b e t w e e n
binding the
upon
finite
crucial
individual
God,
and
to
structuring
great religions of r e c o r d e d history w e r e a
the
response
who
pre-
was
the
all. R e a l i t y
was
the
was
infinite
blurred. T h e ideological phase associated with industrialization and spread
of
literacy
involved
a
much
higher
propensity
social activism a n d e m p h a s i z e d m o r e i m m e d i a t e goals, as either in terms of the nation external
condition
of
man
or s o m e being
other collective
the
primary
the
toward defined
good,
focus.
called for a m o r e explicit definition of our reality, a n d
the
Activism systematic,
even dogmatic, intellectual frameworks were m e a n t to meet
that
need. In our time the established ideologies are c o m i n g under b e c a u s e their institutionalized in mobilizing impediment
the
relatively
to intellectual
character, w h i c h
uneducated adaptation,
was
masses, while
attack
once
has
useful
become
their concern
an with
t h e e x t e r n a l q u a l i t i e s o f l i f e is i n c r e a s i n g l y f e l t t o i g n o r e t h e i n n e r , m o r e spiritual dimension. C o m m i t m e n t to individual action, on moral indignation
and stimulated by
general education, has b e c o m e
a much
higher
a substitute for highly
based
level
of
organized
activity, t h o u g h it a v o i d s t h e p a s s i v i t y a n d i n d i f f e r e n c e t o e x t e r n a l reality that w a s characteristic of the pre-ideological
age.
C o m p e l l i n g ideologies thus are giving w a y to c o m p u l s i v e but
without
the
eschatology
that
characterized
other
ideas,
historical
e r a s . Y e t t h e r e is s t i l l a f e l t n e e d f o r a s y n t h e s i s t h a t c a n
define
the m e a n i n g a n d the historical thrust of our times. In that
search
the
dominating
passion
is e q u a l i t y — a m o n g
men
within
tions, within societies, a m o n g races, a n d a m o n g nations.
instituEquality
motivates both the rebels in the universities—in the W e s t a n d the E a s t — a n d the n e w nations in their struggle against the
in
better
{71
The Quest for a Universal Vision established and
richer
ones. T h i s e m p h a s i s , as w e l l as t h e fear
personal obsolescence, causes concern in m a n y that the n e w industrial
age
competences,
will require
even
differentiation
in
skills,
and intellectual preparation, thereby widening
disparities within the h u m a n fying global
greater
c o n d i t i o n at a t i m e of e v e r
of
post-
the
intensi-
interaction.
1. The Quest for a Universal Vision "Man
came
silently
into the world."
1
But
though
his
coming
is s h r o u d e d i n m y s t e r y — i n t h e s e n s e t h a t w e still k n o w l i t t l e a b o u t the actual beginnings
earliest
known
history m a n has g i v e n e v i d e n c e of an intense y e a r n i n g to
of h u m a n
existence—from
under-
stand himself
primi-
a n d his environment.
However
crudely and
tively, m a n has a l w a y s s o u g h t to crystallize s o m e organizing
prin-
ciple that w o u l d , b y creating order out of chaos, relate h i m to
the
u n i v e r s e a n d h e l p d e f i n e his p l a c e i n it.2 Despite human
the disappearance
evolution—or
in earlier times of entire
social d e v e l o p m e n t — h a s
involved
cultures,3 both
e x p a n s i o n in man's a w a r e n e s s of h i m s e l f a n d his f e l l o w s as a man
entity
endowed
with
certain
common
qualities
an
in-
creasingly systematic intellectual effort to define a n d organize
his
external reality meaningfully. T h e r e has thus b e e n Teilhard d e C h a r d i n has called "an a u g m e n t a t i o n of • . . a stream
whereby
a continuing
and
and
an hu-
at w o r k
transmissible
o f r e f l e c t i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d a n d a l l o w e d t o i n c r e a s e . "
tradition
4
In terms of the entirety of h u m a n existence, that "stream" indeed
be
a short one,
as
the
critics
of the
notion
what
consciousness
of
may
historical
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
progress
readily
point
out.
Nevertheless,
recorded
history
does
provide strong e v i d e n c e of g r o w t h — o f t e n halting a n d uneven, g r o w t h n o n e t h e l e s s — i n man's c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a c o m m o n fate, of dard.*
certain Even
universal
when
they
cravings,
and
compete,
of
religions
common and
but
human
moral
stan-
ideologies
have
increasingly d o n e so in terms of a n d for the sake of principles seem, w h e n v i e w e d f r o m a historical perspective, m o r e a n d
that more
to i n v o l v e s e m a n t i c a n d n o t s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s . T h i s is n o t deny
that practice
has
often widely
markable that conflicts h a v e b e e n w a g e d over competitive to
a
superior
values
as
interpretation
democracy,
and
welfare,
to
d i f f e r e d ; it is, h o w e v e r ,
application
individual
of
such
dignity,
re-
claims
universal
and
personal
freedom.
The Universal The
Religions
crucial breakthrough
in the
development
of
human
self-
a w a r e n e s s o n a m a s s s c a l e c a m e w i t h t h e g r e a t r e l i g i o n s — t h e first universal
syntheses
that
simultaneously
expanded
man's
b o t h vertically a n d horizontally: vertically, to define in and
complex
small
group's
terms alone
man's
relationship
but everyone's;
to a G o d
horizontally,
that to
series of imperatives that g o v e r n e d man's obligations the
grounds
emerged
that
all s h a r e d
as a state of m i n d
the divine even
spark.
vision
extended not
a
articulate
was
a
to m a n
Universalism
at a t i m e w h e n
man
was
on thus still
* We are talking here about our history—of our historical civilization. Claude Levi-Strauss is otherwise quite right in pointing out that . . it is forgotten that each of the tens or hundreds of thousands of societies which have existed side by side in the world or succeeded one another since man's first appearance, has claimed that it contains the essence of all the meaning and dignity of which human society is capable and, reduced though it may have been to a small nomad band or a hamlet lost in the depths of the forest, its claim has in its own eyes rested on a moral certainty comparable to that which we can invoke in our own case. But whether in their case or our own, a good deal of egocentricity and naivety is necessary to believe that man has taken refuge in a single one of the historical or geographical modes of his existence, when the truth about man resides in the system of their differences and common properties" (The Savage Mind, Chicago, 1966, p. 249).
{71
The Quest for a Universal Vision provincial a n d isolated in mutually exclusive social-cultural
com-
partments. Accordingly, the birth of the universal religions represents appearance
of
humanity
equality before G o d
qua
humanity.
The
assertion
of
man's
in t e r m s of h i s spirit, his c o n s c i e n c e ,
soul, laid the basis for the transcendental
the
or
hu-
m a n b e i n g a n d for the m u c h later assertion of the equality of in their political a n d social dimensions.
his
importance of t h e
In that sense,
men
proselytiz-
ing Christianity, w h i c h universalized the more limited Greek
and
Judaic tradition, w a s
was
a particularly
revolutionary
force and
v i e w e d as s u c h b y e s t a b l i s h e d authority, in spite of t h e
distinction
it m a d e b e t w e e n e q u a l i t y b e f o r e G o d a n d o b e i s a n c e t o C a e s a r Caesars
terms.
struggle
and
If h u m a n
an
history
evolution
can
toward
be
the
said to involve
progressive
on
both
liberation
man, then the attainment of equality before the supernatural
a of
was
t h e first m a j o r s t e p o n t h a t r o a d . But
early
himself
man
or his
could
neither
environment.
given to b e accepted,
control
Both
were
nor
comprehend
essentially
a
either
mystery,
a
w h a t e v e r t h e pains of life m i g h t be. A s
a
consequence, the distant future b e c a m e a m u c h more intense ject of p r e o c c u p a t i o n
than the immediate
present.
The
to c o p e effectively w i t h disease, plagues, infant mortality, a life
span,
prompted
or
natural
man
disasters
to seek refuge
such
as
floods
and
crop
in all-encompassing
ob-
inability short
blights
definitions
of
his reality. T h e s e in turn p r o v i d e d at least partial justification for the v i e w that h u m a n endeavor w a s futile and for the necessity accepting
events
with
fatalism.
By
taking
refuge
in
an
mous, distant, divine future, m a n relieved himself of the tion to struggle
intensely
with
the
present
under
obliga-
circumstances
he w a s neither intellectually nor practically prepared
for.
E v e n the notion of "free will"—a central c o m p o n e n t of the activist of the great religions, Christianity—basically inner
act of
conscience
necessary
for the
state
most
involved
an
grace,
rather
external
action.
N o stress w a s p l a c e d o n t h e struggle to i m p r o v e external
condi-
than a p o i n t of departure for morally m o t i v a t e d
of
of
autono-
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
tions, b e c a u s e t h e u n s t a t e d
assumption
was that they
could
be fundamentally improved. T h e emphasis was on the inner b y riveting his attention o n the universal a n d the divine man
could
master
the
present
by
simply
ignoring
it.
not man;
future,
Minimum
social action w a s m a t c h e d b y m a x i m u m c o m m i t m e n t to the
super-
natural. T o m e e t the central n e e d of their t i m e — m a i n l y , to p r o v i d e w i t h a firm m o o r i n g in a w o r l d w h i c h c o u l d not b e —and
to
assert
crystallized The
more
firm
into
control
dogmas
individually
over
and
mans
were
demanding
the d e g r e e of institutionalization.f
spirit,
organized the
religious into
religion,
the
one
hand
institutionalization holy wars of I s l a m )
and
came
higher
on
activism
the (the
other.)5 Crusades
anal-
ChristianWith
the
and
the
a n d t h e exercise of m u s c l e b y religious
nizations on their environment.
was
(This has prompted the
communism more
beliefs
institutions.*
ogies m a d e b y a n u m b e r of scholars b e t w e e n I s l a m a n d ity o n the
man
comprehended
orga-
P o w e r w a s asserted, however,
to
e x t e n d t h e c o n q u e s t of t h e spirit, n o t to e f f e c t s o c i a l c h a n g e .
The
i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of b e l i e f t h u s c o m b i n e d t w o f u n c t i o n s : it
was
the
zealots' self-defense m e c h a n i s m
against
a
non-believing
en-
v i r o n m e n t , a n d it w a s a t o o l f o r s u s t a i n e d p r o s e l y t i z a t i o n , o n e
de-
signed not only to w i n over adherents b u t to o v e r c o m e the inertial
* I do not propose—nor do I feel qualified—to become involved in the debate among Marxists, Freudians, and Jungians concerning the autonomy and the functionality of religious development. My concern here is with the emergence of a conceptual and institutional framework for defining man's relationship to his reality. t An extreme example is provided by the Catholic Church's insistence on celibacy. As one scholar has noted, "Celibacy ensured for it an exclusive loyalty of its personnel that was unavailable to other modern religious institutions. It often contributed to its amazing capacity to resist secular authority. It is worth noting in passing that churches with married priesthoods, be they Lutheran, Anglican, or Greek Orthodox (the latter allowing marriage only for the lower orders of priests), have not been able to stand up against secular authority in a way comparable to that of the Catholic Church. The Protestant and Orthodox churches have typically been servants and appendages of secular authority. They rarely could afford to resist it. One reason for this was precisely that their clerical personnel was deeply involved in the mesh of civil social life" (Lewis A. Coser, "Greedy Organizations," European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 7, 1967, p. 206).
{71
The Quest for a Universal Vision resistance of the masses, w h o w e r e largely indifferent to
spiritual
requirements.6 Although
Christianity
has
been
the
most
activist of
the
great
religions a n d has thereby laid the basis for the subsequent
secular
revolutionary
history,
movements
that have
dominated
t h e process of institutionalization—and the part of o r g a n i z e d tended
religion of
hence
Western
the emergence
status
a stake in the
to m u t e the radical m e s s a g e
on
quo—has
in the Christian concept
history: the m o v e m e n t t o w a r d salvation "on earth as in
of
Heaven."
Thus in practice the Christian churches have gradually
come
to
a c c e p t s o c i a l stratification a n d e v e n t o b e n e f i t f r o m it ( a s i n
Latin
America), and s o m e Lutheran varieties have even c o m e
sanc-
tion in d o g m a
concepts
of racial
inequality
that
are
to
at
extreme
variance w i t h the initial egalitarian revolution r e p r e s e n t e d b y n e w Christian relationship b e t w e e n G o d and The
other
practice
great
and
religions
in theory.
have
been
Buddhism
does
more not
the
man. passive—both
contain
in
imperatives
for social c h a n g e b u t offers salvation f r o m reality. U n l i k e
Chris-
tianity, nirvana d i d n o t s e r v e as a s p r i n g b o a r d for t e m p o r a l
activ-
ism.
Similarly,
Islam's
dominant
strain
of
fatalism
has
worked
against t h e p r e s e n c e of at least that e l e m e n t of tension
between
" e t e r n a l p e a c e " a n d " h e a v e n o n e a r t h " t h a t is s o s t r o n g i n t i a n i t y a n d t h a t h a s p r o m p t e d its r e p r e s s e d
The National With
the
environment,
Chris-
activism.7
Identity
growth
in
secular
the
West
of
rationalism,
m a n s ability accompanied
to by
master a
his
greater
a w a r e n e s s of social c o m p l e x i t y as w e l l as b y a b r e a k d o w n in existing
structure
of
religious
allegiance,
emerged
institutionalized religion. T h a t religious allegiance
to
simultaneously
rested o n the narrowness a n d o n the universalism of m a n s zons:
the narrowness
derived
from massive ignorance,
and a vision confined to the immediate
the
challenge
environment
communications; the universalism was provided b y the
hori-
illiteracy, by
limited
acceptance
1 oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
o f t h e i d e a t h a t m a n ' s d e s t i n y is e s s e n t i a l l y
in God's h a n d s
and
t h a t t h e l i m i t e d p r e s e n t is b u t a s t e p p i n g s t o n e t o a n u n l i m i t e d
fu-
ture. E m e r g i n g s e c u l a r i s m c h a l l e n g e d b o t h d i m e n s i o n s , a n d in
so
doing required for the external projection of man's identity an
in-
t e r m e d i a r y f o c u s of l o y a l t y — s o m e t h i n g in b e t w e e n t h e and
the
infinite.
The
nation-state
and
nationalism
immediate
were
the
re-
sponses. The
doctrine of sovereignty
created the institutional basis
c h a l l e n g i n g the secular authority of established religion, a n d challenge in turn p a v e d t h e w a y for the e m e r g e n c e of the conception of the nation-state.
of t h e process w h i c h and
American
concept
of
reality.
0
radically
altered
the
the
nation-state
became
man's political Nationalism infinite,
but
to
of
au-
dominant
simultaneously
e m b o d i m e n t of p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t s a n d t h e p o i n t of for analyzing reality. This d e v e l o p m e n t
French
structure
a n d prepared the ground for a n e w The
people,
consummation
in the t w o centuries p r e c e d i n g
revolutions
thority in the W e s t
abstract
Sovereignty v e s t e d in the
instead of sovereignty v e s t e d in the king, w a s the
marked
for this
the
departure
a new
phase
in
consciousness. did
not
activate
seek the
to direct
the
impersonal
individual masses
immediately proximate goals. Paradoxically,
for
toward the
these concrete
w e r e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e still i n t a n g i b l e a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ,
the
sake
of
goals though
• "In both its religious and its secular versions, in Filmer as well as in Hobbes, the import of the new doctrine of sovereignty was the subject's absolute duty of obedience to his king. Both doctrines helped political modernization by legitimizing the concentration of authority and the breakdown of the medieval pluralistic political order. They were the seventeenth-century counterparts of the theories of party supremacy and national sovereignty which are today employed to break down the authority of traditional local, tribal, and religious bodies. In the seventeenth century, mass participation in politics still lay in the future; hence rationalization of authority meant concentration of power in the absolute monarch. In the twentieth century, the broadening of participation and the rationalization of authority occur simultaneously, and hence authority must be concentrated in either a political party or in a popular charismatic leader, both of which are capable of arousing the masses as well as challenging traditional sources of authority. But in the seventeenth century the absolute monarch was the functional equivalent of the twentieth century's monolithic party" (Huntington, p. 102).
The Quest for a Universal Vision
{ 7
n e w , object of worship: t h e nation. T h e nation b e c a m e the
source
o f e c s t a t i c , l y r i c a l a f f e c t i o n , a n d it w a s t h i s h i g h l y e m o t i o n a l lationship, flags,
symbolized by
the n e w
anthems
("La
re-
Marseillaise"),
and heroes, that served to energize the populace. T h e
crete g o a l s took the f o r m of m a s s i v e p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h
con-
frontiers,
irredenta, "brethren" to b e regained from foreign captivity, m o r e generally, t h e p o w e r a n d t h e glory of t h e state as t h e expression of the nation. T h e f o r m for the n e w
state thus b e c a m e
1
the
formal
institutional
dominant belief, with a monopolistic
t h e a c t i v e d e d i c a t i o n t o it of m a n , n o w d e s i g n a t e d ,
and,
first
claim and
on
above
all, as t h e c i t i z e n . T h e designation "man the citizen" symbolically marks
another
milestone in the evolution of m a n as a social being. E q u a l i t y fore G o d was n o w m a t c h e d by equality before the law; egalitarianism of
note
that
was legal
now
reinforced
equality
was
by
legal
asserted
spiritual
egalitarianism.
both
by
the
be-
It
is
American
R e v o l u t i o n , w h i c h s u p p l e m e n t e d its stress o n e q u a l i t y b e f o r e
the
law with a strong attachment
de-
to religious values—indeed,
rived the former from the latter—and by the French which
constructed
its p a n t h e o n
of h u m a n
rejecting the religious tradition.
equality
it
Revolution, by
explicitly
In both cases the legal
equality
of t h e c i t i z e n w a s p o s t u l a t e d a s a u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e — a n d t h u s it m a r k e d another giant step in the progressive redefinition of
mans
nature a n d p l a c e in our world. With plative
nationalism, man,
the
concerned
external man,
concerned
distinction with
his
with
between
the
inner
to
God,
relationship
shaping
his e n v i r o n m e n t ,
blurred. Nationalism as a n i d e o l o g y w a s m o r e lations to m a n were
were
not dependent,
objectivized as w a s
externally
by
contemand
activist; m a n s legal norms
man's relation to God,
on
conscience; yet at the s a m e t i m e the definition of m a n
emotional
vagueness
and
criteria.
even
This
irrationality
outlook when
involved used
as
reand
personal as a
tional" w a s b a s e d largely o n abstract, historically determined, highly
the
became
"naand
considerable a
conceptual
framework within w h i c h relations b e t w e e n nations and
develop-
1oo}
II:
The Age of Volatile Belief
ments within nations might be understood. Nationalism only tially i n c r e a s e d m e n ' s s e l f - a w a r e n e s s ; it m o b i l i z e d
them
par-
actively
b u t f a i l e d t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i r c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s ; it w a s m o r e a vehicle
for
human
passion
and
fantasizing
than
a
f r a m e w o r k t h a t m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o d i s s e c t a n d t h e n
mass
conceptual deliberately
reassemble our reality.
Ideological That
Universalism
is w h y
Marxism
represents
a further
vital
and
creative
s t a g e i n t h e m a t u r i n g of m a n ' s u n i v e r s a l vision. M a r x i s m is s i m u l taneously
the
inner,
p a s s i v e m a n a n d a v i c t o r y of r e a s o n o v e r b e l i e f : it s t r e s s e s
a victory
of
the
external,
active
man
over
man's
capacity to shape his material destiny—finite a n d defined as man's only reality—and
it p o s t u l a t e s
the
absolute
capacity
of
man
to
truly u n d e r s t a n d his reality as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e for his
active
e n d e a v o r s t o s h a p e it. T o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n a n y p r e v i o u s
mode
of political thinking, and
rigorous
Marxism puts a premium
examination
of
material
reality
on the
systematic
and
guides
on
to
action derived from that examination. Though
it
may
be
argued
that
this
intellectually
rigorous
m e t h o d w a s e v e n t u a l l y s u b v e r t e d b y its s t r o n g c o m p o n e n t of matic
belief,
awakening
the
Marxism masses
did to
an
expand intense
popular
dog-
self-awareness
preoccupation
with
by
social
equality and b y providing t h e m with both a historical a n d a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n s i s t i n g u p o n it. M o r e t h a n t h a t , M a r x i s m s e n t e d i n its t i m e t h e m o s t a d v a n c e d
repre-
and systematic method
analyzing the d y n a m i c of social d e v e l o p m e n t ,
for
for categorizing
a n d f o r e x t r a p o l a t i n g f r o m it c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s c o n c e r n i n g
it,
social
b e h a v i o r . It d i d s o in a m a n n e r that lent itself to translation
into
highly simplified principles that provided e v e n the relatively
un-
educated with the feeling that their understanding of
phenomena
h a d b e e n basically sharpened a n d that their resentments, tions, a n d v a g u e meaningful
aspirations could b e channeled
actions.
into
frustra-
historically
{71
The Quest for a Universal Vision Because ethical,
of
this,
rational,
Marxism
and
appealed
Promethean
simultaneously
instincts.
The
to
mans
ethical
nent, sustained b y man's emotions, d r e w on the
compo-
Judaeo-Christian
heritage; the rational r e s p o n d e d to m a n s increased desire to prehend
the dynamic
of his
material
environment
com-
more
system-
atically; a n d the P r o m e t h e a n stood for "man's faith in his
powers,
f o r t h e n o t i o n t h a t h i s t o r y is m a d e b y t h e p e o p l e a n d t h a t
nothing
c a n h e m in their a d v a n c e to perfection." I n this sense,
Marxism
has
served
8
as a m e c h a n i s m
of
human
" p r o g r e s s , " e v e n if its p r a c t i c e h a s o f t e n f a l l e n s h o r t o f its Teilhard de
Chardin notes at one point that "monstrous
is n o t m o d e r n magnificent, observes
totalitarianism
and
that
"all
thus the
quite
really near
peoples,
the
to
to
distortion
of
truth?"9
the
remain
something
Elsewhere
human
or
to
has formulated them." outside
the
immediate
10
What
problems the
West
h e d o e s n o t s a y is t h a t f o r
many
influence
of
terms in w h i c h
the
West
and
its
Christian
t r a d i t i o n it h a s b e e n M a r x i s m t h a t h a s s e r v e d t o stir t h e m i n d to mobilize h u m a n energies Moreover,
Marxism has
he
become
m o r e so, are i n e x o r a b l y l e d to f o r m u l a t e t h e h o p e s a n d of the m o d e r n earth in the v e r y s a m e
ideals. as it is,
and
purposefully. decisively contributed
to the
political
institutionalization a n d systematization of t h e deliberate effort define the nature of our era a n d of man's relationship to
to
history
at a n y g i v e n s t a g e in t h a t history. E m p h a s i s o n this q u e s t i o n
has
c o m p e l l e d reflection o n t h e relative i m p o r t a n c e of different forces of c h a n g e ,
the weighing
of
alternative historical
a n d at least the a t t e m p t at t e n t a t i v e j u d g m e n t .
interpretations,
Moreover,
it
has
p r o v o k e d a series of s u b o r d i n a t e q u e s t i o n s , all h e l p f u l in
forcing
r e c o g n i t i o n of c h a n g e a n d i n c o m p e l l i n g a d j u s t m e n t s t o it:
Within
t h e g i v e n era, w h a t particular p h a s e s c a n b e d e c i p h e r e d ?
Is
given phase
one
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l
tension,
s h i f t i n g l o c a l e of conflict, of a n e w present
principal
of
greater stability,
set of alliances? W h o and
objectively?
of our
Who
are
n o w o u r allies? W h a t are t h e s o u r c e s of principal, s e c o n d a r y ,
and
tertiary dangers?
foes—subjectively
are
any
1oo}
II:
The Age of Volatile Belief
Periodic,
formal,
purposeful
examination
of
such
questions
c o m p e l s s y s t e m a t i c p r o b i n g o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c e n e . T h i s is to say that c o n t e m p o r a r y ful
in
accurately
phenomena.
communists
perceiving
always
conviction
of
that
been
new
their
success-
international
analytical
tools often
led them
their
have
meaning
provide a faultless guide to the inner m e a n i n g of things has
and
Indeed,
the
not
astray. U n w i l l i n g to a c c e p t t h e n o t i o n of t h e
elusiveness
of
truth,
they
have
elevated
their
relativity
inescapably
partial insights into absolute d o g m a s and r e d u c e d c o m p l e x to gross
issues
oversimplifications.
Nonetheless, pression
of
to
define
communism—the
Marxism—primarily
from traditional to m o d e r n is, i n f a c t , n o t h i n g b u t
as
status,"
"a 11
institutionalized
disease
ex-
the
transition
or to assert that
"Marxism
an epiphenomenon
of
of technical
develop-
ment, a p h a s e of t h e painful marriage of m a n a n d technique," is t o n e g l e c t
what
of
its r e v o l u t i o n a r y
Marxism:
will probably
remain
major
influence,
which dram-
neglected
broadening
contribution
o p e n e d man's m i n d to previously ignored perspectives a n d atized previously
and
the
12
concerns.
To
say
as m u c h
is n o t
ignore the s u b s e q u e n t l y enslaving effect of institutionalized
to
Marx-
i s m — e s p e c i a l l y w h e n in p o w e r — o r its a n a l y t i c a l i n a b i l i t y to
cope
w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s o f t h e a d v a n c e d t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y w o r l d ; it is to assert that in t h e gradual Marxism
represents
evolution
as i m p o r t a n t
of m a n s
and progressive
universal a stage
vision as
the
a p p e a r a n c e of nationalism a n d of t h e great religions. In
all
three
cases—religion,
breakthrough had many about
as
genius.
the
result
of
nationalism,
and
Marxism—the
antecedents and did not suddenly an
entirely
autonomous
Marx capitalized on the intellectual
act
of
come
creative
achievements
of
his
i m m e d i a t e predecessors, for s o m e of w h o m socialism h a d a strong religious
basis.*
Similarly,
nationalism
and
the
great
religions
w e r e t h e articulate s y n t h e s e s of m o o d s , of attitudes, a n d of a
cer-
* Pierre Leroux (1797-1871) was among the first to analyze the term "socialism" conceptually and to use it in his writings. He saw in socialism the fulfillment of religious imperatives.
Turbulence within Institutionalized
{81
Beliefs
tain social receptivity that h a d matured over a very long of time. Also,
in all t h r e e c a s e s t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h
in
was
by
wars
followed
Inquisition;
national
slaughter;
brutal
the
as
mind
perversion hatreds
terror,
well
in practice:
as
expressed
purges,
the
body
and in
religious in
and
unprecedented
totalitarian the
period
perception
name
the mass
subjugation
of
a
of
"humanist"
ideology. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n all t h r e e c a s e s t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l h o r i z o n s o f once
widened,
could
not
again be
narrowed.
Equality
man,
before
universal G o d and the emphasis on individual conscience,
ity b e f o r e the l a w a n d a c o m m i t m e n t to a social entity larger the i m m e d i a t e one, social equality a n d a concern for dissecting the dynamic
thrust
of
history—all
have
than
analytically cumulatively
h e l p e d to refine a n d enlarge m a n s political and social
conscious-
ness. G i v e n t h e d o m i n a n t role of t h e activist W e s t in s h a p i n g outlook
of
our
times,
now,
in the
second
half
of
century, almost everyone—often without knowing
a
equal-
the
the
twentieth
it—is to
some
extent a Christian, a nationalist, a n d a Marxist.
2. Turbulence within Institutionalized Beliefs It is i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult for institutions to assert cally t h e pristine purity of the doctrines
dogmati-
that they claim
b o d y . T h i s is a s t r u e o f t h e C h r i s t i a n c h u r c h e s
as of
to
em-
communist
parties; in s o m e of t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d c o u n t r i e s this difficulty also involves—especially
on
the
part
of
in
al-
T o d a y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i d e a s t o i n s t i t u t i o n s is t u r b u l e n t :
in-
legiance to t h e p r o c e d u r e s of liberal
the
young—a
crisis
democracy.
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
stitutions resist ideas lest t h e y l e a d to c h a n g e s that u n d e r m i n e institutions, a n d the exponents
of i d e a s r e b e l a g a i n s t
the
institutions
b e c a u s e of t h e intellectual constraints said to b e i n h e r e n t in
their
existence. This
development
is p a r t
of
the progressive
secularization
o u r life. A n i m p o r t a n t r o l e in this p r o c e s s is p l a y e d b y t h e character of c o n t e m p o r a r y
communications,
dissemination of ideas a n d
images,
which permits
rapid
a n d requires less reliance
an organized effort to proselytize. T o d a y , m o r e p e o p l e are to impressions that are both m o r e
on
exposed
and more volatile than
ever
b e f o r e . T h e r e is n o l o n g e r t h e s a m e n e e d t o c h a l l e n g e rigid
and
traditional
taboos
with
fluid
of
changed
alternative
and
more
appealing
visions,
or to o v e r c o m e social inertia w i t h o r g a n i z e d m o b i l i z a t i o n of effort. All this puts institutionalized beliefs o n the d e f e n s i v e :
more
m o r e their
loyalty
efforts are
designed
to retain
the positive
and of
their adherents a n d to c o m b a t influences that are inimical to structured, formalized, and highly institutionalized
beliefs.
W r i t i n g a l m o s t a c e n t u r y a g o , M a r x o b s e r v e d t h a t " u p till it h a s b e e n t h o u g h t t h a t t h e g r o w t h of t h e C h r i s t i a n m y t h s the Roman
Empire
was
possible
only because
printing
now
during
was
yet invented. Precisely the contrary. T h e daily press a n d the graph,
which
in
a
moment
earth, fabricate m o r e m y t h s enlarge
upon them)
d o n e in a century."
13
in one When
spread
inventions
over
the
tele-
whole
( a n d the bourgeois cattle believe day
than could have
not
formerly
to t h e p r e s s a n d t e l e g r a p h is
and been
added
the c o n t e m p o r a r y global role of radio a n d television, a n d to
reli-
gion are a d d e d c o n t e m p o r a r y ideologies, Marx's observations
be-
c o m e even m o r e pertinent. In addition to developments
connected with the means
semination a n d t h e p a c e of technologically i n d u c e d social a n o t h e r f a c t o r is at w o r k . I n t h e v i e w of m a n y c o n c e r n e d especially a m o n g
the y o u n g e r generation, t h e f u s i o n of
or i d e o l o g i e s w i t h institutions has resulted in b u r e a u c r a t i c as w e l l as distortion in values. T h e l o n g tradition of
of
dis-
change, people, religions rigidity
institutional-
ized religion's concentration on the inner m a n has p r o m p t e d
social
Turbulence within Institutionalized passivity and
de facto
{81
Beliefs
indifference to concrete h u m a n
dilemmas,
in spite of stated c o m m i t m e n t s to humanitarianism; the m o r e temporary ideological preoccupation with mobilizing the m a n has resulted in political systems
whose
external
practice refutes
moral significance of their o f t e n p r o c l a i m e d humanitarian t i v e s . If i n t h e
first
case the spiritual elevation of m a n
the
objec-
has
m i t t e d his social deprivation, in the s e c o n d t h e assertion of social primacy has precipitated his spiritual
Institutional
con-
perman's
degradation.
Marxism
Moreover, m a n y p e o p l e feel that both o n the external, m e n t a l level of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e a n d o n t h e inner, one, current institutionalized
environ-
contemplative
beliefs no longer provide
adequate
responses to contemporary problems. Despite the intellectual v a n c e t h a t M a r x i s m r e p r e s e n t s i n o u r t h i n k i n g , it d o e s n o t
ad-
suffice
as t h e sole basis for m e a n i n g f u l c o m p r e h e n s i o n of o u r reality. coveries in m o d e r n science, a d v a n c e s in the s t u d y of t h e
Dis-
human
psyche, and even contemporary socio-economic developments no
longer
the
be
Marxist
satisfactorily framework.
spiritual e l e m e n t inner m a n — a
and
At
interpreted the
by
same
the renewed
exclusive
time,
the
can
reliance
neglect
the
search for the true nature
search m a d e m o r e urgent b e c a u s e of scientific
v e l o p m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e nature of the h u m a n brain a n d
basis for defining t h e m e a n i n g of h u m a n limitation
is
accentuated
by
personsole
existence.
the
link
between
ideas a n d institutions in t h e f o r m of bureaucratic
and
Marxist dogmatic
c o m m u n i s t parties. Precisely b e c a u s e M a r x i s m as a b o d y of a n d as a s o c i o - e c o n o m i c
method has become
so m u c h
ideas
a part
t h e W e s t e r n i n t e l l e c t u a l h e r i t a g e , its i n t e l l e c t u a l vitality a n d litical s i g n i f i c a n c e — t h e
latter c o n c e i v e d
of de-
a l i t y — h a v e further e x p o s e d the limitations of M a r x i s m as t h e
That
on
of
of
source of influence for social p r o g r a m s — n o
in b r o a d
terms
of po-
as
longer depend on
a an
organization of zealots. S u c h organization w a s n e e d e d to proselyti z e , t o s e i z e p o w e r , a n d t o h o l d it. S p e c i f i c R u s s i a n c o n d i t i o n s
led
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
to the L e n i n i s t f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e historical utility of s u c h a party a n d o f t h e a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y o f s u b o r d i n a t i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o it. Subsequently,
the
bureaucratic
elements
that
unavoidably
g a i n e d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o n c e it h a d c o m e
to
power
naturally t e n d e d to put a higher priority o n the organization
than
on the ideas that the organization was
and,
presumably, parties
has
acceptance bureaucratic
to nourish. come
to
and
supposed
to uphold
As
a result, the existence
of
an
effective impediment
to
be
development
organization,
of
Marxist
their inherent
thought. concern
communist the
further
The
parties'
for their
insti-
tutional vested i n t e r e s t s — e v e n at the e x p e n s e of the Marxist trine that they are said to e m b o d y — t h e i r
doc-
fear of intellectual
ex-
ploration, all h a v e c u m u l a t i v e l y s t i m u l a t e d b o t h o p p o s i t i o n o n
the
outside a n d ideological sterility o n the inside. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f this sterility is t h e s t r i k i n g f a c t t h a t t h e communist party has not produced a tial Marxist t h i n k e r in t h e
fifty
single
creative and
Soviet influen-
y e a r s s i n c e it s e i z e d p o w e r i n
1917.
( M o r e o v e r , its l e a d i n g intellectual lights, t h e b e g i n n i n g s of
whose
creativity antedated 1917, w e r e physically liquidated under
Soviet
rule.)
This
is r e m a r k a b l e ,
considering
the
attached to "creative" Marxism-Leninism party ever to h a v e c o m e
significance
by the
to p o w e r . E l s e w h e r e
probing
ential Marxist philosophers—George
Lukacs,
Schaff, or Leszek
invariably
Kolakowski—have
first
officially
communist and
influ-
Ernst Bloch, either
Adam
come
sharp conflict w i t h p a r t y discipline or h a v e e v e n t u a l l y b e e n
into
driven
out of the party. As l o n g as M a r x i s m w a s a n isolated school of thought, t h e could
serve
as
an
effective
mechanism
for
carrying
it
party
to
the
m a s s e s and, m o r e generally, as t h e s e l f - a p p o i n t e d a g e n t of history, the direction of w h i c h
Marxism
claimed
to have
correctly
tified. B u t o n c e M a r x i s m h a d b e c o m e part of t h e w o r l d s mainstream,
to
insist
on
its
separate,
institutional
iden-
historic
identity
and
e x c l u s i v i t y w a s t o d i m i n i s h its i n f l u e n c e a n d t o stifle its c r e a t i v i t y . Y e t t h a t is p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s h a v e
continued
to do, a n d the C o m m u n i s t Party of the Soviet U n i o n has e v e n
ex-
Turbulence within Institutionalized
t e n d e d t h a t c l a i m b y a s s e r t i n g its right to p a s s o n t h e of other parties
general
more
increasing indifference to doctrine
membership
creative
Marxist
and
increasing
thinkers.
ideas have b e c o m e discredited. Europe, where communism nationalism, available
on
correctness
interpretations.
T h e result has b e e n the
the
admittedly
public
This
disaffection
is n o t
to
say
limited
attitudes
that
O n the contrary, even in
has h a d to compete and
indicate
very that
with
mass
access
to education,
among
among
the
socialist Eastern
anti-Soviet
fragmentary
data
socialism—broadly
c o n c e i v e d of as a n a t t e m p t to create a m o r e just society public welfare,
{81
Beliefs
through
social services,
public
o w n e r s h i p of t h e principal m e a n s of production, a n d social
egali-
tarianism—has w i d e popular support, whereas c o m m u n i s m
as
institutionalized belief has not.* Similarly, in the W e s t m o s t socialist parties n o w
accept the welfare society
as d e s i r a b l e
an
nonand
* Data to that effect come from polls taken both within a given country and among Eastern European travelers to the West. Thus, in a 1961 poll conducted in Warsaw among university students, 2 per cent identified themselves as "definitely Marxist" in outlook and 16 per cent as "on the whole, yes." One may assume that these two categories would represent the upper limit of student willingness to accept the official ideology, although many among the 16 per cent presumably would rebel against excessive party orthodoxy; 2 7-5 per cent said "definitely no" and 31 per cent "on the whole, no" to the question "Do you consider yourself a Marxist?" At the same time, however, 28.1 per cent expressed the definite desire to see the world "evolve toward some form of socialism" and 44.5 per cent responded "on the whole, yes," for a total of 72.6 per cent expressing a generalized preference for socialism (East Europe, April 1966, p. 19). The gap between the generalized acceptance of socialism and the selfidentification as Marxists is probably a good measure of the distinction made above. Similarly, in a sample of 490 Polish visitors to the West in i960 (people who were subsequently returning to Poland), 61 per cent defined communism as "a bad idea, badly carried out," while 14 per cent felt that it was "a good idea, badly carried out." The overwhelming majority however, endorsed postwar programs providing for a welfare state, education for all, agrarian reform, and nationalization of heavy industry (Some Aspects of the SocialPsychological and Political Climate in Poland, Audience Research Survey, Radio Free Europe, Munich, 1961, pp. 21, 24). A similar poll conducted among 119 Hungarians yielded 73 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, and again there was considerable endorsement of the measures adopted after World War II (Political Attitudes and Expectations of ng Hungarians, Audience, pp. 38, 43).
1 oo}
II:
normal,
The Age of Volatile Belief
though
tion.
The
view
in
not
necessarily
Catholic the
Church
remarkable
requiring
expressed
papal
extensive
much
encyclical
nationaliza-
the
same
"Mater
et
point
of
Magistra"
(1961). Accordingly, "institutional Marxism," or c o m m u n i s m , n o
longer
c o n f r o n t s a n i n t e l l e c t u a l r e a l i t y t h a t is h o s t i l e e i t h e r t o its
social
aspirations or e v e n to s o m e of t h e u n d e r l y i n g assumptions.
It
no
longer faces a w o r l d that intellectually rejects M a r x i s m — t h a t
is,
a virgin territory tively organized.
to b e
attacked
by
zealous
missionaries
B y the same token, the only historical
collecfunction
of the closed Leninist-type party n o w appears to b e to help munists w h o are in p o w e r to stay in p o w e r . A s a result, a thinker can no longer b e
a communist
if h e
wishes
com-
Marxist
to remain
a
thinker. T h a t Leninist link b e t w e e n herent
restraints
and
ideas and p o w e r — w i t h
predispositions
toward
dogmatism
involves—drives away from communism both the and
the
"efficiency-seeking" intellectuals.14
all t h e
The
that
concern with the
external,
it
"truth-seeking" former
group—
typically the philosophers, humanists, and writers—reacts the excessive
in-
active man;
against
it s e e k s
to
restore a n d r e n e w c o n c e r n w i t h t h e inner m e a n i n g of life a n d
to
c o n f r o n t s u c h s o c i o - p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a as a l i e n a t i o n ; it a l s o a basic incompatibility
between
the quest for personal
that M a r x i s m is s a i d to e m b o d y a n d M a r x i s m ' s
institutionalization
as a s y s t e m of p o w e r . T h e m o s t articulate a n d m o v i n g tions of the s y s t e m
have
usually
come
c o m e to be called the " N e w with
the
"larger"
condemna-
f r o m this group.
c o m m u n i s t countries, this g r o u p also contains m u c h
cupied
In
concerning
non-
of w h a t
L e f t , " w h i c h is i n t e l l e c t u a l l y
questions
the
has
preoc-
individual.
C o h n - B e n d i t — t h e radical leader of the F r e n c h students in
1968—
characteristically reserved his sharpest barbs for the French munist
sees
freedom
Com-
Party.15
Another institution
threat
to
is
challenge
the
lectuals—typically
the
the
established from
economists,
link
the the
between
ideology
"efficiency-seeking" scientists,
and
the
and intelnew
Turbulence within Institutionalized managers.
Beliefs
{ 81
T h e y are p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h s o c i o - e c o n o m i c effi-
ciency, a n d t h e y see in the elevation of d o g m a s ordination
of
ideas
tive d o g m a t i s m — a
to
institutions—with
major
impediment
the
and in the
resulting
sub-
conserva-
to positive social
change.
Less concerned with the inner man, more preoccupied with
satis-
fying the d e m a n d s of the external m a n , they d o not p o s e a
head-
o n c h a l l e n g e t o t h e s y s t e m . B u t b e c a u s e t h e i r a t t a c k is and
because
the
attackers
themselves
are b e c o m i n g
oblique— both
numerous and socially m o r e indispensable to an industrial — t h e i r c h a l l e n g e is m o r e
difficult to suppress.
The
more society
truth-seekers
confront h e a d on; in the case of weaker, m o r e disorganized tems
they
crushed
have
by
the
occasionally application
been of
successful,
superior
only
power.
to
The
be
efficiency-
seekers d o not confront; they seek to erode. Both their a n d their d e f e a t s — s e e n in the c y c l e of c o m m u n i s t forms
and
subsequent
retreats—are
less
visible,
syslater
successes
economic less
re-
extensive,
but perhaps more tangible. At some point, however, even the efficiency-oriented group
will
h a v e to a d d r e s s itself to t h e m o r e b a s i c q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g
the
n a t u r e of m a n a n d t h e p u r p o s e of social e x i s t e n c e . U n t i l it
does
so, t h e r e is a l w a y s t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e r u l i n g e l i t e c a n a t
least
temporarily s u c c e e d in c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z i n g
the scientific
commu-
n i t y , i n e x t r a c t i n g its t a l e n t s , a n d i n c o r r u p t i n g it w i t h a s y s t e m rewards—all
the
while
reserving
to
itself
the
definition
of
of the
larger objectives. Conscious
of
bureaucratic been
this
danger
tradition,
inclined
to
and
reacting
contemporary
assert
the
primacy
against
Marxist of
the
dogmatic
philosophers
human
reason
and
have con-
science over vested organizational interests a n d to point out inescapable apply a
to
limitations
reality.
widespread
'Marxist"
as
Leszek
mood no
of
any
Kolakowski,
when
longer
ideological
he
writing
attacked
meaning
"a
framework
the
person
in
one
1956,
degraded who
reflected notion
of
recognizes
a
definite, m e a n i n g f u l v i e w of t h e world, b u t a p e r s o n of a intellectual
make-up
who
is
distinguished
by
his
the may
definite
readiness
to
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
recognize
the views
established
institutionally."
16
Rejecting
stitutional Marxism," Kolakowski asserted that party
"in-
interference
i n s c i e n t i f i c p u r s u i t s is, b y d e f i n i t i o n , u n - M a r x i s t , s i n c e it
contra-
dicts the e s s e n c e of Marxism: a deliberate, scientific, a n d
rational
inquiry similar
aiming vein,
at
the
closest
Yugoslav
philosophical
Praxis—a
journal
that "Marxism" and
approximation
philosophers
of
associated
magazine
the
truth.
with
the
n o t e d f o r its
In
insistence
"institutional truth" are contradictory
— r i d i c u l e d t h e v i e w s of a Soviet p h i l o s o p h e r w h o that the Party's Central C o m m i t t e e
had
terms
"asserted
formed the best solutions
the most important theoretical questions, including
today
is 'the a m a l g a m a t i o n of all f o r c e s w i t h i n t h e socialist c a m p . ' " to the
Soviet
view
a Yugoslav
philosopher
noted
"the resolutions p a s s e d b y the Central C o m m i t t e e are n o phy whatsoever." More
to
philosophical
ones; in his opinion, the m o s t important philosophical task
response
a
Zagreb
In
that
philoso-
17
fundamental
still h a s
been
the
challenge
to
the
notion
that Marxism as a science of history provides b o t h practical
and
ethical
and
guides
to
the
the more outspoken
future.
The
opponents
more
critical
of t h e fusion of
revisionists Marxist
and a Leninist-type party have challenged that premise K o l a k o w s k i p u t it p a r t i c u l a r l y
thought as
well.
eloquently:
A philosophy of history worthy of consideration describes only what has existed, the past, and not the creative future of the historical process. For this reason, those who wish to subordinate their own engagement in future processes to the pronouncements of the philosophy of history are only tourists who write their names on the walls of dead cities. Everybody can, if he wishes, interpret himself historically and discover the determinants to which he was subject in the past. But he cannot do so with respect to the self he has not yet become. He cannot deduce his own future development from the pronouncements of the philosophy of history in which he trusts. To work such a miracle would mean to become the irrevocable past oneself; that is, to cross the river of death which, the poet says, no one ever sees twice.18 Even
relatively
Schaff—who have
orthodox
Marxist
actively defended
thinkers—such
as
the fusion of ideas
Adam and
in-
Beliefs
{81
choice
between
Turbulence within Institutionalized stitutions
have
eventually
had
to
confront
the
intellectual subordination to institutional loyalty and
intellectual
integrity at t h e e x p e n s e of g o o d s t a n d i n g in t h e party. In
belatedly
o p t i n g for the latter, Schaff freely c o n c e d e d that his o w n could no longer be
confined to the conservative,
hence institutional—definition to
acknowledge
that
his
sociology of M a r x i s m
of M a r x i s m
more
thinking
dogmatic—and
and that he n o w
developed
understanding
required reliance on non-Marxist
tives a n d insights.19 A m e r e d e c a d e
had
of
the
perspec-
earlier, Schaff h a d
still
been
o n e of t h e m o s t effective o r t h o d o x critics of v i e w s e x p o u n d e d his
fellow
Pole,
Kolakowski,
Harich, and by the Yugoslav It
has
popular
been level
said in
the
a d v a n c e in m a n s world. that
It e n d e d
of
social
form
ability an epoch
historical dynamic
earlier
by
the
German
that of
Marxism,
to conceptualize in m a n s
stimulated
disseminated
communism,
a
represented
that might
gave
man
conscious
a
to
be
of its a p p e a l — a n
essentially
of
with
it.
ethical message.
d i d s o o n t h e b a s i s o f a d o c t r i n e t h a t a s s e r t e d t h a t it w a s from a totally rational m e t h o d
of inquiry.
Its s u c c e s s ,
oly o n t h e truth. B u t that w h i c h w a s necessary to h e l p age
of
historical
unconsciousness—especially
counterproductive
dissemination, and accelerating
in
the
age
of
on
seem-
terminate a
popular
masses,
rapid
change. relatively
isolated intellectual class that aspired to harness both history popular
It
monop-
science,
Initially the ideology of a narrowly based, w e a k , a n d
the
In the
therefore,
ingly irrational beliefs a n d against institutions asserting a
level—became
the
derived
helped to stimulate a reaction against truths derived from
the
his
called
sense
concern
the
major
his relationship
history It
on a
s p i t e o f its m a t e r i a l i s t i c d e t e r m i n i s m , it c a r r i e d — a n d t h a t w a s s o u r c e of m u c h
by
Wolfgang
revisionists.0
unconsciousness.
and
East
institutionalized
Marxism
has
become
official d o c t r i n e of n o n i n t e l l e c t u a l b u r e a u c r a t s w h o are
and the
supported
* For another example among many, see the December 1968 issue of Partelet (the Hungarian party journal), containing a communique on the expulsion from the Budapest Philosophical Institute of several Hungarian philosophers, some of whom had advocated a "pluralist" concept of Marxism.
1 o o } II: The Age of Volatile Belief b y millions
( r o u g h l y ten per cent of the adult population in
most
c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s ) f o r w h o m f o r m a l m e m b e r s h i p is m o r e an
expression
opportunism To
buttress
of
conservative
than an an
social
orthodoxy
or
ideological or an intellectual
institution
from
which
the
often
professional commitment.
creative
intellectual
c o n t e n t is i n c r e a s i n g l y d r a i n e d , t h e p r e s i d i n g officials h a v e
more
and m o r e taken refuge in state nationalism as the principal
emo-
tional b o n d with the masses. T h e effect—paradoxical a n d cruel its historical i r o n y — i s to m a k e c o m m u n i s m i n p o w e r
reliant o n the unconscious a n d the emotional factors w h i c h ism had sought to
Organized
supersede.
in
increasingly Marx-
20
Christianity
E q u a l l y d r a m a t i c , t h o u g h different in s u b s t a n c e , is t h e confronted today b y established religions, especially Unlike
communism,
system
of p o w e r ;
contemporary
its t e m p o r a l
Christianity
authority
is
is n o t
problem
Christianity. no
only
longer
a
limited
but
s h r i n k i n g . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is b o t h a s y s t e m o f d o c t r i n e s
and
a n i n s t i t u t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in its C a t h o l i c e x p r e s s i o n . T h e between
the beliefs and
history for the
t h e i n s t i t u t i o n is a n c i e n t ,
new Paul
by
II), to reinvigorate
the
the
the problem
Second 21
Church.
in a setting that simultaneously terest on and
religious
involvement
evidence forms.
in change,
In
of
Ecumenical These
given
Council
(Vatican
efforts are taking
Christians
increasing other
which
been
place
involves both unprecedented
the part of c o n c e r n e d
widespread
scribed
has
painful, a
expressed
but
often
d i m e n s i o n b y t h e efforts initiated b y P o p e s John X X I I I a n d VI, and
Church,
tension
words,
means
(not
only
indifference there
that the
is
in-
Catholics) to
the
both
official
of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n c a n n o t f u l l y c o n t r o l it, a n d u n c e r t a i n t y
pre-
massive guardians concern-
ing the best w a y s to m a k e the Church again truly relevant,
with-
o u t d i l u t i n g its s p i r i t u a l i d e n t i t y . The
fundamental
w o r d s of U n a m u n o ,
dilemma
confronted
by
the
Church,
is t h a t " C a t h o l i c i s m o s c i l l a t e s b e t w e e n
in
the mys-
Turbulence within Institutionalized
{81
Beliefs
t i c i s m , w h i c h is t h e i n w a r d e x p e r i e n c e of t h e l i v i n g G o d i n an intransmittable
experience,
t h e d a n g e r of w h i c h ,
Christ,
however,
t h a t it a b s o r b s o u r o w n p e r s o n a l i t y i n G o d , a n d s o d o e s n o t our vital l o n g i n g — b e t w e e n it
fights
against;
it
mysticism and the rationalism
oscillates 22
scientificized religion."
between
religionized
is
save which
science
and
T o o p t f o r o n e is t o b e d e p r i v e d o f
the
other. Yet neither will d o b y itself: m y s t i c i s m w o u l d m e a n
with-
drawal
mean
from
the
contemporary
world;
scientism
would
a b s o r p t i o n b y it. T h i s is a n o l d d i l e m m a f o r t h e C h u r c h , and
answered
in
different
ways
at
a n d it h a s b e e n
different
posed
historical
stages.
"Mater et Magistra" a n d Vatican I I — o c c u r r i n g in a n a g e
shaped
b y ideological conflict, scientific innovation, mass p o p u l a r ening, political passion, and religious q u i e s c e n c e — c a n b e as an effort to satisfy t h r e e b r o a d objectives: Church's
institutional
structure,
viewed
to u p d a t e
s o t h a t it is n o t a n
to the vitality of the ideological c o m p o n e n t throughout the chapter)
first,
awak-
the
impediment
(to use a term
applied
and so that the institutionalized
beliefs
again b e c o m e m e a n i n g f u l to both the inner and external
dimen-
sions of h u m a n
of
life; s e c o n d ,
better
Church
as a w h o l e
poverty
and social injustice to
to focus the energies
on social problems that range international
bigotry
and
conflict
between
personal
inequality;
nally, to heal doctrinal splits within Christianity of
from
Christianity
and,
and end
and
the
the
fiera
non-Christian
religions. T h e e f f o r t — p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e it d i d m o v e t h e C h u r c h in the desired
directions—produced
ship
ideas
between
and
institutions.
new
somewhat
strains in t h e
relation-
reform,
con-
d u c t e d at a t i m e w h e n p r e s s u r e s for t h e o l o g i c a l a d j u s t m e n t s
have
increasingly c o m e f r o m t h e C h u r c h hierarchy itself ( a s in t h e
case
of c o m m u n i s m ,
these
pressures have
periphery
from
the
the
than
Kremlin
the
center:
Netherlands
has
Institutional
more
what
often come
Yugoslavia
become
to the
from
has
Vatican!),
p r o m p t e d a p r o f o u n d crisis of p a p a l authority. P o p e P a u l s tion of t h e b a n o n artificial c o n t r a c e p t i o n
been
(in "Humanae
the to has
reiteraVitae,"
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
1 9 6 8 ) , w h i c h c a m e shortly after t h e a d o p t i o n b y V a t i c a n II of c o n c e p t of c o l l e g i a l i t y in C h u r c h affairs, p r o v o k e d s t r o n g reactions from various tions
in
which
turn
prompted
departed
of the C h u r c h herself." *
national the
Councils
Pontiff
to
m o r e t h a n a little f r o m and
menaced
of Bishops; against
the
traditional
order in the b o s o m
of
reac-
"attitudes doctrine
the
Church
23
Y e t t h e V a t i c a n c o u l d n o t stifle t h e t h e o l o g i c a l echoing
these
warn
the
negative
the demands
of
Marxist philosophers
Marxist dialogue, Catholic theologians
unrest.
for an
Almost
unfettered
(notably in a public
state-
m e n t released in D e c e m b e r
1968 b y forty of the leading
theolo-
gians )
by
resolve
denounced
efforts
the
theological issues b y administrative
Vatican fiat.
Curia
to
T h e y asserted their
to c o m p l e t e f r e e d o m of inquiry, subject to n o institutional
right
limita-
tions whatever. The
increased
compassion lenge.
but
in "Mater
Intense
ticularly
the
et
on
struggle attention
questions—articulated
i n t h e affairs of
against of
the
placing
the
Church
in direct
munist
movements.
Younger,
saw
social
Magistra"—presented
involvement
in t h e
focus
emphasis
social
on
competition
in that c o m p e t i t i o n — e s p e c i a l l y
could
external
with
socially
different
the world,
injustice,
Church
more
a
the transformation
of
Particularly
movement.
the
Church
par-
not
help
man,
There,
as
elsewhere,
often
socialist or
involved
com-
Catholics
in Latin A m e r i c a — t h e
into merely
bitter
was
the
another conflict
areas w h e r e t h e issue h a d i m m e d i a t e relevance, s u c h as Brazil.24
chal-
and
possible salvation for the Church's mission; conservatives
radical
with
conservatives
felt
that
only feared
temporal in
those
northeast what
the
C h u r c h w o u l d g a i n i n t h e s h o r t r u n w o u l d c o s t it t o o m u c h i n t h e l o n g run: social r e l e v a n c e w o u l d b e g a i n e d at t h e cost of loss identity. M o r e generally, they argued that social s u c c e s s — n o
of less
* The Pope was not alone in facing this quandary. The New York Times of January 16, 1969, reported that Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, general secretary of the World Council of Churches, discussed "the crisis of authority" with Pope Paul VI. It cited Dr. Blake as having said, "We find ourselves facing the same issues in both the World Council and in the member churches."
Turbulence within Institutionalized than economic success—could
{81
Beliefs
b e detrimental to spiritual
It m a y b e a s s u m e d that f r o m their p o i n t of v i e w
the
values.
experience
of Protestantism in t h e U n i t e d States w a s n o t reassuring.® E c u m e n i s m also p r o m p t e d both institutional and doctrinal sion.
Purists
feared
that
it
would
accelerate
the
doctrinal content and transform the Catholic Church in the advanced together
countries with
other
more perplexing
into
a
vague
similar
to the
purists
menical" dialogue between
ethical
bodies, was
in the
organization
social
good
ten-
dilution
engaged,
works.
appearance
of
an
Christians and communists,
in
Catholics took an active part. T h a t such a dialogue c o u l d
Even "ecuwhich
develop,
e v e n t h o u g h it r e c e i v e d r e l a t i v e l y little n o t i c e , w a s itself p r o o f the extent to w h i c h exclusivistic claims to absolute not
formally
abandoned
by
either
side—no
of
more
of
truth—though
longer
dominated
either the W e s t e r n m i n d or e v e n those institutions that w e r e
them-
selves the p r o d u c t s of t h e M a n i c h a e a n tradition, f
* "Protestantism has become so identified with economic success, respectability, and middle-class virtues that large numbers of the clergy and laity alike appear to have lost sight of basic spiritual goals" (Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, Garden City, N.Y., 1963, p. 352). f "Without us, Communists, I fear that your Christian love, marvellous though it is, will continue to be ineffective; without you, Christians, our struggle risks again confinement to a horizon without stars" (Roger Garaudy, as quoted by Le Monde (Hebdomadaire), May 5-11, 1966). These words of a leading French Communist ideologue, once a strong Stalinist and a member of the Politburo, addressing a mixed Christian-Marxist colloquium organized by the Catholics, convey the extent to which previously frozen views are today in flux. Of the many meetings between Christians and Marxists, perhaps the most significant have been those organized by the Paulus Gesellschaft, starting in Salzburg in 1965, followed by meetings in Herrenchiemsee in 1966 (where the above remark was made) and in Marianske Lazne, Czechoslovakia, in 1967. The third meeting brought together two hundred and one Christian and Marxist philosophers, theologians, and scientists from sixteen European countries and the United States (but not from the Soviet Union, which chose to abstain). The theme of the third meeting was "Creativity and Freedom in a Human Society" (the first two having dealt with "Christianity and Marxism Today" and "Christian Humaneness and Marxist Humanism"). At this meeting both sides expressed the view that the human personality can develop only in a setting of freedom; that both Christianity and Marxism must revitalize and open up their institutions and their doctrines; that the human personality cannot be fully understood on the existential and particularly the material
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
It w o u l d , h o w e v e r ,
b e misleading to construe this dialogue
a f u n d a m e n t a l b r e a k t h r o u g h in the doctrinal relationship Christianity dividuals flected
and
who,
Marxism.
given
The
their
participants
intellectual
involved
concerns,
were
in-
themselves
re-
the tension b e t w e e n institutions and ideas; they
resented
institutional
efforts
to limit
inquiry.
Both sides thus represented
not
very
the
centers
of
the
scope
of
power.
The
selves displayed s o m e ambivalence, not so m u c h
inherently
philosophical
the intellectual
bureaucratic
fringes
centers
about
systems
of
respective These
the
degree
thought
were
to
which
about the
said
to
differences
between
have
obscured
been
and
them-
i n g s — w h i c h t h e y tolerated, in part, for reasons of political —but
as
between
meettactics
the
two
by
the
spokesmen.* limitations
notwithstanding,
the
discussions,
doubtless will continue and expand, had broad significance.
which They
level; that the state ought to be neutral on ethical and philosophical problems and that humanist Marxism must guarantee pluralism as the precondition for human freedom; and, finally, that both Christianity and Marxism involve a continuous, never-ending search for the most complete fulfillment of human freedom. (The above is a paraphrase of the conclusions reached by Charles Andras in his research paper on "Christians and Marxists in Marianske Lazne," RFE, July 10, 1967, which contains the best analysis of this meeting that I have seen. See also the valuable study by Kevin Devlin, "The Catholic-Communist 'Dialogue,'" Problems of Communism, May-June 1966, and especially the additional material on Latin America contained in the Spanish edition; and Charles Andras, "The Christian-Marxist Dialogue," East Europe, March 1968.) One outgrowth of this dialogue was a remarkable little volume dealing with the philosophical and social problems of modernity, authored joindy by a leader of the French Communist Party and by a member of the Society of Jesus (Roger Garaudy and Quentin Lauer, S.J., A Christian-Communist Dialogue, New York, 1968). * Subsequent to the meetings, there were reaffirmations from both sides, e.g., by the leadership of the French Communist Party, by the French Council of Bishops, and by Vatican spokesmen, that the dialogue could not be construed as involving any change in basic doctrinal attitudes. In a sense, these statements confirmed the point made by one of the more prominent Catholic participants that a true dialogue will not be possible until each side surmounts the tradition of "monolithism," which elevates both the "ecclesiastical society" and the party into the centers of history (Father Giulio Girardi of the Salesian University of Rome, as cited by Le Monde [Hehdomadaire], May 5-11, 1966; he repeated the same themes at Marianske Lazne [Andras, "The Christian Marxist Dialogue," p. 13]).
Turbulence within Institutionalized
{81
Beliefs
i n d i c a t e d t h a t it is b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o c o n f i n e search
for
tionally
a
more
meaningful
defined frameworks,
stitutions
depends
on
exclusive
identity.
That
the
universal
since
the
what
within
very existence
maintenance
is w h y
vision
of
their
appears
of
the
and
the surface
T h e reforms and the debates within Catholicism have
already
areas of p e r s o n a l life, of s u p p l a n t i n g
authority of the institution b y the rule of o n e s conscience. for example, has b e e n the reaction of m a n y bishops a n d l a y m e n to the issue of birth control.)
To
a spiritually
ity, b u t f o r m o s t p e o p l e
this d i l e m m a a
which
position—in
spite
reliance
the more of
on
Church and
his
conscience
increasingly
Catholic motivated
inescapably
Paul VI
commitment
to
to
things,
how
was
adopt
anyone
t h a t is t h e p u r i t y o f d o c t r i n e , d o e s n o t
t o o c c u p y first p l a c e i n t h e p s y c h o l o g y many
truths
are
seem
of Christians. H o w
questioned
and
put
has
It
innovation—
m o l d e d b y the n e e d for institutional d e f e n s e : "Today, as can see, orthodoxy,
author-
irrelevant.
more led Pope
earlier
the
(Such,
person, c o n s c i e n c e c a n b e a stricter teacher than C h u r c h
effect of m a k i n g
to
from
anathema.25
the traditional W e s t e r n v i e w of s u c h d i a l o g u e as
the
in-
distinctive
on
be m o d e s t and limited has in fact b e e n a major step a w a y
h a d the effect, in m a n y
the
institu-
up
to
many doubt?
H o w m u c h l i b e r t y is c l a i m e d as r e g a r d s t h e a u t h e n t i c h e r i t a g e
of
Catholic
to
doctrine,
not
only
in order to
. . . better
explain
t h e m a n of o u r t i m e , b u t at t i m e s t o s u b j e c t it t o t h a t in
which
profane
a d a p t it . . .
thought
or
to of
The
Pope
was
s e e m to o c c u p y
new
expression,
26
right first
its
in
noting
that
"orthodoxy
. . . does
p l a c e in t h e p s y c h o l o g y of Christians."
is s o n o t o n l y o n t h e l e v e l o f f o r m a l , o v e r t c o m p l i a n c e tain
established
substance 1968
of
Gallup
relativism
to contemporary taste and the receiving capacity
modern mentality?"
. . . seeks
it
rituals
belief, polls.
attendance—while
as The
but is
even
shown
relatively
significant
in
in by
regard Table
low
to 8,
level
revealing
the
with
more
constructed of
regular
increasing
for t h e m o s t basic b u t also the m i n i m a l ritualistic
not This cerbasic from
church
disregard
requirement—
1oo} was
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
not as revealing as the striking g a p b e t w e e n
those w h o
lieve in G o d a n d those w h o believe in life after death. T h e
be-
essence
o f t h e C h r i s t i a n f a i t h is t h a t t h e f o r m e r g u a r a n t e e s t h e latter. without
belief
in life after d e a t h
from the Christian
is s o m e t h i n g
entirely
God.
T h e poll data, t h o u g h fragmentary and superficial, highlight a problem.
On
nevertheless
the one hand, the poll indicates a
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e l i e f . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h o w e v e r , it
ance a n d disbelief in life after d e a t h m e a n pervasive the
TABLE
contrary,
it s u g g e s t s
that
authentic
crisis
suggests
t h a t it w o u l d b e m i s l e a d i n g t o c o n c l u d e t h a t l o w c h u r c h
On
God
different
attend-
irreligiosity.
irreligiosity—that
is
8
Do you believe in life after death?
Do you attend church once per week?
Yes
Yes
Yes
98$ 96
73% 57 4* 38 50 55 4i 50 38 35 54 38
43$
Do you believe in God? United States Greece Uruguay (cities) Austria Switzerland Finland West Germany Netherlands Great Britain France Norway Sweden
89 85 84 83 81
79 77 73 73 60
(Ath
28 24
38 30 5 27 42 —
25 14 9
to say, a d e e p l y felt rejection of a reality b e y o n d the
finite—does
n o t exist, or at least n o t yet. A belief in G o d to w h i c h o n e give substance m a y merely be a holdover from a more society in a context that emphasizes
immediate
cannot
traditional
l i f e , b u t it
could
also reflect the search for a highly personal, inner, a n d direct lationship b e t w e e n the individual and
re-
God.
Privatization of Belief In fact, the w a n i n g
of the
Church
as an institution
s y m p t o m of intensifying religiosity. T h e
Church was
a
may
be
a
necessary
Turbulence within Institutionalized
Beliefs
{ 8
i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n G o d a n d m a n in t h e p h a s e of m a n s poverty
and historical unawareness.
behavior,
institutionalized
in severity
as m a n k i n d
It p r o v i d e d
sanctions
was
(which
socialized
though not international, coexistence), As the Church
fades, for some
will doubtless m e a n
on
code
level
of
of
declined personal,
a n d a link to t h e
the disintegration
license; for m a n y
spiritual
a rigid
gradually
the
1
eternal.
of its
it w i l l s i m p l y b e
controls a
matter
o f i n d i f f e r e n c e ; b u t f o r o t h e r s it w i l l b e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a
much
m o r e direct, m o r e personal, less ritualized relationship to G o d . This could m e a n responses—of what
the emergence
cults,
sects,
different form
much
more
Catholic
of
expressing
personalized
Church.27
For
of highly pluralistic
believers'
form
most
groups,
each
with
its faith, t o s a y
of
people
worship—even the
organized
to
God
will
be
expressed
much
keeping with their specific intellectual The
popularity
tomatic of
our
of
Teilhard
de
age's felt n e e d
more
is,
combine
mystic belief w i t h k n o w l e d g e of the material
of
a
within
the will
relation-
individually
for example, ecstasy
some-
Church
and psychological
Chardin to
a
nothing
continue to provide the basic mooring, but for m a n y the ship
religious
with
and
in
needs. sympscience,
world.*
T h e p r e s e n t f e r m e n t i n C h r i s t i a n i t y is h e n c e p a r t o f t h e
general
aversion toward the institutionalized belief that characterizes
our
time. This aversion reflects the nature of our intellectual style
and
° A French thinker poses the issue more strongly, emphasizing the interdependence of science and ecstasy: "We must conclude that it is far from accidental that ecstatic phenomena have developed to the greatest degree in the most technicized societies. And it is to be expected that these phenomena will continue to increase. This indicates nothing less than the subjection of mankind's new religious life to technique. It was formerly believed that technique and religion were in opposition and represented two totally different dispensations. It was held that, with the development of a purely materialistic society, a struggle was inevitable between the machine and the economy, on the one side, and the ideal realm of religion, art, and culture, on the other. But we can no longer hold such a boundlessly simplistic view. Ecstasy is subject to the world of technique and is its servant. Technique, on the most significant level, integrates the anarchic and antisocial impulses of the human being into society. These impulses take their influence and receive their diffusion strictly by virtue of the technical means brought into play. The ecstatic phenomena of the human psyche, which without technical means would have remained completely without effect, are deployed throughout the world" (Ellul, p. 423).
1oo} the
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
fragmented
and
impressionistic
way
we
ourselves
become
e x p o s e d to reality, as w e l l as t h e instinctive f e e l i n g t h a t i d e a s
are
o n l y relevant as l o n g as t h e y c a n successfully relate to a
reality
t h a t is d y n a m i c . T o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e a n i d e a is t o i m p e d e its
capac-
ity to adjust to c h a n g e .
The
further evolution
of
the
idea
then
b e c o m e s d e p e n d e n t not on the capacity of the m i n d to sense speed
and
the significance of c h a n g e b u t
on t h e rate of
within the bureaucratic organization which has c o m e to
embody
the idea. V e s t e d p o w e r interests thus b e c o m e m o r e important either ethical or intellectual The
crisis
progressive
of
than
imperatives.
institutionalized
secularization
the
change
of
beliefs
life; that
is
the
is, i n
last
the
stage
in
the
detachment
one's social existence f r o m a f r a m e w o r k of belief. W o r k , play, now,
increasingly,
introspection have
gradually
selves from formal Christian belief,28 and they
separated
them-
are beginning
detach themselves from Marxism under communism
as
cultural
and
hence
also psychological
isolation.
gious fanaticism could thrive in such a context, and religious had
profound
moral
meaning.
Physical
exhaustion
(after
Thirty Years W a r a n d after the Battle of V i e n n a of 1 6 8 3 ) as g r o w i n g
skepticism
have
made
religious wars
to
well.
It w a s easier to establish institutional belief in an a g e of graphical,
of and
as
geoReliwars the well
unfashionable.
In our a g e c o m m u n i s m has b e e n the last great absolutist f o r it c o u l d u s e p o w e r t o a s s u r e e x c l u s i v e n e s s . I t is n o t t h a t i s o l a t e d C h i n a h a s l a t e l y b e e n its m o s t f a n a t i c
dogma,
accidental
proponent—
or t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s e r v a t i s m in t h e c o m m u n i s t s t a t e s is u s u a l l y accompanied
by
efforts to c u t s o c i e t y off f r o m
contact with
external world b y radio-jamming and other devices.* Global gestion—though not necessarily conducive to mutual 0
the con-
comprehen-
Nonetheless, these external controls are increasingly incapable of masking the evident lack of commitment within. It is revealing to note that in 1968, when the anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic purge in communist Poland compelled some communist intellectuals, until that moment quite orthodox in their loyalty, to leave the country, a number of them immediately moved to the "capitalist" United States, seeking employment in various institutions specializing in the study of communism and viewed in the East as intrinsically anti-communist.
Turbulence within Institutionalized
{81
Beliefs
sion—is simply inimical to institutions and ideologies relying
exclusivistic
on
conviction.
Ideally, in this setting m a n s h o u l d seek c o m p l e t e fulfillment combining
spiritual
introspection
social justice. H a r v e y
with
the
moral
by
imperative
of
C o x argues in his thoughtful b o o k that
"if
m e n rather t h a n m e t a p h y s i c a l p h a n t o m s bear the m e a n i n g of
his-
toric life, t h e n p u r p o s e s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e of one's o w n c l a n c a n appreciated rather than repudiated. Separate world-views the occasion not for mutual
destruction but for fashioning a
cietal framework within w h i c h such variance can b e and nourished. vides
a hodgepodge
projects can thrive because
each
of h u m a n
recognizes
so-
encouraged
I d e a l l y t h e s e c u l a r c i t y is s u c h a s o c i e t y .
a setting in w h i c h
It
pro-
purposes
and
itself as
provisional
a n d relative. Authentic secularity d e m a n d s that n o w o r l d - v i e w , t r a d i t i o n , n o i d e o l o g y b e a l l o w e d t o b e c o m e the
no
officially e n f o r c e d
w o r l d - v i e w b e s i d e w h i c h n o others are tolerated. This in turn quires pluralistic social a n d political institutions."
re-
29
T h e shaping of the ideal secular city d e m a n d s e n o r m o u s maturity and responsibility.
be
present
social
It also calls for p h i l o s o p h i c a l
depth
a n d a sense of restraint, since t h e transition f r o m t h e tradition d o g m a t o t h e c o n d i t i o n o f d i v e r s i t y is n o t e a s y . D i v e r s i t y o f
of
belief
is c e r t a i n l y t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r f r e e d o m , a n d it m a y e v e n b e
the
c o n c o m i t a n t of creativity
the
( t h o u g h t h e M i d d l e A g e s as w e l l as
O r i e n t a r g u e a g a i n s t i t ) . B u t c a r r i e d t o its e x t r e m e — t o t h e at
which
diversity
itself
becomes
the
substance
of
c r e a t e s its o w n d a n g e r s . T h e h e a l t h y r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t
institution-
a l i z e d d o c t r i n e s is n o t c o m p l e t e u n l e s s it a l s o i n v o l v e s t h e lation of alternative principles
of social contract a n d
views of the role of the individual. Fluid, fragile, a n d ideas cannot provide
the
underlying
rapidly changing
formu-
alternative fragmentary
either lasting insight or an e n d u r i n g
for action. Popular notions, shifting w i t h the w i n d , m a y reflect
point
belief—it
psychological
and
social
reality, b u t d o they provide
either for understanding
basis
accurately
tensions
of
our
an enduring
basis
it or f o r m a s t e r i n g it? I n t e l l e c t u a l
rela-
tivism m a y not suffice to m e e t t h e challenge of subjective
activism,
1oo}
II:
which
The Age of Volatile Belief
is i n t e n s e l y
intolerant
because
it is d e r i v e d
from
purely
personal criteria for e v a l u a t i n g reality. This
problem
not
only
arises
in
systems
in
which
formalized
beliefs p l a y a d e c i s i v e role. It also c o n f r o n t s t h e W e s t e r n
liberal
democratic states. T h e s e , too, d e p e n d o n a symbiosis of ideas
and
institutions, t h o u g h in m u c h less formal, m o r e implicit w a y s .
The
turbulence
and
afflicting c o m m u n i s m
and
Christianity
is v i s i b l e
direct, w i t h restless ideas confronting unyielding institutions;
the
crisis o f a l l e g i a n c e t o l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y is m u c h m o r e e l u s i v e
but
n o t less real. T h e
effective working of a liberal democratic
state
requires a c o m b i n a t i o n of social devotion to the abstract idea d e m o c r a c y a n d of legalism in practice that c a n easily b e
of
strained
b y c o n d i t i o n s of stress a n d crisis. A d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s ,
moreover,
is d i f f i c u l t t o d r a m a t i z e , i n c o n t r a s t t o s u c h n o t i o n s as
revolution,
injustice, a n d f r e e d o m . I n s t e a d , it calls m o r e p r o s a i c a l l y f o r a h i g h degree
of
procedural
commitment:
that
is,
a
concern
with
the
m e a n s as w e l l as w i t h the e n d of the process. U n l e s s infused n e w moral content, procedural commitment m a y
with
not suffice in
confrontation w i t h issues that are p o s e d as absolutes a n d that said to require passion—rather than p r o c e d u r e — f o r their
a
are
resolu-
tion.
3. Histrionics as History in Transition " W e reject t h e w o r l d , w e are n o l o n g e r e v e n 'traitors,' this w o u l d i m p l y a n affinity w i t h w h a t w e are betraying. W e the Viet C o n g of thought.
. . . T h e p h i l o s o p h y of t o m o r r o w
b e terrorist: n o t a p h i l o s o p h y of terrorism b u t a terrorist p h y allied w i t h an active policy of terrorism."
30
since are will
philoso-
T h e s e words of
a
Histrionics
as History
in Transition
{1o1
y o u n g Sorbonne philosopher c o n v e y the degree to w h i c h has come
to substitute
for reason
as a result of
the
emotion
reaction
w h a t m a n y f e e l h a s b e e n t h e failure of rationalism in action. "rejection" of the w o r l d
is in e s s e n c e t h e r e j e c t i o n o f
to The
prevailing
m o d e s of t h o u g h t a n d t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of e c s t a s y a n d a c t i o n in service of an abstract c o n c e p t
of revolution.
Yesterday's
f r o m f r e e d o m " h a s its e q u i v a l e n t in t o d a y s e s c a p e f r o m
the
"escape reason.
Escape from Reason In
its
riots in
extreme
form,
California,
at
this
mood—dramatized
Columbia
University,
the
student
throughout
by
France,
in W e s t Berlin, in L o n d o n , R o m e , Belgrade, W a r s a w , Tokyo, m u c h m o r e lethally at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of M e x i c o students many
were
less
killed in the
publicized
fall of
imitations
1968),
( w h e r e scores
to say
elsewhere—has
nothing
of
elevated
f o r a c t i o n s s a k e i n t o a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e . " A c t i o n is t h e o n l y n o t o n l y reality b u t m o r a l i t y as well," p r o c l a i m e d A b b i e
and
more
ecstatically
by
his
German
reality;
Hoffman, more
counterpart,
D a n i e l C o h n - B e n d i t , t h e leader of t h e 1968 F r e n c h s t u d e n t who
declared
that
"violence
is
happiness."32
As
of the
action
the leader of the A m e r i c a n Yippies.31 H e w a s e c h o e d b o t h belligerently
and
two
strike
observers
s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e n e w r a d i c a l m o v e m e n t s e x p l a i n e d it, t h e
con-
t e m p o r a r y rebels "think that t h e i v o r y - t o w e r e d m e n of ideas
have
cheated them, lied to them, and that action and spontaneous perience will s h o w t h e m t h e truth." From
ex-
33
t h i s a t t i t u d e is d e r i v e d t h e v i e w
that reason b y
itself
is
s u s p e c t , t h a t it m u s t b e b u t t r e s s e d b y e m o t i o n , a n d t h a t if a c h o i c e h a s t o b e m a d e , e m o t i o n is a b e t t e r g u i d e t h a n r e a s o n . S e e i n g the world around t h e m both hypocrisy and the failure of
in
reason
— w i t h r e a s o n i n t h e s e r v i c e of evil, w h i c h e i t h e r m a k e s it a
slave
of
war-
ideology
or
employs
it
as
a
scientific
tool
to
improve
making efficiency—even moderate dissenters c o n d e m n e d
contem-
porary liberals for their lack of passion.* In cold reason t h e y
saw,
* In December 1968, at a major international conference held at Princeton on the subject of America's future, one of the accusations made by a student
1oo} more
II: The Age of Volatile Belief than
to the and
a mere
status quo,
absence
of moral
a willingness
a determination
to avoid
indignation,
to effect only
confronting the
a
commitment
marginal more
change,
basic
moral
issues.* Reliance o n passion a n d action h a d the a d d e d a d v a n t a g e of requiring a programmatic blueprint. In contrast, the old offered
both
a
critique
of
the
present
and
a
blueprint
for
future, thus o p e n i n g themselves to criticism on the level of practicality
(Is their Utopia attainable?)
not
ideologies
and performance
the both
(Why
hasn't the utopia b e e n a c h i e v e d ? ) . T h e politics of ecstasy d o require a program
to generate action,
and
their adherents
not were
therefore not greatly troubled b y the patronizing criticism of their programmatic
vacuity
from the established argue that programs
it is n o t but
advanced communist
through
through
the
from
the
parties, f
institutional
creation of
a
socialist On
the
reforms
old
left
contrary, spelled
community
of
and they
out
in
emotion
leader was that the established liberal participants tend to rely on reason at the expense of passion. This charge prompted Arthur Schlesinger to remark, "Reason without passion is sterile, but passion without reason is hysterical. I have always supposed that reason and passion must be united in any effective form of public action. I can imagine nothing worse for our society than a rejection of reasoned analysis by the young. If we succeed in destroying the discipline of reason, if we make politics a competition in passion, a competition in emotion, a competition in unreason and violence, the certain outcome would be the defeat of the left." * This charge has even been leveled against scholars engaged in studies of the future, and their "futurism" has been interpreted by critics as an immoral escape from the social dilemmas of the present. It has led to some unconsciously humorous situations, such as the one at the above-mentioned Princeton conference, where a millionaire radical attacked "futurists" for neglecting the role of wealth in American society. Shedding his sartorial elegance in favor of the more revolutionary open-necked-shirt uniform, he urged the assembled to "choose equality and flee greed." f Max Eastman spoke for many old socialists when he expressed himself as "kind of sorry for these young rebels today. . . . They have an emotion not unlike ours. . . . They want to make a revolution but they have no ultimate purpose, I have a certain emotional sympathy for them, but they are rather pathetic because they have no plan. They just seek a revolution for its own sake" (as cited by Tne New York Times, January 9, 1969). Communist spokesmen expressed themselves more pungently, condemning the aspirations of the new rebels as "half-baked pie peppered with sexualism and narcomania" (Trybuna Ludu, May 9, 1968).
Histrionics as History in Transition that
true
freedom
can
be
attained.
state, t h e rebels of t h e late oppression
and
"one-dimensional"
society. Herbert them
with
an
creating
frame
quality
of
Fanons
books
of
in s o m e
areas of t h e T h i r d W o r l d ) ,
emotional
Man
have
the
modern
reference
racial violence
that
to overcome
One Dimensional
Marcuse's
intellectual exalting
By
1960s h o p e d
{1o1
has
provided
(much
done
sexual
industrial
as
Frantz
for the
t h o u g h his advice
rebels
and
pro-
g r a m a r e l i m i t e d : " F o r t h e m o m e n t t h e c o n c r e t e a l t e r n a t i v e is still 34
only the negation." The
call for "true f r e e d o m , " h o w e v e r ,
permits
the
subversion
of c o n v e n t i o n a l f r e e d o m , a n d h e r e i n lies o n e of the b a s i c dictions
of
the
movement.
the striking r e s e m b l a n c e
Leopold
between
contemporary
student
revolution
who
asserted
in
that
than
at
the
1845
individual's
Labedz
on
the
freedom
of
and
the
"a p e o p l e
expense."
those
who
do
35
views
cannot
Thus,
of
be
the
Max
free
Stirner,
rebellion
can entail both
not share
the
the
otherwise against
limitation
ideals
of
a n d relative indifference to the suppression of
in the East.
noted
the romantic anarchism of
the "oppressive f r e e d o m " of the W e s t
freedom
contra-
perceptively
"true"
freedom
M o r e o v e r , the right to speak or write freely c a n
d e n i e d a n d its e x e r c i s e d i s r u p t e d b y v i o l e n c e , s i n c e t h a t is m o t i v a t e d b y a n e m o t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t
t o f r e e d o m a n d is
s i g n e d t o a s s e r t it. T h e d e f i n i t i o n o f f r e e d o m is t h u s d e r i v e d
guaranteeing
choice
and
de-
from
a s u b j e c t i v e i n n e r c o n v i c t i o n t h a t o n e is r i g h t a n d n o t f r o m external pattern of relations
be
violence
the
protection
to the individual, w h a t e v e r his views. The
intellectual—though
phenomenon level
of
the
social—seriousness
of
w a s further diluted b y a certain artificiality o n
political
inescapably
not
expression.
partakes
of
Though
the past,
every
genuine
it a c q u i r e s
this the
revolution
its o w n
distinctive
c h a r a c t e r , s t y l e , a n d r h e t o r i c p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e it is a
revolution:
a sharp break with the past. T h e Paris C o m m u n e differed in these respects from the French Revolution, and the C o m m u n e was
not reproduced
years a great
deal
by
the
of the
Bolshevik
student
Revolution.
rhetoric,
Yet in
symbolism,
in
turn
recent
and
per-
1oo}
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
sonal behavior
has taken
the
self-conscious
form
of
a
histrionic
" h a p p e n i n g " d e s i g n e d as a historical r e - e n a c t m e n t . A t t i m e s it w a s t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n t h a t s e e m e d the scenario—especially
to
provide
i n F r a n c e — b u t m o r e o f t e n it w a s
grad and H a v a n a that w e r e being re-enacted. T h e student i m a g i n e d t h e m s e l v e s as historical
figures,
b u t in their
Petroleaders
imitativeness
t h e y o f t e n v e r g e d o n t h e absurd. D u r i n g t h e 1968 crisis at
Colum-
bia University, the leader of the student militants issued a
pam-
p h l e t b e a r i n g L e n i n ' s title, " W h a t Is to B e D o n e ? , " a n d
students
occupying
"a
one
of
the
buildings
proclaimed
themselves
m u n e . " T h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e W e s t Berlin militants w e r e "Smolny." Revolutionary beards Castro to M a r x )
comcalled
(in styles ranging from Lenin
a n d c o m b a t f a t i g u e s a la G u e v a r a
were
m a n d a t o r y c o s t u m e s against a decor of either red or black
flags.
E v e n the v i o l e n c e w a s o f t e n m o r e theatrical t h a n real. In it t o o k t h e f o r m of s t y l i z e d b a t t l e s , i n w h i c h a r m o r e d
Tokyo
combatants
e m p l o y e d shields a n d spears; in Paris a tacit a g r e e m e n t
between
the police and their opponents limited w e a p o n s to those used the Stone Age:
rocks, cobblestones,
and
clubs.*
Only
to
almost
in
in
Mexico
w a s v i o l e n c e g e n u i n e in t h e sense that all available m e a n s
were
e m p l o y e d , a s is t r u e i n r e a l r e v o l u t i o n s , f
* In all of France—despite the apparent temporary collapse of authority in May 1968—only one person died, and somewhat accidentally at that, t But though the style and the format of the student rebellion was contrived and its aspirations almost deliberately unattainable (one of the most popular slogans of the May 1968 outbreak in Paris was "Be realists, demand the impossible!"), at least its youthfulness was authentic. The same cannot be said of the middle-aged admirers of the militants, who—though most often physically passive—outdid themselves in their efforts to drink again at the fountain of youth by vicarious identification with youth's exuberance. Verbal excess was most often the means used to attain this identification. Thus, one American scholar accused those critical of the abuses perpetrated by some militants of literally waging "a war against the young," which he compared to the war in Vietnam; he called for a "cultural revolution" in America! (Richard Poirier, "The War against the Young," The Atlantic, October 1968). Cases of middle-aged exuberance were not isolated phenomena. As Labedz put it, "There can be little doubt that in many cases les parents terribles are worse than les enfants terribles. Some of them have moved from revolt against 'poverty amidst plenty' in the thirties to a revolt against affluent
Histrionics as History in Transition
{1o1
T o d e f i n e t h e h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e s e e v e n t s , it is sary
to
look
superficial
beyond
violence
among
the
important
swept
the
closer
an
that
neces-
beyond
cities in s o m a n y parts of t h e w o r l d in so short a time. A reveals
outbursts
slogans,
many
immediately
the
and
so
analysis
similarity
the
distinction:
some
pects of the manifestations w e r e clearly political in character purpose; o t h e r s — t h o u g h linked w i t h the political, t h o u g h w i t h it a c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a s p i r a t i o n s , a n d t h o u g h it w i t h a m a s s e m o t i o n a l b a s e — w e r e m u c h m o r e cal in origin together,
and
each
vaguely
tended
to
moral
and
obscure
the
ethical
sharing
providing
socio-psychologi-
in content.
specific
asand
Linked
character
of
the
other.
The Political
Dimension
T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o is i m p o r t a n t t o a n i n g of w h a t w a s i n v o l v e d a n d o f w h a t it p o r t e n d s .
understandThe
political
manifestations are in s o m e respects easier to dissect a n d
analyze.
Broadly speaking, they fell into t w o categories. In the W e s t , particularly
in t h e
United
States,
the politically
motivated
tants d r e w o n b o t h the i d e o l o g i c a l l e g a c y of the old left's against capitalist society a n d o n the m o r e recent sense of about the
war
in Vietnam.
As
the
"imperialist"
and
and mili-
attack outrage
"capitalist"
society in the sixties, at the time as they themselves moved from poverty to affluence, to practice alienation at 50,000 dollars a year. The revolutionary Establishment of New York and London, thrilled with revolutionary prospects, and displaying the characteristic Salon-Maoismus, contributes to the orgy of snobbery attendant upon the current Utopian wave. Long before the 'Black Power' spokesmen asked the students assembled at the London School of Economics to establish the Revolutionary Socialist Student Federation, whether they know how to make a petrol bomb, the New York Review of Books published a diagram of and a recipe for a Molotov cocktail on its cover page. This has not prevented, of course, its political writers from deploring 'American violence/ In France the self-abasement of the elderly progressives' reached its peak during the May devolution.' At the meeting of Jean-Paul Sartre with the students at the Sorbonne, Max Pol-Fouchet exclaimed with pathos appropriate to the occasion: 'Representing a generation which has failed, I ask you not to fail!'" (Leopold Labedz, "Students and Revolution," Survey [London], July 1968, pp. 25-26).
1oo }
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
society par excellence, the United States provided the major get. T h e
war
served
as a catalyst for emotions,
international unity a m o n g the y o u n g militants, as a b o n d t h e o l d leftists a n d t h e n e w , a n d as a link b e t w e e n t h e minded and the ethically Those
between
politically-
concerned.0 have
but
they
p r o v i d e d influential leadership. It w a s the politically-minded
who
a relatively
resuscitated vived was
the
(such
who
strictly political c o n c e r n s
small minority
As
restless
the
more
the m o v e m e n t
specifically United
gained
appear youth,
of o r g a n i z e d
slogan of the permanent
defined
as t h e call for i m m e d i a t e
Vietnam).
of the
anarchist critique
the Trotskyite
they
by
for
to
been
motivated
tar-
as the basis
society,
who
revolution; political
and
it
objectives
States withdrawal
momentum
and
re-
from
broadened
its a p p e a l , t h e p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s — p e r h a p s r e s p o n d i n g to t h e less clearly defined ethical a n d psychological n e e d s of the
following—
were widened and became both vaguer and more demanding. w a s n o longer a matter of e n d i n g a particular g o v e r n m e n t a l or of e f f e c t i n g a specific reform; t h e u n d e r l y i n g
policy
"system"—capital-
ist in character a n d h e n c e f u n d a m e n t a l l y i r r e m e d i a b l e — h a d to undone before true reforms could be achieved. mained
obscure,
while
the programmatic
The
language
C o h n - B e n d i t ' s exaltation of a c t i o n — a n d rejection of — t o a rather simplistic r e p e t i t i o n of M a r x i s t
It
specifics ranged
be re-
from
communismf
cant.|
* The war thus served the same function as the earlier campaigns against nuclear bombs in allowing for the expression of essentially moral concerns by the adoption of an anti-United States political posture. Frank Parkin, in his Middle-Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Manchester, 1968), shows how the British CND mobilized middle-class support, drawn from among those with a tradition of moral concern, into a campaign against "evil." The campaign relied heavily on small symbolic gestures, such as eccentric dress, beards, and other forms of distinctive behavior. t Because of this: the Pravda propagandist Yuri Zhukov, with his customary crudeness, characterized Cohn-Benait as a "werewolf" (Pravda, May 30, 1968). t The following may serve as an example: "Marxism is coming more and more to be the common denominator of all student movements in North America and Western Europe, even so in the new left SDS in the United States. I think this is inevitable and is a tribute to the growing sophistication
Histrionics as History in Transition
{ 1o 1
In t h e initial p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n against the V i e t n a m
war,
communist s u p p o r t — j u d g i n g f r o m a p p r o v i n g c o m m u n i s t p r o nouncements—was p e r h a p s i n v o l v e d , b u t c o m m u n i s t a p p r o v a l w a n e d rapidly w h e n t h e anti-institutional character of t h e ment became increasingly evident. militants,
the
communist
conservatism,
since
its
system
original
I n the e y e s of m a n y also
represented
revolutionary
bureaucratic
ideals
had
ized into institutional beliefs. C o m m u n i s t endorsement shifted to criticism and militant
New
Left
then to condemnation;
were
characterized
by
a
move-
political
fossil-
gradually
the views Soviet
of
the
writer
" M a m a i s m , w h i c h incorporates ideas of Marx, M a r c u s e a n d
as
Mao,
a c o m p l e t e l y artificial c o m b i n a t i o n . " 3 6 Though
the
political
manifestations
in
Mexico
City,
Madrid,
Prague, a n d W a r s a w partook of the s a m e reaction against
institu-
tionalized belief a n d similarly capitalized o n s o m e of the
ethical
a n d psychological strains in m o d e r n society, t h e y w e r e m u c h specific in focus, less predisposed t o w a r d emotion,
more
and more
in-
c l i n e d t o w a r d a p r o g r a m m a t i c political a p p r o a c h . I n all f o u r cases, the demonstrators' d e m a n d s w e r e concerned with the loosening direct political restraints, a n d the leaders did not h a v e to an elaborate
"one-dimensional
m a n " thesis
to prove
construct
that
liberal
d e m o c r a c y c a n a l s o b e o p p r e s s i v e a n d t h a t its t o l e r a n c e is i n a m a s k e d form of constraint. level,
their
demands
took
overt political dictatorship: free
assembly,
abandonment
freedom of
both
to
37
the
A s a result, at least o n the familiar
abolition travel,
ideological
of
form
fact
political
the
rejection
of
censorship,
the right
of
political monopoly
of
of
democracy, and
and
oppression
the by
and maturity of the international student new left, inasmuch as Marxism is the most developed, refined and coherent revolutionary philosophy or worldview today and one that as a systematic social theory corresponds to the objective realities of the capitalist era, and inasmuch as it testifies to the realization by the student movements that they must align themselves with the working class in order to achieve the type of social transformation requisite to break the power of monopoly capital and create a new, non-repressive and truly free social order" (Stanley Gray, "Student Radicalism: An American Import?" a speech delivered to the 1968 Couchiching Conference, McGill News, November 1968, p. ).
1oo}
II:
The Age of Volatile Belief
secret police. The similarity of the politically libertarian demands of the students in these four cities is striking.38 It should also be noted that the students who demanded direct political freedom acted in the context of a much more hostile political environment. The student militants in the United States, in Western Europe, and in Japan literally basked in publicity: front-page pictures, television interviews, ecstatic endorsements by middle-aged supporters, epic songs immortalizing their deeds, and books in which the various confrontations were recorded in prose and in photographs.* Given the pluralistic nature of the Western societies and the competitive character of their communications media, youthful militancy was rewarding to the ego— and thus also infectious. This factor must be taken into account both in analyzing the dynamics of events in the West and in comparing them with events in less pluralistic societies.39 There the mass media either ignored the demonstrations or condemned them. The student leaders were abused and arrested. Communications between institutions—not to speak of cities—required great personal effort, sacrifice, and risk. Youthful militancy was not rewarded with social acclaim; Madrid and Warsaw responded with prison sentences for the leaders and university expulsion for the participants. The political environment clearly helped to shape the emphasis and the scope of the students' demands. In a strict authoritarian context, the demands had a politically libertarian content. In a looser, more pluralistic environment, the demands were either focused on more immediate university affairs or took on the form of a broader—and thus inevitably somewhat vaguer—social cri* The publicity bestowed on three female college militants (Peter Babcox, "Meet the Women of the Revolution," The New York Times Magazine, February g, 1969) was characteristic. Similar deference was not paid to girls serving in the Peace Corps or in the war on poverty. In this connection, it was revealing to observe the satisfaction with which the militants would watch themselves on television replays or specially prepared documentaries. The publicity surrounding the militants brought considerable social pressure to bear on those who were less involved.
Histrionics as History in Transition
{1o1
tique. Accordingly, the more specific and libertarian character of the demands made by the student leaders in the authoritarian states provided little basis for a common front with the militants of the West. In fact, there does not appear to have been much actual contact and coordination, although it was charged in Poland's political youth trials in late 1968 that the Brussels headquarters of the IV International (Trotskyite) provided ideological assistance to some Polish activists. If the charge is true, the Trotskyite link was perhaps the sole connection between political activists in the West and in the East. The two movements appear to have been independently led and to have been motivated by profoundly different political aspirations. The slight direct contact that there was between the respective leaders turned out to be abortive. In 1968, in a BBC discussion of the student rebellion, the leader of the English militants attacked the spokesman of the Yugoslav students, while the head of the West Berlin SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) received a rather cool reception from Prague students, who found his political views primitive.* 40 Nevertheless, important similarities between the respective political youth movements should also be noted. In both cases they were led by the abler students, who on the whole came from more socially established families. According to a study conducted at the University of California, the arrested undergraduate and graduate students tended to have much better than average grades; many of them held scholarships or had won awards. 41 In Poland official comment made much of the fact that the activists came from the relatively well-to-do homes of officials, and some * It is also noteworthy that strictly politically oriented student movements in Mexico, Spain, or Poland avoiaed such manifestations as the "foul language" splinter that developed in California in the aftermath of the crisis, the fascination with drugs, and the deliberate adoption of deviant social behavior as in the case of the Yippies. To be sure, these manifestations were also the product of peculiarly American conditions, but their appearance as a side effect of the student rebellion was made possible by the less focused and also less oppressed character of the rebellion.
1o o }
II:
The Age of Volatile Belief
university professors stressed the fact (in conversation with this writer) that their best students were involved. After the demonstrations were suppressed, measures were taken to favor the admission into the university of workers' and peasants' children. Even in Rumania, where student unrest was suppressed relatively quickly, official reaction emphasized the fact that the young "hooligans" were in the main children of "building-site managers, university professors, instrumentalists in the Philharmonic Orchestra, physicians, engineers, white-collar workers, militia staff members." 42 As in the West, the political leadership for the restless young was in many cases provided by the offspring of former left activists; hence not by rebels against the older generation but, rather, by young people who shared the ideals of their parents but felt that these had been corrupted in practice by the ruling communist elite. In Poland the most outstanding student rebels included the children of high party officials, while in the United States children of the old left formed a high percentage of the activist leaders at Columbia and Berkeley. In both the East and the West the rebel leaders came from environments that were not indifferent but ideologically concerned. Another similarity between the student militants in the West and in the East was the vagueness of their long-range objectives. Though the specific and immediate goals of the students in the more politically oppressive regimes were somewhat more precise, their "demands" rarely went beyond a statement of immediate complaints. To be sure, the transformation of a police dictatorship into a multi-party democracy, or at least into something resembling the Yugoslav model, was a more defined objective—with experiential examples available—than the Western students' plea for a participatory democracy; however, the more specific ramifications of the desired social and political systems tended to be vague in the East as well as in the West.* • One of the more extensive critiques of the existing Polish system was prepared by two young Warsaw sociologists, J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski, sev-
Histrionics as History in Transition
{1o1
Though this may have been a weakness from the strictly political point of view—as was charged by the critics of the militants —it also helped to provide a wider bridge between the political leadership and the more generally restless younger generation. It is doubtful—and this is especially true of the more pluralistic societies—whether a highly specific political program would have attracted the wide support generated by the more undifferentiated attack against the Establishment, vested interests, the status quo, and institutionalized beliefs. The reliance on emotion rather than on reason, on felt aspirations rather than on concrete programs, struck a more responsive chord in a generation that was the most directly affected by the pace of contemporary change and that was the very product of that change.
Historical
Discontinuity
In our time the student generation represents one of the most dynamic variables of change. The growth in their number as well as the simultaneous growth in the number of radios, televisions, telephones (all items that affect personal relationships, both making possible and encouraging the rapid dissemination of ideas) make for a subjectively dynamic mood that stands in sharp contrast to the relatively slower rate of change in such items as income (national or per-capita), the switch from rural to urban eral years prior to the student outbreaks of March 1968. (The authors were promptly sent to prison.) Entided "Open Letter to the Party," it became the source of much of the theoretical inspiration for the political-minded leadership of youth. Written from a Marxist point of view, it provided a scathing critique of the degeneration of Polish communism into an institutionalized bureaucratic despotism, with vested interests suppressing the egalitarian idealism of socialism. When it came to offering a program, however, the authors confined themselves to' urging a new revolution led by workers and intellectuals determined to create a new social order characterized by few institutions, workers' self-government, and true social egalitarianism. In late 1968 Kuron and Modzelewski were again sentenced to prison for having allegedly inspired the March events in collusion with the IV International (Trotskyite).
1o o }
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
employment,
the population
shift to larger urban centers,
or
the
a v e r a g e n u m b e r of p e o p l e living in a room. T h e over-all result the
contradiction,
tween
the pace
already
of
noted
change
in
the
preceding
in t h e state of m i n d
r e a l i t y . ( S e e T a b l e s 6 a n d 7, p p .
chapter,
and
in
material
42-43.)
In the w o r d s of a s t u d e n t of m o d e r n i z a t i o n , c o n t e m p o r a r y —and
this is e s p e c i a l l y
true of the y o u n g e r
u n d e r the d o m i n a t i o n of his environment
man
generation—"is
. . . a n d to this
h e is freer, b u t at t h e s a m e t i m e h e is less c e r t a i n o f h i s
less
extent
purpose
a n d i n t i m e s o f g r e a t u n r e s t h e is p r e p a r e d t o s u r r e n d e r h i s d o m in the interest of p u r p o s e f u l leadership." ting the present longer
defined
Writing
by
43
In that
fluid
difficult to c o m p r e h e n d ,
since
religion
or
either
or
nationalism
freeset-
it is
no
historical-
perspectives.44
ideological
Johan
becomes
about
Huizinga
the
waning
described
marked
by the
eternal
salvation,
collapse
of
of a
the
Middle
world
of
Ages,
traditional beliefs,
widespread
the
historian
discontinuity,
pessimism,
and
a
world
uncertainty
about
intense
violence.
Psychological r e f u g e w a s sought b y m a n y in mystical cults,
while
individual behavior was dichotomized, ranging from emphasis
on
the saintly to i n d u l g e n c e in d e p r a v i t y a n d cruelty. Shifts f r o m extreme
to the
other were
common,
social anchorage in absorbing A
similar
pression,
crisis,
marked
occurred
industrialization Massive
psychological
again
combined
national
and
tension,
as m e n
desperately
Captive
cataclysm
commitment.45
by in
much the
to
more
West
change
secular
when the
spawned
forms
Mind,
drew
World
as a c u t e
all-encompassing
War
perceptive
II, C z e s l a w
portraits
of
of
ex-
nationalism
character
class conflicts, as w e l l
of
one
sought
of
and
society.
social
and
ideologies
that
s e e m e d to p r o v i d e b o t h authority a n d a sense of direction. about the
is be-
Writing
Milosz,
Eastern
in
European
intellectuals as t h e y m o v e d f r o m o n e faith to a n o t h e r in a for the personal stability that their environment failed to
The
search
provide.
T o d a y ' s m o o d h a s m a n y p a r a l l e l s , b u t it a l s o d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y in scope and content. T h e industrial revolution, to say nothing
of
Histrionics as History in Transition the
culture of the
fined,
Christian
Middle
Ages,
was
{1o1
territorially
a n d only g r a d u a l l y — i n t h e course of m o r e than a
societies.46
a n d a h a l f — d i d it spill o v e r t o affect m o r e a n d m o r e Its a p p e a r a n c e
was
accompanied
by
con-
century
t h e rise of n a t i o n a l i s m
other secular ideologies, in w h i c h broad concepts were
and
reinforced
b y the institutions e m b o d y i n g them. In contrast, the current
crisis
of institutionalized belief takes place in the context of the
tech-
n e t r o n i c r e v o l u t i o n , a r e v o l u t i o n w h i c h is n o t territorial b u t
spatio-
temporal. This
new
revolution
almost
simultaneously
affects
the
entire
globe, w i t h t h e result that fads a n d n e w forms of b e h a v i o r rapidly
from
society
to society.
The
student
generation
t h i s n e w t e c h n e t r o n i c a g e , e v e n if i n s o m e c a s e s t h e i r societies
do
not.
Unlike
the
industrial
age, which
move
lives
in
immediate
required
that
a society undergo extensive industrialization before the n e w
pro-
letarian class could b e c o m e socially significant, the
spatiotemporal
t e c h n e t r o n i c r e v o l u t i o n d i r e c t l y r e a c h e s t h o s e r e c e p t i v e t o it
be-
cause they h a v e access to c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d b e c a u s e their
state
of m i n d is f o r m e d b y factors o u t s i d e their i m m e d i a t e
con-
text. T h e
contemporary
student
and
is
of
that
why
forms
mass
behavior
is p r e c i s e l y peculiar
to
social
such
a
group,
Berkeley
were
within a year repeated elsewhere ( W e s t Berlin students e v e n sandals in the cold N o v e m b e r Central European weather!). ican
student
activists
studying
American society—have role
in
this
America,
process,
the
first
abroad—and
highly
tended to play an important
and
are
evidence
to experience
the
of
the
critical
r e p l a c e d E u r o p e as t h e principal s o u r c e of social
age
to
which
fully,
has
change.
T h e p r o b l e m f a c i n g t h e rebels of a century a n d a half a g o h o w to integrate meaningfully the unprecedented, sible
changes
wrought
problem
is p o s e d
apparent
threat
rationalization, perience,
and
by to
its its
by
the
industrial
values,
simultaneous spatial
its
immediacy
to
every
of
The
age,
impersonality,
intensification
was
incomprehen-
revolution.
the onset of the technetronic human
of
energizing
extent
technetronic
wore Amer-
its
personal
human
same
with
its
overex-
suffering
1o o }
II: The Age of Volatile Belief
anywhere
on
especially
those
the
globe. who
industrial
many most
directly,
by
and
workers)—Marxism
the
the
For
were
in
the
nineteenth
affected,
revolution
either
(that
provided
the
is,
century—
vicariously
the
integrative
response.
T o d a y t h e s e a r c h is o n f o r s o m e n e w s o u r c e o f i n t e l l e c t u a l ing, a n d
the
searchers
have
begun
by
rejecting
or
intellectuals
moor-
established
an-
swers. The
younger
generation
is t h e
the transition into the n e w
one
age, and
most
directly
it c o n t a i n s
affected
the most
o p p o n e n t s a n d i n c l u d e s t h e majority of those w h o f e e l to b e victims of the technetronic revolution. emotion and violence, many the Luddites
of
themselves
In their reliance
of the o p p o n e n t s
early-nineteenth-century
England,
who
which
supported
b y local public opinion, the L u d d i t e s — w e l l organized a n d
real
injustices
The
fear, hatred,
among
some
that
the
and
people
machines'
Like
the
echoes
more
Luddites,
and
advanced
decried the
appearance
incomprehension
chine a century a n d a half
nological
and
the
electronic Western
of
the
the denunciations
highly
frequently
had
very
precipitated.
computer of
current
the textile
ma-
ago.* contemporary revolution
opponents
represent,
of
the
especially
states, a response to t h e n e w
techin
the
modes
life. T h e L u d d i t e s w e r e t h r e a t e n e d b y e c o n o m i c o b s o l e s c e n c e r e a c t e d a g a i n s t it. T o d a y
of
reacted
to the machine age with primitive passion, destroying that
machines
on
are reminiscent
they did not understand well e n o u g h to harness. O f t e n
motivated—shattered
by
active
of and
t h e militant leaders of t h e reaction,
as
w e l l as their i d e o l o g u e s , f r e q u e n t l y c o m e f r o m t h o s e b r a n c h e s
of
learning evance.47
which Their
are
most
political
sensitive activism
to
the
threat
is t h u s o n l y
of
social
a reaction
more basic fear that the times are against them, that a n e w is e m e r g i n g w i t h o u t e i t h e r t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e o r t h e i r
irrelto
the
world
leadership.f
* In early February 1969, rioting students in Montreal vented their anger at the "system" by destroying with fireaxes a one-million-dollar university computer. t The insistence on total solutions prompts, at the same time, their characteristic unwillingness to become involved in the more mundane process of
Histrionics as History in Transition
{1o1
T h e attraction that a s e g m e n t of the y o u n g e r generation in more
developed
emotion—and —may
be
world
now
feels
toward
poetry,
lyricism,
their c o n t e m p t for reason and intellectual
concepts
of o n e tradition replacing
an-
other but rather of a clash b e t w e e n emotion a n d necessity. O n
the
one hand
indicative not so m u c h
the and
are the feelings a n d attitudes p r o m p t e d
by the
break-
d o w n of institutionalized beliefs a n d intensified b y the n e w
modes
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n — a l l
stimulating
or creating an
overwhelming
desire for e m o t i o n a l e s c a p e , or at least e m o t i o n a l release "concrete" tedious
feelings
necessity
techniques
and to
associations.
master
of computers,
by
mathematics,
like, o n w h i c h t h e r e s o l u t i o n of m a n y lems
On
the
intensive
other
through
hand
is
conceptualization
systems
control,
the
and
contemporary social
the
the
prob-
depends.*
Though whether class of
this
the
clash
student
the twentieth
may
be
a
generation century.
profound represents
A
one, a
new
it
is
doubtful
revolutionary
truly revolutionary
class
must
making partial improvements, of gradually adapting new techniques, of really becoming involved in the world. John Ardagh, in The New French Revolution (New York, 1969), notes this paradox in regard to the French intellectual left: "Sartre and his friends have preached that literature must be engagee—but in practice they have always shied away from realistic political action. . . . Sartre and his friends have always demanded utopia or nothing . . . So the technocrats have stolen the Sartrians' clothes" (p. 358). * Compare, in this connection, Noam Chomsky's attacks on the new breed of American intellectual-experts (American Power and the New Mandarins, New York, 1968) with the attacks on Plato, who was accused of the sin of "intellectualizing" reality. There are other tantalizing parallels to ancient Athens. The author of a recent study of the impact of Plato's philosophy on the society of his time argues that the term "philosopher" was relatively new and was used by Plato to identify "the man who is prepared to challenge the hold of the concrete over our consciousness, and to substitute the abstract" (Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 281). The concentration on the abstract was associated with the appearance of a new technique of communication—the written, which first supplemented and then displaced the antecedent oral tradition (pp. 292-95). Epic poetry relied on narrative, which both stimulated and depended on emotionally shared experience; the more abstract categorization of reality became possible with the introduction of the alphabet and writing, and it opened the doors of history to conceptualization. Both Christianity and Marxism stepped through these doors.
1
oo}
II:
The Age of Volatile Belief
master the c o n t e m p o r a r y techniques of social organization, than reject them.
This
may
be
difficult for the
student
t i o n a r y class" t o d o , s i n c e it is n e c e s s a r i l y t r a n s i t i o n a l in
character
and subject to constant change. This does not preclude sibility
that
student
permanently
and
militants
students
rebellion.
It
may is
revolutionaries
well
become—especially
experience—professional new
might
alive
however,
will be
after
revolutionaries
keep
not,
the
opt
and
feelings
certain
that
able to maintain
out
rather
"revolu-
the
society
hardening
prison
that of
the
inflow
older
create
its
a "class." E a c h own
student
leadership,
its
their ties w i t h t h e
generation
own
and
ex-student
will
aspirations
then
and
new
increas-
ingly s e p a r a t e d b y age. T h e y will r u n t h e risk of b e c o m i n g of
rebels
have
h i s t o r y is, a f t e r all, a c e m e t e r y o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y y o u t h
becoming
more
willing
to tolerate
that
movements.
Moreover, the c o m i n g w a v e s of students m a y enter a n gradually
the
environexistence
of altogether d e v i a n t subcultures a n d offering social support
even
to those w h o c h o o s e to divorce themselves from society. M a n y the contemporary younger rebels—especially those w h o are ological rather t h a n political in their m o t i v a t i o n — m a y w e l l that path.
Finally,
education
and
student
may
as social c h a n g e
knowledge,
be
blurred;
the as
contributes
distinctive
society
more
of
pathchoose
to the spread
characteristics
becomes
to
techniques,
b e f o r e it t o o f a d e s f r o m t h e s c e n e . It is p e r h a p s n o a c c i d e n t
ment
of
restlessness
the
generation of y o u n g e r students, f r o m w h o m t h e y will b e
outside
pos-
of
of
of the
knowledge-
oriented and the student m o r e socially involved, the g a p
between
student life a n d society will narrow. Nevertheless, the c h a l l e n g e of the s t u d e n t g e n e r a t i o n as a w h o l e to rigid hierarchies a n d institutionalized beliefs a n d to the order of
the
industrial
age
has
had
the
effect of
m o r e basic questions concerning the purposes of social tion. W h a t external
should
definitions
the
organiza-
internal and
whenever
d o m i n a t e s our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of reality.
relationship
the
meaning
new
is
the
liberty to social equality? T h e s e questions acquire n e w for
life? W h a t
between
personal
call
of
the balance
the
of
and
qualities
be
social
reopening
a
major
historical
crisis
Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology
{ 1 11
4. Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology T h e nineteenth century can b e said to represent the lectual s u p r e m a c y of the idea of liberty, but the twentieth is w i t n e s s i n g
the
triumph
f o u n d its p o l i t i c a l
of
equality.
embodiment
For
most
in the nation,
intel-
century
people
liberty
and only for
rela-
t i v e l y f e w w a s it in p r o c e d u r a l g u a r a n t e e s f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l .
The
last c e n t u r y w a s , therefore, primarily t h e t i m e of nationalism,
and
only secondarily
of
liberal
which
of
equality
the
strongest
idea
motivating
democracy. can
impulse
be
behind
The
search
expressed the
is
for forms currently
activities
of
blacks
the
university
students in the W e s t a n d of y o u t h f u l critics of the p r i v i l e g e d m u n i s t e l i t e s ; it a l s o g u i d e s r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n
in
and
both in the U n i t e d States a n d in Africa, and b e t w e e n
the
comwhites richer
and the poorer countries. W e h a v e thus r e a c h e d the stage in mankind's history w h e r e passion for equality
is a u n i v e r s a l ,
self-conscious force. W h a t
m o r e , s i n c e e q u a l i t y is n o t l i k e l y t o b e a t t a i n e d o n t h e
substitute,
with
passionate
conflict
and
hostility
is
objective
p l a n e , it m a y b e s o u g h t m o r e a n d m o r e o n t h e s u b j e c t i v e W i t h real equality impossible, equality through e m o t i o n a
the
plane.
becomes
creating
the
illusion of equality.
The Quest for The
passion
Equality for equality
is s t r o n g
today
because
for the
t i m e i n h u m a n h i s t o r y i n e q u a l i t y is n o l o n g e r i n s u l a t e d b y t i m e distance. N a t i o n a l i s m s p r e a d d u r i n g a century a n d a half as
first and
popu-
lations gradually b e c a m e politicized as a side effect of literacy
and
11 8 }
11: The Age of Volatile Belief
industrialization,
but
the
rejection
tween nations has b e c o m e of
decades.
In
this
of
inequality
the dominant m o o d
regard,
as
in
the
within
and
in a m e r e
rebellion
of
the
younger
generation, the a p p e a r a n c e of global c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d of e d u c a t e d m a s s e s is t h e d e c i s i v e
be-
matter
newly
stimulus.
Accordingly, the relationship b e t w e e n the technetronic age
and
the passion for e q u a l i t y — i f not t h e idea of equality itself—is causal.
From
the
standpoint
of
generating
social
and
quite
political
m o t i v a t i o n , it is a m a t t e r o f e n o r m o u s i m p o r t t h a t " t h e p o o r as m u c h in t h e n e w ment
of
world
software multibillion dollar service
information
as t h e
do."48
wealthy
live
environ-
National
pression a n d class oppression h a d to b e direct a n d personal
op-
before
they could generate counterreaction. T o d a y the sense of inequality can b e vicarious and nevertheless extraordinarily intense, it c a n b e m a g n i f i e d b e y o n d t h e l e v e l of p e r s o n a l But though commands
the commitment
the
to the idea of
greatest allegiance,
mains elusive. In the communist
the
because
experience. equality
definition of
currently
equality
states the struggle for
equality involves the desire to do a w a y with the right to rule a privilege
of
only
a
few;
with
the
right
to read
and
re-
political
to
as
travel
f r e e l y as a p r o f e s s i o n a l p r e r o g a t i v e of o n l y t h o s e at t h e t o p of
the
p o w e r elite; w i t h t h e right to b u y w h a t o n e desires as a n
advan-
tage enjoyed only by those on governmental
abroad
or w i t h
access
to
special
stores
for high
assignments
officials.
Nevertheless,
communist party leaders, w h o have long assumed that the
elimi-
nation
social
of
equality
propertied as
the
classes
basis
for
would
personal
libertarian equality difficult to In
the
new
and
developing
automatically liberty,
find
ensure this
desire
for
comprehend. states,
the
difficulty
in
e q u a l i t y is c o m p o u n d e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t i n m o s t c a s e s
defining
complaints
result not only f r o m i m m e d i a t e social inequities b u t f r o m an
acute
sense of deprivation vis-a-vis the d e v e l o p e d world. T h e small
size
of m a n y of t h e n e w
im-
potence
and
states further intensifies their f e e l i n g of
complicates
the
task
of
redress.*
Their
economic
* "The median population of all states independent before 1776 is today 22.6 million, of those emerging from the first anticolonial revolution and the
Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology dependence
on unstable commodity
{111
markets and foreign
capital
m e a n s t h a t t h e i r l i b e r t y is h i g h l y r e l a t i v e a n d t e n u o u s . T h e is a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h l i b e r t y s e e m s t h r e a t e n e d b y t h e
result
absence
of international equality. It is t h e d e s i r e f o r e q u a l i t y t h a t h a s m a d e m o s t o f t h e of
the
new
states
embrace
socialism.
They
see
in
leaders
socialism
vehicle for e n s u r i n g t h e objectives w h i c h m o s t of t h e m share: flowering
of their nations' o w n
nomic
development,
and
the
the
distinctive cultures, national gradual
erosion
of
eco-
internal
and
external inequality. Their socialism shares the Marxist analysis capitalism
and
the
Leninist
description
of
imperialism,
a
of
though
the leaders t e n d to stress that their e c o n o m i c a p p r o a c h avoids errors n o t o n l y of c a p i t a l i s m b u t of c o m m u n i s m as w e l l . 4 9
the
Indeed,
s o m e leaders h a v e claimed that their socialism—less d o g m a t i c
and
enriched by indigenous traditions—would provide the world
with
a more humane ism
of
communism
50
West.
Writing
Kenya, T o m ism,
alternative than
declared
or
just
Mboya, that
the
before
either the doctrinaire
social the
indifference attainment
of
of
the
materialcorporate
independence
in discussing t h e African c o n c e p t of
eventually
Africa
rest of
the
These views, however, remain essentially unstructured and
un-
world w h a t f r e e d o m really means."
"will
show
the
51
systematized. T h o u g h they have been described by some as
in
social-
an
ideology,
they
tend
to
lack
the
systematic,
scholars
coherent,
tegrated, a n d intellectually sustained character of either
or c o m m u n i s m , a n d t h e r e is a n a b s e n c e of f o r m a l d o g m a s a n d stitutional e m b o d i m e n t . T h o u g h t h e y back their v i e w s b y ocratic political p o w e r a n d phrase t h e m in a terminology derived from Marxism, a n d t h o u g h t h e y are necessarily
in-
socialism in-
undemlargely preoccu-
p i e d w i t h i m p r o v i n g m a n ' s e c o n o m i c life, t h e leaders of t h e
new
dissolution of dynastic empires (1776-1945), 5.2 million, and of those that won their independence in the last two decades, only 3.4 million. There may be some disagreement on the optimum size of a nation-state, but there is little doubt that'it is above three or four million. The very size of the newly proclaimed states, particularly in Africa, makes it difficult for them to realize those aspirations of modernity and power, of dignity and prosperity, which their leaders profess" (Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations, Washington, D.C., 1967, p . 247).
11 8 }
11:
The Age of Volatile Belief
nations t e n d to lay stress o n t h e p r e - e m i n e n c e of n a t i o n h o o d
and
of t h e s p i r i t u a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e h u m a n b e i n g . T h i s is a l s o
true
of the n e w i n d i g e n o u s intellectuals—those
in the social layer
mediately below
leaders—who
the present Third World
b e e v e n m o r e radical in their outlook, m o r e
im-
tend
susceptible
to
to
racist
appeals, a n d h i g h l y e m o t i o n a l in behavior.52 Their ecstatic
Marx-
i s m is a f a r c r y f r o m e i t h e r t h e s c h o l a s t i c i s m of M a r x or t h e
organ-
izational s i n g l e - m i n d e d n e s s of Lenin. M o r e o v e r , t h e e x p e r i e n c e of several y e a r s of i n d e p e n d e n c e
has
h a d a chilling effect o n those w h o originally s a w in the n e w
na-
tions an expression of a m o r e h u m a n e vision a n d an e x a m p l e
for
others. In m a n y of t h e n e w states the ruling elites h a v e liberty on the
ground
inequality
eliminating
by
mobilizing national
that
such
restriction
privilege
on
efforts to bridge
the
restricted
is n e c e s s a r y home
to
front
the widening
fight
and
gap
by
between
the nation and the outside world.53 T h e passion for equality in s o m e places b e e n d e b a s e d into a racial nationalism that expression in the expulsion of n o n n a t i v e t r i b e s m e n
(Chinese
Indonesia,
generally
Asians
xenophobic world
as
shown
and
the
from
even
principal
a strong
East
racial
propensity
The
problem
of
equality
and
resentment
exploiter.
s o m e expense to their social
more developed
Africa)
The
toward
of new
more the
developed
political
conspicuous
in
have
consumption,
poses
and prosperous
itself
rather
differently in
countries. There, particularly
vote" formula merely obscures the underlying inequality of b e t w e e n the individual and, for example, the corporations. specifically, the notion of equality—rather than that of heart
of
at
the
civil-rights
struggle
in
the in
"bigness" argue
t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s is d e c e p t i v e b e c a u s e t h e " o n e m a n ,
at t h e
a
white
consciousness.
in institutions a n d v e s t e d interests. O p p o n e n t s of "bigness"
been
its
from
elites
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , it h a s t a k e n t h e f o r m o f o p p o s i t i o n t o
has
has
finds
one
power More
liberty—
the
United
States. F o r m a l "liberty" has b e e n gradually a n d painfully
obtained
b y t h e blacks w i t h t h e p a s s a g e of civil-rights legislation,
particu-
larly
legislation
guaranteeing
the
right
to
vote.
That
"liberty,"
Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology
{ 111
h o w e v e r , hardly assures t h e blacks equality in A m e r i c a , black
mans
struggle
today
is t o
obtain
the
"equality"
w h i t e m a n a l r e a d y p o s s e s s e s . D e f i n i n g t h a t " e q u a l i t y " is
and
the
that
the
precisely
w h a t perplexes the college president or the city manager, to liberty has traditionally b e e n s y n o n y m o u s with
T h e social tensions in the d e v e l o p e d w o r l d — a n d
this is t r u e
s o m e c o m m u n i s t countries as w e l l as of m o r e pluralistic —highlight
the
difficulty of
seeking
equality
whom
equality.
purely
on
ternal a n d material plane. A f t e r several centuries of social
the
ex-
activism
— w h i c h e m p h a s i z e d the external m a n — c o n t e m p o r a r y m a n in advanced
industrial countries
for w h i c h
he
finds
no
religion or ideology. ideological
passions,
confronts
satisfactory
With inner
the
a crisis of
answers
gradual
certitude
Syncretic
the
self-definition
in either
established
fading of nationalist and
external
have yielded to inner ambiguity and external
of
societies
and
commitment
uncertainty.
Belief
W h e n M i c h e l F o u c a u l t p r o c l a i m e d "the d e a t h of man," h e
was
expressing in almost N i e t z s c h e a n terms the pessimism inherent
in
the
in
reaction
against
Promethean
ideologies.*
That
reaction,
* This pessimism has been summarized in Robert Bailey's Sociology Faces Pessimism (The Hague, 1958, pp. 116-17) in ten propositions, contrasting the European Zeitgeist of a hundred years ago with that of today: EUROPEAN ZEITGEIST
1. 2. 3-
45-
One hundred years ago There is progress. Social evolution is linear. Western civilization is moving continually toward greater heights in cultural and social development. Man is rational. Society is composed of individuals who, being rational or capable of becoming rational, shall boost mankind to new levels of accomplishment.
Today 1. There is no progress. 2. Social evolution is cyclical. 3. Western civilization is in a period of disintegration and decline.
4. Man is nonrational or irrational. 5. Society is composed of masses who, being nonrational and easily influenced, shall reduce mankind to mediocrity.
11 8 }
11:
The Age of Volatile Belief
turn, reflects t h e
scientific complexity
of
modern
stimulates a f e e l i n g of futility a n d i m p o t e n c e individual.
on
Foucault's views, associated w i t h a school of
called "structuralism," h a v e b e e n characterized b y ideology
of
contemporary
technocracy,
as the object of a process w h i c h and rules h i m impersonally, T h e rejection of conscious the
society,
ideological-religious
for
sees
of a n y
history—thus that
striking has
autonomy
at t h e
heart
dominated
values,
a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d b e l i e f s a n d of t h e c o l l a p s e of all i n t e g r a t e d purposive
Centuries
in the
ago,
that ought to g u i d e time
in
recorded
historical great
religions,
is
man men.
defined Now,
the
norms
for the
beginning—though
first
just
be-
g i n n i n g — t o liberate himself from the oppressive struggle to
sur-
v i v e as a p h y s i c a l b e i n g .
man
and
interpretations.*
the relations a m o n g
history,
of
Western
t h i n k i n g — i s itself a reflection of the c o n t e m p o r a r y crisis in
simultaneously
the man
dynamic.54
according to a structural
approach
the
thought
a critic as
Foucault
deprives him
which
the part of
This has prompted
a renewed
w i t h t h e m o r e e l u s i v e , spiritual a s p e c t s of e x i s t e n c e ; !
concern
it h a s
also
6. Scientific truth and knowledge 6. Scientific truth and knowledge are beneficial for society. may be harmful for society. 7. Myth and superstition are harm7. Myth and superstition may be ful. beneficial. 8. A society represents a harmony 8. A society is composed always of of interests, a communum boconflicting interests. num. 9. Society is ruled by the consent of 9. Society is ruled by the elite, the people. 10. Democracy and the humanitarian 10. Democracy and the humanitarian social values serve to protect insocial values are unfortunate misdividual and community intertakes that result in the rule of unests. educated masses. 0 Structuralism also involves a critique of Sartre's existentialism, which, in its stress on individual moral autonomy, was itself a reaction to the ideological emphasis on the individual's submissive identification with collective and purposive history-making. t In the words of one of the participants in the Harvard University Program on Technology and Science: "With the advent of the affluent industrial societies science tends to replace economic productivity as a primary social goal. As science is able more and more to satisfy its material needs with less human effort, it becomes more preoccupied with the spiritual and intellectual needs. It must develop new goals and aspirations in order to remain viable as a social order. . . . Many times in the past scientists have believed that
Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology created ingly
a state of agitation, in w h i c h systematic d i a l o g u e
breaks
Naturally, though
{111
down
this
the
because
of
is e s p e c i a l l y
reaction
the
true
gradually
politic. A s a c o n s e q u e n c e ,
lack
of
of
the
shared
intellectual
communicates
itself
the
prothey
less a n d of
the
less internal French
commitment
people
during
p o l i t i c a l o r d e r is a c a s e i n p o i n t . ) cussion today
of the n e e d
abide
body
cedural political order o n l y as l o n g as that order works, b u t have
majority of people
community, to
by
havior
the
increas-
assumptions.
t o it.
(The
May
1968
the
passive
be-
collapse
of
T o b e sure, t h e r e is m u c h
to reassert h u m a n
values,
of
ority of m a n against the tyranny of political despots or
dis-
the
pri-
dehuman-
izing technocrats, but in our t i m e — a s o p p o s e d to the situation eras
when
religion
or
ideology
was
dominant—the
means,
forms, a n d the inner significance of these goals remain narily
undefined.
(The
International
Philosophical
extraordi-
Congress
V i e n n a in 1968 was, for example, d o m i n a t e d b y the v i e w that temporary philosophy m u s t b e in the forefront of the b u t how
"struggle,"
it w a s t o c o n t r i b u t e w a s n e v e r s p e c i f i e d . )
abstract a n d the spiritual, a n d e v e n the e v i d e n c e s of n e w in religiosity—in "the
other
quality
of
words,
all
life"—will
matters
in
the
subsumed
near
future
e m e r g e n c e of n e w f o r m a l ideologies or religions. plexity
and skepticism—reinforced
by
against the systematic
and
dogmatic
reality
was
still
and
ideology
dogmatically
were
part
compressible
the
to
Scientific
the com-
effects
(television)
qualities of an
o l o g y . I n this s e n s e it is t h e r e f o r e r i g h t t o s p e a k ideology." Religion
the
interest
under lead
the impressionistic
of increased reliance o n audio-visual c o m m u n i c a t i o n —work
in
con-
It is d o u b t f u l , t h e r e f o r e , w h e t h e r t h e g r o w i n g c o n c e r n w i t h
term
in the
of
an
into
of "the e n d age
in
ideof
which
intellectualized
all the significant questions had been answered, and the only task remaining was to fill in the details, to work out the full ramifications of the conceptual structure whose main framework was completely delineated. Yet each time the expectation has proved to be wrong. Each new major advance has revealed an unsuspected new world, a new conceptual structure embedded in the old, and subsuming it" (Harvey Brooks, "Can Science Be Planned?" Harvard University Program on Technology and Science, 1968, pp. 13-14 Litalics added]).
11 8 }
11: The Age of Volatile Belief
c o m p a r t m e n t s ; b o t h w e r e reinforced b y t h e u r g e n t desire to translate t h e ideal into t h e real. W h a t
more probably
lies a h e a d
is
turn t o w a r d m o r e personal, less structured, m o r e subjectively fined
attempts
at a s y n t h e s i s of t h e scientific a n d t h e
though perhaps din's thinking.
nothing In any
quite
case,
so mystical
this appears
spiritual—
as T e i l h a r d
to b e
the
a
de-
de
trend
Charamong
contemporary Christian and revisionist Marxist thinkers. Though this
it is i n d i v i d u a l l y
development
democracy.
might
Intellectual
enriching,
work
there
against
confusion
and
the
is
the
danger
durability
political
of
that
liberal
disagreement,
to
say nothing of simple insecurity, m i g h t w e l l stimulate a search for external sources of s t a b i l i t y — w h i c h w o u l d take the f o r m of repression
or
the
bestowal
of
confidence
on
a
either
dominant
per-
s o n a l i t y . M o r e o v e r , "a s o c i e t y t h a t c a r r i e s e c l e c t i c i s m t o t h e
point
w h e r e not only the total culture but the individual becomes
a mere
impossible
to
congeries
make
m a k e of man."
55
A
a
of disassociated
collective
decision
consciousness
elements
as
to
what
will
find
man
leader can then b e a substitute for the
grative tasks of society, w h i c h are o t h e r w i s e p e r f o r m e d b y a
formal
or
an
implicitly
social consensus, fused—mass
society's
media
make
of a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o necessary
shared
ideology.*
emotional this
and
easier
to
In
rational
the
achieve—in
is s e e n as b o t h p r e s e r v i n g a n d
innovations
in
the
social
order.
Given
the
may
the
that
authoritarian
even
approaches
personal
leadership,
a
revolutionary it is v e r y
of be
person
making
the
choice
be-
t w e e n s o c i a l a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s o r d e r — a n d b y t h i s is n o t anything
inteeither
absence
needs
it
shall
meant
situation—and
probable
that
s o m e present constitutional a n d liberal democratic societies
even would
o p t for t h e latter.
* Daniel Bell has described the social functions of ideology in the following terms: "Within every operative society there must be some creed—a set of beliefs and values, traditions and purposes—which links both the institutional networks and the emotional affinities of the members into some transcendental whole. And there have to be some mechanisms whereby those values can be not only 'internalized' by individuals (through norms) but also made explicit for the society—especially one which seems consciously to shape social change; and this explicating task is the function of ideology' ("Ideology and Soviet Politics," Slavic Review, December 1965, p. 595).
Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology The
temptation
to
choose
security
as
an
{111
alternative
to
plexity m a y g r o w in t h e years a h e a d , b e c a u s e "the e n d
com-
of
ideol-
ogy," far f r o m d i m i n i s h i n g the i m p o r t a n c e of ideas a n d ideals p o l i t i c s , is u s h e r i n g i n a n a g e i n w h i c h a b s t r a c t i s s u e s
in
concerning
the m e a n i n g of p e r s o n a l a n d social life are again b e c o m i n g
cen-
tral. It is p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e l i e f s n o l o n g e r
both
confine and
define the
framework
of
the
dialogue
l o g u e is b e c o m i n g m o r e i n t e n s e a n d f a r - r a n g i n g .
that
The
r e n e w e d conflict of ideas, but not of institutionalized renewed In
interest in religiosity,
this
new
and
but
passionate
not in organized
dialogue,
are increasingly
talism, democracy,
socialism, and c o m m u n i s m — e v e n
widely
such
as
dominated
societies,
such
as
the
communist
ideolog-
nations,
i n a d e q u a c y expresses itself m o r e a n d m o r e in e v e n overt on
the
values,
official i d e o l o g y ; it
prompts
framework.
a
in
societies
search
In both cases
for
with
some
the accent
looser,
acceptable
is o n
capi-
nationalism
— a r e n o longer a d e q u a t e to provide relevant insights. In ically
a
ideologies;
and
used terminologies
dia-
religions.
established
useless. Terms
the
r e s u l t is
this
attacks
more
implicit
and
relevant
to
combine
the previously dominant emphasis on external m a n with
the n e e d
renewed
attention to his i n n e r life. I n b o t h c a s e s — a s w a s true of
Marxism
in t h e i n d u s t r i a l a g e — t h e r e is t h e felt n e e d for a n e w
intellectual
synthesis. It is s y m p t o m a t i c o f o u r a g e t h a t d e s p i t e its i n t e n s e it h a s n o t p r o d u c e d of
action
designed
with a new stance concept
of
a relevant concept to
replace
set; t h a t is, b o t h
that
change.
(Marxism),
The
process of industrialization.
a
institutions
and
operative a method
industrial
a n d it w a s
turbulence
of revolution:
of
change
age
did
later applied
strategy
and
values
the
produce
sub-
such
to countries in
T h e r e is n o s u c h t h e o r y a v a i l a b l e
the post-industrial societies, nor has the N e w
a the
Left succeeded
to in
providing one. M o r e o v e r , w h e r e a s in the past ideologies of
change
gravitated
areas—
from
the
developed
world
to
less
developed
thereby stimulating imitation of the d e v e l o p e d w o r l d — t o d a y differences b e t w e e n
the t w o worlds are so p r o n o u n c e d
difficult to c o n c e i v e
of
a new
ideological
wave
the
t h a t it
originating
is
from
11 8 }
11:
The Age of Volatile Belief
the developed world developed
and rapidly acquiring relevance
for
under-
nations.
Total integrative revolutions were possible because ideologies
provided
a
framework
for
total
integrative
change
and
recon-
struction. T h e integrative i d e o l o g y w a s in itself a reflection of a g e in w h i c h institutions.
authority rested on clearly established
The
communist
party, with
its c l a i m
w a s thus the e p i t o m e of an a g e of integrated authoritarian
institutions.
Rapid
scientific
beliefs
to
an and
infallibility,
grand visions
change,
the
and
massive
educational explosion, and the intense communications
implosion
are all factors that m a k e for h i g h l y volatile b e l i e f s a n d
reactions
and create a situation in w h i c h
subjective feelings
portant than collective commitment tion and
im-
for social
ac-
to a blueprint
organization.
Accordingly, for the present, both the tensions
are more
that
are
stimulated
on
the
fragmentation-unification
political,
economic,
tellectual planes b y the g a p b e t w e e n the technological tronic a g e
and
social forms
the persistence
derived
from
in a n e w
another
age
era of point
and
and
institutions
toward
a
turbulence rather t h a n t o w a r d a t i m e of f u n d a m e n t a l
consensus;
the
communist
world
is
finding
and
time
of
revolution.
T h e m o r e d e v e l o p e d w o r l d is f a c i n g a crisis of its liberal, cratic
inelec-
demo-
difficult
to
a d a p t its i d e o l o g y ; t h e T h i r d W o r l d s e e k s a f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e
in
a modified form of socialism that substitutes
it
emotion
doxy. In the past the w o r l d lived in an e n v i r o n m e n t mentalized
uniformity:
socio-economic
structure
agrarian but
societies,
for
of
basically
ortho-
compartsimilar
differentiated in religions
and
in cul-
tures, w e r e isolated f r o m o n e another; t o d a y differentiated
socio-
economic
crum-
realities,
existing
in
an
intellectual
context
bling religions and ideologies, overlap perceptually.
of
The
certitude of the past thus gives w a y to psychic tension;
psychic
confidence
of r i g h t e o u s n e s s yields to f e e l i n g s of guilt or r e s e n t f u l inferiority. *
• Thus, in the past when Christians and Moslems hated one another they did so in self-righteous confidence; today Third World citizens may hate Americans for their wealth but at the same time despise their own felt inferiority, whereas Americans feel guilty about their wealth but savor a feeling of technological superiority.
Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology It is p o s s i b l e t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t p h a s e there are for the
first
{111
of intellectual
spective. T h e assertively universalist ideologies of t h e century were they
turmoil
t i m e the s e e d s of a globally relevant
in fact highly parochial
quickly merged
with
nineteenth
in their origins,
nationalism.
(This
per-
turned
and out
thus to
be
particularly true of c o m m u n i s m u n d e r Stalin.) T h e s e e m i n g l y
in-
ner-oriented ideas and ideals that dominate—in a highly
unstruc-
tured m a n n e r — t h e current dialogue are in fact m u c h m o r e c e r n e d w i t h the universal p r o b l e m s of m a n a n d w i t h the
con-
reinte-
gration of t h e spiritual a n d t h e material. M a n ' s vision of h i m s e l f w a s at mentary,
reflecting
eventually though
emerged
each
was
thousands several
first
of
religions
still c u l t u r a l l y
highly primitive and
small
and
cultures.
with
Out
universal
territorially
frag-
of
these
aspirations,
confined.
The
a g e of s e c u l a r i s m g a v e rise to a m o r e political vision, in w h i c h tionalism
(elevated
into
a
universal
with largely European-derived
principle)
was
ideologies that aspired to
univer-
sal a p p l i c a b i l i t y . W h e t h e r o u r p h a s e is a transition or t h e n i n g of a m o r e
fundamental
disintegration
is l i k e l y
na-
combined
begin-
to b e
very
m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y w h a t h a p p e n s in the t w o major societies our time—the United States and the Soviet U n i o n — a n d b y happens
to the t w o
major
world—liberalism and
contemporary
communism.
visions
of
the
of
what
modern
AMMMA
PART III
Communism: The Problem of Relevance Marxism, born of the social u p h e a v a l p r o d u c e d b y the bined
effects of
the
industrial
and
nationalist
vided a u n i q u e intellectual tool for understanding a n d the
fundamental a
forces
response
to
supplied
the best
of
our
particularly
time.
As
traumatic
available
insight
both
phase
of
com-
revolutions,
a
harnessing
product
mans
pro-
and
a
history,
it
reality;
it
into contemporary
i n f u s e d p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n w i t h s t r o n g e t h i c a l e l e m e n t s ; it f o r m e d basis
for a
sustained
attack
on
antiquated
pre-industrial
the
social
i n s t i t u t i o n s ; a n d it r a i s e d t h e b a n n e r o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m i n a n increasingly dominated b y national As the
first
state to h a v e put
Marxist theory into practice,
Soviet Union could have e m e r g e d
as the standard-bearer
century's
of
model
most
influential
for resolving
today
Soviet
trine.
In
Marxist
the
communism
China,
the
principles
to
system
key
scene
of
extreme
thought
dilemmas
is a
age
hatreds.
facing
conservative the
most
industrial
and
as
the
modern
this
social
man.
bureaucratized
extensive
the
of
Yet doc-
application
backwardness,
of
commu123
i 6 2 } nism
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
is a c u r i o u s
mixture
of ethnocentric
nationalism
and
ideo-
logical f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ; in t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d W e s t
communism
is v i t a l o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it b l u r s its i d e o l o g i c a l
identity
c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h its e r s t w h i l e i d e o l o g i c a l rivals; a n d in t h e
by East
its i d e o l o g i c a l m i l i t a n c y f e e d s o n a d e l i b e r a t e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
with
the most fanatic nationalist passions. In sum, contemporary
com-
m u n i s m has sacrificed Marxism's Promethean c o m m i t m e n t to
uni-
versal humanism. The
tragedy
of
communism
as a universal perspective
is
it c a m e b o t h t o o e a r l y a n d t o o late. It w a s t o o e a r l y t o b e a of true internationalism, b e c a u s e m a n k i n d w a s o n l y just ing
to
national
self-awareness
and
logical m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n
because
the
awaken-
limited
techno-
available were not yet ready
reinforce a universal perspective.
It c a m e t o o late for t h e
trial
and
West,
because
reformism
nationalism
pre-empted
its
that
source
humanist
liberal appeal
concepts through
indus-
of
the
to
statenation-
state. It c a m e too early for t h e pre-industrial East, w h e r e it s e r v e d as
the
ideological
lating in t h e m
alarm
clock
increasingly
for
radical
the
dormant
masses,
stimu-
nationalism.
T o o late in the W e s t , t o o early in the East, c o m m u n i s m its m o m e n t
of
opportunity
in neither
West
nor
East
but
found in
the
h a l f w a y h o u s e of Russia. Its failures a n d successes, as w e l l as specific character, therefore, h a v e to b e seen in the context of peculiar
fifty-year
and
a highly
day
world
tie b e t w e e n
a would-be
universalist
specific Eurasian national setting.
the
practical
reality
of
communism
To is
its
that
doctrine
the
present-
mainly
what
R u s s i a h a s m a d e o f it. To modern man communism
in C h i n a represents o n l y a
tial a n d d o e s n o t offer a relevant e x a m p l e . T h o u g h of
Chinese
permanent the
more
communism—its revolution,
disaffected
its and
alleged
ideological emotional
puritanism,
some its
militancy—may Western
potenaspects
seemingly appeal
intellectuals,
social m o d e l C h i n a offers little g u i d a n c e to t h o s e c o n c e r n e d the problems
of a d v a n c e d
industrial
civilization.
Still
w i t h its o w n b a c k w a r d n e s s , s u f f e r i n g f r o m p o l i t i c a l
as
to a
with
struggling
uncertainties,
The Stalinist Paradox
{
125
m i r e d in conflicts w i t h its i m m e d i a t e n e i g h b o r s , i n c r e a s i n g l y
Sini-
f y i n g its M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m ,
sym-
bol
for
some,
but
China may be
it h a r d l y
offers
the social a n d psychological
a
a revolutionary
blueprint
dilemmas
posed
for
by
coping
the
with
post-indus-
trial age. T o b e sure, C h i n a m a y the would-be
For s o m e of them, tional
discipline
China
and
effort to m o d e r n i z e
of w i l l
example
of
dernity.
The
and
how
in the
provides
ideological
purpose,
dedication,
as a g u i d e
communism of
an attractive
model
responds
the
Soviet
to s o m e
less d e v e l o p e d
of
technological
Chinese
experience
in a different light
elites
in spite of
e v e n o n this level t h e ample
appear
revolutionary
example a massive
only
na-
social
the
Union
But
as an
to the future, to
of
backwardness.
is r e l e v a n t
of
nations.
not
problems provides
ex-
as
an
of the
moonly
a n s w e r to that crucial test.
1. The Stalinist Paradox
One
man
dominated
almost
two-thirds
of
Soviet
history,
a n d h i s n a m e is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h b o t h a s y s t e m of r u l e a n d a ticular approach to constructing communism's
contemporary
within the Soviet Union, Stalin's legacy.
That
communism.
No
role in the world, to say nothing
can afford to overlook
legacy
is r e p r e s e n t e d
by
Stalin's role the
Soviet
two
decades
have
passed
since
Stalin's
death,
any
d i s c u s s i o n of r e f o r m still i n e v i t a b l y r e v o l v e s a r o u n d t h e of breaking with
Stalinism.
of of and
state's
current institutions a n d m o d e s of operation, a n d e v e n t h o u g h most
par-
examination
al-
Soviet
question
i62
}
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
T h i s is q u i t e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e .
The
Soviet
state a n d
the
society of t o d a y w e r e created b y an u n p r e c e d e n t e d social tion deliberately
carried
out
by
the
political
elite.
Soviet revolu-
Violent
costly, that revolution should not b e c o n f u s e d w i t h the
Bolshevik
s e i z u r e of p o w e r in 1917, f o r it o c c u r r e d m o r e t h a n a d e c a d e During
the
crucial years
of
1930-1940,
Soviet society w a s reshaped
that revolution elite. the
It w a s first
as t h e n e w
which
that
spawned
that
revolution
revolution
character was
which
Soviet
which
state
Russia's
is s a i d
to
Marxism
at
took
the
question
The
question
confused bility than
of
with
can
least six
present have
in
what
Marxist p o w e r formed
by
an
first
constructed laid
the
I t is
that
also
specific
to assure the industrial d e v e l o p m e n t
the
that
did
was
political
a n d to h a v e
whether
and
It
as-
society.
Stalinism
of
always
which
aspirations
shape.
sociated so integrally w i t h the creation of the n e w
The Necessity
later.
of
entrance into c o m m u n i s m .
begs
necessary
course
consumed
Soviet
socialist society b a s e d o n
f o u n d a t i o n s for its e v e n t u a l
the
to mirror the ideological
of t h e political rulers, that r e v o l u t i o n a half million lives*
in
and
of
be
"necessity" its
took
autocratic
Stalinism
"inevitability."
more
not.
of
easily
detected
Stalinism
became
In
should
retrospect,
in
what
"inevitable"
root in a specific Russian political
tradition,
did
not
inevitahappen because
environment
intellectual
frustra-
tion, a n d a strong p r o p e n s i t y t o w a r d messianism. A s a result, tain facets of M a r x i s m w e r e reinforced at the e x p e n s e It w a s Lenin's contribution,
be
of
cer-
others.
and the mark of his genius, to
have
* The most detailed accounting is in Robert Conquest's The Great Terror, New York, 1968. He concludes that approximately one million persons were actually executed between 1936 and 1938 (p. 529), that at least two million more died in camps during these years (p. 532), to which one may also add the at least three and a half million who died during the collectivization (p- 533)- My own calculations are that of the ruling party's 2.4 million members, no less than 850,000 were purged during 1937-1938 alone (The Permanent Purge, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 98-110). It should be noted that estimates made by others have been higher.
The Stalinist Paradox
{
127
b e e n able to a d a p t M a r x i s m to his native Russia, a n d in so to have created both Marxist-Leninist ideology and the
doing
Bolshevik
party. Lenin's victory over his rivals within the Russian Marxist ment
and,
lapse of cessful
more
important,
the old autocratic
his
seizure
structure,
"de-Westernization"
of
of
power
laid
the
Marxism,
despotic propensities over occidental
a
upon
basis
col-
for the
suc-
victory
democratic
move-
the
of
oriental
tendencies.
emphasis on dogmatic belief, o n violence, on conspiratorial
His
activ-
ity, a n d o n t h e a l m o s t total s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l to
(partiinost),
party
paranoid Marx's
as w e l l
suspiciousness
own
as his
(all
behavior),
both
to
can
therefore
leader—and
be
potism1—was
and
and
his
characteristic
dissent
of
extended
the
that
Stalin's
emergence
the oriental style a n d m o o d
facilitated,
brutal
operated.
argued
particularly
of
extent
reflected
autocratic tradition in w h i c h h e It
intolerance some
the
if n o t
dictated,
by
Lenin's
as
top
of his
des-
concept
the party as a n elitist g r o u p suspicious of the "trade-union tality" of the w o r k e r s a n d hostile to t h e inertia a n d
conservatism
of the peasants. Intolerance of opposition a n d insistence o n ence to the party facilitated the emergence
of a
of
men-
obedi-
bureaucratically
skilled dictator c a p a b l e of exploiting these traditions to
paralyze
would-be
different
opponents
perspectives, tainly did both
Leonard
not
conveyed
possible
by
and
see the
eye
rivals.
Schapiro to
degree
inhibiting
Writing and
eye
either
to
which
effective
from
Isaac on
entirely
Deutscher,
Leninism
Leninism
cer-
or
Stalinism,
made
Stalinism
the
party
to
Stalin's c o n s o l i d a t i o n of p o w e r . 2 If L e n i n d i d n o t m a k e
Stalin
in-
evitable, h e at least m a d e
opposition
who
within
effective opposition to h i m within
the
party impossible. T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e " n e c e s s i t y " o f S t a l i n i s m is, h o w e v e r ,
a
ferent one. It pertains to t h e p r o b l e m of w h e t h e r Stalinist
dif-
meth-
o d s — a n d the resulting Stalinist s y s t e m — w e r e n e e d e d to effect the socialist revolution and, particularly, industrialization. is a s s u m e d
that Stalinism as a political
system
was
Even
if
it
"inevitable,"
i 6 2 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
it d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t t h e e n o r m o u s h u m a n
sacrifice that
Stalin
extracted from the Soviet p e o p l e w a s necessary to modernize industrialize
Russia
and
the
non-Russian
T h a t sacrifice m a y h a v e b e e n necessary system,0
but
to a d v a n c e
of the a r g u m e n t
and
nations
the
the
case
Stalinist
is t o s h i f t t h e
that
and
USSR.
to preserve the
that proposition
to m a k e
of
ground
to maintain
Stalin's
p o w e r S t a l i n i s t m e a n s h a d t o b e u s e d . T h e r e is n o g a i n s a y i n g
that
argument. It
does
whether
not,
dustrialize Union. Soviet
however,
provide
Stalinist m e t h o d s Russia
The
and
question
an
had to be
the
non-Russian
is i m p o r t a n t
legitimacy—the
answer used
nations
because
authority
and
to
the
the
question
to modernize of
the
the
entire
power
of
Soviet
the
the
crimes
extraordinarily
made
available
Twenty-second Union
in
1961,
detailed to
Congress the
the of
entire
the
tendency
leaders has b e e n to minimize
and
essentially
only slightly marred
gory
accounts
Soviet
Communist of
the
public Party
of
during
of
the
and
the
Soviet
post-Khrushchev
Stalin's m i s d e e d s
by De-
Stalin's
Soviet
to stress
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of t h e thirties. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is t h a t t h e acted correctly throughout,
of
present
Stalin's o c c a s i o n a l m i s c o n d u c t vis-a-vis s o m e of his c o m r a d e s . spite
in-
edifice
S o v i e t e l i t e — i s d e r i v e d f r o m t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e p a s t is o n e of glorious a n d heroic a c h i e v e m e n t ,
and
the
party
a n d h e n c e t h a t its c l a i m t o p o w e r
derived from the essentially infallible leadership
it h a s
is
provided
b o t h in the past a n d in the present. It is o n this c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l
system
b a s e s its c l a i m t o m o r a l i t y a n d universality. T o q u e s t i o n t h e
form
o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e S o v i e t s o c i e t y is t o q u e s t i o n t h e
legit-
imacy
of
the
present
rulers,
albeit
indirectly.
to question the international relevance particularly
its
Leninist-Stalinist
of the
concentration
Even
more,
Soviet model, of
power
in
it
is
and the
0 The Stalinist theory that class struggle intensifies as progress toward socialism accelerates—which conflicts with the notion that class struggle is a consequence of the existence of hostile classes but which justifies increased police terror—was functionally convenient to the interests of Stalin's policies and power.
The Stalinist Paradox
{
h a n d s of a small b u r e a u c r a t i c p a r t y elite. T h e
events in
slovakia
Chinese
in
1968,
Revolution" of
Soviet
attacks
on
the
Czecho"Cultural
b e c a u s e it u n d e r m i n e d t h e p r i m a c y o f C h i n e s e
officials, a n d dilution
the
129
the
long-standing
party
supremacy
Soviet
all
criticism
show
the
of
extent
the to
party
Yugoslav which
the
S o v i e t elite still c o n s i d e r s its p o l i t i c a l m o d e l to b e of b r o a d e r
sig-
nificance. This link b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c interests a n d foreign tions
explains
Soviet
sensitivity
to
suggestions
by
a n d non-Marxist scholars that the Stalinist m o d e of Soviet society w a s wasteful, cruel, a n d — m o s t
aspira-
both
Marxist
transforming
important—neither
outstandingly successful nor necessary. Did
Stalin
have
any
alternative?
At
least
some
Russians—
Marxists as w e l l as n o n - M a r x i s t s — h a d envisaged m e a n s b y Russian industrialization could have b e e n less physically
and
morally
costly
than
achieved
that
in a
pursued
which manner
by
Stalin,
t h o u g h on a c o m p a r a t i v e l y ambitious scale. E v e n b e f o r e the
1917
Revolution, Russian scholars were drawing u p plans for the
mod-
ernization of their country. P e r h a p s the m o s t important p l a n c o n t a i n e d in t h e s t u d y c o n c l u d e d
in
1918 b y
Professor V.
was Grin-
evetskii, rector of t h e M o s c o w Institute of T e c h n o l o g y , w h i c h lined
a
systematic
program,
to
last
several
decades,
for
d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e c o u n t r y . A c c o r d i n g to a n e x t r e m e l y tive analysis of this study,3 in addition to p r o v i d i n g for state
action,
planners
did
Grinevetskii on
price
placed
signals
greater
and
emphasis
profit criteria
as
outthe
informadeliberate
than
Soviet
a means
w h i c h to arrive "in m o s t c a s e s at t h e s a m e priorities, p o l i c i e s , even specific investment choices as those selected by Soviet ners
in
disregard
of
Soviet
these
adopted
by
matched
those envisaged
planners by
criteria." in the
Indeed,
early
Grinevetskii:
the
five-year
top
Soviet from
canal construction,
claim "the
has
granite
been
that
and
plans
closely
electrification, the
so forth.4 T h o u g h
Soviet
foundations
of
plan-
priorities
location of industry a n d population eastward, hydroelectric opment,
industrialization
the was
Marxism-Leninism,"
abundant evidence that Soviet planners, s o m e of t h e m
by and
re-
devel-
standard derived there
is
Grinevet-
i 6 2 }
III: Communism:
The Problem of Relevance
skiis former colleagues, relied heavily o n his work, accepting targets though rejecting his formula for a m o r e making process
and
for greater
(though
not
flexible
his
decision-
exclusive)
reliance
o n price signals a n d profit criteria. Within the c o m m u n i s t party, there w e r e also alternative for industrialization,
most
notably
those
coming
from
a n d t h e so-called "Right Opposition." S o m e w h a t like
plans
Bukharin
Grinevetskii,
they a d v o c a t e d a policy in w h i c h positive i n d u c e m e n t s e m p l o y e d to e n c o u r a g e the peasants to increase their
would
a n d to m a k e the u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n share s o m e of t h e social d e n s of industrialization, the timetable for w h i c h w o u l d b e w h a t extended. T h e y w e r e particularly o p p o s e d to rapid collectivization—the
means
from the peasantry—and
used
by
Stalin
in that opposition
to
extract
they were
Bukharin.
liquidation
By
1930,
of millions
Trotsky had of
kulaks
concluded
was
an
that
immoral
some-
a
surplus
later
physical
"monstrosity," and
violence
a n d to
discredit
communism.5 Perhaps even more damaging from the Soviet of v i e w h a v e b e e n t h e m o r e recent observations of the
Speaking
on November
23,
1961, h e
point
otherwise
orthodox and highly pro-Soviet Polish communist leader, slaw Gomulka.
sup-
opponent
the
w h i c h w a s initiating a vicious circle of c o m p u l s i o n that w a s b o u n d to e n g u l f t h e society as a w h o l e
bur-
coercive
ported e v e n b y Trotsky, w h o initially h a d b e e n a strong of
be
production
Wlady-
similarly
b e l e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n "as t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e p r o c e s s of
la-
growing
lawlessness, violation of socialist legality, the establishment of
an
a t m o s p h e r e of fear, a n d the g r o w t h u n d e r these conditions of
the
personality cult, t h e cult of Stalin." * 0 Whether collectivization facilitated rapid industrialization is a matter of debate among the economists. It is indisputable, however, that its extraordinarily brutal character precipitated a rapid decline in agricultural resources that might have contributed to investment. "The gross output of agriculture fell from 124 in 1928 (1913-100) to 101 in 1933, and was only 109 in 1936, while that of cattle farming declined from 137 in 1928 to 65 in 1933 and then rose slowly to 96 in 1936. Throughout the nineteen-thirties the grain crops did not exceed the pre-1913 level or were somewhat below it" (Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, London, 1963, p. 99). A specialist in Soviet agriculture, in reviewing the recent Soviet reconsideration of that difficult period, reached the conclusion that "with larger grain and currency
The Stalinist Paradox It s h o u l d also b e n o t e d of u n p r e c e d e n t e d
that Stalinism put an e n d
creativity in Russian
{
to a
architecture,
131
period
poetry,
and
the sciences. D u r i n g the 1920s, in the i m m e d i a t e
post-revolution-
ary phase,
vibrant
The
Russia exuded
massive
terror
and
a sense the
of
awakened,
ideological
prompted caution and conformity.
orthodoxy
of
energy. Stalinism
E v e n in t h e ideological
realm
Marxist thought w a s r e d u c e d to an intellectually regressive chism,
for w h i c h
Stalin's
Dialectical
and Historical
cate-
Materialism
( 1 9 3 8 ) s e r v e d as the a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g f r a m e of reference. A
different range
Soviet
of
development,
issues
though
is p o s e d morally
by
the
and
question
physically
whether
costly,
at-
tained goals u n m a t c h e d b y any other society. This, of course,
has
special relevance not only to the internal historical legitimacy
of
t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m b u t p a r t i c u l a r l y t o its s t a n d i n g as a m o d e l
for
other
societies.
European
This
economic
claim
has
historians
been
disputed
by
as w e l l
as b y
those
some
A m o n g the Westerners, Walt Rostow has developed most pointed ments
in
(and
controversial)
modernization.
He
challenge
argues
that
War
I, a n d
West.
perhaps
the
completion
of
its
modernization."6
"in-
development
that "Stalin
the architect not of the m o d e r n i z a t i o n of a b a c k w a r d country, of
the
achieve-
communists
h e r i t e d a n e c o n o m y that h a d t a k e n off" in industrial in the t w o d e c a d e s prior to W o r l d
in the
to Stalinist the
Eastern
Moreover,
he
was but sees
reserves and the existence of a more effective socialized sector, the government's freedom to maneuver would have been considerably greater. The entire edifice of the industrialization program need not have collapsed and it would have been possible to avoid the catastrophic decline in livestock herds, the necessity of devoting huge amounts of scarce capital to the task of merely replacing the loss of draught power, and the tying up of much scarce administrative talent in the apparatus of control and compulsion. Whether the Soviet government would have been able to remain in power without the mass collectivization of 1929-30 is a problem in which an economist qua economist does not have much to say, but he is entitled to think that a non-Stalinist Soviet government might well have been able to do so" (J. F. Karcz, "Thoughts on the Grain Problem," Soviet Studies, April 1967, PP- 429-30). Thus, although the marketable share of agriculture might (or might not) be smaller in a non-collectivized setting, it is reasonably safe to assume that even a smaller share of a larger total output would mean a larger supply in absolute terms.
i 6 2 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
striking parallels in the pattern a n d p a c e of both Russian
industrialization,
the
former
1860s a n d the latter in the 1880s.7 Similarly,
Cyril
Black,
American
commencing
and
around
the
0
in his study
of
Russian
modernization,
h a s c i t e d c u m u l a t i v e d a t a s h o w i n g t h a t "in t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of years,
the
comparative
nomic
and
social
ranking
indices
per
of
the
capita
USSR
has
in
fifty
composite
probably
not
eco-
changed
significantly. S o far as t h e rather limited available e v i d e n c e mits a judgment,
the
USSR
has not overtaken
per-
or surpassed
country on a per capita basis since 1917 with the possible
any
excep-
tion of Italy, a n d the n i n e t e e n or t w e n t y countries that rank higher t h a n Russia t o d a y in this regard also r a n k e d h i g h e r in 1900
and
1 9 1 9 . T h e p e r c a p i t a g r o s s n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t o f I t a l y , w h i c h is j u s t below
that
of
the
fifty
years ago."
the
Soviet
undergo
8
USSR
today,
was
probably
somewhat
higher
B l a c k s comparisons include countries that,
Union,
extensive
were
badly
economic
devastated
recovery.
parative socio-economic development
by
Other
wars
and
students
like
had of
h a v e also tried to devise
s c h e m e for ranking countries, a n d they agree that the Soviet
to
coma
Union
t o d a y ranks s o m e w h e r e in t h e m i d d l e t w e n t i e s . 9 B l a c k is l e d to t h e over-all conclusion t h a t 4 other societies have achieved similar sults at a substantially l o w e r cost," a n d t h u s p u t s into q u e s t i o n m a j o r S o v i e t p r e m i s e a b o u t its o w n
rea
past.f
0 In such areas as steel, coal, petroleum, and electricity the over-all American rate has been somewhat higher, while in light industry and transportation the American performance has been spectacularly more impressive, t Soviet achievements in space, in weaponry, or in the magnitude of its over-all industrial growth have been admirable. Moreover, the Soviet Union has made impressive strides in education, mass culture, and social services, and it has created a solid and extensive scientific base for the country's further development. Thus, it ranked first among the developed nations in the number of doctors per hundred thousand population, and it provided the highest per-capita annual social-security benefits (Statistical Office of the European Communities, Basic Statistics, Brussels, 1967, pp. 131, 153). At the same time, it is useful to recall that in many respects the Soviet Union is a relatively average society as far as socio-economic development is concerned. The previously cited study by Black provides useful rankings of the Soviet Union in comparison with other states in such fields as education (in the 5-19 age bracket the Soviet Union ranked thirty-ninth among
The Stalinist Paradox
{
Support for these generalizations has also c o m e from a ative study
of
growth
in
steel
production
as t h e
key
133
compar-
aspect
of
the industrialization process. It s h o u l d b e n o t e d that Soviet
econ-
omists, as w e l l as political leaders, h a v e f r e q u e n t l y relied o n
steel
as the major indicator of Soviet industrial g r o w t h . T h e a u t h o r this study, Stefan Kurowski, w r i t i n g in c o m m u n i s t P o l a n d ,
extraordinarily
detailed
Soviet steel production
comparisons did
showing
not increase
that under
at a significantly
Stalin, faster
p a c e than during the m o r e rapid p h a s e of the p r e - W o r l d W a r Russian industrialization, a n d that these rates approximated attained b y other countries, particularly Japan, during their responding
phases
of
rapid
industrialization.*
More
of
offers
I
those cor-
generally,
124 countries for which information was available in i960), communications (in i960 the Soviet Union ranked twenty-sixth in newspaper distribution per capita among 125 countries), in public health (in life expectancy the Soviet Union was thirteenth among 79 countries), and so on. In regard to such indicators of modernity as the availability of air communications, radios, telephones, cars, highways, or computers, the Soviet Union was again in the lower ranks of the more developed countries. Thus, when compared with the more developed twenty-one countries (including the EEC and EFTA nations, Greece, Turkey, Finland, Spain, the United States, Canada, and Japan), the Soviet Union ranked twentieth in the number of telephones, seventh in the number of radio receivers, and twentieth in the number of passenger cars. The Soviet lag in the more complex areas, such as computers, is equally striking. Thus, it has been estimated that by 1968 the United States had approximately 50,000-70,000 computers in use, of which (according to Paul Armor, "Computer Aspects of Technological Change, Automation, and Economic Progress," The Outlook for Technological Change and Employment, Appendix Vol. I to National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, Technology and the American Economy, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 220-223) only 10 per cent were in use in the Defense Department, AEC, and NASA; the corresponding nonmilitary Soviet figure was somewhere between 2000 and 3500, or approximately as many as were then operating in Japan or West Germany, or the United Kingdom, respectively (see the comprehensive estimates in Richard V. Burks, Technological Innovation and Political Change in Communist Eastern Europe, RAND Memorandum, Santa Monica, Calif., August 1969, pp. 8 - 9 ) . For a fuller discussion of the current problems of innovation in the Soviet Union, see pp. 155-159 of this book. Kurowski shows by projecting rates based on those from 1870 that Russian steel production would have grown between 1914 and 1920 to 11 million tons. In 1929 Soviet steel production had only reached the 1914 level, and b y *935—after Stalin's First Five-Year Plan and the six years equivalent to
i 6 2 }
III:
relying
on
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
a more
extensive
comparative
analysis
that
involves
some dozen countries over the period 1780-1970, Kurowski that
socio-political
systems
have
relatively
little
to
do
acceleration in the p r o d u c t i o n of steel a n d iron, a n d
argues
with
the
that in
the
a c c e l e r a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n t h e r e is a p a t t e r n of u n i f o r m i t y d u e technical innovation.10 This conclusion, quite naturally,
official ire,11 f o r it t o u c h e d u p o n t h e k e y i s s u e i n t h e S o v i e t
Imperial Yet
to
provoked past.
Pacification
though
Stalinism
may
have
been
a
needless
tragedy
for
b o t h t h e R u s s i a n p e o p l e a n d c o m m u n i s m as a n i d e a l , t h e r e is t h e intellectually tantalizing possibility that for the world
at large
was, as w e shall see, a blessing in disguise. A s t h e state
possessing
the
largest
and
richest
land
mass,
inhabited
by
pliant
yet
it
very
creative p e o p l e , as t h e carrier of a strong imperial tradition, as society the
skilled in w a r f a r e
USSR
was
destined
and
statecraft, with
to emerge
in
the
or w i t h o u t
front
ranks
of
powers, with only another continental power, the United
world States,
a s its p e e r . I t is t h u s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y , g i v e n R u s s i a ' s t r a d i t i o n s the ambitions that t h e availability of p o w e r i n e s c a p a b l y
a
Stalin
and
stimulate,
that p o s t - W o r l d W a r I Russia w o u l d have long remained
stagnant,
m i r e d in a morass of inefficiency. T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e f o r e arises is w h a t k i n d o f R u s s i a otherwise
have
emerged.
A
democratic
Russia,
either
liberal
socialist, d o e s n o t s e e m to h a v e b e e n a real alternative. have required an unprecedented racy—without
an
intervening
It
leap from autocracy to
period
of
democratic
a n d in a setting of e n o r m o u s social deprivation,
might or
would democ-
gestation—
dislocation,
and
c o n f u s i o n . It is difficult t o s e e h o w p o s t - W o r l d W a r I R u s s i a ,
torn
by national dissension,
class conflicts, c o m p e t i n g
ideological
ap-
those that separate 1914 from 1920—it reached 12.6 million (Stefan Kurowski, Historyczny Proces Wzrostu Gospodarczego, Warsaw, 1963, pp. 132*33•) Moreover, Kurowski compares Soviet and Japanese growth rates during both the 1928-1940 and the 1950-1962 periods in great detail. Again, he demonstrates striking regularities in rates of growth (pp. 134, 138, 175).
The Stalinist Paradox
{
135
peals, and sheer physical misery, could h a v e effectively institutionalized
a
democratic
countries
system,
when
such
systems
have
failed
e n d o w e d with stronger democratic traditions a n d
tioning under circumstances m u c h more propitious to
in
func-
democratic
growth. Given
the massive
political
awakening
of
the
Russian
that h a d b e e n s t i m u l a t e d b y t h e industrialization of t h e
people
preceding
decades, b y the b e g i n n i n g s of literacy, a n d b y the e x p e r i e n c e s the war, the only other alternative appears to have b e e n a n chauvinist linked
with
and
intensely
economic
imperialist
expansion,
dictatorial
similar
phases
regime. in
the
When political
d e v e l o p m e n t of other great n a t i o n s — G e r m a n y , Japan, the States—resulted
in
aggressive,
dynamic
imperialism.
of
openly
United
Expansive
nationalism provided the basis for popular mobilization a n d for a highly assertive, e v e n aggressive, foreign policy. At the very R u s s i a , i n all p r o b a b i l i t y a i d e d b y f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s investment in states that s u b s e q u e n t l y
became
w a s characteristic of t h e capitalist era),* chauvinist
dictatorship,
might
have
least,
(economic
political
enemies
led by
a
modernizing,
experienced
a
burst
of
im-
p e r i a l i s t , n a t i o n a l i s t e n e r g y t h a t w o u l d a l s o h a v e m a d e it a
world
p o w e r , p e r h a p s b o t h at l o w e r d o m e s t i c cost a n d in a fashion
more
threatening to the world. This point deserves s o m e elaboration. marriage of M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m
and
Stalin c o n s u m m a t e d
Soviet—particularly
Russian
—nationalism. T h e increasing stress on Great Russian state tions, o n frontiers, o n national mission
vis-a-vis
the
aspirations,
non-Russian
Soviet
on
Russia's
nations,
and
the
tradi-
civilizing the
like,
w e n t h a n d in h a n d w i t h t h e p h y s i c a l transformation of t h e
Soviet
communist
lot
party
from
one
dominated
by
a rather
mixed
c o s m o p o l i t a n a n d internationally oriented intellectuals of
of
Russian,
* For impressive evidence of Western participation in the early phase of Soviet economic growth, see Antony C. Sutton's Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917-1930 (Stanford, Calif., 1968), which argues that "Soviet economic development for 1917-1930 was essentially dependent on Western technological aid" (p. 283), and that "at least 95 per cent of the industrial structure received this assistance" (p. 348).
i 6 2 }
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
Jewish,
Polish,
Baltic,
and
Caucasian
origin
into
a
party
domi-
nated primarily b y Russian, and to s o m e extent Ukrainian, ants turned party
apparatchiki.
T o these men, the Soviet
peas-
political
s y s t e m simultaneously r e p r e s e n t e d the source of their o w n advancement
and
of
their
political
power.
Their
social
loyalty
s y s t e m w a s not unlike that of m a n y peasant priests
to
the
(usually
the
y o u n g e s t sons, for w h o m n o land w a s left) to the Catholic in traditional s o c i e t i e s : it w a s m o r e institutional t h a n
Church
intellectual.
Ideology provided the integrative, intellectual perspective, but w a s n o t t h e principal s o u r c e of m o t i v a t i o n a n d c o m m i t m e n t h a d been to the international-minded intelligentsia w h o
it
as it
preceded
them. Accordingly,
the new
Soviet elite t e n d e d to b e b o t h
tive and nationalist, e v e n w h e n they sincerely believed to be
the
advocates
of
thus act in a m a n n e r and
nevertheless
an
internationalist
essentially
consider
dictated
themselves
ideology. by
conservathemselves
They
their o w n
true
could
interests
internationalists.
t h e m Stalin's f a m o u s d i c t u m that t h e test of a true
To
internationalist
is h i s l o y a l t y t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w a s t h e i d e a l r e s o l u t i o n o f tension that d e v e l o p e d nist internationalism.
between
Soviet nationalism
N o w o n d e r that Brezhnev
the dictum in 1968 to explain the occupation The
cumulative
result of this situation
mixed motivation and
behavior,
of
revived
Czechoslovakia. a pattern
since Stalin b y
considerations that often cynically exploit the ethical
b e c a u s e it t a p p e d t h e i d e a l i s m
universalism only
for the Soviet U n i o n
of Soviet y o u t h , m a k i n g
it
financial
technical aid to China w a s not politically disinterested, the people tors)
genuinely
believe
(as they
occasionally
that the Soviet U n i o n has aided
C h i n a as p a r t of its o b l i g a t i o n t o c o m m u n i s t Moreover,
the
internal
violence
grumble
both Eastern
and
easier
for the r e g i m e to recruit adherents. T h o u g h the Soviet U n i o n e x p l o i t its E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n v a s s a l s , a n d t h o u g h its
of
state
o f M a r x i s m . B u t t h e l a t t e r h a s a l s o h a d t o b e k e p t a l i v e , if b e c a u s e it m o b i l i z e d f o r e i g n s y m p a t h y
the
commu-
in effect
has been
dominated
and
did and
Soviet to
visi-
Europe
and
solidarity.
employed
by
Stalin
and
the
The Stalinist Paradox educational
effect
of
the
communist
{
ideology—even
if
not accepted b y the m a s s e s — h a d a restraining effect on
137
initially
unbridled
n a t i o n a l i s m . A t first b o t h S t a l i n i s t t e r r o r a n d i d e o l o g i c a l l y
induced
social changes perplexed a n d often alienated the people. T h e precedented nomic,
military,
and
intellectual
leadership
inevitably
the vitality of Soviet society. Literally several h u n d r e d
eco-
reduced thousand
of the most talented and best-trained people perished during years.
In addition, though
often violated
the
in practice,
principle
it d i d
restrain
that principle helped
nationalities, despite
Stalin's p u r g e s
nationally,
to shape
it h e l p e d
that worked
states
against
Finland, (at
one
membership
the
and
the
inclination
point
the
including Gustav is a t e m p t a t i o n
Husak,
Union,
the
other
behav-
non-Russian
a state Soviet
some
mind
for
communists,
for Slovakia).
nationalist
of
European
volunteered
Slovak
the same
traditionally
Inter-
of
Union
Eastern
themselves
and
proposed
that m o r e
into
even
Yugoslavs
leaders
was
toward
of their intelligentsia.
incorporation
in the Soviet
to preserve
in Soviet
perhaps
those
of internationalism
G r e a t R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , if o n l y b y f o r c i n g m o r e c o v e r t ior. D o m e s t i c a l l y ,
Poland,
un-
1936-1938 massacre of the top Soviet political,
and
This
Pan-Slav
R u s s i a n l e a d e r s m i g h t h a v e f o u n d difficult to resist. Paradoxically,
therefore,
though
Soviet
ideology
quently been reinforced and perhaps even increasingly b y the nationalism of t h e m a s s e s
has
subse-
dominated
(particularly since W o r l d
War
I I ) , t h e historical f u n c t i o n of Stalinist c o m m u n i s m m a y h a v e
been
to restrain a n d redefine a p h a s e in w h i c h t h e Russian p e o p l e
went
through
awakening.
It
forced that n e w m a s s nationalism to p a y at least lip service to
an
intense
nationalist,
even
imperialist,
in-
ternational c o o p e r a t i o n , e q u a l i t y of all p e o p l e s , a n d t h e
rejection
of racism. M a r x i s m n o t o n l y p r o v i d e d R u s s i a w i t h a g l o b a l
revo-
l u t i o n a r y d o c t r i n e b u t i n f u s e d it w i t h a u n i v e r s a l p e r s p e c t i v e
de-
rived
in
the
sapped
the
from
ethical
concerns
not
unlike
those
stimulated
W e s t b y the religious and liberal traditions. Despite
its
monumental
achievements,
Stalinism
h u m a n a n d e m o t i o n a l resources of t h e Russians, a n d a
post-Stalin
i 6 2 }
III: Communism:
The Problem of
Relevance
Russia m a y therefore eventually enter into the world
community
as another spent, post-imperial power. Finally, b y creating a ticularly despotic m o d e l of c o m m u n i s m
par-
and b y insisting that
o t h e r C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s s u b m i t t o it, S t a l i n n o t o n l y s e t i n
all
motion
t h e process of f r a g m e n t i n g c o m m u n i s m b u t also vitiated m u c h communism's
appeal
at
a
more advanced West—the for the historical
time
when
the
susceptibility
area originally s e e n b y M a r x as
transformation—might
have
made
of
of
the
ripest
communism
the truly d o m i n a n t a n d vital force of our time.
2. The Bureaucratization of Boredom The
Communist
achievement
Party
t o its credit:
of
it h a s
the
Soviet
Union
succeeded
in
has
a
unique
transforming
the
m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y doctrine of o u r a g e into dull
social
a n d p o l i t i c a l o r t h o d o x y . T h a t o r t h o d o x y is r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n
rheto-
ric b u t c o n s e r v a t i v e in practice. T h e political s y s t e m , h i g h l y t r a l i z e d b u t a r r e s t e d in its d e v e l o p m e n t ,
is s e e n b y
some
cen-
Soviet
citizens as increasingly irrelevant to the n e e d s of Soviet society, frozen in a n ideological posture that w a s gether different age.
a response
Soviet society, in w h i c h
to an
elements
of
as
altourban
m o d e r n i t y a r e c o m b i n e d w i t h e x t e n s i v e r u r a l b a c k w a r d n e s s , is n o longer undergoing
rapid,
b i l i z i n g y o u t h f u l elan;
revolutionary
changes
capable
it s e e m s , i n s t e a d , b e n t o n s i m p l y
of
mo-
matching
t h e h i g h e r c o n s u m e r standards of t h e capitalist W e s t . Under those circumstances, more
difficult to justify the
utility of
Soviet
society's
it b e c o m e s i d e o l o g i c a l l y m o r e
historical
continued
legitimacy
subordination
and to
the a
and
social
political
The Bureaucratization system
embodying
increasingly
sterile
of Boredom
{
nineteenth-century
trines. I n d e e d , t h e u l t i m a t e i r o n y is t h a t t h e S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l having thrust Russia into the mid-industrial
age—has
c o m e the principal i m p e d i m e n t to the country's further It k e e p s R u s s i a in a m o l d t h a t is i n d u s t r i a l - b o u r g e o i s dogmatic-authoritarian
politically.
For
the
USSR
truly m o d e r n society, the basic assumptions
more
relevant
vision of
tomorrow
official i d e o l o g y is a l s o n e e d e d
than
now
At one
be-
socially to
and
become
a n d structure of
that
a the
changed.
provided
to c o p e with the highly
by
the
personal
as w e l l as t h e b r o a d e r social c o n c e r n s of t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c
The Innovative
docsystem
evolution.
political forms created to press industrialization must be A
139
age.
Relationship
point the
ary relationship
to
Soviet political society.
system
Consolidated
was
and
in
a
revolution-
subsequently
sub-
ordinated to the will of o n e m a n , the political system i m p o s e d process of radical transformation o n society b y c o m b i n i n g
modern-
ization (largely through intense industrialization and mass tion)
with
ideologically
derived,
novel
social
educa-
institutions
and
relationships. In effect, t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e political s y s t e m in viet society parallels w h a t M a r x d e s c r i b e d as t h e capitalist's cipal role in history:
So-
prin-
bent on making value
expand
itself, h e ruthlessly forces t h e h u m a n race to p r o d u c e for
produc-
tion's
sake;
he
thus
"Fanatically
a
forces
the
development
of
the
productive
forces of society, a n d h e creates those material conditions
which
alone c a n f o r m t h e real basis for a h i g h e r f o r m of society, ciety in w h i c h the full a n d free d e v e l o p m e n t
of e v e r y
a
so-
individual
forms the ruling principle." Domestic
revolutionary
change
fulfilled
the
ideological
of the ruling elite w i t h o u t p u s h i n g that elite into foreign
needs revolu-
t i o n a r y v e n t u r e s t h a t m i g h t h a v e j e o p a r d i z e d its p o w e r . T h e
new
ruling
zeal
elite
was
apprehensive
lest
premature
ideological
p r o v e its u n d o i n g ; y e t it w a s a l s o i d e o l o g i c a l l y c o m p u l s i v e .
Social-
ism in o n e
perma-
country—Stalin's
famous
answer
to Trotsky's
i 6 2 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
nent revolution—was
a b r i l l i a n t c o u p , f o r it f u s e d t h e
dedicated
revolutionaries' genuinely ideological aspirations w i t h their
newly
a c q u i r e d taste for office. Socialism in o n e c o u n t r y a l l o w e d t h e rulers
to
retain
their
ideological
self-righteousness
new
and
their
positions. More basically, the n e w cific, i n n o v a t i v e
role
for
"one-country" concept
the
political
society. T h e political system b e c a m e namism
for social
change,
setting
system
in
defined
and
spe-
relationship
the principal
goals
a
to
source of
defining
dy-
priorities.
O n c e society had taken the desired shape, however, and began mirror
the
official
aspirations
of
the
political
rulers—who
in the m e a n t i m e b e e n transformed into bureaucratic
to
had
officials—the
m o m e n t u m for social c h a n g e started to wane. I n l a t e 1952, S t a l i n h i n t e d t h a t in his v i e w t h e r e w a s still for further
ideologically
transformation.
derived
Subsequently,
and
politically
Khrushchev
on
directed
several
need social
occasions
strove to infuse the relationship b e t w e e n the political system society with n e w programmatic content. At one time he
suggested
a dramatic reconstruction of the Soviet countryside into "agricultural cities." L a t e r h e a t t e m p t e d to define n e w
communism.
When
that
effort
in
social
out b y the party's i d e o l o g u e s in the n e w
so-called
ideological
goals linked to Soviet society's ultimate transition f r o m to
and
socialism
innovation—spelled
party program
adopted
in 1 9 6 1 — t u r n e d o u t t o b e little m o r e t h a n a s h o p p i n g list of
addi-
tional material benefits to b e enjoyed b y the Soviet p e o p l e
some-
time in the
1980s,
Khrushchev
turned
his attention
to the
party
itself a n d b e g a n t o t o y w i t h t h e n o t i o n of r e d e f i n i n g its role. 1962 h e p u s h e d party
into
two
through separate
a drastic reform that in effect split organisms,
one
devoted
to
In the
agricultural
matters and the other to industrial problems. As h e explained
it,
"The
in
production
line
is
the
main
one.
. . . The
main
thing
c o m m u n i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n is e c o n o m i c s , p r o d u c t i o n , t h e s t r u g g l e
for
the creation of material a n d spiritual g o o d s for t h e life of man." Though party
into
Khrushchev's two
separate,
r e f o r m ran t h e risk of essentially
transforming
managerially
oriented
12
the hier-
The Bureaucratization archies
(and was
for that reason
{
of Boredom
immediately
undone
by
160
Khru-
s h c h e v ' s s u c c e s s o r s a f t e r h i s o v e r t h r o w i n l a t e 1 9 6 4 ) , it d i d r e f l e c t a recognition that the relationship b e t w e e n the political system t h e s o c i e t y h a d b e c o m e d y s f u n c t i o n a l , t h a t if t h e p o l i t i c a l was no longer defining new,
and
system
grandiose, ideological objectives
society, t h e n t h e s y s t e m itself h a d to b e r e f o r m e d in k e e p i n g the
more
routine,
which had by now
operational
requirements
acquired the technical
of
Soviet
for with
society,
and industrial
where-
w i t h a l f o r its o w n f u r t h e r , s t e a d y g r o w t h .
Sensing that the
party
w a s in search of a n e w
was
make
role, K h r u s h c h e v
prepared
to
the necessary reforms.
Defensive
Orthodoxy
Khrushchev's
successors
rejected
his
view
and
opted
for relatively minor adjustments—primarily in e c o n o m i c and
control—simultaneously
re-emphasizing
the
instead planning
imperative
ne-
cessity of ideological orthodoxy a n d m o r e vigorous ideological doctrination.
Under
the post-Khrushchev
neither a definition of n e w
regime
in-
there has
been
ideological goals nor any major
tam-
p e r i n g w i t h the political structure. A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , official v i e w s o n t h e state of S o v i e t society, o n f o r e i g n affairs, o n t h e
problems
of t h e future, a n d o n t h e n a t u r e of c o n t e m p o r a r y c o m m u n i s m tain strikingly little r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e n o v e l p r o b l e m s
that
conbeset
m a n , either in terms of his p e r s o n a l c o n d i t i o n or as a m e m b e r the
emerging
global
community.
Difficult problems
are
of
simply
s w e p t under the ideological rug. On
the
domestic
front,
the
prevailing
official v i e w
has
been
that the Soviet Union, h a v i n g c o m p l e t e d socialist construction, now
laying
the
foundations
of
a
communist
society,
and
existing problems are essentially instrumental, n e e d e d to
improve
t h e e f f i c i e n c y of a s y s t e m t h a t i n its b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n s a n d i z a t i o n is o f f i c i a l l y c o n s i d e r e d in the areas
world. of
The
Soviet
life
lag is
in
to b e the most
socio-economic
ascribed
either
to
advanced
development the
ravages
is
that
organ-
and in of
just some
World
i 6 2 } War
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
II or to
writings
the
failures
of revisionist
of
the
pre-revolutionary
Marxist thinkers
on
the
regime.
problems
The
of
per-
sonal alienation in an advanced urban society—to say nothing anti-Semitism in a socialist s o c i e t y — a r e
dismissed
as
inappropri-
ate to Soviet conditions, or as malicious slander. T h e Soviet is s a i d t o h a v e n o g e n e r a t i o n a l
problems,
and
only
of
Union
recently
has
u r b a n c r i m e b e e n d i s c u s s e d as a p h e n o m e n o n in its o w n r i g h t
and
not m e r e l y as a l e g a c y f r o m the pre-revolutionary era. T h e s e v i e w s h a v e b e e n articulated in the context of efforts to reassert a n d
expand
ideological
training
intensified
(thereby
par-
tially c o m p e n s a t i n g for the decline of coercion as a k e y m e a n s integrating Soviet society with the political system). social scope of these t h e r e is o p e n has
been
and
the
efforts has
acknowledgment
focused people
on
the
want
new
to
see
been
expanded,
of the fact that
in recent special
scientific c o m m u n i t y : in
scientists
not
only
fighters
for t h e c a u s e of c o m m u n i s m . "
13
among
scientists
and,
what
is
years
"The
party
creators
even
and
people,
In addition,
h a v e b e e n e x p r e s s i o n s of official c o n c e r n o v e r a l l e g e d indifference
there
ideological
worse,
over
t e n d e n c y in these circles to consider technocrats the natural ers of m o d e r n society.14
Scientists h a v e repeatedly
( a n d t h e very w a r n i n g s reveal t h e attitudes of
the
attention
organizers of scientific-technical progress b u t also political active
of
Though
been
Soviet
a
lead-
warned
scientists)
not to v i e w themselves as "super-class humanists" but to
identify
closely w i t h the class struggle and the people.15 The
issue of "humanism" appears
sensitive one. H u m a n i s m , a
point
of
departure
present Soviet system.
for
to h a v e
been
a
particularly
a central Marxist concern, can serve a
critique
Moreover,
of
both
Stalinism
the dehumanizing
and
potential
as the of
m o d e r n science has g i v e n n e w u r g e n c y to the p r o b l e m of
defining
h u m a n i s m in t h e m o d e r n w o r l d . T h e official v i e w , stated
authori-
tatively in a series of major articles in the k e y ideological
journals,
has
been
unequivocal:
"Socialism
is p r o f o u n d l y
humanistic
c a u s e it e l i m i n a t e s t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of m a n b y m a n . "
"it is a l s o h u m a n i s t i c w h e n it e r e c t s t h e b u i l d i n g o f a n e w at the price of extraordinary
hardships
be-
Accordingly,
in t h e persistent
society struggle
The Bureaucratization
of Boredom
{
a g a i n s t t h e old. It is also h u m a n i s t i c w h e n c o n d i t i o n s h a v e
143
already
b e e n created for the t h o r o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t of the individual
but
s o c i e t y is still c o m p e l l e d t o c o n t r o l t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a p e r s o n
and
his labor discipline and, w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k a n d in the of all of society individual,
a n d of t h e c o m m u n i s t
does
not
permit
education
individuals
to
interests
of a
particular
the
freedoms
abuse
presented b y socialism, does not permit people with an o p e d s e n s e of responsibility community, etc." "the
16
suppresses
This
argument
so-called
individual
eternal'
dignity
geoisie to mislead
S t a l i n i s m is e s s e n t i a l l y Views
to violate the n o r m s of the
the
opposition
has been
s u c h as t h e s e
of
buttressed
values—freedom,
. . . are a w e a p o n and
undevel-
by
the
17
and
forces,
assertion
democracy,
in the h a n d s
fool the masses,"
socialist
anti-socialist
that
humanism, of
the
that the
bour-
issue
of
irrelevant.0 have
been
expressed
in the
context
broader emphasis on the argument that an ideological
o n c o n t e m p o r a r y r e a l i t y is a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l i n o r d e r t o accurate insight into that reality, a n d that scientific
of
obtain
communism—
as defined b y the Soviet l e a d e r s — p r o v i d e s the only valid
perspec-
t i v e . A l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r is n o t a n e w p r o p o s i t i o n , t h e r e is i n t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h it h a s b e e n l i n k e d in t h e m o r e
novelty
prestigious
S o v i e t s c h o l a r l y journals, as w e l l as in m a s s m e d i a , w i t h a n
attack
o n W e s t e r n theories of i d e o l o g i c a l erosion, of t h e e m e r g e n c e of general
type
bureaucratic
of
industrial
political
society,
elites
Soviet critics h a v e m a d e
in
all
and
of
the
developed
a
perspective
ubiquity political
of
a
new
systems.
it c l e a r t h a t t h e y v i e w t h e s e t h e o r i e s
not only scientifically erroneous but politically harmful a n d
as
prob-
ably designed deliberately to u n d e r m i n e c o m m u n i s m , f 0 "At the present time attempts are being made to discredit what was done in the process of building socialism by using the bugbear of 'Stalinism.' The Stalinism' bugbear is being used to intimidate unstable persons, to spread the thought that all firmness and revolutionary character in politics, uncompromisingness in ideology, and consistency in the defense of Marxism are, if you please, 'Stalinism' " (D. I. Chesnokov, "Aggravation of the Ideological and Political Struggle and Contemporary Philosophical Revisionism," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 12, 1968). f For a systematic and well-documented Soviet criticism, see L. Moskvichev, The 'Deideologization' Theory: Sources and Social Essence," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, No. 12, 1968.
i 6 2 }
III:
Communism:
The Problem of
Relevance
Soviet scholars h a v e b e e n particularly vigorous in rejecting theory of " c o n v e r g e n c e " of the Soviet
and
Western,
American, systems. In the Soviet view, the crucial and element the
of
the
expression
Soviet of
system—rule
proletarian
by
the
distinctive
communist
dictatorship—has
been
party
characteristics
of
a
modern
industrial
society,
d e l v i n g m o r e p e n e t r a t i n g l y i n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of its essence. merit
Though
(and
some
of
the
Soviet
t h e r e is a c u r i o u s t o u c h
criticisms
are
of neo-Marxist
not
without
determinism
i n s o m e o f t h e W e s t e r n t h e o r i e s o f c o n v e r g e n c e ) , it is s t r i k i n g
system.
the
without
socio-political
m u c h intellectual effort has b e e n invested in asserting a n d the distinctive character of the c o m m u n i s t
as
underesti-
m a t e d b y W e s t e r n thinkers, w h o have superficially focused o n external
the
particularly
how
proving
It o n c e
reveals the importance attached to the notion that the Soviet
again past
is l i n k e d t o a f u t u r e t h a t is a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t i v e a n d n o t p a r t o f a broader stream of m a n s political evolution.*
It also m a k e s
possi-
In the Soviet view, both the Marxist revisionists and Western theorists of ideological evolution, erosion, or deideologization of Soviet Marxism have essentially been engaged in a political stratagem designed to undermine the ideological foundations of Soviet power. The present author was particularly singled out for criticism in this connection. See, for example, Professor E. Modrzhinskaya's "Anti-Communism Disguised as Evolutionism" (International Affairs [Moscow], No. 1, 1969). She sees in Western sociological writing an effort to pave "the ideological way for subversion against Socialism. Among these theories are: the theory of stages in economic growth propounded by Walt Rostow (a well known U.S. reactionary politician and sociologist); the doctrine of the single industrial society, whose most famous propagandist is the reactionary French publicist and sociologist Raymond Aron; the convergence doctrine, and—the capstone of them all—the theory of evolution, which has been elaborated in greatest detail by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University. . . . "The principal features of the evolutionary theory are set out in Brzezinski's writings of the last few years. . . . A distinctive and highly notable feature of the evolution theory is the desirable sequence of change: from ideology to politics leading to changes in the socio-economic system, and not the other way round, from economic changes to subsequent political transformation, as the votaries of convergence suggest" (p. 16). * This emphasis sometimes leads to statements that verge on the comical, as when it was asserted in a major analysis of "Problems of the Last Third of the Century" that "Marxism-Leninism has no need to reconcile ideas with facts." The author—apparently in all seriousness—added that "according to
The Bureaucratization
of Boredom
{
b l e t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m is f r e e o f t h e
145
dilemmas
t h a t b e s e t c o n t e m p o r a r y m a n e l s e w h e r e , a n d it f r e e s S o v i e t munists f r o m the responsibility of e n g a g i n g in a dialogue about these The
com-
cross-ideological
dilemmas.
official Soviet definition of f o r e i g n p r o b l e m s
is
character-
i z e d b y s i m i l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l i n f l e x i b i l i t y . T h i s is n o t t o s a y t h a t Soviet
leadership
and
elite
are
basic facts or d e v e l o p m e n t s .
misinformed
There
meet
and
anticipated
that
factual
ideological
ignorant
the
about
is n o d o u b t t h a t t h e l e v e l
Soviet overt a n d covert reporting of considerably,
or
world
affairs h a s
of
improved
misrepresentation—designed
preferences—has
declined.
to
Special-
ized Soviet scholarly journals o n Africa or Asia, Soviet analyses the
Common
Market,
or
Soviet
efforts
to
develop
studies of t h e U n i t e d States g o b e y o n d p u r e l y i d e o l o g i c a l las a n d reflect the i m p o r t a n c e attached to the d e e p e r ing of regional d e v e l o p m e n t s . w o r l d affairs ( f o r e x a m p l e ,
nye Otnoslienia)
Some
Mirovaia
scholarly
formu-
understand-
Soviet journals
Ekonomika
i
on
Mezhdunarod-
c o m p a r e very favorably with their best
Western
counterparts in terms of systematic coverage, documentation, scholarly rigor. S p e c i a l i z e d
of
systematic
research institutes, such as the
tute of W o r l d E c o n o m y a n d International Affairs, are
and Insti-
apparently
b e i n g m o r e f r e q u e n t l y c o n s u l t e d in the preparation of policy, this d o u b t l e s s contributes to greater sophistication in the
and
decision-
making process. Yet, in spite of this, t h e S o v i e t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e b r o a d w o r k of c o n t e m p o r a r y even
as p r e s e n t e d
dogmatic.
The
in
basic
reality, as articulated scholarly premise
journals, continues
by
top
remains to
be
frame-
leaders
and
fundamentally
the
Manichaean
notion of the antagonistic d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n the socialist a n d
the
capitalist worlds
be-
(or
between
good
and
evil).
Though
war
t w e e n t h e s e t w o w o r l d s is n o l o n g e r s a i d t o b e "fatalistically
in-
evitable," a n d the destructiveness of nuclear w e a p o n s dictates
the
the recent decree of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee . . . the outstanding revolutionary events of the twentieth century have all been associated with Leninism" (V. A. Cheprakov, Izvestia, August 18, 1968).
i 6 2 }
III:
Communism:
The Problem of Relevance
necessity of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e — i n d e e d ,
sometimes
c o o p e r a t i o n is t a c t i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e b e c a u s e o f o t h e r (for of
example,
our a g e
systems: against and
the
is still
"Two each
The
said
to b e
antagonistic
other
violence
aspects.
Sino-Soviet
today
which
in
affects
antagonists
are
conflict)—the the
a the
underlying
competition
socio-economic struggle life
of
capitalism
of
even
closer
considerations
between
systems
reality the
are
unprecedented
human
society
in
and
socialism."
tually o n e or the other will h a v e to p r e v a i l /
and Soviet
two
pitted scope all
18
Even-
analysts
are c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e y k n o w w h i c h o n e it w i l l b e . T h i s t h e m e like a t h r e a d t h r o u g h all major s p e e c h e s , f o r e i g n - p o l i c y
its
runs
analyses,
or s c h o l a r l y c o m m e n t a r i e s o n w o r l d affairs. It w o u l d b e a n error to dismiss the a b o v e as m e r e l y a ritualistic a c t o f o b e i s a n c e t o d o c t r i n e , o r t o v i e w it a s a s i g n o f f a n a t i c a l implacable militancy. ideological
Its i m p o r t a n c e
framework
well-informed,
policy
on more
immediate,
judgments.
and
lies in t h e influence of
Though
and far
otherwise
from
committing
Soviet leaders to short-term militancy, the ideological does inhibit t h e m from thinking of a c c o m m o d a t i o n
the
quite
framework
and
stability
as e n d s in themselves, since that w o u l d b e t a n t a m o u n t to
negating
the c o m m u n i s t v i e w of history as a
fluid,
dialectical process.
cordingly, an official Soviet analysis of the issues c o v e r e d first
t w o chapters of this b o o k w o u l d run a l o n g these lines:
p r e s e n t e r a is d o m i n a t e d b y t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e w o r l d
Ac-
in
the
"The
socialist
s y s t e m . Its e m e r g e n c e is a d e c i s i v e f o r c e of c h a n g e , n o t o n l y celerating
the
pace
of
socialist
revolution
but
also
ac-
successfully
d e t e r r i n g t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s f r o m c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s . W a r is t h e r e f o r e no longer inevitable,
a n d p e a c e f u l rivalry b e t w e e n
the two
sys-
tems, and especially b e t w e e n the U S S R
a n d the U n i t e d States,
possible.
competition
The
eventual
outcome
of
the
is,
is
however,
0 Thus, a Soviet scholar, in an ambitious effort to analyze contemporary world affairs, asserts that "the outcome of the competition rules out accident. Victory or defeat are necessary, that is, unavoidable, and law-governed. Defeat comes but once in such competition. There will be no return match, no replay/ no chance of revenge" (Kh. Momjan, The Dynamic Twentieth Century, Moscow, 1968, pp. 107-108).
The Bureaucratization foreordained, munist
of Boredom
given the inherent historical superiority
{ 147 of
the
com-
system. In the m e a n t i m e , in m a n y areas m o r e active
coop-
e r a t i o n is to b e s o u g h t , i n o r d e r to a v e r t w a r or t o p r o m o t e n o m i c or social d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e Third World. In s o m e the preconditions for the p e a c e f u l transition to socialism exist; in s o m e of t h e less d e v e l o p e d countries a violent w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y , b u t it w o u l d
be
places already
revolution
a tactical error to
it t o o s o o n ( a s u r g e d b y t h e M a o i s t s o r t h e
eco-
precipitate
Castroites)."
Authoritative Soviet analysts have, moreover, argued that d e t e c t signs of intensified crisis in t h e m o r e
advanced
they
capitalist
states. "Political crises n o w o c c u r far m o r e o f t e n than, let us
say,
ten to t w e n t y years ago, a n d n o longer only o n the 'periphery'
but
in t h e chief the
centers
capitalist
exacerbated nomic
of
states
are
financial
situation
of
imperialism. now
The
spreading
socio-political under
crises
conditions
of
crisis a n d deterioration in t h e over-all the
f a c t o r is s a i d to b e
imperialist
the
growing
camp."
19
radicalism
An of
new
intellec-
tuals, the majority of w h o m — u n l i k e those of the p r e - W o r l d II e r a — a r e the Soviet
now
"becoming
a more
view,
this p o i n t s
to the
internal crisis of more important
the
advanced
than the
active progressive further
changes
or e v e n
heavals that are likely to occur in the Third The
decisive
equation
thus
remains
the
War
force."
intensification
capitalist world,
an eco-
important
Western
in
In
of
a factor
the
that
revolutionary
is up-
World.
that
of
American-Soviet
competition. Accordingly, the crucial operational
question—leav-
ing
not
aside
immediate
tactical
considerations—is
g i v e n course of action will a d v a n c e
whether
t h e c a u s e of w o r l d
n i s m b u t h o w it w i l l a f f e c t t h e S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n b a l a n c e : of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n or a g a i n s t it? T h e no contradiction b e t w e e n national movement, barrassment
and
in
Soviet policymaker
favor senses
Soviet interests a n d those of the he
thus experiences
in assisting anti-American
no
elements
ideological otherwise
logically foreign to c o m m u n i s m or in seeking to reach
interemideo-
accommoda-
tion w i t h the U n i t e d States o n specific issues. This close identification of purely Soviet state interests w i t h the
a
commu-
subjective ideological
i 6 2 }
III: Communism:
The Problem
cause, and the resulting goal-oriented impossible
the
simplistic
judgment
the
the opinion
in tactics, Soviets
stage
in
have
historical
d e v e l o p m e n t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y i n t e n s e s h a r p e n i n g of t h e capitalism
either
Soviet leaders
that "the c o n t e m p o r a r y
ical struggle b e t w e e n
render
are
cynical.
In regard to t h e ideological confrontation, ventured
Relevance
flexibility that
ideologically obsessed or ideologically
of
a n d socialism." This
ideolog-
conclusion
w a s formally expressed b y the Soviet Central C o m m i t t e e in April 1968.20 It w a s f o l l o w e d b y a systematic d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e
propo-
s i t i o n t h a t t h e w o r l d is w i t n e s s i n g " t h e r i s i n g r o l e o f i d e o l o g y " that ideological intensity. T h e
competition
in international
affairs is g a i n i n g
Soviet invasion of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a
g a v e rise to particularly
extensive
and
elaborations
in August
in
1968
of this t h e m e .
w a s explicitly a r g u e d that internal c h a n g e in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a abetted by Western
It was
policies of "peaceful e n g a g e m e n t " that
had
as their u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e t h e transformation of c o m m u n i s m
into
social d e m o c r a c y . T h i s p o l i c y w a s l a b e l e d b y S o v i e t writers as the n e w W e s t e r n strategy of "peaceful counterrevolution."
21
The emphasis put on the continuing confrontation between t w o conflicting ideological systems—and
the
thus on the notion
that
c o n t e m p o r a r y reality c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d in terms of s u c h a dichoto m y — i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s d e f i n i t i o n of its role in international c o m m u n i s m a n d of c o n t e m p o r a r y itself.
In
spite
of
the
enormous
changes
in
own
communism
international
com-
munism precipitated by the Sino-Soviet dispute, by the decline Soviet
authority,
and
by
the
demoralization
military invasion of o n e c o m m u n i s t
state b y
resulting another,
from the
of the
Soviet
leaders h a v e c o n t i n u e d to u p h o l d t h e o r t h o d o x c o n c e p t of a single m o v e m e n t still l e d b y M o s c o w . T h e y h a v e a c c o r d i n g l y
continued
to press for "unity c o n f e r e n c e s " of as m a n y c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s possible, e v e n t h o u g h the results h a v e often w o r k e d against T h e y have also continued ideology and have
to assert a d o g m a t i c
consequently
as
unity.
interpretation
b e e n u n d e r t h e necessity of
of ex-
c o m m u n i c a t i n g t h o s e w h o differ. * 0 "Only one social theory, one teaching, is capable of expressing the content and direction of world processes in our epoch in depth—this is Marxism-
The Bureaucratization
of Boredom
{
149
T h e result has b e e n not only the oft-repeated c o n d e m n a t i o n
revisionists
or of C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s b u t the increasing
tual inability practice The
or
to
the
assimilate
in doctrine
progressive
evolution
Soviet attitude toward
the
either of
new
revolutionary
communism
rebellion of
in
Western
power.
youth
c a s e in p o i n t . A s s o o n a s it b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e s e y o u n g were not prepared to accept established communist a n d that their i d e o l o g u e s w e r e critical of Soviet the Soviet attitude b e c a m e
vehemently
hostile.
of
intellec-
is
leadership—
bureaucratism— Marcuse
was
es-
pecially attacked for o v e r e m p h a s i z i n g the role of the y o u n g the intellectuals at t h e e x p e n s e of the classical c o n c e p t of a
and revo-
lution b y the w o r k i n g class.* In effect, Soviet theorists refused take
seriously
into
account
the
potentially
revolutionary
q u e n c e s of t h e e d u c a t i o n a l u p s u r g e in the d e v e l o p e d Similarly,
when
the
Castroite
revolution
in
Here,
parties too,
directed, political
objected,
the
preference
proletarian leaders
guide
for
they
was
for
revolutionary
began
specifically Russian suitable
and
to
suggest
conditions, the
further
was
were
world.
Latin
the
supported tried,
model.
America
that
Leninism,
perhaps
evolution
of
by
no
Com-
Moscow.
city-based,
When
to
conse-
m o v e d into direct guerrilla action, the established pro-Soviet munist
a
people
party-
Czechoslovak a
product
longer
the
Czechoslovak
of
most com-
m u n i s m , t h e Soviet reaction w a s to c h a r g e deviation. Thus, in spite of m a n y p r o n o u n c e m e n t s
concerning multiple roads to
socialism,
the Soviet party has r e m a i n e d w e d d e d to the c o n c e p t of
dogmatic
Leninism. Only one philosophy is capable of interpreting all the contradictions of the present stage of historical development. . . . Communists have always regarded Leninism—and continue to regard it—not as a purely Russian but an international Marxist doctrine" (F. Konstantinov, "MarxismLeninism: A Single International Teaching," Pravda, June 14, 1968). The foregoing view permits Soviet ideologues to assert that "the philosophical 'thoughts of Mao Tse-tung' are philistine, often anarcho-idealistic eclecticism which has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist philosophy" (A. Rumyantsev, writing in Kommunist, No. 2, 1969). It should be noted that Rumyantsev and Konstantinov are leading Soviet ideologues. These attacks sometimes took grotesque forms. Thus, a Radio Moscow commentator, Valentin Zakharov, devoted an entire program to the theme that Marcuse and Brzezinski were jointly involved—naturally in behalf of the CIA—in organizing "the Czechoslovak counterrevolution" in 1968 (Radio Moscow, August 19, 1969).
i 6 2 }
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
u n i v e r s a l i s m , w h i c h is u n i v e r s a l o n l y i n t h e s e n s e t h a t it s e e s
the
Soviet e x p e r i e n c e as f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n i v e r s a l in r e l e v a n c e .
Perspective on Tomorrow T h i s rigidity b o t h conditions a n d restricts Soviet t h i n k i n g the future. Studies and widespread
of
the future have
in the West.
become
both
about
fashionable
They have involved systematic
at-
t e m p t s to link t e c h n o l o g i c a l projections w i t h social forecasting, w e l l as w i t h m o r e critical, n o r m a t i v e discussions. T h e
cal ramifications of scientific discoveries, especially as they
pertain
to the h u m a n being, h a v e b e c o m e the object of a particularly tense dialogue. T h e political implications of t e c h n o l o g y h a v e attracted the
attention
of
scholars
and
increasingly
as
philosophi-
even
inalso
of
po-
litical leaders. G i v e n t h e future-oriented thrust of Marxist
thought,
one w o u l d have expected the Soviet Union to be in the
forefront
of these investigations a n d analyses. This has only b e e n
partially
true. Systematic
Soviet efforts to study the future w e r e
spurred
by
high-level decisions taken at the Twenty-third Party Congress. its w a k e , s p e c i a l s t u d y g r o u p s w e r e in a n u m b e r of
established for that
Soviet institutes—for
emy's group for Social and
example,
Technological
the
Soviet
Forecasting.
In
purpose Acad-
In
addi-
tion, m a n y informal g r o u p s w e r e set u p to bring Soviet
scholars
and intellectuals
entirely
together.
A
special
annual
publication
d e v o t e d to the future of science w a s established in 1966, a n d first
numbers
have
included
contributions
by
both
its
Soviet
and
non-Soviet scholars.22 Soviet scholars also established useful
con-
tacts w i t h similar study groups a n d publications in the W e s t , cluding the United
Solid work has been d o n e by area of t e c h n o l o g i c a l - e c o n o m i c the Soviet philosophical journal,
Soviet scholars, primarily in forecasting. F o r e x a m p l e , in
Voprosy Filosofii,
ing a series of articles o n the t h e m e Revolution
and
Its
in-
States.
Social
of " T h e
Consequences."
began
the 1964
publish-
Scientific-Technical
On
the
whole,
these
The Bureaucratization
of Boredom
{
articles h a v e b e e n serious a n d frequently very informative
151 treat-
m e n t s of s u c h subjects as t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of forecasting, t h e ganizational problems
explosion,
of
science
in the context of
the
scientific
the role of cybernetics, comparative analyses of
tific d e v e l o p m e n t
and
projections
for the
United
States
Soviet Union, to say nothing of m o r e specifically economic and technological
or-
scien-
and
the
Soviet-oriented
prognoses.23
In contrast to these efforts, there has b e e n a striking p a u c i t y
of
political, ideological, or p h i l o s o p h i c a l studies f o c u s e d o n t h e interactions with projected
technological-economic
no doubt that Soviet intellectuals
are a w a r e
changes. of
the
There
link b e t w e e n the two,* b u t p u b l i s h e d Soviet discussions h a v e limited primarily to critical evaluations the subject. In their cruder
of W e s t e r n
forms—particularly
tions" h a v e b e e n limited to d e n u n c i a t i o n . !
More
been
literature
when
i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l o r g a n o f t h e p a r t y , Kommunist—these
is
unavoidable
on
appearing "evalua-
serious—though
0 In a statement remarkably free of ideological cant, one Soviet scientist— and novelist—remarked, "The future has borne the brunt of all kinds of emotions: optimism, blind irrational hope, and black despair. It has been threatened by both hysterical seers and precise calculations. Attempts have been made to poison it or simply to annihilate it, to turn it backward, to return it to caves. It has survived. Today we have the opportunity to give it serious and thoughtful study. Today, perhaps as never before in human history, the future depends on the present and demands a new approach. It is fraught with crises we cannot assess today. Crises connected not only with a different conception of freedom, but also a different idea of individuality" (Daniil Granin, "And Yet . . . ," Inostrannaia Literatura [Moscow], No. 1, 1967). In contrast, the five-volume work Socialism and Communism, prepared by the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in a comprehensive effort to sum up the likely shape of Soviet society under communism, refrains from any analysis of the social tensions brought on by the scientific revolution. It presents a uniformly blissful picture of the future, t For examples of particularly primitive writings, see G. Gerasimov, "The Falsifiers of the Future," Kommunist, No. 2, 1968, for criticism of Aron, Fourastie, and others; or Yuri Zhukov's various articles attacking my earlier article, "America in the Technetronic Age." Soviet commentators were particularly incensed by my observation ("America in the Technetronic Age") that "the world is on the eve of a transformation more dramatic in its historic and human consequences than that wrought either by the French or the Bolshevik revolutions. Viewed from a long perspective, these famous revolutions merely scratched the surface of the human condition. The changes
i 6 2 }
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
still p r i m a r i l y n e g a t i v e — a s s e s s m e n t s h a v e a p p e a r e d i n o t h e r journals, particularly in the o r g a n of the Institute o n W o r l d ics. I n b o t h c a s e s , h o w e v e r , possibility
of
either
the
the tendency
evolution
of
has
been
Western
Econom-
to d e n y
polities
into
post-industrial forms n o longer determined b y the capitalist of industrialization
or the
capacity of
these n e w
new phase
forms to
c o m e t h e i n d i v i d u a l crisis of alienation a n d frustration
the
over-
associated
w i t h the capitalist system. T h i s is w h y s o m e P o l i s h c o m m u n i s t s , t h o u g h l o y a l to t h e
com-
m o n ideology, h a v e n o t e d critically that "we h a v e to give a
more
specific a n s w e r to t h e q u e s t i o n as to w h a t really h a p p e n s in
mod-
ern monopolistic capitalism and what influence the technical
revo-
l u t i o n h a s o n it." T h e y h a v e o b s e r v e d t h a t c o m m u n i s t t h e o r y n o c o n c e p t of t h e transition f r o m m o d e r n c a p i t a l i s m to that it h a s n o t f a c e d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e i n c r e a s i n g obsolescence
of
communist
the advanced West,
economies
has
socialism,
technological
as c o m p a r e d
to those
t h a t it h a s still t o c o n f r o n t t h e f a c t t h a t
c i a l i s m — t h o u g h it h a s p r o v e n its m e t t l e i n o v e r c o m i n g
of so-
industrial
b a c k w a r d n e s s — h a s y e t to p r o v e its c a p a c i t y for scientific
innova-
tion, a n d t h a t it h a s n o t g i v e n a n y t h o u g h t t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e conflicts b e t w e e n discussion,
a
generations.24
Rumanian
In a far-ranging
communist,
T h e o r y of t h e Technical-Scientific
appealing
and "For
a
with
the
scientific-technical tions. unified
theoretical revolution
elaboration and
of
its social
the and
more
sustained
essence human
. . . W e c a n n o t as y e t speak of the existence of a
Marxist
Marxist
R e v o l u t i o n , " p u t it e v e n
bluntly: "In r e c e n t y e a r s t h e W e s t has e v i d e n c e d a m o r e concern
of
thoughtful
of
the
conneccoherent,
theory of the scientific-technological revolution."
2f)
I n short, Soviet political t h o u g h t has failed to p r o v i d e a n y
sys-
tematic d e v e l o p m e n t of ideas concerning the future political
and
i d e o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n of t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m itself or, for that
matter,
they precipitated involved alterations in the distribution of power and property within society; they did not affect the essence of individual and social existence. Life—personal and organized—continued on much as before, even though some of its external forms (primarily political) were substantially altered. Shocking though it may sound to their acolytes, by the year 2000 it will be accepted that Robespierre and Lenin were mild reformers."
The Bureaucratization
of Boredom
of the w o r l d revolutionary process u n d e r novel historic
{
153
conditions.
T h i s is n o t o n l y b e c a u s e i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s s e n t h a s b e e n r e s t r i c t e d informal,
"underground"
forms
of
expression
but
cause there has been no open-ended creative discussion
among
no longer shaped
Soviet
Marxists
through
the
primarily
political-ideological
themselves.
Soviet
creative interaction
ideology
of
tion,
a
Ideology
entirely
emanates
monopolized
from
the
offices
by of
career
the
before
being
proval. A n
ideology
process
not
is
likely
submitted whose to
to
the
content
be
party
Central
w h e r e it is p r e p a r e d o n t h e b a s i s o f c o m m i t t e e papers
became
is t h e p r o d u c t of a b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s of
process
for
is d e t e r m i n e d
preoccupied
with
defini-
officials.
Committee,
reports
Politburo
is
theoretical
thought a n d practice—as w a s the case until Stalin s p o w e r supreme—but
to be-
by
and
staff
group a
ap-
political
speculative,
and
t h e r e f o r e p o t e n t i a l l y disruptive, issues. It h a s little to d o w i t h
in-
tellectual creativity a n d a great deal to do with bureaucratic
im-
peratives. Paradoxically,
bureaucratic
sterility in t h o u g h t
prompts
sified emphasis on revolutionary rhetoric a n d symbolism. the once revolutionary doctrine has b e c o m e
inten-
Because
so intertwined
the vested interests of guardians w h o are themselves highly
with sensi-
t i v e t o R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y t o t a k e ological refuge in increased emphasis on revolutionary
ide-
symbolism.
T h i s is a m a n i f e s t a t i o n c o m m o n t o all d o c t r i n e s in t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l decline: as practice increasingly deviates f r o m prescription,
sym-
bolism and rhetoric gain in importance.
how-
The
consequence,
e v e r , is t o c o n g e a l c e r t a i n f o r m u l a s a n d c l a i m s , m a k i n g innovation
more
difficult,
even
when
ideological restraints are increasingly T h e r e s u l t is a c o n d i t i o n o f of
ideological
petrifaction
the
operational
level
evaded.
arrested
rather
on
intellectual
than
ideological erosion,
r e m a i n i n g vital only outside the Soviet U n i o n .
0
development,
Marxist
thought
T h e vision of
to-
* This matches the Victorianism and grayness of much of contemporary Soviet life. Lincoln Steffens exclaimed, on visiting the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, "I have been into the future and it works!" Today more and more visitors to the Soviet Union come back saying, "I have been into the past and it is a bore."
i 6 2 }
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
morrow is reduced to meaningless and increasingly vague declarations, such as the conclusion to the official Soviet prognosis for the remainder of this century: "Armed with Marxist-Leninist thought and filled with historical optimism, the leading revolutionary forces of the world will march into the future." 2 6
3. The Soviet Future
The crucial question today is: When will the Soviet Union break with the Stalinist legacy? Without such a break it will remain difficult for the Soviet leaders to diagnose the problems of their own society accurately and to make the Soviet Union truly relevant to the intellectual and international dilemmas of our time. Such a break need not require the abandonment of socialism or of Marxism, but it would require the transformation of a political system that today both reflects and is buttressed by an obsolescent and bureaucratized ideology of power into one more in keeping with the emerging humanist, universalist mood of our time. It is no exaggeration to say—though some anti-communists may be loath to admit this—that the peace of mankind depends in large measure on the Soviet Union's return to the occidental Marxist tradition from which the more oriental Leninism-Stalinism had diverted it, but not necessarily on the outright abandonment of Marxism. Ideological change in the Soviet Union will inevitably be closely connected with socio-economic change, but it would be a mistake to view the latter as dictating the former. A Marxist framework of analysis is the one least suited to understanding
The Soviet Future
{
155
communist politics, in which the political superstructure actually dominates the economic base. Political change in the Soviet Union will necessarily be influenced by the emergence of a new social elite, more technological in its orientation, but it will be even more affected by the changes in the internal character and outlook of the professional, ruling party bureaucracy, and by the degree to which this elite succeeds in coping with internal Soviet problems.
Internal
Dilemmas
These problems are likely to develop on the levels of both economic-technological efficiency and political-ideological dissent. There can be little doubt that the Soviet economy will continue to grow in the years ahead, but it does appear likely that, barring some unforeseen development in either the United States or the Soviet Union, the absolute gap between the two countries will widen even further.* The growth will therefore probably be insufficient to satisfy the ideological ambitions of the political elite, and it is even less likely to satisfy rising social aspirations. These aspirations are certain to escalate as comparison with the West makes it more and more apparent that major sectors of Soviet society have remained extraordinarily antiquated. Soviet backwardness is particularly evident in agriculture. Agricultural productivity has leapfrogged during the last several decades in most developed countries and lately even in a number of the underdeveloped ones. Not so in the Soviet Union, where pro0 It can be estimated that if the GNP of the United States grows at 3.5 per cent per annum, by 1985 it will be over $1.5 trillion; if the rates of the 1960s continue, it will already be $1.7 trillion by 1980; if the Soviet GNP grows at the higher rate of 5 per cent, by 1985 it will be just under $800 billion; if it grows at the even higher rate of 7 per cent, by 1985 the GNP will be approximately $1.1 trillion. Thus the absolute gap will not narrow and could even widen considerably between 1965 and 1985. In 1961 the Soviet leaders formally adopted a party program which, among other things, promised that by 1970 the Soviet Union will have surpassed the United States in industrial output. Clearly, this has not happened.
i 6 2 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
ductivity steadily declined and has only recently risen somewhat. The Soviet rural population is underemployed, undercompensated, and underproductive. The resolution of the Soviet agricultural problem is one of the more urgent—but also ideologically more sensitive—problems on the Soviet agenda. (The technological underdevelopment of Soviet agriculture is reflected in a laborforce distribution that places the Soviet Union considerably behind the more advanced sectors of the globe.) TABLE 9 .
DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR
AREA Industry Agriculture Services United States 8 39 53 Western Europe 14 45 4I Oceania 23 43 34 Japan 28 33 39 USSR 27 28 45 48 Latin America 20 3* Source: International Labor Review, January-February 1967.
In the industrial sector, more advanced than agriculture, the remarkable achievements of Soviet science in such areas as space and weapons technology have obscured a situation that is also far from satisfactory for a modern, industrialized society. It has been estimated that the Soviet Union (allowing for the differential in actual costs) has in real terms been spending approximately as much for research and development as the United States.27 Moreover, Soviet scientific manpower has been growing at an impressive rate and now matches that of the United States. In addition, Soviet theoretical work in a number of fields, particularly physics, has been of the first order. Yet the over-all socio-economic benefits of the Soviet scientific effort have been relatively meager. Though Soviet leaders were quick to capitalize ideologically on their initial space successes by claiming that they proved the superiority of communism (an assertion quietly allowed to fade after the American landing on the moon), the fact remains that the Soviet Union has not been
The Soviet Future
{
157
able to produce technologically advanced products capable of penetrating economically rewarding world markets in the face of Western competition, nor has it satisfied more than the rudimentary needs of domestic consumption. Even in such a relatively elementary industrial field as automobile production, the Soviet Union has been compelled to rely on foreign help (currently Italian) to produce workable and economically feasible automobiles.28 The rigid separation of secret military research from the rest of the economy, as well as the concentration of Soviet scientific researchers in institutes remote from industry, has meant that research breakthroughs have either never been developed, developed only for military purposes, or developed only after considerable delay.* The Soviet lag is unmistakable in computers, transistors, lasers, pulsars, and plastics, as well as in the equally important areas of management techniques, labor relations, psychology, sociology, economic theory, and systems analysis.f * Soviet Academician V. Trapeznikov estimated that 98 per cent of Soviet researchers work in institutes, whereas 60 per cent of American researchers work directly in the relevant industries. He also estimates that approximately half the Soviet research discoveries are obsolescent by the time of their development (Pravda, January 19, 1967). See also the interview with Academician V. M. Glushkov, in Komsomolskaia Pravda, May 15, 1968, in which he calls for the rapid training of "systems managers," a skill in which he feels that Americans excel and which has no equivalent in the Soviet Union. He also urged the regular retraining of Soviet managers, again citing American precedents. f "Certain sectors, including of course space and some military R & D, and an important part of the iron and steel industry, are technically very advanced; but many industries, particularly in the consumer goods sector, are far less technically developed than in major Western countries. . . . "The impression which emerges from both Soviet and Western studies is that the Soviet Union is less technically advanced than the United States in all but a few priority industries, and that in a number of major industries the Soviet Union is technologically behind the industrialized countries of Western Europe" (Science Policy in the USSR, pp. 9, 476). According to a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Soviet Union, which in 1954 was the first nation to adapt nuclear energy for peaceful uses, had by 1969 been surpassed by the United States and the United Kingdom; by 1975 it will be behind the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Sweden, and Germany, with its megawattage approximately fourteen times less than that of the United States (Power and Research Reactors in Member States).
i 6 2 }
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
To correct this condition, the government initiated in 1968 a series of reforms designed to spur scientific research and development and to improve the quality of management. The Central Committee of the party passed a special resolution in October 1968 ("On Measures to Raise the Efficiency of the Work of Scientific Organizations and to Accelerate the Utilization of Scientific and Technical Achievements in the National Economy"), highly critical of Soviet research and development and initiating a series of reforms, which in essence upgraded the status of researchers working directly in industry to that held by scientists employed in purely scientific institutes, created research laboratories based in industrial enterprises, and offered bonuses and awards for innovation. As Academician Trapeznikov put it, "An important item in the resolution is the establishment of competition in scientifictechnical ideas and proposals." 29 It is far from certain that these reforms will suffice to generate a creative and socially significant burst of innovation and adaptation. Soviet scientists recognize that creativity requires "an atmosphere of free discussion, polemics, and airing of ideas, even if some of them are radically wrong." 30 This factor is in turn related to the ideological and institutional organization of society as a whole, and cannot be corrected merely by a few organizational adjustments. The OECD study, Science Policy in the USSR (1969), which reveals in a detailed, statistically documented manner the extraordinary disproportion between the scale of the Soviet effort and its relatively meager socio-economic consequences, reinforces the view that ideological-political centralizaAs Burks puts it, "The curve of technological development in the West is exponential. Synthetic fibers, plastics, nuclear energy, transistors, digital computers, xerography, lasers, succeed one another in seemingly endless succession. As Western technology becomes more complex, furthermore, the time lag involved in its reproduction by East Europeans becomes greater. Borrowing time runs anywhere from two to fifteen years with the odds at least 50-50 that the product will be, in Western terms, obsolescent when it first appears on the Eastern market. In computers, the time lag for Soviet (not to speak of East European) borrowing varies between two and ten years" (Burks, p. 8). See also data cited on p. 133, supra, especially as it concerns computers.)
The Soviet Future
{
159
tion results at best in a capricious science policy and at worst in a catastrophic one.* There can be no doubt that in the years to come the Soviet Union will accomplish many remarkable scientific feats, especially in the internationally prestigious realm of space investigations and in scientific areas related to defense research. Its military technology will also continue to match America's and in some areas will doubtless surpass it. This will be done by crash programs concentrating economic resources and scientific talent. The Soviet organizational structure is remarkably suited to such programs. But the crucial question is whether Soviet science and industrial management can provide Soviet society with the broad-gauged pattern of scientific innovation necessary both to assure internal progress and to advance the international position of the Soviet Union. The forces opposing far-reaching scientific and economic reforms are formidable. They are primarily the bureaucratic party elite, especially the ideological sectors, and some of the upper echelons of the armed forces, who fear that decentralization would also mean the transfer of some key research institutes to nonmilitary uses. The upper echelons of party officialdom are still largely the products of the Stalinist era, and many among them got their start during the purges. Paradoxically, and contrary to Western speculation, the managerial elite has also been part of the opposition. The present Soviet managerial generation, trained to operate in a highly confined, hierarchical setting, is not predisposed to assume the greater personal hazards that a more decentralized, competitive system would necessarily involve. t Proposals for economic reforms have characteristically come mostly from the theoretical economists. 0 An example of the latter result is the Lysenko affair and its disastrous effects on Soviet biology. An extraordinarily vivid and informative account of the affair is provided by the Soviet scientist Z. A. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko, New York, 1969. Medvedev's book was written in the Soviet Union, but its publication there was not permitted, t Moreover, as Jeremy Azrael has convincingly argued in his Managerial Power in Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), it must be recognized that
i 6 2 }
III: Communism:
The Problem of Relevance
The problem of intellectual freedom prompts considerations that are more directly concerned with politics and ideology. It is impossible to judge the extent of fundamental, unorthodox dissent in the Soviet Union of the late 1960s and early 1970s.* In late 1968 two successive issues of the magazine Problems of Communism were devoted to the underground writings, petitions, protests, and appeals of dissenting Soviet intellectuals. They made for remarkable and profoundly moving reading, as did some separately published documents in which Ukrainian intellectuals protested the suppression of their country. 31 These publications indicated the existence of an active and articulate group of intellectuals, largely concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad, composed in some cases of the offspring of the Soviet political elite but more often of the children of prominent communists who had perished under Stalin. Though a number of these dissenters have been tried both privately and publicly in Moscow and Leningrad, they have not been deterred from "occupational specialization can attain a high level without giving rise to social or political pluralism; that engineers and managers can be governed at least as much by transfunctional ideological and political commitments as by their 'objective' interests as incumbents of economic roles; that these interests can be largely, if not completely, satisfied within the framework of a political system that is neither democratic nor technocratic; and that men who are oriented toward the maximization of political power can successfully maintain a position of dominance over men who are oriented toward the optimization of economic utilities, although their doing so may require important sacrifices" (p. 175). * It is important to differentiate here between instrumental, orthodox dissent and fundamental, unorthodox dissent. The two are sometimes confused by outside observers, with the result that instrumental dissenters are lionized for having run nonexistent risks and the government's tolerance of them is interpreted as the sign of a basic departure from the Leninist-Stalinist tradition. The classic contemporary example is Yevgeny Yevtushenko. His "dissent" has been primarily instrumental in content: it has aimed at making the relationship between the political system and society more compatible, without addressing itself to the question whether in fact the more basic, ideological underpinnings of the system needed rethinking and revision. In contrast, precisely because Alexander Solzhenitsyn's or Pasternak's works have had the effect of questioning the historical antecedents of the political system more searchingly, they have been objects of more assertive official displeasure.
The Soviet Future
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161
protesting, and they did so again, at grave personal risk, following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. For the time being and for some time to come, the intellectual and orthodox dissenters will in all probability remain a relatively small, isolated group. Like their predecessors in the nineteenth century, at the moment they do not appear able to attract broader popular support. The majority of the Soviet Union's urban population—only one generation removed from their rural setting—are characterized by a social orthodoxy based on a rather simplistic internalized ideology and by a sense of satisfaction in their recent social advancement. Moreover, in its social origins and ways of thinking, the party is closer to the masses than the masses are to the intellectuals.* A very special and particularly perplexing kind of dissent is posed by increasing restlessness among the Soviet Union's nonRussian nations. The political significance of this phenomenon has largely been ignored by American scholars of Soviet affairs. Yet about one-half of the two hundred and forty million inhabitants of the Soviet Union are non-Russian, and many of them possess a distinctive sense of their own cultural heritage, their own language, territory, and history. Their intelligentsia, almost entirely Soviet-reared, tends to be increasingly assertive though not necessarily secessionist in attitude. It is beginning to demand a larger share in Soviet decision-making as well as a bigger part of the economic pie, and it is becoming increasingly leery of Russification. To some extent this Russification is deliberately * "For all its modernization, the Soviet Union still contains a very massive 'dark' population aspiring to bourgeois amenities on the one hand, yet immersed in socialist rhetoric on the other. And within this population there is a strong element of 'grudge'—crude, primitive, often all too wellfounded, a kind of legendary force in its own right—which views all privilege as corruption, and which is directed equally against the political and managerial elite of the party and against the intelligentsia. Here, however, the intelligentsia is at a disadvantage, for it still carries the traditional burden of guilt toward the people, and the lines of manipulation are in the hands of the party" (Sidney Monas, "Engineers or Martyrs: Dissent and the Intelligentsia," Problems of Communism, September-October 1968, p. 5).
i 62 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
fostered by Moscow, but it is also the natural result of industrialization and modernization. Official Soviet discussions of this problem, as well as attacks on the dangers of local nationalism, indicate that Soviet leadership is becoming apprehensive; indeed, a number of non-Russian intellectuals have been tried and sentenced in recent years. For the moment, the Soviet government has succeeded in confining nationalist tendencies to a relatively few intellectuals while evidence on the attitude of non-Russian party cadres tends to be ambiguous; however, the very scale of this problem, as well as the fact that nationalism tends to be infectious whether suppressed or tolerated, would suggest that in the years to come the Soviet Union might well be faced with a nationality problem graver in its political consequences than the racial problem in the United States. The rumblings of ideological discontent within the scientific community have probably been more immediately disturbing to the party. The now well-known manifesto by the prominent Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov, which was published in the West in mid-1968,32 had apparently first been circulated among Soviet scientists and then revised by the author in the light of comments. The fact that subsequent Soviet responses to Sakharov took an indirect form, never mentioning him by name, and that he was not denounced by the usual device of a public statement of condemnation signed by his colleagues, seems to indicate that the government thought it preferable to avoid direct confrontation and public discussion. This document is remarkable in that it not only challenges the right of ideological orthodoxy to continue but also attempts to offer an alternative vision of the future. In so doing, it exposes Soviet reality to a scathing critique. Sakharov s principal underlying assumption is well summarized by his assertion that "any preaching of the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is a madness and a crime." He categorically rejects any restraint whatsoever on intellectual freedom and condemns "the ossified dogmatism of a bureaucratic oligarchy and its favorite weapon,
The Soviet Future
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163
ideological censorship/' In rejecting intellectual subordination to the will of "the party's central apparatus and its officials," he also asks, "Who will guarantee that these officials always express the genuine interests of the working class as a whole and the genuine interests of progress rather than their own caste interests?" * His thesis is that our age requires and compels increasing international cooperation—both to avoid a nuclear war and to overcome the dangers to mankind posed by hunger, overpopulation, and pollution—and that this cooperation will eventually come from the increasing convergence of the currently distinctive political and social systems. In this connection, he specifically asserts that, given the productive energies of the American economy, a revolution in the United States—in contrast to a similar upheaval in the Third World—would not be advantageous to the workers. His long-range vision for the remainder of the century involves a four-stage development: In the first stage the communist countries, and notably the Soviet Union, will become more democratic, overcoming the Stalinist legacy of single-party * In criticizing the persisting backwardness of Soviet society, a condition which the officially idyllic view has ignored, Sakharov reveals the extraordinary fact that some 45 per cent of the population, or approximately 110 million Soviet citizens, live in underprivileged conditions. He compares this to the United States where "about 25 per cent of the population is on the verge of poverty. On the other hand, the 5 per cent of the Soviet population that belongs to the managerial group is as privileged as its counterpart in the United States," implying a condition of considerable social inequality in the Soviet Union. Sakharov's observation is important because the attainment of social equality has long been a major Soviet claim. In fact, Soviet statistics and, more recently, sociological studies confirm the fact that in higher education the children of white-collar officials have considerably greater opportunities than do those of workers or of collective farmers. For example, in the late 1950s, 75 per cent of Moscow University students were children of officials; 20 per cent and 5 per cent were, respectively, the children of workers and of collective farmers. During this period the population distribution was approximately 20 per cent, 48 per cent, and 31 per cent, respectively (see the collective volume Kulturnaia Revoliutsia, Moscow, 1967, p. 151). Considerable disproportion also exists in levels of remuneration, with the Soviet minimum wage fixed as of 1968 at approximately $65 per month.
i 6 2 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
dictatorship; the second stage will see the transformation of the United States and other "capitalist" countries by reformers who will effect internal changes and adopt a policy of peaceful coexistence; the third stage will involve a massive Soviet-American effort to cope with the problems of the Third World and to promote disarmament; the fourth stage will see the remaining global problems attacked on the basis of broad international cooperation. Sakharov's views, even if somewhat Utopian, are noteworthy because they reveal how the world view of some in the new Soviet intellectual-scientific elite contrasts with the official perspective. Their importance, however, should not be exaggerated. His argument is simply inaccessible not only to the overwhelming majority of literate Soviet people but also to the majority of Soviet intellectuals. It may be assumed that where there are large concentrations of intellectuals (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Akademgorodok, Obninsk), unorthodox viewpoints circulate somewhat more widely, but even there much depends on the degree to which at any particular moment the government is prepared to apply administrative pressure in order to enforce at least formal orthodoxy. Given the party's monopoly of communications, the extensive efforts to inculcate the official ideology, and the growing emphasis on nationalism, the government's view of the world and of Soviet society is still the basic source of information and interpretation for most Soviet citizens.
Alternative
Paths
It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that possible alternative paths of Soviet political development should be evaluated. For analytical purposes, these have to be reduced to a manageable number and, accordingly, the discussion that follows will concentrate on five rather broadly conceived variants, with attention focused on the role of ideology and the party. The five developmental variants can be capsuled as (1) oligarchic petrifaction, (2) pluralist evolution, (3) technological adaptation, militant fundamentalism, and (5) political disintegration.
(4)
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165
Oligarchic petrifaction would involve the maintenance of the dominant role of the party and the retention of the essentially dogmatic character of the ideology. In effect, more of the same. Neither the party nor the ideology would be in a particularly revolutionary relationship to society; instead, the main thrust of the relationship would be for the party to retain political control over society without attempting to impose major innovations. Strong emphasis would be placed on ideological indoctrination and the confinement of ideological deviations. Political leadership could remain collective, for the absence of deliberately imposed change would not require major choices. The domestic result would be rule by an ossified bureaucracy that would pursue a conservative policy masked by revolutionary slogans. Pluralist evolution would involve the transformation of the party into a less monolithic body, somewhat like the Yugoslav party, and the ideological erosion of the dogmatic LeninistStalinist tradition. The party would become more willing to tolerate within its own ranks an open ideological dialogue, even ferment, and it would cease to view its own doctrinal pronouncements as infallible. Its role would be more that of a moralideological stimulant than that of a ruler; the state as well as society itself would become the more important source of innovation and change. Because so much of the party's history has been contrary to the above pattern, in addition to sustained social pressure from key economic and intellectual groups, either a basic split in party leadership, or, paradoxically, a strong leader (like Tito) would be necessary to condition party officialdom into acceptance of such political and ideological pluralism. Technological adaptation would involve the transformation of the bureaucratic-dogmatic party into a party of technocrats. Primary emphasis would be on scientific expertise, efficiency, and discipline. As has already happened in Ulbricht's East Germany, the party would be composed of scientific experts, trained in the latest techniques, capable of relying on cybernetics and computers for social control, and looking to scientific innovation for the preservation of Soviet security and industrial growth. Na-
i 6 2 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
tionalism would replace ideological dogmas as the basic integrative principle linking society and the state. The younger, more technologically oriented leaders of the military establishment would, in all probability, favor this pattern. Political leadership, as in the first variant, could remain collective, though it would probably involve a wider coalition of party-state-military-economic leaders. Militant fundamentalism would involve a revivalist effort to rekindle ideological fervor, which would in turn require a more revolutionary relationship between the political system and society. The notion of progression toward communism would have to be given new programmatic content, and hence politically induced social changes would be necessary. In all probability, this development would necessitate the application of force to overcome both actual resistance and sheer social inertia. Even if it fell short of Stalinist methods, the effort to shake up the Soviet system's rigidly bureaucratized structure would require highly centralized leadership, ideological militancy, perhaps a more hostile attitude toward the outside world, and something along the lines of Mao Tse-tung's "Cultural Revolution." Political disintegration would involve internal paralysis in the ruling elite, the rising self-assertiveness of various key groups within it, splits in the armed forces, restiveness among the young people and the intellectuals, and open disaffection among the nonRussian nationalities. In the wake of the intensifying contradiction between the political system and society, the crisis that could arise would be made more acute by an inadequate economic growth incapable of satisfying popular demands. The petrified ideology— no longer taken seriously by the elite—would be incapable of providing the system with a coherent set of values for concerted action. Looking approximately a decade ahead and using as a guide the present distribution of power in Soviet society, it would appear from the nature of the more immediate political-economic
The Soviet Future
{ 167
problems facing Soviet leadership and from the general pattern of contemporary Soviet social development that the Soviet leadership will seek to strike a balance between the first and the third variants. The combination comes closest to satisfying elite interests, the imperatives of social orthodoxy, and the needs of the Soviet Union as a global rival of the United States. In the short run, development toward a pluralist, ideologically more tolerant system does not seem likely. The years 1964-1969 have even seen movement in the opposite direction. The political system is not in the near future likely to elevate to leadership a man with the will and the power to democratize Soviet society, and that society lacks the cohesion and the group pressures necessary to effect democratization from below. As the experience of Czechoslovakia has shown, democratization from below must be an organic process that links the intellectuals, the workers, and the students with some segments of the leadership in a deliberate effort to reform the political structure as well as the economic structure. Moreover, such a process must either draw on a democratic tradition (as was the case in Czechoslovakia) or create one by accepting the priority of legal norms over political expediency. For Soviet communism this would be tantamount to a new concept of politics.* Furthermore, the Soviet problem with nonRussian nationalities inhibits democratization: the Great Russian majority would inevitably fear that democratization might stimulate the desire of the non-Russian peoples first for more autonomy and then for independence. Given the thrust of Soviet social development and the interests of the present ruling elite, it is unlikely that an effective democratizing coalition could emerge during the 1970s. 0 As one Czech scholar observed in commenting on the Czech experience with Stalinism, "One of the possible methods of preventing the recurrence of political trials in any form is a change in the concept of politics, with which is connected the birth of a new political system. I have in mind such a concept of politics as would not contain the elements of, or an assured basis for, displays of illegality of the kind that happened most frequently in the period of the political trials" (K. Kaplan, "Thoughts about the Political Trials," Nova Mysl, No. 8, 1968).
i 6 2 }
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
Militant fundamentalism under a one-man dictatorship,
though
perhaps s o m e w h a t m o r e probable in the short run t h a n a pluralist evolution, also w o u l d h a v e to o v e r c o m e e n o r m o u s inertia and collective stake of the party oligarchs in p r e v e n t i n g the
reappear-
a n c e of o n e - m a n rule. Pressures t o w a r d s u c h a rule c o u l d in the f a c e of d o m e s t i c u p h e a v a l
or a major f o r e i g n
a talented a n d effective political leader w o u l d h a v e
the
develop
threat, to b e
but
avail-
able. T h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t b u r e a u c r a c y is c o n s t i t u t e d i n s u c h a as to w e e d
out and
revolutionary party in w h i c h individual courage a n d ness m a k e for
the fundamentalist
alternative
m i s s e d o u t o f h a n d , e s p e c i a l l y if it b e c o m e s to political disintegration as a w h o l e .
leadership's
resulting
Protracted
inability
to
from
should not be the only
the
petrifaction
internal decay
as
to
current
come
grips
with
dis-
alternative
a result
of
the
of
the
problems,
continued failure to catch u p with the United States in the
scien-
tific c o m p e t i t i o n , a n d i n t e r n a l t h r e a t s t o n a t i o n a l u n i t y c o u l d i n context
of
increasing
international from
a
a
resourceful-
advancement.
Nonetheless,
system
way
snuff o u t i n d i v i d u a l talent; it is n o l o n g e r
ideological
security
section
of
threat
the
to
elite.
indifference spark
Such
a
combine
with
fundamentalist
spasms
are
a an
spasm
characteristic
of
political faiths in their decline. The
alternatives of f u n d a m e n t a l i s m
or of
disintegration
b e precipitated b y a Sino-Soviet war. Such a war w o u l d i m p o s e major strains o n the Soviet system.
Even
could
inevitably
if w o n
rapidly
b y t h e S o v i e t s i d e , it w o u l d e n t a i l m a j o r e c o n o m i c c o s t s a n d even involve lengthy postwar counter-guerrilla
activities.
tracted w a r w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e itself a direct d e f e a t for t h e r e g i m e , a n d it is a l m o s t c e r t a i n that t h e r e g i m e w o u l d b e from power by
dissatisfied e l e m e n t s in the ruling circles.
e v e r its o u t c o m e , trigger
highly
Union,
creating
militant
of
this m a g n i t u d e
and
pressures
pulling the regime Given
a war
on
volatile behalf
would
feelings of
be
within
one-man
rule
could
A
pro-
Soviet toppled What-
certain
to
the
Soviet
or
simply
apart.
the conditions
prevailing
in the
early
1970s,
oligarchic
The Soviet Future petrifaction
would
be
the
probable
consequence
of
rule b y the present majority of the a g i n g u p p e r party ( t h e average a g e of Central C o m m i t t e e
{
169
continued
bureaucracy
members was over
sixty
in 1969, m a k i n g t h e m p r o b a b l y the oldest political leaders in world,
except
for those
of
the
Vatican
and
Mao
and
his
the
asso-
ciates ), of t h e o l d - t i m e a r m y m a r s h a l s ( s o m e of w h o m h a v e
more
party
party
seniority
than
the
top
political
rulers),
and
of
the
ideologues. This coalition represents not only the political but t h e t o p s o c i a l elite of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t its g i v e s it p r e r o g a t i v e s e q u i v a l e n t to t h o s e a s s o c i a t e d u n d e r ism
with
ruling
wealth:
class,
it
luxury,
tends
to
convenience, become
c h a n g e s that t h r e a t e n its position. important
consideration—the
and
prestige.
conservative
and
Moreover—and
Soviet
middle
also
power capital-
Like
any
resistant
this is a
class
is
to
very
highly
bu-
reaucratized a n d consists a l m o s t entirely of state officials w h o rather conservative in their political a n d social mores a n d are
are only
o n e generation r e m o v e d f r o m their proletarian or p e a s a n t
origins.
This class d o e s not w a n t
it
major political
change,
though
desire m o r e m a t e r i a l g o o d s . It p r o v i d e s t h e u n d e r p i n n i n g conservatism of the The elite
upper
has,
stratum
however,
of
Soviet
too
ambitious
social
and
this stratum has g a i n e d
of
professional
broad,
too
and
well
the
and that
Though concerned with domestic
scientific increasing
number
areas
requiring
and
In
access to the
expertise.
political
international
innovation.
of Sciences has n o t e d
of scientists called
scientific
a pattern
recent
bargaining, of
the
that "in r e c e n t t i m e s ,
the
on to participate
The
organ
in the work
governmental apparatus, e v e n at the highest levels, has
of
influence,
added
in to
the the
economic
sphere."
increasingly
33
Their
widespread
the
increased.
T h e y should b e called o n m o r e often to organize production to direct planning
imyears
decision-makers
a n d thus participates informally in a process of g r o u p especially in policy Soviet A c a d e m y
the
educated,
to b e satisfied w i t h
status quo.
it is a l s o a w a r e for
the
become
merely preserves the stability,
for
leadership.
too nationalistically
peratives
does
and
innovative
political
ap-
i 6
2
}
III: Communism:
The Problem of Relevance
preciation of the i m p o r t a n c e
of scientific innovation,
feelings of rivalry w i t h the U n i t e d and
security
aspirations
ented military leaders, sion of the
first
adaptation)
of
the
States, a n d
younger,
is a l r e a d y
to
to the
more
scientifically
stimulating pressures
(oligarchic petrifaction)
and third
variants, in an attempt to construct
national
nationalist ori-
for a
fu-
(technological
a novel kind
of
"technetronic communism." * T h e e x a m p l e of Ulbricht's E a s t G e r m a n y m a y b e c o m e larly relevant. revolution's
Though
in R u m a n i a
significance
have
that this revolution requires
led
explorations some
a new
of
the
communists
particuscientific
to
suggest
theoretical framework
based
o n the principle of universality,34 Ulbricht has a t t e m p t e d to bine
scientific innovation
Stalinist ideological highly centralized,
with
tradition.
adherence
Political
leadership
has
remained sup-
emphasized
that
"the
been
com-
Leninist-
other
has
dissent has
the
firmly
leader,
ideological
to
pressed. At the s a m e time, Ulbricht, perhaps more than any communist
and
strict
development
t h e socialist s y s t e m , a b o v e all t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e system as a whole, leadership.
is t o a g r o w i n g
. . . W e
orient
extent
ourselves
on
a matter
the
control of c o m p l e x p r o c e s s e s a n d s y s t e m s b y
made
an
the second intense
order to c o m b i n e
half of the
effort to
scientific
conscious
scientific
the people
initiative
economic with
an
and
for
35
1960s, E a s t G e r m a n
rationalize
lower-level
economic
of
the people. W e m a k e u s e of cybernetics in this sense." During
of
leadership
management
in
effective
system
of controls a n d coordination. T h e S e v e n t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s
(April
9 This process would provide the political expression for the impressive growth in both the over-all number of specialists engaged in scientific activity and services (including those with specialized secondary education) and in the number of those members of the political elite who have had extensive backgrounds in technical and scientific fields. Between the years 1950 and 1966 the former grew from 714,000 to 2,741,000 (Science Policy in the USSR, p. 679); George Fischer has gathered evidence showing that the latter are becoming the predominant group among the younger members of the Central Committee of the CPSU ( T h e Soviet System and Modern Society, New York, 1968, especially pp. 125-34). Technical competence is as widespread in the Soviet political elite as legal background is in its American counterpart.
The Soviet Future
{
171
1 9 6 7 ) set itself t h e task of d e v e l o p i n g a g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of relations system East
between as
a
whole;
Germany
electronic
the
various
more
utilized
data
than
Committee
proudly
reported—and
any
Two
Plenum, he
with
other
cybernetics,
processing.
Central
part-systems
the
communist
operational
years
later,
Politburo
repeatedly
at
member
used
this
country,
research, the
the
economic
and
April Kurt
1969 Hager
formula—that
East G e r m a n y w a s not only ideologically sound but "correctly programmed." In
line
with
this
"correct
phasized the importance
of
programming," expertise
the
among
has
em-
its m e m b e r s , 3 6
party
and
the e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m h a s b e e n r e f o r m e d in order to link closely
with
transformed into the most
industry.*
By
itself
one
from
economically
oriented communist tion
of
the
Prussian
Leninist-Stalinist
of and
the
discipline, ideology
1960s, most
fifty-year
German
has
East
thus
advanced lapse, the
scientific again
made
science
Germany
war-ravaged
ideologically
state. After a
m u n i s m a m o d e l f o r its e a s t e r n
0
late
had
societies sciencecombina-
efficiency, German
and com-
neighbors.
Under these reforms universities and polytechnical schools have been transformed into new "science combines" directly linked with industrial enterprises. For example, the Technical University of Dresden works jointly with the nearby Radeberg computer factory, and other institutions of learning have been similarly linked with the basic industrial efforts of their cities or regions. In this reform a major effort was made to obtain student participation, and students are said to have made a number of constructive proposals along the above lines. At the same time, Marxist-Leninist indoctrination has continued to be assigned high priority in the educational process, but stress has been placed on the necessity to combine it with scientific social forecasting: "It is necessary to impart to the leadership personnel of the socialist state a complex knowledge which enables them to carry out the party resolutions with a high degree of quality; this must be done on the basis of the social longrange forecast, in teamwork with the Socialist Economic Management Institute, the Social Sciences Institute, the 'Karl Marx' Party College, and other institutions" (a speech by Erich Honecker, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party, April 29, 1969). Honecker's speech was remarkable for its emphasis on the technetronic features of a modern society and for its relative neglect of the ideological question.
i 62 }
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
In the Soviet
Union,
however,
other considerations
will in
all
likelihood i m p e d e the p a c e of a similar "technologization" of Soviet
political
system.
For
one
thing,
the
Soviet
Union
is
m u c h b i g g e r c o u n t r y , is m o r e difficult t o i n t e g r a t e , a n d h a s m o r e areas of s o c i o - e c o n o m i c b a c k w a r d n e s s dition,
over
the
last
fifty
years
the
ruling
to overcome. party
has
style, a n d t h o u g h
acquisition
its officials, it is l i k e l y
technical
skills b y
attached to ideology.
37
since that w o u l d
many In
ad-
it f a v o r s to
tinue to resist t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a n essentially technical t i o n a m o n g its m e m b e r s ,
dilute the
a
developed
its o w n t r a d i t i o n s a n d i d e o l o g i c a l of
the
the con-
orienta-
importance
Moreover, perhaps intensified in the
years
to c o m e b y the Sino-Soviet dispute, the role of the security
factor
in policymaking a n d of the military in the political process
might
tend to increase. urgent
and
Indeed,
Soviet
increasingly
if t h e s e c u r i t y
leadership
difficult to d e n y
first
rigidity
and
the third
with
process.
variants
technological
transformation during the
collective,
of
more
become
participation
in
In that case, the fusion
of
(striving
expertise)
to
combine
would
also
ideological involve
1970s of t h e p r e s e n t c o m m u n i s t
dictatorship into a c o m m u n i s t praetorian
The Problem
becomes it w i l l
the military direct
the political decision-making the
remains
problem
oligarchy.*
Vitality
T h e q u e s t i o n t h e n is: W i l l s u c h a p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t tate the resolution
of
the
economic
and
political
to
be
even
bine
more
it w o u l d
ideological
speculative appear
than
doubtful
orthodoxy
with
the
prognosis
whether
an
technological
facili-
dilemmas
f r o n t i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ? T h e a n s w e r t o this q u e s t i o n is
whole,
the party
itself.
attempt
con-
bound On
to
innovation,
the comper-
* This view is held also by some Yugoslav observers. Thus, V. Stanovcic, writing in the Yugoslav Central Committee weekly Komunist (September 26, 1968), has argued that the present Soviet system has proven itself unable to liberalize gradually and that as a consequence it will very likely "logically develop into a Bonapartist form of rule, with managerial-militarist groups assuming the role of nne prescribers' and 'organizers' or society."
The Soviet Future haps
buttressed
by
increasing
reliance
on
{
nationalism
and
military, will create a setting propitious to intellectual a n d tific creativity. S u c h a n a t t e m p t is m o r e l i k e l y t o p r o d u c e contradictions, pulling
in
with
the
opposite
ideologues
directions.
This
and
the
will
be
internal
especially
ingly r e c o g n i z e d as n e c e s s a r y for e c o n o m i c reasons, b u t
the
scien-
technocrats
often
true
concerns the complex issue of e c o n o m i c decentralization,
( s u c h as h a v e b e e n characteristic of
increas-
tempo-
Brezhnev)
or drastic policy shifts f r o m o n e emphasis to the other. T h e sequent tension will w i d e n the gap b e t w e e n and
society;
the
political
internal dilemmas, ated for a m o r e relevance
of
and
system
increasing
fundamental
the
will
and
of
con-
system
unresponsive
social pressure
reassessment
ideological
the political
appear
as
neverthe-
less f e a r e d for political reasons. T h e result will b e either rary c o m p r o m i s e s
173
will b e
the
institutional
to
gener-
contemporary
character
of
the
Soviet state. Accordingly, the that
spread
to
Spain,
it m a y the
be
Soviet
Yugoslavia,
expected Union
Mexico,
that
of
the
1970s
convulsions
and
Poland
will
witness
similar
began
to
to
in t h e late 1960s. T h e S o v i e t s t u d e n t p o p u l a t i o n will h a v e during tween
the
1960s
1958 and
(it
increased
1965),
and
by
seventy-seven
it is u n l i k e l y
that the
per
doubled cent
Soviet
will altogether avoid student unrest. T h e late 1970s will
the party
ideologues
will
not
find
it e a s y
to
be-
Union
probably
see the sexual revolution spread to the more urban Soviet and
those
undergo
centers,
accommodate
w i t h i n the prevailing official mores. T h e s e factors c o u l d create broader
social
basis
for
the
currently
isolated
ideological
a
dis-
senters and, together w i t h the likely g r o w t h in the
self-assertive-
ness
more
of
the
social and ting,
a
non-Russian
political
red
flag
tensions.
flag
Given
spontaneously
their university will h a v e the same
intelligentsia,
fluttering
much
make
the
flown
authoritarian
by
graver
Moscow
political
o v e r C o l u m b i a or the
B u t it w i l l n o t b e u n t i l t h e e a r l y
for
visible
Soviet
set-
students
over
symbolism
than
Sorbonne.
1980s that the
first
fully
Stalin political leadership will enter the political arena. A n
postaspir-
i 6
2
}
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
ing forty-five-year-old leader in 1980 will h a v e b e e n o n l y
eighteen
at t h e t i m e of Stalin's d e a t h a n d t w e n t y - o n e w h e n
de-Stalinization
actually began
generation
probably ten
or
in the
find
its
even
Soviet
access
twenty
Semichastnys,
Union.
to
power
years
Tolstikovs
of
mittee.
more
Given
the
the have
probably
more
European
states,
(the
today),
immediately
it w i l l
blocked
older
from the echelons
which
Though
volatile
matured, flexible
will
press the
its
character
it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e
political
that of
domestic
given
by
Polyanskis,
it
below
his
and
for
even
resisted
introduction
of
deliberate ideas,
then by
political
decision
to let e a c h
to
open
Soviet
Eastern
that
the
emerging
political
the level of
the party's ideological
sion-making
and
thus
to share
a
at s o m e
he
control,
system
oligarchy. point
Union
what
power
pluralist
political
Soviet
citizen read
development
power.
into
will
the
in
given
adjoining
entrenched
pluralism
setting
education,
the
evolution
the
Com-
of
requires intense concentration of political Nevertheless,
influence
Central
elite will b e less c o m m i t t e d to the notion that social
likely to b e
leaders
Shelepins,
global
higher
will
to
require
a
competitive
wants,
to
reduce
to decentralize
with
is
The
society:
in
deci-
effect,
a
major t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e s y s t e m as a w h o l e . U n i n t e n d e d
conse-
quences
of
suffice
to bring
about
pre-1968
Czechoslovakia,
economic-technological
adjustments
significant political at
some
change. point
As
the
will in
not
Yugoslavia
political
elite
or
must
decide to embark o n deliberate political reforms. Thus, and more
barring an upheaval resulting
dramatically likely,
dissent—the
bringing
a revivalist more
about
dictator
probable
from internal
either
capable
pattern
social of
for the
shift t o w a r d the c o m b i n a t i o n of the s e c o n d and third (technological adaptation) political
pluralism
petence,
within
representing
a
the
and
intense
context
coalition
of
of the
still
upper
controlling 1980s
is a
(pluralist
on
internal marginal
economic-
technological
authoritarian echelons
of
or,
evolution)
variants: limited
emphasis a
paralysis—
democracy
com-
government the
principal
interest groups. This c o u l d b e the b e g i n n i n g of t h e return to
the
The Soviet Future
{
175
Western Marxist tradition, but only a slow and cautious beginning at best.* It w o u l d therefore b e rash to e x p e c t in the near f u t u r e a damental revision of the Soviet attitude toward the world. will
be
change,
rivalry w i t h the ideology
and
but
it w i l l
United
be
slow.
Moreover,
States, reflecting the
reinforced
by
the
likely to continue to b e dominant, Soviet recognition that increased
element
vestigial
middle-class-urban
fun-
There of
legacy
of
nationalism,
is
e v e n if t e m p e r e d b y
United States-Soviet
growing collabora-
t i o n is d i c t a t e d b y t h e b a s i c i m p e r a t i v e s o f h u m a n
survival.
Sino-Soviet
contradictory
conflict
may
also
have
a
double
and
effect: while intensifying the Soviet desire for a secure a n d ful western
flank,
The
peace-
it is l i k e l y t o h e i g h t e n S o v i e t s e c u r i t y
concerns,
a n d thus strengthen the d o m e s t i c position of the m o r e
conserva-
tive and nationalist This
elements.
combination
tionalism
makes
of
eroding
it u n l i k e l y
that
ideology the
Soviet
and
intensifying
Union
will
c o m e involved either in militantly a d v a n c i n g the cause revolution
or in actively
promoting
a policy
of
soon of
global
world
coopera-
tion. A m o r e likely result is a n a m b i g u o u s p a t t e r n d e t e r m i n e d short-range spective.
In
expediency that
rather
context,
than by
precisely
a broad,
because
long-range
the
Soviet
nabe-
by per-
Union
* It might be relevant at this juncture to put to rest the popular analogy frequently made between the evolution of the French Revolution into a bourgeois democracy and the allegedly similar political consequences of the embourgeoisement of Soviet society. The analogy overlooks several salient differences between these revolutions. The French Revolution took place in a setting shaped by a rationalist, idealistic intellectual tradition and ineffective absolutism. The Russian Revolution was preceded by increasing intellectual fanaticism and utopianism, reacting to the absolutist and autocratic political setting. The French Revolution was effected by an idealistic and highly disorganized professional middle class; the Bolshevik Revolution by a highly professional, ideological, and disciplined party. The French revolutionaries did not have the time during their relatively short stay in power to reorganize French society fundamentally; the Bolsheviks, particularly under Stalin, ripped apart and rewove the entire social fabric, while effecting a far-reaching industrial and urban revolution. The French middle class was an innovative and intellectually restless class; the new Soviet middle class is Victorian, conservative, and orthodox. Last but not least, the legatee of the French Revolution, Napoleon, was defeated; Stalin was victorious.
i 6
2
}
III: Communism: The Problem of
Relevance
does not appear likely to experience in the near future a phase
of
open
attractiveness
as
communism, ing
the
intellectual
one
the
socio-economic
capable
imagination
creativity
of
and
model
of intellectually
mankind,
will
domestic
experimentation, for
and
morally
probably
its
contemporary captivat-
continue
to
de-
cline.
4. Sectarian Communism
In our age a universal ideological m o v e m e n t pluralist one.
And
if it is t o b e
pluralist—that
can only be
is, r e s p o n s i v e
rapidly changing, differentiated global conditions and the ing
volatile
intellectual
mood—its
ideological
content
result-
must
highly generalized, m o r e ethical than practical, a n d m o r e
An
be
human-
istic than nationalistic. I n effect, an e c u m e n i c a l c o m m u n i s m h a v e to b e a deliberately pluralist c o m m u n i s m .
a to
would
international
pluralist c o m m u n i s m w o u l d in turn inevitably generate
pressures
for internally pluralist c o m m u n i s t parties. Pluralist c o m m u n i s m Communist
d o e s not exist a n d
universalism
matism. That dogmatism as l o n g as c o m m u n i s m conditions political power.
in the
in
these
stages
disparate
dogmatism
began
to
new
to
the
own
national
pow
of
intellectuals
states,
rulers
see
is u n l i k e l y t o
victim
to
had
merge
r interests.
world
of
to define
power
the
through
Dogmatism,
and
in
natural the
no
its
seeking different
propensity
prism
longer
only global
found
intellectuals
seized
with
dog-
with universalism
industrialization groups
appear.
communist
an abstract attempt
of
the
fallen
was compatible
was
early
expression Once
has
of
their
operating
Sectarian Communism
{
177
o n the level of universal abstraction b u t o n that of national tice,
facilitated
anism—with
the
each
transformation sect
truly universal o n e
insisting
and
of
communism
that
its
internal
establishing
into
perspective
prac-
sectariwas
the
party discipline
on
that basis. The
Soviet
Union
into sectarian among more of
all
led
communist
established
conflicting
patched-up
transforming but
the
parties
communist
claims,
temporary
communism mankind.38
in
and
forms Far
power
and
out
communism
developed
of
even
and
power.
a mosaic
latent
almost
helping
naturally
among As
excommunications, active
from
universal
process
parties
mutual
compromises,
nations
of
in
communism,
a
result
occasional
conflicts,
as varied
to e n d
the
the
con-
as
the
intellectual
f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f t h e g l o b e , s e c t a r i a n c o m m u n i s m i n t e n s i f i e s it.
Phases Four broad phases can be munism first
as an international
communist
state
in the
responding roughly to the to
the
1930s,
which
Soviet society—can tially W e s t e r n
discerned in the evolution movement Soviet
be
Union.
the
ideological
first
responding
com-
setting
setting.
and
This
redefined
involved
ported and readapted Domestication
An
meet
the
political
and
needs
dogmatizing
matization
that
formulations
as defined
cratic
setting
largely into
Rusthat
the
im-
ideology.
considerations was
of
of
first
by
derived
Lenin
and
from even
specific more
b y Stalin, increasingly p e r m e a t e d t h e doctrine; as a result, parochial
of
essen-
to the specific conditions
domesticating
meant
Russian conditions,
to
cor-
particularly
W e s t e r n capitalist industrialization, w a s transplanted to the sian
the
phase,
restructuring
transplantation.
called that of
doctrine,
The
1920s a n d the 1930s—but
witnessed
of
since the creation of
were the
which
dogmatically
consequence Marxism
was
of
so
purely
universalized.
Dog-
the
auto-
primitive,
transplanted,39
arbitrary p e r s o n a l traits of t h e t o p i d e o l o g u e s ,
a n d of the
of
the
power
2
i 6
}
needs
III: Communism:
of
what
the
Marx
new
saw
communist
as
proletarian base
The Problem of
the
that
elite
that
foundation
capitalist
for
Relevance
found
itself
socialist
development
without
rule—the
had
created
solid in
the
West. The
second
phase,
the
universalization
active
of
specific, c o r r e s p o n d e d approximately to the 1930s a n d the
1940s. It s a w
the
Soviet
particularly
the Stalinization of foreign c o m m u n i s t
parties,
the forcible export of the Soviet version of c o m m u n i s m
to
ern E u r o p e , a n d t h e s p o n t a n e o u s e x p a n s i o n of the m o r e Leninist
adaptation
Centralized Soviet
by
of
Marxism
Moscow,
experience
to China,
international
without
taking
a
common
mold
became
more
Indeed,
intense
leadership
for
groups
adjustments;
in
came time
under the
imitated
insistence because
phase, the
particularization
the
1950s.
Yugoslav
and
and national
growing
national
It saw,
first
leadership
power
through
Polish
leadership,
of
(in
its o w n the
demands. of
complete
measure
domestic
leaders
of
pres-
themselves interests
such
third
communism
during
self-assertion
of
because
efforts), the partial beginnings
com-
result w a s the
international
all, t h e
large
The
a
conditions.
b e g a n to see a divergence b e t w e e n their o w n needs and and Soviet prescriptions
the
conditions
Soviet
precisely
This state of affairs c o u l d n o t l o n g endure,
sures
Vietnam.
consideration
major gap existed b e t w e e n ideology and local
munist
and
communism
into
prevailing within the different nations. on
Korea,
East-
oriental
it h a d
come
self-assertion self-assertion
the to
of
the
by
the
R u m a n i a n s , a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t of all, t h e i n c r e a s i n g
inclination
of
version
of
relevance
of
the
Chinese
communism
leadership
and
both
to generalize
to
practice
its
the significance
its e x p e r i e n c e f o r o t h e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o m m u n i s t The
1960s accordingly witnessed a n e w
international c o m m u n i s m . tween process
the by
process which
by
and
parties.
stage in the history
It w a s d o m i n a t e d b y o p e n t e n s i o n
which
specific
own
doctrine
points
of
was
view
relativized were
made
For the sake of unity, Soviet leadership s e e m e d at tolerate increasing diversity; in the early
first
and
of bethe
absolute. willing
1 9 6 0 s it f o r m a l l y
to
aban-
Sectarian Communism
{
179
d o n e d b o t h its c l a i m t o l e a d e r s h i p a n d its i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e for a c o m m o n
general
however,
place
took
perhaps
generated
line.40
in
by
the the
A
shift in
second fear
the
half
that
of
opposite the
decade;
relativization
stage in the erosion of the ideology,
and
need
direction, it
was
was
the
first
that the resulting
ecu-
m e n i c a l unity w o u l d b e d e v o i d of a n y political substance.
Czech-
oslovak political d e v e l o p m e n t s in 1968 a n d the persistent
Chinese
challenge
were
in all p r o b a b i l i t y
the
catalysts
that
precipitated
the Soviet leaders' turn t o w a r d sectarianism: the reassertion of absolute universality of certain c o m m o n
laws,
largely as
the
defined
by the Soviet leaders themselves. T h e inescapable price that to b e
paid
their o w n
was
that
those
divergent
communist
position
would
parties
do
that
so—and
could
would
have
d o so in t h e context of m u t u a l ideological denunciations. larism,
instead
translated
of
during
being the
a
stage
1960s
into
toward the
ecumenism,
fourth
had
assert to
Particuwas
and
current
is t h u s
devoid
thus phase,
sectarianism. Communist substantive appeals Soviet
unity
as of
meaning.*
for
popular
Union
offers
the
early
Western support
a
by
relevant
1970s
communist
parties
increasingly model.
denying
Indeed,
the
the
voters
would
be
only to the
that
a
degree
French
different
from
or
an
the
that they Italian
Soviet
successfully
communist
model.
that
the and
parties
convince
government
Despite
persisting
Soviet pressures, the ruling Eastern E u r o p e a n communist continue to m a k e
any their
Italian
French c o m m u n i s t leaders have c o m e to realize that their will succeed
of
fortify
parties
quiet adjustments to domestic necessities,
and
in so doing they increasingly diverge from the Soviet model.
The
Chinese
Communist
Party
not
only
practices
its o w n
brand
of
* Failure to perceive this reality still prompts some Western conservative scholars to speak of "the foreign policy of communism," and to be critical of the view that communist ideology is no longer capable of mobilizing unified global support. See Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States, New York, 1969, p. 32. Presumably for the same reason, Professor Morgenthau argued in 1965 that the Vietnam war would bring the Soviets and the Chinese together.
i 6
2
}
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
communism
b u t e x p l i c i t l y d e n i e s t h a t t h e S o v i e t p a r t y is a
munist party—indeed, process of restoring
it c h a r g e s t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n
particularly
fateful for international
Stalinist
model
of
the
Czechoslovak
democ-
communism
H a d the Soviet leaders permitted the liberalization tially
the
capitalism.
T h e Soviet decision in 1968 to snuff out C z e c h o s l o v a k ratization w a s
com-
is in
of the
communist
essen-
state,
major a n d vitally important step in the democratization of
a
Euro-
p e a n c o m m u n i s m w o u l d h a v e b e e n taken. T h e democratization Czechoslovakia w o u l d h a v e significantly affected the other m u n i s t states, i n c l u d i n g t h e Soviet U n i o n ,
eventually
of
com-
generating
similar tendencies within them. This w a s the primary
reason
the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia. R o g e r
for
Garaudy,
a m e m b e r of the Politburo of t h e F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t Party at the time, w a s
correct in stating
feared the
democratization
that the of
Soviet leaders
Czechoslovakia
instinctively
precisely
because
they h a v e b e e n so c o m m i t t e d to the Stalinist m o d e l of
socialism
that a n y a t t e m p t to adjust socialism to t h e c o n d i t i o n s of m o r e v a n c e d societies h a s c o m e to b e v i e w e d as a m e n a c e to
ad-
socialism
itself. D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w e n t against t h e grain of their entire traini n g a n d outlook; the o c c u p a t i o n of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a w a s
therefore
system.41
not an error b u t a logical c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e Stalinist
T h e spectacle of a democratic Czechoslovakia, ruled b y a munist party tolerant of individual f r e e d o m press),
would
Western
com-
these parties to
effect
their
rapidly,
internal
had
an
enormous
democratization
impact
more
on
com-
speech,
munist parties. It w o u l d h a v e e n c o u r a g e d own
have
( f r e e travel,
and
it
would
h a v e m a d e t h e m m o r e a p p e a l i n g to their national electorates. would have meant
a major turning point
This
in the history of
com-
m u n i s m itself. It w o u l d h a v e c r e a t e d in t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d
West
a d e m o c r a t i z i n g c o m m u n i s m p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h humanistically harn e s s i n g t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c c h a l l e n g e ; it w o u l d h a v e l e d t o a m i l i t a n t , more
revolutionary
communism,
violently
reacting
against
b a c k w a r d n e s s a n d social i n a d e q u a c y of the conditions
in the Third W o r l d . U n w i l l i n g n e s s to tolerate C z e c h o s l o v a k i a thus
meant
not
only
that
the
Soviet
Union
will
for
the
prevailing
some
has time
Sectarian Communism
{
181
persist in a congealed, highly bureaucratized mold, but that will b e
many
sectarian
communisms,
presses a universally valid
Assimilated The
message.
each
claiming
there
that
it
Communisms
1970s
diversified
and
the
1980s
communisms
are h e n c e
merging
likely
with
to see
specific
increasingly
local
conditions
w h i l e f a d i n g as part of an international m o v e m e n t a n d a ideology. In Eastern E u r o p e this m i g h t m e a n
universal
the appearance
some regimes that w o u l d more appropriately qualify for the "social
fascist" t h a n
inforce their o w n who
in
ex-
0
any
way
communist;
dogmatism tend
to
that
by
is,
ruling
forcing from
deviate
from
the
parties their
norm.
that
ranks
Intensely
of socially a n d politically conservative
middle-class
officials w h o
have
vaguely
re-
those
tionalistic, the m i d d l e a n d u p p e r e c h e l o n s of their elite w o u l d composed
of
label
nabe
first-generation the
official
ideology—especially the belief in the paramountcy of the
internalized
state—
ruling in an alliance w i t h an ideologically neutral, expert
class
disdainful
of
the
more
technologically
"old-fashioned"
intellectual
humanists, a n d s u p p o r t e d b y the military. In addition to the
Soviet
* Soviet spokesmen have occasionally argued that a democratic Czechoslovakia would have ceased to be a communist Czechoslovakia, that the communist party would have been put out of power. This is doubtful, though it cannot be either proven or disproven. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that other political parties could have actually appeared in Czechoslovakia, for neither the social basis nor the personnel for them appears to have existed. Indeed, as of 1968 the predominant attitude among the Czechs and Slovaks was in favor of working within and through a more democratic, pluralist communist party that would have been communist without being LeninistStalinist. The Soviet argument, however, is deserving of note because it reveals something else. The charge is tantamount to an admission that democracy and the Soviet version of communism are still incompatible. It thus reflects not only a deeply ingrained bureaucratic suspicion of the popular will but the persistent incapacity of Soviet communist officials to relate meaningfully to the contemporary preoccupation with political and social equality, to the contemporary search for a new humanism relevant to the "scientifictechnological revolution," which communists themselves admit that they have tended to neglect (see p. 152, supra).
i 6
2
}
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance
Union, East G e r m a n y and perhaps Poland and Bulgaria are
likely
to a p p r o x i m a t e t h e a b o v e "social fascist" c a t e g o r y . * T h e s e regimes, however, are not likely to b e stable. T h e elites suffer f r o m increasing
cynicism
and
tend
to b e
ruling
more
and
more fragmented; cliques, intrigues, and personal feuds
dominate
t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s , w h i c h still l a c k d e f i n e d
constitu-
tional procedures. Societies are b e c o m i n g m o r e restless u n d e r isting political restraints a n d are fearful lest their systems insufficiently innovative in technological
areas. M o r e o v e r ,
a n d e v e r l a r g e r g e n e r a t i o n o f s t u d e n t s is b e g i n n i n g
ex-
prove a
new
to leave
the
universities a n d t o l a y c l a i m to p o w e r . T h e o u t b u r s t s of 1 9 6 8
are
likely to b e r e p e a t e d in the 1970s. S h o u l d t h e y occur in a in w h i c h W e s t e r n E u r o p e exerts a social attraction for
setting
frustrated
E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n s , a n d i n w h i c h t h e r e is p o l i t i c a l w e a k n e s s division in M o s c o w ,
the
next w a v e
of
Eastern
European
and
unrest
could b e explosive o n a regional, a n d not just national, scale. In Yugoslavia t h e m a i n source of uncertainty for the future the possibility of dissension
among
the various
nationalities,
is es-
pecially after T i t o s death. That dissension could lead to a military c o u p d e s i g n e d to preserve the state, a n d Soviet leadership
would
t h e n b e likely to m a k e a major effort to i m p r o v e relations w i t h
such
a p r a e t o r i a n Y u g o s l a v r e g i m e . If t h a t d a n g e r — w h i c h is q u i t e
real
— i s s u r m o u n t e d b y a c o m b i n a t i o n of political skill a n d
continued
economic
toward
more
growth,
Yugoslavia
pluralist pattern
West—no
and
will
continue
to cultivate
to
closer
evolve contacts
with
d o u b t including s o m e t h i n g like associate status in
E u r o p e a n C o m m o n Market. It m a y e v e n b e g i n to e x p e r i m e n t m u l t i - p a r t y e l e c t i o n s , a n d it is likely t o b e less a n d less about the classical issue of state versus private
a the the
with
doctrinaire
ownerships
Yu-
* It is interesting and relevant to note here that Central European fascism was primarily an urban development. For example, in 1937, 50 per cent of the members of the Hungarian Arrow Cross party were industrial workers, 12 per cent were professional and self-employed people, and only 8 per cent were peasants. At the same time slightly over half the population was peasant (Istvan Deak, "Hungary," in The European Right, Eugene Weber and Hans Rogger, eds., Berkeley, 1965, pp. 396-97)f In the more developed parts of Yugoslavia there is already strong senti-
Sectarian Communism
{
183
goslav theoreticians have already argued publicly that a multiparty system is a necessary mechanism for avoiding the political degeneration inherent in the communist party power monopoly. They have warned that "nothing is so irrational as a closed rational system which does not allow other ideas and contrary views to live, which does not permit any intellectual unrest." 42 The example provided by such a Yugoslavia would be
attractive
to the m o r e d e v e l o p e d E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n states, s u c h as
Czecho-
slovakia and H u n g a r y , a n d eventually to the currently m o s t pendent-minded
member
of
the
Eastern
bloc,
inde-
Rumania.
f o r m e r are likely to c o n t i n u e quietly p u r s u i n g the road of
The
democ-
ratization from within, eventually heading toward
independence;
Rumania
by
the
is l i k e l y t o c o n s o l i d a t e
scope
of
popular
its i n d e p e n d e n c e
participation
political life. All t h r e e
countries
in
the
country's
increasingly
increasing social
appreciate
sirability of substituting a m i x e d e c o n o m y for the highly ized Soviet model.
Moreover,
Czechoslovak
and
the
sociologists h a v e
cently b e e n d r a w i n g attention to the transformation of their society into one in w h i c h
the intelligentsia,
"the fastest
ship of the proletariat."43 implications nomic model gentsia,
of
the
a n d of
have
also
Hungarian
increasingly
sociologists,
decentralized
a similar increase in the
called
for
direction of "comprehensive
a
redefinition
own
this
dictator-
discussing
Hungarian Hungarian
the eco-
intelliin
the
social reforms, including broad
sec-
tions of social life (political a n d cultural as
of
re-
growing
g r o u p i n s o c i e t y , " is p l a y i n g t h e d e c i s i v e role. I n t h e i r v i e w , necessarily c o m p e l s a r e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t of "the
de-
central-
socialism
well)."44
Moreover, the Eastern E u r o p e a n states fear that scientific
obso-
lescence m a y b e the price that t h e y will h a v e to p a y for r e m a i n i n g too closely associated with an Eastern bloc and for b e i n g cut
off
from
not
extensive
contacts
with
the
West.
(These
fears
are
ment on behalf of widening the private sector in the economy. The group with the strongest anti-private-property feelings is that of the white-collar workers with the least education (see the public-opinion poll published in the Zagreb Vjesnik, December 24, 1968).
i 6
2
}
III:
Communism:
groundless. See Table
10.)
The Problem of Relevance T h i s f e a r is s h a r e d e v e n b y E a s t
Ger-
m a n y , w h o s e t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t is i n c r e a s i n g l y t u r n i n g toward Western
markets,
with the result that
n o l o g i c a l s u c c e s s is i n t e n s i o n w i t h its p o l i t i c a l In the West munism
of
TABLE 10.
the
the
bureaucratized
Stalinist
variety
and
is
the regime s orientation.
ideologically
likely
to
sterile
continue
to
INVENTIONS REGISTERED PER 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 INHABITANTS
Country Belgium Austria Denmark Norway
it
tech-
com-
fade
in
(1964)
No. of Inventions 164
147 131 121
Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Rumania
52 20 10
7 Source: Burks, Technological Innovation and Political Change in Communist Eastern Europe, p. 12. socio-political relevance. passed into the hands groups;
as a result,
to
political
seek
T h e revolutionary
of m o r e
the
ideologically
established
relevance
by
standard
has
already
volatile
and
activist
communist
minimizing
parties
their
are
likely
orthodoxy
emphasizing their acceptance of constitutional procedures.*
and Their
f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m is l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e t o b e t h a t t h e y h a v e attractive m o d e l communist
of
power
a modern
highly
sophisticated
to offer as an e x a m p l e
and
no
pluralist
to their electorates;
in
a d d i t i o n , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e i r p r o g r a m m a t i c m e s s a g e is f u r t h e r reduced
by
the fact that the W e s t
has preceded
states in experiencing the social a n d technological
the
communist
revolution.
Thus, both in order to exploit the tensions connected with transition from the
industrial
to the technetronic
society
and
the to
* Or even participation in their national establishments. A moving account of the efforts of a devoted communist militant to arouse her party s officials to the plight of the Neapolitan masses and to stimulate a more revolutionary attitude in them is provided by M. A. Macciocchi, Lettere dall'interno del PCI a Louis Althusser, Milan, 1969. In her diary she describes her efforts to gain the confidence of the workers and—even more futile—to make the party bureaucrats more sensitive to the workers' abysmal conditions.
Sectarian Communism provide the
the
Italian
basis
orthodoxy. S o m e the need
for effective
communist
political
parties
have
action,
been
of their theoreticians h a v e
to redefine the
communist
the
forced
already
communist
parties
politically
isolated;
ceeded
gaining
in
have moved
to
in
the
the
support,
and
not be
that w o u l d
structure.
West
extent the
To
the
remain
that
the
communist
both
integrated,
and
certainly
These visions can no longer encompass
that
leaders,
sectarian
reformists parties
exclusivist
new ideo-
extent
and
have
in
toward diluting their nineteenth-century
tradition of dogmatic,
their
emphasized
these reformists have b e e n thwarted b y conservative party the
and
dilute
party as a n altogether
logical in t h e strict s e n s e of t h e w o r d , in its b u r e a u c r a t i c
185
French
in
party that w o u l d i n c l u d e the entire left, that w o u l d
not be Leninist
{
the
sucWest
ideological
grand
visions.*
either the n e w
scientific
revolution or the revolutions of the students and intellectuals, have replaced
the communists
our time. W h a t e v e r the W e s t
the response,
the communist
who
as the anti-establishmentarians the basic fact remains
parties are no longer either
of
that
in
innovative
or revolutionary.
China and Global
Revolution
T h o u g h it c a m e t o o l a t e i n t h e W e s t , c o m m u n i s m h a s c o m e e a r l y f o r t h e E a s t , or, m o r e
generally, for the Third
World
too as
a
0 The first situation has been more true of the French Communist Party, and George Lichtheim was quite correct in stating that "if the role of Marxist doctrine in contemporary France can be reduced to a formula, it may be summed up by saying that from the vision of a revolutionary future it has turned into the critical contemplation of an eternal and seemingly unchangeable present" (George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France, a study by the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, New York, 1966, p. 169). The second situation is more applicable to the Italian party, in which the most explicit concept of the new broad party was developed by one of its theoreticians, G. Amendola, in a series of articles published in the fall of 1964 in the theoretical journal of the Italian Communist Party, Rinascita In these articles he called for the creation of a single party of the left, which would be neither communist nor social democratic, neither shackled by ideology nor dominated by the party cadres.
i 6
2
}
III:
whole.
Communism:
Instead
of
being
The Problem of Relevance
the
internationalizing
and
humanizing
force that M a r x c o n c e i v e d socialism to be, c o m m u n i s m in the is at b e s t a n i n s p i r a t i o n for i n t e n s e l y n a t i o n a l i s t i c
East
modernization
or o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e s i s t a n c e t o s o c i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n ; a t w o r s t , it is the basis for despotic the
West,
fanaticism
communisms
virtues
and
massive
have
more
oppression.
often
As
been
s t r a t e d w h e n it h a s b e e n o u t o f p o w e r a n d h a s a c t e d a s a
catalyst
in the struggle against inequality, social injustice, or foreign ination. I n p o w e r , it h a s t e n d e d t o b e c o m e e x t r e m e l y fanatical, a n d intensely
dom-
oppressive,
nationalistic.
C o m m u n i s m in the East, e v e n m o r e than in the West, has a particularly important force in stimulating populist This
is
World
quite
understandable.
masses
before
their
Communism
political
came
awakening,
been
nationalism.
to
the
and
Third
it h a s
suc-
c e e d e d o n l y w h e r e it h a s b e c o m e b o t h t h e e x t e r n a l e x p r e s s i o n the internal c o n t e n t of the n e w sense of national identity.
tions o n b o t h external a n d d o m e s t i c levels, c o m m u n i s m of inferiority t o w a r d
b e c a u s e of this, c o m m u n i s m
the more
advanced
in the Third World
and
Focusing
o n industrialization as the w a y in w h i c h to fulfill p o p u l a r
feelings
aspira-
galvanized
West.
Indeed,
has been
espe-
cially vulnerable to the racism t h a t — g i v e n t h e bitter l e g a c y of white
mans
in
demon-
imperialism—inevitably
national-
i s m . 4 5 R a c i s m , h o w e v e r , is o n e of t h e m o s t p r i m i t i v e a n d
irrational
and
a communist
the
the
new
sources of motivation,
infected
ideology
reinforced
i t — w h e t h e r in Asia or in A f r i c a — c a n n o t h e l p b u t b e d e p r i v e d
by of
b o t h its u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d its rationality. An
altogether
different
challenge
to
communism's
and institutional global relevance has b e e n p o s e d of C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s m .
ideological
by
the
Chinese communism has not only
leled t h e claim of Soviet c o m m u n i s m
t o b e the
pure
victory paral-
communism
of o u r t i m e , b u t h a s b e e n w i l l i n g t o b a c k its c l a i m w i t h
domestic
revolutionary action. T h e "Cultural Revolution" of the late
1960s,
w h i c h f o l l o w e d b y a f e w years the "Great L e a p Forward" of late 1950s, w a s d e s i g n e d to o v e r c o m e the ruling party's tendency
toward
bureaucratic
stagnation
and
the
dangerous
ideological
petri-
Sectarian Communism
{
187
faction. T h e C h i n e s e h a v e explicitly stated that, in their v i e w , Soviet party
had
already
T h e Cultural Revolution economic
shake-up
become
a victim
of
such
( t h e intellectual equivalent of the
effected
by
the
Great
Leap
the
petrifaction. socio-
Forward)
was
d e s i g n e d to b e the internal, d o m e s t i c expression of the living continuing
revolution.
Its over-all effect, h o w e v e r ,
was
the Chinese Communist Party what Khrushchev's aborted of 1963 almost d i d to t h e Soviet party: to t h o r o u g h l y
and
to d o
to
reforms
disorganize
it, a n d , w i t h it, t h e C h i n e s e e c o n o m y a s w e l l . 4 6 By denigrating the party and by simultaneously elevating Tse-tung's personal rule a n d role, C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s m separated
itself
from
the
traditional
communist
Mao
inevitably
mainstream—in
spite of the C h i n e s e theory that the g e o g r a p h i c vortex of
revolu-
tionary leadership has over the years shifted from France to m a n y to Russia a n d n o w to China. Moreover, unlike Stalin,
Ger-
whose
role in the international c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t w a s reinforced a towering personal standing a n d b y leadership of the only
by
com-
m u n i s t party in p o w e r , M a o w a s f a c e d b y a n u m b e r of other ruling communist
parties,
all d i s p u t i n g
his claim
to orthodoxy
and
all
e a g e r t o p o i n t o u t his d o c t r i n a l errors. T h e effect w a s t o
weaken
China's
and
international
claim
to
ideological
universality
tarnish both the revolutionary prestige of the C h i n e s e and their undeniably impressive overcome China's
achievements
communists
in the struggle
to
backwardness.47
China's c a p a c i t y to serve as a m o d e l of c o m m u n i s m w a s c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e u n i q u e character of C h i n a itself. T h e communists
to
further Chinese
c a m e to p o w e r not in a single country b u t in a
society that represents a comprehensive and sophisticated
vast
civiliza-
tion. N o t o n l y is t h a t c i v i l i z a t i o n h i g h l y d i s t i n c t i v e b u t it h a s a l o n g t i m e h a d its o w n c o n c e p t of a w o r l d o r d e r i n w h i c h is t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c e n t e r . T h o u g h t h e h i s t o r i c a l a n d u n i v e r s a l gories of Marxist t h o u g h t h a v e b e e n assimilated into that f r a m e w o r k a n d b e c o m e a n e x t e n s i o n o f it, t h e c u l t u r a l ,
for
China cate-
Chinese
linguistic,
a n d racial distinctiveness of the Chinese has automatically their c o m m u n i s m m u c h m o r e difficult to export or emulate.
made
i 6
2
}
III: Communism:
Moreover,
unlike
the
The Problem of Relevance
Russians,
who
have
often
referred
M o s c o w as the "Third R o m e / ' the Chinese h a v e traditionally played no intense missionary
zeal.
Effective performance
in
missionary role requires, in addition to personal inclination,
to disthe
some
cultural, philosophic, a n d e v e n ethnic kinship, to say n o t h i n g of
a
p r o s e l y t i z i n g t r a d i t i o n . It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t , d e s p i t e its m i s s i o n a r y z e a l , E u r o p e a n - b a s e d C h r i s t i a n i t y w a s m u c h less s u c c e s s f u l in its efforts to spread to Asia t h a n w a s the East's M i d d l e Islam.
Perhaps
a racial appeal—explicitly b a s e d o n color a n d ideologically m i z e d b y t h e identification of t h e w h i t e m a n w i t h may
create
a bridge
between
Chinese
legiti-
imperialism—
proselytizers
and
foreign
m a s s e s , b u t e v e n t h a t a p p e a l is m o r e likely to b e e f f e c t i v e i n a r e a s sufficiently distant tionalism
and
from
China's
China
not
cultural
to b e
hegemony.
fearful of Hence
Chinese
Africa,
than Asia, m a y b e a m o r e promising long-range C h i n e s e
target.
These considerations provide s o m e clues to the probable of C h i n a s tremism
revolutionary
nor
even
world
China's
role.
crash
Neither
program
to
Chinese
limits
verbal
establish
na-
rather
a
ex-
nuclear
a r s e n a l ( t h e o l d q u e s t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n s o r c a p a b i l i t i e s ) is a s i m p o r t a n t as t h e f a c t t h a t C h i n a h a s b e c o m e a s o m e w h a t
self-contained
civilization-nation-state. China's p o w e r will probably g r o w in y e a r s t o c o m e , a n d w i t h it C h i n a ' s c a p a c i t y t o t h r e a t e n its
Union.48
bors a n d eventually e v e n the U n i t e d States or the Soviet B u t it d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t C h i n a w i l l t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e a n director of militant a n d globally relevant revolutionary O n the contrary,
as m e m o r i e s
of C h i n e s e
find
activist
processes.
revolutionary
ments gradually recede into the past, China will
achieve-
it m o r e
m o r e difficult to p r e s e n t itself as the historically relevant tionary model. China's aid will b e accepted by n e e d y
the
neigh-
and
revolu-
revolution-
aries, b u t it w i l l p r o b a b l y b e c o m e m o r e rather t h a n less
difficult
for t h e C h i n e s e to c o n v i n c e the recipients of s u c h aid that
China
has a universal mission. N o r is it c e r t a i n ,
as has b e e n
years to c o m e
communism
tractive m o d e l
combining
occasionally
argued,
will offer to the Third sustained
economic
that in
World
an
development
the atand
Sectarian Communism
{
s o c i a l m o d e r n i z a t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . E v e n if C h i n a impressive
strides a n d its G N P
makes
g r o w s steadily at 5 p e r c e n t
a n n u m , i n t h e y e a r 2 0 0 0 it w i l l still b e a m o n g t h e p o o r e r
The
Third World
relevance
of
Soviet
is a l s o d o u b t f u l .
economic
Analysis
of
the
factor
economic
experience Soviet
per
nations
o f t h e w o r l d . T h e f a c t is t h a t its n u m b e r s , f a r f r o m b e i n g a of strength, m e r e l y m a g n i f y t h e s c a l e of its social a n d dilemmas.
189
to
the
experience
strongly suggests that industrialization need not b e derived
from
the impetus provided b y extraordinarily coercive m e a n s
from
t h e p h y s i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f a s o c i a l c l a s s . M o r e o v e r , it is
or
important
to note that Soviet industrialization occurred in a society that
had
s o m e thirty years of prior industrial d e v e l o p m e n t
that
was
endowed
working
and
with
matchless
disciplined
and that even
natural
population
before World
War
behind
resources
(but
I had
not
and
Stalinist Paradox.") the
Third
World
These
countries
now
the advantages
a n y case, relatively w e l l
developed
provide
examples
can rarely
undertaking
Whether
can
hard-
of
solid
preliminary
( S e e our earlier discussion of
conditions
industrialize themselves.
over)
a
overpopulation),
statistics, relatively w e l l - t r a i n e d t e c h n i c a l cadres, a n d plans for future development.
it,
of
to
be
modernize
China or C u b a
by and
( t h e latter,
at t h e time of
sustained
"The
matched
Castro's
growth
in
take-
and
political
power
without
stability is uncertain. Of
the
countries
where
communism
being imposed by foreign intervention Cuba, Yugoslavia, Albania, Vietnam), succeeded
in achieving
sustained
came
to
(the Soviet Union,
China,
only Yugoslavia has so
economic
growth,
social
far
mod-
ernization, a n d political stability w i t h o u t e m p l o y i n g m a s s i v e terror or experiencing violent p o w e r conflicts; e v e n Yugoslavia, required record
of
extensive
outside
economic
financial
development
aid. of
Moreover,
communist
however,
though
countries,
t i c u l a r l y t h e m o r e p r i m i t i v e o n e s , is g o o d , it h a s n o t b e e n than
that
of
some
non-communist
countries.
In
better
addition,
c o m m u n i s t political systems ( e x c e p t for Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Cuba)
have
been
characterized
by
sporadic political
the par-
most and
instability.
i 6
2
}
III:
Communism: The Problem of Relevance
which in some cases h a d to be put d o w n through Soviet
interven-
tion. T h u s t h e o v e r - a l l r e c o r d is, at b e s t , a m i x e d o n e a n d
hardly
sufficient to justify the a r g u m e n t that only the c o m m u n i s t s found the key to effective modernization. Nor, for that matter, have they found revolution-making. only
one
Cuba. when
Communism
country
not
came
previously
the answer
to p o w e r
devastated
I n s e v e r a l o t h e r c o u n t r i e s it c a m e communists
experienced economy
picked
complete
during
a
up
the pieces
destruction
major
war.
revolutionary record since
of
Other
have
0
by
to
effective
indigenously a
major
to power after these
war—
indigenously nations
had
their
state
machinery
and
than
that,
the
communist
1917 has b e e n o n e of rather
frequent
f a i l u r e , ! w h i l e in P o l a n d , H u n g a r y , a n d R u m a n i a it w a s t h e army that established
Soviet
communism.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t i n t h e y e a r s t o c o m e vidual,
highly nationalistic,
perhaps
even
by
appealing
both
to
the
indi-
racist c o m m u n i s t
ties will c o m e to p o w e r in s o m e Asian, African, or L a t i n countries
in
populist
par-
American
nationalism
of
masses a n d the statism of impatient intellectuals. In his s t u d y
munism and the Politics of Development, that "Communist economic
John Kautsky has
p a r t y s t r e n g t h is l o w e s t
development,
rises
gradually
economic
m e n t , crests at a fairly h i g h l e v e l of s u c h d e v e l o p m e n t , clines sharply with the highest level."
49
shown
at t h e l o w e s t s t a g e
with
the Com-
of
developand
This generalization
not b e mechanically applied to the Third W o r l d w i t h the
de-
should conclu-
sion that c o m m u n i s m w i l l f a d e as s o o n as d e v e l o p m e n t h a s
made
substantial progress. A s e i z u r e of p o w e r could, for e x a m p l e ,
occur
during the intermediary
phase.
• In these respects, useful comparisons can be made between communistruled countries and countries ruled by modernizing non-communist elites; Poland-Spain-Italy; Rumania-Yugoslavia-Spain; Czechoslovakia-Sweden; Hungary-Austria; North Korea-South Korea; North Vietnam-South Vietnam; China-India; and so on. These comparisons are more revealing of certain uniformities than of significant disparities. The disparities are sharper when the comparison is made with non-modernizing, non-communist countries, t A partial list of more significant revolutionary efforts by the communists includes: Hungary 1919; Poland 1920; Germany 1918, 1923; China 1927; France and Italy 1947; Greece 1948; Indonesia 1949, 1965; Bolivia 1966.
Sectarian Communism I t is, h o w e v e r ,
unlikely
that
these
seizures
of
{
power
191
will
be
effected b y the orthodox a n d formal c o m m u n i s t parties, w h i c h some
countries
(particularly
coming assimilated revolutionaries,
into the
in
Latin
America)
are
social establishment.
in
already
The
though perhaps labeling themselves
be-
successful
communists,
will probably b e loosely o r g a n i z e d coalitions of impatient
middle-
class intellectuals, y o u n g e r officers, a n d students. I n s t e a d of
being
adherents of a d o g m a t i c a n d a l l e g e d l y universal ideology, t h e y are m o r e likely to b e m e n combination Communist
of
motivated
by a vaguer and more
radicalism,
nationalism,
and
parties, t h o u g h
experienced
in organizing
disadvantaged
workers
even
volatile
some
racism.
exploited,
a n d in transforming landless b u t
nation-
alistically aroused peasants into revolutionary armies, h a v e so b e e n u n a b l e to discipline, either i d e o l o g i c a l l y or
the students a n d the intellectuals fermenting in the m o d e r n less-steel-and-glass universities. T o these men, F a n o n a n d dienne,
or Bolivar a n d
Marx and Lenin,
Guevara,
are m o r e
rather than
relevant symbols.
Marx The
Mao,
or
revolutions
and
to
c o m e will hence neither signify an automatic addition of
The these
ideologically novel
stain-
Boume-
strength
to "international c o m m u n i s m " nor represent a step forward the intellectual unity of
far
organizationally,
toward
mankind.
more
revolutionary
volatile, forces
less
would
disciplined be
in
character
keeping
of
with
broader trends already noted. Conditions during the early
the
indus-
trial a g e c a l l e d for i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l integration, the dynamic congestion
of
t h e g l o b a l c i t y is i n i m i c a l
to a
but
disci-
p l i n e d , c e n t r a l i z e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w h o s e p u r p o s e is
to
disseminate a particular system
to
create a globally uniform
of t h o u g h t
social order on
a n d of v a l u e s a n d that basis.
The
that proximity paradoxically dictates not uniformity but Moreover, the chances of truly revolutionary cally and
rapidly
revolutionizing
both
fact
is
pluralism.
upheavals—radi-
social values
and
institu-
tions—are in any case not high. In m o d e r n times only the
French,
the M e x i c a n , a n d the C u b a n revolutions c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as thentically
indigenous
and
far-reaching
internal revolutions
w e r e achieved without the benefit of the cataclysmic
authat
dislocations
i 6
2
}
III: Communism:
The Problem of Relevance
w r o u g h t b y the t w o w o r l d wars. Otherwise, e v e n the most ineffective
social
highly
and
resilient
political and
that
systems
have
shown
difficult to overthrow.
been
found
meal
and that superimposed
social
inertia
can
only
In be
themselves
to
be
most
cases
it
has
coped
with
radical efforts to o v e r c o m e
pieceit
have
p r o m p t e d effective resistance. A t o n e t i m e Soviet theorists t o y e d w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of t h e tional
democracy
as
a
transitional
stage
toward
a
na-
communist
people's democracy. T h e o v e r t h r o w of B e n Bella, Goulart,
Kassem,
Keita, N k r u m a h , P a p a n d r e o u , a n d Sukarno has c o m p e l l e d the viets to think in terms of m u c h lengthier a n d m o r e g r a d u a l lutionary processes; at t h e s a m e time, the C h i n e s e a n d t h e have moved
toward emphasis
So-
revo-
Cubans
on various forms of guerrilla
often in the f a c e of o p e n criticism f r o m local c o m m u n i s t
war,
parties.*
B o t h cases h a v e i n v o l v e d an i m p l i e d admission of the
increasing
irrelevance of the classical revolutionary theory a n d a
concession
to social particularism, matism—means
which—when
linked
to ideological
dog-
sectarianism.
S e c t a r i a n i s m is t h e n e g a t i o n of u n i v e r s a l i s m . turn out to h a v e b e e n
Communism
t h e last great integrative
dogmatic
T o the extent that s o m e c o m m u n i s t parties are today joining
may faith. their
national establishments, they are conforming to reality rather than forming
are
em-
bracing racism a n d intense nationalism in the Third World,
it. T o
the
extent
that
some
communist
parties
they
a r e c a p i t u l a t i n g t o r e a l i t y r a t h e r t h a n r e s h a p i n g it. I n e i t h e r
case
t h e r e is a l o s s o f i d e n t i t y w h i c h , o n c e l o s t , is n o t l i k e l y t o b e g a i n e d . T h u s , e v e n if o n e is n o t a M a r x i s t , it is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y
rea
9 The issues at stake were sharply posed by the secretary-general of the Venezuelan Communist Party, Jesus Faria, who stated in an interview printed in the Hungarian party organ, Nepszabadsag (February 17, 1968): "Experience has shown that the masses are withdrawing from the previous armed struggle. . . . Four million people are participating in the election campaign and we believe that we can orient the people better if we also participate in this campaign. . . . The ultraleftist groups in Venezuela, which disregard the combat readiness of the masses and persist in the slogan of armed struggle at any price, commit one mistake after another and find themselves more and more isolated."
Sectarian Communism
{
193
cause for rejoicing to note that c o m m u n i s m — w h i c h h e l p e d to
en-
large the collective consciousness of m a n k i n d a n d to mobilize
the
m a s s e s for s o c i a l p r o g r e s s — h a s f a i l e d in its o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i v e linking humanism with
internationalism.
of
AMAMM
PART IV
The American Transition There
is s o m e t h i n g
awesome
and
baffling about
that can simultaneously c h a n g e man's relationship to the by placing a man on the moon, w a g e and
finance
a
a
society universe
thirty-billion-
dollar-per-annum foreign w a r despised b y a significant portion its
people,
maintain
the
most
powerful
and
far-flung
forces in history, a n d confront in t h e streets a n d a b e t in t h e a r e v o l u t i o n in its internal
racial relations,
doing
of
military courts
all this in
the
c o n t e x t of t h e e x p l o s i o n of h i g h e r l e a r n i n g in its r a p i d l y
expand-
ing and turbulent universities,
of
bling
political
institutions,
and
of rotting u r b a n of
dynamically
centers, growing
fum-
frontier
i n d u s t r i e s that are t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e w a y its c i t i z e n s l i v e a n d m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e another. A n y o n e of t h e a b o v e aspects
comwould
suffice to transform the values a n d self-image of a society, a n d few might be enough
to o v e r t h r o w its s y s t e m . A l l t o g e t h e r ,
create a situation that defies analogy to other societies and lights the
singular character
of
the
contemporary
a
they high-
American
ex-
perience.
195
196
}
TV: The American
Contemporary
America
Transition
is
the
world's
social
laboratory.
p r o b l e m s t h a t t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d w o r l d is b e g i n n i n g t o —and and
the
Third
World
often painfully.
is w i t n e s s i n g — a b s o r b
It is in
the
United
America
States
that
The
confront directly
the
crucial
d i l e m m a s o f o u r a g e m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s m o s t starkly; it is i n U n i t e d States that m a n s
t o d e f i n e h i m s e l f m e a n i n g f u l l y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o it is b e i n g intensely tested.
the
capacity to master his e n v i r o n m e n t
Can man
and most
master science for fundamentally
hu-
m a n e ends? C a n liberty a n d equality coexist, a n d d o so in a multiracial environment? C a n merit a n d a c h i e v e m e n t
flourish
without
special privilege? C a n technology b e socially creative without ducing excessive social control? C a n a society w i t h diverse avoid
complete
American
disbelief?
life—the
These
focus
of
issues
global
dominate
American
contemporary
attention—and
conflicting a n d o f t e n critical assessments
of
in-
beliefs
they
prompt
the meaning
of
the
experience.1
Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union, in America the l e n g e of c h a n g e
chal-
is h i g h l y v i s i b l e . I n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n s o c i e t y
like a boiling subterranean
volcano that strains against the
is
rigid
surface crust of the political system. In the m o r e volatile
United
States, social, e c o n o m i c , a n d political forces o p e n l y clash,
change,
a n d interact o n a b r o a d front. T h e resulting t u r m o i l is as
creative
as it is d e s t r u c t i v e , unique
a n d it l e a d s t o m e t a m o r p h i c
combination
of
order
and
chaos
changes
known
as
in
the
that
United
States. In the next twenty will 80
approach per
under
cent twenty
three will years
years the population hundred
be
million,
metropolitan
of
age.
of
and
Intensely
of
the
which almost
scientific
United
States
approximately 50 in
per
cent
orientation,
A m e r i c a n society will h a v e greater m a s t e r y of b o t h terrestrial spatial e n v i r o n m e n t
than
and
any other society. At the s a m e time
will h a v e experienced intense social conflicts in w h i c h racial siderations w i l l b e p a r a m o u n t b u t in w h i c h
antagonism
it
con-
between
g e n e r a t i o n s w i l l also b e a b a s i c a n d p a i n f u l b u r d e n . I n all
likeli-
h o o d it w i l l a l s o b e a s o c i e t y c o n f r o n t i n g a n a c u t e c u l t u r a l m a l a i s e ,
/V: The American Transition uncertain
of
its a e s t h e t i c
standards,
and
{ 197
searching
for
common
from
industrial
integrative values. Contemporary
America
the technetronic
age.
is i n t r a n s i t i o n
As
the world's
first
the
post-industrial
to
society,
t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is n o l o n g e r s h a p e d b y t h e s a m e f o r c e s t h a t
have
stimulated
since
England
social
first
change
in
the
advanced
countries
confronted the machine. This broad
ever
transformation
is c a u s i n g a crisis of e s t a b l i s h e d A m e r i c a n v a l u e s a n d
institutions,
particularly the tradition of liberal d e m o c r a c y , a n d as t h e two-hundredth
birthday
approaches,
definition of t h e A m e r i c a n
it t h e r e f o r e
calls
nations
for a
system.
L i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y is a p e c u l i a r b l e n d of t h e a r i s t o c r a t i c tion,
constitutional
legalism,
and
mass
democracy.
tradi-
Unlike
com-
m u n i s m , it w a s n o t i n t e l l e c t u a l l y e x t r a c t e d f r o m a t e l e s c o p e d t r a u m a t i c h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , a n d it is n o t e m b o d i e d i n a
and
move-
m e n t w h i c h d r a w s its f e r v o r a n d d e d i c a t i o n f r o m t h e d e e p l y bedded
Manichaean
growth—though
re-
tradition.
occasionally
Rather,
it is t h e p r o d u c t
accelerated
by
em-
of
slow
revolutionary
h e a v a l s in E n g l a n d , t h e U n i t e d States, a n d F r a n c e — w h i c h
up-
cumu-
latively created a b r o a d tradition of social behavior, a set of
only
partially explicit values, a n d highly defined legal procedures
and
institutions. T h e aristocratic tradition put a p r e m i u m o n excellence
and
achievement,
though
in time
standards
personal of
excel-
lence c h a n g e d a n d b e c a m e less exclusive. Legalism, w h i c h in past
doubtless
served
to
protect
established
interests,
regularity and objectivity in social relations and therefore
gradu-
ally c a m e to protect the individual. T h e democratic element, ulated through universal suffrage, not only diluted the
the
stressed
stim-
aristocratic
c o m p o n e n t but infused liberal d e m o c r a c y with a strong
concern
for social welfare. These components uneasy manner, clashed. though major
In on
American the
have
combined
in a loose a n d
occasionally
and from time to time they have conflicted
whole
exception,
and
history rather its
such
clashes
sporadic.
outcome
The
have
been
Civil
War
effectively
and
and
violent, was
the
rapidly
de-
l 98 }
IV: The American
stroyed
the
aristocratic
Transition
element
in
American
tradition,
whereas
t h e d e c l i n e of E u r o p e a n aristocracy w a s s l o w . T h e industrial r e v o l u t i o n p r o d u c e d its o w n
strains a n d violence, b u t the rapid
pace
of g r o w t h as w e l l as t h e availability of E u r o p e a n capital a n d f o r e i g n m a r k e t s e a s e d t h e g r o w i n g p a i n s e v e n a s it e n l a r g e d then consolidated the democratic component. T h e resulting wealth and democratic freedom have made of a n e w f o r m of social organization,
America
all t h e m o r e
c a u s e its s p e c t a c u l a r s u c c e s s e s o b s c u r e d its s o c i a l T h i s p h a s e is c o m i n g t o a n e n d . T h e
the
social symbol
attractive
social blinders that
and the painful awareness
of A m e r i c a n society's lingering
quacy has been
more
whose
rendered
In a word,
America
acute by
have
a new
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e is t h a t it s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
off,
inade-
the intensity and
is u n d e r g o i n g
be-
blemishes.
m a d e A m e r i c a u n a w a r e of its s h o r t c o m i n g s h a v e b e e n r i p p e d
of change.
of and
pace
revolution, maximizes
A m e r i c a ' s p o t e n t i a l a s it u n m a s k s its o b s o l e s c e n c e .
1. The Third American Revolution I t is e a s y t o p i n p o i n t tions, or the Bolshevik, It is a l s o n o t From
the
French
and the
Mexican
the Chinese, and the C u b a n
difficult to
identify
a colony that revolution
t h e first A m e r i c a n
created a nation;
a
Constitution,
both
of
which
articulated
revolution.
implicit
strongly felt beliefs g a v e birth to a Declaration of and
revolu-
revolutions.
though
Independence
novel
principles
of political a n d social order. Historical definition b e c o m e s more complex w h e n dealing the
second
American
revolution.
Precisely
when
did
it
with
happen
The Third American Revolution
{
a n d w h a t d i d it d o ? T h o u g h t h a t r e v o l u t i o n c a n n o t b e w i t h the s a m e a c c u r a c y as t h e
first,
199
pinpointed
it is a f a c t t h a t a n
essentially
rural, partially aristocratic, a n d e v e n s l a v e - o w n i n g s o c i e t y w i t h limited
representative
urban-industrial equality
political
nation0
extended—at
system
whose
least
of its p e o p l e a n d w h o s e
in
public
was
transformed
relative form—to
ethos was
into
almost
90
dominated
per
cent
largely
It took the Civil W a r , the
the N e w
not
indus-
trialization of t h e country, t h e m a s s i v e influx of immigrants, finally,
by
govern-
m e n t a l i n t e r v e n t i o n . T h u s , it t o o w a s a real r e v o l u t i o n , t h o u g h first.
an
legal-political-social
w i d e s p r e a d acceptance of social welfare, effected through
as contained in time as the
a
and,
D e a l t o t r a n s f o r m A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y . T o c a l l it a
r e v o l u t i o n is a d m i t t e d l y t o s t r e t c h t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f r e v o l u t i o n ,
but
t h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t b o t h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e v a l u e s o f
the
U n i t e d States w e r e t h e r e b y p r o f o u n d l y altered in a little over
a
century. T h e third A m e r i c a n r e v o l u t i o n is e v e n h a r d e r t o d e f i n e , f o r are n o w i n t h e m i d d l e of it a n d t h u s c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n of its come.
In one respect,
however,
it is e a s i e r t o i d e n t i f y t h a n
we outthe
s e c o n d , f o r its i m p a c t a n d its e f f e c t are m o r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t i m e . T h e third revolution b e g a n gathering m o m e n t u m after W o r l d
War
II, w i t h t h e m a s s i v e e n t r a n c e into c o l l e g e s of ex-GIs; w i t h t h e
con-
comitant explosion in higher learning a n d the g r o w i n g of t h e
social primacy
of
education;
with
the
union
acceptance of
national
p o w e r and m o d e r n science c r o w n e d b y the harnessing of
nuclear
energy a n d the federal g o v e r n m e n t e m e r g i n g as a major
sponsor
of scientific investigation; nental
communications,
with the
ranging
s u d d e n birth of rapid
from
the
world's
most
a n d d e v e l o p e d h i g h w a y s y s t e m , t h r o u g h r a p i d air p a s s e n g e r port,
to
a
uniquely
effective
instant
transcontinental
conti-
modern trans-
telephone
0 In 1800 the rural population of the United States accounted for about 94 per cent of the total; in 1850, for approximately 85 per cent; in 1900, 60 per cent; in 1950, 35 per cent. It is estimated that by the year 2000 the rural population will be approximately 50 million out of a total of 300 million, or 17 per cent. In 1969, 73 per cent of all Americans lived on one per cent of the land ( T i m e , January 24, 1969, pp. 18, 3 0 - 3 3 ) .
l 9 8 }
IV: The American
system, and
finally
Transition
to a nation-wide television intimacy; with
transformation in managerial techniques wrought b y the
the
appear-
a n c e of c o m p u t e r s a n d o t h e r electronic d e v i c e s t h a t c o n q u e r
com-
plexity, distance, a n d e v e n the diffusion of authority; a n d w i t h fading of industry as the m o s t for most
Americans.
Prompted
important by
source
technology
the
of
employment
and
particularly
e l e c t r o n i c s , t h e t h i r d r e v o l u t i o n is c h a n g i n g t h e b a s i c
institutions
a n d values of A m e r i c a n society and, as w a s also t h e case w i t h preceding
revolutions,
it is e n c o u n t e r i n g
resistance,
the
stimulating
violence, causing anxiety, a n d stirring hope. In the process, the of
emerging learning,
it is c r e a t i n g
new
America
research,
and
three Americas
symbolized
development
higher learning with society
by that
in one.
the
new
link
There
institutions
and create unprecedented
new
museums
electronics
and
fine
and
sparking
arts a n d c u l t u r e , a s is e v i d e n c e d
art centers.
laboratories
of
opportu-
nities for innovation a n d experimentation, in addition to increased interest in the
is
complexes
Technetronic
America
centers of learning
along
s u r r o u n d i n g B o s t o n , 2 it is i n t h e a c a d e m i c - s c i e n t i f i c
by
is in
the
Route
128
conglomerates
a r o u n d L o s A n g e l e s a n d S a n F r a n c i s c o ; a n d it is i n t h e n e w tier industries. T h e s u b u r b a n m i d d l e class i n c r e a s i n g l y
fron-
gravitates
t o w a r d this A m e r i c a , t h o u g h f r e q u e n t l y r e s e n t i n g its scientism
and
nostalgically y e a r n i n g for m o r e c o m m u n i t y a n d stability. Industrial A m e r i c a — t h e second America—is in the
established
factories a n d steel mills of Detroit and Pittsburgh, w h o s e
skilled
blue-collar
of
workers
are
gradually
forgetting the
traumas
Great Depression and beginning to enjoy both security and but are fearful lest their n e w social position b e below.
For the
this
slums
of
racial
minority
second
industrial that
America big
is m o r e
cities,
lives
increasingly
difficult to
absorb
leisure
threatened
alongside
the
the
from
decaying
populated because
by
the
a so-
c i e t y w a s l a t e i n d r a w i n g it i n t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l a g e . F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s t h e o r i g i n a l , t h e first A m e r i c a , t h e A m e r i c a of sharecroppers
pre-industrial
and migrant workers from the
Missis-
sippi delta and of obsolescent miners from Appalachia, w h o s e
in-
The Third American Revolution come access
has fallen behind to
education
is
the American considerably
nation, a n d racial discrimination
average.
less
is o v e r t .
than 3
In
{
this
201
America
elsewhere
This America
in is
the seek-
ing to enter both the industrial and the post-industrial ages, and to do
s o it m u s t
obtain
the
assistance
of
the n e w
America,
whose
v a l u e s a n d c o n c e p t s it o f t e n m i s t r u s t s a n d r a r e l y s h a r e s . The new
A m e r i c a is o n l y n o w
taking shape. "Today,
not
only
does a child face a radical rupture w i t h the past, b u t h e m u s t trained for a n u n k n o w n future. A n d this task confronts t h e society as well." philosophical
4
T h e current transformation also poses
issues
concerning
the
very
essence
of
of
scientific p o w e r
over both
self.* Studies of c h a n g e 5 society undergoing
man's
environment
profound
social
e n c e , s i n c e it is l a r g e l y d e r i v e d f r o m a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d and
be
entire
exist-
expansion man
him-
cumulatively reinforce the picture of
a far-reaching,
technologically
induced
a
revo-
lution.
The Pace and Thrust of Progress T h e facts reflecting c h a n g e in A m e r i c a are familiar a n d f o r e n e e d n o t b e r e l a t e d i n d e t a i l . T h e r e i s , first o f a l l , t h e expansion knowledge.
in
the
sector
of
This
means
a
society
concerned
significant
with
growth—more
theremassive
science
and
rapid
than
that in the other s e c t o r s — i n the n u m b e r of scientists, college dents,
and,
of
course,
the
institutions
that
nurture
them.f
stuAs
a
0 The discussion in the first section of Part I of this book is particularly relevant to understanding contemporary America, since it deals with the basic differences between an industrial and a technetronic society, t The scale of that change can be illustrated by a few figures. College enrollments increased by 45 per cent in the years 1964-1969. In 1965 more than 50 per cent of all adults were high-school graduates; in 1900 the corresponding figure was only one per cent! (For background data, see A. J. Marrow, D. G. Bowers, S. E. Seashore, Management by Participation, New York, 1967.) The number of teachers increased from about 1.3 million in *954 to about 2.1 million a decade later; the number of engineers grew from about half a million to almost a million. An OECD study of American science estimates that between 1963 and 1970 the scientific population of the United States will have grown from 2.7 million to 4 million, with doctorates
202 }
TV:
The American
Transition
result, t h e u n i v e r s i t y h a s e m e r g e d as t h e c r e a t i v e c o r e of t h e sive learning-communications complex, the source of m u c h tic a n d international influence,
strategic
the university
innovation.
is d i s p l a c i n g
of t h e m o r e traditional A m e r i c a :
mas-
domes-
In social prestige
the
equivalent
and
institutions
the church and big
business.
T h e emphasis on science and learning goes h a n d in h a n d the
rationalization
teaching,
of
techniques
and
the
managerial,
computing,
and
communications
introduction
w h i c h are altering established practices a n d c h a n g i n g
of
the
meth-
national
information grid that will integrate existing electronic data already
being
knowledge.
6
developed
Increasingly
to
pool
swamped
the
libraries
nations may
a two-thousand-page
parency
smaller
than
feasible
for every
the
soon
small
book can be reduced
average college
book
to
page;
possess
a
banks
accumulated find
by shifting to the ultramicrofiche technique, pioneered b y by which
new
devices,
ods u s e d to store a n d retrieve accumulated k n o w l e d g e . A
is
with
relief NASA,
to a
trans-
this will m a k e library
inferior
none.7 T h o u g h American educational theorists disagree about d e g r e e to w h i c h t h e educational systems c a n adapt the n e w niques, their debates reveal the extent to w h i c h technical
it to the
tech-
assimila-
tion rather than philosophical issues dominates their thinking.8 Contemporary and
the
pooling
rapid of
business puts a similar p r e m i u m
adaptation
resources,
and
of
new
techniques.
collective
on
This
organizational
frequent a n d systematic retraining of top personnel,
knowledge
requires efforts, and a
tie w i t h the centers of k n o w l e d g e . Linear p r o g r a m m i n g , a approach
to problems,
coordinated
teamwork,
and
the the close
systems
a highly
so-
in science increasing from 96,000 to 153,000 and those in engineering from 10,000 to 17,000. In 1869-1870, roughly at the beginning of America's industrial revolution, the number of all degrees awarded by institutions of higher learning was just under 10,000; in 1889-1890 it was 17,000; in i939~ 1 940> 216,000; a decade later it was 497,000; and in 1963-1964, 614,000. In the past twenty years investments in research and development have increased fifteenfold, expenditures in education sixfold, while the GNP has tripled (see Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," pp. 201, 206, 228; and Reviews of National Science Policy: United States, OECD, pp. 45, 54).
The Third American Revolution phisticated attitude t o w a r d h u m a n relations and labor are
becoming
the
dominant
According to Lawrence agement
Association,
fessional
management
features
of
{
psychology
managerial
processes.
Appley, chairman of the A m e r i c a n
the
number
societies
of
and
managers working
involved
with
in
dred
thousand
in
1962.
Operationally,
business
resembles a political hierarchy or a personal
fiefdom;
ingly similar to a systematic scientific undertaking
less
In
pro-
and
hunless
it is i n c r e a s that not
p r o d u c e s w h a t is k n o w n b u t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y s e e k s to e x p l o r e is t o
Man-
management
consultants has risen f r o m t e n t h o u s a n d in 1948 to o v e r six 9
203
only what
come.* summarizing
nology,
Daniel
the
Bell
social
listed
transformation
five
key
areas
wrought
of
change:
by "(1)
p r o d u c i n g m o r e g o o d s at less cost, t e c h n o l o g y has b e e n t h e engine
of
raising
the
living
standards
of
the
world.
. . .
techBy chief (2)
* "The new style of dealing with the future has no accepted, inclusive name, but the names of its more highly developed techniques have become familiar in the last ten years to most businessmen, government officials, military officers, scientists, and technicians. The techniques themselves, which are apt to be called 'systems analysis' or 'systems planning/ are now widely used both with and without the help of computers. 'Cost-benefit' or 'cost-effectiveness' analysis is a major ingredient of the new techniques; this involves ways of arraying ends and means so that decision makers have clearer ideas of the choices open to them and better ways of measuring results against both expectations and objectives. "Among characteristics of the new pattern are these: ( 1 ) A more open and deliberate attention to the selection of ends toward which planned action is directed, and an effort to improve planning by sharpening the definition of ends. ( 2 ) A more systematic advance comparison of means by criteria derived from the ends selected. ( 3 ) A more candid and effective assessment of results, usually including a system of keeping track of progress toward interim goals. Along with this goes a 'market-like' sensitivity to changing values and evolving ends. ( 4 ) An effort, often intellectually strenuous, to mobilize science and other specialized knowledge into a flexible framework of information and decision so that specific responsibilities can be assigned to the points of greatest competence. ( 5 ) An emphasis on information, prediction, and persuasion, rather than on coercive or authoritarian power, as the main agents of coordinating the separate elements of an effort. ( 6 ) An increased capability of predicting the combined effect of several lines of simultaneous action on one another; this can modify policy so as to reduce unwanted consequences or it can generate other lines of action to correct or compensate for such predicted consequences" (Max Ways, "The Road to 1977/' Fortune, January 1967, pp. 9 4 - 9 5 ) .
204
}
TV:
The American
Transition
T e c h n o l o g y has created a n e w class, hitherto u n k n o w n in of
the
engineer
created
a new
and
The
. . .
of
a new
in
transportation
technology,
have
and
created
d e p e n d e n c i e s a n d n e w social interactions. ceptions, altered." To
(3)
society,
Technology mode
of
has
thought,
functional relations and the quantitative.
revolutions
consequence
technician.
definition of rationality,
which emphasizes (4)
the
particularly
of
space
and
. . .
communication, new . . .
time,
as
economic (5)
have
Esthetic
been
a
interper-
radically
10
these
should
be
added
the
new
sense
of
self-awareness
i n d u c e d b y society's increasing ability to see itself
in t h e
mirror
provided b y television, buttressed b y increased reliance o n
statis-
tical analysis,* a n d intensified b y a systematic p r e o c c u p a t i o n
with
m a n a g i n g not only the present b u t the future. Moreover, for perhaps the
first
t i m e in its h i s t o r y A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y is b e g i n n i n g
acquire a national outlook o n s u c h matters as race a n d
hence, inadequacies in o n e sector are n o longer a matter of tive indifference to another prompts
a
more
deliberate,
social inadequacies, injustice w i t h over-all
and
a more
region or class or minority. less
haphazard
effort
operational preoccupation Man's
with
inhumanity
rela-
All
to
at
social
improving
to m a n
was
tainly easier to accept in a setting in w h i c h h u m a n relations distant,
class
interests
were
compartmentalized,
and
this
identify
it t h e r e b y links m o r a l o u t r a g e
social performance.
to
poverty;
social
cerwere con-
science w a s rarely a r o u s e d b y visible injustice. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e is n o t o n l y u n d e n i a b l y r a p i d p r o g r e s s i n
many
areas a n d increased social awareness of existing failings, b u t the intensification of old p r o b l e m s lenges. can's makes
The
economic
material the
lot
has
American
base
that
expanded per-capita
and the posing
determines in
recent
GNP
the years
increase
at
of n e w
average at
a
chalAmeri-
pace
a rate
also
that
greater
than that enjoyed either b y other advanced societies or b y
those
* It is useful to recall that a century ago a citizen would rarely, if ever, see the charts, graphs, and tables that a contemporary American reads almost daily in his press and that are a standard feature of any report or study.
The Third American Revolution
{
205
that are b e c o m i n g so.11 This c h a n g e has b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d in years
1959-1967
income
by
distribution
significant,
even
in patterns
of
accelerating,
employment
shifts
the in
(see
Tables
11 a n d 1 2 ) . T h e s e shifts i n d i c a t e t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e
middle
levels of A m e r i c a n
and
and
society, a development
of greater social e g a l i t a r i a n i s m
but
not only
symptomatic
also significantly
relevant
the political aspects of the current A m e r i c a n transition
TABLE 1 1 .
(on
to
which
CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND IN EMPLOYMENT
Percentage of Families with Income of:
$ 5 0 0 0 - $ 15,000
1959 3-1 52.3
1963 54 58.3
Under $5000
44.6
36.2
Over $15,000
1959-1963 Change +23
1963-1967 Change
1967 12.2 62.7
+6.0
+6.8
+4.4 — 11.1 25.1 Based on "Consumer Income," Current Population Reports, Department of Commerce, August 5, 1968, pp. 2-7. The data in this table are based on income only, prior to deductions for taxes. However, the report states, "Even after allowance for changes in consumer prices, family income has risen by to 4 percent in each of the last 4 years" (p. 1). TABLE 12.
-8.4
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT IN PERCENTAGES
White-Collar 1958 1967
Blue-Collar
42.6 46.0
Service
Farm
11.9 12.5
8.5 4.8
37.1 36.7
Source: Manpower Report of the President, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., April 1968, p. 232. more later). In addition to these over-all percentages, note be
taken
of
the
fact that as of
the
end
of
the
1960s
should
Americans
o w n e d close to 70 million automobiles, that 95 per cent of
Ameri-
can households h a d at least o n e television set a n d 25 per cent at least t w o , a n d that o v e r 6 0 p e r c e n t of A m e r i c a n f a m i l i e s their o w n homes.12 D e s p i t e the indisputable persistence of in the United
States, A m e r i c a n
s o c i e t y is a c h i e v i n g
an
had
owned poverty
unprece-
d e n t e d affluence t h a t t o u c h e s all classes. That
poverty
documented
in
besets recent
millions years,
of
and
Americans the
has
majority's
been
amply
indifference
to
l 9 8 }
IV:
The American
Transition
this p r o b l e m h a s b e e n at least s o m e w h a t shaken. T h e p o v e r t y w a s initially defined, b y arbitrary a n d very b r o a d
as i n c o m e less t h a n $ 3 0 0 0 per a n n u m for a f a m i l y of four, or for an individual. acute
hardship
even more
There
is n o
for most,
debilitating
doubt
and
even
that
such
a level
malnutrition
is t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l
line
approximation,
sense
$1500
involves
for many, of
but
deprivation
in relationship to the society's over-all w e a l t h . * N o n e t h e l e s s , too the p a c e of e c o n o m i c growth, c o m b i n e d w i t h m o r e
efforts, h a s b r o u g h t progress: f r o m 1961 to 1969 t h e g r o u p the poverty line—as defined b y the Social Security
13 per c e n t of t h e population.13
below
Administration
a n d taking into a c c o u n t t h e rise in p r i c e s — d r o p p e d cent to
here
deliberate
Moreover,
from 22
t h e C o u n c i l of E c o n o m i c A d v i s o r s ' R e p o r t of e a r l y 1 9 6 9 , if 1968 rates in r e d u c i n g the n u m b e r of poor persons are "poverty"
will
be
entirely
eliminated
in
ten
years;
the
five
a cost of $9.7 billion annually
GNP
(one
p e r c e n t of t h e
1968
years and
58 per
In
cent
of
1966
their
the
median
g r o w n to 60 per cent.14 housing, inhabited
poor by
schooling, a much
at 5
budget).
Poverty has p l a g u e d particularly, but not exclusively, the Americans,
to
1961-
continued, if
r a t e s a r e c o n t i n u e d , it w i l l d i s a p p e a r i n a little o v e r
p e r c e n t of the federal
per
according
nation-wide income
Blacks and
greater
of
median
income
whites;
by
black
was
1968
are the principal victims of unemployment. percentage
of
The blacks
only
this
had poor
urban
slums,
than
whites
( a n d blacks in the U n i t e d States t o d a y are m o r e h i g h l y
urbanized
than whites),
the
impose
living conditions
phases of industrialization—and
reminiscent
of
all t h e m o r e i n t o l e r a b l e
worst
because
t h e y are n o longer a part of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h b u t a vestigial m i n d e r of a n a g e w h i c h A m e r i c a is i n c r e a s i n g l y l e a v i n g
re-
behind.
Nevertheless, here too economic growth and the appearance
of
* It is this psychological dimension that some foreign commentators neglect when they comment, with a touch of envy, on the United States' definition of poverty. For example, . . America draws its poverty line at levels that would be considered generous abroad. Amid all the sad statistics poured forth about the ghettos, it is worth remembering that in 1967 some 88 per cent of all black American families had a television set" ("The Neurotic Trillionaire," The Economist, special issue, May 10, 1969, p. 51).
The Third American Revolution
{ 207
n e w social values m a k e accelerating progress visible. T h e
obvious
breakthroughs h a v e b e e n o n t h e legal level of civil rights, cially in e d u c a t i o n on the economic
and housing,
level.
In
but they have
also taken
1961, 5 6 per cent of A m e r i c a n
w e r e classified as poor, b u t b y
1969 the
figure
place blacks
had dropped to
per cent; in 1956, o n l y 9 p e r cent of N e g r o families h a d of m o r e than $7000, b u t b y
espe-
incomes
1968 this h a d g r o w n to 28 p e r
and the m e d i a n income of a black family w a s $5360.15
cent,
Between
i 9 6 0 a n d 1966 the n u m b e r of blacks in professional, technical, managerial jobs doubled,
and
substandard
housing
to a Gallup poll, b e t w e e n
1963 and
and
occupied
blacks d r o p p e d from 4 0 p e r cent in i 9 6 0 to 2 4 per cent in According
33
1969 the
by
1968.
number
of blacks expressing satisfaction w i t h their jobs increased f r o m per cent to 76 per cent, a n d the n u m b e r of those blacks
54
satisfied
with their housing rose from 43 per cent to 50 per cent.16 E x t e n s i v e c h a n g e is a l s o t a k i n g p l a c e i n A m e r i c a ' s o v e r - a l l tural
life.
Increased
education,
greater
leisure,
and
unconscious reaction to the danger that technology cultural
emptiness
have
led
to
a
heightened
cul-
perhaps could
interest
in
an
breed music,
d r a m a , a n d t h e v i s u a l arts. T h i s h a s n o t o n l y i n v o l v e d a s p u r t the
construction
of
art
centers
and
renewed
life
for
in
American
m u s e u m s b u t has also led to t h e extensive a d o p t i o n of n e w
tech-
niques—such
make
easily
as
available
required
a
video in the
great
tape
or
home
expenditure
stereophonic
sound—to
cultural
pleasures
of
and
time
that
money.
previously
In
addition,
closed-circuit television has o p e n e d u p n e w opportunities for both local
and
even
home-based
university-
or
museum-sponsored
adult education. Culture and education have therefore ceased b e aristocratic privileges; they h a v e increasingly b e c o m e an available to more
and more
ostentatious s y m b o l of n e w Economic
progress
Americans—as
well
as a
people
higher education.
from
and elevated
families with
Of the
sometimes
opulence. social expectations
cipitated an influx into colleges a n d universities of large of y o u n g
to
option
no
previous
have
pre-
numbers
background
s o m e 4.3 million family-supported
lege students in 1966, 63 p e r cent c a m e from h o m e s in w h i c h
of colthe
227
}
TV:
The American
Transition
h e a d of the family h a d n e v e r c o m p l e t e d a single y e a r in
college.
M o r e s t r i k i n g still is t h e f a c t t h a t 3 0 p e r c e n t , o r a l m o s t
one-half
of t h e
above
63 per
cent,
came
from homes
in w h i c h
the
of the family h a d not h a d e v e n four years of h i g h school.17 1
head
During
963-i9f>9 the n u m b e r of m a l e blacks w h o h a d c o m p l e t e d a
high-
school education increased from 36 to 60 per cent; the n u m b e r those w h o
had
obtained
college
degrees
almost
doubled
in
just
t w o years, f r o m 4 per cent in 1963 to 7.5 per cent in 1965.18 A s the late 1960s, 83 per c e n t of sixteen- to seventeen-year-old
of
of
black
A m e r i c a n s w e r e still i n s c h o o l , a n d t h e p r o p o r t i o n g o i n g t o c o l l e g e was
higher
than that for the same
age
bracket in Western
Eu-
rope.19 the
extent
that
important
To
means
of
figures Thus, from
higher
social
education
advancement
has in
become
America,
are e v i d e n c e of potentially significant u p w a r d as of
1969 some
blue-collar,
37 per cent of
service,
or
farm
all c o l l e g e
families.20
the
most
the
above
movement.
students
0
came
Educational
back-
ground a n d intellectual-scientific achievement are increasingly
be-
c o m i n g t h e m e a s u r e of s o c i a l w o r t h . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t is of
par-
ticular i m p o r t a n c e to race relations.
Neither the hucksters
cut nor the Horatio A l g e r story offers m u c h incentive or
short
promise
to millions of y o u n g blacks, b u t m a s s education, c o m b i n e d w i t h the e c o n o m y ' s e x p a n d e d n e e d s , d o e s p r o v i d e a w i d e c h a n n e l f o r satisfying individual ambitions o n a socially significant scale. tion could therefore serve as the point of departure for a
socially
egalitarian
and
politically
democratic
Educaattaining
multi-racial
ciety. T h e attainment of s u c h a society w o u l d b e a historic
so-
victory
* One related and intriguing aspect of this development is the increasing entrance into the country's political elite of previously nonparticipating ethnic and racial groups. Jews, Negroes, Italians, and, to a lesser extent, Poles and Greeks, have been making an appearance in the national government on levels and on a scale previously rarely attained by non-" WASPS." While precise statistics are not available, these new "elites"—whose Americanism is sometimes as intense as it is new—may have had something to do with the reappearance of the activist, nationalist, dynamic orientation noted by David Riesman in his "Some Questions about the Study of American National Character in the Twentieth Century," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1967, especially p. 47.
The Third American Revolution for mankind,
vulnerable
for the
brutal fact
is that
{ 209
race relations
are
most
to the irrational forces of h u m a n motivation: the visual,
instinctive,
exclusivistic
selection that operates
almost
automati-
cally o n the racial front.
The Uncertainty of Progress But
it m u s t i m m e d i a t e l y
becomes
be
added
such a society—indeed,
America
fully
i n o r d e r f o r it t o b e c o m e
that
before
such
a s o c i e t y — t h e u n a s s i m i l a t e d l e g a c y of industrial A m e r i c a as
well
as t h e u n u s u a l p r o b l e m s i n h e r e n t in t h e A m e r i c a n transition to technetronic
society
must
first
be
surmounted.
The
initially
luctant b u t increasingly w i d e s p r e a d social recognition of the that t h e p a s t h a s still to b e being
harnessed
has
settled
created
an
a l r e a d y t a k e n its toll a n d c o u l d g r o w An
economic
recession
with even
while
inflammable
fact
the n e w
situation
that
a
re-
is has
worse.
thwarting
aroused
hopes
would
have
especially calamitous c o n s e q u e n c e s for the stability of the
Ameri-
c a n social order. M u c h
econo-
clearly depends on the expanding
my's capacity to absorb a n d ameliorate existing tensions. growth
at
a
relatively
stable
and
high
three a n d a half per cent per annum, tions, s e e m s
to b e the
sine qua non
rate
of
Economic
approximately
allowing for annual for the continued
of A m e r i c a n society t o w a r d a situation in w h i c h liberty a n d ity will buttress b u t not vitiate o n e another.
T h i s is
varia-
evolution equal-
particularly
true of p o v e r t y a n d race relations, in w h i c h e v e n social g o o d
will
will b e powerless to a c c o m p l i s h m u c h in t h e e v e n t of a significant economic slowdown. poor
and
the
The
blacks,
first
who
victims of a recession will b e always
absorb
a m o u n t of the suffering, o w i n g to e c o n o m i c
a
the
disproportionate
malfunction.®
Unfortunately, it is not even certain that the relatively strong pace of economic growth in the 1960s will suffice to liquidate the * The 3.2 per cent unemployment figure at the end of 1968 meant that 21.5 per cent of all black teen-agers were unemployed (for whites the corresponding figure was 11.6 per cent); and that 3.4 per cent of black men were without jobs (for whites the figure was 1.6 per cent).
2i o }
/V: The American
Transition
unfinished business of America's industrialization, b o t h in absolute t e r m s or relative to t h e g r o w t h of s o c i e t y at l a r g e . 0
Indeed,
what
a m o u n t s to the coexistence of t w o rather separate A m e r i c a n
econ-
omies—the
lagging
and
even
creasingly exposed to more
decaying
industrial
economy
effective foreign competition,
(in-
highly
vulnerable to cyclical swings, and e m p l o y i n g the poorer and skilled workers) and the expanding technetronic e c o n o m y on
aerospace
and
better-trained, made
other
frontier
better-educated,
the assimilation
and
industries and
and
(based
employing
better-paid
upgrading
less
the
workers)—has
of the poorer segments
of
A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y m o r e difficult. T h i s g a p is c o m p l i c a t i n g t h e efforts to c r e a t e a racial
harmony
based on both liberty and equality. T h e N e g r o should have integrated into American revolution.
society
during
the American
Unfortunately, that revolution c a m e
before
America,
if n o t t h e N e g r o , w a s r e a d y f o r f u l l i n t e g r a t i o n . If t h e b l a c k ican h a d represented only an e c o n o m i c legacy of the
been
industrial
Amer-
pre-industrial
age, perhaps h e could have b e e n more effectively integrated the industrial age. But racial prejudice kept h i m from the
necessary
more
skills.
advanced
The
American
problem
is c u m u l a t i v e ,
urban-industrial
regions
and
today
are
difficult to integrate b l a c k s — b o t h a racial minority a n d only feudal legacy—precisely
because
these regions
into
acquiring
finding
it
America's
are
into a n e w a n d m o r e c o m p l e x phase that requires m o r e
the
moving
developed
s o c i a l skills. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , it c a n b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e S o u t h
today
* With a 4 per cent growth in GNP (in constant dollars, which is higher than the average growth since i 9 6 0 ) , there are likely to be close to 17 million in poor households in 1974 compared to 26 million in 1967. Of these, more than 4 million will be families headed by non-aged working males compared to 10 million in 1967" (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Toward a Social Report, Washington, D.C., p. 47). "In 1947 the poorest 20 per cent of the population received 5 per cent of the income, and it held this same 5 per cent share in 1964. . . . The second lowest fifth got 12 per cent in 1947 and 12 per cent in 1964. In short, 40 per cent of the American people were held to a 17 per cent share of the income throughout the entire postwar period. The 5 per cent at the top got about the same proportion as that 40 per cent" (Michael Harrington, Toward a Democratic Left, New York, 1968, p. 26).
The Third American Revolution
{
211
stands a better long-range chance of fully integrating the blacks: American consciousness is changing, the black has awakened, and the American South is beginning to move into the industrial age. It might, if it moves rapidly enough, take the black along with it.21 T h e larger q u e s t i o n still r e m a i n s : W i l l t h e p a c e of
development
be rapid enough to meet the challenge posed by the
simultaneous
and
mutually
reinforcing
processes
set
in
action
by
the
black
A m e r i c a n s awakening a n d b y his disillusionment w i t h the
Ameri-
can
black's
system?
Numerous
growing conviction
public-opinion
that h e
polls
record
the
out of
the
political system, to rely o n exclusiveness, e v e n o n violence, as
the
basic m e a n s of progress.
22
e n c e of w h i t e i m m i g r a n t
has no choice but to opt
This m o o d was absent from the groups, which
on the whole
experi-
aspired
enter the A m e r i c a n c o m m u n i t y as rapidly as possible. I n
m a n y blacks see in exclusiveness a n d in building a separate munity longer
the
only
way
necessarily
to
the
implies
future—a
future
eventual
merger
an
that
to
with
to
contrast, com-
them
no
the
larger
of
blacks
American society. N o r is it c e r t a i n t h a t t h e e n t r a n c e of l a r g e n u m b e r s into integrated Though
universities
this d e v e l o p m e n t
ticipation
of
the
black
factors point to an increased
black
to alleviate racial
is n e c e s s a r y to p r o m o t e the
increase
educational
uncertain that
in
will help
United
States,
tensions.
full-scale
several
par-
short-term
in racial tensions as a result of
opportunities graduates
will
for blacks. in fact
First of
obtain
the
magnified by
the predisposition
of s o m e blacks to insist o n
intelligentsia of the global ghettos;
finally,
be sep-
academic
standards, w h i c h will inevitably p r o d u c e in g r o w i n g n u m b e r s A m e r i c a n equivalent of the frustrated a n d b a d l y e d u c a t e d
is
positions
t h e y w i l l f e e l e n t i t l e d t o ; ° s e c o n d l y , this difficulty is l i k e l y to
arate "black studies" programs, not subject to prevailing
the
all, it
the
pseudo-
as the A m e r i c a n
black
* New York City statistics indicate, for example, that white dropouts have better employment opportunities tiian black high-school graduates ( T h e Negro Almanac, New York, 1967, chart on p. 292).
2 i o }
/V:
The American
Transition
gains self-confidence a n d as his social position improves, h e temporarily b e less responsive to the a r g u m e n t that his d e p e n d s o n cooperation w i t h whites, a n d his s h a r p e n e d
may
progress awareness
of social injustice is likely to b e e x p r e s s e d in a m o r e r a d i c a l political p o s t u r e t h a t is i n d i f f e r e n t t o w h i t e The
problem
broader White build
society a
of
question
race
of
may
better
the
relations place
continue
society/'
inferior social condition
of to
but
the
sensitivities.
gives
added
violence
proclaim black
in that
will
as t h e basic reality.
urgency
to
American "violence
continue To
the
cannot
to
see
m u n i t y t o r e d r e s s injustices, t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t v i o l e n c e is to
black
progress
becomes
stronger
and
stronger.
other hand, this reliance o n v i o l e n c e t e n d s to blur the
his
extent
violence precipitates bursts of reform d e s i g n e d b y t h e w h i t e
sary
the
society.
that com-
neces-
On
distinction,
important to the functioning of any society, b e t w e e n political criminal violence fugitive?),
and
( w a s Eldridge Cleaver a political or a
re-
pressions b y society at large a n d rationalizations of v i o l e n c e b y
the
more
so-
and
prompts
educated
both
legally
segments;
formalized
and
criminal
massive
liberal
it
the
either
result
destroys
ciety's c a p a c i t y for discriminating b e t w e e n the necessity for order a n d t h e imperative of
change.
A s o c i e t y ' s c a p a c i t y f o r m a k i n g s u c h j u d g m e n t s is b o u n d t o undermined
by
the
degree
to w h i c h
it b e c o m e s
be
psychologically
inured to living w i t h violence a n d to a c c e p t i n g v i o l e n c e as a m e a n s f o r s o l v i n g its p r o b l e m s . T h a t A m e r i c a ' s s o c i a l history, as w e l l its p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y , h a s b e e n v i o l e n t is n o t d i s p u t e d . T h a t
as
America
h a s b e e n a m o r e v i o l e n t s o c i e t y t h a n o t h e r s is d e b a t a b l e . * B u t
the
° The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, in its report "Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives" (New York, 1969), states: "Despite its frequency, civil strife in the United States has taken much less destructive forms than in many non-Western and some Western countries. . . . The nation has experienced no internal wars since the Civil War and almost none of the chronic revolutionary conspiracy and terrorism that plagued dozens of other nations. . . . "Although about two hundred and twenty Americans died in violent civil strife in the 5 years before mid-1968, the rate of 1.1 per million population was infinitesimal compared with the average of all nations of 238 deaths per
The Third American Revolution
{
question of violence g o e s b e y o n d statistics or e v e n race
213
relations;
it i n v o l v e s t h e b a s i c p a t t e r n of a n a t i o n ' s culture® a n d t h e w a y
in
w h i c h a s o c i e t y s o l v e s its p r o b l e m s . Today adept
the
problems
psychological
of
poverty
sensitivity
to
or
of
race
nuances
and
relations
demand
restraint
in
ancing many complex and competing individual and group This
is a p o i n t
which
many
impatient
reformers
overlook.
assimilation of a n y ethnically or racially distinctive g r o u p into m a j o r i t y c u l t u r e is p o s s i b l e o n l y i n a c o n t e x t o f s t a b l e
bal-
rights. The the
institutions
a n d v a l u e s e x p r e s s e d i n o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e s . It is p o s s i b l e t o m a i n tain majority d o m i n a t i o n b y v i o l e n c e or to reverse t h e p o w e r tions b e t w e e n races b y violent revolution, but to create ious race relations a society must b e conditioned to accept peacefully
and
to
resolve
social
issues
nonviolently.!
rela-
harmonchange
But
this
million, and less than the European average of 2.4 per million" (pp. 7 9 9 800). On the other hand, a later report by the same commission points out that "a comparison of reported violent crime rates in this country with those in other modern, stable nations shows the United States rape rate clear leader. Our homicide rate is more than twice that of our closest competitor, Finland, and from 4 to 12 times higher than the rates in a dozen other advanced countries, including Japan, Canada, England and Norway" (as cited by The New York Times, November 24, 1969). 0 Though it may not be more violent than other societies, contemporary America is psychologically permeated by violence. This is not only—and not even largely—because of the dramatic assassinations of the 1960s. It is above all attributable to American television, almost entirely controlled by three profit-oriented corporations and only loosely checked by the national government. In 1969 the University of Pennsylvania School of Communications reported in the research study prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence that in two weeks of viewing the three major networks from 4:00 to 10:00 P.M. it had counted 790 persons killed or injured in television dramas (not news reports), and that it had found 15 acts of violence for every hour of television viewing (as reported in The New York Times, July 6, 1969). To this dubious record should be added sensation-seeking "documentaries" such as NBC's "exclusive interview," prominently advertised in advance, with Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy's convicted assassin, filmed (according to NBC's advertisements) "the day after Sirhan was formally sentenced to die." For a perceptive discussion of the television magnates' attitude toward their educational-social responsibilities, see Harrington, Toward a Democratic Left> pp. 19-20. t This is not to deny that violence did play a constructive social role at
214}
The American
automatically
Transition
tends to strengthen the forces that oppose
change,
w h e t h e r t h e s e f o r c e s r e p r e s e n t e n t r e n c h e d interests or, m o r e
gen-
erally, i n g r a i n e d social or racial attitudes. A social setting in w h i c h a
large
change
part
of
the
and
to
equate
population order
comes
with
to
the
identify
absence
violence
of
setting in w h i c h an escalation of conflict b e c o m e s
with
change
is
a
unavoidable.
The Futility of Politics The
responsiveness
of
political
institutions
c h a n g e is of g r e a t i m p o r t t o A m e r i c a ' s f u t u r e .
to
the
need
for
S o m e citizens
see
the p r e s e n t A m e r i c a n s y s t e m as i n c a p a b l e not o n l y of the
needed
social
changes
but
even
of
reacting
to
promoting
pressure
behalf of s u c h c h a n g e s . In such a setting, p r o c e d u r e s a n d tions that in t i m e s of stability are v a u n t e d for their
institu-
deliberateness
b e c o m e in t i m e s of m o r e rapid c h a n g e e x a m p l e s of delay, ciency, and even fundamental
on
ineffi-
injustice.*
different stages of history. In overthrowing tyranny or in defying exploitation, violence has often acted as history's scalpel. The exaltation of historical violence should not, however, be carried too far. Barrington Moore, in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966), suggests that the physical cost of revolutionary regimes should not be held against them, for the absence of a revolution might have been even more costly. He does not, however, examine the possibility that the reforms undertaken by revolutionary regimes, often with monstrous brutality, might have been less physically costly if alternative schemes of reform successfully undertaken by other nations had been followed. Indeed, it can be argued that much of the violence undertaken by revolutionary regimes was in fact dysfunctional to the positive tasks they had set themselves. The real comparison, therefore, should be between the physical costs of alternative ways of changing society rather than between the cost of not changing it and the cost of changing it by very violent means. Historical judgments aside, it is noteworthy that modern man is still educated in terms that promote aggressive feelings. In the West, films and television emphasize violence, and the teaching of history stresses wars, victories, defeats, and conflict between "good" and "bad" nations. These aggressive instincts are also expressed by children's games as well as by adult forms of entertainment. In communist countries ideology similarly stimulates aggressive feelings and hostility toward "evil" forces, thus continuing the more fundamental dichotomies introduced by the religious tradition. 0 American justice is a particularly glaring example. It is as antiquated as it is often absurd. It appears to have benefited neither by the legal reforms
The Third American Revolution The government
{
215
as a n expression of the national will
increas-
ingly tends to b e s e e n as u n a b l e to direct a n d coordinate
national
c h a n g e effectively. It a p p e a r s neither to articulate national nor to d e v e l o p
a sense of national
direction.
This feeling
c e r t a i n t y a b o u t n a t i o n a l p u r p o s e is a l s o m a g n i f i e d b y
goals of
the
un-
fading
of the established political elite that has g u i d e d the nation
since
W o r l d W a r II. P r i m a r i l y c o m p o s e d of m e n c o m i n g f r o m t h e
east-
ern
high
seaboard
financial
and
connected
with
legal,
corporate,
circles, t h e political elite p r o v i d e d a s e n s e of
within
the
framework
nature
and
character
of of
a
pragmatic
modern
stability of t h e late 1940s a n d t h e L a t e l y this elite has c o m e
under
liberal
industrial
and
continuity
consensus
society.
The
1950s reflected that increasing challenge
on
the
relative
consensus. both
from
the newer, geographically m o r e dispersed economic interests
asso-
ciated with the n e w scientific-defense a n d frontier industries,
and
from the more ideologically inclined intellectual forces, w h i c h
are
becoming more The
breakup
influential. of
the
postwar
elite
highlights
the
dichotomy
carried out decades ago in Europe, nor even by the English pattern of relatively swift justice. Its extraordinarily cumbersome procedures, dominated by theatrical stratagems and showmanship and involving lengthy and complex appeals, lead to delays and even occasionally to results that defy the most elementary concepts of justice. The trial of Martin Luther King's killer —during which period Ray's lawyers competed in selling his memoirs—was a travesty; Sirhan Sirhan's protracted show in Los Angeles was hardly dictated by the needs of abstract justice; highly paid "exclusives" by the killers of Sharon Tate were a disgrace. Soviet secret trials are certainly deplorable, but are American judicial circuses really needed to protect the defendant and render fair judgment? At the same time, the intermeshing of private and public interests, exemplified by the outside economic interests of congressmen and senators, reinforces many Americans' inclination to dismiss the political process as dominated by inherently conservative, socially unresponsive, profit-oriented interests. For example, 8 members of the House Commerce Committee have financial interests in railroads, airlines, radio stations, and moving companies, all of which come under their legislative purview; 90 members of the House, including 12 on the Banking Committee, have interests in banks, savings and loan associations, or bank holding companies; 77 members, including 19 on the Judiciary Committee, maintain private law practices; 44 members have interests in oil or gas companies, and so on. (The New York Times, Mav n , 1969).
2 i o }
/V:
The American
Transition
b e t w e e n the qualities n e c e s s a r y to g a i n political p o w e r in
Ameri-
can d e m o c r a c y a n d those necessary to exercise effective leadership of t h a t d e m o c r a c y . T h e c o u r t s h i p of t h e p r e s s a n d t h e m a s s
media
is a n e c e s s a r y c o n c o m i t a n t o f c o u r t i n g t h e m a s s e s , s i n c e t h e
masses
are influenced not only b y direct appeal but also through the t e r m e d i a r y o f a n " i m a g e , " w h i c h is i n p a r t b u i l t u p b y t h e themselves.
The
advocating
the
desirability immediately
of
this
image
popular
and
puts
the
a
in-
media
premium
fashionable
on
rather
than on formulating broader objectives b y focusing attention basic philosophical questions concerning the m e a n i n g of a
on
modern
society. Since social c o n s e n s u s has b e e n f r a g m e n t e d b y the p a c e of change
and
society's
value
structure
has
itself
tactical, t h e larger strategic questions t e n d to b e
become
highly
obscured.
T o m a k e matters worse, the American institutional
framework
has not k e p t u p w i t h t h e p a c e of societal c h a n g e . G i v e n t h e try's
enormous
transformation
communications
through
industrial
m o b i l i t y , its f e d e r a l a r r a n g e m e n t s
increasingly d e v o i d of e c o n o m i c or g e o g r a p h i c arrangements vested
are
interests,
kept
alive
rather
by
than
by
local
actual
growth have
and
become
substance.
traditional
their
coun-
These
sentiment
functional
and
utility.
T h e price of this has primarily b e e n p a i d b y the n e w b i g
cities,
for w h o s e
little
allow-
of the
means
growth
ance and which
the constitutional
have consequently
of coping w i t h their
structure m a d e been
deprived
dilemmas.
T h e national government, particularly because of the
two-party
s y s t e m , h a s a l s o f o u n d it difficult t o d e v e l o p t h e n e e d e d
mecha-
nisms for openly channeling the n e w major competitive forces
on
t h e p o l i t i c a l s c e n e , a n d it still o p e r a t e s as if t h e p o l i t i c a l
"game"
revolved
interest
around
the
two
relatively
loose
alliances
of
g r o u p s that largely reflected the industrial-rural d i l e m m a s of earlier
age.
In
general,
that
arrangement
had
been
the
effective
in
expressing, as w e l l as moderating, the p o p u l a r will a n d in striking a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n c o n t i n u i t y a n d c h a n g e . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is w o r t h noting that in past times party system
occasionally
of stress a n d sharper c h o i c e s broke up, though
only
the
two-
temporarily.
It
The Third American Revolution
{
217
w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t t h e b r e a k u p of t h e t w o - p a r t y s y s t e m is under way, precisely because become
intensified b y
the dilemmas
the extraordinary
again
of t h e c o u n t r y
pace
of c h a n g e
have
and
by
t h e w i d e n i n g s p e c t r u m o f o f t e n i n c o m p a t i b l e c h o i c e s it s t i m u l a t e s . As work
a result, t h e no
longer
political
forces:
industrial-rural adequately
the
or liberal-conservative
encompasses
existing
frame-
competitive
agrarian-conservative-anti-communist
largely congressionally based bastion; the n e w
scientific conglomerates that uneasily collaborate w i t h the
former
o n political-ideological g r o u n d s b u t are in conflict w i t h it in of economic
thrust;
and
the
emerging,
very
and
industrial-military-
loose,
terms
welfare-civil
rights-intellectual coalition that shares s o m e of the second's e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c s b u t is i n b a s i c conflict w i t h b o t h t h e
socio-
first
the s e c o n d in t h e m a t t e r of priorities. T h e t w o latter forces operated largely outside of direct participation in the process
of
the
country,
and
so reflect the
degree
to
and have
legislative which
representative aspects of A m e r i c a n d e m o c r a c y h a v e failed to
the keep
u p with social change.® Several political sub-Americas thus coexist uneasily, a n d America
is b e g i n n i n g
America
tends
American
to
to project
reality.
The
think
of
onto
the
relationship
itself
as
whole
an
entity,
its o w n
between
these
each
sub-
perception
of
sub-Americas
is t h e r e f o r e t e n s e ; e a c h t e n d s t o s e e k its o w n p o l i t i c a l rather than to m e r g e in t h e larger w h o l e . In the 1968 contest, Robert K e n n e d y
though
expression presidential
personified the politics of anxiety,
pas-
0 The heavy representation of small-town lawyers is symptomatic of this condition. In contrast, the first National Assembly of France's Fifth Republic contained 67 professors and teachers, 48 medical men, 45 high professional civil servants, 34 lawyers, 32 workers, 27 businessmen, 25 scientists and engineers, 20 journalists, and so on. It is evident that from a representative standpoint the French Assembly more accurately reflected the character of a relatively modern society. The benefits of greater scientific competence in society's representative bodies are beginning to be recognized in Britain: The House of Commons would benefit enormously by having, say, 50 engineers who could ensure that parliamentary discussions were more closely geared to the technical realities of the day," Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Minister of Technology, wrote in his weekly magazine Engineering News (quoted by the Associated Press, August 21, 1965).
2i o }
/V:
The American
Transition
sionately articulating t h e grievances of the u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d though h e shared the fears and uncertainties of established icans
who
sensed
and
desired
major
k n o w w h a t that c h a n g e ought to be; petulant
spokesman
of
the
change
23
politics
but
did
even Amer-
not
quite
Eugene McCarthy was
of
nostalgia,
the
lackadaisically
promising to take d o w n the fences around the W h i t e H o u s e
lawn,
responding to the suburbanites' desire for a pastoral life a n d social justice—provided
the
l a t t e r is i m p l e m e n t e d
from them; Hubert H u m p h r e y
for
at a
distance
p r e a c h e d t h e politics of
compro-
mise b e t w e e n classes a n d races, a n d his passion e v o k e d the conflict atmosphere of the N e w
Deal; George Wallace
class-
expressed
t h e politics of resentment, speaking for those A m e r i c a n s w h o that m u c h of the social a n d racial progress w a s b e i n g
at their e x p e n s e b y A m e r i c a n s w h o w e r e m o r e c o m f o r t a b l y lished; won
Richard
Nixon
practiced
because significant numbers
the
politics
of
caution,
and were
uncertain
estaband
of A m e r i c a n s f r o m t h e
s u b - A m e r i c a s b e c a m e f e a r f u l t h a t "their" A m e r i c a w a s as to w h a t t h e n e w
America
felt
promoted
he
several
endangered
might hold
in
store for them. This
inclination
potence
to
stress
personal
interests
felt b y
some
constituencies
national policy.
Many
citizens sensed
reflected
concerning change
the
the
shaping
but felt that
personally
congressional
political preference. fragmented less
In
consensus,24
adequate
dential
elections
satisfying method
form
election,
served
of expressing
a t i m e of
election
for expressing given
the
the
and
increasingly
campaigns
popular
will.
importance
fluence
rather the
than
nation's
incrementally by
an
exercise
direction.
of
basic
These
administrative
fiat
choices
choices
are
became The
they
are
more
responsive
to
influences
instead
from
the
con-
national
meant
or in congressional
a
presi-
television
to
in-
made
commit-
tees; since b o t h these processes are largely r e m o v e d f r o m view,
and
generalized
fers o n personal looks a n d style, has for m a n y b e c o m e a pageant
presi-
acceptable
a highly
discontinuity
national
especially
as a n
of
they
h a d l i t t l e c o n t r o l o v e r it. I n a t i m e o f r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y , dential and
im-
public various
The Third American Revolution special interests—with
which
administrators
{
219
or c o n g r e s s m e n
are
often in close r e l a t i o n s h i p — t h a n they are to the voters.
Related
t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n is t h e o f t - n o t e d r e m o t e n e s s ,
complexity,
a n d impersonality of b o t h p u b l i c a n d private institutions. A s
the
old traditional
the
affiliations of t h e
industrial age p r o d u c e d
fessional
societies.
But
agrarian
society
crumbled,
its e q u i v a l e n t s t h r o u g h u n i o n s unions
are n o
longer
and
pro-
institutions,25
vital
a n d the "atomization" of m o d e r n life accentuates the citizens' feelings
of impotence.
Social
institutions
appear
to provide
an outlet for individual idealism nor a rapid response to demands.
neither
collective
Moreover, the state or a b i g private organization
ines-
capably schematizes social dilemmas in order to cope with
their
complexities;
though
this
schematization
permits
a
large-scale
r e s p o n s e , it f r e q u e n t l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l l y f e l t sions of t h e
same
problem
and
therefore
limits the
dimen-
individual's
f r e e d o m e v e n as it fails t o p e r c e i v e t h e b e s t s o l u t i o n t o h i s
prob-
lems. T h u s , t h e m o r e t h e state tries to h e l p , t h e m o r e it t e n d s reinforce the individual's f e e l i n g of T h e r e s u l t is p a r a d o x i c a l :
to
impotence.
the situation described stimulates
a
more intense public interest in politics while increasing the
sense
of the futility of politics;
consensus
while
prompting louder appeals for a sense of c o m m o n national
direc-
tion;
finally,
it f r a g m e n t s
it s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
national
confronts the
individual
with
t w i n dangers of f r a g m e n t a t i o n a n d of excessive
control.
national
government
policy
seems
to
fragment
pands.26 A s a result, m a n y
as
Indeed, ex-
feel that their f r e e d o m
is
contracting. This feeling s e e m s to b e c o n n e c t e d with their loss
of
purpose,
since freedom
Americans
national
the
implies
choice
of
action,
and
action
re-
q u i r e s a n a w a r e n e s s of goals. If A m e r i c a ' s p r e s e n t t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e technetronic a g e d o e s n o t result in personally satisfying ments,
the next
phase
could
be
social and political involvement,
one a
of
flight
sullen
from social a n d
responsibility through inner retreat and o u t w a r d In
the
meantime,
the
scientific
and
achieve-
withdrawal
from
political
conservatism.
technological
revolution,
itself s o b a s i c a l l y c e r e b r a l i n c h a r a c t e r , still t e n d s to a f f e c t
Ameri-
2 i o }
/V:
The American
Transition
c a n s o c i e t y i n a l a r g e l y u n p l a n n e d f a s h i o n t h a t is d e t e r m i n e d decisions and impulses reflecting the values a n d interests
of
earlier A m e r i c a . I n t e l l e c t u a l p o w e r is m o b i l i z e d t o a n s w e r but not to ask "why?" America civilization means
committed
to carelessly
to
the
examined
still to d e v e l o p m e c h a n i s m s the
second
question.
consequently quest
ends."
for 27
The
"how?"
risks b e c o m i n g
continually political
that
fundamentally
"a
improved system
and procedures to raise a n d
Matters
by the
has
answer
affect the
na-
tional w a y of life, s u c h as t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s u p e r s o n i c
aircraft,
or that
such
pose
industrial handled
an
ecological
pollution by
a
as w e l l
or radiation
decision-making
as
a
from
human
threat,
atomic-energy
process
that
inhibits
plants, the
tunities for a n intelligent expression of t h e p o p u l a r will. ing
to
the
National
Science
Foundations
are
oppor-
(Accord-
seventeenth
annual
report, less t h a n 5 p e r cent of the m o r e t h a n 200,000 scientists engineers
employed
by
the
federal
government
in
concerned with social or psychological disciplines. cording to the defense,
and
energy
research
were
were
Moreover,
relatively
limited
frontiers. In addition,
resources
to a
systematic
absorbing
approxi-
our society concern
ac-
Advisers,
m a t e l y two-thirds of the scientists w o r k i n g o n t h e nation's tific a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l
and
1967
1963 report of the C o u n c i l of E c o n o m i c
space,
as
sciendevotes
with
social
p r o b l e m s , w h i l e it d e v o t e s e n o r m o u s r e s o u r c e s t o e c o n o m i c ,
tech-
nical, a n d scientific matters. T a b l e 13 tells part of t h e story.)
Even
higher education, b y not focusing on the underlying questions by emphasizing tion:
t e c h n i q u e s , runs t h e risk of b e c o m i n g
of creating large n u m b e r s
they k n o w
the
miseduca-
of " e d u c a t e d " p e o p l e w h o
the
T h e third A m e r i c a n revolution highlights the sharp contrast
be-
tween
but who
in fact do not
even
think
know
truly important
answers,
but
questions.28
our technical
success
and
our social failure,
and
it
raises
basic questions concerning the control and direction of the
thrust
of technological innovation. H o w are choices m a d e ? W h y are
they
m a d e ? B y w h o m are they m a d e ? W h a t values are involved in these choices, and h o w can they b e crystallized so that a coherent
policy
The TABLE 13.
Third
American
Revolution
{221
ANNUAL BUDGET IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Physical Health
Industrial General Motors Ford Standard Oil (N.J.) General Electric Chrysler Mobile Oil Texaco U.S. Steel I.B.M.
Natl Cancer Inst. Nat'l Heart Assn. Nat'l Inst, of Arthritis Nat'l Inst, of Neurology Nat'l Inst, of Allergy Nat'l Inst, of Child Health American Cancer Society American Heart Assn. Nat'l Tuberculosis Assn.
20,210 12,240 12,190 7,180
5,650 5,250 4,43o 4,36o 4,250
186 164 141 119
90 66
59 37 27
Social and Psychological National Inst of Mental Health* Stanford Research Inst.* Menninger Foundation Planning Research Corp.* Inst, for Social Research American Inst, for Research in Behavioral Sciences Brookings Institution Human Resources Research Office Mental Health Research Inst.
31 18 9.5 8 5.5 5 5 4.5 2
Source: Thomas Jefferson Research Center, June-July 1969, p. 5. * Approximate portion of budget allocated to social problems. can
be
shaped?
societies,
but
These
given
questions
the
extensive
increasingly social
beset
scope
of
all
modern
contemporary
A m e r i c a n s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y , this c h a l l e n g e is e s p e c i a l l y portant in the
United
States because
it a f f e c t s — a n d
im-
potentially
t h r e a t e n s — t h e m o s t i n t i m a t e a s p e c t s of A m e r i c a n life. S i n c e it a p p e a r s t r u e t h a t "this s o c i e t y h a s c h o s e n t o
emphasize
t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e as its c h i e f m o d e of c r e a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n basis for e c o n o m i c
growth,"
29
it f o l l o w s
and
that this society's
most
i m p e r a t i v e t a s k is t o d e f i n e a c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h
tech-
nological change can b e given meaningful and h u m a n e ends. less
this
is
directionless
done, the
there third
is
the
real
American
danger
revolution,
that so
by
pregnant
possibilities for individual creativity a n d fulfillment, can socially destructive.
Un-
remaining with
become
2 i o }
/V:
The American
Transition
im/m 2. The New Left Reaction A
revolution
not
only
breeds
its
own
children—it
repels
t h e m . It is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h a t a s o c i e t y w h i c h p u t s a p r e m i u m change, w h i c h m a k e s k n o w l e d g e the basic vehicle of
w h i c h vastly e x p a n d s t h e institutions of a d v a n c e d learning, for the
first
time
in history
creates a large
on
innovation, which
class of p e o p l e
throughout their late adolescence and early maturity of the
free
limita-
tions inherent in the b u r d e n of self-support, w h i c h e n d o w s
intel-
lectual activity w i t h a h i g h d e g r e e of social prestige b u t n o
direct
political p o w e r , s h o u l d b r e e d rebels w h o are t h e p r o d u c t s of very revolution that torments and repels them. T h e supreme of that loose a n d volatile socio-political p h e n o m e n o n porary itself
middle-class the
America
creation
of
the
named
the
technetronic
New
Left
revolution
of
contem-
is t h a t as
the
irony
well
it
is
as
a
of
a
r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t it.
Infantile The rather
Ideology
New fluid
Left,
a
complex
combination
from a m o n g the N e w professorial
circles)
of
and
elusive
individual
entity
made
sympathizers
York City literary establishment and
a
scattering
of
w h i c h Students for a Democratic Society
up
(especially and
some
new
organizations,
(SDS)
has b e c o m e
of the
b e s t - k n o w n , is t h e p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l e x p r e s s i o n o f a m o r e
exten-
sive restlessness
youth.
among
American
A s of the late 1960s, m e m b e r s h i p tions w a s
relatively
confrontations
with
limited, the
but
middle-class
university
in the m o r e militant in m o m e n t s
authorities)
these
of
stress
organiza(such
organizations
as
were
The New Left Reaction quite successful in mobilizing broader support.
{
Moreover, at
ferent times a n d in response to different issues, the N e w able to d r a w on the deep-rooted traditions of A m e r i c a n Quaker pacifism, and
the pre-World
War
II largely
as
well
as
a
widespread
though
passive
dif-
Left
was
populism, immigrant-
imported socialism and communism. T h e tension b e t w e e n tions
223
genera-
alienation
also
p r o m p t e d expressions of solidarity w h i c h occasionally c r e a t e d
the
impression of youth's m a s s i v e identification w i t h t h e goals of
the
more militant N e w
Left.*
T h e outer b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e N e w L e f t are, therefore,
imprecise.
At o n e time or another essentially reformist m e m b e r s of t h e cal establishment, s u c h as Robert K e n n e d y and E u g e n e
politi-
McCarthy,
w e r e a b l e to s i p h o n off a g r e a t d e a l of t h e volatile y o u t h f u l port that otherwise w a s attracted by the more extreme of the
New
Left.
The
N e w
Left
m o r e militant in its rhetoric, m o r e
itself, h o w e v e r , sectarian in its
tendencies
tended
to
broader
coalition endeavoring to forge the " n e w politics" in America. difference, however,
was
the
New
be
organization,
more intellectually and generationally exclusive than the
key
sup-
Left's militancy—a
The mili-
tancy derived f r o m t h e belief that reforms will n o l o n g e r suffice. It has often b e e n said that the rather sporadic identification
of
broad s e g m e n t s of y o u t h w i t h the militant N e w L e f t reflected
the
m o r e intense idealism a n d social consciousness of the current
col-
l e g e g e n e r a t i o n , i m p a t i e n t w i t h t h e crass m a t e r i a l i s m of its s o c i e t y and distressed b y
the political system's delay in m o v i n g
against
* It should, however, be noted that the number of students participating in the more overt manifestations of militancy and strife was relatively limited. In the period October 1967-May 1969, one-fifth of the eruptions took place on six major campuses: Berkeley, San Francisco State, Columbia, Harvard, University of Wisconsin, and Cornell. Of the nation's 2374 colleges, there were outbreaks on only 211 campuses, and in a total of 474 such confrontations with authority 6158 arrests were made (according to data compiled for the United States Senate and reported in The Washington Post, July 2, 1969). Dues-paying members of the SDS were estimated at about 6000; those vaguely sympathetic to some New Left appeals, at about 700,000; the total number of students, about 7 million (Fortune, special issue on youth, January 1969). The number of SDS activists was estimated in early 1969 as ranging between 70,000 and 100,000 (Guardian, January 11, 1969).
224 }
JV- The American
Transition
s o c i a l injustice. T h i s is d o u b t l e s s so. T h e y o u n g h a v e b e e n in the struggle for racial equality;
they responded
active
initially
enthusiasm to the call of global service in the ranks of the Corps;
they
have
flocked
into
the
ranks
of
the
many
efforts to m o u n t a struggle against urban p o v e r t y
and
with Peace
domestic ignorance.
I t is e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h e d s y s t e m d i d n o t f u l l y t a p idealism. T h e idealism of the y o u n g required a sense of
that
deliberate
n a t i o n a l e f f o r t i n o r d e r t o g i v e it f u l f i l l m e n t , a n d it w a s n o t t o y o u n g alone that this effort s e e m e d to b e lacking.
the
Cumulatively,
the resulting frustrations created an intense alienation,
first
from
the political system a n d then from the socio-economic system as a whole. Both were denied moral legitimacy, and the
combination
of frustrated idealism a n d historical uncertainty c r e a t e d circumstances
for
simple dichotomic
appeals
based
on
passion
and
a
propitious
desire
for
a
formula.
Major catalysts for youthful disillusionment w i t h liberal
democ-
racy's d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d c a p a c i t y t o c o p e w i t h e i t h e r its o l d o r its n e w problems were provided b y the Vietnam war and the
white
majority's indifference to the black man's quest for equality.
Both
reinforced the argument that the existing system w a s
preoccupied
with self-preservation and not with change, and that federal funds w e r e readily available for remote causes b u t not for curing
Amer-
ica's i m m e d i a t e ills. B o t h a l s o p r o v i d e d t h e y o u n g w i t h
convenient
rationalizations
intellectual
for failing to c o m e
to grips w i t h the
c o m p l e x i t y of our t i m e a n d for turning their b a c k s o n the difficult a n d i n e s c a p a b l y s l o w task of social renewal. This
same
kind
of
self-serving
intellectual
rationalization
for
the more immediately convenient and emotionally gratifying posture of c o m p l e t e n e g a t i o n also plays a part in the broader malaise, w h i c h Explanatory
theories
major emphasis values
the more militant N e w
on
of
the
student
idealism
of
the
militancy
psychological
in contemporary activists.
America, For
Left has been
on
have
dimension the
example,
typically of the
stifling of t h e Robert
student
exploiting.
Liebert
placed crisis
of
genuine has
co-
g e n t l y a r g u e d t h a t "it is n e c e s s a r y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e l i v e s o f
the
The New Left Reaction
{ 225
participants [in student militancy] in a psycho-historical' . . The
result
is
a
sense
of
the
profoundly
in
tenuousness
its
of
unconscious
life
context. which
manifested
more
specifically,
it h a s p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h a s e n s e o f u r g e n c y t o e f f e c t
c h a n g e so that life c a n g o on."
30
stressed that in rejecting the
existing society,
aspects.
is
Similarly, K e n n e t h Keniston the
student
p r e s s i n g "a r e v u l s i o n a g a i n s t t h e n o t i o n o f q u a n t i t y ,
quality.
revolt
. . . Another
against
mogenization.
goal
uniformity, . .
of
the
new
equalization,
revolution
ex-
concepts
involves
standardization
and
dimension. Mark Gerzon s
psychological
The Whole World Is Watching,
pathetic account by a young Harvard undergraduate, put psychological
aspect,
a
sym-
primary
n o t i n g that at b o t h
Harvard
a n d Berkeley "the psychiatric units at the health services of
the
t w o universities, normally quite busy, f o u n d that the n u m b e r students
coming
in
for
psychiatric
help
declined
during the period of c o n c e r t e d political action. must
be
a
ho-
."31
S t u d e n t participants h a v e also t e n d e d to stress t h e
stress o n t h e
has
is
particularly
economic quantity and materialism, and a turn towards of
More
concluded,
found
an
external
concern a n d so w e r e less c a g e d not m e a n
that their personal
however,
sublimated
in
outlet
in their o w n
problems
something
solved;
the
students,
their
minds."
were
beyond
The for
of
dramatically
32
This
they
student.
it
intense did
were, Gerzon
also cited data s h o w i n g that b o t h militancy a n d drug-taking
were
m o r e p r e v a l e n t a m o n g s t u d e n t s in t h e "soft" sciences, w h o
were
more preoccupied
w i t h the "habit of self-analysis" a n d less
pared for active participation
in the more
scientifically
pre-
oriented
society.33 T h e r e is d o u b t l e s s m u c h m e r i t i n t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l tion of student militancy.
interpreta-
T h e existing system and especially
e m e r g i n g system put so extensive a p r e m i u m o n individual p e t i t i o n t h a t a n x i e t y is g e n e r a t e d e a r l y i n life. P a r t o f t h e against authority in education can b e attributed to the
com-
rebellion
understand-
able desire of the y o u n g to get a w a y f r o m a competitive in w h i c h success or failure, at so early an age, has s u c h
the
structure
potentially
226 }
TV: The American
lasting
consequences.
family
structure
At
Transition
the
creates
same
pressures
time, for
the
weakening
compensatory
of
the
sources
of
psychological reassurance, and peer groups b e c o m e important
in
setting patterns of b e h a v i o r a n d p r o c l a i m e d b e l i e f s . In addition,
so highly
rationalized
a society
0
as the
tends to b e a dangerously boring society. B e c a u s e boredom
as t h e s o u r c e of a l i e n a t i o n — t h a t
planation—should
not be
underestimated
American
of this,
sheer
oft-cited catch-all as a n important
of restlessness. I n our society "the e x c i t e m e n t of the
unexpected,
the invigorating state of m i n d p r o d u c e d b y shifts in pleasure, tranquility
and
anxiety
are
largely
missing.
ex-
cause
Underlying
pain,
the
wards of b e i n g a c o g in the w h e e l can b e a sense of b o r e d o m thinness of self." pening" can be personal
refusal
34
T o e s c a p e f r o m it i n t o a r e v o l u t i o n a r y
freedom, to
and
participate
endless in
discussions
the
"hap-
exalting
"automated
one's
society,"
"gadget economy," a n d "corrupting affluence" b e c o m e
reand
the
a form
of
This m o o d p r o m p t s a search for n e w sources of feeling a n d
of
group therapy.
authority,
which
the
simultaneously
impersonal
and
permissive
existing institutions fail to p r o v i d e . It creates a r e s p o n s i v e n e s s
to
* According to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967): "In America in the i96o's, to perhaps a greater extent than in any other place or time, adolescents live in a distinct society of their own. It is not an easy society to understand, to describe, or, for that matter, to live in. In some ways it is an intensely materialistic society; its members, perhaps in unconscious imitation of their elders, are preoccupied with physical objects like clothes and cars and indeed have been encouraged in this preoccupation by manufacturers and merchants who have discovered how profitable the adolescent market is. In some ways it is an intensely sensual society; its members are preoccupied with the sensations they can obtain from surfing or drag racing or music or drugs. In some ways, it is an intensely moralistic society; its members are preoccupied with independence and honesty and equality and courage. On the whole it is a rebellious, oppositional society, dedicated to the proposition that the grownup world is a sham. At the same time, it is a conforming society; being inexperienced, unsure of themselves and, in fact, relatively powerless as individuals, adolescents to a far greater extent than their elders conform to common standards of dress and hair style and speech, and act jointly in groups—or gangs" ( T h e Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, New York, 1968, p. 176).
The New Left Reaction highly generalized mobilization
{
status quo.
against the
227
Paradox-
ically, the v a g u e r a n d m o r e a m b i t i o u s the d e m a n d s , the closer more rapidly narrowing the g a p b e t w e e n the reality a n d Finally,
there
appears
to
be
an
element
of
and
hope.*
uneasy
guilt
and
self-gratification in the m o t i v a t i o n of s o m e of the a l i e n a t e d
young
p e o p l e , a n d t h i s f a c t o r s h o u l d n o t b e i g n o r e d . It is c e r t a i n l y
easier
to c o n d e m n VISTA
the
social system
programs
an extension
as a w h o l e
or t h e P e a c e
Corps.
than
to participate
Condemning
of i m p e r i a l i s m b e c o m e s
in
the latter
a self-serving
as
explanation:
the militants' "deep dissatisfaction w i t h t h e m s e l v e s a n d their inner confusion first,
is p r o j e c t e d
against
the
institutions
of
the
university
a n d a g a i n s t all institutions of s o c i e t y s e c o n d a r i l y , w h i c h
blamed
for their
own
weakness."35
inner
This
especially important in v i e w of the e c o n o m i c a l l y secure, class character of m a n y
of
self-indulgent
somewhat
life
style
the
youthful militants. belies
their
ents or b y their colleges.
support provided There
Indeed,
their
professed
anti-
either by
are accordingly
is
middle-
materialism, especially as their material existence t e n d s t o on the relatively generous
are
consideration
depend
their
some
par-
analogies
b e t w e e n the restless A m e r i c a n middle-class student a n d the
Latin
American student rebels, w h o are generally d r a w n from the upper classes a n d similarly q u i t e certain that, g i v e n the social of their societies,
they
can
count
on
a relatively
structure
successful
materially r e w a r d i n g life, w h a t e v e r the o u t c o m e of their The
outlook
of
alienated
but
idealistic y o u n g
people,
trast to that of t h e activist political i d e o l o g y of t h e much logical
smaller
New
infantilism:
Left, can relying
perhaps
on
be
as
their
in
as
equality,
and
so o n )
but
act
ideo-
intellectual
source, they use the current political slogans of the adult (freedom,
con-
numerically
characterized
psychology
and
studies.
a s if t h e w o r l d
world were
a
* Involved here was "the general American tendency, perhaps the human tendency, to assume that if things are presently bad, they were once better, rather than realizing that they are likely to be considered bad precisely because they are getting better" (Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Role of Student Subcultures," The Record, Teachers College, Columbia University, October 1967, p. 1 [italics in original]).
2 i o }
/V:
The American Transition
g i v e n c o n s t a n t . F o r e x a m p l e , in G e r z o n s b o o k t h e r e is n o sion of h o w racial injustice can b e eliminated, h o w the
discus-
economy
s h o u l d create t h e n e e d e d w e a l t h , or w h o s h o u l d m a k e t h e fly,
planes
the hospitals operate, the social system work. T h e book
however, contain the usual emotional elements system:
the
enemies
righteousness
of
are
adults
and
of a n
technology,
t h e i d e a l i s t i c y o u n g is r e p e a t e d l y
and
the
function
is
abandoned
to
others,
and
the
self-
stressed.
r e s u l t i n g d o c t r i n e is s e l f - s e r v i n g , s i n c e t h e t e d i o u s t a s k o f society
does,
ideological
The
making
future
is
left
vague.*
Revolutionaries
in Search of
The extreme N e w
Revolution
Left represents the p h e n o m e n o n
of
middle-
c l a s s r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t m i d d l e - c l a s s s o c i e t y . I t is n e w i n t h e that in exploiting the psychological unrest of s o m e of the g e n e r a t i o n it d r a w s m u c h of its s u p p o r t f r o m a s o c i a l g r o u p is itself n o t y e t e n g a g e d in p r o d u c i n g s o c i a l w e a l t h a n d
sense
college which
therefore
c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d as b e i n g exploited; o n the w h o l e , that g r o u p enjoys
social a n d
material
security,
but
it is p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y
secure, frustrated, bored, and guilt-ridden. This also appears to the c a s e w i t h s o m e older supporters of the N e w
Left,
inbe
particularly
* The psychological interpretation fits well some of the points made by Konrad Lorenz: "During and shortly after puberty human beings have an indubitable tendency to loosen their allegiance to all traditional rites and social norms of their culture, allowing conceptual thought to cast doubt on their value and to look around for new and perhaps more worthy ideals. There probably is, at that time of life, a definite sensitive period for a new object-fixation, much as in the case of the object-fixation found in animals and called imprinting. If at that crucial time of life old ideals prove fallacious under critical scrutiny and new ones fail to appear, the result is complete aimlessness, the utter boredom which characterizes the young delinquent. If, on the other hand, the clever demagogue, well versed in the dangerous art of producing supranormal stimulus situations, gets hold of young people at the susceptible age, he finds it easy to guide their object-fixation in a direction subservient to his political aims. At the postpubertal age some human beings seem to be driven by an overpowering urge to espouse a cause and failing to find a worthy one may become fixated on astonishingly inferior substitutes" (On Aggression, New York, 1966, p. 258).
The New Left Reaction those from the intellectual
community,
whose
{ 229
recently
acquired
social a n d m a t e r i a l p r e s t i g e is i n t e n s e l y t h r e a t e n e d b y a s e n s e political i m p o t e n c e a n d increasing fear of historical T h e difficulty e n c o u n t e r e d b y the militant N e w
of
obsolescence. L e f t in
i n g t h e " m a s s e s " is r e l a t e d t o t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e
reachUnited
States. D u r i n g t h e 1930s, radical m o v e m e n t s h a d a real basis
for
their h o p e to radicalize the A m e r i c a n laboring masses, w h o
were
suffering f r o m t h e deprivations of t h e Great D e p r e s s i o n a n d
only
then beginning to develop their o w n organizational There was,
in effect, at least
the potential
consciousness.
for a historical
biosis b e t w e e n radical ideology a n d the frustrated a n d
sym-
impover-
ished masses.* T o d a y t h e s i t u a t i o n is e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f o r v e r y m a n y cans, t h o u g h n o t f o r all: as h a s a l r e a d y b e e n n o t e d , t h e
Americhildren
of A m e r i c a n s w i t h o u t a n y higher e d u c a t i o n ( t h e blue-collar ers
of
the
still
industrial,
second
America)
are
work-
flocking
c o l l e g e s , a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y t h r o u g h its a p p a r e n t
into
openness
r e i n f o r c e s t h e r e l a t i v e f e e l i n g o f w e l l - b e i n g c r e a t e d b y its m a t e r i a l a d v a n c e s . T h a t s e c o n d A m e r i c a i n c r e a s i n g l y s e e s its w a y c l e a r the
long-range
opportunities
held
out
by
the
new
to
scientific-
t e c h n o l o g i c a l society. It is s i m p l y n o t c o n v i n c e d b y t h e N e w
Left's
argument that "more opportunity plus more d e m o c r a c y equals less freedom."
36
America,
whose
The
New
Left
various
holds
anxieties
selves in a politically c o n s e r v a t i v e
little p r o m i s e tend
rather
to
for the
second
express
them-
and even anti-intellectual
pos-
L e f t m i l i t a n t s , still i n s e a r c h of m a s s
sup-
ture. This leaves for N e w
p o r t , o n l y t h e first A m e r i c a , t h e p r e - i n d u s t r i a l a n d t h e moribund America.
industrially
B u t h e r e t h e p r o b l e m is c o m p l i c a t e d b y
f a c t t h a t m u c h of t h a t A m e r i c a is b l a c k a n d t h a t A m e r i c a n
the
blacks
are either inclined to take a d v a n t a g e of gradually enlarging
eco-
0 But only a potential. As Paul Buhle, the editor of Radical America, noted in the radical weekly Guardian (June 21, 1969): . . the most notable characteristic of American society, in contrast to that of Europe, has been the absence of a stable, class conscious proletarian movement."
2
5 4 }
nomic
TV:
The American Transition
opportunities
or
to
seek
their
identity
racial exclusiveness. I n either case, the N e w to
many
of
middle-class
them
as
a
diversion,
quarrelsome, perhaps
of
not
through
militant
Left tends to overly
marginal
appear
serious
nuisance
white
value
shaking s o m e w h i t e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t institutions a n d in stirring white
consciences,
but generally lacking
and defined political The
N e w
Left
consistency,
continuity,
direction.* might
have
become
therefore more constructive—political
a
more
serious—and
force in the U n i t e d
t o d a y if its p r o p h e t s h a d b e e n i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a b l e t o m o v e either their
dated
antirationalism.f
in
some
European
For
radicalism
example,
modern
or their society
newer poses
States beyond escapist
especially
* The assessment of the SDS by David Hilliard, chief of staff of the Black Panther party, is revealing in this connection: "We don't see SDS as being so revolutionary. We see SDS as just being another pacification front that's given credit by the fascist establishment in order to cause disfusion [sic] in hopes that this would weaken the support for the Black Panther party. . . . ". . . we'll beat those little sissies, those little schoolboys' ass if they don't try to straighten up their politics. So we want to make that known to SDS and the first motherfucker that gets out of order had better stand in line for some kind of disciplinary actions from the Black Panther party" (interview in Berkeley Barb, August 4, 1969, as cited by Guardian, August 16, 1969). f The intellectual roots of both Marcuse and Chomsky are grounded in nineteenth-century European radical dogmatism (on Chomsky and communism, see the particularly perceptive comments by Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Left, the Jews and Israel," Encounter, December 1969, p. 34). In this regard, comments by Walter Laqueur are particularly pertinent to Marcuse's ponderous justifications for his preferred brand of dictatorship and to Chomsky's political banalities: "The American youth movement, with its immense idealistic potential, has gone badly, perhaps irrevocably, off the rails. For this, a great responsibility falls on the shoulders of the gurus who have provided the ideological justification for the movement in its present phase—those intellectuals, their own bright dreams having faded, who now strain to recapture their ideological virginity. . . . The doctors of the American youth movement are in fact part of its disease. They have helped to generate a great deal of passion, but aside from the most banal populism they have failed to produce a single new idea" ("Reflections on Youth Movements," Commentary, June 1969, p. 40). This "banal populism" is expressed in the case of some writers (such as A. Mendel, in his trivial "Robots and Rebels," The New Republic, January 11, 1969) by an intensely Manichaean escapism and by attempts (for example, in the more intellectually serious effort by Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture, New York, 1969) to legitimize the antirational posture of some of the young as a new and enduring culture. The prevailing passion of the "gurus" is revealed by the sympathetic comments on Roszak's
The New Left Reaction
{
c o m p l e x p r o b l e m s relating to equality, a n issue of m a j o r to the N e w
Left; but those problems
231
concern
cannot be resolved b y
v o k i n g n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y criticisms of capitalism.
37
In failing
assimilate intellectually the n o v e l t y of the current A m e r i c a n sition, t h e N e w
Left has made
designed
society. This has created a
tion d e p l o r e d b y e v e n radical critics of the c o n t e m p o r a r y States.*
In addition, the
New
Left's exuberant
immaturity
of
the
young
rhetoric, militants
historical a n a c h r o n i s m o f its p r o p h e t s , h a s r e s u l t e d i n a
and
Marxist
rhetoric and exaltation of passion appears to h a v e b e e n
with the ideological
to
tran-
itself an essentially n e g a t i v e
obsolescent force. Indeed, the N e w Left's combination of
to shock rather than to c h a n g e
in-
situaUnited
coupled and
the
program-
matic posture and ideological debates that occasionally verge
on
the hilarious.f
book by philosophy professor Robert Wolff. After noting that Roszak argues that "modern industrial society in general, and American society in particular, is ugly, repressive, destructive, and subversive of much that is truly human," Wolff goes on to say that the above proposition " . . . I take it, is now acknowledged to be true by virtually every sensible man and woman. Anyone who still imagines that the United States is the land of opportunity and the bastion of democracy is a candidate either for a mental hospital or for Richard Nixon's Cabinet" ( T h e New York Times Book Review, September 7, 1969, p. 3 ) . 0 The Guardian, for example, condemned the SDS for its "intoxication with sectarianism, dogmatism, obscure rhetoric and empty sloganeering which tends to permeate the upper reaches of its leadership. Such practice can only further isolate the leadership from a membership which has never enjoyed a serious, national educational program designed to eliminate gaps in political consciousness that exist on the chapter level. . . . We question tendencies leading to the application by rote of important and intricate concepts such as the dictatorship of the proletariat and vanguard party, without regard for the present nature of U.S. monopoly capitalism or to adjustments which would have to be made in these formulations to be applicable to the world's most industrially advanced nation" (Guardian, July 5, 1969, p. 1 2 ) . t For example, at the SDS National Convention in 1969 the following dialogue took place: "The next speaker, Chaka Walls, minister of information of the Illinois Black Panther party . . . then began to explain the role of women in the revolution. 'We believe in the freedom of love, in pussy power/ he said. A shock wave stunned the arena, and PL responded with chants of Tight male chauvinism.' 'We've got some puritans in the crowd,' responded Walls. 'Superman was a punk because he never tried to fuck Lois Lane.' Fight male chauvinism,' PLWSA and many others began to chant.
254}
TV:
The American Transition
Cumulatively, the N e w Left has loosely linked the the abstainers,
and the
excluded
obsolescents,
of t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c
age, but
it
has offered little p r o s p e c t of a realistic r e s p o n s e to this age's d i l e m mas.
It is t h u s
more
interesting as a s y m p t o m
of
social
change
t h a n for its p r o g r a m m a t i c m e s s a g e . It is a n e s c a p i s t
phenomenon
rather than
it
a determined
revolutionary
movement;
proclaims
its d e s i r e t o c h a n g e s o c i e t y b u t b y a n d l a r g e o f f e r s o n l y a from society.*
More
concerned
with
refuge
self-gratification than
with
Anger was so intense that Walls stepped down and left the podium to Jewel Cook, another Panther spokesman. Cook, not understanding what was wrong with 'pussy power,' quickly made matters worse. . . . Cook said: 'He [Walls] was only trying to say that you sisters have a strategic position for the revolution . . . prone'" (Guardian, June 28, 1969). PLWSA: Progressive Labor-Worker—Student Alliance. Similarly, the Berkeley Liberation Committee's revolutionary program, designed to set a "revolutionary example throughout the world,' contained the following thirteen points (Oakland Tribune, June 5, 1969): "1—We will make Telegraph Avenue and the South Campus a strategic free territory for revolution. 2—We will create our revolutionary culture everywhere. 3—We will turn the schools into training grounds for liberation. 4—We will destroy the university unless it serves the people. 5—We will struggle for the full liberation of women as a necessary part of the revolutionary process. 6—We will take communal responsibility for basic human needs. 7—We will protect and expand our drug culture. 8—We will break the power of the landlords and provide beautiful housing for everyone. 9—We will tax the corporations, not the working people. 10—We will defend ourselves against law and order. 11—We will create a soulful socialism in Berkeley. 12—We will create a people's government. 13—We will unite with other movements throughout the world to destroy this racist capitalist imperialist system.". * Kenneth Keniston, though suggesting that youth really is shaping the future, has characteristically not indicated how it is shaping it, and thus appears to take their rhetoric for reality. (See his article "You have to Grow Up in Scarsdale to Know How Bad Things Really Are," The New York Times Magazine, April 27, 1969.) The same is largely true of Roszak. Keniston, moreover, seems to be excessively influenced by prevailing moods. Thus in 1961 he wrote that "the drift of American youth, I have argued, is away from public involvements and social responsibilities and toward a world of private and personal satisfactions. . . . They will assure a highly stable political and social order, for few of them will be enough committed to politics to consider revolution, subversion, or even radical change . . ." ("Social Change and Youth in America," in The Challenge of Youth, Eric H. Erikson, ed., New York, 1961, p. 215).
The New Left Reaction the social consequences engage
of its acts,
in the wildest verbal
the
abuse,
N e w
without
Left can
{
233
afford
any regard
for
the
f a c t t h a t it a l i e n a t e s e v e n t h o s e w h o a r e p o t e n t i a l s u p p o r t e r s . c o n c e r n is t o c r e a t e a s e n s e o f p e r s o n a l i n v o l v e m e n t f o r its ents
and
to
safety valve fulfillment
release
their
for its y o u t h f u l
for
its
more
D e s p i t e its i n c r e a s i n g l y is m o r e
reminiscent
style—and
passions;
quite
of
it
militants
passive,
provides and
affluent,
Marxist-Leninist Fourier
in
symptomatically
and
since
Dadaism were themselves reactions to a n e w
of
older
rhetoric, 38
Its
adher-
psychological
sense
and
content so,
a
a
to
the of
both
vicarious admirers.* N e w
Left
Dadaism Fourier
in and
age.
* For some the sexual revolution also became a partial substitute for political action. With political institutions too difficult to tackle, social conventions and the universities became convenient targets guaranteed to gain the desired mass-media coverage. As one actress explained the political significance of nudism in a statement to The New York Times: "I considered (and still do) the naked human body the height of beauty, innocence and truth. I wished to oppose my nakedness to the intimate realism of Vietnam, in itself only symptomatic of the corruptions and hypocrisies of our time. The nude body on stage was the Truth; Vietnam, the Lie. "Vietnam, Chicago, and Berkeley made me realize that my body could not be my own 'property' any longer, and that trust and vulnerability were our only salvation. I wished to say that, in reaching the natural end of their emancipation, women of my generation can no longer consider themselves as 'property.'" A response by a black actress, asked to comment on the same subject, was much more to the point: "This preoccupation with nudity under the guise of 'sexual liberation' is a white hang-up. Too many white 'artists' are constantly making a pretense of coming up with new forms, new ideas, and experiments. This is due to the fact that they are bankrupt when it comes to the tormenting business of artistic creation out of the human condition as it is. This task is much more difficult to confront. "Any endeavor which employs the blatant and aggressive display of bodily nakedness in the glare of public voyeurism, all under the label of artistic merit, is not one step above those girlie magazine stores and movie houses on 42nd Street. It is what it has always been, pornography for thrill-seeking consumers. For the actor, this is nothing short of debilitating and exhausting to his artistic individuality. And as for liberation, sexual or otherwise, I as a black person am concerned with but only one liberation, and that is the total liberation of all black people. This is a reality which is quite naked" (Sally Kirkland and JudyAnn Elder, respectively, as quoted in The New York Times, June 22,
2
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TV:
The American Transition
The Historic Function On
balance,
the
of the Militant
militant
New
Left
Left
appears
to
be
largely
^
transient p h e n o m e n o n , a s y m p t o m of the tensions inherent in interaction of t h e several A m e r i c a s coexisting in a t i m e of American tinue
transition.
to spark
besetting
In
all probability,
additional
some
young
violence,
people
this transition
and
may
the
broader
prompt
a
more
or g o v e r n m e n t
careers
may
deny
will
youth
(especially
which
America's
elite
social
equalizer
by
opening
up
drawn,
system
a
source well
opportunities
from
act
as
a
for
first-
generation, post-blue-collar urban youth w h o h a v e in recent
years
gained greater access to advanced
career
may
attractive-
middle-class
from the better universities), the is t r a d i t i o n a l l y
con-
protracted
the
m e a s u r e of social talent, b u t this alienation of s o m e
general
frustrations
alienation from the existing system. T h e decline in the ness of business
the
education.
T h e long-run historic f u n c t i o n of t h e militant N e w L e f t largely fade
or
on be
politically change, New
the
circumstances
suppressed. futile,
revolution
itself
Though
it m i g h t
accelerating
Left
serve
some
have
been
it w i l l
itself
ideologically additional
an
If it d o e s ,
its f u n c t i o n positive;
if
in
it
to
and social
though
third
will
either
barren
spur
even
the
not,
depends
eventually
as
reforms.
disappears,
will
in w h i c h
the
American
have
been
catalyst for a m o r e reactionary social response to the n e w
a
dilem-
mas. T h e anarchistic e l e m e n t in the N e w L e f t has often b e e n
noted.
L e s s a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n p a i d t o its totalitarian p r e d i s p o s i t i o n .
Yet
both
and
mood.
elements Despite
with equality, words
of
elitist a n d Its
a
are
influential
the democratic the demands
sympathetic
aristocratic,
membership,
in
and
terms
in
the
N e w
rhetoric
and
of the N e w
of
both
behavior
proclaimed
Left—in
observer—have should be
Left's
been
the
perceptive
"fundamentally
frankly faced
social
concern
as
composition
c h o l o g i c a l m a k e - u p , is r e m a r k a b l y a n a l o g o u s t o t h a t of
such."39 and
psy-
European
groups which, in response to overwhelming complexity and
times
The New Left Reaction of
stress,
such
gravitated
groups
were
toward
recruited
totalitarian from
movements.
among
uprooted
and
In
marginal
the m i d d l e class, t h e unaffiliated intellectuals,
{
235
Europe
members
new
and
of
recently
trade
union-
ists.40 I n A m e r i c a , g i v e n t h e n e w f o r c e s s h a p i n g its s o c i e t y ,
mem-
proletarians,
s o m e of t h e m o r e isolated
bers have to a greater extent b e e n d r a w n from a m o n g
unaffiliated
intellectuals, s t u d e n t s — w h o in effect form a n e w c l a s s — a n d m e m b e r s of t h e m i d d l e class, all of w h o m , unlike their counterparts,
are r e s p o n d i n g less to e c o n o m i c
and more to
chological anxieties. T h e s e e l e m e n t s are united b y their for total solutions mental
and
their b o r e d o m
some
European
or i m p a t i e n c e
psy-
proclivity
with
incre-
change.
T h e strong totalitarian t e n d e n c i e s of t h e N e w f r o m its c o n d u c t a n d p r e s c r i p t i o n s . *
Left are
evident
Y e t it m o r e a c c u r a t e l y
war-
rants t h e t e r m "neo-totalitarian," b e c a u s e it h a s l a r g e l y f a i l e d forge
sufficient unity
to
emerge
ganized totalitarian m o v e m e n t .
as
a
relatively
disciplined,
Its totalitarian m o o d
and
aspira-
tions h a v e not yet b e e n m a t c h e d b y totalitarian organization, t h o u g h the bitter internal factional conflicts a n d m u t u a l are strongly reminiscent of earlier d o g m a t i c Moreover, the sharp edge
of the N e w
even
expulsions
movements.
Left's
intellectual—and
sometimes e v e n p h y s i c a l — a t t a c k s has b e e n a i m e d at those
Ameri-
can institutions w h o s e n o r m a l operation relies m o s t o n reason nonviolence. T h e university, a peculiarly defenseless and able
social
institution—and
liberal t h o u g h t — h a s
been
in A m e r i c a
the
principal
a primary target because
greatest c h a n c e for success w i t h the
least a m o u n t
generally, leading N e w Left s p o k e s m e n have b e e n of free speech,
democratic
procedures,
and
to or-
and
vulner-
haven
for
it o f f e r s
the
of risk.
More
contemptuous
majority
rule.
h a v e left little r o o m for d o u b t as to h o w t h e y w o u l d h a n d l e
They their
critics if t h e N e w L e f t w e r e e v e r t o g a i n p o w e r .
Though they seemingly conflict, the anarchistic and the totali* By no means the most glaring example of the latter is the explicit advocacy of repression of views divergent from those approved by the New Left. See Robert Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Boston, 1965, especially pp. 81-110.
2
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TV: The American Transition
tarian strands of the N e w The
anarchistic
Left have been
component
is
in
tune
mutually
with
the
reinforcing. uncertainties
c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e r a p i d a n d baffling p a c e of c h a n g e ; t h e tarian c o m p o n e n t , derived from the M a n i c h a e a n sense of self-righteousness,
totali-
absolute
provides a secure point of departure for
fronting that change.
It s h o u l d
totalitarianism
proclaims
rarely
be
remembered,
itself
in
con-
moreover,
advance;
it
that
emerges
t h r o u g h practice. Since the F r e n c h Revolution, the over-all political style of t h e W e s t e r n w o r l d has called for reliance o n
slogans
expressing
fascism
claimed
devotion
to
freedom
t h a t its d i s c i p l i n e
made
and men
equality. free.
The
Even
left
has
b e e n shrill i n p r o c l a i m i n g its c o m m i t m e n t t o t r u e d e m o c r a c y ,
radical
but
t h e r e a l t e s t o f d e m o c r a c y is n o t u l t i m a t e g o a l s b u t t h e
procedures
used in attaining them. New
Left militants have
thus threatened
American
liberalism
in a m a n n e r r e m i n i s c e n t of the h a r m d o n e to d e m o c r a t i c conservatism
and
n o m e n o n of the
liberal
anticommunism
1950s. T h e N e w
social progress b y providing more
conservative
social
by the
American
McCarthy
Left has jeopardized
a convenient
attitudes.
rationalization
Beyond
this,
it h a s
to the surface a n d intensified—but not c a u s e d — t h e
phe-
American for
the
brought
current
crisis
of A m e r i c a n liberalism. T h a t has p e r h a p s b e e n the m o s t significant political result of the N e w third American
Left's neo-totalitarian reaction to
the
revolution.
3. The Crisis of Liberalism T o a great extent, m o d e r n A m e r i c a n liberalism h a s itself b l a m e f o r its p r e s e n t crisis. L o n g t h e a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e of
industrial
America,*
liberalism
has
not
only
to
philosophy
dominated
the
* "For along with its agrarianism the new nation was imbued with liberalism,
The Crisis of Liberalism political discourse
of
the country but
s c o n c e d in t h e seat of p o w e r ,
{ 237
lately has b e e n
from which
firmly
entrenched but largely defensive congressional
needed
thirty-six years, a w o r l d war, t w o A s i a n wars, a n d d o m e s t i c social unrest in order to regain the W h i t e H o u s e .
racial-
(Eisenhowers
victory in 1952 w a s a personal triumph, not a party one; h e won
Republican
as
a
Democratic
Party did
so less b y
candidate.)
the
rural-conservative
forces. S w e p t out of office in 1932, the R e p u b l i c a n Party
also have
en-
it h a s c o n f r o n t e d
Yet
even
offering an alternative
philosophy than b y capitalizing on the divisions within liberalism a n d o n the nation's uneasiness w i t h liberal
would
then
the
political American
prescriptions
a n d style. T h e prescriptions and style w e r e once a creative and response to the pressures and About
these
dilemmas
and American
iniquities
American
conservatism,
of industrial
conservatives
had
humane
capitalism.
little to
preaching puritan homilies
tolling the virtues of free enterprise,
did not succeed
say,
and
in
ex-
making
a full adjustment to the industrial a g e or to the m a s s i v e social p o l i t i c a l a w a k e n i n g it p r o m p t e d . T h i s l e f t t h e trinaire radicals, to liberals, w h o
who
largely
sought to
drew
adapt
on
field
European
the idealism
and
either to
experience, the
or
optimism
of the A m e r i c a n tradition to t h e n e w industrial age. T h e
success
of the liberals p r e s e r v e d America's u n i q u e n e s s — a n d this h a s their c r o w n i n g
and doc-
been
achievement.
Whig to the bone. Neither throne nor altar, nor, above all, reverence for the past existed as barriers to the new leveling forces unleashed by industrial technology. "The political turning point was the defeat of the South in the Civil War, which ended forever any possibility of a nation based on agrarian values— and, indeed, destroyed forever the possibility of a conservatism that was anything other than intellectual preciousness or a shield for particular business interests. Bryan's constituents in the crucial election of 1896 were small farmer capitalists who were resentful of their disadvantaged position within the system rather than of industrial processes as such. When in the i93o's a group of southern writers responded to the American economic crisis and the attendant cultural crisis of industrial capitalism with their manifesto III Take My Stand, looking to agrarianism and rejecting both socialism and industrial capitalism in favor of small property, they found little resonance. Dixieland reacted to the Depression by standing in the vanguard of those supporting the state capitalism of the N e w Deal" (Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality, New York, 1969, pp. 6 5 - 6 6 ) .
2
5 4 }
TV:
Without
The American Transition
the
economically
liberal, A m e r i c a
or,
perhaps
might
even
well
more
have
likely,
a n t i d e m o c r a t i c social a n d political crisis. T h e Deal
liberal
solution
was
to fuse
the
either
fallen
decayed
victim
to
genius of the
individualism
an
New
intrinsic
in
American historical e x p e r i e n c e — a n individualism that has
inher-
ently reinforced a conservative reluctance toward collective
social
action—with
a
the
process.
political
avoided
the
they have
sense
dogmatic
tended
of social responsibility In
so
doing,
rigidities
to share with
of
as defined
American European
them
the
through
liberals
initially
socialists,
though
inclination
to rely
on
the g o v e r n m e n t as the principal instrumentality for social reforms. This inclination, philosophical preference
apart, w a s in a n y
case
dictated b y the situation prevailing in America: the national
gov-
ernment
was
the
only instrument
that w a s
relatively
responsive
to the democratic process, that could b e u s e d to express a n d fill
the welfare needs
of
the masses,
that
could
blunt
the
ful-
sharp
e d g e of e c o n o m i c and social inequality.
The Liberal
Janus
In the process, however, the American liberal b e c a m e ingly
a statist
establishmentarian,
confident
of
and convinced that h e h a d discovered the w a y change.
Indeed,
the American
liberal b e c a m e
his
increas-
prescriptions
to m a n a g e
social
a Janus-like
crea-
ture, g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r i n g t w o faces. T h e relatively p r a g m a t i c
lib-
eral w h o
and
was
rooted
in the
American
democratic
tradition
w h o s e social values provided the broad f r a m e w o r k for a matic
approach
to
problem-solving
came
to
be
nondog-
matched
by
m o r e ideological, eventually m o r e d o g m a t i c liberal, w h o w a s creasingly draw
inclined toward
his intellectual
abstract
inspiration
social engineering,
from
European
left
prone
tient with the nonideological "expedient" attitude of the
with the growth
in prestige
and
impa-
pragma-
tic liberal p o w e r practitioner. T h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e s e c o n d closely linked
to
radicalism,
ideologically hostile to the business community, a n d rather
was
a in-
liberal
influence
of
t h e A m e r i c a n i n t e l l e c t u a l c o m m u n i t y after W o r l d W a r II. Increas-
The Crisis of Liberalism ingly, it w a s this m o r e who
doctrinaire liberal w h o
dominated American
{ 239
set the tone
liberalism, though h e w a s
still
during t h e 1960s to gain full control of the D e m o c r a t i c
and
unable
Party.
T h e accession of t h e doctrinaire liberal to p r o m i n e n c e a n d l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , if n o t t o p o w e r — a d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h
with the intensifying stresses in the American s o c i e t y — h a d to d o w i t h a subtle b u t important
change
much
of tone in t h e
discourse. Both the procedural elements rooted in liberal
liberal democ-
racy's a t t a c h m e n t to legal order a n d the patriotic pride in ica's
constitutional
achievements
tended
to
be
po-
coincided
Amer-
downgraded
favor of greater e m p h a s i s o n rapid social change, on
in
restructuring
e c o n o m i c relations, a n d o n a m o r e general a n d highly critical appraisal of the A m e r i c a n
re-
tradition.
T h e doctrinaire liberal, moreover, w a s not innocent of the
sin
of intellectual arrogance.41 Since neither the conservative nor
the
communist
was
able
to
match
his
social
success,
his
self-confi-
dence gradually developed into arrogance, often expressed b y
an
intolerance of critics a n d a n inclination to label as reactionaries
all
w h o d e v i a t e d f r o m t h e l i b e r a l n o r m a s h e h i m s e l f d e f i n e d it. inclination b e c a m e
most
vironment increasingly were more inclined ceptualize
statist
in the a c a d e m i c
dominated
world,
b y liberal intellectuals,
than the liberal p o w e r practitioners
liberalism
a result, a h u m a n e tones of d o m i n a n t
marked
and
and
creative
to
excommunicate
creed
gradually
This
an
en-
42
who
to
con-
deviants.
acquired
As
over-
orthodoxy.
T h i s m a d e it m o r e d i f f i c u l t e i t h e r t o p e r c e i v e or to r e s p o n d n e w and unusual circumstances. T h e A m e r i c a n liberal
the dilemmas p o s e d b y the third A m e r i c a n revolution w i t h a Deal strategy tried and tested during the recent
New
industrial-capital-
ist crisis. T h e r e w a s little i n t h e d o c t r i n a i r e - l i b e r a l a n a l y s i s o f problems facing the U n i t e d States in the 1960s that d e p a r t e d the principles a n d r e m e d i e s d e v e l o p e d in the p r e c e d i n g
the from
decades;
there w a s little r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e g r o w i n g r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o
social
problems of societal institutions a n d organizations other than federal
to
approached
the
government.
Moreover, the doctrinaire liberals were by and large late in
2
5 4 }
TV:
recognizing New
Left.
The American Transition the
antidemocratic
Various
factors
and
played
antiliberal a
role
w h i c h w a s that in the past s o m e of t h e m h a d nism.
Though
Stalinism
had
character
here,
eventually
not
flirted
the
of
with
disenchanted
most
reflex, w h i l e t h e crudities of M c C a r t h y i s m h a d m a d e
less
highly
risky
fashionable,
socially
acceptable,
and
political counterparts, w h o
tune w i t h the m o o d of the e l e c t o r a t e — r e s p o n d e d
sounded
the slogans voiced b y the N e w Left
of
strong
anti-anticompolitically
than fellow-traveling. Thus m a n y doctrinaire
unlike their pragmatic
liberals—
were
more
to the fact
The
downgrading
t h a t it h a d
become
that
ex-
idealism.
of
orderly
a buttress
legal of
procedure,
conservative
on
the
ground
institutions,
tributed directly to the crisis of l e g i t i m a c y of t h e A m e r i c a n
con-
system.
T h i s crisis is c l e a r l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e u n w i l l i n g n e s s of a m a j o r tor of t h e d o m i n a n t
liberal c o m m u n i t y
to insist o n
legal
sec-
proce-
dures. T h e a m b i v a l e n c e of so m a n y p r o m i n e n t liberals, a n d inclination
in
democratic; their un-
democratic procedures w e r e excused as examples of youthful uberance and admirable
of
commu-
them, the fear of b e i n g "outflanked o n the left" r e m a i n e d a
munism
the
least
to rationalize
abuses
by
militants—reflecting
their
in
part
their highly permissive educational c o n c e p t s — c o n v e y e d the w e a k ening liberal c o m m i t m e n t
to w h a t has traditionally b e e n
a
vital
ingredient of d e m o c r a c y : respect for majority rule as expressed established democratic
The Price of Victorious
Skepticism
T h i s crisis of liberal v a l u e s ( a n d t h e N e w L e f t q u i t e
accurately
d i a g n o s e d it a s s u c h a n d t h e r e b y g a i n e d c o n f i d e n c e i n its on
liberal
democracy)
by
procedures.
is in
turn
related
to
more
basic
attack causes.
Liberalism w a s initially not only an expression of a relevant, ern, a n d h u m a n e r e s p o n s e to t h e conditions c r e a t e d b y
mod-
industrial-
ism but also an attack on the then prevailing orthodoxies.
These
orthodoxies, r o o t e d in t h e traditional society, w e r e a b l e n d of
re-
ligious
re-
views
and
conservative
instincts
reinforced
by,
and
The Crisis of Liberalism inforcing,
established
church
and
rural-aristocratic
{
241
institutions.
T h e liberal attack o n these d e e p l y ingrained orthodoxies a n d beliefs w a s part of the e m e r g i n g
mood
of rationalism
and
skepti-
cism. This m o o d w a s remarkably well suited to the n e e d s of new
industrial age.
Liberals
reflected the
spirit of
the
the times
in
attacking institutionalized religion; t h e y w e r e fashionable in their anti-Catholicism; t h e y w e r e m o d e r n a n d m o d e r n i z i n g in a t t a c k i n g the rural-aristocratic c o n c e p t s of life. T h e y w e r e also successful,
and by the mid-twentieth
century
remarkably
the United
States
h a d b e c o m e a n e s s e n t i a l l y s e c u l a r society, its m a s s m e d i a a n d educational system d o m i n a t e d — e x c e p t for parochial
its
schools—by
an essentially rationalist a n d skeptical philosophy. Liberal success also m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g of the liberal W i t h success c a m e evidence that the United States w a s a society without institutions.
The
any mass
integrating media
values
could
not
or integrating replace
crisis.
becoming cultural
religion
as
the
source of integration, since their orientation w a s itself d e v o i d
of
more fundamental concerns, and unalloyed nationalism alone
was
clearly
a
not
enough
when
danger
to
liberal
it e m e r g e d
values.
as the
Skepticism
triumphant
was
simply
antithesis
of
tional religion. T h e gravitation of s o m e doctrinaire liberals the radical left w a s h e n c e success. had
Understandably
always
combated,
also partially a c o n s e q u e n c e
unable
these
to turn toward the
doctrinaire
liberals
traditoward
of
their
values
they
were
attracted
to the m o r e intensely h e l d beliefs of the radical left, since beliefs were
similarly
derived
m o s t liberals, h o w e v e r ,
from
a rejection
of
the turn to the extreme
the
such
old.
For
left w a s not
a c c e p t a b l e solution, for it i n v o l v e d a b e t r a y a l of their democratic ideals. But what, they w e r e forced to ask
an
traditional themselves,
w a s to b e the s u b s t a n c e of a victorious skepticism? Belief
is a n i m p o r t a n t
social cement.
A
society
that does
b e l i e v e i n a n y t h i n g is a s o c i e t y i n a s t a t e o f d i s s o l u t i o n . T h e ing
of
common
aspirations
and
a
unifying
faith
not shar-
is e s s e n t i a l
c o m m u n i t y life. T h i s is a f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y
a n d s k e p t i c a l l i b e r a l is b e g i n n i n g t o c o n f r o n t , e s p e c i a l l y a s a s e q u e n c e of his a m b i v a l e n c e in d e f e n d i n g p r o c e d u r a l
to
doctrinaire con-
democracy.
2
5 4 }
TV:
The American Transition
I n d e e d , the chief beneficiaries of this liberal c o n f u s i o n h a v e
been
the American conservatives who, though largely unresponsive the social d i l e m m a s of contemporary America, h a v e reaped ical
rewards
by
advocating
nationalism,
private
to
polit-
property,
and
constitutional order. From
the standpoint
of the liberal w h o sees himself
as a
g r e s s i v e f o r c e , b e l i e f is n e c e s s a r y t o t h e e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l
pro-
assimila-
tion of c h a n g e . T h e social costs of t h e a b s e n c e of c o n v i c t i o n
and
t h e p a r a l y z i n g effects of s k e p t i c i s m as a ruling principle h a v e most
graphically
shown
by
t h e liberal's
ambivalent
been
response
the n e w b l a c k challenge. T h e liberal w a s in the forefront of s t r u g g l e f o r r a c i a l e q u a l i t y a s l o n g as it w a s o p p o s e d b y t h e servatives;
the
conservative
dams
had
crumbled
con-
and
the
black e m e r g e d with d e m a n d s that w e r e n o longer defined for
him
b y the w h i t e liberal, t h e liberal b e c a m e baffled. This w a s the
case
in N e w
once
to the
York City's struggle over c o m m u n i t y
control
of
schools,
a n d it w a s a l s o t h e c a s e at C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y , w h e r e a r m e d students presented
their d e m a n d s
As a consequence,
some
liberals
in the form appeared
of an
to turn
conservative:
they rejected black d e m a n d s for separate social institutions. turned into undifferentiated capitulators:
they
black
ultimatum.
granted
d e m a n d s i n a n a t t e m p t t o e x p i a t e t h e i r g u i l t as w h i t e
Others
all
black
men.
0
Yet w h a t society n e e d e d m o s t in this t i m e of transition w a s actly tional
what
the
enemy
liberal—uncertain
was
of
prostrate—found
himself most
because
difficult to
his
ex-
tradi-
provide:
definition of his principles, an affirmation of his convictions, a willingness to act on his devotion to liberal democracy.
a
and
Ameri-
* It is truly remarkable that no prominent liberal educator was willing to say to his black students: 4T will not engage in reverse discrimination by granting indiscriminately any demands that you choose to make simply because you are black. I will treat you as I treat all my students. The era of discrimination is over and I will not return to it under a new guise. I can understand the psychological roots of your demands, as well as some of your fears in having to compete with better prepared whites. I will, therefore, do everything I can to remedy the situation, even at considerable cost and organizational effort, but I will not grant those demands which will have the effect of perpetuating your exclusion from this society."
The Crisis of Liberalism can blacks also n e e d e d assimilation
of
any
such a response
ethnic
or
racial
{
243
from the liberal, for
group
into
society
the
requires
stable institutions and defined, t h o u g h not dogmatic, values. integration of blacks, difficult e n o u g h
under most
The
circumstances,
b e c o m e s h o p e l e s s if e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d v a l u e s f a i l t o
provide
a f r a m e w o r k resilient e n o u g h to absorb the strains inherent in
the
unprecedented
so-
cietal
entrance of a large racial minority into e q u a l
participation.
The
a n d e v e n racist y o u n g
emergence
of
black leadership
radical, was
antidemocratic,
doubtless
d u e to the w h i t e community's slow response to black it w a s also, h o w e v e r ,
due
to the
growing
contempt
primarily
aspirations; by the
New
Left and younger black leaders for democratic procedures and their realization that s u c h c o n t e m p t could b e expressed w i t h punity, g i v e n the liberal's o w n a m b i v a l e n c e a b o u t the
belief.
T h e ramifications of this situation w e r e e v e n broader a n d
of
liberal
values
by
the
they led to increased
lower-middle-class
im-
legitimacy
of d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s a n d t h e m e a n i n g of d e m o c r a t i c
ically m o r e painful to the liberal:
to
polit-
rejection
blue-collar
workers,
w h o b e g a n to v i e w the doctrinaire liberal as their natural
enemy.
T o an industrial w o r k e r of the 1930s the s y m b o l of the class
enemy
w a s a rich capitalist b a n k e r or industrialist. E v e n as late as Harry
Truman
appealing replaced:
was
able
to bring
to that sentiment.
By
the class e n e m y w a s
about
the late
an
electoral
1960s
1948
victory
that s y m b o l
the black, b a c k e d b y
a
by was
dogmatic
liberal intellectual, preferably a college professor. There has been an undeniable
e l e m e n t of justice in t h e
blue-collar American's r e s e n t m e n t of the liberal's social
white
idealism.
T h e long d e l a y e d a n d imperatively n e e d e d racial revolution launched
in
the
United
States
by
the
comfortably
established
u p p e r m i d d l e class at a relatively l o w cost to themselves; the less
financially
secure a n d less racially tolerant w h i t e
class w h o b o r e the brunt of the c h a n g e in education, and in social mores.
To
many
was
in
it
was
working housing,
industrial w o r k e r s it s e e m e d
that
the rich w e r e not sharing t h e e c o n o m i c costs of the revolution hiring practices or in social p r o g r a m s ,
and that the militant
in lib-
2
5 4 }
TV: The American Transition
erals w e r e
unwilling to m a k e
the
compromises
necessary
tain broader p o p u l a r a c c e p t a n c e of painful social
to
ob-
readjustments.*
T h e resentment of the N e w Left b y m u c h of the A m e r i c a n
public
thus tended to b e coupled with white industrial labors feeling betrayal b y the liberal forces, again to the a d v a n t a g e of the
of
more
conservative e l e m e n t s in A m e r i c a n politics. This
sense
of
disaffection
was
intensified
by
the
frustrations
bred b y the t e n d e n c y to multiply governmental agencies in
order
to o b t a i n p o s i t i v e social c h a n g e s , f H e r e t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e
prag-
matic liberal m e r g e d w i t h the ideological preferences of his trinaire counterpart. remote, vast, a n d
The
combination
of abstract
theory
complex instrumentality had m u c h
to do
the alienation a n d irritation felt b y w h i t e sectors of the
doc-
with
a
with
American
public.
* It is striking that it was only in the wake of the 1968 presidential elections that organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action began to stress the need to remedy the liberal's neglect, and even abuse, of the industrial working class. On the eve of the presidential elections, a series of newspaper articles in The New York Times explored the ethnic and economic sources of northern-urban support for Wallace, repeatedly pointing its finger at the Slavic ethnic minority. Subsequently, it turned out that both in that election (in which, according to the NBC voting profile, Wallace obtained nationally 22 per cent of the Italian ethnic vote, 17.8 per cent of the Slavic, and 13 per cent of the Jewish [Newsweek, November 11, 1968, pp. 35-36]) and in the 1969 metropolitan elections the conservative swing was a much more generalized case of urban disaffection with the liberal approach. f "We now have ten times as many government agencies concerned with city problems as we had in 1939. We have increased by a factor of a thousand or so the number of reports and papers that have to be filled out before anything can be done in the city. Social workers in New York City spend some 70 or 80 per cent of their time filling out papers for Washington, for the state government in Albany, and for New York City. No more than 20 or 30 per cent of their time, that is, almost an hour and a half a day, is available for their clients, the poor. As James Reston reported in The New York Times (November 23, 1966), there were then 170 different federal aid programs on the books, financed by over 400 separate appropriations and administered by 21 federal departments and agencies aided by 150 Washington bureaus and over 400 regional offices. One Congressional session alone passed 20 health programs, 17 new educational programs, 15 new economic development programs, 12 new programs for the cities, 17 new resources development programs, and 4 new manpower training programs, each with its own administrative machinery" (Peter F. Drucker, "The Sickness of Government," The Public Interest, Winter 1969, p. 8 ) .
The Crisis of Liberalism N o r w a s it a l w a y s privileged
groups
in believing
that
good remedial
concerned. social
economic ill-being
social policy for the
Just as the
unrest
{
communists
(revolution)
was
under-
had
erred
the product
of
(exploitation), the doctrinaire liberal erred
in
assuming that e c o n o m i c progress w o u l d prompt social Both underestimated
well-being.
the psychological a n d spiritual
S o m e liberals s e n s e d this, a n d e x p e r i m e n t s
dimensions.
designed to
combine
social initiative, free enterprise, a n d g o v e r n m e n t a l support as R o b e r t
245
Kennedy's
Bedford-Stuyvesant
effort)
were
(such
meant
to
provide a n e w direction. Yet, t h o u g h c o m m u n i t y action as a b r o a d g o a l w a s a n o b l e i d e a , in p r a c t i c e it t o o b e c a m e a m e a n s o f ing the g a m e according to established political rules:
play-
organizing
to gain p o w e r in order either to extract m o r e public f u n d s or create a base for m o r e radical politics.
In the meantime, increased governmental intervention and liberate social e n g i n e e r i n g — t h e social c h a n g e
crosscutting
group
a blend
conflicts,
of
social
lic c o n s e n s u s a n d t h e alienation of t h e y o u n g e r finally
obtained
a
unique
opportunity
to
indifference, pub-
generation. do
much
Hav-
of
what
h e h a d long aspired to do, the pragmatic liberal discovered his intellectual arsenal, d e r i v e d f r o m a highly successful to
the
crisis
of
an
advanced
industrial
society,
of
operational
and political complexity that m a d e for b o t h a b r e a k d o w n of
ing
de-
latter d e r i v e d f r o m "theories"
and development—created
incompetence,
to
43
was
that
response
exhausted;
the doctrinaire liberal—confident that he h a d the right
remedies
and theory, impatient w i t h the s e e m i n g conservatism of the pragmatic p o w e r practitioner, and ambivalent toward the
more
anarch-
ism a n d totalitarianism of t h e N e w L e f t — u n d e r m i n e d the liberal's base of
support
by
destroying
c o m m i t m e n t to liberal The
contemporary
public confidence
in the
liberal's
democracy. liberal
thus
faces
the
threat
of
being
de-
prived of his greatest assets: his optimism, his faith in
America's
future, his vision. I n r e s p o n s e to t h e crisis that h e f e e l s
acutely—
and
than
has
in
many
conservative—the
respects
anticipated
more
correctly
liberal, especially the intellectual
the
doctrinarian,
tends m o r e a n d m o r e to w i t h d r a w into an ideological shell,
savor-
254
}
TV: The American Transition
ing t h e pleasures of indiscriminate attacks o n t h e n a t u r e of ican society
and
thoroughly
enjoying
apocalyptic
Amer-
predictions
of
A progressive society has b e e n defined as o n e that involves
an
the i m m i n e n t d o o m of this society.
Utopian
interplay of
goals a n d practical steps,44 b u t the
doctrinaire
liberal s e e m e d increasingly to offer society only a c o m b i n a t i o n
of
pedestrian prescriptions and dogmatic solutions. H i s attitude
to-
w a r d space exploration, w h i c h linked the explosion of
knowledge
with
suggestive.
The
deeply
felt
human
doctrinarians
cial opportunity politically
aspirations,
symbolically
response to the adventure,
provided
unwise,
is
and
by
the
space
psychologically
age
challenge, was
and
anachronistic.*
for c o n c e n t r a t i n g all a t t e n t i o n o n A m e r i c a ' s u n f i n i s h e d
His
call
terrestrial
business simply ignored the psychological fact that a nation c o m e s m o r e a w a r e o f its s h o r t c o m i n g s a s it e x p a n d s — r a t h e r contracts—its
so-
unimaginative,
bethan
ambitions.
It w a s t h e frontier tradition that stirred t h e A m e r i c a n
imagina-
* President Kennedy's goal of reaching the moon was the object of particular scorn. For example, Lewis Mumford asserted that "the moon landing program . . . is a symbolic act of war, and the slogan the astronauts will carry, proclaiming that it is for the benefit of mankind, is on the same level as the Air Force's monstrous hypocrisy—'Our Profession Is Peace.' . . . It is no accident that the climactic moon landing coincides with cutbacks in education, the bankruptcy of hospital services, the closing of libraries and museums, and the mounting defilement of the urban and natural environment, to say nothing of many other evidences of gross social failure and human deterioration" ( T h e New York Times, July 21, 1969). In contrast, Michael Harrington noted that "there is a certain puritanism on the Left whenever the question of space comes up. It is the fashion to denigrate spending money on heaven when the earth is still so shoddy. But this view ignores two important points. First, if peace were to break out, a massive cutback in the billions for defense plus the normal growth of a fullemployment economy would provide sufficient funds for rebuilding America ana going to the stars. Second, space is not empty of social, scientific, and even aesthetic significance. It could conceivably provide room for human beings, vast new resources for the development of the world, and it will certainly incite a deeper knowledge of both man and the universe. Beyond these pragmatic considerations, there is a moral imperative which requires that humanity live up to the fullness of its powers, and men can rightly boast that they have always experimented and innovated" (American Power in the Twentieth Century, p. 31).
The Crisis of Liberalism
{
tion, c r e a t e d a society of m o v e m e n t a n d g r o w t h , a n d g a v e i c a its i n t e g r a t i v e m y t h .
Scientific exploration,
including
tion of space, has b e c o m e the functional equivalent of frontier tradition,
and
such
endeavor
is i m m e d i a t e l y
247
Amer-
exploraAmericas
relevant
to
the educational a n d scientific attainments of the country. This not to argue
against
greater social expenditures.
I t is,
to argue that a broadly g a u g e d i m p r o v e m e n t of A m e r i c a n
society
will b e a deliberate b y - p r o d u c t of a society that thrusts w i t h its a c q u i r e d including process
those
energy, that seeks altogether n e w beyond
achieving
its i m m e d i a t e
greater
social
forward
objectives—
confines—thereby
consciousness
is
however,
and
in
the
successfully
confronting the u n r e s o l v e d p r o b l e m s of t h e past. Even
aside from
the possibility that the
of the space program
may
end
up by
technological
contributing
impact
more
to
the
resolution of c i t y - g h e t t o p r o b l e m s t h a n all t h e p r o g r a m m a t i c sociological
doctrines
currently
so
fashionable,
there
is
and
also
important international a s p e c t to the s p a c e effort: a major
an
world
p o w e r such as the U n i t e d States has to pioneer in those areas life w h i c h are historically relevant a n d crucial. T o the extent o u r s is a scientific a g e , t h e f a i l u r e of
States to
push
b e y o n d existing frontiers—and space offers a very dramatic
chal-
lenge—would mean
the
United
of
that
the loss of a major p s y c h o l o g i c a l
motivation
for i n n o v a t i o n . T h o u g h it m a y n o t b e p o p u l a r t o s a y so, t h e
fact
is t h a t a c o n t i n e n t a l s o c i e t y like t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d n o t
sur-
vive by becoming
it w o u l d
not
survive
i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a n d it is n o t e v e n c e r t a i n t h a t it w o u l d
find
a
factory
balance
merely another
between
Sweden;
domestic
material
needs
and
aspirations. S p a c e e x p l o r a t i o n is m o r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e
tradi-
tion of a pioneering country w h o s e greatness has b e e n linked innovation ment, To
in
in constitutional
continental
many
arrangements,
exploration,
Americans,
and
in
contemporary
in e c o n o m i c scientific
liberalism
investigation. offers
b o t h a crisis of c o n f i d e n c e a n d of historical r e l e v a n c e . bleak
prospect
that
liberalism,
historically
with
develop-
neither
p r i n c i p l e n o r p r o g r e s s . T h e crisis o f A m e r i c a n l i b e r a l i s m is
the
satis-
spiritual
45
the
hence
It p r e s e n t s most
vital
2 54
}
TV:
The American Transition
source of innovation in contemporary A m e r i c a n b e c o m e the critical expression of a doctrinarian
democracy,
i n g l y r e a c t i v e in s p i t e of its r h e t o r i c — a n d a h a v e n f o r protest active
against shaping
somewhat
the
dehumanizing
of the
future passes
conservative
The End of Liberal
effects
but
of
philosophic
science,
into the hands
technologically
while
of
a
innovative
only
one
elite.*
Democracy?
American
lead to some
possibility.
f o r m of technological
Other
socio-economic
alternatives tensions
could
could
be
phase
managerialism be
more
and technological
is
extreme.
aggravated
by
loss of m o m e n t u m in e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d therefore in t h e of scientific research
the
socially
A technologically innovative and politically conservative that w o u l d
may
minority—increas-
development—an
the pace
impor-
tant s o u r c e of n a t i o n a l pride. Racial strife, u r b a n guerrilla
activity,
a n d alienation of the young,
national
split over America's down
of national
in addition to a p r o f o u n d
g l o b a l role, c o u l d result in a further
consensus
and
the extreme right to capitalize
lead either the
break-
extreme
on America's political
left
or
disintegra-
tion b y attempting to seize power. O n balance, t h e c h a n c e s for t h e success of a serious
revolution-
ary attempt do not appear to b e very good. T o b e c o m e tive revolutionary
instrument the present
New
not only to relate m o r e m e a n i n g f u l l y to the n e w issues our times but also to develop the techniques,
an
quire
modern, the
technologically
transformation
of
advanced a
t h e skills, a n d
society.
somewhat
This
petulant
have
confronting
organizational forms required to effect a revolution in the most
effec-
Left would
the
world's
would
re-
middle-class
* Though public opinion can shift dramatically, it is worth noting that in 1969 polls showed that a consistent majority of younger people and those with college education were in favor of increased space exploration; those opposed were most numerous among the more elderly and among those with grade-school education (cf. Gallup poll, as cited by The New York Times, August 7, 1969, and Harris poll, The Washington Post, August 25, 1969). At the same time, college graduates tended to favor more energetic law enforcement, including more wire tapping (Gallup poll, as cited by The New York Times, August 21, 1969).
The Crisis of Liberalism youth
{
249
movement, supported from a safe distance b y some
sectors
of the m o r e esoteric u r b a n intellectual c o m m u n i t y , into an
organ-
ization w i t h a systematic theory of action that takes into
account
the
of
specificity
of
contemporary
America.
SDS
worship
G u e v a r a , a t r a g i c rural r e b e l , a n d its g r o w i n g r e l i a n c e o n Marxist-Leninist
phraseology
may
be
a compensation
Che turgid
f o r its
a b i l i t y t o m a k e t h a t a d a p t a t i o n , b u t it h a r d l y a u g u r s its
in-
emergence
as an effective revolutionary force. T h e r e is a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r e v o l u t i o n a r y and
revolutionary
success.
Revolutionary
rorism, sabotage, selective assassinations,
activity
activity—through urban guerrilla
is p o s s i b l e a n d e v e n l i k e l y i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s . I t w i l l c o m e n o t t h e N e w L e f t b u t f r o m its e m e r g i n g s u c c e s s o r — t h e
and
confusion but
from
those
among
them
b e e n hardened, disillusioned, and embittered b y their in prisons a n d penitentiaries. prepared the
for real violence,
sitdowns
and
the
raids
These
and on
men
they
will b e
offices.
w o u l d then have to confront a major internal
infuse
who
experiences
as child's
American
as
well
as
the
coercive
might
of
play
society
threat.
B u t e v e n then the collective w e i g h t of political a n d social tutions,
it
have
psychologically
will dismiss
deans'
from
professionally
Violent Left; not from the idealistic y o u n g people w h o with zeal
ter-
strife—
organized
insti-
authority,
w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y prevail. A s l o n g as the N e w L e f t largely i n e f f e c t i v e in its s p o r a d i c r e l i a n c e o n v i o l e n c e ,
remains
it w i l l
be
s p a r e d ; s h o u l d it b e c o m e t h e V i o l e n t L e f t , s u p p r e s s i o n w o u l d
be
its a l m o s t c e r t a i n f a t e . T h e
f a c t is t h a t r e v o l u t i o n s
are
historical
rarities, a n d in m o d e r n t i m e s their s u c c e s s h a s g e n e r a l l y
required
a c o m b i n a t i o n of internal social dissolution a n d external
military
defeat.
The
organization
of
power
must
itself
break
elites m u s t b e split, t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s y s t e m m u s t
down,
the
malfunction,
an alternative leadership m u s t crystallize, a n d the m o r e
creative
social forces m u s t be, at least in significant part, c o n v i n c e d a b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e is a v a i l a b l e . S h o r t of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s ,
that
reliance
o n r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i o l e n c e is likely to b r e e d s u p p r e s s i o n , a n d
even
effectively brutal suppression. *
* On this point there is agreement among such dissimilar observers as the
2
5 4 } The
TV:
The American Transition
suppression
of
the
Violent
Left
would
almost
certainly
p u s h t h e country to the right. O r g a n i z e d coercion w o u l d the
introduction
of
a variety
of
controls
over
the
require
individual.
undertaken systematically b y the legitimate institutions, the ess w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y s t r e n g t h e n
the conservative
forces;
would
if
undertaken
ineffectively,
it
prompt
right-wing vigilantism, b a s e d on a variety of paramilitary
Such a coup would
require the development
of
proc-
political
probably
tions. B u t e v e n t h e n a right-extremist c o u p s e e m s m o s t
forma-
unlikely.
a degree
ganizational cohesion and conceptual relevance that seems
of
The would
more
likely probability,
or-
beyond
the capability of the e x t r e m e rightists—most of w h o m h a v e left b e h i n d b y the p a c e of A m e r i c a n
If
been
change.46
then,
is that
sporadic
lead to a polarization of public opinion,
with
civil the
strife Demo-
cratic Party gradually b e c o m i n g identified w i t h s o m e
of t h e
extreme N e w
Republican
L e f t positions a n d / o r splitting, a n d the
less
Party striving to exploit this situation a n d to consolidate a national conservative majority. This could c o m e about gradually; the
more
National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and Barrington Moore, a severe critic of the present American system. The commission concluded that "collective violence seldom succeeds as an instrument for accomplishing group objectives. It can succeed when one group so overpowers its opponents that they have no choice but to die or desist. But modern governments are much more likely to succeed in such contests than their opponents. "In the contemporary United States, attempts at revolution from the left are likely to invite massive repression from the right. The occurrence of violence in the context of protest activities is highly likely to alienate groups that are not fundamentally in sympathy with the protesters. "The chronicles of American labor conflicts suggest that violence, when it occurred, was almost always ineffective for the workers involved. The more violent the conflict, the more disastrous the consequences for the workers" (conclusions of a report to the Commission on Violence in America, The New York Times, June 6, 1969). Very much in the same vein, Moore warned that the prospects for an urban revolution in America are very dim and that successful radical revolutions have so far failed to provide "a lasting contribution to human freedom" ("Revolution in America?" The New York Review of Books, January 30, 1969, p. 10. See also the thoughtful study by Bruce Smith, "The Politics of Protest: How Effective Is Violence?" Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, July 1968).
The Crisis of Liberalism adventuresome empted
by
Agnew's
aspects
the
call
more
for
a
of
the
American
conservative
mission
to
dream
leaders
Mars),
(for
while
{
would
251
be
pre-
example,
Spiro
lower-middle-class
America's disillusionment w i t h liberalism, resentment of the
N e w
Left, a n d fear of the blacks w o u l d p r o m p t
con-
centration on order that concern
such an extreme
w i t h progress in race
relations
would b e c o m e merely w i n d o w dressing and eventually fade the public agenda. T h e e m e r g e n c e of a more reactionary response w o u l d neither b e dramatic nor have the overt
from
political overtones
of fascism. This
process
could be
accelerated
by
the
doctrinaire
liberals'
determination either to r e m o l d the D e m o c r a t i c Party in their
own
i m a g e or to create their o w n political party. T h e insistence o n doctrinaire response to complexity and the impatience with generalized
compromises
in t i m e s
historical
of
are characteristic
discontinuity;
social
as has
been
more
manifestations already
t h e y are particularly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e y o u n g a n d of
noted,
marginal
m e m b e r s of society. T h e political c o n s e q u e n c e w o u l d b e an greater s q u e e z e o n the p r a g m a t i c , less ideological liberals, from one side by engineering other
by
the doctrinarians
advocating
conservatives
preaching
the
even
pressed
large-scale
a n d opting out of external challenges
the
a
and
merits
of
social
from
social
the con-
solidation a n d of n e w scientific frontiers. T h e latent anti-intellectualism of a great m a n y
Americans—in-
tensified b y college disorders, aggravated b y the a m b i v a l e n c e the intellectuals, a n d s h a r p e n e d b y class hostility t o w a r d bellious offspring of m i d d l e - c l a s s A m e r i c a — c o u l d also public
support
matching
the
for
the
perilous
country's challenge
educational from
the
the
undermine
institutions,
left w i t h
an
issues, sorts
politicized: with
of
either constantly agitated over
its f a c u l t i e s
extraneous
and
matters
students and
passing
increasingly
thus
equally
perilous challenge f r o m the right. T h e A m e r i c a n university become
would
nonacademic
resolutions injecting
on
assemblies
and
trustees w h o
all
political
criteria into their intellectual pursuits; or subject to stricter side control b y conservative
of re-
out-
would
} impose mia.°
IV: The American Transition their political biases
The
itself
be
resulting
a
grave
on the
destruction
symptom
of
of the
internal workings the
liberal
decline
of
of
acade-
university
would
American
liberal
democracy, f In such equitable trends
a context,
the
multi-racial
augur
a
already
society
worsening
staggering
could
crisis
unless
a m e l i o r a t i o n is p r o m p t l y u n d e r t a k e n . ence are
or, e v e n two
equally
in America: Either
worse,
one
public
horrendous
suppression could
be
of
the
pressures
toward
a
creating
social
for
only
such
effort
and/or
and would
their
context
itself
Suppression,
separation. a
more
generate
of
over-
including
s t r i f e , f o r t h e A m e r i c a n b l a c k is n o l o n g e r p l i a n t a n d , whites
would
flock
to his side. T h o u g h
desperation
suppression
at the a b s e n c e
of
scope
of
American
democracy
has
deepened
major
could black
progress—
the price p a i d w o u l d b e a tragic reversal of the process b y the
ef-
moreover,
effectively b e u n d e r t a k e n — e s p e c i a l l y in the w a k e of m a s s i v e uprisings p r o m p t e d b y
there
relations
forts at s o m e f o r m of s e p a r a t e resettlement, w o u l d i n v o l v e
many
at
indiffer-
efforts,
white-black
in the
an
Present
Assuming public
blacks
reaction.
of
hopeless.
major
toward
prospects
reactionary political atmosphere whelming
47
hostility
undertaken
task
become
and
which
enlarged
over the course of the country's history. Another democracy.
threat, More
less
overt
directly
but
no
less basic,
linked to the i m p a c t
confronts
liberal
of technology,
involves the gradual a p p e a r a n c e of a m o r e controlled a n d
it
directed
* Examples of this are provided by the Columbia University Senate's first major act in 1969, which was to express its judgment on the Vietnam war, and by the objections of UCLA's trustees to a young black philosophy professor because of her political associations. f The long-range consequences of the attack on the universities appear to be of little concern to the New Left. For example, the demand for the separation of defense research from universities could create a separate complex of government-operated military research institutes whose secrecy would shield their operations from outside intellectual influence, as is true in the Soviet Union. This is precisely what has already happened in the case of bacteriological-warfare devices, which were developed in closed governmental research laboratories far removed from the overview of the scientific community. The removal of ROTC could similarly accelerate rather than slow down the emergence of a separate large professional career-officer corps —in other words, a warrior caste.
{
The Crisis of Liberalism society.
Such
a society
would
be
dominated
by
an elite
253
whose
claim to political p o w e r w o u l d rest o n allegedly superior scientific k n o w - h o w . U n h i n d e r e d b y the restraints of traditional liberal valu e s , this elite w o u l d n o t h e s i t a t e to a c h i e v e its p o l i t i c a l e n d s
by
using the latest m o d e r n techniques for influencing public behavior a n d keeping society u n d e r close surveillance a n d control. such circumstances, of
the country
the
would
scientific and
not be
reversed
technological but
would
Under
momentum
actually
feed
o n t h e s i t u a t i o n it e x p l o i t s . T h e e m e r g e n c e of a large d o m i n a n t party, a l o n g s i d e t h e
more
narrowly focused and more intensely doctrinaire groupings o n right a n d the left, c o u l d a c c e l e r a t e the trend t o w a r d s u c h logical managerialism.
the
techno-
Such a large dominant party w o u l d
com-
b i n e A m e r i c a n society's q u e s t for stability w i t h its historical affinity for innovation.
Relying
on
scientific g r o w t h
to p r o d u c e
m e a n s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h s o c i a l ills, it w o u l d t a p t h e n a t i o n s lectual talent for broad target planning and exploit the
the
intel-
existence
of doctrinaire g r o u p s b y u s i n g t h e m as social b a r o m e t e r s a n d s o u r c e s of n o v e l i d e a s . P e r s i s t i n g social crisis, t h e e m e r g e n c e of charismatic
personality,
and
the
exploitation
of
mass
media
as a to
obtain public confidence w o u l d b e the steppingstones in the piecem e a l transformation of the U n i t e d States into a highly
controlled
society. *
0 This could also produce a historical paradox. The traditionally democratic American society could, because of its fascination with technical efficiency, become an extremely controlled society, and its humane and individualistic qualities would thereby be lost. (Such a society is the subject of Kurt Vonnegut's novel Player Piano.) On the other hand, the communist countries, because of their organizational inefficiency and the gradual loosening of political controls, might become more preoccupied with questions of humanism; their socialist inefficiency, combined with these more humane concerns, could eventually produce a more flexible social order in some of them. It should, however, be noted that this extremely unlikely prospect is applicable only to the more advanced communist countries. The weight of the political tradition and great power aspirations of the Russian form of communism, as well as the relative socio-economic backwardness of most communist states, argue against it. For a critique of the concept of convergence, i.e., the evolution of a communist system into a traditional liberal democracy, see the concluding chapter of the book I wrote with Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, New York, 1964.
2
54 }
TV: The American Transition
In different ways, might
find
cial control
both
the
doctrinarian
and
the
conservative
the temptations inherent in the n e w t e c h n i q u e s of too
difficult to
resist.
The
inclination
of
the
naire left to legitimize m e a n s b y ends could lead t h e m
to
justify
m o r e s o c i a l c o n t r o l o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it s e r v e s p r o g r e s s . T h e servatives, preoccupied w i t h public order a n d fascinated b y ern gadgetry, w o u l d b e t e m p t e d
to u s e the n e w
Such
an outcome—were
it t o c o m e
conmod-
techniques
response to unrest, since they w o u l d fail to recognize that c o n t r o l is n o t t h e o n l y w a y t o d e a l w i t h r a p i d s o c i a l
so-
doctri-
as
a
social
change.
to p a s s — w o u l d
represent
a profoundly pessimistic answer to the question whether
American
liberal d e m o c r a c y can assimilate a n d give philosophical t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n it is u n d e r g o i n g .
meaning
This matter not only has
v a n c e f o r t h e U n i t e d States; it h a s l a r g e r i m p l i c a t i o n s :
rele-
American
success or failure m a y p r o v i d e a significant indication w h e t h e r modern democracy with highly educated citizens can u n d e r g o a n e x t e n s i v e s o c i a l c h a n g e w i t h o u t l o s i n g its democratic
character.
Fortunately,
the
contains the potential for an American
American
redemption.
a
successfully essentially
transition
also
MMMM
PART V
America and the World America's relationship w i t h the world m u s t reflect domestic values and preoccupations.
American
A profound discrepancy
be-
t w e e n t h e e x t e r n a l c o n d u c t of a d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y a n d its i n t e r n a l n o r m s is n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e ; m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s q u i c k l y
expose
the gulf and undercut the support n e e d e d
policy.
f o r its f o r e i g n
Just as a n a t i o n p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e c o m m u n i s t threat at
home
can conduct a vigorously anti-communist policy abroad, or a tion fearful of revolution c a n b e c o m e intensely involved in terrevolutionary activity, so a nation concerned w i t h social and
technological
adaptation
committed on an international In his
cannot
help
but
become
justice
similarly
level.
Second Treatise on Government,
John Locke wrote,
in t h e b e g i n n i n g , all t h e w o r l d w a s A m e r i c a . " T o d a y all t h e is A m e r i c a , in t h e s e n s e t h a t A m e r i c a is t h e
first
. . world
to experience
social, psychological, political, a n d i d e o l o g i c a l d i l e m m a s by mans
na-
coun-
the
produced
s u d d e n acquisition of altogether u n p r e c e d e n t e d
over his e n v i r o n m e n t a n d o v e r himself. T h e third A m e r i c a n
power revo-
255
2
5^ }
V; America and the World
lution, occurring in an era of volatile beliefs a n d of rapidly
spread-
ing technological change, thus clearly dictates America's role:
that
of the
man
but
social innovator,
without
exploiting
dogmatically
science
prescribing
the
in the service of destiny
of
man.
The
success of A m e r i c a in building a healthy democratic society
would
h o l d p r o m i s e f o r a w o r l d still d o m i n a t e d b y i d e o l o g i c a l a n d
racial
conflicts, b y only
would
economic be
a
a n d social injustice.
setback
for trends
America's
under
way
failure
since
the
not
great
revolutions of the late eighteenth century b u t c o u l d signify a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n failure: man's inability to o v e r c o m e his
baser
instincts a n d his capitulation before the complexity a n d p o w e r
of
science.
1. The American Future If t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t c o n f r o n t A m e r i c a w e r e
neither
nized nor anticipated, the inherent dangers w o u l d b e even
recoggreater.
S u c h is n o t t h e c a s e . C o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a is p e r h a p s m o r e didly
critical
and
more
demanding
of
itself
than
any
ciety: national reports pinpointing the society's failures, ing critiques of national shortcomings, stocktaking—all
reflect
sober national mood. scale
(both
endowed
by
a
more
elaborate
introspective
academic
commissions
social
deliberately
S t u d i e s of t h e future, o r g a n i z e d
special
so-
devastat-
efforts at and
can-
other
on a
large
by
well-
and
private institutes), indicate mounting national
recogni-
tion that the future can a n d must b e planned, that unless there a m o d i c u m of deliberate choice, c h a n g e will result in chaos.*
is
This
* The concern is not limited to intellectuals but includes businessmen as well. Thus, in March 1969 Fortune unveiled a plan to remedy the condition of "a second-rate nation with a civilization only half-built/' offering a pro-
The American Future does
not
guarantee
that
a
national
response
will
{273
actually
m o u n t e d , b u t it d o e s i n d i c a t e a m o r e p e r v a s i v e a w a r e n e s s leading sectors of society of the n e e d for a deliberate
be
among
response.
T h e historical vitality of the U n i t e d States system derives
from
the deeply rooted c o m m i t m e n t of the American people to the of
democratic
change.
The
American
a n d of hierarchically u n f e t t e r e d been
an
important
factor
in
tradition
of f r e e
idea
dialogue
expression of d i s a g r e e m e n t 1
developing
this
c h a n g e ; it h a s m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o e x p l o i t p r o t e s t m o v e m e n t s thereby
render
adopting violence
them
historically
their programs. in A m e r i c a n
superfluous)
by
T h i s is t o d e n y n e i t h e r
history
nor
the
has
responsiveness
oft-noted
to
(and
adapting
and
the element
of
conservatism
of
the electorate. Nevertheless, the f u n d a m e n t a l reality of
American
life has b e e n the assimilation of the rapid c h a n g e i n d u c e d b y frontier, b y
immigration,
socio-economic servatism
and
reality has
and
created
in the past p r o v e n
by
industrial
blended
a pluralist
with
growth.
A
a certain political
socio-political
itself to b e r e m a r k a b l y
system
resilient in
the
dynamic con-
that
has
absorbing
e x t r a o r d i n a r y c h a n g e ; it p o s s e s s e s a s t r u c t u r a l q u a l i t y c a p a b l e generating
and
deciphering
warning
signals
of
mounting
of
social
stress. T o d a y ' s A m e r i c a h a s set h i g h e r s t a n d a r d s for itself t h a n h a s other society: equality,
at
it a i m s a t c r e a t i n g r a c i a l h a r m o n y
achieving
social
welfare
while
on the basis
preserving
less—but
in
its
ambitious
S t a t e s m i g h t b e less w e r e it t o
goals
America
retains
its
of
personal
liberty, at eliminating p o v e r t y w i t h o u t shackling individual dom. Tensions in the U n i t e d
any
freeseek
innovative
character. Though the N e w
L e f t — a n d particularly the Violent
Left—has
gram for extensive rehabilitation of the nation. It would require a massive public and private effort. See also a more extensive study by Leonard A. Lecht, Goals, Priorities and Dollars: The Next Decade (New York, 1966), which outlines in extraordinary detail a plan for allocating the GNP for various tasks of national renewal, with special concentration on the scientific-technological and ecological structure of society.
2
58 }
V: America and the World
temporarily tionary likely
served
trends,
the
to p e r m e a t e
to fortify socially conservative impatience the
of
the
socio-political
young system,
is
or e v e n
more
especially
b e g i n to o c c u p y m o r e influential positions a n d m a k e sponsive
to the
creasingly
need
for c h a n g e
international
and
experience
reform.
of
the
and business elite has already p r o m p t e d
reac-
and
more
as
they
it m o r e
Moreover,
American
a greater inclination
States from both the
there-
political
A s a result, m o r e A m e r i c a n s r e c o g n i z e that t h e t w o b r o a d of n e e d e d a n d — i t is t o b e h o p e d — d e v e l o p i n g and
former
largely,
sphere,
the
concerns
the
though
latter
the
cultural
to
content
not
the and
aspects
of
exclusively,
educational the
shaping
pertains
of
areas
change involve
American
domain,
to
countries.0
evolution a n d t h e social innovation of other a d v a n c e d
institutional
in-
intellectual
consider contemporary problems within a larger framework, b y drawing lessons for the United
re-
the
society.
to
the
political
particularly
national
the The
values.
as
it
More
d e l i b e r a t e c h a n g e in b o t h r e a l m s w o u l d s e r v e as a catalyst for ref o r m in o t h e r areas of n a t i o n a l life, p r o v i d i n g b o t h t h e and the motivation for the timely adoption of n e e d e d
Participatory
framework remedies.
Pluralism
T h e a p p r o a c h i n g t w o - h u n d r e d t h anniversary of the of I n d e p e n d e n c e c o u l d justify the call for a national convention to re-examine
Declaration
constitutional
the nations formal institutional
frame-
work. E i t h e r 1976 or 1 9 8 9 — t h e t w o - h u n d r e d t h anniversary of
the
C o n s t i t u t i o n — c o u l d serve as a suitable target d a t e for c u l m i n a t i n g a national d i a l o g u e o n the relevance of existing arrangements,
the
w o r k i n g s of t h e representative process, a n d the desirability of imitating t h e various E u r o p e a n regionalization reforms a n d of streamlining
the
administrative
structure.
More
important
still,
either
0 For example, it is now more candidly admitted that America has much to learn from Western Europe in metropolitan planning, in local urban planning, in regionalization, in the development of new towns, and in social and legal innovation.
The American Future
{ 273
date w o u l d provide a suitable occasion for redefining the of
modern
democracy—a
task
admittedly
challenging
n e c e s s a r i l y m o r e s o t h a n w h e n it w a s u n d e r t a k e n b y t h e f a t h e r s — a n d for setting ambitious a n d concrete social Realism,
however,
political innovation form, desirable
forces will not
us
as that w o u l d
scope
may
be
recognize
come
from
be.f
likely to d e v e l o p incrementally eventual
to
The
that
meaning but
goals.*
the
necessary
direct constitutional needed
change
is
far-reaching,
in the political sphere the increased of
make possible to the
lower
more
efficient
especially
of
flow
more
as
the
of
government
and
Thus,
coordination
of authority a n d society.
its
political
of i n f o r m a t i o n a n d
techniques
greater devolution levels
re-
a n d less overtly. Nonetheless,
process gradually assimilates scientific-technological change.
development
not
founding
the may
responsibility
In
the
past
the
division of p o w e r has traditionally c a u s e d p r o b l e m s of inefficiency, poor coordination, a n d dispersal of authority, b u t today the communications
and computation techniques make possible
increased authority at the l o w e r levels a n d almost instant
highly
advanced national
analytical
planning—in
methods, the
would
looser
also
French
make sense
both
national
coordination.! T h e rapid transferal of information, c o m b i n e d
broad
new
with
possible of
target
* For example, 1976 could provide a target date for a massive effort to terminate poverty as currently defined, or to bring Negro education up to the national average; 1989, for ecological targets. t For example, one simple—though admittedly unattainable—constitutional reform would go a long way toward making Congress more responsive to social evolution: the passage of a congressional equivalent of the Twentysecond Amendment limiting the presidential term of office, t These techniques could also be used to improve electoral procedures and to provide for closer consultation between the public and its representatives. Existing electoral machinery in the United States—in regard to both registration and voting procedure—has simply not kept up with innovation in electronic communications and computation. Reforms (such as electronic home-voting consoles) to make it possible for representatives of the public to consult their constituents rapidly, and for these constituents to express their views easily, are both technically possible and likely to develop in view of growing dissatisfaction with present machinery. More intense consultation, not necessarily only on the national level or only in regard to political institutions, would further enhance the responsiveness of the American social and political system.
26o }
V: America and the World
definition—not
only
concentrating
on
clearly defining ecological and cultural Technological
developments
ciety will require more ment
of t h e A m e r i c a n
and
make
more
economic
goals
but
it c e r t a i n
planning.
future will b e c o m e
that
modern
Deliberate
with
tor a n d manipulator. This will p u t a greater e m p h a s i s o n goals and, b y the s a m e token, on a more self-conscious
so-
manage-
widespread,
p l a n n e r e v e n t u a l l y d i s p l a c i n g t h e l a w y e r as t h e k e y social
tion with social ends. H o w
more
objectives.
the
legisladefining
preoccupa-
to c o m b i n e social p l a n n i n g w i t h
s o n a l f r e e d o m is a l r e a d y e m e r g i n g as t h e k e y d i l e m m a o f
per-
techne-
tronic America, replacing the industrial age's preoccupation balancing social n e e d s against requirements of free T h e strengthening of local, especially metropolitan, is a l r e a d y r e c o g n i z e d
as an urgent
process in the U n i t e d States. T h e sibility to l o w e r e c h e l o n s both the
flow
of t h e political
of better talent
and
government
necessity for the
devolution of system
greater
with
enterprise.
democratic
financial may
responencourage
local participation
more important local decision-making. National coordination local
participation
coordination.
This
could has
thus
already
be
wedded
been
tried
by
new
systems
successfully
in and
by
of
some
large businesses. The would
trend
toward
be
keeping
in
more with
sharp distinctions b e t w e e n tutions such as T V A
coordination the
but
American
less
centralization
tradition
of
blurring
public and private institutions.
or the F o r d
Foundation
perform
Insti-
functions
difficult for m a n y E u r o p e a n s to understand,
since they are
accustomed
between
either
to
differentiate
sphere and the private
sharply
the
more public
(as has b e e n typical of the industrial
or to s u b o r d i n a t e the private to the p u b l i c
( a s is f a v o r e d b y
socialists a n d s o m e liberals) or to absorb t h e private b y the lic ( a s has b e e n the case in c o m m u n i s t
political
issue
of
a
society
the pub-
states).
A t o n e t i m e t h e q u e s t i o n of o w n e r s h i p w a s and
age
undergoing
the decisive
social
modernization.
forms of land o w n e r s h i p customary in the feudal-agricultural w e r e e x t e n d e d t h r o u g h force of habit as w e l l as historical
The age
accom-
The American Future modation
into the industrial
age; o w n i n g
{273
a factory was
b e i n g largely the s a m e as o w n i n g a p i e c e of land. T h i s
seen
as
eventually
led to a severe conflict b e t w e e n
old forms and modes
of
ating
new
industrial
individual
rights
and
the
requirements
of
evalu-
organization, of collective e m p l o y e e rights, a n d of c h a n g e d political institutions. more
advanced
Socialism
one extreme
depersonalized
socio-
solution;
the
ownership
and gen-
accommodation.
The
corporate
in
the limited sharing of authority w i t h organized labor w a s the eral pattern of
West
was
q u e s t i o n of
ownership
was
thus redefined into o n e of control a n d regulation, w h i l e the of exploitation
associated
with
ownership
was
replaced
problems concerning the economic participation cal w e l l - b e i n g of the
and
by
question
new
psychologi-
employed.
In the process, e v e n in A m e r i c a the federal g o v e r n m e n t as the k e y
issue
institution for restructuring
of the extent of
emerged
social relations,
t h e state's role in e c o n o m i c
and
the
affairs
be-
c a m e crucial. U n l i k e the agricultural age, during w h i c h f e w
state
institutions w e r e involved in organizing and assisting man's
daily
existence, the industrial age p r o d u c e d both greater
opportunities
for national direction a n d a greater social d e m a n d for g o v e r n m e n t imposed seemed
social the
justice.
only
More
alternative
centralized to
chaos
direction
and
the
only
by
the
state
response
to
social injustice. Our age has b e e n m o v i n g toward a n e w pattern, blurring tinctions
between
public
and
private
bodies
and
m o r e cross-participation in b o t h b y their e m p l o y e e s a n d In Europe co-determination but
has
increasingly
led
not only has involved
to participation
members.
profit-sharing
in policymaking;
sures in the s a m e direction are clearly building u p in the States as well. A t t h e s a m e time, t h e w i d e n i n g social
dis-
encouraging
presUnited
perspectives
of the A m e r i c a n business c o m m u n i t y are likely to increase the v o l v e m e n t of business executives in social problems, t h e r e b y
in-
merg-
ing private and public activity on both the local and the
national
levels. This m i g h t in turn m a k e for m o r e effective social
applica-
tion of t h e n e w
bureau-
management
techniques,
which,
unlike
262} cratized
V: America and the World governmental
procedures,
and responsive to external
have
proved
both
efficient
stimuli.0
Such participatory pluralism m a y prove reasonably effective subordinating science and technology for s o m e the introduction
of
to social ends.
the machine
was
In the
t e c h n o l o g y is s e e n b y s o m e m o d e r n c o n s e r v a t i v e s a s t h e of a h a p p y n e w
as t h e
symbol
of
social evil.2
Yet
the
beginning many
replacing
crucial
issue
mains the e n d s to w h i c h science a n d t e c h n o l o g y are applied, a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h e f f e c t i v e c o o r d i n a t i o n is c o m b i n e d w i t h tralization
is m o r e
likely
to
crystallize
the
necessary
of
today
a g e b e c a u s e it p r o m i s e s t o f r e e m a n f r o m
s o c i a l p r o b l e m s , w h i l e f o r t h e N e w L e f t t e c h n e t r o n i c s is property
past
the beginning
Utopia; f o r o t h e r s it m e a n t t h e u n l e a s h i n g o f e v i l . S i m i l a r l y ,
in
reand
decen-
discussion
a n d reflection. Scientific expertise c a n t h e n b e m o b i l i z e d for social ends
without
granting
scientists
a dominating
political
c a u s e of their scientific credentials, f P a r t i c i p a t o r y
role
pluralism
bewill
* This is especially ironic since the government has sponsored the transfer of many technological innovations from defense to private industry (see R. Lester and G. Howick, Assessing Technology Transfer, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1966, especially pp. 42, 48, 76, and 79). At the same time, the internal bureaucratic procedures of many government agencies lag in technological innovation as compared with major banks or corporations. Bureaucratic rigidity appears to be a function of size and hierarchy. A study by sixteen leading research administrators reported in the spring of 1967 that small, independent companies have been much more innovative technologically than large companies (see Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity, New York, 1969, p. 62.) t On the complex question of the role of scientists in policymaking, comments by Don K. Price in The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, Mass., 1965) and by Sanford A. Lakoff and J. Stefan Dupre in Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962) are especially pertinent. There is no reason to believe that scientific competence is sufficient for relevant judgments concerning all areas of social existence or public policy. Indeed, though somewhat exaggerated, the observations of a French social thinker on the dangers of excessive deference to the nonscientific opinions of scientists have some merit: "We are forced to conclude that our scientists are incapable of any but the emptiest platitudes when they stray from their specialties. It makes one think back on the collection of mediocrities accumulated by Einstein when he spoke of God, the state, peace, and the meaning of life. It is clear that Einstein, extraordinary mathematical genius that he was, was no Pascal; he
The American Future automatically sibility,
but
ensure neither political w i s d o m it m i g h t
make
for
a
society
{273
nor social
that
more
respon-
nearly
ap-
proaches both. Anticipation
of
the
social
effects
of
technological
offers a g o o d e x a m p l e of the necessary forms of
innovation
cross-institutional
c o o p e r a t i o n . O n e of t h e nation's m o s t u r g e n t n e e d s is t h e of a variety of m e c h a n i s m s
that link national
ments, academia, and the business community of N A S A m a y b e e s p e c i a l l y r e w a r d i n g )
and
creation
local
govern-
(there the
example
in the task of
evaluating
not only the operational effects of the n e w technologies b u t
their
cultural and psychological
local
effects. A series of national a n d
c o u n c i l s — n o t restricted to scientists b u t m a d e u p of various
social
groups, including the c l e r g y — w o u l d b e in k e e p i n g w i t h b o t h
the
n e e d a n d the e m e r g i n g pattern of social response to c h a n g e . * T h e trend t o w a r d the progressive b r e a k d o w n of sharp
distinc-
tions b e t w e e n the political a n d social spheres, b e t w e e n public
and
knew nothing of political or human reality, or, in fact, anything at all outside his mathematical reach. The banality of Einstein's remarks in matters outside his specialty is as astonishing as his genius within it. It seems as though the specialized application of all one's faculties in a particular area inhibits the consideration of things in general. Even J. Robert Oppenheimer, who seems receptive to a general culture, is not outside this judgment. His political and social declarations, for example, scarcely go beyond the level of those of the man in the street. And the opinions of the scientists quoted by L'Express are not even on the level of Einstein or Oppenheimer. Their pomposities, in fact, do not rise to the level of the average. They are vague generalities inherited from the nineteenth century, and the fact that they represent the furthest limits of thought of our scientific worthies must be symptomatic of arrested development or of a mental block. Particularly disquieting is the gap between the enormous power they wield and their critical ability, which must be estimated as null" (Ellul, p. 435). For some suggestive analogies, see R. Todd, "George Wald: The Man, the Speech," The New York Times Magazine, August 17, 1967. This would go beyond the task set the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, authorized by Congress in 1964, and also address itself to the issues with which, for example, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science has been grappling. An editorial in Science (August 1, 1969) on "The Control of Technology" errs in implying that the above matter should be restricted to scientists. Social scientists, the clergy, and humanists should also be involved, and the Special Commission on the Social Sciences, established in 1968 by the National Science Board, could well be drawn in.
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
private
institutions,
will
not
lend
itself
to
easy
classification
as
liberal, conservative, or socialist—all terms d e r i v e d f r o m a different
historical
context—but
participatory democracy
it w i l l
be
a
major
toward Left
in to
through
a
progressive
symbiosis
of t h e N e w
the
t h e l a t e 1960s. I r o n i c a l l y , this p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c y is l i k e l y emerge
advocated by some
step
of
the
institutions
of
society a n d of g o v e r n m e n t rather t h a n t h r o u g h the r e m e d i e s
the
New
and
Left
had
been
advocating:
economic
expropriation
political revolution, b o t h distinctly anachronistic remedies of
the
earlier industrial era. T h e evolutionary e m e r g e n c e of participatory pluralism m a y s e e m a sufficient r e s p o n s e t o t h o s e sectors of A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y have b e c o m e entirely alienated—and
it m a y
a p p e a r as too
much
c h a n g e to those w h o h a v e a vested interest in the
status quo.
for
the
that
gradual terns
of
large
body
change social
of
and
Americans
who
value
involvement
who
procedural
could
expert-oriented.
political decline
parties
as
In
that
setting
traditionally
in i m p o r t a n c e ;
order,
provide
o u t l e t f o r a s o c i e t y t h a t is i n c r e a s i n g l y and
accept
the
known
in their stead,
multiple
becoming
it is e v e n in
concept
desired more
possible
America
organized
ad
hoc
and
shifting national coalitions
basis a r o u n d specific issues of national
complex that
dominate
Less
the
visible
visible—indeed,
vailing progress
rhetoric toward
sometimes
about a
ticipatory pluralism
dimensions
new
the
of
regional,
will form on
"repressive
democracy
in m a n y
areas
term crises d o not deflect the U n i t e d
by
society"—is
from
life.
the
the
based
life. A s s u m i n g States
an
likely
political
obscured
increasingly of
for
import.*
American
totally
the
further
In the i m m e d i a t e future, the politics of street protest are to
of pat-
urban, professional, and other interests will provide the focus political action,
But
creative
will
local,
not that
pre-
gradual on
that
parshort-
redefining
the
• These coalitions are less likely to form along the traditional dividing line of Republicans and Democrats or—as more recently—of conservatives and liberals, but rather to divide according to basic philosophical attitudes toward the problems of modern life. In greatly simplified terms, the humanists and idealists on one side might be pitted against the pragmatists and modernizers on the other.
The American Future
{273
s u b s t a n c e of its d e m o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n , t h e l o n g - r a n g e e f f e c t o f
the
p r e s e n t t r a n s i t i o n a n d its t u r m o i l s w i l l b e t o d e e p e n a n d w i d e n
the
scope of the d e m o c r a t i c process in America.
Change in Cultural The
Formation
evolutionary
development
of
American
democracy
will
h a v e to b e m a t c h e d b y c h a n g e s in t h e processes of f o r m i n g shaping
the
political
change,
through
evolution—in
stimulated matic
content
by
of
its
cultural
reform
part
over-all
engineering.
national is
more
deliberately
social
The
culture.
As
in
the
likely
to
come
encouraged
change—than
element
of
and
through
deliberate
and
case
of
about in
part
program-
and
conscious
choice m a y b e e v e n m o r e important here than in the
transforma-
tion
of
complex
institutional
in
modern
society the educational system and the mass media have
become
the principal social m e a n s for defining the substance of a
national
c u l t u r e . T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y downgraded traditional The regard
arrangements,
because
which
has
such alternative sources of culture as c h u r c h e s
true in A m e r i c a n
society,
and
customs.
educational to black
system
has
Americans.
a
special
Here
the
social
responsibility
simultaneous
needs
e n h a n c e t h e black c i t i z e n s dignity a n d to enlarge his
will be
quest for his separate identity
to c o m b i n e
the black
to
long-range
opportunities. These needs h a v e occasionally clashed, but the short-term r e m e d y
in
are
perhaps
American's
(through such institutional
devices
as separate courses a n d r e s i d e n c e s ) w i t h m a s s i v e a n d scientifically oriented
remedial
training.
The
for several decades to c o m e — i s the
late-industrial
cannot
be
matched
done
by
stage
unless
of
challenge
of
probably
to help the black A m e r i c a n
America's
sensitivity
a recognition
today—and
to
his
development, psychological
the necessity
skip
and
this
needs
for a disciplined,
is fo-
c u s e d i n t e l l e c t u a l e f f o r t . T h e t w o w i l l b e h a r d t o c o m b i n e , b u t it is m
this area that e v e n t u a l
relations will be
progress
or disaster in America's
race
shaped.
Racial calamity will be avoided only if society at large defines
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
m o r e c l e a r l y t h e v a l u e s it s e e k s , is w i l l i n g t o c r e a t e a
responsive
f r a m e w o r k t o p r o m o t e t h e m , a n d is p r e p a r e d to insist o n for orderly
procedure.
wide
swings
any
demand
from
Nothing
permissive
made
by
could and
black
be
more
respect
destructive
guilt-ridden
than
acquiescence
extremists—such
m e r e l y stimulates an escalation of e x t r e m i s m — t o insensitive sivity or o p p o s i t i o n to black d e m a n d s for a fair share of tion
in
American
society.
A
massive
educational
pas-
participa-
effort
is
c r u c i a l f a c t o r , b u t t o b e s u c c e s s f u l it m u s t b e g e a r e d t o t h e range thrust of A m e r i c a n society's d e v e l o p m e n t a l
general
question
whether
needs.
mechanically
technical
and
duration
industrial
needs of
of
the
current
emphasis
on
emerging
mass
society.
education
minimum
mass
the
psychological
The
social
differs f r o m literacy
raises
extending
duration of e d u c a t i o n w i l l suffice to m e e t b o t h t h e and
the long-
T h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d spread of m a s s e d u c a t i o n in A m e r i c a the more
to
acquiescence
for
scope
the
early-
males
(and
f r o m the e v e n m o r e elitist m e d i e v a l pattern of v e r y limited
learn-
i n g for v e r y f e w ) . C o n t e m p o r a r y p r o g r a m s a i m at t h e e d u c a t i o n of a h i g h proportion of b o t h sexes and call for periods of lasting a n y w h e r e f r o m ten to almost t w e n t y years more advanced degrees).
schooling
(in the case
I n A m e r i c a h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n is
of
carried
on within a relatively self-contained organizational and e v e n social f r a m e w o r k , m a k i n g for a p r o t r a c t e d p e r i o d of s e m i - i s o l a t i o n
from
p r o b l e m s of social reality. As a result, b o t h organizationally in terms of content, a divorce b e t w e e n e d u c a t i o n a n d social ence has tional
tended
and
to
develop,
psychic
leading to
manifestations
of
the
already
student
and exist-
noted
emo-
frustration
and
immaturity. By
extending
education
the lifetime of the citizen, meeting
this
problem.
relatively
isolated
shortened.
Taking
maturation
of
The
phase into
young
on
an
intermittent
society w o u l d duration of
initial
account
people
the
today,
of
go the
basis
it c o u l d
toward
self-contained
education earlier
throughout
a long way
could
physical be
then
and
more
and be
sexual
generally
p u r s u e d w i t h i n a w o r k - s t u d y f r a m e w o r k , a n d it s h o u l d b e
supple-
The American Future
{273
m e n t e d b y periodic additional training throughout most of
one's
a c t i v e life. A g o o d c a s e c a n b e m a d e for e n d i n g initial e d u c a t i o n
(more
w h i c h c o u l d b e o b t a i n e d in t h e h o m e t h r o u g h electronic
s o m e w h e r e a r o u n d t h e a g e of e i g h t e e n . T h i s f o r m a l initial c o u l d b e f o l l o w e d b y t w o years of service in a socially cause;* then b y direct involvement
period
desirable
in s o m e professional
activity
a n d b y advanced, systematic training within that area; a n d by
regular
periods
of
one
and
eventually
even
two
one's
life, s o m e w h e r e
medical
or
college,
thus
legal both
up
training
to
the
could
begin
after
only
two
years
of
attracted
into
retraining—as
well as b r o a d e n i n g — c o u l d m o s t of one's professional
to
example,
these
formally
needed
decade
For
training and probably also increasing the n u m b e r and
time
sixty, f
the
Regular
the
of
of
complete
professions.
shortening
age
finally
years
broadening, "integrative" s t u d y at the b e g i n n i n g of e v e r y of
of
devices)
required
e n s u e at regular intervals
throughout
career.
C o m b i n i n g initial specialization w i t h a s u b s e q u e n t
broadening
* This cause could be either national or international, publicly or privately tackled. It would be in keeping with the humanitarian idealism of the young not to limit such service to national causes. One good way to handle the matter would be to maintain a list of acceptable humanitarian activities, service on behalf of which would be an acceptable equivalent for military duty. * This would go beyond the task set for the National Commission on Techintegrative needs of the modern age. It would thus combine science with philosophy but no longer act as an intellectual cafeteria, offering studies ranging from physical education through classics, from "sour courses to the latest specialized sciences. In effect, the roles of the "junior" college and of the university would become separate in time and place, probably to the advantage of both institutions. This would permit concentration on the larger social questions and keep higher education from being an aristocratic process; at the same time, it would allay some of the dangers inherent in the illusion that an educated citizenry is created by simply running a lot of people through the educational mill. In addition, the traditional titles of learning, such as "doctor of philosophy," imply a terminal educational process and reflect the situation of an earlier stage in social history. Since learning will become a continuous, lifetime process that involves almost the entire community, degrees become a symbolic anachronism and should be drastically reclassified to indicate more accurately the various stages of specialized and generalized knowledge.
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
of philosophical a n d scientific horizons w o u l d s o m e w h a t act the present trend, w h i c h
makes
increased
rising professional standing g o h a n d in hand.
counter-
specialization
narrowness of general outlook. T h e trend c o u l d b e
gradually
versed b y a situation in w h i c h specialization at the a g e of absorptive
capability
integration
at
approach
a
would
would
stage
of
be
followed
increased
encourage
the
society's underlying h u m a n e scientific
specialization
is
by
personal
gradual
grative, m o d e r n i z i n g elite that w o u l d
more
a re-
greatest
intellectual
maturity.
emergence
Such
of
an
an
inte-
show greater concern
with
values in a n a g e in w h i c h
fraught
and
This encourages
with
dangers
of
intensive
intellectual
fragmentation. * The formal educational ploiting
the
education vices.
new
through
It has
also
nongovernmental
system has b e e n relatively
opportunities television been
for
supplementary
consoles
suspicious
organizations
of
to
slow in
and the
other
growing
develop
their
home-based
electronic
tion,
for
Greater
and business
psychological multiplicity
in
are b e c o m i n g as
well
as
educational
m o r e pluralistic national community, ment
of
business
companies
in
more
for
own
involved
will
in
education
may
make
lead
black educa-
reasons.f
and the increasing
rapid adaptation of the latest techniques a n d scientific
of
learning
professional
training
de-
inclination
and training programs. In different ways, however, both the community
ex-
to
for
a
involvea
more
knowledge
* "One of the paradoxes of the future is that while an increasing number of managerial decisions will be handled by automatic data processing, buttressed by clear and swift communications networks, the intelligent direction and coordination of large-scale systems will place an even greater premium than at present upon the wise, artful, and broadly-experienced general manager in organizations characterized by operational decentralization. In short, the proposition that effective decentralization can occur only where organizational centralization has become efficient will have become increasingly recognized, not as a paradox, but as a logical reality" ( T h e United States and the World in the 1985 Era, p. 44). f For example, Olin Corporation, noting in an advertisement that "there is no growth potential in ignorance," has instituted literacy and high school training programs in three of its plants. Other major corporations have similar training programs.
The American Future to
the
extent, grams
educational the
process.
government
of managerial
American
have
in
educational
and,
undertaken
"retooling" and
toward the intermittent educational Change
business
already
retraining,
{273 to
a
lesser
extensive
thereby
moving
pattern.
procedures
and
philosophy
should
also b e a c c o m p a n i e d b y parallel c h a n g e s in the broader
national
processes b y w h i c h values are generated and disseminated. Americas niques,
role as a w o r l d
this is b o t h
a
disseminator
national
other country has permitted
and
a
of n e w
values
be
almost
advertising,
exclusively
tech-
global
obligation.
Yet
its m a s s c u l t u r e ,
taste, daily
amuse-
the
or permitted
Given
and
m e n t , a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t , t h e i n d i r e c t e d u c a t i o n of its to
domain
both
of
standards
private of
taste
and
entrepreneurs
television, tively
located
in w h i c h
small
group,
tions process
to the
in
one
a cultural reflects tastes
metropolitan
the
monopoly
the and
center.
is e x e r c i s e d
insensitivity
of
philosophical
values
and intelgroup
American by
the
no
children
business
lectual content of culture to b e defined largely b y a small of
pro-
a
rela-
communicaof
much
of
America.* Rising public dissatisfaction with
this state of affairs
that perhaps s o m e c h a n g e has to c o m e geographical
decentralization
and
in this
dispersal
of
field
as well.
the
television
dustry into more numerous
units, the separation of
from
and
program
production,
tional p r o g r a m m i n g
will
the
probably
further be
of
opposed
i n g i n t e r e s t s ; if p a s t A m e r i c a n e x p e r i e n c e c a n s e r v e a s a guide,
change
will
come
by
attrition
and
The in-
broadcasting
extension
sharply
indicates
piecemeal
educa-
by
exist-
relevant reform,
* . . broadcasting has imposed upon American society what in the supreme civic sense may be a fatal contradiction. The extension of communication should be an extension of democracy. Yet while the participatory base of democracy has been broadening, the ownership and control of the means of communication have narrowed. Tt could be said indeed that far from being an expression of majority desire, as the networks say, television programs are die imposition of a social minority on the majority, the minority consisting of the fifty top advertisers, the three networks, and a dozen or so advertising agencies" (Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time: The Life of Edward R. Murrow, Boston, 1969, PP- 1 2 - 1 3 ) .
2. j 2. } rather and
V: America and the World than
by
wholesale
technological
of constructive
readjustment.
developments
change;
may
they may
Here,
become
make
again, the
possible
scientific
handmaidens
(through
home
video tapes, h o m e - o p e r a t e d lenses, closed-channel
programming)
far
well
greater
diversity
than
is
today
available,
as
extensive exploitation of the audio-visual m e d i a b y
as
more
more institu-
tions and organizations.
Instead of limiting intellectual
horizons,
television could b e c o m e
a diversified and intellectually
enriching
source of this society's over-all cultural Cultural growing sexual
change
female
mores.
in
our
society
rebellion,
The
massive
a
generation
tunity.
away,
and
restlessness
Such
into American
may
also
be
accelerated
by
entrance
women
sions, into executive positions,
mounting
growth.
of
education
The
into
there
is
already
abundant
of
current
inequalities
feminine
society's
the
and the
because
increased
by
new
profes-
a n d i n t o p o l i t i c s is p r o b a b l y
cultural
assertiveness front,
only
evidence of
could
enhancing
general social interest in cultural g r o w t h a n d
Rational
spurred
spill
over
somewhat
the
standards.
Humanism technological
thrust
and
the
economic
wealth
of
U n i t e d S t a t e s n o w m a k e it p o s s i b l e to g i v e t h e c o n c e p t of
the
liberty
and equality a broader meaning, going b e y o n d the procedural external to the personal and ence. By focusing more of life, A m e r i c a m a y
inner spheres
of man's
deliberately on these
social
qualitative
avoid the depersonalizing
inherent
mechaniza-
tion of e n v i r o n m e n t a n d b u i l d a social f r a m e w o r k for a of man's external a n d inner
synthesis
dimensions.
S u c h a synthesis m a y eventually result from the current between
the
and the impersonal
and exist-
aspects
dangers
in the self-generating b u t philosophically m e a n i n g l e s s
conflict
of
oppor-
irrational
personalism
of
the
rationality of t h e "modernizers." T h e
group, source of m u c h of the rhetoric of the literary
intense
"humanists" former
community,
t h e s t u d e n t activists, a n d t h e doctrinaire liberals, p a r t a k e s of
the
tradition of skepticism a n d disbelief that p l a y e d s u c h a vital
role
The American Future in
overthrowing
the
industrial America
religious
on
the
and
values
of
philosophical industrial
{273
hold
of
America;
pre-
it
seeks
to fortify this tradition b y a n e w e m p h a s i s o n e m o t i o n a n d
feeling.
G i v e n its D a d a i s t style a n d its L u d d i t e - i n s p i r e d historical
posture,
it is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s c a m p w i l l l o n g r e m a i n vital. T h e
potential
transformation of the N e w L e f t into the Violent L e f t will
certainly
n o t e n h a n c e its a p p e a l t o t h e A m e r i c a n p u b l i c . T h e l a t t e r more
typical of
commercial
the n e w
establishment,
seeks to c o m b i n e
since
tional or philosophical idealistic y o u n g The
clash
remnants
of
and
self-interest
tionalist innovation;
threatening
business
executives,
the with
scientific
group,
governmental-
organization
a detached
it fails to p r o v i d e
rationale
the
emphasis
men, on
ra-
a satisfactory
emo-
for either, it a l i e n a t e s t h e
more
people.*
between to
these
American
the
two
orientations
liberal
consensus
of
is
democracy.
the
industrial
destructive
and
fragments
the
It age
and
polarizes
a r t i c u l a t e p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Y e t it a l s o h o l d s t h e p r o m i s e o f a perspective
that
is b e t t e r
suited
A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y , s i n c e it m o v e s vant
framework
that
now
to
the
needs
beyond
confines
of
the
the increasingly
modern
man's
new
emerging irrele-
outlook.
This
n e w perspective involves growing recognition that man's
propen-
sity for scientific i n n o v a t i o n
as
as man's m i n d expressions.
functions,
cannot
be
restrained—that
scientific innovation
B u t it a l s o i n v o l v e s
a heightened
will b e
one
awareness
l o n g as m a n c o n c e i v e s of himself as a distinctive being, will b e the central m o d e need
for both
innovation
of e x p r e s s i n g his spirit. T h e and
idealism
is t h u s
long of
its
that
as
idealism
imperative
stimulating
a
ra-
* Modern psychology increasingly recognizes that the non-concrete, more abstract qualities of life, such as goodness, aesthetic beauty, and morality, are becoming more and more important in satisfying individual wants in modern society (see, for example, Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, New York, 1954, and Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton, 1962). However, the quest for these more abstract and emotional satisfactions often takes ludicrous forms. The late sixties have seen in America a proliferation of various institutes and seminars in which businessmen and others engage in special "sensitivity" seances, expose themselves to "brainwave conditioning,' undertake yoga exercises and sustained "meditation," and the like. These fads reflect the fracturing of the broader, more integrative frameworks of belief, as noted in our discussion in Part II.
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
tionalist h u m a n e
outlook
t h a t is g r a d u a l l y
liberal skepticism of s o m e humanists indifference of s o m e
supplanting
both
and the conservative
modernizers.
T h i s r a t i o n a l h u m a n i s m is e x p r e s s e d in s e v e r a l w a y s :
first,
in an
e m e r g i n g international consciousness that m a k e s so m a n y cans
and
concerns human
American and
institutions
become
growth
and
deeply
go
beyond
involved
nourishment,
and
second,
ingrained human
in
a
growing
and
not
with
view
as political
problems in
spite
of
a
international
confrontations
and
dilemmas fact
that
often intolerant
immediately. Americans,
In
addition,
instead
science, are attempting
desire
of
to resolve it
can
trying
to
also flee
of
still
ecoldeeply
problems between
all be
the
a Utopian,
seen
in
the
problems
to balance their fascination with
quest
definitions
for of
more
human
philosophical nature.
This
and
religiously
suggests
revival of religiosity of a m o r e personal,
the
problems
likelihood
noninstitutional
of
prescriptive
nature.
nine-
concepts
social organization b u t stresses cultural a n d e c o n o m i c versity. I n s o d o i n g , r a t i o n a l h u m a n i s m is l i k e l y t o b e
a
contingent
in t h e s e n s e t h a t it d o e s n o t i n v o l v e — a s w a s t h e c a s e w i t h ideology—universally
and
ecumenical
F i n a l l y , t h e e m e r g i n g r a t i o n a l h u m a n i s m is h i s t o r i c a l l y
teenth-century
of
science
b y a m o r e intense c o n c e r n w i t h the personal qualities of life a
as
good
outstanding
a n d t h e i r r e l i a n c e o n it a s a t o o l f o r d e a l i n g w i t h h u m a n
by
of
American
problems
a n d evil; third, in a s t r o n g p u b l i c i d e a l i s m t h a t is f r e e of impatient,
Ameri-
nationalistic
global
is p r o m p t i n g
tendency—in
anticommunism—to
issues
purely
in
youth such a constructive preoccupation ogy;
the
social
global
of di-
historically
m o r e relevant t h a n w a s the case w i t h earlier responses
to
dilemmas.
and
his-
of the m i n d
into
Unlike
the
industrial
torical discontinuity i n d u c e d a t a v i s m or futuristic availability
of
means
Utopias, permits
age,
when
ideological
complexity
flights
in the technetronic the
definition
of
age the more
social
greater
attainable
ends, thus m a k i n g for a less doctrinaire a n d a m o r e effective
re-
l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n " w h a t is" a n d " w h a t o u g h t t o b e . " T h e great revolutions of the nineteenth a n d twentieth
centuries
The American Future sought
both
liberty
and
equality,
but
even
in
the
{ 273 absence
r a c i a l c o n f l i c t it w a s f o u n d t h a t t h e t w o w e r e difficult t o
in an age in w h i c h the traditional institutions of a religious, cratic,
and
skeptical
agricultural
rationalism,
era
were
legalistic
clashing
with
democracy,
the
nascent
aristo-
effects social
sciousness, a n d t h e n e e d s of a d e v e l o p i n g urban-industrial In
America
hindered
the
by
linkage
deeply
of
liberty
embedded
and
equality
was
fundamentalist
especially values
the
gressing w h i t e c o m m u n i t y a n d t h e artificially arrested b l a c k Inequality
became
a self-fulfilling prophecy,
an economic necessity to the industrially developing
of
con-
society.
religious
that were reinforced b y the ever widening gap b e t w e e n
munity.
of
combine
procom-
as w e l l
as
North.
T h e positive potential of the third A m e r i c a n revolution lies its p r o m i s e t o link l i b e r t y w i t h e q u a l i t y . T h i s l i n k a g e is a and
will
not
be
several decades expected.
attained
all
reversals
Nevertheless,
and
at
once.
even
though
Indeed,
increased
frequently
during
tensions
"cultural
revolution"
that
America
cultural revolution more enduring
has
the
been
next
are to
obscured
sionate polemics, the e m e r g i n g rational h u m a n i s m
in
process,
by
be pas-
is p a r t o f
the
experiencing,
and deeper than the one
a
that
initiated the term. L i n k e d to political reform, the current
cultural
revolution could gradually enlarge the s c o p e of personal
freedom
by
increasing
the
sense
of
self-fulfillment of
an
unprecedented
n u m b e r of citizens a n d g i v e greater m e a n i n g to equality b y ing knowledge
the basis
for
social
and
racial
could create the preconditions for a socially creative and ually gratifying society that w o u l d inevitably have a world role to play.
mak-
egalitarianism.
It
individ-
constructive
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
Mmm 2. International Prospects T e n s i o n is u n a v o i d a b l e as m a n s t r i v e s t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e into the f r a m e w o r k of the old. F o r a t i m e t h e e s t a b l i s h e d work
resiliently
familiar
shape.
integrates But
at
the
some
new
point
by the
adapting old
it
in
framework
a
forms,
force. Today, —with
and
eventually
it
asserts
though the old framework
itself
with
more
becomes
overloaded. T h e n e w input can no longer b e redefined into tional
new
frame-
tradi-
compelling
of international
politics
their spheres of influence, military alliances b e t w e e n
tion-states,
the
fiction
of
from nineteenth-century
sovereignty, crises—is
doctrinal
clearly
no
conflicts
longer
na-
arising
compatible
w i t h reality. Indeed,
it
is
have changed
remarkable
how
rapidly
d u r i n g t h e last t w o
the
dominant
moods
decades.
The
1950s w e r e
era of certainty. T h e t w o s i d e s — C o m m u n i s t
and
Western—faced
each other in a setting that pitted conviction
against
Stalinist
missionaries.
mood
Manichaeans
quickly
gave
confronted
way
Dulles's
to another,
with
the
communist
world
prompted
an
conviction.
Khrushchev
n e d y serving as transitions to an era of confusion. ideological
the
That
and
Ken-
Dissension
crisis,
while
W e s t i n c r e a s i n g l y b e g a n t o q u e s t i o n its o w n v a l u e s a n d
in the
righteous-
ness. C o m m u n i s t cynics c o n f r o n t e d liberal skeptics. There
are
indications
growing awareness
that
the
1970s
will
that the time has c o m e
be
dominated
for a c o m m o n
to shape a n e w f r a m e w o r k for international politics, a
framework
that c a n serve as an effective c h a n n e l for joint endeavors. must b e recognized that there will b e n o real global
by
effort
Yet
it
cooperation
u n t i l t h e r e is f a r g r e a t e r c o n s e n s u s o n its p r i o r i t i e s a n d
purposes:
International Prospects I s it t o
enhance
development? international
man's
Is
material
economic
educational
well-being
growth effort
to
Should health h a v e priority? H o w to
the
perhaps
less
important
the be
and
answer, the
{ 275
his or
point
intellectual
is
a
of
massive
departure?
is p e r s o n a l w e l l - b e i n g more
easily
related
measured
gross
national p r o d u c t ? Is there a n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n
scien-
tific a d v a n c e a n d p e r s o n a l
but
happiness?
T h e r e is a l r e a d y w i d e s p r e a d
agreement
about
the
desirability
of cutting arms b u d g e t s a n d d e v e l o p i n g international
peace-keep-
i n g f o r c e s . T h e r e is a l s o a m o r e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s a w a r e n e s s o f inherent
aggressiveness
and
of
the
need
to
control
it.
3
man's Totally
destructive w e a p o n s m a k e the effects of conflict incalculable thus r e d u c e the likelihood of a major war. Here, again, a n ing global consciousness
is f o r c i n g t h e a b a n d o n m e n t
pations with
national
supremacy
dependence.
In
United
awareness
has
the
sometimes
and
States
taken
accentuating this
the
growing
form
of
obstructed
the
unlimited
c h e m i c a l w e a p o n r y a n d its u s e i n c o m b a t .
4
sensitivity and
advanced
countries,
particularly
it
has
of
biological-
It h a s also
stimulated
pressures for a re-examination of defense requirements, other
inter-
international
greater
development
preoccu-
global
to t h e influence of t h e "military-industrial c o m p l e x , " effectively
of
and
emerg-
in
Japan
while
and
in
Western
E u r o p e , it h a s p r o m p t e d s t r o n g pacifist m o v e m e n t s . Nonetheless, a realistic assessment c o m p e l s the conclusion there will be
no
global
security
future. T h e most that can b e
arrangement
expected
and
in the
that
foreseeable
effectively sought
a w i d e n i n g of arms-control treaties, s o m e unilateral restraints defense
spending,
machinery.
The
and
some
conflicts
expansion
between
in
nations
U N
is on
peace-keeping
are
still
very
real;
r e a d i n g s of w o r l d c h a n g e still differ s h a r p l y , a n d n a t i o n a l
aspira-
tions remain divergent.
in
Japan,
the
Soviet
Western Union
Europe,
nor
in C h i n a
development pose
and
and
restraints
on
Moreover, the
is t h e r e
defense views
unlike
United any
States, public
spending. that
the situation neither
discussion
Secrecy
diverge
in
from
and the
of
weapons
censorship official
im-
position,
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
a n d thus limit the influence of a g r o w i n g global consciousness policy choices o p e n to the leaders of these
T h e p i c t u r e is s o m e w h a t m o r e a m b i g u o u s i n t h e nomic tries
and
now
educational-scientific accept
the
principle
developed
countries.
This
important
component
of
development. that
is a n e w the
new
they
global
All
ought
moral
n a t i o n s still a s s e r t t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y i n
fields
have
in
effect created
a binding
of
eco-
major
coun-
to
aid
the
position,
and
it is
consciousness.
fixing
less
Though
precedent:
despite persisting conflicts a m o n g
the
states,
ex-
available), extension
of a i d h a s b e c o m e a n i m p e r a t i v e . It s e e m s likely t h a t i n t h e to come,
an
the scale of aid
t e n d e d ( m o s t m a k e less than o n e per cent of their G N P they
on
states.
years
economic
aid
will g r o w in scale a n d b e u s e d less a n d less as a v e h i c l e of political influence. A t t h e s a m e time, h o w e v e r , short of a v e r y major it s e e m s
unlikely
that aid will b e
forthcoming
crisis,
in amounts
suffi-
c i e n t t o o f f s e t t h e t h r e a t e n i n g p r o s p e c t s d i s c u s s e d i n P a r t I. In
some
respects
technological-scientific
developments
m o r e p r o m i s e for t h e rapid global spread of e d u c a t i o n a l a n d of n e w
techniques.
Television
satellites
regional educational programs possible
are already
(as in Central
a n d there has b e e n progress in setting u p regional institutes
augur
programs making
America),
technological
(this m i g h t eventually reduce the brain drain, w h i c h
is
c a u s e d in part b y the temptations inherent in resident studies
in
the more advanced countries). T h e Development Assistance mittee of O E C D meeting
the
educational
and unlike U N E S C O them.
5
needs
of
the
less
developed
Such an approach w o u l d b e consistent with the
to
adopt
a
common
of the d e v e l o p e d
development
strategy.
emergence
E n g l i s h as a g l o b a l scientific l a n g u a g e is a c c e l e r a t i n g
the and
increasingly
mobile
one
spread
tion of a global
scientific family,
from
nations,
The
to
countries,
it is n o t s u b j e c t t o p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s
of a m o r e cooperative c o m m u n i t y able
Com-
offers the potential for a systematic a p p r o a c h
of
formainter-
changeable. Yet
this
progress
social incapacity
could
to digest
be and
vitiated
in
absorb
the
many
countries
positive
by
potential
a in-
International Prospects herent
in
educational
economic
and
resources—only
scientific
growth.
marginally
foreseeable foreign a i d — m a y
even
Their
augmented
cause
some
{ 277 inadequate
by
reasonably
positive
changes
to backfire, p r o m p t i n g not social a d v a n c e b u t costly conflict, policy innovation but political paralysis. knowledge the
role
of
the
played
psychology,
factors
in
that
hinders
the
inducing
I n d e e d , o u r still
social
development formulation
development,
by of
religion,
an
not
limited and
culture,
effective
of and
strategy
the dissemination of technical k n o w - h o w a n d for the
for
application
of material aid.* In
this
ments
of
setting, chaos,
which two
combines
general
rudiments
prospects,
of
both
order
more
and
relevant to United States foreign policy, s e e m probable: Third
World,
turbulent
though
changes,
revolutionary
it
will
is n o t
experience common
rival to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b u t t o o w e a k internally to b e its
global
externally
will
a
global
strong
Union
to by
a
too
Soviet
swept
be
remain
the
continue
to b e
the
the
future
second,
likely
first,
in
seeable
wave;
obviously
very
ele-
immediately
not
to
fore-
partner.
The Revolutionary
Process
T h e c o n c e p t of an international revolution inspired b y mon ideology had some seemed
meaning
when
the industrial
com-
to indicate that certain f o r m s of social organization
of social crisis h a d a g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n .
parochialism.
It
processes
assumed, was
in
relatively
framework could be postulated p e r i e n c e of a f e w
Western
part
because
limited,
and
That view combined
universal intellectual perspective with a geographically
world
a
revolution
that
information a
common
about global
o n the basis of t h e historical
countries.
It is n o w
a
historical
increasingly
exevi-
• T h i s is why there is special merit in the National Planning Association's proposal (1969) that a Technical Assistance and Development Research Institute be established in Washington to provide technical assistance to underdeveloped nations and to make a broad-gauged study of the problems connected with development.
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
dent that social conditions, and
technology
this variety tural,
are
includes
religious,
as well as the w a y
socially
and
very
applied,
subtle
historic
vary
but
in w h i c h
enormously,
important
tradition,
in
science
and
nuances
addition
to
that
of
cul-
economic
and technical factors.* Moreover, in Russia a n d in China the revolutionary
intelligent-
sia of t h e late n i n e t e e n t h a n d early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s w a s in the the
forefront of the
most
advanced
process
segments
of modernization. of
society,
and
It
itself
represented
hence
a
political
v i c t o r y b y it i n h e r e n t l y i n v o l v e d a h i s t o r i c a l s t e p f o r w a r d f o r s o c i e t y a s a w h o l e . T h i s is n o l o n g e r t h e c a s e . T h e intelligentsia
in the
its v i c a r i o u s
middle-class
States,
often
modernization
less
developed
intellectual
represents process
countries,
a
social
to
anachronism.
is c o n c e r n e d ,
this
revolutionary
say
equivalents
the
nothing
of
in
the
United
As
far
as
intelligentsia
has
left b e h i n d b y d e v e l o p m e n t s in science a n d t e c h n o l o g y , in
the been
which
it is l a r g e l y "illiterate." It is p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , the even
more
modern
succeed,
industrial their
by
values,
societies
ones,
by
that
clinging in
in s o m e
these to
essentially
effectively
insisting
countries,
anachronistic
that
blocking it b e
perhaps
aristocratic the
and
until
disseminated through
by the
mass
communications,
impact
of
mass
it
after
the
tronic revolution could partially b e c o m e a self-limiting
antithesis
techne-
creates
its on
trained
intelligentsia, w h o are m o r e receptive to doctrinal appeals, more
socially
concerned
and
innovative
own some
countries
this m i g h t e v e n t u a l l y pit the traditional humanist-legalist
younger,
of an
phenome-
communications
sectors of the intelligentsia. In s o m e of the d e v e l o p i n g
the
may anti-
modernization
postponed
ideological revolution has taken place. In this sense,
non:
even
intelligentsias
against officers,
engineers, and students, w h o h a v e c o m b i n e d to effect a
moderni-
zation that
program-
matically
is i n d i g e n o u s
and
socially
radical,
though
eclectic.
0 For earlier discussion of the prospects of revolutionary success, see pp. 48, 119, 188-191, and 248-249.
International Prospects
{ 279
In Latin America the more extreme reforms m a y b e more niscent
of
Peronism
and
the student population
fascism
will be
than
of
communism.
approximately
one
remi-
By
1970 6
million,
thus
creating an ambitious a n d politically volatile base for reform.
In
addition, b o t h the o p p o s i t i o n of Latin A m e r i c a n
to
governments
United States e c o n o m i c a n d political influence7 and their tion to undertake
radical
domestic
reforms m a y
be
inclina-
expected
increase, but to do so within a framework that c o m b i n e s socially responsible Catholicism
with nationalism,
a
in a setting
considerable national diversity. This will produce a highly entiated
pattern
of
change,
but
are not likely to b e m o d e l e d since
the relative
elites
reduces
Soviet
models.
cultural
the
appeal
The
even
its
sophistication of
officer
radical
on communist
the
corps,
of
stodgy
manifestations especially
the
American
Latin
Eastern of
European
socially
or
radical
a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y i n n o v a t i v e y o u n g e r officers, is m o r e l i k e l y than the local
ideology but by continuing anti-Yankeeism—pure and
trinally
religious
oriented.
that will compensate and
Iraqi
intellectual
and
Sudanese
for the
traditions coups
of
probably
weakness
by
being
the
late
carried out b y alliances of officers a n d intellectuals, will be repeated elsewhere
in Africa a n d
the
Middle
commitment
o f it is h i g h l y v o l a t i l e a n d
Doubtless,
these
There
of these n e w
S o m e of t h e i r i d e o l o g y is s h a p e d b y e x t r a n e o u s f a c t o r s
drastic changes.*
regimes
will
be
1960s,
is,
genuineness
t i o n o f I s r a e l a n d o f t h e S o v i e t a t t i t u d e ) ; s o m e is m e r e l y fashionable rhetoric; m u c h
of
doc-
probably
East.
however, s o m e reason for skepticism concerning the a n d d e p t h of the ideological
by
simple.
In other parts of the g l o b e similar social combinations will result in regimes
to
communist
parties, a n d Latin A m e r i c a n discontent will b e g a l v a n i z e d not
indigenous
of
differ-
countries,
composed
b e the source of revolutionary c h a n g e
to
more
regimes.
(the
ques-
currently subject
assisted
to and
* Moreover, these regimes have difficulty in moving into what Huntington has called the second phase of a revolution: "A complete revolution, however, also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalization of a new political order. The successful revolution combines rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization. Not all revolutions pro-
2. j 2. }
V:
exploited ample,
America and the World
by
the
have
Soviets
already
and
made
the
Chinese.
political
(The
inroads
latter,
into
for
East
ex-
Africa.)
E v e n so, it w i l l still b e m o r e a m a t t e r o f t a c t i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n
than
of actual control a n d a c o m m o n strategic policy. Similarly, are
likely
in
to
South
have
and
an
Southeast
essentially
Asia
revolutionary
indigenous
and
patterns
differentiated
c h a r a c t e r . It is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e t w o l a r g e p o l i t i c a l India and nomic
Pakistan—which
and
ethnic
entities,
likely as t h e p r e s e n t
combine may
a variety
split up.
elites, w h o s e
This
of
units—
disparate
will b e
internal unity
eco-
especially
was
forged
by
the struggle against t h e British, f a d e f r o m t h e scene. T h e
waning
of t h e C o n g r e s s Party in India has b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d b y
intensi-
fying ethnic stresses a n d b y the polarization of political Should the Indian Union break down, southern Tamil p r o b a b l y left-wing radical in orientation, w o u l d b e northern
Hindu
right
radicalism,
perhaps
more
contested
of
the
other.
As
happened
earlier
in
ori-
indigenous China,
any
tendency toward c o m m u n i s m that might result from such a frontation w o u l d
soon b e culturally absorbed
w h e l m e d b y the w e i g h t of economic In
China
inescapable shattered
the
Sino-Soviet
Siniflcation
the
of
revolution's
commitment
to
the
Soviet
ably
increasingly of
ideological
share
the
modernization. tenacity
and
already
communism.
universal
perspective
Hence,
Chinese
experience This
lead
to
over-
accelerated That
may more
whatever
development of
both
other
from
its
happens
in
will
nations
dilute
eclectic
the
conflict
and—perhaps
Chinese modernization
model.
con-
perhaps
backwardness.
conflict has
the short run, in years to c o m e
process
and
Chinese
even more important—detached
by
religiously
ented; each w o u l d tend to intensify the doctrinal and distinctiveness
opinions.
separatism,
the
probin
the
regime's
experimentation
in shaping the C h i n e s e road to modernity.
duce a new political order. The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion of political participation. The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth" (Huntington, p. 266).
International Prospects Many
of the u p h e a v a l s
in the T h i r d W o r l d
will
{
unavoidably
h a v e a s t r o n g a n t i - A m e r i c a n b i a s . T h i s is l i k e l y t o b e
particularly
true w h e r e American presence and p o w e r has traditionally m o s t visible. In areas near t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d China, anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese
281
attitudes are likely to
been
however,
predominate
in the long run, irrespective of the character of the internal
re-
forms a n d of the external c o m p l e x i o n of the ruling regimes.
This
again highlights the point that the revolutionary process as
such
will
not
necessarily
determine
the
foreign-policy
stance
of
the
n e w elites, w h i c h is m o r e l i k e l y t o b e s h a p e d b y a c o m b i n a t i o n
of
traditional antipathies, current fears, and domestic political needs. Moreover, the basic orientation of t h e n e w elites will m o r e m o r e respond to the intellectual i m p a c t
of d o m e s t i c
and
changes
the more advanced world, changes directly a n d personally
in
visible
to these elites t hr o u g h travel, study, a n d global mass media.
This
intimacy w i t h life abroad will further r e d u c e the importance
of
integrative ideologies, w h i c h had previously provided a substitute for a clear vision of the future a n d t h e outside world. uniformity was
the prescription for remaking
Ideological
a world
that
was
both distant and largely u n k n o w n , but proximity and global
con-
gestion n o w dictate revolutionary diversity. Accordingly, the real v a l u e s — a s distinguished from the rhetoric — o f the aspiring elites of t h e d e v e l o p i n g nations will b e b y tangible developments rather than by abstract T h e s u c c e s s of t h e U n i t e d
shaped
generalizations.
States in shaping a workable,
multi-
racial d e m o c r a c y w h i l e p i o n e e r i n g in science a n d technology,
the
ability of E u r o p e
and
and Japan to overcome
the psychological
social stresses of m a t u r e modernity, and—last, b u t not
least—the
degree to which the Soviet U n i o n breaks a w a y from the
doctrinal
orthodoxy
critically
that inhibits
its s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t
will be
i m p o r t a n t in s h a p i n g t h e o u t l o o k of T h i r d W o r l d leaders.
2. j 2. }
V:
America and the World
USA/USSR: The
Less Intensive,
extent
to
which
Americans
a b r o a d as a u t o m a t i c a l l y
inimical
extent to which these seem fitted
More Extensive view
Rivalry
revolutionary
changes
to their interests reinforces
beneficial to the Soviets
and
can
into a global communist framework; conversely, the
to w h i c h America views these changes
in a neutral
the be
extent
light
dimin-
ishes the intrinsic attraction of the Soviet m o d e l for Third
World
revolutionaries and encourages indigenous factors to surface
more
rapidly. T h e Soviet attraction has already b e e n w e a k e n e d b y
the
a p p e a r a n c e of states m o r e militant than the Soviet U n i o n a n d groups m o r e activist than the pro-Soviet c o m m u n i s t parties. Soviet appeal has also declined because internal Soviet ratization
and
dogmatic
restraints
on
intellectual
of
The
bureauc-
creativity
social innovation h a v e m a d e the Soviet U n i o n the m o s t
and
conserva-
tive political a n d social order of the m o r e a d v a n c e d world. * A m e r i c a n - S o v i e t r i v a l r y is h e n c e l i k e l y t o b e c o m e
less
ical i n c h a r a c t e r , t h o u g h it m a y b e c o m e m o r e e x t e n s i v e cally
and
more
dangerous
in
terms
of
the
ideolog-
geographi-
power
involved.
Increased direct contacts b e t w e e n the t w o nations, restraints posed
by
weapons
mutual systems,
recognition and
of
lessened
Third World could make
the
destruetiveness
ideological
American-Soviet
of
expectations relations
for
more
Soviet military capabilities,
and countermoves
forces,
extends
particularly
if t h e
growth
conventional
American-Soviet
rivalry to
in
air-
and
areas
c o u l d t e m p t e i t h e r s t a t e t o e m p l o y its p o w e r to offset or creating situations
analogous
the
long-range sea-lift
previously
considered b e y o n d the Soviet reach. Instability in the Third
the other, t h e r e b y
the
stable.
Nevertheless, m o r e a n d m o r e areas o n the globe could b e c o m e objects of m o v e s
im-
present
to the
World
pre-empt Fashoda
0 Some Soviet scientists (particularly Kapitsa and Sakharov) have already warned of the resulting long-run cost to Soviet scientific and intellectual growth.
International Prospects
{ 283
incident, w h i c h at the e n d of the nineteenth century almost
caused
a war between
powers
were
moving
France
(and
a n d Britain at a t i m e w h e n t h e s e
a European
ac-
O n the whole, close cooperation b e t w e e n the United States
and
commodation.
continued
to m o v e )
toward
8
the Soviet Union
seems
a very unlikely prospect
in the
coming
d e c a d e . T h i s is o n l y p a r t i a l l y d u e t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l political
character
of
the
two
countries.
A
communist
and
America
w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y r e m a i n a rival of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , as C o m m u n i s t C h i n a s o o n b e c a m e o n e . G i v e n its s i z e a n d a democratic and creative
Soviet Union might be
just
power,
an even
more
p o w e r f u l c o m p e t i t o r f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a n is t h e p r e s e n t reaucratically
stagnant
and
doctrinally
orthodox
bu-
Soviet
system.
Moreover, d e m o c r a t i c nations are not necessarily pacifist
nations,
as A m e r i c a n history a m p l y demonstrates. Rivalry b e t w e e n is
inherent
in
an
international
global
consensus—the
mans
outlook
dividual
by
result of
competitive
superiority,
and
system
that
centuries nations
particular
of the
that
values.
nations
functions
without
conditioning
insisted Such
on
their
rivalry
is
likely to b e terminated b y a n y t h i n g short of a f u n d a m e n t a l struction in the nature of relations b e t w e e n
of innot
recon-
nations—and
hence
in t h e character of n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y itself. At
present,
the
formation
of
a
new
cooperative
international
p a t t e r n is g e t t i n g l i t t l e h e l p f r o m t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , i n s p i t e o f f a c t t h a t it c o n s i d e r s itself i n t h e f o r e f r o n t of historical
progress
a n d w a s until recently the standard-bearer of an ideology that cut across traditional national lines. T h e
i r o n y of h i s t o r y is
t h a t t o d a y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a s a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h a t is nationalistic
and a domestic policy
of non-Russian minorities;
that calls for the
it a c t i v e l y c a m p a i g n s
patterns of international cooperation, grants a
the
had such
intensely
domination
against
regional
disproportionately
small a m o u n t of h e l p to the less d e v e l o p e d nations
(roughly
ten
p e r cent of U n i t e d States f o r e i g n a i d ) , a n d rejects a joint explorat i o n o f s p a c e ( c l o a k i n g its o w n e f f o r t s i n u t m o s t
secrecy).
I n d e e d , o n e of t h e u n a n t i c i p a t e d effects of t h e Sino-Soviet
dis-
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
p u t e m a y b e a h a r d e n i n g of t h e S o v i e t o u t l o o k a n d a m o r e noid view
of t h e world.
Though
Soviet leaders
want
two-front confrontation and are h e n c e p u s h e d t o w a r d dation
with
either
the
West
or the
East,
the
very
para-
to avoid
a
accommo-
scale
of
the
C h i n e s e c h a l l e n g e intensifies their fears, puts a p r e m i u m o n
mili-
tary preparedness,
with
and stimulates an intense preoccupation
the sacredness of frontiers.* E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t b u t less generally r e c o g n i z e d inhibiting the Soviet U n i o n from seeking more
as a factor
binding
forms
i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n is t h e d o m e s t i c w e a k n e s s a n d of Soviet leaders. E v e n
fifty
relies which
heavily
on
coercion
is a c q u i r e d
through
not by
protracted,
insecurity
y e a r s a f t e r its i n c e p t i o n , t h e
s y s t e m t h e y h e a d still lacks e l e m e n t a r y l e g i t i m a c y : and
censorship
regular,
bureaucratic
to
constitutional infighting.
political
its r u l i n g
retain
its
elite
power,
procedures
(The
struggles
succession are a case in point.) B e c a u s e of the doctrinal
social innovation, broad a c c o m m o d a t i o n
of the w o r l d — w h i c h ruling party—is
no
with the West,
that the Leninist
in turn justifies the L e n i n i s t c o n c e p t longer relevant,
would
inevitably
Soviet-dominated Eastern In
large
Russia's
measure,
delayed
this
conservative
terms of the global city, the
not quite yet
vision of
cause
Union
and
and
Leninist political
Soviet Union
attitude
the farin
reflects
development.
represents
an
In
archaic
that experiences modernity existentially
normatively.
of
Europe.
modernization
religious c o m m u n i t y
for
carrying
dichotomic
reaching internal political instability in the Soviet
but
incapacity
of the Soviet political s y s t e m to r e s p o n d to the internal n e e d s
w i t h it t h e a c k n o w l e d g m e n t
in of
but
9
* To appreciate Soviet fears, one would have to imagine a situation in which the United States was confronted by eight hundred million Mexicans who had nuclear arms and rockets and who were loudly insisting that the United States had seized vast expanses of Mexican territory, that the American system was inherently evil, and that the American government was their enemy. Such a situation would doubtless stimulate intense fears in the American public. Soviet apprehensiveness is further increased by the fact that Siberia —relatively undeveloped and uninhabited—serves as a magnet to the Chinese masses, and that Russo-Chinese territorial arrangements are of a historically dubious character.
International Prospects
Policy
{
285
Implications
T h e foregoing general propositions point to several
immediate
i m p l i c a t i o n s for A m e r i c a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y , in t e r m s b o t h of assumptions a n d of the desirable foreign posture. Before
guiding elaborat-
i n g , l e t u s first p o s i t t h e s e i m p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e i r m o s t s u c c i n c t
form:
a posture based on ideological considerations has b e c o m e
dated;
a n A m e r i c a n - S o v i e t axis is n o t l i k e l y t o b e t h e b a s i s f o r a n e w
in-
ternational system; traditional spheres of influence are increasingly unviable; economic
determinism
countries
communist
or to
the
basis for policy; regional becoming
obsolescent;
a b r o a d is b e c o m i n g
in regard to the less states
alliances
an
does
not
developed
provide
a
sound
against individual nations
extensive
American
military
are
presence
counterproductive to American interests
to t h e g r o w t h of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y ; A m e r i c a n
and
diplomatic
m a c h i n e r y — d e v e l o p e d in the pre-global and pre-technetronic — h a s b e c o m e o u t m o d e d and requires extensive
modernization.
Although American foreign policy has not been tiated^ anti-communist
as
undifferen-
a s its critics h a v e f o u n d it c o n v e n i e n t
assert,* there has b e e n a strong rhetorical t e n d e n c y in official circles to r e d u c e international p r o b l e m s
to an
Henceforth,
local
transformations
American
addition,
the
gradual
pluralization
of
the
Ameri-
in various
of the w o r l d are less likely to b e s e e n as part of a universal in
parts threat;
communist
world
will continue to accelerate differences a m o n g the c o m m u n i s t tems. This will reduce reliance on active American m a k i n g it i m p e r a t i v e
to an overt hostile
act b y
sys-
intervention,
primarily in d e f e n s e of concrete
interests or in response
to
ideological
confrontation a n d to identify radical c h a n g e as contrary to c a n interests.
age
American
a power
with
the potential to threaten the U n i t e d States, f
* The charge that the United States has conducted its foreign policy on the assumption of a monolithic world communist conspiracy is dear to some scholarly critics. In point of fact, the United States pioneered in aid to Yugoslavia in the late 1940s; it was the first to initiate American-Soviet cultural exchanges, visits between heads of state, and so on. t i n more specific terms, it would be desirable and proper for the United
2. j 2. }
V:
America and the World
A less ideological perspective will r e d u c e relationship Soviet
to
Union
its
proper
poses
proportions.
to the
United
The
States
is
the
American-Soviet
principal
threat
military:
a
the
stronger
Soviet U n i o n therefore inescapably tends to threaten America; weaker
Soviet
between
the
arms-control tated by
Union two
feels threatened
superpowers
arrangements
common
sense.
would
between
The
by be
the
continuing
America.
Since
mutually two
a
war
destructive,
countries
SALT
a
are
dic-
(Strategic
Arms
Limitation Talks) b e t w e e n the United States and the Soviet
Union
c a n b e s e e n as m o r e t h a n a n e g o t i a t i o n b e t w e e n t w o rivals; vertently, precisely b e c a u s e t h e y will b e lengthy, t h e talks a
de facto
Although
b e g i n n i n g of a joint c o m m i s s i o n o n a r m s a n d limited
in
actual
power,
the
"commission"
inad-
signify
strategy. gradually
a n d p e r h a p s increasingly will affect the w a y e a c h side acts,
stimu-
lating greater m u t u a l sensitivity to felt n e e d s and fears.* I n t h e m e a n t i m e , u n t i l a b i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t is r e a c h e d , c a n t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n is s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v i d e t h e
Amerineces-
States to aid Thailand with arms and equipment should that country be threatened by North Vietnam. The same response would apply to a North Korean threat against South Korea, or a threat by the Arab states against Israel. But in none of these cases should American forces be committed unless a major power, i.e., the USSR or China, becomes directly involved. Total American abstention would encourage aggression, but American aid should suffice to make the war either useless or very costly to the aggressor. To repeat—direct involvement should be reserved for situations in which a power with the capacity to threaten the United States is involved. * Science and technology have already revolutionized the exercise of sovereignty by the two countries vis-a-vis each other. The utilization of the U-2S, and subsequently of reconnaissance satellites, vitiated the claim to unlimited sovereignty over national air space, somewhat undoing Soviet military secrecy. The acquiescence of the Soviet Union to the U-22 flights was necessitated by its inability to shoot these planes down; in spite of the May i960 incident, the precedent of unilateral inspection was thereby asserted and has since become a practice followed by both states. The inherent complexity of reaching an arms-control agreement is suggested by the following conclusion by a specialist in the field: "There is basis for hope [of a possible agreement] if both sides can accept the fact that for some time the most they can expect to achieve is a strategic balance at quite high, but less rapidly escalating, force levels; and if both recognize that breaking the action-reaction cycle should be given first priority in any negotiations" (George W. Rathjens, The Future of the Strategic Arms Race, New York, 1969, p. 4 0 ) .
International Prospects sary
degree
of
ambiguity
to
p o w e r relationship b e t w e e n of destructive parity,
the
qualitative
and
{ 287
quantitative
the t w o states. In t h e current
this strategic
and
psychological
phase
posture
n e e d e d in order to replace earlier reliance o n manifest a n d ble deterrence born of A m e r i c a n superiority in destructive Parity
deterrence
requires
some
deterrence demanded precise But
outside
this
ambiguity,
just
as
is
credipower.
superiority
credibility.
relationship
the
opportunities
for
a
wide-
ranging settlement are relatively restricted.10 A n
American-Soviet
axis w o u l d
therefore
both
be
resented by
Washington
and
too m a n y
Moscow
to
states
exploit
and these
tempt
resentments.
In
effect, t h e m o r e s u c c e s s f u l t h e efforts to c r e a t e s u c h a n axis, stronger the impediment
t o it. I n a d d i t i o n ,
as h a s
already
argued, the Soviet U n i o n d o e s not represent a vital social tive
that
offers the
world
an
attractive
h a n d l i n g e i t h e r its o l d d i l e m m a s posed
by
America
science
and
joint s p a c e exploration, tively,
seek
in international
these may
help
As
a
result,
is a g r a d u a l
cooperation
undersea shape
relevant
studies,
a pattern
the
increase
through and
of
alternafor
new
ones
most
that
in
such
been
model
or—particularly—the
technology.
can reasonably
volvement
and
the
Soviet
in-
projects
as
so forth.
Cumula-
collaborative
involve-
ment that will eventually embrace other spheres. M e a n w h i l e , it is l i k e l y t h a t A m e r i c a n a n d R u s s i a n i n f l u e n c e
will
decrease in areas that both nations h a v e traditionally
considered
their o w n
out"
special
domains.
In
a modern
city "staked
areas
are possible only in relations a m o n g criminal gangs; in t h e city
sealed
least
spheres
costly—to
of
influence
remain
Eastern
Europe
happen
to a larger
quite
European
will not b e able to halt this process
is
bound
at
impede
otherwise
Europe
difficult—or to
would
Eastern
increasingly
attracted to the West, a n d only direct Soviet coercion can what
maintain.
are
global
rapidly: entity.
the
Even
linkage Soviet
entirely; the traditional
t u r a l a t t r a c t i o n o f t h e W e s t is t o o s t r o n g , a n d it is c u r r e n t l y forced
by
of
technological
the
growing
Eastern gap
European
between
the
recognition East
and
that,
the
of
force culrein-
because
West,
Rus-
2. j 2. } sia
V: America and the World
cannot
effectively
help
Eastern
industrial age. This attraction
Europe
is h e a l t h y ,
to
enter
the
for the gradual
postexpan-
s i o n of E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n links w i t h W e s t e r n E u r o p e is b o u n d a f f e c t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n as w e l l a n d l e s s e n its d o c t r i n a l
orientation.
T h e notion of a special relationship b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d and Latin America tionalism, will
be
more
is a l s o b o u n d
and
directed
more
with
radical
increasing
to decay.
Latin
a s it w i d e n s animosity
to
States
American
na-
its p o p u l a r
against
the
base, United
S t a t e s , u n l e s s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s r a p i d l y s h i f t s its o w n p o s t u r e .
Ac-
c o r d i n g l y , it w o u l d b e w i s e f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o m a k e a n
ex-
plicit m o v e to a b a n d o n the M o n r o e D o c t r i n e and to c o n c e d e in the n e w
global
age
geographic
or hemispheric
that
contiguity
no
longer n e e d be politically decisive. N o t h i n g could b e healthier
for
Pan-American relations than for the U n i t e d States to place
them
o n t h e s a m e l e v e l as its r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e rest o f t h e w o r l d ,
con-
fining
does
itself t o e m p h a s i s o n c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l a f f i n i t i e s ( a s it
with Western Europe) w i t h the less d e v e l o p e d
a n d e c o n o m i c - s o c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s ( a s it d o e s countries).
It w o u l d also b e a d v i s a b l e to v i e w the q u e s t i o n of t h e
political
d e v e l o p m e n t of b o t h the c o m m u n i s t a n d the d e v e l o p i n g
countries
with
a great
power may
deal
of patience.
not always be
infusion
of
American
the solution, so reliance
Just as the
on
economic
g r o w t h is n o g u a r a n t e e o f e i t h e r d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n ,
political
stabil-
ity, or p r o - A m e r i c a n i s m . A s h a s b e e n p o i n t e d out, p o l i t i c a l in the c o m m u n i s t
states is n o t a s i m p l e b y - p r o d u c t of
development,
the susceptibility
and
change
economic
of the less d e v e l o p e d
coun-
tries to radical a p p e a l s rises as t h e y b e g i n to d e v e l o p . F o r e i g n and closer e c o n o m i c contacts are not a palliative for crises or a r e m e d y
for the
ills of
deeply
entrenched
aid
deep-rooted ideological
institutions. This argues for an approach to international e c o n o m i c
relations
a n d f o r e i g n a i d t h a t is i n c r e a s i n g l y d e p o l i t i c i z e d i n f o r m , e v e n t h e u l t i m a t e u n d e r l y i n g p u r p o s e r e m a i n s political. If t h a t
is t o p r o m o t e t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a m o r e c o o p e r a t i v e c o m m u n i t y nations, irrespective of their
individual
internal
systems,
if
purpose
then
of it
International Prospects
{
w o u l d b e a step in the right direction to g i v e international a larger role in e c o n o m i c
development
and
to start
289
bodies
eliminating
r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t r a d e . S u c h a c t i o n is all t h e m o r e l i k e l y t o b e tually
successful
geared
to
because
expectations
it
is
of
less
rapid
achieved through direct e c o n o m i c
overtly and
political
basic
and
a less anxious
is
political
preoccupation
with
the
Soviet
processes
Union
would
also help the U n i t e d States to d e v e l o p a different posture China.
China
and
South
Asia
not
change
leverage.*
A more detached attitude toward world revolutionary and
even-
are
heavily
populated
toward
areas
have inherited from the past complex challenges to social
that
organ-
ization, a n d are still s t r u g g l i n g w i t h t h e s e o l d p r o b l e m s at a when new
the advanced dimensions.
these
can
Western
world
Until
initially
be
is b e g i n n i n g
links
are
sought
Europe—China
will
to confront
established
and
directed
remain
an
with
of
China—and
through
excluded
time
problems
Japan and
and
a
self-
e x c l u d e d p o r t i o n of m a n k i n d , all t h e m o r e t h r e a t e n i n g b e c a u s e backwardness will increasingly be combined with massive power. indirect viously
Accordingly, Soviet
ally
the
United
against
wants—should
States,
instead
China—which
encourage
efforts
of
is w h a t by
other
its
nuclear
becoming Moscow countries
s e e k t i e s w i t h C h i n a . I n a d d i t i o n , it s h o u l d l a u n c h its o w n tives,11 a n d a v o i d b e c o m i n g e n t a n g l e d in overt a n t i - C h i n e s e
an obto
initiasecu-
rity arrangements. Indeed, to
in
resemble
our those
age
international
of
large
security
metropolitan
arrangements
centers:
such
ought
arrange-
m e n t s are directed not against specific organizations or individuals but against
those w h o
association based on a variety of purposes,
depart
from
a concept including
established
of c o o p e r a t i v e
Thus,
an
nations linked
norms.
for
security, ought
gradually
to
place existing alliances, w h i c h are usually formulated in terms
reof
0 This need not exclude the concentration of effort on specific states when prospects for economic development coincide with more strictly political American interests. In other words, international economic aid for humanitarian purposes can go hand in hand with more selective and more intensive efforts in regard to specific countries.
2. j 2. }
V:
America and the World
a potential aggressor,
explicitly identified either in the
treaty
in the a c c o m p a n y i n g rhetoric. T h o u g h initially this w o u l d b e a formalistic
change—for
the
association
of states
would
sarily involve o n l y t h o s e that share certain interests a n d
necesfears—a
deliberately o p e n - e n d e d structure, with the security elements a partial and secondary aspect, w o u l d avoid perpetuating tionally
the
but
often
transient
conflicts
only
institu-
of
interests
E v o l u t i o n in t h e forms of international security w o u l d
facilitate
between
inevitable
or
only
states.*
the gradual restructuring
of the A m e r i c a n
defense
posture,
ticularly b y concentrating A m e r i c a n military presence
par-
abroad
in
a f e w k e y countries. E x c e p t in countries that feel themselves rectly
threatened,
prolonged
United
States
military
presence
tends to galvanize political hostility t o w a r d the U n i t e d States in traditionally friendly countries presence
was
once
wanted
by
on the waging
of nuclear w e a p o n s World
violence
the
countries
concerned,
of an all-out w a r b y
the
replace
the
previous
that
it
has
restraint
destructiveness
and with the likelihood that sporadic
will
even
(like Turkey), and though
t e n d e d to b e c o m e a n A m e r i c a n v e s t e d interest. W i t h the imposed
di-
preoccupation
central war, American forces stationed abroad on the
Third with
a
assumption
that t h e y will b e n e e d e d to assure the security of different nations f r o m a c o m m o n threat are less a n d less r e q u i r e d for that With some exceptions Germany),
by
terests w o u l d
and
large both
probably
fense posture became true of t h e
Soviet
purpose.
(for example, South Korea, Berlin, or
not be
global stability jeopardized
territorially m o r e
Union,
with
and
if t h e
confined
little a p p a r e n t
curity), and relied increasingly on long-range
West
American American (this has
damage
inde-
been
t o its
se-
mobility.!
* This may be especially relevant to efforts to construct a system of cooperation in the Pacific. By itself, it is unlikely that Southeast Asia, even with improved economic performance, can create the foundations for regional security. But enlarged through Japanese, Australian, and American participation —and not specifically directed against China—some forms of cooperation could gradually develop, and the system might eventually involve more and more nations. f Some stand-by facilities for international peace-keeping forces could be provided if, with the agreement of the host country, some vacated United
International Prospects
{
291
Finally, the opportunities a n d the dangers inherent in the entific-technological in American
age
attitudes
require
and
subtle
organization.
but
important
These
changes
c o m e rapidly; they cannot b e blueprinted in detail; they likely to b e achieved tive
world
exploits
the
role
will
not
are
un-
dramatically. Nonetheless, to play an
America
latest
needs
foreign-relations
communications
techniques
effec-
machinery and
sci-
changes
uses
a
that style
a n d organization responsive to the m o r e congested pattern of
our
global existence. T h i s is h a r d l y t h e c a s e t o d a y . O u r d i p l o m a t i c m a c h i n e r y is still the product of the traditional arrangements
that w e r e
contrived
after 1815 a n d that w e r e ritualistically p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h It
is
predominantly
geared
tions, often n e g l e c t i n g social
developments.
the
to
currently
It is n o
protocol.
government-to-government far more
accident
that
important
newspapermen,
d e p e n d e n t on governmental contacts and m o r e inclined to a b s o r b e d in a g i v e n society's life, h a v e o f t e n b e e n m o r e
of less
become sensitive
to the b r o a d pattern of c h a n g e in foreign countries than h a v e local American diplomats. Contemporary foreign relations
rela-
role
the
increas-
States bases were taken over by the UN. It should in any case, be noted that American public opinion seems little disposed to back the use of American forces to protect foreign nations. In a mid-1969 public-opinion poll, which asked whether America ought to aid foreign states if these were invaded by outside communist military forces, those who were willing to rely on force were in the majority only with respect to Canada and Mexico (57 per cent and 52 per cent respectively); the figure for West Germany was 38 per cent, for Japan 27 per cent, for Israel 9 per cent (here the foreign aggression postulated was not necessarily communist), for Rumania 13 per cent; when combined with those willing to help short of force, the percentage for Canada was 79 per cent, for Mexico 76 per cent, for West Germany 59 per cent, for Israel 44 per cent, for Rumania 24 per cent, for Japan 42 per cent (Harris Poll, as cited by Time, May 2, 1969). The national mood could easily change in the light of circumstances, but the above poll is significant in indicating a general attitude. It suggests a more selective approach toward military commitment and may have some bearing on the likely public response to the formation of a professional volunteer army. A large, conscript-based army was to some extent a reflection of the populist nationalism stimulated by the French Revolution, which saw every citizen as a soldier. This had greater meaning in an age of relatively unsophisticated weaponry and intense ideological motivation. With both factors changing drastically, the case for a more professional armed force, employed for more selective purposes, gains weight.
2. j 2. } ingly
V: America and the World
require
skills
in
intellectual-scientific
cluding the ability to c o m m u n i c a t e
communications,
effectively with
the
in-
creative
s e g m e n t s of o t h e r s o c i e t i e s , a n d it is p r e c i s e l y i n t h e s e
fields
the existing diplomatic training and procedure are most
deficient.
M o r e o v e r , t h e entire tradition of secret dispatches a n d
that
lengthy
cables, w h i c h daily o v e r w h e l m State D e p a r t m e n t headquarters
in
Washington,
in
modern
has simply
not taken into account
communications,
the
development
reporting in the leading A m e r i c a n e v e n the role of television.*
of
the
explosion
excellent
foreign
and foreign newspapers,
In commenting on the
1969
report, w h i c h w a s similarly critical of t h e British f o r e i g n
service,
Canadian political scientist James Eayrs noted: "Too m a n y p u s h too m a n y p e n s across too m a n y pieces of paper, with
worthless
messages/'12
Thomas
Jefferson o n c e
and
Duncan
people
filling
them
complained
that h e h a d not h e a r d f r o m o n e of his a m b a s s a d o r s for a year; present
Secretary
of
State
could
legitimately
daily hears too m u c h from too m a n y u n n e e d e d The
United
States
is t h e c o u n t r y
complain
the
that
he
ambassadors.
that most
urgently
needs
r e f o r m its f o r e i g n s e r v i c e a n d p o l i c y m a k i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t , is b e s t e q u i p p e d t o u n d e r t a k e s u c h r e f o r m . It is t h e
first
to
and
t o b e c o m e g l o b a l l y o r i e n t e d , a n d it is t h e o n e w i t h t h e m o s t
exten-
sive a n d intensive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s involvement. Its business
com-
munity, moreover, has also acquired extensive experience in e i g n operations a n d has effectively m a s t e r e d the arts of reporting,
foreign
representation,
relying on enormous
and
central
staffs a n d r e d u n d a n t operations.
conferences,
shared-time
for-
accurate
control—without It h a s
p i o n e e r e d in t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e latest t e c h n i q u e s , s u c h as circuit television
it
society
computers,
and
also
closedother
devices. T h o u g h this is h a r d l y t h e p l a c e to o u t l i n e t h e n e e d e d r e f o r m s in detail, the point remains that, g i v e n the f u n d a m e n t a l
changes
in
* This writer can state on the basis of personal experience while serving in the Department of State that in most cases a better or at least as good a picture of foreign developments can be obtained by reading the better newspapers—including, of course, the foreign ones—than by perusing the hundreds of daily telegrams, often reporting cocktail-party trivia.
A Community
of the Developed
Nations
{ 293
the w a y nations interact, an extensive study and drastic reform the existing, h i g h l y traditional structure a n d style of t h e
of
American
f o r e i g n s e r v i c e is l o n g o v e r d u e . W i d e r d i p l o m a t i c u s e o f
compu-
ters a n d direct s o u n d - a n d - s i g h t electronic c o m m u n i c a t i o n
should
p e r m i t the r e d u c t i o n in t h e size a n d n u m b e r of U n i t e d States foreign
missions,
efficient
making
international
them
operationally
corporations.
similar
to
Washington's
the
more
policymaking
p r o c e s s n e e d s t o b e s i m i l a r l y s t r e a m l i n e d a n d f r e e d f r o m its t a n g l e of bureaucratic red tape.13
3. A Community of the Developed Nations These
more
immediately
necessary
changes
must
be
forced b y a broader effort to contain the global tendencies
rein-
toward
chaos. A c o m m u n i t y of the d e v e l o p e d nations must eventually f o r m e d if t h e w o r l d serious
is t o r e s p o n d
effectively to the
crisis t h a t in d i f f e r e n t w a y s
now
threatens
both
the
ad-
vanced world and the Third World. Persistent divisions a m o n g developed
states,
particularly
those
based
on
outmoded
in the m o r e
contribute to a resurgence of
Western
Europe
and
advanced
world
they
could
aid even
nationalism.
Japan
From an American standpoint, the more important and ing changes
the
ideo-
logical concepts, will n e g a t e t h e efforts of individual states to the Third World;
be
increasingly
in the years
to c o m e
will have
to involve
promisWestern
E u r o p e and Japan. T h e ability of these areas to continue to
grow
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
economically a n d to maintain relatively democratic political forms will m o r e crucially affect the gradual evolution of a n e w tional
system
tions.
Western
initiatives tions,
than
will
Europe
designed
and
like
changes
Japan
in
ward
a
they
possibilities
they
in
the
for rela-
forefront
represent
the
the vitality
cooperation
and—much
consciousness.0
is a l r e a d y
For
an entity
of E u r o p e a n
European
the
more
chieftains
(occasionally
visited
seriatim
the
Europeans, political
by
the
repro-
foreign
p o t e n t a t e f r o m W a s h i n g t o n ) , t h e i r E u r o p e is f r o n t i e r l e s s , o p e n unlimited
tourism,
to the almost
and increasingly to the free
flow
unlimited
movement
of
of students and workers. T o
the n e e d e d psychological basis for a n e w
to
goods,
s u r e , a p o s i t i v e r e g i o n a l i s m is y e t t o m a t u r e , b u t t h e f o r e g o i n g least provides
is
important—to-
younger
in all b u t
na-
development
spect: t h o u g h still anachronistically g o v e r n e d b y a series of vincial
of
most
globe.
European Europe
are
innovation,
some scholars emphasize
increasing
Western
rela-
fabric of international
tionalism, the b r o a d thrust of W e s t e r n toward
interna-
American-Soviet
offer greater
a new
America,
technological
vital regions of t h e Though
and
to w e a v e
because,
scientific a n d
likely
be at
Europe.
T h e technetronic revolution h a s a c c e l e r a t e d t h e a p p e a r a n c e of this E u r o p e , a!nd t h e a u t a r k i c i d e a s o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l a g e h a v e l i t t l e
or
n o h o l d o n it t o d a y . In Europe ruptive
the impact
within
some
of s c i e n c e
societies
and
technology,
(particularly
Italy,
though
which
c o m p l e t i n g t h e i n d u s t r i a l p h a s e of its d e v e l o p m e n t ) ,
has
is
disjust
inspired
increased cooperation; in Japan, however, w h i c h lacks the
imme-
* This has been dramatically illustrated in France by polls which show that French public opinion, long held to be strongly nationalist, supports the emergence of a European government that would have decisive powers over a local French government in such areas as scientific research (66 per cent for a European government, 15 per cent for a decisive French government) and foreign policy (61 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively). These polls indicate that most Frenchmen favored retaining the French government's decisive role only in purely internal affairs, such as social policy, vacations, education, and so forth (Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "The French and the Political Unification of Europe," Revue jrangaise de science politique, February 1969, pp. 145-7°) •
A Community diate external
outlet
that
of the Developed
European
Nations
{ 295
unification provides
for
the
W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n s a n d w h i c h is s u b j e c t t o a h i g h l y v i s i b l e A m e r i c a n military-political p r e s e n c e , it h a s h a d a n internally
aggravat-
i n g e f f e c t . It t e n d s t o s h a r p e n t h e n a t i o n s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s , polarizing of
the
public
country
evident
in m o s t of the
Japan,
given
World
War
its
opinion
traditions
Japanese
the II
and
uncertain.*
and
the
modern
nationalism
or
world
upheaval
only
turn
future
have
generations
special by
achieved
gravity
in
defeat
in
its
balance
institutions.
toward
orientation
between
produced
recently
democratic a
the
conflicts
advanced
cultural
and
rendering
The
A
ideological
between revival
of
radicalism
w o u l d seriously threaten t h e h i g h l y t e n u o u s structure of p e a c e the Pacific and directly affect the interests of the U n i t e d the Soviet Union, and
in
States,
China.
Accordingly, an effort m u s t b e m a d e
to forge a c o m m u n i t y
of
the d e v e l o p e d nations that w o u l d e m b r a c e the Atlantic states, more
advanced
nations
need
European
not—and
communist
for a very
states,
and
time
could
long
homogeneous community resembling E E C
Japan.
These
not—form
or the o n c e h o p e d
Atlantic c o m m u n i t y . N o n e t h e l e s s , progress in that direction h e l p to terminate the civil w a r that has d o m i n a t e d politics fifty
among
the
developed
nations
for
the
last
international hundred
that
both
has
precluded
democratic
and
a constructive communist
and
among
these nations h a v e less a n d less relevance to mankind's real
dilemmas
a for
would
years. T h o u g h the nationalist and ideological disputes
lems, their persistence
the
prob-
response
to
states
increas-
ingly r e c o g n i z e as b e i n g t h e k e y issues of our times. T h e
absence
of a u n i f y i n g process of i n v o l v e m e n t has kept old disputes
alive
a n d has obscured the purposes of statesmanship. T o postulate the n e e d for such creation
as
the
coming
decade's
a community major
task
is
and to define not
its
utopianism.
* Thus, the center-right coalition that has governed Japan in the postwar period has gradually shrunk: in 1952 it obtained 66.1 per cent of the popular vote; in 1953, 65.7 per cent; in 1955, 63.2 per cent; in 1958, 57-8 per cent; in i960, 57.6 per cent; in 1963, 54.7 per cent; in 1967, 48 8 per cent; and in 1969, 47.6 per cent.
2. j 2. }
V:
America and the World
U n d e r the pressures of economics, science, and technology, k i n d is m o v i n g
steadily
toward
p e r i o d i c reverses, all h u m a n
large-scale
cooperation.
history clearly indicates progress
t h a t d i r e c t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r a s p o n t a n e o u s will
suffice
to
counterbalance
the
dangers
already
calls for deliberate efforts to accelerate the process of cooperation a m o n g the advanced toward
a
larger
tions will necessarily h a v e clude
more
homogeneous
And
response
international
nations.
community
of
to be piecemeal, relationships
the and
within
developed
larger
of r e a s o n i n g
derived
pre-
entity.
Moreover, such a community cannot be achieved by fusing
f o r m a l s t a t e is itself a n e x t e n s i o n
na-
it w i l l n o t
the
ing states into o n e larger entity. T h e desire to create o n e
existlarger,
from
a g e of n a t i o n a l i s m . It m a k e s m u c h m o r e s e n s e to a t t e m p t t o ciate existing states t h r o u g h a variety of indirect ties a n d developing limitations on national In this process, t h e one hand
Soviet
and Western
l o n g time to enjoy m o r e
The
and
Eastern
Europe
States-Soviet
nuclear rivalry, w h i c h
would
colonial competition:
emerging European
a or
sweep remain
cooperative
setting, the competition b e t w e e n the U n i t e d States a n d the
Anglo-French
a
own
regional
But in the broader
U n i o n could eventually r e s e m b l e in f o r m
the
for
is t o d e v e l o p
in various
functional forms of cooperation. S u c h a structure w o u l d not aside United
on
within their
point, however,
b r o a d e r structure that links the f o r e g o i n g
t h e axis of w o r l d military m i g h t .
already
on the other will continue
intimate relationships
a r e a s . T h a t is u n a v o i d a b l e .
the asso-
sovereignty.
Union
Europe
in
movement noted.
s i n c e t h e a n s w e r is p r o b a b l y n o , it f o l l o w s t h a t a r e a l i s t i c
Movement
man-
Despite
Soviet
late-nineteenth-century
Fashoda
did
not
vitiate
the
entente.
M o v e m e n t t o w a r d s u c h a c o m m u n i t y will in all probability
re-
q u i r e t w o b r o a d a n d o v e r l a p p i n g p h a s e s . T h e first o f t h e s e
would
involve the f o r g i n g of c o m m u n i t y links a m o n g the U n i t e d
States,
W e s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d Japan, as w e l l as w i t h other m o r e countries
(for
example,
Australia,
Israel,
Mexico).
advanced
The
p h a s e w o u l d i n c l u d e the extension of these links to m o r e
second
advanced
A Community
of the Developed
Nations
{ 297
communist countries. S o m e of t h e m — f o r example, Yugoslavia Rumania—may more
rapidly
move
than
toward
others,
necessarily b e sharply
Structure
and
and
closer
international
hence
the
two
or
cooperation
phases
need
not
demarcated.
Focus
The emerging community
of d e v e l o p e d
nations w o u l d
require
s o m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , e v e n t h o u g h it w o u l d b e u n w i s e seek to create too m a n y binding integrated processes
A case can b e m a d e for initially setting u p only a high-level sultative
council
for
gether the heads cuss
their
global
of g o v e r n m e n t s
common
nations.
with
Some
problems,
their moral
permanent
continuity to these Accordingly,
con-
bringing
to-
world to
dis-
educational-scientific,
as
well
obligations
supporting
as
to
toward
machinery
deal
and
from
the
that
developing
could
provide
consultations.
such
a
council
something more than O E C D level and would
regularly
of the d e v e l o p e d
political-security,
economic-technological perspective
cooperation,
to
prematurely.
for
global
cooperation
would
in t h a t it w o u l d o p e r a t e o n a
be
higher
also b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h political strategy, but
would be more diffused than N A T O
in t h a t it w o u l d n o t s e e k
it to
forge integrated military-political structures. Nevertheless, a council of this s o r t — p e r h a p s Japan, and Western litical leaders problems common
of
initially linking only the
Europe,
states
and
sharing
of m o d e r n i t y — w o u l d programs
unavoidably
thus bringing together
certain be
by
the
Cold
common
more
t h a n is t h e U n i t e d
limited
United
War
effective in
by
the
po-
aspirations
and
developing
Nations, whose and
States,
efficacy
north-south
is
divi-
sions. T h e inclusion of Japan w o u l d b e particularly important, b o t h the internal d e v e l o p m e n t such
a community.
Japan
of Japanese is a w o r l d
life a n d power,
to the
and
in a
vitality world
e l e c t r o n i c a n d s u p e r s o n i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n s it is a p s y c h o l o g i c a l political error to t h i n k of it as p r i m a r i l y
an Asian nation.
to of of
and
Japan
2. j 2. }
V:
needs
an
ment,
not
pygmies
America and the World
outlet
commensurate
one
and
that
places
that excludes
real world powers.
with
it i n
its o w n
the
de facto
it
advanced
position from
of
a
the
develop-
giant
among
councils
T h e regular American-Japanese
of
cabinet-level
talks are a desirable bilateral arrangement, b u t J a p a n will more
fully
and
creatively
involved
in
world
the
affairs
in
become a
larger
setting of e q u a l partners. W i t h o u t s u c h a l a r g e r s e t t i n g , t h e r e is d a n g e r t h a t t h e
extraor-
dinary p a c e of J a p a n e s e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t will
become
destructive.
The
automatic
projections
of
Japanese
growth
into
the future, m a d e w i t h increasing f r e q u e n c y in the late 1960s, misleading;
they
do
not
make
allowance
for
effect of t h e i m p a c t of c h a n g e o n J a p a n e s e
the
are
destabilizing
t r a d i t i o n s . T h e r e is
real possibility that in the 1970s Japan will u n d e r g o extremely
setting internal conflicts unless in s o m e w a y Japanese idealism b o t h stimulated a n d turned to goals larger t h a n insular a n d sonal hedonism.
International cooperation,
w i t h J a p a n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
as w e l l
involving
as of p o w e r ,
a
upis
per-
the
sharing
could
provide
such an outlet. a political-security
frame-
w o r k in w h i c h t h e security concerns of e a c h state c o u l d b e
Such
a council
would
also
provide
viewed
in a context that takes into account between Soviet
such
crisis,
matters Chinese
as
Soviet
nuclear
the inescapable
policy
in
Berlin
development
and
connections
and its
the
Sino-
implications
both, for J a p a n e s e security a n d for E a s t - W e s t relations in
Europe,
a n d so on. Similarly, m a t t e r s s u c h as J a p a n e s e r e a r m a m e n t , bly
even
Japan's
creasingly second
half
large of
acquisition numbers
the
of
1970s),14
of
nuclear
arms
Japanese
to
could
viewed
be
be
(thought likely in
possiby
in-
during
terms
the
of
this
b r o a d e r significance rather t h a n as a r e s p o n s e to p u r e l y local
con-
siderations. I n d e e d , g i v e n t h e n a t u r e of m o d e r n scientific
develop-
ments
of
and
communications,
it is n o t
too early to
think
tech-
nological c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n d Japan, as w e l l as b e t w e e n b o t h of t h e m a n d t h e U n i t e d States, in s o m e defense.
fields
of
A Community Political-security second
the
efforts w o u l d ,
in importance
tional-scientific most
of the Developed
and
advanced
however,
to efforts to b r o a d e n economic-technological
industrial
nations
that
Nations
{
299
in all p r o b a b i l i t y the
scope
be
of
educa-
cooperation
among
are
becoming
industrial a n d are in s o m e regards m o v i n g into the
post-
post-national
age. T h e projected w o r l d i n f o r m a t i o n grid, for w h i c h Japan,
West-
ern Europe, and the U n i t e d States are most suited,0
create
could
the basis for a c o m m o n e d u c a t i o n a l program, for the a d o p t i o n common
a c a d e m i c standards, for t h e o r g a n i z e d p o o l i n g of
mation, a n d for a m o r e rational division of labor in research development. "conversing"
Computers with
Latin
at M.I.T.
already
no for
City, a n d Milan. easier to set u p
of
New
York,
and
and
regularly is
15
universities,
been
technical obstacle to p e r m a n e n t information linkage b e t w e e n , example, the universities
American
have
of
infor-
Moscow,
there
Tokyo,
Mexico
Such scientific-informational linkage w o u l d
than joint educational
programs
and
would
courage an international educational system by providing an tional
stimulus
to
an
international
division
of
academic
addilabor,
u n i f o r m a c a d e m i c standards, a n d a cross-national p o o l i n g of demic
aca-
resources.
Steps in that direction could b e accelerated by s o m e
symbolic
j o i n t a c t i o n s . S p a c e e x p l o r a t i o n is p r o b a b l y t h e m o s t d r a m a t i c ample
be en-
of
human
adventure
made
possible
by
science,
but
excur-
• "Western Europe and Japan present the most immediate opportunities for the world-information-grid. The Europeans and the Japanese are both increasingly sensitive to the importance of information storage and transfer network, similar to the one now evolving in this country. "The Europeans' success in this project will depend, in part, on their ability to modify a number of present restrictive attitudes. One is the lingering tradition of secretiveness in their research-and-development work. Another is the nationalistic inhibition in sharing regional information resources. It would be unfortunate if these attitudes held up formation of the network, since Europeans, over the long run, cannot think in terms of 'Italian research' or 'Norwegian research' any more than they are able to make a distinction between research done in California or New Jersey. "There is every reason to encourage the Europeans to overcome these problems. The American information-transfer network should be linked directly into their regional system, permitting a broader exchange of information" (Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, pp. 10-11).
2. j 2. }
V:
America and the World
r e n t l y it is a l m o s t e n t i r e l y m o n o p o l i z e d o n a c o m p e t i t i v e b a s i s the U n i t e d States a n d the Soviet Union. T h e p o o l i n g of European, Japanese, undertaking could
and American resources
do
much
to accelerate
by
Western
for a specific
international
joint
coopera-
t i o n . 1 6 I n a d d i t i o n , it m a y b e d e s i r a b l e t o d e v e l o p a n
international
convention
science
on
the
social
consequences
of
applied
and
technology. This not only w o u l d permit the ecological and effects of n e w
techniques
to b e w e i g h e d
in advance
social
but
would
a l s o m a k e it p o s s i b l e t o o u t l a w t h e u s e o f c h e m i c a l s t o l i m i t manipulate man
and
to prevent other scientific abuses
some governments may be
to
and
which
tempted.
In the economic-technological
field
some international
coopera-
tion has already b e e n achieved, but further progress will
require
greater A m e r i c a n sacrifices. M o r e intensive efforts to s h a p e a world monetary structure will have to b e undertaken, with c o n s e q u e n t risk t o t h e p r e s e n t relatively f a v o r a b l e A m e r i c a n tion. F u r t h e r p r o g r e s s w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y r e q u i r e t h e d o n m e n t of restrictions, i m p o s e d b y C o n g r e s s on
the international
activities
their foreign subsidiaries international
structure
of
of
American
and plants.
The
production
and
to g o h a n d in h a n d with the e m e r g e n c e
in
appearance financing
posiaban-
1949 and
corporations
new some
1954,
and
of
truly
would
have
of a "theory of
interna-
tional production," n e e d e d to s u p p l e m e n t our present theories international trade.* Progress along these lines w o u l d 0
on
a
also
of
facili-
Judd Polk argues that "what we need is not a theory of international trade that abstracts from production, but a theory of an international production which, being specialized, presupposes trade." He goes on to note that "the question is not one of intruding into the economy of others; it is a matter of releasing the production capabilities of all nations. The problems of production seen from the standpoint of an economy vastly larger than that of the nation are new to everyone. The United States cannot abandon its concern for the national balance of payments, but, as noted, it is beginning to perceive the urgent need for a system of international accounts as comprehensive as the present national accounts. It particularly needs to follow the whole picture of the international movement of factors of production. Just to feel this need is to have made extraordinary progress in a short 20 years, for there cannot occur a dislodgment of the dollar from its international function without a crippling dislodgment of the production and trade it supports. Nor can there be a practical improvement in this function except
A Community
of the Developed
Nations
{
301
tate t h e creation of a free-trade area, w h i c h c o u l d b e t a r g e t e d
in
progressive stages.
The Communist The
Soviet
framework the
West
States Union
of
may
cooperation
for the
Eastern
come
to
because
participate of
the
in
such
inherent
Europeans—whom
the
a
larger
attraction Soviet
of
Union
w o u l d h a v e t o f o l l o w lest it l o s e t h e m a l t o g e t h e r — a n d b e c a u s e
of
the Soviet Union's o w n felt n e e d for increased collaboration in the technological
and
scientific revolution.
That
Eastern
Europeans
w i l l m o v e c l o s e r t o W e s t e r n E u r o p e is certain. T h e e v e n t s of in Czechoslovakia
are m e r e l y
an augury
of w h a t
1968
is t o c o m e ,
s p i t e of f o r c i b l e S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o t h e c o n t r a r y . It is o n l y a
of t i m e b e f o r e individual c o m m u n i s t states c o m e k n o c k i n g at doors of E E C or O E C D ; h e n c e , b r o a d e r E a s t - W e s t may even become
a w a y for M o s c o w
with the Eastern European
the
arrangements
to maintain effective
links
capitals.
T h e evolution of Y u g o s l a v thinking a n d b e h a v i o r attests to fact that the communist
in
matter
states are not i m m u n e
the
to the process
of
c h a n g e a n d to intelligent W e s t e r n initiatives. Slightly m o r e
than
twenty years ago, Yugoslav pronouncements were not unlike
those
of
the
Chinese
today.
states in e c o n o m i c ideological
Yet
moderation.
Yugoslavia's
Yugoslavia
now
reform, in the openness
association
In the with
late
1960s
leads
all
communist
of its s o c i e t y , a n d it j o i n e d
EFT At—and
GATT,°
perhaps
of
"socialism," Yugoslavia's
views
on
and
eventually
w i t h t h e C o m m o n M a r k e t — i s a p r o b a b i l i t y . W h i l e still to the notion
committed
international
politics are moderate, a n d they h a v e h a d a significant i m p a c t c o m m u n i s m in Eastern Similar
trends
are
in
on
Europe. slowly
developing
elsewhere
in
the
com-
in the context of the cash and credit requirements of the new world economy" ("The New World Economy," Columbia Journal of World Business, January-February 1968, p. 15). * GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, f EFTA: European Free Trade Association.
2. j 2. }
V:
America and the World
m u n i s t world. T o b e sure, t h e y are o p p o s e d b y e n t r e n c h e d crats, b u t in t h e l o n g r u n t h e reactionaries
are
bureau-
fighting
a
losing
battle. Social forces are against them, a n d the conservative
elites
a r e o n t h e d e f e n s i v e e v e r y w h e r e . It is d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r t h e y reverse, t h o u g h they certainly can delay, the trend toward a open, humanistic,
and
less ideological
society.
those regimes dominated by entrenched cies will be further w e a k e n e d
The
resistance
conservative
if t h e W e s t
views
of
bureaucra-
the
Cold
War
as primarily d u e to the f a d i n g self-serving doctrines of the m u n i s t r u l e r s , if it a p p r o a c h e s t h e C o l d W a r m o r e
can more
as an
Comaberra-
tion a n d less as a mission. Over
the
long
run—and
our
earlier
analysis
would be a long run—Soviet responsiveness
indicates
could be
t h r o u g h the deliberate o p e n i n g of E u r o p e a n c o o p e r a t i v e to
the East
designed
and
through
initially
only
the
creation
to p r o m o t e
a
information, and the encouragement deliberate
definition
of
certain
development,
technological
arrangements
could
and
the growth
example, O E C D
of
through and
help
formal
links
institutional
in
security purpose
framework. sphere
Economic
and
through
United
States-Soviet
(For
between Assistance
( C E M A ) ; in the security sphere b e t w e e n N A T O a n d the Pact,
Warsaw
arms-control
arrange-
ments; or b y t h e creation of an informal E a s t - W e s t political sultative body.) * A
larger
effects. initially Western
For
con-
17
cooperative one
of The
economic
common
economic
Mutual
ethos.
East-West of
bodies
exchange
objectives and
a sense
in the
for
the
it
ventures
East-West
of a c o o p e r a t i v e
common
stimulate
Council
new
dialogue,
assistance,
a rudimentary
the
of
that
stimulated
thing,
demonstrate initiative.
goal
would
it is l i k e l y
hesitancy
Therefore,
or an
also
that even
have
the
hostility
approach
other
Soviet
beneficial
Union in
based
the on
would face
of
bilateral
0 This is not only a matter of technological and multilateral determinism, as suggested by Pierre Hassner in his "Implications of Change in Eastern Europe for the Atlantic Alliance" (Orbis, Spring 1969, p. 246), but also a deliberate, though very long-range, strategy.
A Community American-Soviet
of the Developed
accommodation—as
Nations
{ 303
advocated by some
Ameri-
c a n s — m i g h t prove to b e abortive a n d w o u l d consequently sify tensions. B u t efforts to create a larger cooperative
inten-
community
n e e d not b e halted b y initial Soviet reluctance, nor c a n they
be
easily exploited b y M o s c o w to perpetuate the Cold War. O n
the
contrary, Soviet resistance w o u l d only result in m o r e costly
Soviet
isolation. B y s e e k i n g to c u t E a s t e r n E u r o p e off f r o m t h e W e s t , S o v i e t U n i o n w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y also d e n y itself t h e fruits of
closer
East-West technological cooperation. In 1985 the c o m b i n e d of the U n i t e d States, W e s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d Japan will b e
the
GNP
roughly
s o m e w h e r e a r o u n d three trillion dollars, or four t i m e s t h a t of
the
likely
the
Soviet
Soviets); toward
GNP
with
(assuming
some
greater
Eastern
cooperation
a
favorable
European with
growth
rate
for
states gradually
EEC
and
OECD,
shifting
the
Soviet
U n i o n c o u l d a b s t a i n o n l y a t g r e a t c o s t t o its o w n d e v e l o p m e n t
and
world position.
Risks and
Advantages
T h e shaping of such a c o m m u n i t y
may
well provoke
charges
t h a t its e m e r g e n c e w o u l d a c c e n t u a t e t h e d i v i s i o n s in a w o r l d ready tions
threatened is t w o f o l d :
problem
is h o w
by
fragmentation.
First, best
division
to deal
The
already
with
it. A s
answer exists, long
to
and as
such our
the
present
advanced
w o r l d is i t s e l f d i v i d e d a n d i n c o n f l i c t , it w i l l b e u n a b l e t o late coherent benefiting
goals.
from
the
The
less d e v e l o p e d
internal
w h i c h i n c i t e it t o c o m p e t e tends
to
be
focused
on
rivalries
in
in extending
short-term
countries the
may
formu-
even
developed
advantages
be
world,
aid; b u t s i n c e s u c h
political
al-
objec-
to
aid the
d o n o r , it is s u b j e c t t o p o l i t i c a l f l u c t u a t i o n s a n d m a y d e c l i n e a s t h e rivalry declines in intensity.
Second, the emergence of a more cooperative structure among the more developed nations is likely to increase the possibility of a long-range strategy for international development based on the emerging global consciousness rather than on old rivalries.
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
It c o u l d h e n c e
diminish
the desire for immediate
political
offs a n d thus p a v e t h e w a y for m o r e internationalized,
pay-
mutilateral
f o r e i g n aid. W h i l e t h e v e x i n g p r o b l e m s of tariffs a n d t r a d e w i t h t h e Third W o r l d are not likely to disappear, they m i g h t b e c o m e manageable
in
a
setting
truly international
that
reduces
production
and,
both
the
consequently,
a
given
try's s t a k e i n this or t h a t p r o t e c t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t . T h e motivation
for
such
a
community
p o r t a n t . If this c o m m u n i t y
is,
more
impediments
however,
underlying
extremely
does not spring from fear and
but from a wider recognition that world
to
coun-
affairs will h a v e
to
c o n d u c t e d o n a d i f f e r e n t b a s i s , it w o u l d n o t i n t e n s i f y w o r l d sions—as h a v e alliances in the p a s t — b u t w o u l d b e a step
im-
hatred be
divi-
toward
greater unity. Its
appearance
would
therefore
celerate the further development as the W o r l d
Bank—which
of the d e v e l o p e d greater help
sense
of
world
support
are in any
geared
community
to strengthen of p u b l i c
these
and
case
perhaps
world
within
it m i g h t
backing
also
ac-
institutions
Third
the developed by
even
bodies—such
de facto
to assisting the
institutions
opinion;
possibility of s o m e t h i n g
assist
of present
World.
world
them
eventually
would
with
lead
A
the
to
the
a l o n g t h e lines of a g l o b a l taxation
sys-
tem.0 M o r e specifically, A m e r i c a w o u l d gain several advantages its identification w i t h
a larger goal.
Such
a goal
would
r e d u c e the increasing d a n g e r of American isolation in the t h i s i s o l a t i o n is u n a v o i d a b l y b e i n g i n t e n s i f i e d associated over,
the
with
America's
United
States
domestic
cannot
leap
shape
into
the
18
by
the
world
the
from
tend
world;
problems
future.
efforts to d o
so.
By
encouraging
and
More-
singlehanded,
e v e n t h o u g h it m a y b e t h e o n l y f o r c e c a p a b l e o f s t i m u l a t i n g mon
to
becoming
com-
associated
w i t h other major p o w e r s in a joint response to the p r o b l e m s
con-
* In my view, such a community would also provide a base for implementing more far-reaching and visionary proposals for global cooperation; for example, those contained in the stimulating "Bulletin of Peace Proposals" prepared by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, in the autumn of 1969.
A Community fronting man's
life o n
of the Developed
this planet,
and
by
Nations
jointly
{ 305
attempting
m a k e deliberate u s e of t h e p o t e n t i a l offered b y s c i e n c e a n d
to
tech-
n o l o g y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y a c h i e v e its o f t e n proclaimed The
goal.
quest
for
that
goal
cannot,
however,
be
geographically
c o n f i n e d t o t h e A t l a n t i c w o r l d , n o r s h o u l d its m o t i v a t i o n b e
even
implicitly derived from security fears stimulated b y a major
out-
side power.
O n e reason for the declining popular
appeal
of
the
A t l a n t i c c o n c e p t is t h e l a t t e r s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s p o s t - W o r l d W a r II E u r o p e a n d w i t h t h e fear of Soviet
W h i l e s u c h a c o n c e p t w a s a b o l d i d e a a t t h e t i m e , it is n o w torically a n d geographically
limited. A
broader, more
his-
ambitious,
a n d m o r e r e l e v a n t a p p r o a c h is c a l l e d f o r b y t h e r e c o g n i t i o n the problems
of t h e
diffuse—they
will
1970s will be
more
t h a t is still u n s t r u c t u r e d
widely
that
less overtly ideological,
reflect
politically
the
malaise
and highly
of
aggression.
of
more
a
world
inegalitarian
eco-
nomically. Such
an
American
approach globalism.
would The
also
tend
to
f a c t is t h a t m u c h
end
the
debate
over
of the initiative
impetus for an undertaking o n so grand a scale will h a v e to f r o m the U n i t e d States. G i v e n the o l d divisions in the world—and
the weaknesses
nations—the
absence
of
and
parochialism
constructive
of the
American
and come
advanced developing
initiative
would
at t h e v e r y least p e r p e t u a t e t h e p r e s e n t drift in w o r l d affairs. T h a t d r i f t c a n n o t b e h a l t e d if t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o l l o w s t h e p a t h it is n o w
de-
s p i t e t h e w e i g h t a n d m o m e n t u m o f its p o w e r , A m e r i c a c o u l d
dis-
itself,
there
is
advocate—disengagement.
something
quaintly
Even
which if,
engage
fashionable to
old-fashioned
in
e l o q u e n t denunciation of U n i t e d States global involvement, c i a l l y w h e n it c o m e s f r o m E u r o p e a n s , w h o h a v e s h o w n a l e s s admirable most
ability
brilliant
to maintain
indictment
of
world
peace.
Moreover,
United
States
policy
even
cannot
the espethan the erase
t h e f a c t that, d e s p i t e its a l l e g e d l y l o n g r e c o r d of errors a n d
mis-
conceptions,
the
only
p o w e r that has b e g u n to think in global terms and actively
seek
the
United
States
has
somehow
become
2. j 2. }
V: America and the World
constructive
world-wide
arrangements.
revealing to note that initiatives such
In
this
connection,
as t h e T e s t - B a n
it
the Non-Proliferation Treaty were opposed by governments itually praised ment.
This
by
global scale has and
the
some
country's
only
been
critics
of
commitment decided
remaining
by
relevant
United to
States
global
international
history. question
is w h a t
be
or
hab-
involve-
affairs
It c a n n o t
is
Treaty
on
a
undone,
its f o r m
and
goals will be. The
debate
on
globalism
did,
however,
perform
one
function. T h o u g h m u c h of the criticism did not provide a ingful policy program,0
the debate prompted greater
useful mean-
recognition
of t h e n e e d to redefine America's w o r l d role in t h e light of historical c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h r u s t into t h e w o r l d b y its o w n and by the cataclysms
of t w o world wars, America
first
new
growth actively
promoted and then guaranteed the West's economic recovery
and
° Even a critic who identifies himself as sympathetic to the "isolationist or neo-isolationist" school concludes that the alternatives offered by the more traditional students of international politics, such as Lippmann or Morgenthau, have relatively little of a constructive nature to offer (Charles Gati, "Another Grand Debate? The Limitationist Critique of American Foreign Policy," World Politics, October 1968, especially pp. 150-51). Moreover, the propensity of even some perceptive writers to concentrate almost entirely on the shortcomings of American foreign-policy performance makes it difficult for them to account for its relatively respectable performance during the last twenty years as compared with, for example, that of the European powers. Thus, Stanley Hoffmann's massive (556 pages) and in places stimulating book, Gullivers Troubles (New York, 1968), focuses almost entirely on the impatience, wrongheadedness, misunderstanding, self-righteousness, gullibility, condescension, inflexibility, and paranoid style of American foreign policy. This leads him, on a more popular level, to say in a magazine article ("Policy for the Seventies," Life, March 21, 1969) that "Americans . . . have been prepared by history and instinct for a world in black and white, in which there is either harmony or an all-out contest." He does not explain why, in that case, the United States and the Soviet Union were successful in maintaining peace, whereas in the past the European powers had failed to do so. At the same time, traditionalists who emphasize the continued vitality of nationalism are inherently inclined to postulate policies that are no longer in tune with the times. Thus, on the very eve of De Gaulle's repudiation by the French people, Hoffmann could speak of a "fundamental rapprochement" with De Gaulle ("America and France," The New Republic, April 12, 1969, p. 22).
A Community military security.
This
of the Developed
posture—of
Nations
necessity
{ 307
heavily
marked
by
military preoccupations—has increasingly shifted toward a greater i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h the less political a n d m o r e basic p r o b l e m s
that
m a n k i n d will f a c e in the r e m a i n i n g third of t h e century. John Kennedy
caught
the essence
of America's
novel
i n t h e w o r l d w h e n h e s a w h i m s e l f a s " t h e first A m e r i c a n for w h o m
the w h o l e w o r l d was, in a sense,
Indeed, Kennedy was the
first
position President
domestic politics."
"globalist" president of t h e
States. R o o s e v e l t , f o r all his i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,
essentially
United believed
in an 1815-like global arrangement in w h i c h the "Big Four" have
specific spheres
to
specific
a
a
clear
regional
course,
These
States
role.
influence.
and
Eisenhower
applying
shifts With
Truman
challenge,
priority.
occasionally
gions.
of
communist
were
European
came
a
of
the
sense
and
that America
same
other
changing
that
owed
the
to
every
and every people h a d the right to expect leadership tion from America,
indicated
on
precedents
would
responded
policies
continued
symptomatic
Kennedy
primarily
his
to
style
which
intellect,
mission,
in
some
stressed
while
his
the
ways
appealed
and
an almost
universal
romantic
more
to
humanism
United
inspira-
equal
fascination
with
the
the
in-
evoca-
emotion
of
re-
continent
volvement to every continent and every people. Kennedy's tive
19
than
American
conquest
space reflected his conviction that America's scientific
of
leadership
w a s n e c e s s a r y t o its e f f e c t i v e w o r l d role. Global
involvement
is,
however,
w h a t has to date b e e n k n o w n clear-cut formulas
and
qualitatively
as foreign policy.
traditional preferences.
different
from
It is i n i m i c a l But
this
to
intellec-
tual c o m p l e x i t y d o e s not n e g a t e the fact that for better or for w o r s e t h e U n i t e d States is s a d d l e d w i t h m a j o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y the framework for change.
This point of v i e w
for
shaping
is s u b j e c t t o
misrepresentation a n d is h i g h l y u n p o p u l a r in s o m e circles.
easy
World
c o n d i t i o n s d o n o t c a l l f o r a P a x A m e r i c a n a , n o r is this t h e a g e American omnipotence. U n i t e d States, the
first
Nevertheless,
it is a f a c t t h a t u n l e s s
g l o b a l s o c i e t y , u s e s its p r e p o n d e r a n t
ence to give positive direction and expression to the
of the
influ-
accelerating
3o8 }
V: America and the World
p a c e of c h a n g e , that c h a n g e n o t o n l y m i g h t b e c o m e linked
to
threaten
old
conflicts
and
antipathies—but
the effort to improve
the
nature
chaos—when
could
and
the
eventually
character
of
a community
of
A m e r i c a n d o m e s t i c life. To sum up:
Though
t h e o b j e c t i v e of s h a p i n g
the developed
nations
is less a m b i t i o u s
government,
it is m o r e a t t a i n a b l e .
It is m o r e
c o n c e p t of an Atlantic c o m m u n i t y to the n e w sions
by
to
the
goal
of
ambitious
world
than
but historically m o r e
the
relevant
spatial revolution. T h o u g h cognizant of present
between
tempts
than
communist
create
exploiting
a
new
these
and
non-communist
framework
divisions
but
for
international
rather b y
striving
it
at-
affairs
not
to
preserve
a n d c r e a t e o p e n i n g s f o r e v e n t u a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . F i n a l l y , it nizes that the w o r l d s
developed
nations have
divi-
nations,
a certain
recogaffinity,
a n d that o n l y b y n u r t u r i n g a greater s e n s e of c o m m u n a l i t y
among
t h e m c a n an effective response to the increasing threat of
global
fragmentation—which
itself
intensifies
the
impatience with human inequality—be
growing
world-wide
mounted.
T h e r e is t h u s a c l o s e c o n j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e h i s t o r i c
meaning
of America's internal transition a n d America's role in t h e Earlier
in
this
large areas:
book,
can democracy
distinctions
social
processes; the
change;
between the
need
unintended
the need
priorities
were
reduced
for a n institutional realignment
to e n h a n c e
tional
with
domestic
the need
social responsiveness governmental for
and
anticipatory
consequences
for educational
of
and
to of
The lar:
international
the
gradual
tradi-
nongovernmental
institutions
to
cope
technological-scientific
reforms to mitigate
the
effects
humanist
society.
equivalents
shaping
three Ameri-
blur
of g e n e r a t i o n a l a n d racial conflicts a n d p r o m o t e rational values in the e m e r g i n g n e w
world.
of
of our d o m e s t i c
a community
of
the
needs
are
developed
tions w o u l d b e a realistic expression of our e m e r g i n g global sciousness; concentration logical
knowledge
would
on disseminating reflect a m o r e
man's problems, emphasizing
simi-
scientific a n d
functional
nacon-
techno-
approach
ecology rather than ideology;
to
both
A Community
of the Developed
Nations
{ 309
the foregoing would help to encourage the spread of a more personalized rational humanist world outlook that would gradually replace the institutionalized religious, ideological, and intensely national perspectives that have dominated modern history. But whatever the future may actually hold for America and for the world, the technetronic age—by making so much more technologically feasible and electronically accessible—make deliberate choice about more issues more imperative. Reason, belief, and values will interact intensely, putting a greater premium than ever before on the explicit definition of social purposes. To what ends should our power be directed, how should our social dialogue be promoted, in what way should the needed action be taken—these are both philosophical and political issues. In the technetronic era, philosophy and politics will be crucial.
AMMAM Reference Notes I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution 1. Part of this section is adapted, in a revised form, from my "America in the Technetronic Age," Encounter, January 1968. In this connection, I wish to acknowledge the pioneering work done on this general subject at Columbia University by Daniel Bell and at Michigan University by Donald Michael. 2. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, N e w York, 1967, pp. 1 8 9 - 9 0 . 3. Testimony by Dr. D . Krech, Government Research Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee, as reported by The New York Times, April 3, 1968, p. 32; see also Gordon R. Taylor, The Biological Time Bomb, N e w York, 1967. 4. The New York Times, January 18, 1969. 5. Donald N. Michael, "Some Speculations on the Social Impact of Technology," mimeographed text of address to the Columbia Seminar on Technology and Social Change, 1966, p. 11. 6. Michael, pp. 6 - 7 . 7. Sir Julian Huxley, "The Crisis in Man's Destiny," Playboy, January 1967, p. 4. 8. See Neal J. Dean, "The Computer Comes of Age," Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968, pp. 8 3 - 9 1 . On the computerinitiated "profound revolution in our patterns of thought and communication," see Anthony G. Oettinger, "Educational Technology," in Toward the Year 2018, Foreign Policy Association, N e w York, 1968. 9. The United States and the World in the 1 9 8 5 Era, Syracuse, N.Y., 1964, pp. 9 0 - 9 1 . 10. See John P. Robinson and James W. Swinehart, "World Affairs and the TV Audience," Television Quarterly, Spring 1968. 11. Cyril E. Black, "Soviet Society: A Comparative View," in Prospects for Soviet Society, Allen Kassof, ed., N e w York, 1968, p. 36; A. B. Trowbridge, "The Atlantic Community Looks to the Future," Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1967, p. 72. 12. "The Technological Gap in Russia," The Economist, February 9, 1969. 311
}
Notes
13. John Diebold, "Is the Gap Technological?" Foreign Affairs, January 1968, pp. 2 7 6 - 9 1 . 14. For some examples of the predominance of American communications among the engineering-technical elite in Latin America, see Paul J. Deutschmann et a l , Communication and Social Change in Latin America, N e w York, 1968, especially pp. 56, 70. 15. See Leonard H. Marks, "American Diplomacy and a Changing Technology," Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, pp. 7, 9. 16. Bruce M. Russett, "Is There a Long-Run Trend toward Concentration in the International System?" Journal of Comparative Political Studies, April 1968. For somewhat forced analogies to past empires, see George Liska, Imperial America, Baltimore, 1966; and for a highly critical appraisal, see Claude Julien, L'Empire americain, Paris, 1968, especially chaps. 1, 6 - 1 1 ; also Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, N e w York, 1967. For a criticism of the "imperial" approach, see Stanley Hoffmann, Gullivers Troubles, N e w York, 1968, pp. 4 6 - 5 1 . 17. The New York Times, November 17, 1968, cites government sources as indicating that 200,000 American civilians are serving abroad; for commitments, see US Commitments to Foreign Powers, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 1967, especially pp. 4 9 - 7 1 ; for data on bases, see The New York Times, April 9, 1969. 18. Judd Polk, "The N e w World Economy," Columbia Journal of World Business, January-February 1968, p. 8, estimates that United States investment abroad accounts for total deliveries of some $165 billion. 19. Joseph Kraft, "The Spread of Power," The New York Times Book Review, September 22, 1968, p. 10 (a review of Amaury de Riencourt's The American Empire, N e w York, 1968). 20. In this connection, compare Harry Magdoff's The Age of Imperialism, N e w York, 1969, which sees America simply as a politically motivated imperial power, with the Rockefeller Foundation's President s Five-Year Review and Annual Report, 1968, which describes the Foundation's foreign activities. The Ford Foundation could also be cited. 21. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000, N e w York, 1967, p. 149. 22. See Kahn and Wiener, tables pp. 1 6 1 - 6 5 and 1 2 3 - 3 0 , for a fuller discussion of the assumptions on which these calculations are based. See also, however, Everett E. Hagan, "Some Facts about Income Levels and Economic Growth," Review of Economics and Statistics, February i 9 6 0 . Hagan points out that comparisons between developed and underdeveloped countries are in some respects misleading and tend to exaggerate the disparities. 23. ILO conference, September 1968, as reported by The New York Times, September 3, 1968. For some equally staggering population projections for Latin America, see Louis Olivos, "2000: A No-Space Odyssey," Americas ( O A S ) , August 1969.
Notes
{
313
24. The United States and the World in the 1 9 8 5 Era, pp. 7 8 - 7 9 . 25. Lester R. Brown, "The Agricultural Revolution in Asia/' Foreign Affairs, July 1968, p. 698, and Brown's address before Kansas State University, "A N e w Er& in World Agriculture," December 3, 1968. For 1967 data, showing f o o d production outstripping population growth in the Third World, see Ceres ( F A O R e v i e w ) , September-October 1968, pp. 1 7 - 1 8 . For a more pessimistic assessment, see Myrdal, The Asian Drama, N e w York, 1968, pp. 417, 1 0 2 9 - 4 9 . 26. See United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1966, Table 7B. 27. Myrdal, pp. 322, 5 4 0 - 4 1 , 5 5 2 ff., 1585. See also United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1967, for data on physicians per inhabitants in the early 1960s (p. 6 9 6 ) ; on number of occupied dwellings, average size, density of occupation, and general housing facilities (Table 202, p. 7 0 8 ff.); and on calories per day, proteins, and industrial consumption of cotton, wool, rubber, steel, tin and fertilizer in the years 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 6 5 , covering general consumption (pp. 4 9 8 - 5 1 1 ) . 28. For a discussion of some pertinent examples, see Twenty-Third Report by the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 1968, hereinafter cited as Report. . . . Also Hearing before a Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1968, hereinafter cited as Hearing. . . . 29. Joseph Lelyveld, "India's Students D e m a n d — A Safe Job in the Establishment," The New York Times Magazine, May 12, 1968, pp. 53, 58; for an equally damning judgment, see also Myrdal, pp. 1 7 8 4 - 9 0 . 30. Myrdal, pp. 1645, 1649. 31. Raul Prebisch, "The System and the Social Structure of Latin America," in Latin American Radicalism, Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., N e w York, 1969, p. 31. 32. Report . . . , pp. 7 - 8 . 33. Hearing . . . , p. 96. 34. Report . . . , p. 17. 35. Report . . . , p. 9, quoting the testimony of Dr. C. V. Kidd, head of the Physics Department of the American University in Beirut. 36. William K o r n h a u s e r , The Politics of Mass Society, G l e n c o e , 111., 195937. H. Jaguaribe, "Foreign Technical Assistance and National D e v e l opment," paper submitted at Princeton, 1965, pp. 2 5 - 2 6 , as cited in Hearing . . . , p. 57; see also Irving Louis Horowitz, "Political Legitimacy and the Institutionalization of Crises in Latin America," Comparative Political Studies, April 1968, especially pp. 6 4 - 6 5 . 38. See, for example, William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, Black Rage, N e w York, 1969. 39. Myrdal, p. 471; see also pp. 4 6 7 - 6 9 for urban-growth data compared with national growth; for fuller data on the growth of cities in
314}
Notes
the Third World, see G. Breese, Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966. 40. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, N e w Haven and London, 1968, p. 290, citing also Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," Dissent, Vol. 8, Spring 1961, p. 177, and Benjamin B. Ringer and David L. Sills, "Political Extremists in Iran," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 3 , PP- 6 9 3 - 9 4 . 41. Myrdal, p. 117. 42. For a useful and pertinent discussion of the relationship of violence and economic development, see Bruce M. Russett et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, N e w Haven, 1964, especially pp. 3 0 4 - 3 1 0 ; and John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development, N e w York, 1968, especially chap. 10, "Communism and Economic Development," co-authored with Roger W . Benjamin. For a somewhat different breakdown of societies, see Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, N e w York, 1966, p. 150. For a much more optimistic prognostication, see Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass., i 9 6 0 , p. 127. 43. Myrdal, p. 300. 44. A. Barber, "The 20th Century Renaissance," private paper, Institute of Politics and Planning, Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 1, 8. 45. In Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Duhrings Revolution and Science, as cited by D. G. Brennan, "Weaponry," in Toward the Year 2018, N e w York, 1968, p. 2. 46. See Brennan, ibid., p. 19. This possibility is developed further by M. W. Thring in his essay "Robots on the March," in Unless Peace Comes, Nigel Calder, ed., London, 1968, pp. 1 5 5 - 6 4 . 47. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, "How to Wreck the Environment," in Unless Peace Comes, p. 181. 48. Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality, N e w York, 1969, p. 199; Michael Harrington, American Power in the Twentieth Century, N e w York, 1967, pp. 39, 43, 48; also the eloquent plea by Aurelio Peccei of Olivetti Corporation, "Considerations and the N e e d for Worldwide Planning," delivered in Akademgorodok, USSR, September 12, 1967 (mimeograph).
II: The Age of Volatile Belief 1. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, N e w York, 1961, p. 183. 2. See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, Chicago, 1966. 3. In this connection, see Jacques Soustelle, Les Quatre Soleils, Paris, 1967. In lively terms, Soustelle attacks the progressive theory of history as expressed by Marx, Spengler, Toynbee, and Teilhard d e Chardin.
Notes
{ 315
For a more complex analysis, see Michel Foucault, Volte et deraison, Paris, 1961; American edition, Madness and Civilization, N e w York, 1965. 4. Teilhard de Chardin, pp. 1 7 8 - 7 9 . 5. See, for example, Jules Monnerot, Sociology and Psychology of Communism, Boston, i 9 6 0 . 6. In this connection, interesting data are provided by Jacques Toussaert, he Sentiment religieux en Flandre a la fin du Moyen^tge, Paris, 1963^ 7. "The writer knows of no instance in present day South Asia where religion has induced social change" (Myrdal, p. 1 0 3 ) . See also Teilhard de Chardin, pp. 2 0 9 - 1 1 , for a discussion of the passivity of oriental religions, and Kavalam M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads, Bombay, 1955. 8. Kh. Momjan, The Dynamic Twentieth Century, Moscow, 1968, p. 21. 9. Teilhard d e Chardin, p. 257. 10. Ibid., p. 211. 11. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, pp. 1 6 2 - 6 3 ; see also p. 158, where Marxism is described as "a system full of flaws but full also of legitimate partial insights, a great formal contribution to social science, a monstrous guide to public policy." 12. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, N e w York, 1965, p. 290. 13. Karl Marx, writing in 1871, as cited by Lewis S. Feuer, "Karl Marx and the Promethean Complex," Encounter, D e c e m b e r 1968, p. 3i. 14. These terms were used by James H. Billington, "Force and Counterforce in Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, October 1968, p. 34. 15. Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Le Gauchisme, remdde a la maladie senile du communisme, Paris, 1968. 16. Leszek Kolakowski, "The Permanent and Transitory Meaning of Marxism," Nowa Kultura, No. 4, 1957. 17. Praxis, May-June 1967, p. 431. 18. Kolakowski, "Hope and the Fabric of History," Nowa Kultura, No. 38, 1957. For a recent and very perceptive analysis of Kolakowski's thought, see Leopold Labedz, "Kolakowski on Marxism and Beyond," Encounter, March 1969, pp. 7 7 - 8 8 . 19. See Adam Schaff, Marxsizm a Jednostka Ludzka, Warsaw, 1965, p. 56, and p. 2 8 ff., where Schaff acknowledges his debt to Professor Erich Fromm for his improved understanding of Marxism. Schaff was expelled from the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party in 1968. 20. This result makes it also reminiscent of fascism. See m y "Democratic Socialism or Social Fascism?" Dissent, Summer 1965. See also the next chapter for further discussion.
3 i 6 }
Notes
21. On the problem of authority and legitimacy in contemporary Catholicism, see George N. Shuster, ed., Freedom and Authority in the West, Notre Dame, 1967, especially the contribution of the late John Courtney Murray, S.J. 22. Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, N e w York, 1954, p. 7723. Letter to Cardinal Konig, Archbishop of Vienna, January 14, 1969. 24. For an account generally sympathetic to the conservative point of view, see Ulisse Floridi, S.J., Radicalismo Cattolico Brasiliano, Rome, 1968. For a more general account, Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, Cambridge, Mass., 1965; and William V. D'Antonia and Frederick B. Pike, Religion, Revolution and Reform, N e w York, 1964. 25. These two words are the title of Garaudy's book De Tanath&me au dialogue, Paris, 1965, discussing the Christian-Marxist dialogue. 26. As cited by the Washington Post, January 7, 1969. 27. For a similar point of view, see Emile Pin, S.J., "Les Motivations des conduites religieuses et le passage d'une civilisation pretechnique a une civilisation technique," Social Change, Vol. 13, 1966. 28. See Harvey Cox, The Secular City, N e w York, 1965. 29. Ibid., p. 69. 30. Pierre Trotignon in L'Arc, Paris, No. 3, 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 8 , as cited by Raymond Aron, "At the Barricades," Encounter, August 1968, p. 23. 31. Abbie Hoffman, Revolution for the Hell of It, N e w York, 1968. The best analysis of the ideology of the "student revolution" is the article by Leopold Labedz, "Students and Revolution," Survey (London), July 1968. 32. As cited by N. Molchanov, "Students Rebel in the West: The Meaning, the Causes and Goals," Literaturnaya Gazeta, November 6, 1968. 33. Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals, N e w York, 1966, p. 7. 34. Speaking in 1967 at the Free University in West Berlin, as cited by Labedz, "Students and Revolution," p. 6. 35. Ibid., p. 7. 36. Molchanov. 37. See Robert P. Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Boston, 1965. 38. Compare, for example, the demands of the Warsaw students, adopted in March 1968, with the demands of the Mexican students of September of the same year (Survey, July 1968, p. 114; The New York Times, March 28 and September 9, 1968). 39. This point is well made by Professor Z. Bauman, a well-known Warsaw sociologist expelled from Poland in 1968 after the student outbreak of March, in his introduction to a special documentary volume on
Notes
{ 317
those events, published in Paris by Instytut Literacki, Wydarzenia Marcowe 1968, 1969.
40. See Melvin Lasky, "Revolution Diary," Encounter, August 1968, pp. 88-89.
41. The New Left, memorandum prepared for the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 23, citing also data from Jack Newfield, A Prophetic Minority, New York, 1966. 42. "The Hooligans of Peace Square," Scinteia Tineretului, July 5, 1968.
43. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, p. 31.
44. On this, see also Kenneth Keniston, "Social Change and Youth in America," in The Challenge of Youth, Erik H. Erikson, ed., New York, 1961. 45. See Johan Huizinga, Waning of the Middle Ages, especially chap. 1 on "The Violent Tenor of Life," New York, 1954. r 46. See Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, for descriptive and sequential analysis. 47. On this, for United States examples see Mark Gerzon, The Whole World Is Watching, New York, 1969, pp. 5 2 - 5 4 , 73, 1 8 9 - 9 0 ; for a more systematic treatment pertaining to the Third World, see Donald K. Emmerson, Students and Politics in Developing
Nations,
New York, 1968, including a similar conclusion on p. 414. 48. Marshall McLuhan, The Marshall McLuhan Dew-Line, No. 1,
p. 15. 49. See Paul Sigmund, ed., The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, New York, 1963, especially pp. 1 2 - 1 7 . For a systematic evaluation of the appeal and meaning of the concept of equality within one 1968,
new nation, see James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite, New Haven, 1968, pp. 1 9 4 - 9 6 . For more
general treatment, David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, Glencoe, 111., 1964; and Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, New York, 1963.
50. For example, see Leopold Senghor, African Socialism, New York, 1963. 51. Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, Boston, 1963, p. 262. 52. It is among them that Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth (New York, 1965) has the widest appeal. See also F. J. Marsal, "Latin American Intellectuals and the Problem of Change,^ Social Research, Winter 1966, pp. 5 6 2 - 9 2 . 53. They have thus become "tutelary democracies." Cf. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States, The Hague, 1965, pp. 60-67. 54. See the highly stimulating review of Michel Foucault's book, Les Mots et les choses (Paris, 1 9 6 6 ) , by Jean-Marie D o m e n a g u e ,
Temoignage Chretien, March 1968.
55. Victor C. Ferkiss, p. 241.
3 i 8 }
Notes
III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance 1. For insights into Stalin's character, see Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, N e w York, 1962; and Svetlana Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters to a Friend, N e w York, 1967. 2. See Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of Communist Autocracy, London, 1956; and Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, London, 1963. 3. Leon Smolinski, "Grinevetskii and Soviet Industrialization," Survey, April 1968, p. 101. See also the critical comment b y Alec N o v e on Smolinski's analysis and Smolinski's reply in Survey, Winter-Spring, 1969. 4. Smolinski, p. 109. 5. Deutscher, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 1 5 . 6. Rostow, p. 66. 7. Rostow, p. 95. See also pp. 9 6 - 9 7 for detailed tables by Warren Nutter, in which the persistent lag in certain areas of Russian industrial production is compared with American production. 8. Black, "Soviet Society: A Comparative View," in Prospects for Soviet Society, pp. 4 2 - 4 3 . 9. Black, pp. 4 0 - 4 2 , provides a useful summary of their findings and the basis for reaching the conclusions. 10. See the fascinating cumulative table, in Stefan Kurowski, Historyczny Proces Wzrostu Gospodarczego, Warsaw, 1963, p. 335. 11. See Tryhuna Ludu, July 8, 1963, and Nowe Drogi, No. 8, 1963. 12. Speech of November 19, 1962. 13. N. Sviridov, "Party Concern for the Upbringing of the ScientificTechnical Intelligentsia," Kommunist, No. 18, p. 38. 14. P. Demichev, "The Construction of Communism and the Goals of Social Sciences," Kommunist, No. 10, p. 26. 15. E. G. R. Kosolapov and P. Simush, "The Intelligentsia in Socialist Society," Pravda, May 25, 1968. 16. D . I. Chesnokov, "Aggravation of the Ideological and and Political Struggle and Contemporary Philosophical Revisionism," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 12. This important article discusses the general state of contemporary Marxism as well as the significance of contemporary revisionism. 17. D. I. Chesnokov, "Current Problems of Historical Materialism," Kommunist, No. 6, 1968, p. 48. See also G. Smirnov, "Socialist Humanism," Pravda, D e c e m b e r 16, 1968. 18. G. Khromushin, "Sharpening of World Ideological Struggle," International Affairs ( M o s c o w ) , No. 12, 1968. 19. T. Timofeyev, "The Leading Revolutionary Force," Pravda, December 24, 1968. Timofeyev is the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Working Class Movement and a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
Notes
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319
20. Pravda, April 11, 1968. 21. S. Kovalev, "On 'Peaceful' and Non-Peaceful Counterrevolution," Pravda, September 11, 1968. 22. A useful source on Soviet "futurology" is the report by a Soviet scholar, I. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Les Etudes sur lavenir en URSS," Analyse et Prevision (Futuribles), No. 5, 1968. 23. See, for example, A. D. Smirnov, "Socialism, the ScientificTechnological Revolution and Long-Range Forecasting," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 9, 1968; I. G. Kurakov, "Forecasting Scientific-Technological Progress"; and M. K. Petrov, "Some Problems of the Organization of Knowledge in the Epoch of the Scientific-Technological Revolution," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 10, 1968; and V. G. Afanasev, Nauchnoe Upravlenie Obshchestvom, Moscow, 1968. 24. "A Discussion: The Problems of the Unity of the Communist Movement," Zolnierz Wolnosci, January 21, 1969, particularly the contributions by S. Trampczynski; J. Urban, "Hands Close to Pulse," Politykay June 9, 1969. 25. V. Roman in Contemporanul, January 3, January 10, 1969 (italics his). Roman, a member of the Central Committee and a former minister in the Rumanian government, is a professor and engineer by training. He is the author of several books on the scientific-technical revolution. 26. Cheprakov, Izvestia, August 18, 1968. 27. See C. Freeman and A. Young, The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union, OECD, p. 33; also the exhaustive study Science Policy in the USSR, OECD, 1969. 28. For other examples, see Science Policy in the USSR, p. 95. 29. Izvestia, October 28, 1968. 30. Academician P. L. Kapitsa, Komsomolskaia Pravda, January 19, 1968.
31. Problems of Communism, July-August and September-October 1968. See also V. Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers, New York, 1968. 32. Text published in The New York Times, July 22, 1968. (Citations in the text are from this version.) 33. Vestnik Akademii Nauk, No. 3, 1966, p. 138. 34- V. Roman, "For a Marxist Theory of the Technical-Scientific Revolution," Contemporanul. 35- Walter Ulbricht, "The Significance and Vital Force of the Teachings of Karl Marx for Our Era," pamphlet, Berlin, May 2, 1968. 36. See Peter C. Ludz, Parteielite im Wandel, Cologne, 1968. 37- See, for example, the warning by P. Demichev, "The Construction of Communism and the Goals of Social Sciences," Kommunist, No. 10, 1968, p. 26. For a provocative discussion of the trend toward greater fusion of party bureaucratic experience with technical com-
3^0}
Notes
petence, see George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society, N e w York, 1968. 38. For an excellent general survey, see Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith, N e w York, 1966. 39. See in this connection the perceptive essay by Henry L. Roberts, "Russia and the West: A Comparison and Contrast," The Slavic Review, March 1964. 40. See the statement in Kommunist, No. 15, 1963, especially p. 26, which attacks the Chinese concept of an absolute line for the international movement, and the letter of the Soviet leadership of July 1963 to the Chinese leaders, explicitly rejecting the concept of a general line for the international movement. This period has been analyzed by me in my The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1967. 41. Roger Garaudy, Pour un modele frangais du socialisme, Paris, 1968, pp. 148-49. 42. D. Susnjic, Knjizevne Novine, March 2, 1968. For useful summaries of Yugoslav views concerning a multi-party system, see also the RFE research papers of October 6, 1967, and May 21, 1968, both of which summarize the evolution of Yugoslav thinking on the subject. 43. For data on the growth of the Czechoslovak intelligentsia and for a discussion of its implications, see Z. Valenta, "The Working Class and the Intelligentsia," Nova Mysl, February 1968. 44. See the very thoughtful discussion by A. Hegedus, "On the Alternatives of Social Development," and "Reality and Necessity," Kortars, June, July 1967. For a conservative response to the above, see P. Varkonyi, "The Development and Problems of the Socialist Society," Kortars, November 1968. Even the more conservative response did concede the desirability of such discussion, which went much further than anything recently published in either the Soviet Union or the other more conservative Communist states. 45. See in this connection the revealing polemics between the Soviets and the Chinese on the subject of the revolutionary role of the American Negro: R. A. Remington, "Revolutionary Role of the AfroAmerican: An Analysis of Sino-Soviet Polemics on the Historical Importance of the American Negro," Center for International Studies, M.I.T., October 1968. 46. Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," The China Quarterly, April-June, 1969. 47. Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, N e w York, 1966. 48. O. E. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, N e w York, 1964, pp. 4 1 3 - 2 4 . See also Ping-ti H o and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Chicago, 1967; and for a more general discussion, J. K. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, Cambridge, Mass., 1968. 49. John H. Kautsky, p. 187.
Notes
{ 3 2 1
IV: The American Transition 1. See, for example, Ronald Segal's Americas Receding Future, N e w York, 1968; or Giose Rimanelli, Tragica America, Genoa, 1968. 2. A highly informative account is contained in the full-page article by Henry Lieberman, "Technology: Alchemist of Route 128," The New York Times, January 8, 1968. 3. An excellent and well-documented summary can be found in The Advancing South: Manpower Prospects and Problems, N e w York, 1968. 4. Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Indicators of Social Change, Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore, eds., N e w York, 1968, p. 149. 5. Notably Bell, above; also the more general, less documented reflections in the fourth annual report of Harvard University, Program on Technology and Society; and Victor Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality. For an extremely useful summary of present trends in America, see Toward a Social Report, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1969. For a revealing and in places moving account of the impact of all this on some of the young, see Mark Gerzon, The Whole World Is Watching. 6. Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, p. 9. 7. For a fuller discussion, see NASA: The Technology Utilization Program, 1967, p. 10; and editorial in Saturday Review, April 19, 1969. 8. See Anthony G. Oettinger and Sema Marks, "Educational Technology: N e w Myths and Old Realities" (discussion and r e p l y ) , The Harvard Educational Review, Fall 1968. 9. As cited by Return to Responsibility, a report by the Thomas Jefferson Research Center, Pasadena, 1969, p. 5. 10. Bell, p. 175. 11. Toward a Social Report, p. 43. 12. Ibid., p. 42. 13. Bureau of the Census report, cited by The New York Times, August 20, 1969. 14. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 337. A breakdown of the distribution of the poor is contained in the report of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, released on November 12, 1969; see also Joint Report of the Commerce and Labor Departments cited by The New York Times, February 2, 1970. 15. Bureau of the Census report; Nathan Glazer, ' T h e Negroes' Stake in America's Future," The New York Times Magazine, September 22, 1968, p. 31; The Economist, May 10, 1969, p. 51. 16. The New York Times, May 11, 1969. It should, however, b e noted that in 1949, 59 per cent of the blacks expressed satisfaction with
322
}
Notes
their housing. This presumably indicates higher expectations in 1969. On housing, see Joint Report (note 14, above). 17. "Characteristics of Students and Their Colleges," a study by the Bureau of the Census, as cited in The New York Times, June 15, 1969. 18. Glazer, pp. 31, 90; see also Joint Report. 19. The Economist, p. 51. 20. Toward a Social Report, pp. 1 5 - 2 7 ; Time, October 31, 1969,
p.
42.
21. But for a rather pessimistic projection and assessment, see "America's Frustrated South," The Economist, June 14, 1969. 22. See the special report "Black America," Newsweek, June 30, ^69, p. 23. For a broader analysis, see The Politics of Protest (The Skolnick Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence), New York, 1968, especially chap. 4, "Black Militancy." 23. Gloria Steinem, "Link between the New Politics and the Old," Saturday Review, August 2, 1969, p. 19.
24. For a useful discussion of the fragmentation of political culture in democracy, see Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, April 1968.
25. Gus Tyler, The Political Imperative, New York, 1968. 26. For strikingly conflicting assessments of the impact of that expansion, see Emmanuel Mesthene, "How Technology Will Shape the Future" (Science, July 12, 1 9 6 8 ) , who argues strongly that the role of government is enhanced; and Ferkiss, pp. 1 4 6 - 4 7 , who argues quite the contrary point of view. For a broad-gauged and stimulating discussion, see Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity, New York, 1969. 27. From the introduction to Ellul, The Technological Society, by Robert K. Merton, p. vi. 28. See our earlier discussion, Part IV, p. 201. 29. Donald N. Michael, The Next Generation, New York, 1965, p. 16.
30. Robert S. Liebert, "Towards a Conceptual Model of Radical and Militant Youth: A Study of Columbia Undergraduates," presentation to the Association for Psycho-analytic Medicine, April 1, 1961, p. 28. 31. Kenneth Keniston, "You Have to Grow Up in Scarsdale to Know How Bad Things Really Are," The New York Times Magazine, April 2 7> 1969, p. 128. The foregoing reflects the argument of his larger book, Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth, New York, 1968.
32. Gerzon, p. 26. 33. Ibid., pp. 52-53, 73, 185, 190. 34. Michael, The Next Generation, p. 41; see also Robert A. Nisbett, "Twilight of Authority," The Public Interest, Spring 1969. 35. Testimony of Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, professor of psychology and psychiatry, University of Chicago, to the House Special Subcommittee on Education, March 20, 1969.
Notes
{
323
36. See the argument developed by Edgar C. Friedenberg, "The Hidden Costs of Opportunity," Atlantic Monthly, February 1969, pp. 84-90. 37. See T. B. Bottomore, Critics of Society: Radical Thought in North America, N e w York, 1968. 38. See Daniel Bell, "Charles Fourier: Prophet of Eupsychia," The American Scholar, Winter 1968-69. 39. Friedenberg, p. 89. 40. William Komhauser, The Politics of Mass Society. 41. For some perceptive comments, see Andrew Knight, "America's Frozen Liberals," The Progressive, February 1969. 42. For a discussion of the position of the liberal in the academic world, see Irving Louis Horowitz, "Young Radicals and the Professorial Critics," Commonweal, January 31, 1969, pp. 5 5 2 - 5 6 . 43. For a good discussion, see particularly p. 54 of the special issue of The Economist, May 10, 1969. 44. From a lecture by Professor Joseph Blau, Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies, January 1969. 45. Quite symptomatic is the title of the recent book by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of Confidence, Boston, 1969. 46. A good account of right and left extremist groups is in George Thayer, The Farther Shores of Politics, N e w York, 1967. 47. For the outlines of the needed effort, see the Report . . . on Civil Disorders, especially pp. 2 2 5 - 2 6 .
V: America and the World 1. For some comparative data, see Toward a Social Report, pp. 81-82. 2. Strong overtones of this view are to be found in John McDermott's "Intellectuals and Technology," The New York Review of Books, July 31, 1969; it is even more strongly argued in Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture, N e w York, 1969. 3. See particularly Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, N e w York, 1966; also N. Tinbergen, "On War and Peace in Animals and Man," Science, June 28, 1968. v 4. For a criticism of the radical attacks on the industrial-military complex, see Stanley Hoffmann, Gullivers Troubles, p. 149. 5. See Frank S. Hopkins, "American Educational Systems for the Less Developed Countries," Washington, D.C., 1967 (mimeograph), and his proposal for an Educational Development Administration. 6. Irving Louis Horowitz et al., Latin American Radicalism. Student partisanship in Latin America is well covered in chapters 8 - 1 1 in Donald K. Emmerson, Students and Politics in Developing Nations.
3
i
4 }
Notes
7. See Claudio Veliz, "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, October 1968. 8. See my article, "Peace and Power," Encounter, November 1968. 9. For a stimulating interpretation of Russian history and of its "lag" vis-a-vis the West, see Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 18011Q17, Oxford, 1967, especially pp. 7 2 8 - 4 2 . 10. I share in this respect the conclusions reached by Theodore Draper in his "World Politics: A N e w Era?" Encounter, August 1968, p. 12. 11. See my article, "Meeting Moscow's 'Limited Coexistence,'" The New Leader, December 16, 1968. 12. Montreal Star, September 9, 1969. 13. For a fuller discussion, see my "Global Political Planning," Public Interest, Winter 1969. 14. See on this the public-opinion polls analyzed in Peace Research in Japan, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 2 5 - 7 1 . They point to rising Japanese expectations of nuclear proliferation. 15. See in this connection the speech by Leonard Marks, director of USIA, "A Blueprint for a N e w Schoolhouse," November 8, 1967. 16. For detailed calculations of the likely financial share of contributors other than the United States, see The Economist, August 9, 1969, P- 13. 17. For a fuller elaboration of these proposals, see my "The Framework for East-West Reconciliation," Foreign Affairs, January 1968. 18. See the revealing analysis of foreign attitudes toward the United States in the polls cited by The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, report by the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., December 22, 1968, especially pp. 15-18. 19. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, Boston, 1965, p. 559.
Index
Age of Discontinuity, The (Drucker), 26211. Agnew, Spiro T., 251 Agrarianism, 236n., 237*1. Agricultural revolution, in Asia, 38 Albania, 189 Algeria, 20, 21, 27, 40 Amendola, G., 18571. "America in the Technetronic Age" (Brzezinski) 15m. American Challenge, The (ServanSchreiber), 30 American Power and the New Mandarins (Chomsky), logn. American Power in the Twentieth Century (Harrington), 49fi., 246m American Revolution, 71, 198 Americanization, 31 Americans for Democratic Action, 24 4 n. Anarchism, 97, 100, 234 Andras, Charles, 88n. Anti-anticommunism, 240 Appley, Lawrence, 203 Ardagh, John, quoted, 10971. Argentina, 20, 21, 4511. Armor, Paul, 13311.
Arms spending, global (1966), 62n. Aron, Raymond, 144/1., 15 m. Asian Drama (Myrdal), 3on. Assessing Technology Transfer, 262n. Audio-visual communications: in selected countries ( i 9 6 0 and 1966), 20, 21; in technetronic society, 11, 18-19 Australia, i7n., 296 Austria, 90, 184 Automation, 11, 13, 41 Ayub Khan, Muhammad, 49 Azrael, Jeremy, quoted, 15971.-16on. Babcox, Peter, i02n. Bailey, Robert, i i 5 n . Belgium, 26n., 55, 184 Bell, Daniel, gn., 1411., 202n.; quoted, n 8 n . , 203-204 Benelux, zSn. Benn, Anthony Wedgwood, quoted, 2i7n. Berkeley Liberation Committee, 232 n. Birth control, 37, 89 Black, Cyril, 23n., 132 and unquoted, 132
325
326
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Index
Black Americans, 46 and n., 47, 48, 114, 115, 206-207, 210-12, 229230, 242-43, 252, 265, 266 Black Panther party, 230n., 23m., 232 ft. Blake, Eugene Carson, 86n. Bloch, Ernst, 78 Blue-collar workers, American, 200, 205, 229, 243 Bolivar, Simon, 191 Bolivia, 190 n. Bolshevik Revolution, 98, 126, i75n. Boumedienne, Houari, 191 "Brain drain," 29-30, 3on., 276 Brazil, 20, 21, 27, 36, 4in., 42, 43, 45n., 86 Brezhnev, Leonid I., 136, 173 Britain, see Great Britain; United Kingdom Brooks, Harvey, quoted, n 6 n . - i i 7 n . Bryan, William Jennings, 237/1. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, i44n., i49n. Buddhism, 69 Buhle, Paul, quoted, 229n. Bukharin, Nikolai, 130 Bulgaria, 182 Burks, Richard V., 133n.; quoted, 158ft. Burma, 38, 45n. "Can Science Be Planned?" (Brooks), 117ft. Canada, 20, 21, 28n., 50, 55, 133ft., 15771., 213ft., 291ft. Capitalism, and technical revolution, 152 Captive Mind, The (Milosz), 106 Carstairs, G. N., 17ft. Castro, Fidel, 189 Catholic Church, 68ft., 80, 84-86, 87, 89, 91, 136 Ceylon, 41ft. Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, The, 226ft. Cheprakov, V. A., 145ft. Chesnokov, D. I., quoted, 143ft. Chile, 45ft. China, 29, 36, 92, 123-24, 125, 129, 136, 178, 179, 275, 278, 280, 281, 286ft., 290ft., 298; Communist Party of, 179-80, 187; "Cultural Revolution" in, 129, 166, 186, 187; and global revolution, 185189; and "Great Leap Forward," 186, 187; gross national product of, 189; and United States, 289
Chomsky, Noam, logn., 23on. Christian-Communist Dialogue, A (Garaudy and Lauer), 88ft. Christianity, 59, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 84-90, 9i, 94, 109ft., 188; and Marxism, 87-88 City life, 17 and ft. Civil-rights legislation, in United States, 114, 207 Civil War, American, 197-98, 199, 212ft., 23yn. Class struggle, i28n. Cleaver, Eldridge, 212 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, 80, 95, 100 and ft. Cold War, 51 and ft., 297, 302, 303 Columbia University, 98, 25271. Common Market, European, 55, 145, 182, 301 Communications, audio-visual, see Audio-visual communications Communism, 24, 33, 59, 68, 74, 75, 79 and n., 83, 84, 92 and ft., 94, 113, 119-26 passim, 138, 240, 253ft.; and community of developed nations, 301-303; despotic model of, 138; diversified forms of, 181-85; phases in evolution of, 177-81; sectarian, 177, 179193; technetronic, 170; and Third World, 185, 186, 188, 190; see also China; Leninism; Marxism; Marxism-Leninism; Soviet Union; Stalinism Communism and the Politics of Development (Kautsky), 190 Communist parties, 77, 78-79, 96, 191; Stalinization of, 178 Community of developed nations, 293-309; and communist states, 301-303; risks and advantages of, 303-309; structure and focus of, 297-301 "Computer Technology" (DeCarlo), i5ftComputers, American lead in, 2yn., i33ft"Conflict in the Twentieth Century" (Wood), 7ft. Conquest, Robert, 126ft. Conservatism, 236, 237 and ft., 242, 250, 257 Constitution, U.S., 198, 258 Convergence theories, 144 and ft., 163, 253n. Cook, Jewel, 232ft.
Index Cornell University, 242 Coser, Lewis A., quoted, 68n. Cost-effectiveness analysis, 20371. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), 302 Council of Economic Advisers, 206, 220 Cox, Harvey, quoted, 93 Crime, organized, 6 Crime rates, 21371. Critique of Pure Tolerance, A, 23571. Cuba, 189, 190, 191 Cybernetics, 11, 55, 151, 165, 170, 171 Czechoslovakia, 20, 21, 42, 43, 55, 8771., 149, 167, 174, 179, 183, 184, 301; Soviet occupation of, 129, 136, 148, 161, 180, 18m. Dadaism, 233 Deak, Istvan, 18271. Debray, Regis, 48 DeCarlo, Charles R., 1571. Declaration of Independence, 2971., 198, 258 Democracy, liberal, see Liberal democracy; participatory, 264 Democratic Party, 239, 250, 251 Denmark, 184 Deutscher, Isaac, 127; quoted, 13071. Development Assistance Committee of OECD, 276 Devlin, Kevin, 88n. Dialectical and Historical Materialism (Stalin), 131 Drucker, Peter, 26271.; quoted, 24471. Dupre, J. Stefan, 26271. Dynamics of Modernization, The (Black), 2371. East Germany, 165, 170, 171 and n., 182, 184 Eastman, Max, quoted, g6n. Eayrs, James, quoted, 292 Ecology, 61, 272, 308 Ecstasy: politics of, 95, 96; and science, 91 and n. Ecumenism, 87 Education: in France, 26, 27, 43; in Germany, West, 26, 27, 43; in India, 27, 41, 43, 44; in Italy, 26, 43; in Japan, 27, 43; in Latin America, 44; in Soviet Union, 26, 2 7> 43; and technetronic society, 11; and television, closed-circuit, 207; in Third World, 41; in United
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States, 26, 27, 43, 207-208, 2 6 6 269 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 237, 307 Elder, Judy-Ann, quoted, 23371. Elites: of Third World, 47-48; transnational, 59; of United States, 20871., 215-16 Ellul, Jacques, 1771.; quoted, 9171., 26271.-26371. Emergence of Modern Russia 18011917, The (Pushkarev), 3971. Engels, Friedrich, 56 England, see Great Britain; United Kingdom Equality, 71, 111, 205, 231; lacking in Soviet Union, 16371.; quest for, 111-15 Escapist antirationalism, 230 Europe, Western, see Western Europe European Common Market, 55, 145, 182,301 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 301 Evolution: ideological, 14471.; of participatory pluralism in United States, 264; pluralist, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165, 174 Existentialism, Sartre's, 11671. Fanon, Frantz, 48, 97, 191; quoted, 45"Faria, Jesus, quoted, 19271. Fascism, 18271., 236, 251, 279 Federal government, 215-17, 261; complexity of, 24471. Ferkiss, Victor C., quoted, 23771. Finland, 90, 13371., 137, 21371. Fischer, George, 17071. Ford, Henry, 13 Ford Foundation, 260 Forecasting, technological-economic, 150-Si Foucault, Michel, 115, 116 Fourier, Frangois, 233 Fourth International (Trotskyite), 103, 10571. France, 24, 26 and n., 28n., 31, 55, 19071., 283; city population of, 42; Communist Party of, 80, 88n., 179, 180, 185 and n.; education in, 26, 27, 43; government of, 21771.; gross national product of, percapita, 42; newspapers in, 20, 21; radio in, 20, 21, 43; religious
328
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Index
France (cont'd.) belief in, 90; student riots in, 95, 98 and n.; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Freeman, C., 26ft. French Revolution, 24, 71, 97, 98, 175^-, 191, 236, 29m. Frontier industries, 2771., 200, 210, 215 Garaudy, Roger, 88n., 180; quoted, 8 in. Gati, Charles, 3o6n. Gaullism, 55 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 301 Generation gap, 17-18, 223 Gerasimov, G., 15m. Germany, see East Germany; West Germany Gerzon, Mark, 225, 228; quoted, 225 Ghana, 36 Ghettos, urban, of United States, 46, 48 Girardi, Giulio, 88n. Global City, The (Von Laue), 7n. Globalism, American, 305, 306, 307 Glushkov, V. M., 157*1. Goals, Priorities and Dollars: The Next Decade (Lecht), 257n. God: belief in, 90; man's relationship to, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 75> 85, 91; see also Religions Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 130 Government: federal, see Federal government; local, in United States, strengthening of, 260 Granin, D., quoted, 15m. Gray, Stanley, quoted, l o o n . - i o m . Great Britain, 28n., 90, 217ft., 283; see also United Kingdom Great Depression, 200, 229, 237ft. Great Terror, The (Conquest), 126ft. Greece, 90, 133ft., 190ft. Grid: national information, 202; world information, 32, 59, 299 and ft. Grinevetskii, V., 129, 130 Guardian, 223ft., 231ft., 232ft. Guevara, Che, 48, 191, 249 Gullivers Troubles (Hoffmann), 306ft. Harich, Wolfgang, 83
Hager, Kurt, 171 Harrington, Michael, 49ft., 51ft., 213ft.; quoted, 246ft. Hartz, Louis, 12 Hassner, Pierre, 302ft. Havelock, Eric A., 109ft. Hearing before Subcommittee on Government Operations (1968), 30 ft. Hilliard, David, quoted, 230ft. Hoffman, Abbie, 95 Hoffmann, Stanley, 306ft. Holography, 1571. Honecker, Erich, quoted, 171ft. Hoselitz, Bert F., 48 Howick, G., 262ft. Huizinga, Johan, 106 "Humanae Vitae," 85 Humanism: as Marxist concern, 142; rational, 270-73, 308, 309 Humphrey, Hubert H., 218 Hungary, 182ft., 183, 184, 190 and n. Huntington, Samuel P., quoted, 40ft., 5 in., 70ft., 279ft.-28on. Husak, Gustav, 137 Huxley, Julian, quoted, 17 Idealism, 271, 272; of young, 223, 224, 26771. Ideology: "end" of, 117, 119; social functions of, 118ft.; Soviet, as product of bureaucratic process of definition, 153; theory of evolution of, i44n. "Ideology and Soviet Politics" ? (Bell), n 8 n . I'll Take My Stand, 23771. India, 13, 40 and ft., 41ft., 44, 51, 55, 280; city population of, 42; education in, 27, 41, 43, 44; and gross national product, per-capita, 36, 42; illiteracy in, 4571.; newspapers in, 20, 21; radio in, 20, 21, 43; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Individualism, and liberalism, 238 Indonesia, 27, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 4 5 n . , 1 1 4 , 19071.
Industrial revolution, 106, 107, 108, 123, 198, 210, 277 Institute for Politics and Planning, 32 ft. Integration, of black Americans, 210211, 243 International Atomic Energy Agency, 2771., 157ft.
Index International Labor Organization (ILO), 37, 5971. International Peace Research Institute, 30471. International production, need for theory of, 300 and n. Inventions: American lead in, 2771., 2871.; registrations of, in selected countries (1964), 184 Iran, 46, 48 Islam, 68, 69, 188 Israel, 37, 279, 28671., 29m., 296 Italy, 2871., 19071.; city population of, 42; Communist Party of, 179, 185 and 71.; education in, 26, 43; gross national product of, percapita, 42, 132; radio in, 43; telephones in, 43; television in, 43 Izvestia, 14571. Japan, 9, 2871., 31, 50, 133 and n., 275, 281, 289, 29171., 295 and 71., 298; city population of, 42; computers in, 13371.; crime rates in, 21371.; education in, 27, 43; and Europe, Western, 293-97 passim, 298; and grid, world information, 299 and 71.; and gross national product, per-capita, 37, 42; labor force in, 156; newspapers in, 20, 21; nuclear energy used in, 15771.; radio in, 20, 21, 43; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Jefferson, Thomas, 292 Jencks, Christopher, quoted, 22771. John XXIII, Pope, 84 Jury trials, American, absurdities of, 21471.-21571. Kaganovich, Lazar, 13 Kahn, Herman, 5071. Kaplan, K., quoted, 16771. Karcz, J. F., quoted, 13m. Kautsky, John, 190 Kendrick, Alexander, quoted, 26971. Keniston, Kenneth, 23271.; quoted, 225, 23271. Kennedy, John F., 24671., 307 Kennedy, Robert F., 213ft., 217, 223, 245 Kenya, 113 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 140, 141, 187 Kirkland, Sally, quoted, 23371. Kolakowski, Leszek, 78, 81, 82, 83; quoted, 82 Kommunist, 14971., 151 and n.
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Konstantinov, F., quoted, 14871.14971. Kuron, J., 10471., 10571. Kurowski, 133 and n., 134 and n. Labedz, Leopold, 97; quoted, 9871.99". Lakoff, Sanford A., 26271. Laqueur, Walter, quoted, 23071. Lasers, American lead in, 2771. Latin America, 34, 36, 4171., 44, 4571., 69, 86, 149, 156, 191, 279, 288 Lauer, Quentin, 88n. Lecht, Leonard A., 25771. "Left, the Jews and Israel, The" (Lipset), 23071. Lenin, Nikolai, 114, 126, 127, 177, 191 Leninism, 127, 14571., 149, 154, 284 Lenski, Gerhard, quoted, 8771. Leroux, Pierre, 7471. Lester, R., 26271. Levi-Strauss, Claude, quoted, 66n. Liberal democracy, 197, 224, 239, 271; alternatives to, 248-54 Liberalism, 121, 236-37; ambivalence of, in defending democracy, 241; crisis of, 236-54; doctrinaire, 238-40, 241, 245, 246, 251, 270; and individualism, 238; and New Left, 240, 245; and space age, unimaginative response to, 246 and 71.; statist, 238, 239 Lichtheim, George, quoted, 18571. Liebert, Robert, quoted, 224-25 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 23071. Locke, John, 255 Lorenz, Konraa, quoted, 22871. Luddites, 108 Lukacs, George, 78 Lysenko, T. D., 15971. McCarthy, Eugene, 218, 223 Macciocchi, M. A., 18471. MacDonald, Gordon J. F., quoted, 57 and 71. McLuhan, Marshall, 19 Management by Participation (Marrow et at), 20171. Managerial Power in Soviet Politics (Azrael), 15971. Managerial processes, 202-203 Managerialism, technological, 253 Mao Tse-tung, 101, 149"-, 166, 169, 187, 191
330 }
Index
Marcuse, Herbert, 97, 101, 149 and ft., 23cm., 235ft. Marx, Karl, 74, 101, 114, 127, 138, 186, 191; quoted, 76, 139 Marxism, 48, 72-74, 92, 108, 109ft., 113, 114, 119, 123, 324, 126, 127, 13§, !37, 154» 177; and Christianity, dialogue between, 87 and n., 88 and ft.; institutional, 77-84; Leninist adaptation of, to Orient, 178; pluralist concept of, 83ft.; see also China; Communism; Leninism; Marxism-Leninism; Soviet Union; Stalinism Marxism in Modern France (Lichtheim), 185ft. Marxism-Leninism, 78, 125, 127, 12 9> ^ 5 , 144ft., 148ft.—149*1. Maslow, Abraham, 271ft. Mass media, 21, 253; and liberalism, 241; political courtship of, 216 "Mater et Magistra," 80, 85, 86 Mathematics, 28ft. Mboya, Tom, 113 "Measurement of Knowledge and Technology, The" (Bell), 14ft., 202 ft. Medvedev, Z. A., 159ft. Mendel, A., 230n. Mexico, 95, 98, 103ft., 1 73, 191, 29in., 296 Meyn, Hermann, i8n. Michael, Donald N., quoted, 58n. Middle Ages, 59, 93, 106, 107 Middle-Class Radicalism (Parkin), 100ft.
Militant fundamentalism, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 166, 168 Milosz, Czeslaw, 106 Mine, Hilary, 13 Modrzhinskaya, E., quoted, 144ft. Modzelewski, K., 104ft., 105ft. Momjan, Kh., quoted, 146ft. Monas, Sidney, 16 in. Monde, Le, 87ft., 88ft. Monroe Doctrine, 288 Moore, Barrington, 214ft., 235ft., 250 ft. Morgenthau, Hans, 179ft., 3o6n. Moskvichev, L., 143ft. Motivation and Personality (Maslow), 271ft. Multi-spectral analysis, from earth satellites, 61 Mumford, Lewis, quoted, 246ft.
Myrdal, Gunnar, 3on., 45ft.; quoted, 4on., 56ft. Mysticism, 84-85 NASA, 23n., 202, 263 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 49 National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence, 213ft., 25on. National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, 263ft. National Planning Association, 277ft. National Science Foundation, 220 Nationalism, 4, 54, 55-56, 70-72, 74, 106, 107, 111, 114, 121, 123, 124, 135, 191, 192, 293, 3o6n.; "new," 55-56, 56ft., 186 Nation-states, 54, 55, 56, 70, 113ft. NATO, 302 Netherlands, 26ft., 85, 90 New Deal, 199, 218, 23jn. } 238, 239 New Foreign Policy for the United States, A (Morgenthau), 179ft. New French Revolution, The (Ardagh), iogn. New Left, 80, 101, 119, 222-36, 243, 244, 248, 249, 251, 252ft., 257, 264, 271; anarchistic element in, 2 34> 235, 236, 245; historic function of, 234-36; infantile ideology of, 222-28; and liberalism, 240, 245; in search of revolution, 228233; and technetronics, 262; totalitarian tendencies of, 234, 235, 236, 245; see also Violent « Left "New World Economy, The" (Polk), 30m. New York City, 242 New York Times, 15, 28ft., 29ft., 4on., 96ft., 2i3n., 215ft., 233ft., 244ft., 246ft., 248ft., 250ft. Newspapers, in selected countries ( i 9 6 0 and 1966), 20, 21 Nigeria, 36, 41ft. Nixon, Richard M., 218 Nobel Prizes, 28ft. Non-Proliferation Treaty, 306 North Korea, 286ft. North Vietnam, 286n. Norway, 90, 184, 213ft. Oceania, 17ft., 156
Index Oligarchic petrifaction, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165, 168-69, 17° On Aggression (Lorenz), 228ft. One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse), 97 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 25ft., 26ft., 28 and n., 2971., 158, 20ift., 276, 301, 302, 303 Overpopulation, 37, 61 Pakistan, 36, 37, 38, 44, 4511., 280 Parkin, Frank, loon. Parks, Ford, 28n. Particularization, of international communism, 178-79 Pasternak, Boris, i6on. Paul VI, Pope, 84, 85, 86n., 89; quoted, 89 Paulus Gesellschaft, 87ft. Peace Corps, 224, 227 Permanent Purge, The, 126ft. Peru, 45ft. Philippines, 38 Piore, E., 30ft. Planning, functional, 61 Planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS), 18 Plato, 109ft. Pluralism, participatory, in United States, 258-65 Pluralist evolution, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165, 174 Poirier, Richard, 98ft. Poland, 13, 26ft., 27, 42, 43, 79ft., 92ft., 103 and ft., 104, 133, 137, 173, 178, 182, 184, 190 and ft. Pol-Fouchet, Max, 99ft. Political disintegration, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 166, 168 Political Order in Changing Societies (Huntington), 40ft. Political Power: USA/USSR (Brzezinski and Huntington), 253ft. Polk, Judd, quoted, 300/1.-30 lft. Pollution, industrial, 61, 220 Pravda, 100 ft., 157ft. Price, Don K., 262ft. Problems of Communism, 160 Production, international, need for theory of, 300 and n.
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Prophet Outcast, The (Deutscher), 130ft. Protestantism, 87 and ft. Public Interest, The (Drucker), 244ft. Pushkarev, S., quoted, 39ft. Racism, 186, 191, 192 Radio: in selected countries, 20, 21, 43; in Third World, 40, 43 Radio Free Europe, 79ft. Rashin, A. G., 39ft. Rathjens, George W., quoted, 286ft. Rational humanism, 270-73, 308, 309 Reason, escape from, 95-99, 109 "Reflections on Youth Movements" (Laqueur), 230ft. Regionalism, as American foreignpolicy formula, 34, 53 Religions, 74, 116; privatization of belief in, 90-94; of recorded history, 64; universal, 66-69; s e e also God Religious Factor, The (Lenski), 87ft. Renaissance, 56 Report by the Committee on Government Operations (1968), 26ft. Republican Party, 237, 250 Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America, and the Soviet Union (Freeman and Young), 26ft. "Revolution in America?" (Moore), 250 ft. Richardson, J., 28ft. Riesman, David, 208ft.; quoted, 227ft. "Road to 1977, The" (Ways), 203ft. Roosevelt, Franklin D., 307 Rostow, Walt, 131, 144ft. Roszak, Theodore, 230ft., 231ft., 232 ft. Rumania, 104, 170, 178, 183, 184, 190, 291ft., 297 Rumyantsev, A., quoted, 149ft. Russia, 44; industrial revolution in, 39 and ft.; revolutionary intelligentsia of, 278; see also Soviet Union Rustow, Dankwart, quoted, 112ft.113"Sakharov, Andrei, 162-63, 163ft., 164, 282ft. Sartre, Jean-Paul, 99ft., 116ft.
3 32 }
Index
Savage Mind, The (Levi-Strauss), 66 n. Schaff, Adam, 78, 82, 83 Schapiro, Leonard, 127 Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., quoted, , 96n. Science: dehumanizing potential of, 142; and ecstasy, 91 and n.; social significance of, 15 Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics (Lakoff and Dupre), 262 n. Science explosion, 22-23, 53 Science Policy in the USSR (OECD), 26n., i57n., 158, 170ft. Scientific Estate, The (Price), 262n. Seaborg, Glenn T., 23n. Second Treatise on Government (Locke), 255 Servan-Schreiber, J. J., 30 Sexual revolution, 173, 233n. Siberia, 284FT.
Sirhan, Sirhan, 213n., 215ft. Slovakia, 137 Smith, Bruce, 250ft. Social explosion/implosion, 14-18 Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Moore), 214ft. Social patterns, new, 10-14, 203204 Social Security Administration, 206 Socialism, 59, 74ft., 79 and ft., 113, 120, 152, 261 Socialism and Communism, 151ft. Sociology Faces Pessimism (Bailey), 115ft. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, i6on. South Korea, 36, 44, 286ft., 290 Soviet Academy of Sciences, 169 Soviet System and Modern Society, The (Fischer), 170ft. Soviet Union, 7, 9, 25ft., 26ft., 29, 54, 8 7ft., 121, 123, 125, 132ft., 133ft., 136, 177, 196, 275, 280, 281, 283, 284, 286ft., 287, 288, 289; agriculture in, 155-56; bureaucratization of, 138-54 passim; and China, 168; city population of, 42; Communist Party of, 78-79, 135-36, 138, 161, 165; and community of developed nations, 301, 302, 303; Czechoslovakia occupied by, 129, 136, 148, 161, 180, 18m.; dissent in, 160 and n., 161, 162-63; education in, 26, 27, 43; foreign aid by (1966); 62ft.; future of, 154-
176; and gross national product, 37, 42, 132, 155ft., 303; industrial sector in, 156-57; labor force in, distribution of, 156; lag in economic-technological development of, 132, 133ft., 155, 157 and n., 158 and ft., 159; military technology of, 159; newspapers in, 20, 21; Nobel Prizes won by, 28ft.; non-Russian nationalities in, 55, 161-62, 166, 167; possible alternative paths of political development in, 164-72; radio in, 20, 21, 43; and socialism-in-one-country concept, 139-40; steel production of, 133 and ft.; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43; and United States, rivalry between, 146-47, 277, 282-84, 296; see also Communism; Marxism; Russia; Stalinism Space exploration, 61, 156, 159, 220, 246 and ft., 247, 248ft., 283, 287, 299 Spain, 55, 103ft., 133ft-, 173 Stalin, Joseph, 121, 125, 127-31 passim, 133-40 passim, 160, 174, i75ft-, 177, 187 Stalinism, 125, 137, 142, 143 and ft., 154, 167ft., 240; "necessity" of, 126-34 passim Stanovcic, V., 172ft. Steffens, Lincoln, 153ft. Stirner, Max, 97 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 286 Structuralism, 116 and ft. Student rebellion, 95-105 passim, 107, 110; Soviet attitude toward, 149; see also New Left Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 222, 223ft., 230ft., 231ft., 249 "Students and Revolution" (Labedz), 99ftStudies in a Dying Colonialism (Fanon), 45ft. Sutton, Antony C., 135ft. Sweden, 20, 21, 28ft., 50, 90, 157ftSwitzerland, 28n., 90 Systems analysis, 203ft. Taiwan, 36, 44 Technetronic communism, 170 Technetronic revolution, 10, 60, 107, 108, 278; contradictions in cumu-
Index lative effect of, 52; in Europe, Western, 294; impact of, on existing ideologies, 63$.; and New Left, 222; Third World as victim of, 35#Technetronic society, 9, 10, 11, 12, !3> 5 2 , 200, 20m., 209, 309 Technological adaptation, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165-66, 170, 174 Technological Man (Ferkiss), 237/1. Technological Society, The (Ellul), 17/1. Technology, social transformation wrought by, 203-204 Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, 73, 91, 118; quoted, 65, 73 Telephone dialing, global, 19 Telephones, in selected countries, 43 Television, 10, 13, 19, 117, 204, 269/1., 269-70, 292; American, violence on, 213/1.; closed-circuit, and education, 207; in selected countries, 20, 21, 43; in Third World, 40, 43; and world affairs, 22 Television satellites, 19 and n., 4on., 276 Test-Ban Treaty, 306 Thailand, 38, 286/1. Third American revolution, 198-221, 239, 255-56, 273 Third World, 6, 7/1., 39, 45, 50, 51 and n., 97, 120, 147, 163, 164, 180, 185, 189, 192, 196, 277, 281, 282, 290, 293, 304; anarchy in, growing, 52-53; and communism, 185, 186, 188, 190; education in, 41; elites of, 47-48; radio in, 40, 43; revolutionary intellectuals in, 48; social fragmentation in, 54; television in, 40, 43; United States influence on, 53-54; as victim of technetronic revolution, 35$.; weaponry of, in "underworld" wars, 57/1. Tinbergen, Jan, quoted, 5971.-60/1. Tito, Marshal, 165, 182 Todd, R., 263/1. Toward a Democratic Left (Harrington), 213/1. "Towards the Year 2000" (Piore), 30/1. Transplantation, of international communism, 177-78 Trapeznikov, V., 15771., 158
{
333
Trotsky, Leon, 130, 139 Truman, Harry S, 243, 307 Turkey, 38, 133™-, 290 Two-party system of government, 216-17 Ulbricht, Walter, 165, 170 Ultramicrofiche technique, 202 Unamuno, Miguel de, quoted, 84-85 UNESCO, 41, 276 United Arab Republic, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43 United Kingdom, 26, and n., 28/1., 3i> 55; computers in, 133/1.; crime rates in, 213/1.; newspapers in, 20, 21; nuclear energy used in, 157/1.; radio and television in, 20, 21; see also Great Britain United Nations, 5, 59/1., 275, 291/1., 297 United States, 7, 9, 44, 45, 50, 121; affluence of, 205; and arts, interest in, 207; budget of (industrial, health, social, and psychological), 221; and China, 289; city population of, 17/1., 42; civil-rights legislation in, 114, 207; and community of developed nations, 296, 304-305; crime rates in, 213/1.; as disseminator of technetronic revolution, 24-35 passim; education in, 26, 27, 43, 207-208, 266-69; elites of, 208/1., 215-16; employment in, changes in (1958-1967), 205; foreign aid by (1966), 62/1.; frontier industries in, 2771., 200, 210, 215; future of, 256-73 passim; as global society, first, 34, 53, 292, 307; government of, see • Federal government; and grid, world information, 32, 299; and gross national product, 37, 42, 155/1., 204; income distribution in ( 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 7 ) , 205; and international prospects, 274-93; labor force in, distribution of, 156; media used in, by audience groups, 21; newspapers in, 20, 21; Nobel Prizes won by, 28/1.; and novel relationships with world, 32-35; nuclear energy used in, 157/1.; poverty in, 205-206, 206/1.; radio in, 20, 21, 43; religious belief in, 90; and Soviet Union, rivalry between, 146-47, 277, 282-84, 296; surplus commodity
334 }
Index
United States (cont'd.) production of, 38; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43; third ' revolution in, 198-221, 239, 255256, 273; in transition, from industrial to technetronic age, 197$., 209^., 219; violence in, 212 and n., 213 and n., 257; as world's social laboratory, 196-98 United States and the World in the 198s Era, The, 4in., 268n. Universalism, 66, 69, 176, 192; ideological, 72-75 Universalization, as phase in evolution of communism, 178 University: politicized, 251-52, 252n.; in technetronic society, 12, 202 Uruguay, 90 Vatican II, 84, 85, 86 Venezuela, 45n., 192ft. Vietnam, 25, 98ft., 99, 100, 101, 178, 179ft., 189, 224, 233ft., 252ft. Violence, 6, 214ft.; in United States, 212 and ri., 213 and ft., 257 Violent Left, 249, 250, 257, 271 Von Laue, Theodore H., 7ft. Vonnegut, Kurt, 253ft. Voprosij Filosofii, 150 Wallace, George, 218, 244ft. Walls, Chaka, 231ft., 232ft. "War against the Young, The" (Poirier), 98ft. Warfare: new weaponry for, 57; nuclear, 7; secret, 57ft. Warsaw Pact, 5, 302 Ways, Max, quoted, 203ft. Weather modification, in warfare, 57 and n. Weiner, Myron, 48 Welfare society, 79-80 Werblan, A., 26ft.
West Germany, 26 and ft., 28ft., 31, 290, 291ft.; city population of, 42; computers in, 133ft.; education in, 26, 27, 43; gross national product of, per-capita, 42; newspapers in, 20, 21; nuclear energy used in, i57ft.; radio in, 20, 21, 43; religious belief in, 90; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Western Europe: and Japan, 293-97 passim, 298; and world information grid, 299 and ft. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development (Sutton), 135ft. White-collar workers, American, 205 Whole World Is Watching, The (Gerzon), 225 "Why Europe Lags Behind" (Richardson and Parks), 28ft. "Why Is Man Aggressive?" (Carstairs), 17ft. Wiener, Anthony J., 50ft. Wiener, Norbert, 10 Wolff, Robert, 235ft.; quoted, 231ft. Women, 270 Wood, David, yn. World Bank, 304 World Council of Churches, 86n. World of Nations, A (Rustow), 113ft. World War II, 33, 106, 141-42, 295 Year 2000, The (Kahn and Wiener), 50ft. Yevtushenko, Yevgeny, i6on. Yippies, 95, 103ft. Young, A., 26ft. Yugoslavia, 55, 85, 165, 173, 174, 178, 182 and n., 183 and ft., 189, 285ft., 297, 301 Zakharov, Valentin, 149ft. Zhukov, Yuri, loon., 151ft.
