Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era

BETWEEN TWO AGES

By the same author Political Controls in the Soviet Army (editor and contributor) The Permanent Purge—Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (with Carl J. Friedrich) The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics Africa and the Communist World (editor and contributor) Political Power: USA/USSR (with Samuel P. Huntington) Alternative to Partition: For a Broader Conception of America's Role in Europe Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics (editor and contributor)

BETWEEN TWO AGES America's Role in the Technetronic Era

Zbigniew Brzezinski THE

VIKING

PRESS

/

NEW

YORK

Copyright © 1970 by Zbigniew Brzezinski All rights reserved First published in 1970 by The Viking Press, Inc. 625 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022 Published simultaneously in Canada by The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited SBN 670-16041-5 Library of Congress catalog card number: 76-104162 Printed in U.SA. by H. Wolff Book Mfg. Co. Prepared under the auspices of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, Columbia University

Portions of this book appeared in Encounter in different form

For Ian, Mark, and Mika

Acknowledgments

Though this book deals with communism only in part—and then primarily in relation to the broader issues with which I am concerned—the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University provided m e with invaluable research assistance and with a congenial and stimulating setting. My colleagues at the Institute little realize h o w very helpful they have been in the gradual process of shaping my ideas, testing m y views, and enlarging m y perspectives. The manuscript was read and criticized by a number of friends and colleagues. I am especially grateful to Professor Samuel P. Huntington for his trenchant criticisms and very helpful recommendations; to Professor Albert A. Mavrinac, w h o maintained our friendly tradition of his questioning m y arguments and of forcing m e to rethink some of my propositions; to Mrs. Christine Dodson, the former Administrative Assistant of the Research Institute, w h o prepared a very constructive and highly perceptive chapter-length critique of the entire draft; and to Professor Alexander Erlich for steering m e away from some economic pitfalls. I am also most obliged and grateful to Miss Sophia Sluzar, currently the Administrative Assistant, w h o very ably supervised the over-all preparation of the manuscript and w h o earlier was instrumental in preparing the tables and assembling the needed data. Miss Toby Trister, m y research assistant, was indefatigable in exposing m y inaccuracies, in filling bibliographic gaps, and in completing the research. Miss Dorothy Rodnite, Miss Michelle Elwyn, and Mr. Myron Gutmann amiably and efficiently—even w h e n under great pressures of t i m e — d e v o t e d their energies to the completion of the manuscript. T o all of them I o w e a debt which I am pleased to acknowledge.

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Acknowledgments

I also wish to note my obligation to Mr. Marshall Best of The Viking Press, on whose experience and wise counsel I often relied, and to Mr. Stanley Hochman for his sensitive editorial assistance. A special mention is due to my wife. In all my writing I have never come across a more conscientious reader, a more ferocious critic, and a more determined—dare I say obstinate?—perfectionist. I have no hesitation in saying, though only now I say it with relief, that any merit this essay may have is in large measure due to her efforts. Z.B. October 1969

MMMM Contents Introduction Part I.

The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution

3

T h e Onset of t h e Technetronic Age

9

New Social Patterns • Social Explosion/Implosion • Global Absorption T h e Ambivalent Disseminator The American Impact • New Imperialism? Global Ghettos Prospects for Change • The Subjective Transformation • The Political Vacuum Global Fragmentation and Unification Fragmented Congestion • Toward a Planetary Consciousness Part II.

The Age of Volatile Belief

24 35

52

63

T h e Quest for a Universal Vision

65

The Universal Religions • The National Identity • Ideological Universalism T u r b u l e n c e within Institutionalized Beliefs

75

Institutional Marxism • Organized Christianity - Privatization of Belief Histrionics as History in Transition Escape from Reason • The Political • Historical Discontinuity

Dimension ix

x }

Contents Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology

m

The Quest for Equality • Syncretic Belief P a r t III.

C o m m u n i s m : T h e Problem of Relevance T h e Stalinist Paradox The Necessity of Stalinism • Imperial Pacification T h e Bureaucratization of Boredom The Innovative Relationship • Defensive Orthodoxy • Perspective on Tomorrow The Soviet Future Internal Dilemmas • Alternative Paths • The Problem of Vitality Sectarian Communism Phases • Assimilated Communisms • China and Global Revolution

P a r t IV.

T h e American Transition

125

138

154

176

195

T h e Third American Revolution

ig8

The Pace and Thrust of Progress • The Uncertainty of Progress • The Futility of Politics The New Left Reaction

222

Infantile Ideology • Revolutionaries in Search of Revolution • The Historic Function of the Militant Left T h e Crisis of Liberalism The Liberal Janus • The Price of Victorious Skepticism • The End of Liberal Democracy? P a r t V.

123

America a n d t h e W o r l d T h e American F u t u r e Participatory Pluralism • Change in Cultural Formation • Rational Humanism

236

255 256

Contents International Prospects The Revolutionary Process • USA/USSR • Policy Implications A C o m m u n i t y of the Developed Nations Western Europe and Japan • Structure and Focus • The Communist States • Ris&s and Advantages

{ xi 274

293

Notes

311

Index

3^5

Introduction Perhaps the time is past for the comprehensive "grand" vision. In some ways, it was a necessary substitute for ignorance, a compensation in breadth for the lack of depth in mans understanding of his world. But even if this is so, the result of more knowledge may be greater ignorance—or, at least, the feeling of ignorance—about where we are and where we are heading, and particularly where we should head, than was true when in fact we knew less but thought we knew more. I am not sure that this need be so. In any case, I am not satisfied with the fragmented, microscopic understanding of the parts, and I feel the need for some—even if crude—approximation of a larger perspective. This book is an effort to provide such a perspective. It is an attempt to define the meaning—within a dynamic framework—of a major aspect of our contemporary reality: the emerging global political process which increasingly blurs the traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics. In working toward that definition, I shall focus particularly on the meaning for the United States of the emergence of this process, seeking to draw implications from an examination of the forces that are molding it. Time and space shape our perception of reality. The specific moment and the particular setting dictate the way international estimates and priorities are defined. Sometimes, when the moment is historically "ripe," the setting and the time may coalesce to provide a special insight. A perceptive formula is easier to articulate in a moment of special stress. Conditions of war, crisis, tension are in that sense particularly fertile. The situation of crisis permits xiii

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Introduction

sharper value judgments, in keeping with man's ancient proclivity for dividing his reality into good and evil. (Marxist dialectic is clearly in this tradition, and it infuses moral dichotomy into every assessment.) But short of that critical condition—which in its most extreme form involves the alternatives of war or peace— global politics do not lend themselves to pat formulations and clear-cut predictions, even in a setting of extensive change. As a result—in most times—it is extraordinarily difficult to liberate oneself from the confining influence of the immediate and to perceive—from a detached perspective—the broader sweep of events. Any abstract attempt to arrive at a capsule formula is bound to contain a measure of distortion. The influences that condition relations among states and the broad evolution of international affairs are too various. Nonetheless, as long as we are aware that any such formulation inescapably contains a germ of falsehood— and hence must be tentative—the attempt represents an advance toward at least a partial understanding. The alternative is capitulation to complexity: the admission that no sense can be extracted from what is happening. The consequent triumph of ignorance exacts its own tribute in the form of unstable and reactive policies, the substitution of slogans for thought, the rigid adherence to generalized formulas made in another age and in response to circumstances that are different in essence from our own, even if superficially similar. Today, the most industrially advanced countries (in the first instance, the United States) are beginning to emerge from the industrial stage of their development. They are entering an age in which technology and especially electronics—hence my neologism "technetronic"*—are increasingly becoming the principal determinants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of society. And precisely because today change is so rapid and so complex, it is perhaps more important than ever before that our conduct of foreign affairs be guided by a sense of history—and to speak of history in this • To be more fully discussed in Part I.

Introduction

{

xv

is to speak simultaneously of the past and of the future. Since it focuses on international affairs, this book is at most only a very partial response to the need for a more comprehensive assessment. It is not an attempt to sum up the human condition, to c o m b i n e philosophy and science, to provide answers to more p e r p l e x i n g questions concerning our reality. It is much more m o d e s t than that, and yet I am uneasily aware that it is already much too ambitious, because it unavoidably touches on all these issues. The book is divided into five major parts. The first deals with the impact of the scientific-technological revolution on world affairs in general, discussing more specifically the ambiguous position of the principal disseminator of that revolution—the United States—and analyzing the effects of the revolution on the so-called Third World. The second part examines how the foregoing considerations have affected the content, style, and format of man's political outlook on his global reality, with particular reference to the changing role of ideology. The third part assesses the contemporary relevance of communism to problems of modernity, looking first at the experience of the Soviet Union and then examining the over-all condition of international communism as a movement that once sought to combine internationalism and humanism. The fourth part focuses on the United States, a society that is both a social pioneer and a guinea pig for mankind; it seeks to define the thrust of change and the historical meaning of the current American transition. The fifth part outlines in very broad terms the general directions that America might take in order to make an effective response to the previously discussed foreign and domestic dilemmas. Having said what the book does attempt, it might be helpful to the reader also to indicate what it does not attempt. First of all, it is not an exercise in "futurology"; it is an effort to make sense of present trends, to develop a dynamic perspective on what is happening. Secondly, it is not a policy book, in the sense that its object is not to develop systematically a coherent series of context

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Introduction

prescriptions and programs. In Part V, however, it does try to indicate the general directions toward which America should and, in some respects, may head. In the course of developing these theses, I have expanded on some of the ideas initially advanced in my article "America in the Technetronic Age," published in Encounter, January 1968, which gave rise to considerable controversy. I should add that not only have I tried to amplify and clarify some of the rather condensed points made in that article, but I have significantly revised some of my views in the light of constructive criticisms made by my colleagues. Moreover, that article addressed itself to only one aspect (discussed primarily in Part I) of the much larger canvas that I have tried to paint in this volume. It is my hope that this essay will help to provide the reader with a better grasp of the nature of the political world we live in, of the forces shaping it, of the directions it is pursuing. In that sense, it might perhaps contribute to a sharper perception of the new political processes enveloping our world and move beyond the more traditional forms of examining international politics. I hope, too, that the tentative propositions, the generalizations, and the theses advanced here—though necessarily speculative, arbitrary, and in very many respects inescapably inadequate—may contribute to the increasing discussion of America's role in the world. In the course of the work, I have expressed my own opinions and exposed my prejudices. This effort is, therefore, more in the nature of a "think piece," backed by evidence, than of a systematic exercise in social-science methodology.* * In this respect, I share the view of Barrington Moore, Jr., that "when we set the dominant body of current thinking against important figures in the nineteenth century, the following differences emerge. First of all, the critical spirit has all but disappeared. Second, modern sociology, and perhaps to a lesser extent also modern political science, economics, and psychology, are ahistorical. Third, modem social science tends to be abstract and formal. In research, social science today displays considerable technical virtuosity. But this virtuosity has been gained at the expense of content. Modem sociology has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago" (Political Power and Social Theory, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, p. 123).

Introduction

{ xvii

Finally, let me end this introduction with a confession that somewhat anticipates my argument: an apocalyptic-minded reader may find my thesis uncongenial because my view of Americas role in the world is still an optimistic one. I say "still" because I am greatly troubled by the dilemmas we face at home and abroad, and even more so by the social and philosophical implications of the direction of change in our time. Nonetheless, my optimism is real. Although I do not mean to minimize the gravity of America's problems—their catalogue is long, the dilemmas are acute, and the signs of a meaningful response are at most ambivalent—I truly believe that this society has the capacity, the talent, the wealth, and, increasingly, the will to surmount the difficulties inherent in this current historic transition.

BETWEEN TWO AGES "Human life is reduced to real suffering, to hell, only when two ages, two cultures and religions overlap. . . . There are times when a whole generation is caught in this way between two ages, two modes of life, with the consequence that it loses all power to understand itself and has no standard, no security, no simple acquiescence." — H E R M A N N HESSE,

Steppentvolf

PART I

The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution The paradox of our time is that humanity is becoming simultaneously more unified and more fragmented. That is the principal thrust of contemporary change. Time and space have become so compressed that global politics manifest a tendency toward larger, more interwoven forms of cooperation as well as toward the dissolution of established institutional and ideological loyalties. Humanity is becoming more integral and intimate even as the differences in the condition of the separate societies are widening. Under these circumstances proximity, instead of promoting u nity, gives rise to tensions prompted by a new sense of global congestion. A new pattern of international politics is emerging. The world is ceasing to be an arena in which relatively self-contained, "sovereign," and homogeneous nations interact, collaborate, clash, or make war. International politics, in the original sense of the term, were born when groups of people began to identify themselves— a nd others—in mutually exclusive terms (territory, language, 3

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{4

symbols, beliefs), and when that identification became in turn the dominant factor in relations between these groups. The concept of national interest—based on geographical factors, traditional animosities or friendships, economics, and security considerations—implied a degree of autonomy and specificity that was possible only so long as nations were sufficiently separated in time and space to have both the room to maneuver and the distance needed to maintain separate identity. During the classical era of international politics, weapons, communications, economics, and ideology were all essentially national in scope. With the invention of modern artillery, weaponry required national arsenals and standing armies; in more recent times it could be effectively and rapidly deployed by one nation against the frontiers of another. Communications, especially since the invention of the steam engine and the resulting age of railroads, reinforced national integration by making it possible to move people and goods across most nations in a period of time rarely exceeding two days. National economies, frequently resting on autarkic principles, stimulated both the awareness and the development of collective vested interest, protected by tariff walls. Nationalism so personalized community feelings that the nation became an extension of the ego.* All four factors mentioned above are now becoming global. Weapons of total destructive power can be applied at any point on the globe in a matter of minutes—in less time, in fact, than it takes for the police in a major city to respond to an emergency call. The entire globe is in closer reach and touch than a middlesized European power was to its own capital fifty years ago. Transnational ties are gaining in importance, while the claims of nationalism, though still intense, are nonetheless becoming diluted. This change, naturally, has gone furthest in the most ad* This was a major change from the earlier feudal age. At that time weapons were largely personal, communications were very limited and primarily oral, the economy was primitive and rural, and ideology stressed direct, religionbased obeisance to a personally known chief. These conditions thus reinforced and reflected a more fragmented "intranational" political process.

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution

.{ 5

countries, but no country is now immune to it. The conseis a new era—an era of the global political process. Yet though the process is global, real unity of mankind remains remote. The contemporary world is undergoing a change in many respects similar to that prompted by the earlier appearance of large population centers. The growth of such centers weakened intimate and direct lines of authority and contributed to the appearance of many conflicting and crosscutting allegiances. A typical city dweller identifies himself simultaneously with a variety of groups—occupational, religious, leisure, political— and only rarely operates in an environment that is exclusively dominated by a single system of values and a unilinear personal commitment. American metropolitan politics are typically messy: special-interest and pressure groups, ethnic communities, political organizations, religious institutions, major industrial or financial forces, and even the criminal underworld interact in a pattern that simultaneously includes continuous limited warfare and accommodation. Global polities are acquiring some analogous characteristics. Nations of different sizes and developmentally in different historical epochs interact, creating friction, variable patterns of accommodation, and changing alignments. While the formal rules of the game maintain the illusion that it is played only by those players called "states"—and, when war breaks out, the states become the only significant players—short of war the game is truly played on a much more informal basis, with much more mixed participation. Some states possess overwhelming power; others, the "mini-states," are overshadowed by multimillion-dollar international corporations, major banks and financial interests, transnational organizations of religious or ideological character, and the emerging international institutions that in some cases represent" the interests of the minor players (for example, the ^ N ) or in other cases mask the power of the major ones (for example, the Warsaw Pact or SEATO). The methods for coping with international conflicts are hence vanced

quence

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{6

becoming similar to those for dealing with urban discord. A characteristic feature of concentrated humanity is the routinization of conflict. Direct violence becomes increasingly regulated and restricted, and ultimately comes to be considered as a deviation from the norm. Organized mechanisms, in the form of uniformed, salaried personnel, are established to confine violence to socially tolerable limits. A certain measure of crime is accepted as unavoidable; for the sake of order, therefore, organized crime is generally preferred to anarchic violence, thus indirectly and informally becoming an extension of order. The routinization of conflict on a global scale has been the goal of statesmen for many decades. Agreements, conventions, and pacts have sought to govern it. None of these could prove effective in a system of relatively distinctive and sovereign units; but the appearance of rapid communications, which created not only physical proximity but also instant awareness of distant events, and the onset of the nuclear age, which for the first time made truly destructive global power available to at least two states, fundamentally altered the pattern of international conflict. On the one hand these factors depressed its level, and on the other they heightened its potential and increased its scope. Urban underworld wars do not give rise to much moral revulsion nor are they seen as major threats to social peace. Only outbreaks of violence directed at that peace, as represented by human life and major vested interests—banks, shops, or private property, for example—are resolutely combated. Similarly, in the more advanced portions of the world there is a tendency among the establishment and the middle class of the "global city" to be indifferent to Third World conflicts and to view them as necessary attributes of a low level of development—provided, of course, that such conflicts do not feed back into the relations among the more powerful states. Wars in the Third World thus seem tolerable as long as their international scale is contained at a level that does not seem to threaten major interests.* * . . during the post-1945 years, the development of nuclear weapons, the formation of power blocs and multilateral alliance systems, and the in-

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In our time the routinization of conflict has also meant a shift from sustained warfare to sporadic outbreaks of violence. Sustained, prolonged warfare was made possible by the industrial age. In earlier times armies confronted each other, fought pitched, head-on battles, and, like gladiators of old, scored decisive victories or went down in defeat. The industrial age permitted societies to mobilize their manpower and resources for prolonged but indecisive struggles resembling classical wrestling and requiring both skill and endurance. Nuclear weapons—never used in conflict between nuclear powers—pose the possibility of such mutual annihilation that they tend to freeze their possessors into passive restraint, with sporadic outbreaks of violence occurring on the peripheries of the confrontation. Though, in the past, violence tended to result in the use of maximum available power, today those states possessing maximum power strive to employ a minimum in the assertion of their interests. Since the appearance of nuclear weapons, relations between the superpowers have been governed by a rudimentary code of restraint forged by trial and error in the course of confrontations ranging from Korea through Berlin to Cuba. It is likely that in the absence of these weapons war would long since have broken out between the United States and the Soviet Union. Their destructive power has thus had a basic effect on the degree to which force is applied in the relations among states, compelling an unprecedented degree of prudence in the behavior of the most creasing financial cost of modem warfare, have all been factors inhibiting the outbreak of formal warfare between the advanced, industrial nations. The majority of 'conflicts' during these years have taken place in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the so-called Third World. And a large number of them have followed on or been associated with the break-up of colonial empires, whether Ottoman, British, French or lapanese, and the subsequent emergence of new states which are often small, poor and insecure" (David Wood, "Conflict in the Twentieth Century," Adelphi Papers, June 1968, P- 19) • The above study contains a list of eighty conflicts that have occurred in the years 1945-1967. All but eight of these conflicts involved Third World participants on both sides. The analogy with metropolitan politics is also made by Theodore H. Von Laue in his thoughtful book The Global City (New York, 1969). Von Laue }s particularly stimulating in his analysis of the impact of the Western metropolitan" system on world politics during the last century.

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{27

powerful states. Within the fragile framework in which the contemporary transformation of our reality occurs, nuclear weapons have thus created an entirely novel system of deterrence from the reliance on overwhelming power. In the case of urban politics, the weakness of accepted and respected immediate authority is compensated for by the sense of higher allegiance to the nation, as represented by the institutional expression of state power. The global city lacks that higher dimension—and much of the contemporary search for order is an attempt to create it, or to find some equilibrium short of it. Otherwise, however, global politics are similarly characterized by the confusing pattern of involvement, congestion, and interaction, which cumulatively, though gradually, undermines the exclusiveness and the primacy of those hitherto relatively watertight compartments, the nation-states. In the process, international politics gradually become a much more intimate and overlapping process. Eras are historical abstractions. They are also an intellectual convenience: they are meant to be milestones on a road that over a period of time changes imperceptibly and yet quite profoundly. It is a matter of arbitrary judgment when one era ends and a new one begins; neither the end nor the beginning can be clearly and sharply defined. On the formal plane, politics as a global process operate much as they did in the past, but the inner reality of that process is increasingly shaped by forces whose influence or scope transcend national lines.

The Onset of the Technetronic Age

{1 9

/mMM 1. The Onset of the Technetronic Age The impact of science and technology on man and his so-' ciety, especially in the more advanced countries of the world, is becoming the major source of contemporary change. Recent years have seen a proliferation of exciting and challenging literature on the future. In the United States, in Western Europe, and, to a lesser degree, in Japan and in the Soviet Union, a number of systematic, scholarly efforts have been made to project, predict, and grasp what the future holds for us. The transformation that is now taking place, especially in America, is already creating a society increasingly unlike its industrial predecessor. 1 The post-industrial society is becoming a "technetronic" society: 0 a society that is shaped culturally, psychologically, socially, and economically by the impact of technology and electronics—particularly in the area of computers and communications. The industrial process is no longer the principal determinant of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, and the values of society. In the industrial society technical knowledge was applied primarily to one specific end: the acceleration and improvement of production techniques. Social consequences were a later by-product of this paramount concern. In the technetronic society scientific and technical knowledge, in addi* The term "post-industrial" is used by Daniel Bell, who has done much of the pioneering thinking on the subject. However, I prefer to use the neologism "technetronic," because it conveys more directly the character of the principal impulses for change in our time. Similarly, the term "industrial" described what otherwise could have been called the "post-agricultural" age.

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tion to enhancing production capabilities, quickly spills over to affect almost all aspects of life directly. Accordingly, both the growing capacity for the instant calculation of the most complex interactions and the increasing availability of biochemical means of human control augment the potential scope of consciously chosen direction, and thereby also the pressures to direct, to choose, and to change. Reliance on these new techniques of calculation and communication enhances the social importance of human intelligence and the immediate relevance of learning. The need to integrate social change is heightened by the increased ability to decipher the patterns of change; this in turn increases the significance of basic assumptions concerning the nature of man and the desirability of one or another form of social organization. Science thereby intensifies rather than diminishes the relevance of values, but it demands that they be cast in terms that go beyond the more crude ideologies of the industrial age. (This theme is developed further in Part II.)

New Social Patterns For Norbert Wiener, "the locus of an earlier industrial revolution before the main industrial revolution" is to be found in the fifteenth-century research pertaining to navigation (the nautical compass), as well as in the development of gunpowder and printing.2 Today the functional equivalent of navigation is the thrust into space, which requires a rapid computing capacity beyond the means of the human brain; the equivalent of gunpowder is modern nuclear physics, and that of printing is television and longrange instant communications. The consequence of this new technetronic revolution is the progressive emergence of a society that increasingly differs from the industrial one in a variety of economic, political, and social aspects. The following examples may be briefly cited to summarize some of the contrasts: (1) In an industrial society the mode of production shifts from

The Onset of the Technetronic Age

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agriculture to industry, with the use of human and animal muscle supplanted by machine operation. In the technetronic society industrial employment yields to services, with automation and cybernetics replacing the operation of machines by individuals. (2) Problems of employment and unemployment—to say nothing of the prior urbanization of the post-rural labor force—dominate the relationship between employers, labor, and the market in the industrial society, and the assurance of minimum welfare to the new industrial masses is a source of major concern. In the emerging new society questions relating to the obsolescence of skills, security, vacations, leisure, and profit sharing dominate the relationship, and the psychic well-being of millions of relatively secure but potentially aimless lower-middle-class blue-collar workers becomes a growing problem. (3) Breaking down traditional barriers to education, and thus creating the basic point of departure for social advancement, is a major goal of social reformers in the industrial society. Education, available for limited and specific periods of time, is initially concerned with overcoming illiteracy and subsequently with technical training, based largely on written, sequential reasoning. In the technetronic society not only is education universal but advanced training is available to almost all who have the basic talents, and there is far greater emphasis on quality selection. The essential problem is to discover the most effective techniques for the rational exploitation of social talent. The latest communication and calculating techniques are employed in this task. The educational process becomes a lengthier one and is increasingly reliant on audio-visual aids. In addition, the flow of new knowledge necessitates more and more frequent refresher studies. (4) In the industrial society social leadership shifts from the traditional rural-aristocratic to an urban-plutocratic elite. Newly acquired wealth is its foundation, and intense competition the outlet—as well as the stimulus—for its energy. In the technetronic society plutocratic pre-eminence is challenged by the political leadership, which is itself increasingly permeated by individuals

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possessing special skills and intellectual talents. Knowledge becomes a tool of power and the effective mobilization of talent an important way to acquire power. (5) The university in an industrial society—in contrast to the situation in medieval times—is an aloof ivory tower, the repository of irrelevant, even if respected, wisdom, and for a brief time the fountainhead for budding members of the established social elite. In the technetronic society the university becomes an intensely involved "think tank," the source of much sustained political planning and social innovation. (6) The turmoil inherent in the shift from a rigidly traditional rural society to an urban one engenders an inclination to seek total answers to social dilemmas, thus causing ideologies to thrive in the industrializing society. (The American exception to this rule was due to the absence of a feudal tradition, a point well developed by Louis Hartz.) In the industrial age literacy makes for static interrelated conceptual thinking, congenial to ideological systems. In the technetronic society audio-visual communications prompt more changeable, disparate views of reality, not compressible into formal systems, even as the requirements of science and the new computative techniques place a premium on mathematical logic and systematic reasoning. The resulting tension is felt most acutely by scientists, with the consequence that some seek to confine reason to science while expressing their emotions through politics. Moreover, the increasing ability to reduce social conflicts to quantifiable and measurable dimensions reinforces the trend toward a more pragmatic approach to social problems, while it simultaneously stimulates new concerns with preserving "humane" values. (7) In the industrial society, as the hitherto passive masses become active there are intense political conflicts over such matters as disenfranchisement and the right to vote. The issue of political participation is a crucial one. In the technetronic age the question is increasingly one of ensuring real participation in decisions that seem too complex and too far removed from the aver-

The Onset of the Technetronic Age

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age citizen. Political alienation becomes a problem. Similarly, the issue of political equality of the sexes gives way to a struggle for the sexual equality of women. In the industrial society woman the operator of machines—ceases to be physically inferior to the male, a consideration of some importance in rural life, and begins to demand her political rights. In the emerging technetronic society automation threatens both males and females, intellectual talent is computable, the "pill" encourages sexual equality, and women begin to claim complete equality. (8) The newly enfranchised masses are organized in the industrial society by trade unions and political parties and unified by relatively simple and somewhat ideological programs. Moreover, political attitudes are influenced by appeals to nationalist sentiments, communicated through the massive increase of newspapers employing, naturally, the readers' national language. In the technetronic society the trend seems to be toward aggregating the individual support of millions of unorganized citizens, who are easily within the reach of magnetic and attractive personalities, and effectively exploiting the latest communication techniques to manipulate emotions and control reason. Reliance on television—and hence the tendency to replace language with imagery, which is international rather than national, and to include war coverage or scenes of hunger in places as distant as, for example, India—creates a somewhat more cosmopolitan, though highly impressionistic, involvement in global affairs. (9) Economic power in the early phase of industrialization tends to be personalized, by either great entrepreneurs like Henry Ford or bureaucratic industrial officials like Kaganovich, or Mine (in Stalinist Poland). The tendency toward depersonalization of economic power is stimulated in the next stage by the appearance of a highly complex interdependence between governmental institutions (including the military), scientific establishments, and industrial organizations. As economic power becomes inseparably linked with political power, it becomes more invisible and the sense of individual futility increases.

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(10) In an industrial society the acquisition of goods and the accumulation of personal wealth become forms of social attainment for an unprecedentedly large number of people. In the technetronic society the adaptation of science to humane ends and a growing concern with the quality of life become both possible and increasingly a moral imperative for a large number of citizens, especially the young. Eventually, these changes and many others, including some that more directly affect the personality and quality of the human being himself, will make the technetronic society as different from the industrial as the industrial was from the agrarian.* And just as the shift from an agrarian economy and feudal politics toward an industrial society and political systems based on the individual's emotional identification with the nation-state gave rise to contemporary international politics, so the appearance of the technetronic society reflects the onset of a new relationship between man and his expanded global reality.

Social

Explosion/Implosion

This new relationship is a tense one: man has still to define it conceptually and thereby render it comprehensible to himself. Our expanded global reality is simultaneously fragmenting and thrusting itself in upon us. The result of the coincident explosion and implosion is not only insecurity and tension but also an entirely novel perception of what many still call international affairs. Life seems to lack cohesion as environment rapidly alters and human beings become increasingly manipulable and malleable. Everything seems more transitory and temporary: external reality 0 Bell defines the "five dimensions of the post-industrial society" as involving the following: ( l ) The creation of a service economy. ( 2 ) The pre-eminence of the professional and technical class. ( 3 ) The centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and policy formulation in the society. ( 4 ) The possibility of self-sustaining technological growth. ( 5 ) The creation of a new "intellectual technology.' (Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Indicators of Social Change, Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore, eds., New York, 1968, pp. 152-53-)

The Onset of the Technetronic Age

{ 1 15

more fluid than solid, the human being more synthetic than authentic. Even our senses perceive an entirely novel "reality"—one of our own making but nevertheless, in terms of our sensations, quite "real." * More important, there is already widespread concern about the possibility of biological and chemical tampering with what has until now been considered the immutable essence of man. Human conduct, some argue, can be predetermined and subjected to deliberate control. Man is increasingly acquiring the capacity to determine the sex of his children, to affect through drugs the extent of their intelligence, and to modify and control their personalities. Speaking of a future at most only decades away, an experimenter in intelligence control asserted, "I foresee the time when we shall have the means and therefore, inevitably, the temptation to manipulate the behavior and intellectual functioning of all the people through environmental and biochemical manipulation of the brain." 3 Thus it is an open question whether technology and science will in fact increase the options open to the individual. Under the headline "Study Terms Technology a Boon to Individualism," 4 The New York Times reported the preliminary conclusions of a Harvard project on the social significance of science. Its participants were quoted as concluding that "most Americans have a greater range of personal choice, wider experience and a more highly developed sense of self-worth than ever before." This may be so, but a judgment of this sort rests essentially on an intuitive —and comparative—insight into the present and past states of mind of Americans. In this connection a word of warning from an acute observer is highly relevant: "It behooves us to examine carefully the degree of validity, as measured by actual behavior, of the statement that a benefit of technology will be to increase the number of options and alternatives the individual can choose 0

Charles R. DeCarlo, in "Computer Technology" (Toward the Year 2018, New York, 1968, p. 102), describes the use of "holography" to create the sensation of living presence—as well as the actuality of conversations—by long-range laser beams from a satellite.

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{35

from. In principle, it could; in fact, the individual may use any number of psychological devices to avoid the discomfort of information overload, and thereby keep the range of alternatives to which he responds much narrower than that which technology in principle makes available to him." 5 In other words, the real questions are how the individual will exploit the options, to what extent he will be intellectually and psychologically prepared to exploit them, and in what way society as a whole will create a favorable setting for taking advantage of these options. Their availability is not of itself proof of a greater sense of freedom or selfworth. Instead of accepting himself as a spontaneous given, man in the most advanced societies may become more concerned with conscious self-analysis according to external, explicit criteria: What is my IQ? What are my aptitudes, personality traits, capabilities, attractions, and negative features? The "internal man"— spontaneously accepting his own spontaneity—will more and more be challenged by the "external man"—consciously seeking his selfconscious image; and the transition from one to the other may not be easy. It will also give rise to difficult problems in determining the legitimate scope of social control. The possibility of extensive chemical mind control, the danger of loss of individuality inherent in extensive transplantation, the feasibility of manipulating the genetic structure will call for the social definition of common criteria of use and restraint. As the previously cited writer put it, ". . . while the chemical affects the individual, the person is significant to himself and to society in his social context —at work, at home, at play. The consequences are social consequences. In deciding how to deal with such alterers of the ego and of experience (and consequently alterers of the personality after the experience), and in deciding how to deal with the 'changed' human beings, we will have to face new questions such as 'Who am I?' 'When am I who?' 'Who are they in relation to me?'" 6 Moreover, man will increasingly be living in man-made and rapidly man-altered environments. By the end of this century

The Onset of the Technetronic Age

{ 17

approximately two-thirds of the people in the advanced countries will live in cities.0 Urban growth has so far been primarily the by-product of accidental economic convenience, of the magnetic attraction of population centers, and of the flight of many from rural poverty and exploitation. It has not been deliberately designed to improve the quality of life. The impact of "accidental" cities is already contributing to the depersonalization of individual life as the kinship structure contracts and enduring relations of friendship become more difficult to maintain. Julian Huxley was perhaps guilty of only slight exaggeration when he warned that "overcrowding in animals leads to distorted neurotic and downright pathological behavior. We can be sure that the same is true in principle of people. City life today is definitely leading to mass mental disease, to growing vandalism and possible eruptions of mass violence." f 7 The problem of identity is likely to be complicated by a generation gap, intensified by the dissolution of traditional ties and values derived from extended family and enduring community relationships. The dialogue between the generations is becoming a dialogue of the deaf. It no longer operates within the conservativeliberal or nationalist-internationalist framework. The breakdown in communication between the generations—so vividly evident during the student revolts of 1968—was rooted in the irrelevance of the old symbols to many younger people. Debate implies the acceptance of a common frame of reference and language; since these were lacking, debate became increasingly impossible. Though currently the clash is over values—with many of the * In 1900 there were 10 cities with populations of one million or more; in !955 the number had grown to 61; in 1965 there were over 100 cities with populations of one million or more. Today in Australia and Oceania threequarters of the people live in cities; in America and Europe (the USSR included) one-half do; in Africa and Asia one-fifth live in cities. T G. N. Carstairs, in ''Why Is Man Aggressive?" (Impact of Science on Soctety, April-June 1968, p. 90), argues that population growth, crowding, and social oppression all contribute to irrational and intensified aggression. Experiments on rats seem to bear this out; observation of human behavior in large cities seems to warrant a similar conclusion. For a cri du cceur against mis congested condition from a French sociologist, see Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, New York, 1965, p. 321.

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{37

young rejecting those of their elders, who in turn contend that the young have evaded the responsibility of articulating theirs— in the future the clash between generations will be also over expertise. Within a few years the rebels in the more advanced countries who today have the most visibility will be joined by a new generation making its claim to power in government and business: a generation trained to reason logically; as accustomed to exploiting electronic aids to human reasoning as we have been to using machines to increase our own mobility; expressing itself in a language that functionally relates to these aids; accepting as routine managerial processes current innovations such as planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS) and the appearance in high business echelons of "top computer executives." 8 As the older elite defends what it considers not only its own vested interests but more basically its own way of life, the resulting clash could generate even more intense conceptual issues.

Global

Absorption

But while our immediate reality is being fragmented, global reality increasingly absorbs the individual, involves him, and even occasionally overwhelms him. Communications are the obvious, already much discussed, immediate cause. The changes wrought by communications and computers make for an extraordinarily interwoven society whose members are in continuous and close audio-visual contact—constantly interacting, instantly sharing the most intense social experiences, and prompted to increased personal involvement in even the most distant problems. The new generation no longer defines the world exclusively on the basis of reading, either of ideologically structured analyses or of extensive descriptions; it also experiences and senses it vicariously through audio-visual communications. This form of communicating reality is growing more rapidly—especially in the advanced countries 0 • For example, Hermann Meyn, in his Massen-medien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin, 1966), provides data showing cumulatively that an

The Onset of the Technetronic Age

{

1

9

—than the traditional written medium, and it provides the principal source of news for the masses (see Tables 1-3). "By 1985 distance will be no excuse for delayed information from any part of the world to the powerful urban nerve centers that will mark the major concentrations of the people on earth/' 9 Global telephone dialing that in the more advanced states will include instant visual contact and a global television-satellite system that will enable some states to "invade" private homes in other countries* will create unprecedented global intimacy. The new reality, however, will not be that of a "global village/' McLuhans striking analogy overlooks the personal stability, interpersonal intimacy, implicitly shared values, and traditions that were important ingredients of the primitive village. A more appropriate analogy is that of the "global city"—a nervous, agitated, tense, and fragmented web of interdependent relations. That interdependence, however, is better characterized by interaction than by intimacy. Instant communications are already creating something akin to a global nervous system. Occasional malfunctions of this nervous system—because of blackouts or breakdowns —will be all the more unsettling, precisely because the mutual confidence and reciprocally reinforcing stability that are characteristic of village intimacy will be absent from the process of that "nervous" interaction. Man's intensified involvement in global affairs is reflected in, and doubtless shaped by, the changing character of what has until now been considered local news. Television has joined newspapers in expanding the immediate horizons of the viewer or reader to the point where "local" increasingly means "national," and global affairs compete for attention on an unprecedented scale. Physical and moral immunity to "foreign" events cannot be average West German over the age of fifteen read each day for fifteen minutes, listened to the radio for one and one-half hours, and watched television for one hour and ten minutes. It is estimated that within a decade television satellites will carry sufficient power to transmit programs directly to receivers, without the intermediary of receiving-transmitting stations.

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{20

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The Onset of the Technetronic Age

TABLE 2 . ABSOLUTE INCREASE PER 1 0 0 0 POPULATION IN RADIO, TELEVISION, AND NEWSPAPER CIRCULATION, 1 9 6 0 - 1 9 6 6

United States Canada Sweden United Kingdom West Germany Czechoslovakia France USSR Argentina Japan Brazil Algeria India

Radios +393 + 150 + 10

TV

Newspapers - 1 4 — 10

+66 +67 + 121

+ 11 + 172 + 10 +80 + 124

+43

+ 11 - 2 6

+ 130 + 109 + 110

+25 +52 -4

+59

+ 141

+61

+ 102 - 2 7

+ 118

+ 119 +12

+69 —21

+25 +75 + 8

+ 8

+2

—

TABLE 3. APPROXIMATE U S E OF MEDIA FOR EACH OF THE FOUR AUDIENCE GROUPS

Per cent of U.S. population that:

Mass Majority

Peripheral Mass

College Graduates

(50-60%)

(20-40%)

(10-25%)

Read any nonfiction books in the last year 15 Read one issue a month of Harpers, National Re% 2 view, etc. Read one issue a month of Time, Newsweek, or 10 U.S. News 5 Read one issue a month of 50 25 Look, Life, or Post 80 70 Read a daily newspaper X X Read the New York Times Read national or interna10 20 tional news first in paper Want more foreign news in 10 20 paper 60 70 Listen to radio daily 60 50 Hear radio news daily 80 75 Use television daily 45 45 Watch TV news 60 35 Favor TV as news medium 5 15 Favor news as TV show Source: Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, p. 47. These most part derived from data in John Robinson, Public World Affairs, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1967.

Elites (less than 1%)

30

50

10

25

45

70

65 90 5

30 95 50

30

50

30 85 65 65 45

50

20

30

? ? ? ? ?

50 figures are for the Information about

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{22

very effectively maintained under circumstances in which there are both a growing intellectual awareness of global interdependence and the electronic intrusion of global events into the home. This condition also makes for a novel perception of foreign affairs. Even in the recent past one learned about international politics through the study of history and geography, as well as by reading newspapers. This contributed to a highly structured, even rigid, approach, in which it was convenient to categorize events or nations in somewhat ideological terms. Today, however, foreign affairs intrude upon a child or adolescent in the advanced countries in the form of disparate, sporadic, isolated—but involving—events: catastrophes and acts of violence both abroad and at home become intermeshed, and though they may elicit either positive or negative reactions, these are no longer in the neatly compartmentalized categories of "we" and "they." Television in particular contributes to a "blurred," much more impressionistic —and also involved—attitude toward world affairs.10 Anyone who teaches international politics senses a great change in the attitude of the young along these lines. Such direct global intrusion and interaction, however, does not make for better "understanding" of our contemporary affairs. On the contrary, it can be argued that in some respects "understanding"—in the sense of possessing the subjective confidence that one can evaluate events on the basis of some organized principle —is today much more difficult for most people to attain. Instant but vicarious participation in events evokes uncertainty, especially as it becomes more and more apparent that established analytical categories no longer adequately encompass the new circumstances.* The science explosion—the most rapidly expanding aspect of ° To provide one simple example, for about twenty years anticommunism provided the grand organizational principle for many Americans. How then fit into that setting events such as the confrontation between Moscow and Peking, and, once one had become accustomed to think of Moscow as more "liberal," between Moscow and Prague?

The Onset of the Technetronic Age

{ 1 23

our entire reality, growing more rapidly than population, industry, and cities—intensifies, rather than reduces, these feelings of insecurity. It is simply impossible for the average citizen and even for men of intellect to assimilate and meaningfully organize the flow of knowledge for themselves. In every scientific field complaints are mounting that the torrential outpouring of published reports, scientific papers, and scholarly articles and the proliferation of professional journals make it impossible for individuals to avoid becoming either narrow-gauged specialists or superficial generalists.* The sharing of new common perspectives thus becomes more difficult as knowledge expands; in addition, traditional perspectives such as those provided by primitive myths or, more recently, by certain historically conditioned ideologies can no longer be sustained. The threat of intellectual fragmentation, posed by the gap between the pace in the expansion of knowledge and the rate of its assimilation, raises a perplexing question concerning the prospects for mankind's intellectual unity. It has generally been assumed that the modern world, shaped increasingly by the industrial and urban revolutions, will become more homogeneous in its outlook. This may be so, but it could be the homogeneity of insecurity, of uncertainty, and of intellectual anarchy. The result, therefore, would not necessarily be a more stable environment. 0 It is estimated, for example, that NASA employs some fifteen thousand special technical terms—all of which are compiled in its own thesaurus (CTN Bulletin [Centres d'etudes des consequences generales des grandes techniques nouvelles, Paris], June 1968, p. 6). It is also estimated that "the number of books published has about doubled every twenty years since 1450, and some 30 million have by now been published; the projected figure is 60 million by 1980" (Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, New York, !966, p. 12) and that "science alone sees the publishing of 100,000 journals a year, in more than 60 languages, a figure doubling every 15 years" (Glenn T. Seaborg, "Uneasy World Gains Power over Destiny," The New York Times, January 6, 1969).

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{24

2. The Ambivalent Disseminator

The United States is the principal global disseminator of the technetronic revolution. It is American society that is currently having the greatest impact on all other societies, prompting a far-reaching cumulative transformation in their outlook and mores. At various stages in history different societies have served as a catalyst for change by stimulating imitation and adaptation in others. What in the remote past Athens and Rome were to the Mediterranean world, or China to much of Asia, France has more recently been to Europe. French letters, arts, and political ideas exercised a magnetic attraction, and the French Revolution was perhaps the single most powerful stimulant to the rise of populist nationalism during the nineteenth century. In spite of its domestic tensions—indeed, in some respects because of them (see Part IV)—the United States is the innovative and creative society of today. It is also a major disruptive influence on the world scene. In fact communism, which many Americans see as the principal cause of unrest, primarily capitalizes on frustrations and aspirations, whose major source is the American impact on the rest of the world. The United States is the focus of global attention, emulation, envy, admiration, and animosity. No other society evokes feelings of such intensity; no other society's internal affairs—including America's racial and urban violence—are scrutinized with such attention; no other society's politics are followed with such avid interest—so much so that to many foreign nationals United States domestic politics have be-

The Ambivalent

Disseminator

{ 25

come an essential extension of their own; no other society so massively disseminates its own way of life and its values by means of movies, television, multimillion-copy foreign editions of its national magazines, or simply by its products; no other society is the object of such contradictory assessments.

The American Impact Initially, the impact of America on the world was largely idealistic: America was associated with freedom. Later the influence became more materialistic: America was seen as the land of opportunity, crassly defined in terms of dollars. Today similar material advantages can be sought elsewhere at lower personal risk, and the assassinations of the Kennedys and of Martin Luther King, as well as racial and social tensions, not to speak of Vietnam, have somewhat tarnished America's identification with freedom. Instead, Americas influence is in the first instance scientific and technological, and it is a function of the scientific, technological, and educational lead of the United States.* Scientific and technological development is a dynamic process. It depends in the first instance on the resources committed to it, the personnel available for it, the educational base that supports it, and—last but not least—the freedom of scientific innovation. In all four respects the American position is advantageous; contemporary America spends more on science and devotes greater resources to research than any other society.! * As a sweeping generalization, it can be said that Rome exported law; England, parliamentary party democracy; France, culture and republican nationalism; the contemporary United States, technological-scientific innovation and mass culture derived from high consumption. t According to a 1968 congressional report, "Current spending on research and development in the United States amounts to some $24 billion annually —about two-thirds financed by the Federal Government—in contrast to a mere $6 billion in all of Western Europe/* The Soviet figure has been estimated to be in the vicinity of 8 billion rubles, but, American costs being higher, one ruble buys approximately $3 of research. In 1962, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ( O E C D ) , the United States was spending $93.70 per capita on research and development;

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{26

In addition, the American people enjoy access to education on a scale greater than that of most other advanced societies. (See Tables 4 and 5.) At the beginning of the 1960s the United States had more than 66 per cent of its 15-19 age group enrolled in educational institutions; comparable figures for France and West Germany were about 31 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. The combined populations of France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom are equal to that of the United States—roughly two hundred million. But in the United States 43 per cent of collegeage people are actually enrolled, whereas only 7 to 15 per cent are enrolled in the four countries (Italy having the low figure and France the high). The Soviet percentage was approximately half that of the American. In actual numbers there are close to seven million college students in the United States and only about one and a half million in the four European countries. At the more advanced level of the 20-24 age bracket, the American figure was 12 per cent while that for West Germany, the top Western European country, was about 5 per cent. For the 5-19 age bracket, the American and the Western European levels were roughly even (about 80 per cent), and the Soviet Union trailed with 57 per cent. 11 Britain $33.50; France $23.60; and Germany $20.10. As a percentage of gross national product, the United States' expenditure on research and development amounted to 3.1; Britain's to 2.2; France's to 1.5; Poland's to 1.6; Germany's to 1.3; and the Soviet Union's to 2.2. The number of scientists, engineers, and technicians engaged in research and development totaled 1,159,500 in the United States; 211,100 in Britain; 111,200 in France; 142,200 in Germany; 53,800 in Belgium and Holland; and somewhere over 1,000,000 in the Soviet Union (C. Freeman and A. Young, The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union, OECD, 1965, pp. 71-72, 124. Source for Poland: a speech by A. Werblan, published by Polish Press Agency, October 15, 1968. The Poles expect to reach 2.5 per cent only by 1975. For a higher estimate of Soviet scientific manpower, see Scientific Policy in the USSR, a special report by the OECD, 1969, especially pp. 642-47). On a global scale, the United States accounts for roughly one-third of the world's total supply of scientific manpower ("The Scientific Brain Drain from the Developing Countries to the United States," Twenty-third Report by the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 1968, p. 3; hereafter cited as Report . . .).

The Ambivalent

Disseminator

TABLE 4 . ACCESS TO HIGHER-LEVEL EDUCATION PER OF TOTAL POPULATION ( 1 9 5 0 , 1 9 6 5 )

{ 25

100,000

Absolute Increase United States West Germany France Japan USSR Poland India Indonesia Brazil Algeria

1950

1965

1,508 256

2,840 632 1,042 1,140

+ i,332 +376

1,674 800

+981 +327 + 171 +87

334 471 693 473 113

(1963)

284

8

(1963)

95 189 68

1950-1965

+708 +669

+9i 98 + 16 52 Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1967, Table 2.10, pp. 185-99. TABLE 5 . NUMBER OF GRADUATES FROM HIGHER-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS PER 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 OF TOTAL POPULATION ( 1 9 6 4 )

United States (1965) West Germany France Japan USSR Source: UNESCO Statistical

349 109 96 233 177 Yearbook, 1967, Table

Poland India (1962) Indonesia Brazil Algeria 2.14, pp. 259-68.

81 45 — 25 —

As a result, the United States possesses a pyramid of educated social talent whose wide base is capable of providing effective support to the leading and creative apex. This is true even though in many respects American education is often intellectually deficient, especially in comparison with the more rigorous standards of Western European and Japanese secondary institutions. Nonetheless, the broad base of relatively trained people enables rapid adaptation, development, and social application of scientific innovation or discovery.* While no precise estimates are possible, * America's scientific lead is particularly strong in the so-called frontier industries that involve the most advanced fields of science. It has been estimated that approximately 80 per cent of all scientific and technical discoveries made during the past few decades originated in the United States. About 79 per cent of the world's computers operate in the United States. America's lead in lasers is even more marked. The International Atomic Energy Agency has estimated (in its report Power and Research Reactors in Member States, Vienna, 1969) that by 1975 the United States will utilize more nuclear power for peaceful uses than the next eleven states combined (including Japan, all of Western Europe, Canada, and the Soviet Union).

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{47

some experts have suggested that a present-day society would experience difficulties in rapid modernization if less than 10 per cent of its population in the appropriate age bracket had higher education and less than 30 per cent had lower education. Moreover, both the organizational structure and the intellectual atmosphere in the American scientific world favor experimentation and rapid social adaptation. In a special report on American scientific policies, submitted in early 1968, a group of experts connected with OECD concluded that Americas scientific and technical enterprise is deeply rooted in American tradition and To measure innovating performance, OECD analysts checked to see where one hundred and thirty-nine selected inventions were first used. Nine industrial sectors that depend heavily on innovation were surveyed (i.e., computers, semi-conductors, pharmaceuticals, plastics, iron and steel, machine tools, non-ferrous metals, scientific instruments, and synthetic fibers). The results showed that in the last twenty years the United States has had the highest rate of innovation, since approximately 60 per cent of the one hundred and thirty-nine inventions were first put to use in the United States (15 per cent in Great Britain, 9 per cent in Germany, 4 per cent in Switzerland, 3 per cent in Sweden). The United States collects 50-60 per cent of all OECD-area receipts for patents, licenses, etc.; the United States predominates in trade performance, accounting for about 30 per cent of the world's export in research-intensive product groups (J. Richardson and Ford Parks, "Why Europe Lags Behind," Science fournal, Vol. 4, August 1968, pp. 8 1 86). It is striking to note, for example, that while Western Europe still slightly exceeds the United States in the number of patents registered annually, industrial application of patents is roughly eight times higher in the United States. American leadership is also marked in pure science. In an unusually assertive—but not inaccurate—report, the National Academy of Sciences stated in late 1968 that the United States enjoys world leadership in mathematics, citing as evidence that 50 per cent of the prestigious Fields Medals awarded since 1945 went to Americans, that American mathematicians play the leading role in international mathematics congresses (delivering more than 33 per cent of all scientific papers), and that American mathematical research is cited most frequently in foreign mathematics journals ( T h e New York Times, November 24, 1968). American preponderance in Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry, and Medicine has also become more marked. Thus, between the years 1901 and 1939 the United States and Canada won 13 prizes, while France, Germany, Italy, Benelux, and the United Kingdom won a total of 82, Scandinavia won 8, the USSR won 4, and Japan won none. Between 1940 and 1967 the respective figures were 42, 50, 6, 8, and 2.

The Ambivalent

Disseminator

{25

history. 0 Competitiveness and the emphasis on quick exploitation have resulted in a quick spin-off of the enormous defense and space research efforts into the economy as a whole, in contrast to the situation in the Soviet Union, where the economic byproducts of almost as large-scale a research effort have so far been negligible. It is noteworthy that "the Russians themselves estimate that the productivity of their researchers is only about half the Americans' and that innovations take two or three times as long to be put into effect." 12 This climate and the concomitant rewards for creative attainments result in a magnetic pull (the "brain drain") from which America clearly benefits. America offers to many trained scientists, even from advanced countries, not only greater material rewards but a unique opportunity for the maximum fulfillment of their talents. In the past Western writers and artists gravitated primarily toward Paris. More recently the Soviet Union and China have exercised some ideological attraction, but in neither case did it involve the movement of significant percentages of scientific elites. Though immigrating scientists initially think of America as a platform for creative work, and not as a national society to 0 "Since the first hours of the Republic, the right of citizens to the 'pursuit of happiness,' formulated in the Declaration of Independence, has been one of the mainsprings of American society; it is also the foundation of a social policy inspired by the prospect of new benefits issued from the scientific and technical enterprise. How can one fail to hope that these benefits, which have in fact contributed so much to national defense or the race for world prestige, will make an essential contribution to the achievement of other great national goals? It is this propulsion which has given science, the mother of knowledge, the appearance of a veritable national resource. The enterprise is indissolubly linked to the goals of American society, which is trying to build its future on the progress of science and technology. In this capacity, this society as a whole is a consumer of scientific knowledge, which is used for diverse ends: in the last century, to increase agricultural productivity and to facilitate territorial development, and then to back the national defense effort, to safeguard public health and to explore space. These are activities which have an impact on the destiny of the whole nation, and it seems natural that all skills should be mobilized to cooperate. In this way industry and the universities and private organizations are associated with the Government project" (conclusion of a report prepared by the Secretariat of the OECD, January 1968, as quoted by The New York Times, January 1968, p. 10).

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{30

which they are transferring political allegiance, in most cases that allegiance is later obtained through assimilation. Americas professional attraction for the global scientific elite is without historic precedent in either scale or scope. * Though this attraction is likely to decline for Europeans (particularly because of America's domestic problems and partially because of Europe's own scientific advance), the success of J. J. Servan-Schreiber's book, The American Challenge, reflects the basic inclination of concerned Europeans to accept the argument that the United States comes closest to being the only truly modern society in terms of the organization and scale of its economic market, business administration, research and development, and education. (In contrast, the structure of American government is viewed as strikingly antiquated.) European sensitivity in this area is conditioned not only by fear of a widening American technological lead but very much by the increasing presence on the European markets of large American firms that exploit their economic advantages of scale and superior organization to gradually acquire controlling interests in key frontier industries. The presence of these firms, the emergence under their aegis of something akin to a new international corporate elite, the stimulation given by their presence to the adoption of American business practices and training, the deepening awareness that the so-called technol0 In the words of E. Piore, vice president and chief scientist of I.B.M., "The United States has become the intellectual center of the world—the center of the arts, the sciences, and economics" ("Towards the Year 2000," Daedalus, Summer 1967, p. 958). It is symptomatic that in the early 1960s, 44 per cent of the Pakistani students studying at institutions of higher education in fifteen foreign countries were studying in the United States; 59 per cent of the Indians; 32 per cent of the Indonesians; 56 per cent of the Burmese; 90 per cent of the Filipinos; 64 per cent of the Thais; and 26 per cent of the Ceylonese (Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, New York, 1968, p. 1773). In 1967 the United States granted 10,690 M.D.s at its own universities, and admitted in the same year as permanent immigrants 3457 physicians (Report. . . , p. 3). In that same year 10,506 scientific, engineering, and medical personnel from the developed countries emigrated to the United States ("The BrainDrain of Scientists, Engineers and Physicians from the Developing Countries to the United States," Hearing before a Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1968, pp. 2, 96; hereafter cited as Hearing . . .).

The Ambivalent

Disseminator

{ 2 5

ogy gap is in reality also a management and education gap 13 — all have contributed both to a positive appraisal of American "technostructure" by the European business and scientific elite and to the desire to adapt some of America's experience. Less tangible but no less pervasive is the American impact on mass culture, youth mores, and life styles. The higher the level of per-capita income in a country, the more applicable seems the term "Americanization." This indicates that the external forms of characteristic contemporary American behavior are not so much culturally determined as they are an expression of a certain level of urban, technical, and economic development. Nonetheless, to the extent that these forms were first applied in America and then "exported" abroad, they became symbolic of the American impact and of the innovation-emulation relationship prevailing between America and the rest of the world. What makes America unique in our time is that confrontation with the new is part of the daily American experience. For better or for worse, the rest of the world learns what is in store for it by observing what happens in the United States: whether it be the latest scientific discoveries in space and medicine or the electric toothbrush in the bathroom; pop art or LSD; air conditioning or air pollution; old-age problems or juvenile delinquency. The evidence is more elusive in such matters as style, music, values, and social mores, but there too the term "Americanization" obviously implies a specific source. Similarly, foreign students returning from American universities have prompted an organizational and intellectual revolution in the academic life of their countries. Changes in the academic life of Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan, and more recently France, and to an even greater extent in the less developed countries, can be traced to the influence of American educational institutions. Given developments in modern communications, it is only a matter of time before students at Columbia University and, say, the University of Teheran will be watching the same lecturer simultaneously. This is all the more likely because American society, more than

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{32

any other, "communicates" with the entire globe.14 Roughly sixtyfive per cent of all world communications originate in this country. Moreover, the United States has been most active in the promotion of a global communications system by means of satellites, and it is pioneering the development of a world-wide information grid. 0 It is expected that such a grid will come into being by about 1975.15 For the first time in history the cumulative knowledge of mankind will be made accessible on a global scale—and it will be almost instantaneously available in response to demand.

New

Imperialism?

All of these factors make for a novel relationship between the United States and the world. There are imperial overtones to it, and yet in its essence the relationship is quite different from the traditional imperial structure. To be sure, the fact that in the aftermath of World War II a number of nations were directly dependent on the United States in matters of security, politics, and economics created a system that in many respects, including that of scale, superficially resembled the British, Roman, and Chinese empires of the past. 16 The more than a million American troops stationed on some four hundred major and almost three thousand minor United States military bases scattered all over the globe, the forty-two nations tied to the United States by security pacts, the American military missions training the officers and troops of many other national armies, and the approximately two hundred thousand United States civilian government employees in foreign posts all make for striking analogies to the great classical imperial systems.17 Nevertheless, the concept of "imperial" shields rather than reveals a relationship between America and the world that is both * It is estimated (by the Institute for Politics and Planning, Arlington, Virginia) that the volume of digital communication will shortly exceed human conversation across the Adantic; it has already done so in the United States. Moreover, within the next decade the value of information export from the United States to Europe will exceed the value of material exports.

The Ambivalent

Disseminator

{25

more complex and more intimate. The "imperial" aspect of the relationship was, in the first instance, a transitory and rather spontaneous response to the vacuum created by World War II and to the subsequent felt threat from communism. Moreover, it was neither formally structured nor explicitly legitimized. The "empire" was at most an informal system marked by the pretense of equality and noninterference. This made it easier for the "imperial" attributes to recede once conditions changed. By the late 1960s, with a few exceptions the earlier direct political-military dependence on the United States had declined (often in spite of political efforts by the United States to maintain it). Its place had been filled by the more pervasive but less tangible influence of American economic presence and innovation as they originated directly from the United States or were stimulated abroad by American foreign investment (the latter annually yielding a product considerably in excess of the gross national product of most major countries). 18 In effect, ". . . American influence has a porous and almost invisible quality. It works through the interpenetration of economic institutions, the sympathetic harmony of political leaders and parties, the shared concepts of sophisticated intellectuals, the mating of bureaucratic interests. It is, in other words, something new in the world, and not yet well understood." 19 It is the novelty of America's relationship with the world— complex, intimate, and porous—that the more orthodox, especially Marxist, analyses of imperialism fail to encompass. To see that relationship merely as the expression of an imperial drive is to ignore the part played in it by the crucial dimension of the technological-scientific revolution. That revolution not only captivates the imagination of mankind (who can fail to be moved by the spectacle of man reaching the moon?) but inescapably compels imitation of the more advanced by the less advanced and stimulates the export of new techniques, methods, and organizational skills from the former to the latter. There is no doubt that this results in an asymmetrical relationship, but the content of

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{34

that asymmetry must be examined before it is called imperialism. Like every society, America no doubt prefers to be more rather than less advanced; yet it is also striking that no other country has made so great an effort, governmentally and privately, through business and especially through foundations, to export its knowhow, to make public its space findings, to promote new agricultural techniques, to improve educational facilities, to control population growth, to improve health care, and so on. All of this has imperial overtones, and yet it is misleading to label it as such.20 Indeed, unable to understand fully what is happening in their own society, Americans find it difficult to comprehend the global impact that that society has had in its unique role as disseminator of the technetronic revolution. This impact is contradictory: it both promotes and undermines American interests as defined by American policymakers; it helps to advance the cause of cooperation on a larger scale even as it disrupts existing social or economic fabrics; it both lays the groundwork for well-being and stability and enhances the forces working for instability and revolution. Unlike traditional imperialistic powers, which relied heavily on the principle of divide et impera (practiced with striking similarity by the British in India and more recently by the Russians in Eastern Europe), America has striven to promote regionalism both in Europe and in Latin America. Yet in so doing, it is helping to create larger entities that are more capable of resisting its influence and of competing with it economically. Implicitly and often explicitly modeled on the American pattern, modernization makes for potentially greater economic well-being, but in the process it disrupts existing institutions, undermines prevailing mores, and stimulates resentment that focuses directly on the source of change—America. The result is an acute tension between the kind of global stability and order that America subjectively seeks and the instability, impatience, and frustration that America unconsciously promotes. The United States has emerged as the first global society in history. It is a society increasingly difficult to delineate in terms

Global Ghettos

{41

of its outer cultural and economic boundaries. Moreover, it is unlikely that in the foreseeable future America will cease to exercise the innovative stimulus that is characteristic of its current relationship with the world. By the end of this century (extrapolating from current trends) only some thirteen countries are likely to reach the 1965 level of the per-capita gross national product of the United States.-1 Unless there is major scientific and economic stagnation or a political crisis (see Part IV), at the end of the century America will still be a significant force for global change, whether or not the dominant subjective mood is pro- or anti-American.

M » 3. Global Ghettos

The Third World is a victim of the technetronic revolution. Whether the less developed countries grow rapidly or slowly, or not at all, almost inevitably many of them will continue to be dominated by intensifying feelings of psychological deprivation. In a world electronically intermeshed, absolute or relative underdevelopment will be intolerable, especially as the more advanced countries begin to move beyond that industrial era into which the less developed countries have as yet to enter. It is thus no longer a matter of the "revolution of rising expectations." The Third World today confronts the specter of insatiable aspirations. At one time in history seemingly insoluble problems prompted fatalism because they were thought to be part of a universal condition. Today similar problems stimulate frustration because they are seen as a particular phenomenon by which others, more for-

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{36

tunate, are not afflicted. The plight of the urban ghettos in the United States provides an appropriate analogy to the global position of the less developed countries, particularly in Africa and Asia. Their problem is not that of the absence of change. 0 In some cases it is not even that of insufficiently rapid change, because in recent years several underdeveloped countries have attained impressive and sustained rates of growth (South Korea, Taiwan, and Ghana, for example). Rather, their problem arises from an intensifying feeling of relative deprivation of which they are made more acutely aware by the spread of education and communications. As a result, passive resignation may give way to active explosions of undirected anger.

Prospects for Change It is extremely difficult to predict the economic and political development of the underdeveloped countries. Some of them, especially in Latin America, may make respectable progress and may, within the next two decades, reach the economic levels of the currently more advanced states. Islands of development may increasingly dot the maps of Asia and Africa, assuming that there is relative peace and political stability in the region as a whole. But the over-all prognosis is not hopeful. Medium projections for several of the more important underdeveloped countries point to a per-capita annual gross national product in 1985 of $107 for Nigeria, $134 for Pakistan, $112 for Indonesia, $169 for India, $185 for China, $295 for the United Arab Republic, and $372 for Brazil. 0 "The growth rate of these countries during the Development Decade has not reached the annual figure of 5 per cent which was set as the minimum target. Actually the average rate for fifty-four countries, representing 87 per cent of the population of the developing world as a whole, was only 4.5 per cent per annum from i960 to 1965. . . . Among the fifty-four countries mentioned, there is a group of eighteen with an average growth rate of 7.3 per cent per annum, while the rate for fifteen countries was scarcely 2.7 per cent per annum. . . . Between these two extremes there were twenty-one countries whose average growth rate was 4.9 per cent" ("Towards a Global Strategy of Development,' a report by the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, New York, 1968, p. 5).

Global Ghettos

{41

(By way of contrast, the prospective per-capita figure for 1985 for the United States is $6510, for Japan $3080, for the USSR $2660, and for Israel $2978.)22 What is even more striking is that while the per-capita GNP in the above advanced countries is likely to double during the years 1965-1985, for a single Nigerian the per-capita GNP will have increased by only $14, for a Pakistani by $43, for an Indonesian by $12, for an Indian by $70, for a Chinese by $88, for an Egyptian by $129, and for a Brazilian by $92 during the same two decades of development. The threat of overpopulation to economic growth—indeed to existence itself—has been widely discussed in recent years. That threat, it should be added, involves a crucial social-political dimension. Overpopulation contributes to the breakup of landholdings and thereby further stratifies and complicates the rural class structure, widening disparities and intensifying class conflicts. Staggering problems of unemployment are also highly probable. According to the International Labor Organization, by 1980 the labor force of Asia's developing nations will have increased from 663 million to 938 million. During this same period the number of new jobs in these countries will increase by only 142 million, according to projections of current growth rates. 23 Even if it is assumed that the problem of overpopulation will be met by greater acceptance of birth control, the economic picture in terms of the per-capita GNP for underdeveloped countries becomes only marginally brighter when it is compared with the figures projected for the more advanced societies. For example, in the unlikely event that by 1985 Indonesia's population will not have increased since 1965, its per-capita GNP will be approximately $200 instead of the projected $112; under similar circumstances, for Pakistan it will be $250 instead of the projected $134, and for the United Arab Republic almost $500 instead of $295. Since some population growth is unavoidable, the above figures actually represent unattainable levels, even though they are in themselves singularly unimpressive when compared with the figures for the more advanced portions of the world.

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{38

To point to these figures is not to exclude the probability that progress will be made in some fields. It is probably true that "the picture of the world in 1985, despite the large pockets of poverty that will still exist, is far from grim. Indeed, by 1985 mass starvation, mass homelessness, and the rampant spread of diseases that have historically decimated entire populations will be generally eliminated. Although the underdeveloped countries will still be comparatively poor, they will have greater and more immediate access to worldwide transportation and communications systems and to the provision of drugs, medical care, food, shelter and clothing through international assistance in the event of disaster. The surplus commodity production of the United States will be an important element in the feeding of underprivileged nations." 24 One may assume that the appearance of greater international planning in terms of international commodity agreements, transport arrangements, health regulations, finance, and education will make for more orderly and deliberate approaches to the problems posed by backwardness, slow growth, and the widening disparity in standards of living. The increasing communications intimacy will permit instant responses to sudden emergencies and allow for continuous long-distance visual consultations by specialists. In the event of need, aid could be mobilized and ferried across the globe in no more time than is now needed to respond to an internal national calamity—or even an urban one. The agricultural revolution in Asia is already challenging the recently fashionable predictions of mass hunger and starvation. Mass educational campaigns and the introduction of new cereals and fertilizers have prompted an impressive upsurge in productivity. Within the next few years Pakistan, the Philippines, and Turkey may become grain-exporting states; Thailand and Burma already have. The cumulative effect of such successes may well be to "bolster the confidence of national leaders in their ability to handle other seemingly insoluble problems. It may also strengthen the faith in modern technology and its potential for improving the well-being of their people." 25

Global Ghettos

{41

Yet even allowing for these more hopeful developments, the fact remains that though the material conditions of life in the Third World are in some respects improving, these improvements cannot keep pace with the factors that make for psychic change. The basic revolutionary change is being brought about by education and communications. That change, necessary and desirable to stimulate an attitude receptive to innovation (for example, the acceptance by peasants of fertilizers), also prompts an intense awareness of inadequacy and backwardness. In this regard, a comparison of the contemporary socio-economic transformation of the Third World with that of Russia at about the turn of the century is revealing. In Russia the industrial revolution outpaced mass education; literacy followed—rather than preceded—material change. 0 The revolutionary movements, particularly the Marxist one, strove to close the gap by politically educating—hence radicalizing—the masses. Today in the Third World a subjective revolution is preceding change in the objective environment and creating a state of unrest, uneasiness, anger, anguish, and outrage. Indeed, it has been observed that "the faster * Between 1887 and 1904, Russian coal-mining output rose by 400 per cent (from 5 million to 21.5 million tons) and iron smelting by 500 per cent; between 1861 and 1870, 5833 miles of railway were constructed, and between 1891 and 1900, 13,920 miles. "Coal production in Russia rose 40 percent in the period 1909-1913, as against a growth rate of 24 percent in the United States, 28 percent in Germany, 7 percent in Britain, and 9 percent in France in the same period. In the case of pig iron, Russian output rose by 61 percent in the period 1909-1913, while the rate of increase in the United States was 20 percent, in Germany 33 percent, in Britain 8 percent, and in France 46 percent. Although the economic backwardness of Russia had not disappeared on the eve of the war, it was clearly disappearing. The standard of living was not high, but it was rising. In the twenty years preceding the war the population of Russia increased by about 40 percent, while the domestic consumption of goods more than doubled" (S. Pushkarev, The Emergence of Modern Russia 1801-1917, New York, 1963, p. 280). Yet on the eve of World War I there were only 117,000 students in higher education in a country of some 160 million people, and 56 per cent of the people were illiterate (Pushkarev, pp. 286, 292). Of the children in the 8 - 1 1 age bracket, 49 per cent were not receiving any education, while the percentage of literates among military inductees rose between 1874 and 1913 at a rate of only slightly more than one per cent per annum (A. G. Rashin, Formirovanie Rabochego Klassa Rossii, Moscow, 1958, p. 582).

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{40

the enlightenment of the population, the more frequent the overthrow of the government/' * This gap between awakening mass consciousness and material reality appears to be widening. In the years 1958-1965 the income per capita of an Indian rose from $64 to $86 \ and that of an Indonesian from $81 to $85; the income of an Algerian declined from $236 to $195-26 The percentage of the economically active population in fields other than agriculture grew substantially only in Algeria (from 10 per cent to 18 per cent). Housing, physicians per thousand inhabitants, and personal consumption did not show significant advances for the major backward areas. In some they even showed a decrease. 27 (See Table 6.)

The Subjective

Transformation

Although objective conditions changed slowly, the subjective environment altered rapidly. Spectacular advances came primarily in two fields: communications and education. The number of radios in India quadrupled between 1958 and 1966 (from 1.5 million to 6.4 million); elsewhere in the Third World the figures have doubled or tripled. The television age is only beginning in these regions, but both transistor radios and television will no doubt become generally available there in the next two decades. \ 0 "For 66 nations, for example, the correlation between the proportion of children in primary schools and the frequency of revolution was -.84. In contrast, for 70 nations the correlation between the rate of change in primary enrollment and political instability was .61'* (Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven and London, 1968, p. 47). t It should be noted that these are average figures. "A survey for 1965-66 indicated that half of India's population was living on R14.6 or less per month (about lotf in U.S. currency per day). . . . In short the very low average income does not begin to plumb the depths of misery in India" (Myrdal, p. 565). } The Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission estimated that community television for all the five hundred and sixty thousand villages in India could be transmitted by satellite in five years at a cost of only $200 million ( T h e New York Times, August 15, 1968). In September 1969 the United States concluded an agreement with India for the creation by 1972 of a satellite that will provide television programs on agriculture and birth control for approximately five thousand villages in four Hindi-speaking states (see also our earlier discussion of the American impact).

Global Ghettos

{ 41

Access to higher education has also grown rapidly: in India between 1958 and 1963 the increase was roughly 50 per cent (from 900,000 to 1.3 million students), and by 1968 there were about 1.9 million students in 2749 colleges and 80 universities; in Indonesia the increase was 30 per cent (from 50,000 to 65,000) between 1958 and 1964; and in the United Arab Republic it was more than 50 per cent (83,000 to 145,000) during the same half decade. Enrollment in India's primary schools jumped from 18.5 million in 1951 to 51.5 million in 1966, according to UNESCO statistics. (See Table 7.) Increased access to education gives rise to its own specific problems. On the one hand, access to advanced training, particularly of a technical nature, is too limited to sustain extensive and intensive modernization. 0 The Third World is still woefully backward in intermediate technical education. On the other hand, the capacity of many of the less developed countries to absorb trained personnel is inadequate; the result is a class of dissatisfied college graduates, composed especially of those from the legal and liberalarts faculties, who are unable to obtain gainful employment compatible with their expanded expectations. Although this problem is already acute in several countries,28 it could be made worse by the introduction of automation into the overmanned factories and bureaucracies of the less developed countries, f The problem is aggravated by the frequently low level of what is officially described as higher education. According to one ad* See the tables on page 27, as well as the more extensive comparisons between the Third World and the United States and Western Europe (both current figures and projections for the year 2000) contained in Higher Education, Committee on Higher Education, London, 1963, especially Appendixes I and V. t "As the scientific processing of information will be under way in the urban centers of Asia, Africa and Latin America by 1985, large numbers of clerks, runners, sorters, and filers that today account for the weight of public and private bureaucracy in India, Nigeria or Brazil will begin to be threatened with displacement and the insecurities of unemployment" (The United States and the World in the 1985 Era, p. 91). It is estimated that by 1970 roughly one-half of Ceylon's expected one million unemployed will have certificates of higher education ("The International Report," The Economist, June 15, 1968, p . . 4 7 )

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic TABLE

Revolution.{42

6 PER CENT OF POPULATION PER-CAPITA G N P

IN U . S .

DOLLARS

EMPLOYED

OUTSIDE AGRICULTURE

Increase

1958

1966

(in percentages)

Increase

1950

i960

(in percentages)

U n i t e d States

2,602

3,842

48

90.4

93-5

31

West Germany

1,077

2,004

86

742

86.6

12.4

France

1,SOI

2,052

58

72.5 (1954)

(1961)

Italy

1,182

598

Soviet U n i o n Poland

1,100

1,500 (>965) 1,100

800

7.7

80.2 (1962)

98

60.5

71.8 (1962)

36

(1951) 52.0

11.3

60.8

8.8

(1959) 38

42.8

—

61.4

3-8

46.6

(1965) Czechoslovakia

—

—

Japan

344

986

187

India

72

105

46

Indonesia United

84

95 (1963)

13

179 (1965) 333

49

80.5

191

(1965) 740

—

27.0

271

(1951)

(1961)

—

0.1

320

—

—

(1961)

Arab

Republic Brazil

120 310

7

PER CENT OF POPULATION IN LOCALITIES OVER 2 0 , 0 0 0

37-3 (1947) 5I.9

43-3

0.6

48.4

-3-5

AVERAGE: NUMBER OF PERSONS

INHABITANTS

PER ROOM

Increase i960

(in p e r c e n t a g e s )

1950

i960

5-5 6.I

0.7

0.7 0.9

0.0

—

1.0

1.0

0.0

(1954) 1.3

(1962)

(195O

(1961)

U n i t e d States

41.4

46.9

West Germany

4I.5

47-6

France

33-3 (I954)

Italy

41.2

—

—

(1951) Soviet U n i o n Poland

Increase

1950

—

85-5

35-5 (1959) 31-9

—

6.4

1.1

—

—

(in percentages)

—

—0.2 —

(1956) 1-7

—

(1961) Czechoslovakia Japan

21.0

25-3

(1947)

(1961)

—

72.0

4-3

1.5

1-3

— 0.2

(1961) —

—

1.2 (1963) 2.6

—

India

12.0

—

—

—

Indonesia

(1951) 91 (1955)

—

—

—

—

—

29.1

0.0

—

1.6

—

8.0

13

1-3

0.0

—

United Arab Republic Brazil

29.1 (1947)

0955)

20.1

28.1

Global Ghettos TABLE

{41

7 N U M B E R OF STUDENTS IN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING

NUMBER OF RADIOS

Increase

Increase

(in per1958

1965

centages)

1966

centages) 63

3,042,200

5,526,325

161,000,000

262,700,000

173.320

372,929

»i5

15,263,000

27,400,000

79

186,101

174

10,646,000

15,861,000

49

216,248

509,764 300,940

39

6,112,000

11,163,000

2,178,900

3,860,500

77

36,667,000

76,800,000

83 109

111,820

251,864

5.593,000

25

141,687

125 190

4,465,000

48,805

3,317,000

3,829,000

15

Japan

566,551

1,116,430

97

14,610,000

24,787,000

70

India

913,380

1,310,000

43

1,560,000

6,485,000

316

49.557

(1963) 65,635

32

631,000

1,250,000

98

113

792,000

1,613,000

104

U n i t e d States West

Germany

France Italy Soviet

Union

Poland Czechoslovakia

Indonesia

81.6

(in per1958

(1964) United

Arab

Republic

83.251

177,123

(1965) Brazil

86,868

155.78I

79

4,000,000

88

7,500,000 (1964)

N U M B E R OF TELEVISION RECEIVERS

N U M B E R OF TELEPHONES Increase

Increase (in per-

(in per-

centages)

1958

1966

centages)

74,100,000

47

66,630,000

98,789,000

48

12,720,000

499

5,090,102

9,532.417

87

989,000

7,471,000

655

3,703,578

6,554,441

Italy

1,098,000

6,855,000

524

2,988,465

77 116

Soviet U n i o n

1,767,000

19,000,000

975

2,370,000

6,467,597 4,459.ooo (1965) 1,411,481

U n i t e d States West Germany France

Poland Czechoslovakia Japan India

1958

1966

50,250,000 2,125,000

88 216

85,000

2,540,000

2888

446,236

328,000

2,375,000

624

1,582,852

100

1,600,000

19,002,000

1088

789,679 4.334,602

16,011,745

269

400

4,000

900

367,000

926,617

153

4,600

—

90,968

116,332

28

185,452

335,000

81

928,117

1.431,653

54

(1962) Indonesia

—

United Arab Republic

128,000

375,000

193

(1962) Brazil

700,000

2,500,000

Sources for Tables 6 and 7: UN Statistical

257

Yearbooks,

1960-1967; UNESCO Yearbook,

1967.

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{44

mittedly

impressionistic

estimate,

perhaps

but perceptive

5 per cent

account,

the mass

in

are receiving decent training

by

recognizable

. . .

In

Indian

generous

institutions of higher e d u c a t i o n standards.

of

"At a

students

world

of

most

places

academic

standards have fallen so l o w that they can hardly b e said to survived."29

This

condition

is

by

no

means

limited

" T e a c h i n g i n S o u t h A s i a n s c h o o l s at all l e v e l s t e n d s t o independent

thinking

experimental

bent

and

of m i n d

the

growth

of

that

discourage

insufficiently 30

scale."

l a r l y i n L a t i n A m e r i c a : " B y n o w it is f u l l y r e c o g n i z e d t h a t tion in Latin A m e r i c a has f u n d a m e n t a l

and

development.

. . . T h e South Asian p e o p l e s are not m e r e l y b e i n g on a huge

India.

inquisitive

t h a t is s o e s s e n t i a l f o r

educated; they are being miseducated

have

to

shortcomings,

Simieduca-

that

there

is a h i g h illiteracy rate, a n d t h a t t h e e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m b e a r s relation to the requirements of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t , quite from

the

serious

respects."

31

deficiencies

that

exist

in

other

basic

" E d u c a t i o n " of this sort contributes to t h e

no

apart

cultural

emergence

of a n i n a d e q u a t e l y trained class of y o u n g e r p e o p l e w h o s e

frustra-

tions, increasing radicalism, a n d susceptibility to Utopian

appeals

have

many

gentsia

of

parallels the

in

more

those

of

the

backward

nineteenth-century

regions

of

Europe,

intelli-

particularly

Russia and the Balkans. T o obtain quality education, a small percentage of the

students

—either b e c a u s e they are unusually gifted a n d can obtain arships, or b e c a u s e t h e y c o m e f r o m w e a l t h y f a m i l i e s — g o

scholabroad.

A s a result, t h e y are t e m p t e d to adapt to foreign styles a n d

modes

of life, a n d e v e n t o r e m a i n a b r o a d ; in effect, t h e y o p t o u t of own

society

either

by

emigrating

simply by never returning. the

Chinese

United centage

students

States chose was

21,

respectively.32

It

studying

internally

on

1967, for example, sciences

and

for Korea a

and

staggering

Pakistan

fact

that

their return, 26 per cent

engineering

not to return to Taiwan;

and is

In

for India it w a s

the

their

15

in

the

or of the

per-

and

13,

underdeveloped

countries s u p p l i e d almost exactly one-half of the total n u m b e r engineers, scientists, a n d m e d i c a l personnel w h o e m i g r a t e d to

of the

Global Ghettos U n i t e d States in the year e n d i n g J u n e 1967: 10,254 It is e x p e c t e d

{ 41

o u t

20,760

that this proportion will actually rise in t h e

33

years

to c o m e . 3 4 A t the s a m e time, m a n y of those w h o d o return to their native lands d o so after having b e c o m e "immersed in values an

educational

advanced

system

which

country and may

prepares

individuals

to

unfit t h e m for d e v e l o p i n g

priate personality for a n active life in their o w n

fit an

and

in

community

3 5

T h e c u m u l a t i v e effect of these factors m a k e s for a h i g h l y bulent a n d extremely a m o r p h o u s political pattern. W i t h o u t ing for specific differences a m o n g Third W o r l d

an

appro-

tur-

allow-

c o u n t r i e s , it

can

b e said in g e n e r a l t e r m s that t h e political p y r a m i d in t h e less

de-

v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s h a s at its b a s e t h e p e a s a n t m a s s e s , still p r i m a r i l y engaged

in

manual

labor

and

largely

illiterate*

but

no

longer

parochially restricted to their immediate environment, since sistor radios establish

intimate

contact with

the national

a n d help d e v e l o p awareness of their material or national tion; f

next

in

order

is

a

rapidly

increasing

urban

tran-

society depriva-

population,!

0 As of i960, approximately 70 per cent of the males over 15 and 90 per cent of the females over 15 in Pakistan were illiterate; in India the percentages were 60 per cent and 85 per cent, respectively; in Indonesia 40 per cent and 70 per cent; and in Burma 20 per cent and 60 per cent. In Latin America in i960, 35.6 per cent of the males and 42.6 per cent of the females in Brazil were illiterate; in Argentina 7.5 per cent and 9.7 per cent; in Chile 15.1 per cent and 17.6 per cent; in Peru 25.6 per cent and 52.4 per cent; and in Venezuela 30.2 per cent and 38.3 per cent (Myrdal, pp. 540, 1672; UN Statistical Yearbook, 1965). t It is therefore too late to suggest that since participation is running ahead of the effective institutionalization of political processes, it might be desirable —in order to prevent chaos—to either limit or delay programs that stimulate higher levels of participation—for instance, by slowing down drives against illiteracy so that literacy does not outpace economic and political development. Even if the latter were practicable, the dissemination of transistor radios (and soon television) is beginning to have the same politically activizing effect that literacy had on the urban proletariat of the late nineteenth century. Thus, Frantz Fanon quite correctly observed in his Studies in a Dying Colonialism (New York, 1965) that "since 1956 the purchase of a radio in Algeria has meant, not the adoption of a modern technique for getting news, but the obtaining of access to the only means of entering into communication with the Revolution, of living with it" (p. 83). t Cities with populations of over a hundred thousand have been increasing in Asia at a rate three times that of the general population growth of the countries concerned (Myrdal, p. 469).

I: The Global composed dwellers

to

a

large

Impact extent

which

per c e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n people

of

who

during

the

first-generation

Revolution.{46

post-peasant

city

sources of authority;36 t h e n c o m e s

searching for n e w

pseudo-intelligentsia,

of the Technetronic

accounts

for

roughly

a n d is c o m p o s e d

last d e c a d e

have

two

to

of relatively

acquired

young

some

a d v a n c e d e d u c a t i o n — o f t e n of v e r y p o o r professional

formal

quality—and

who, because they live badly and feel that society does not t h e m the opportunity to w h i c h t h e y are entitled,

or p r e v e n t

reforms

(some

Latin

( I r a n ) , or American

sus-

pyramid

is a r e l a t i v e l y w e l l - e d u c a t e d b u t n a r r o w - g a u g e d e l i t e class, gling to achieve b o t h stability a n d progress

offer

are highly

ceptible to militant x e n o p h o b i c causes; at the top of the

to delay

strug-

sometimes countries),

b e c a u s e , a s a B r a z i l i a n s c h o l a r p u t it, t h e y " w a n t it t h a t w a y . order

to

maintain

their

privileges,

they

are

a

three

dependent

on

In the

perpetuation of the status quo."37 T h e s e privileges are either those of p r o p e r t y or, m o r e f r e q u e n t l y in t h e c a s e of t h e n e w nations,

of

bureaucratic position. T h e ghettos of the global city have, accordingly, s o m e to the racial slums

of the

problem

absence

is n o t

the

United

States.

In American

of d e v e l o p m e n t

parallels cities

or change;

it

the

stems

from the perception b y the poor that e v e n rapid c h a n g e will c h a n g e m u c h for m a n y in the near future, a n d f r o m their realization

that

those

who

are

richer

are

themselves

not

growing becoming

morally u n e a s y over the material gap. This c o m b i n a t i o n of

factors

creates a sense of acute deprivation that results in intensified litical hostility t o w a r d that hostility in the

the

outside

United

world.38

States w a s

The

made

possible by

crease in the n u m b e r of black Americans receiving higher tion and therefore capable

of providing o n

a socially

the

grievances.

number

of

black

Another

Americans

factor w a s living

in

the rapid cities0

and

of in-

educa-

significant

scale the e n e r g i z i n g l e a d e r s h i p for t h e expression of hitherto pressed

po-

mobilization

growth

sup-

in

the

therefore

re-

0 The proportion of all Negroes living in the North and West almost quadrupled from 1910 to i960, when 73 per cent of all Negroes resided in urban areas and thus represented a more urbanized population than the whites,

Global Ghettos leased

from

the

lethargy

of

traditional,

{41

white-dominated

existence and brought into direct contact with the white nity,

which,

although

essentially

conservative,

has

become

c r e a s i n g l y a m b i v a l e n t i n its v a l u e s . W i t h i n this c o n t e x t , at reform contributed

rural

commu-

to further tension and friction,

in-

attempts prompting

some, in the d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i t y , to adopt a reactionary

posture

against change, and others, especially a m o n g the deprived, to

ar-

g u e that n o c h a n g e w a s m e a n i n g f u l within the f r a m e w o r k of

the

existing

system.

A m e r i c a n racial slums h a v e g r o w n in a pattern not unlike e x p a n s i o n of t h e h u g e i m p o v e r i s h e d u r b a n c e n t e r s of Asia. from the South have reaction

tended

to their poverty

to m o v e

and

to northern

felt injustice

than

the

Blacks

cities m o r e because

of

actual e m p l o y m e n t available there. T h e rate of u n e m p l o y m e n t l a r g e A m e r i c a n cities is s e v e r a l t i m e s m o r e t h a n t h e n a t i o n a l age. In Asia, cities inhabited b y impoverished

and

opportunities

"Instead West,

of

but

standing

urbanization

poverty." The

because

of rural poverty

as a s y m p t o m in

South

Asia

of

growth,

is

an

aver-

and

employ-

insecurity.

as it w a s

aspect

of

in

39

parallel

between

the

ghettos

of

the

global

city

and

U n i t e d States "integration" h a s so far t e n d e d to m e a n t h e

also

of t h e d o m i n a n t means

community,

the

in w h i c h

loss

community; of

talent

and

the less educated,

however, expertise more

their to

prevailassimila-

the

militant

black

"pseudo-

intelligentsia" increasingly provides charismatic leadership to

lished

by

exploiting

social

elites of

reverse the

racism.

Third

In

World

like m a n n e r , have

tended

the

selective

assimilation of a f e w individuals w h o can c o n f o r m to the ing norms

the

problems

f a c e d b y t h e intellectual political elite of t h e T h i r d W o r l d . I n

masses

the

continued

racial slums of the U n i t e d States c a n b e e x t e n d e d to t h e

tion

in

unproductive

masses h a v e g r o w n rapidly in recent years not b e c a u s e of ment

in the

the to

the

estabemulate

only 70 per cent of whom resided in urban areas (Philip M. Hauser, "Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro," in The Negro American, Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark, eds., Boston, 1965, pp. 74-75)-

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{48

the life styles of the m o r e a d v a n c e d world, a n d to e m i g r a t e

into

it e i t h e r d i r e c t l y o r v i c a r i o u s l y .

The Political The

Vacuum

resulting v a c u u m

ligentsia, w h o s e v i e w s Frantz

Fanon,

Regis

teenth-century

is

filled

by

an indigenous

pseudo-intel-

are influenced by doctrines advocated Debray,

European

Che

Guevara,

Marxism,

and

originally

others.

Nine-

addressed

u r b a n p r o l e t a r i a t o n l y r e c e n t l y d i v o r c e d f r o m r u r a l life, is

to

global

ghettos.

"The revolutionary

an

roman-

tically a d a p t e d to t h e conditions of industrially b a c k w a r d tieth-century

by

twen-

i n t e l l e c t u a l is

virtually universal p h e n o m e n o n in modernizing societies. 'No is as i n c l i n e d least within served.

to foster violence

the

Indian

as a d i s g r u n t l e d

context,' Hoselitz

'It i s t h e s e p e r s o n s

who

compose

and the

intellectual,

Weiner cadres

demagogues

and

who

become

leaders

of

at

have

ob-

the

less

of

responsible political parties, w h o m a k e u p the narrower of

entourage

millenarian

and

m e s s i a n i c m o v e m e n t s , all of w h i c h m a y , w h e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y ripe,

threaten

political

stability/

In

Iran

extremists

of

both

left a n d the right w e r e m o r e likely than m o d e r a t e s to b e

educated."

Given

this

products

context,

external

aid,

designed

c o m e the specific c o n d i t i o n of b a c k w a r d n e s s a n d poverty,

prove sion. and

the In

point of

objective

the

private

urban

friction, a n d — e v e n

situation—stimulates ghettos

of

the

becomes

it h e l p s

to

im-

further subjective

United

States,

governmental been

ever, they h a v e o f t e n b e c o m e targets of w h i t e charges that

funds

advance

blacks; w h e n

administered

for specific d e v e l o p m e n t black

militancy.

On

has been the formula used

by

ten-

how-

designed

administered

over-

have

by the

programs

when

to

blacks,

resented

aid

be

4 0

emotional

an additional

is the

of the city, to c o m e f r o m t h e m i d d l e e c o n o m i c strata, a n d to better

a

one

the

programs global

whites by

the

have

scale,

been

used

to

"neocolonialism"

to stimulate suspicion

by the

of the political m o t i v e s of e c o n o m i c aid f r o m the a d v a n c e d

masses coun-

Global Ghettos tries;* graft, corruption, made

by

donor

and

countries

inefficiency have

against

the

been

recipients

{41

the of

charges economic

assistance. T h e shift toward e c o n o m i c assistance on an international is a r e s p o n s e

to

this

danger—at

least in part.

It p o s e s

basis

another

danger, h o w e v e r . A i d c a n at best b e only a partial response to condition roots.

that has profoundly

Economic

assistance

the recipient country's

can

psychological be

emotional

as w e l l

effective only

resources

as

if, i n

material addition,

are mobilized

s e n s e o f p o p u l a r e n t h u s i a s m a n d p u r p o s e is c r e a t e d . T h i s

and

t o u t i l i z e f o r e i g n a i d i n t e l l i g e n t l y . S u c h l e a d e r s h i p is rare;

terests a n d

advice,

and

thus

stimulates

difficulties f a c e d b y the U n i t e d

a

requires

n a t i v e l e a d e r s h i p t h a t k n o w s b o t h h o w t o stir t h e m a s s e s a n d

it d o e s e x i s t it f r e q u e n t l y t e n d s t o b e u n r e s p o n s i v e

a

how

where

to foreign

foreign resentment.

inThe

States in d e a l i n g w i t h N a s s e r

or

A y u b Khan, w h o w e r e not only promoting but also responding

to

the emotionalism of their o w n masses, are cases in point. M o r e o v e r , e v e n if t h o s e i n a u t h o r i t y a r e d e t e r m i n e d t o

promote

social change, they are f a c e d w i t h the intractable fact that reality can b e c h a n g e d only very gradually, lization o n b e h a l f of c h a n g e

can be

attained

while

popular

only b y

their mobi-

stimulating

mass enthusiasm a n d emotion. T h e rulers thus confront a

dilemma.

* On a more sophisticated level, the economic system of the advanced countries is condemned as inherently incapable of providing true assistance. "Thus, Furtado [the Latin American economist] points out, the corporation is designed to fit the needs of profit-making in an advanced economy, and when one tries to transplant its technology to impoverished, developing lands, furious contradictions result. The newest machines save manpower— a blessing in the US and a curse in a country with rampant underemployment. Mass production requires a huge market nonexistent in an archaic agricultural society. So, Furtado concludes, the very structure of economic life in the new nations—forced upon them in the last century—makes it difficult for them to absorb the benefits of scientific and technical progress on those rare occasions where they might have the opportunity to do so. Thus, the rich nations specialize in activities which make work easier, goods more abundant, leisure more widespread, and living standards higher. The poor nations are left with the grubby tasks of primary production and with a stagnant or declining market; they must sell cheap and buy dear from the booming factories" (Michael Harrington, American Power in the Twentieth Century, New York, 1967, p. 9 ) .

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic

To

admit

the

reality

of

the

slowness

of

change

Revolution.{50 to

deprive

themselves of the support of the masses a n d to yield the

is

political

initiative to radical d e m a g o g u e s ; to mobilize the masses on of

unattainable

goals

is t o

court

an

eventual

behalf

explosion—unless

that mobilization b e c o m e s a vehicle for subordinating the to centralized,

bureaucratic

control

of

the

sort

that

masses

communist

leaders provide most effectively. Furthermore, to obtain the port

of

the

the

reform

planners often h a v e to "tread most warily in order not to

disrupt

the traditional social order

contain

loopholes The

propertied

of

all sorts

distance

and

and

between

more

educated

groups,

sup-

. . . they permit the laws to even

let t h e m

promise

and

remain

attainment

unenforced/'41 thus

tends

to

widen. T h e p r o s p e c t is t h a t f e e l i n g s of i n t e n s i v e r e s e n t m e n t w i l l

most

likely g r o w as the g a p b e t w e e n the Third W o r l d

and the

oped world widens. * Indeed,

intensify as

they will probably

devel-

the year 2000 the spectrum expands and ranges from the f e w advanced Japan,

post-industrial

Sweden,

states

(only

then

2000

vanced

will

to the

approaching

States), to the ten to by

technetronic

Canada),

have

fifteen

the

the

those

primitive

containing

present

states,

levels

to the

still in t h e p r e - i n d u s t r i a l s t a g e , a n d in extremely

(the

or

so

United

mature

levels

of

States,

industrial

the

United

currently u n d e r d e v e l o p e d states

reached

early-industrial

states

dozen

conditions.

of

the

large

finally The

currently

group

less

(about

third

and

fourth

population

that ad-

sixty)

to those remaining

t h e majority of t h e world's

by

most

still

groups, and

ex-

p e r i e n c i n g at b e s t o n l y partially effective progress, will in all likelihood

be

the

centers

tension, and extremism

of

volatile

political

activity,

resentment,

42

I n t h a t c o n t e x t , it is difficult t o c o n c e i v e h o w d e m o c r a t i c 0

institu-

In 1965 the per-capita production of the developed world exceeded that of the less developed by twelve times; it is estimated that by the year 2000 the proportion will be eighteen times greater (Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000, New York, 1967, p. 142). In 1965 Illinois alone had a larger gross product than all of Africa; California, more than all of China.

Global Ghettos tions

(derived largely from Western experience but typical

of the m o r e stable a n d w e a l t h y W e s t e r n n a t i o n s ) a

{41

country

like

India—or

how

they

will

only

will endure

develop

in

elsewhere.*

" M u c h will d e p e n d o n the p a c e of e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t 43

a n d in this r e s p e c t the o m e n s are far f r o m favorable."

itself,

The

likely

c o n s e q u e n c e is s p o r a d i c t u r b u l e n c e i n i n d i v i d u a l c o u n t r i e s a n d turn toward more

personal

internally

dictatorships.

oriented,

though

The

latter will

socially

radical,

be

based

unifying

a on

doc-

trines in the h o p e that the c o m b i n a t i o n of x e n o p h o b i a

and

cha-

risma m a y provide the m i n i m u m stability necessary for

imposing

social-economic modernization from above. As in the case of u r b a n ghettos in the U n i t e d States, this make

for

advanced

a

tenser

world.

relationship

The

with

latter has

the

in recent

more

prosperous

years

come

to

may and

accept

— a t l e a s t as a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , a n d still g r u d g i n g l y — a

moral

obligation

Third

World.

to

This

assist "new

materially morality"

W a r rivalry, w h i c h

made

the

was

the

development

doubtless

two

developed

of

the

stimulated camps

by

Cold

compete

in

p r o v i d i n g a s s i s t a n c e t o t h e b a c k w a r d n a t i o n s . I t is f a r f r o m

cer-

t a i n t h a t t h e s e f e e l i n g s o f c o n s c i e n c e w i l l p e r s i s t if t h e C o l d

War

wanes;f

they

certainly will not

if E a s t - W e s t

rivalry

is

replaced

b y intensifying N o r t h - S o u t h animosity. T h e p e o p l e s of t h e oped

world

may

well

take

refuge

in

the

self-serving

that the irrational fanaticism of t h e leaders of t h e g l o b a l precludes cooperation. the further widening mankind, which

devel-

argument ghettos

Such a negative posture will ensure of the

is f o r t h e

gulf

first

both

a n d a m o r e bitter split

among

time beginning to live in

subjec-

tive intimacy. 0 "Like the states of seventeenth-century Europe the non-Western countries of today can have political modernization or they can have democratic pluralism, but they cannot normally have both" (Huntington, pp. 136-37). t This has been duly noted by some Third World spokesmen. The Algerian delegate to the UN Economic and Social Council meeting in Geneva said in July 1966, "Even as the detente in the Cold War has permitted an attenuation of the conflict between blocs with different social systems, one must fear that the East-West opposition will revolve on its axis and become an antagonism of North against South" (cited by Harrington, p. 20).

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic

Revolution.{52

4. Global Fragmentation and Unification T h e c u m u l a t i v e effect of t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c r e v o l u t i o n is tradictory. O n the o n e h a n d , this revolution marks the of a g l o b a l c o m m u n i t y ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it f r a g m e n t s and

detaches

revolution

it f r o m

is w i d e n i n g

its t r a d i t i o n a l the spectrum

moorings.

The

of t h e h u m a n

con-

beginnings humanity

technetronic condition.

It

intensifies t h e g u l f in t h e m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n o f m a n k i n d e v e n as it contracts m a n k i n d s subjective tolerance of that disparity. T h o u g h differences a m o n g societies gradually d e v e l o p e d in the c o u r s e of h u m a n h i s t o r y , it w a s n o t until t h e i n d u s t r i a l

revolution

t h a t t h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s b e c a m e sharp. T o d a y s o m e n a t i o n s still live under many

conditions

not

unlike

live in circumstances

those no

of

pre-Christian

better than

those

times,

of

the

A g e s . Y e t s o o n a f e w w i l l l i v e i n w a y s s o n e w t h a t it is n o w cult to imagine could of

be

the social a n d personal ramifications.

a profound

mankind.

technetronic

The

three-way

coexistence

societies,

each

of

split in the

attitudes

agrarian,

industrial,

providing

different

and

Middle diffi-

The

result

and

views

and

new

perspectives

life, w o u l d m a k e u n d e r s t a n d i n g m o r e difficult at t h e v e r y t i m e b e c o m e s m o r e p o s s i b l e , a n d it w o u l d r e n d e r t h e g l o b a l o f c e r t a i n n o r m s l e s s l i k e l y e v e n a s it b e c o m e s m o r e

Fragmented This weak

it

acceptance

imperative.

Congestion

three-way fabric of

on

global

social

split

could

further

and political order

and

strain

the

result in

and, therefore, possibly international chaos. G r o w i n g the Third W o r l d w o u l d very likely involve racist a n d

already domestic

anarchy

in

nationalist

Global Fragmentation and Unification passions.

At

the

very

least,

this w o u l d

create

major

{61

pockets

disruption and chaos in the world; at worst, Third W o r l d bility

could

draw

the

more

developed

nations

into

of

insta-

potentially

antagonistic forms of i n v o l v e m e n t that c o u l d h a v e the s a m e

effect

on American-Soviet relations as Balkan conflicts h a d o n the

Euro-

p e a n o r d e r p r i o r t o W o r l d W a r I. In the m o s t a d v a n c e d w o r l d the tension b e t w e e n "internal" "external" m a n — b e t w e e n

m a n p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h his inner

ing a n d his relationship to the infinite, a n d m a n d e e p l y in his e n v i r o n m e n t a n d c o m m i t t e d to s h a p i n g w h a t h e to be

finite—prompts

involved recognizes

a n a c u t e crisis of p h i l o s o p h i c , religious,

p s y c h i c i d e n t i t y ; this crisis is a g g r a v a t e d b y

the fear that

malleability m a y permit w h a t w a s previously considered ble

in

man

knowledge

to

poses

uncertainty

be

undermined.

the

danger

increasing

w h a t is k n o w n .

and

mean-

in

The

explosion

immuta-

in

scientific

of

intellectual

fragmentation,

direct

proportion

to

T h e result, especially in the

the

and

mans

with

expansion

United

States

Part I V for a m o r e e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n ) , is a n a c c e l e r a t i n g

in

(see

search

for n e w social and political forms. T h e i m p a c t of the U n i t e d States as t h e flects

these

searches

conflicting

for global

to preventing

tendencies.

stability

and

revolutionary

first

Though

devotes

upheavals,

global society the

United

its e n o r m o u s

its

social

violent

antagonism

to

itself,

it

sets

off

resources

impact

w o r l d is u n s e t t l i n g , i n n o v a t i v e , a n d c r e a t i v e . E v e n

as it

expectations

on

be

met

until

well

unification of other since

the

1960s

into

the

next

societies—not

become

century.

only

Washington's

It

because

the

provokes that

m e a s u r e d b y A m e r i c a n standards a n d that in most countries not

re-

States

are can-

accelerates

the

regionalism

has

professed

foreign-policy

formula but also because other nations see in unification the

best

w e a p o n f o r c o m b a t i n g A m e r i c a n i n f l u e n c e . I n its r o l e as t h e

first

g l o b a l society, it t h u s unifies, c h a n g e s , stimulates, a n d o t h e r s — o f t e n a g a i n s t its o w n tion" thus

creates

common

i m m e d i a t e interests.

aspirations

and

highly

challenges

"Americanizadifferentiated

reactions. In the Third W o r l d the effect of U n i t e d

S t a t e s i n f l u e n c e is

to

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic

intensify social contradictions tions. M a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s

and

Revolution.{54

conflict b e t w e e n

and education create

the

genera-

expectations—

for w h i c h t h e m a t e r i a l w e a l t h of A m e r i c a p r o v i d e s a v a g u e dard—that simply cannot b e m e t b y most societies. Since communications pected

that

traditional

nor education

political

can be

tensions

will

contained,

mount

as

neither

it is t o b e

purely

In

advanced world the contemporary challenge increasingly o n the identity of m a n , but in the Third W o r l d social tion looms as the principal

problem—one

which

nationalism

is

the

focuses

fragmenta-

is i n a

historic

societies' only slowly m a t u r i n g sense

their global responsibility for h e l p i n g d e v e l o p the Third Even

ex-

parochial,

attitudes yield to broader global perspectives.

race with the advanced

stan-

subject

to

contradictory

of

World.

influences.

Na-

tionalism has never been stronger and has never before

enjoyed

such extensive, aroused, and conscious support from the

popular

m a s s e s as w e l l as f r o m t h e intelligentsia. T h e i n t e r a c t i o n of nationstates still d e t e r m i n e s m a t t e r s a f f e c t i n g w a r a n d p e a c e , a n d

mans

p r i m a r y s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is still o n t h e b a s i s of n a t i o n a l i s m . non-Russian

The

states in the Soviet U n i o n are p e r h a p s the only

c e p t i o n to nationalism's successful dissolution of colonial Yet precisely because

this is so, n a t i o n a l i s m

compelling force that determines in our time. T h o u g h

is c e a s i n g t o b e

the b r o a d character of

still t h e s o u r c e of m a n y

pered by the growing recognition,

ex-

empires.

t e n s i o n s , it is

shared even

the

change tem-

by the most

na-

tionalist elites, that t o d a y regional a n d continental c o o p e r a t i o n necessary success

to the

fulfillment of

of n a t i o n a l i s m

makes

many the

nation

n o longer the vital subject, of d y n a m i c Because confusing, stricted

he

finds

and

impersonal

and

himself

familiar

living

purely

in

The

a principal

The

object,

but

a

congested, man

seeks

national

overlapping, solace

community

o b v i o u s o n e to turn to, a n d a definition of w h a t a n a t i o n a l m u n i t y is m a y w e l l b e c o m e tional cooperation was

a compromise

develops. dictated

m o r e restrictive as b r o a d e r For by

is

goals.

processes.

environment,

intimacy.

national

many

peoples

economics,

by

the

in

re-

is

the com-

transna-

nation-state

security,

and

by

Global Fragmentation and Unification other factors. A n

optimum

balance was

eventually

{61

struck,

often

a f t e r c e n t u r i e s o f c o n f l i c t . T o d a y t h e b a l a n c e is b e c o m i n g tled,

because

emerging,

newer

and

the

and

larger

effective

cohesive units into m u c h

frameworks

integration

of

of

unset-

cooperation

much

are

smaller,

l a r g e r w h o l e s is b e c o m i n g

more

increasingly

possible b e c a u s e of computers, cybernetics, communications,

and

so on. As a consequence, the F l e m i n g s a n d the W a l l o o n s in

Belgium,

the French and English Canadians in Canada, the Scots a n d W e l s h in t h e U n i t e d and

the

Slovenes

Czechoslovakia tionalities

Kingdom,

in Yugoslavia,

are

in the

the Basques in Spain, the and the

claiming—and

Soviet

Union

Czechs

some

of t h e

the

various

and

and

the

Croats

Slovaks

non-Russian

in na-

linguistic-ethnic

groups in India m a y soon c l a i m — t h a t their particular

nation-state

n o l o n g e r c o r r e s p o n d s t o h i s t o r i c a l n e e d . O n a h i g h e r p l a n e it h a s been

rendered

(Common

superfluous

Market)

intimate linguistic come

by

Europe,

or

some

other

regional

arrangement, while on a lower plane a and

religious

community

the impact of the implosion-explosion

more

is r e q u i r e d t o characteristic

overof

the

T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t is t h u s n o t a r e t u r n t o t h e e m o t i o n s o r t o

the

global metropolis.

ecstatic style of nineteenth-century nationalism, e v e n t h o u g h

there

a r e m a n y s u p e r f i c i a l a n a l o g i e s t o it. I t t a k e s p l a c e , b y a n d

large,

in a context that r e c o g n i z e s the current necessity for b r o a d e r operation

on

a

level

above

the

national.

It a c c e p t s

as

the functional integration of regions a n d e v e n of w h o l e

an

continents.

It is a r e f l e c t i o n of t h e d e s i r e for a m o r e d e f i n e d s e n s e of ality

in

an

increasingly

impersonal

world,

and

utility of s o m e of the existing state structures.

of

the

personchanged

This can even

s a i d of G a u l l i s m , w h i c h h a s o f t e n b e e n d e s c r i b e d as a

was

to construct

a Europe

that w o u l d

be

be

throwback

to nineteenth-century nationalism. Nevertheless, Gaullism's ambition

co-

ideal

major

"European"

and not dominated b y an external h e g e m o n y , though, to b e

sure,

F r a n c e w o u l d e x e r c i s e p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p i n it. T h e "new" nationalism has m a n y elements of the old

national-

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{56 ism, especially in s o m e of the n e w still

a radical,

feelings

but

changing

force

also prompting

nations. There

creatively

ethnic

nationalism

mobilizing

exclusiveness

and

conflicts.*

Y e t it is g e n e r a l l y t r u e , a s t h e a u t h o r o f a s u g g e s t i v e p a p e r that "the vision a n d objectives of society

[have]

the

past

Renaissance

five

which

guided

man's

Today

concepts

behavior

for

the

h u n d r e d years." T h e nation-state as a f u n d a m e n t a l

of man's organized force:

have

notes,

changed.

a n e w c o n c e p t o f m a n a n d his w o r l d is c h a l l e n g i n g t h e of

life has

"International

banks

ceased and

to be

the

principal

multinational

unit

creative

corporations

are

acting a n d p l a n n i n g in terms that are far in a d v a n c e of the tical

concepts

of

gradually yielding

the

nation-state."44

its s o v e r e i g n t y ,

But

as

the

is

community

poli-

nation-state

the psychological

o f t h e n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y is rising, a n d t h e a t t e m p t t o an equilibrium b e t w e e n t h e imperatives of the n e w

is

importance establish

international-

ism and the n e e d for a m o r e intimate national c o m m u n i t y

is

the

source of frictions a n d conflicts. T h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h a t e q u i l i b r i u m is b e i n g m a d e m o r e cult b y the scientific a n d technological

innovations in

diffi-

weaponry.

It is i r o n i c t o r e c a l l t h a t i n 1 8 7 8 F r i e d r i c h E n g e l s , c o m m e n t i n g the

Franco-Prussian

reached

such

a stage

War, of

proclaimed perfection

that

that

"weapons

further

used

progress

on

have which

w o u l d h a v e a n y r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g i n f l u e n c e is n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e . "

45

N o t only h a v e n e w w e a p o n s b e e n d e v e l o p e d but s o m e of the basic concepts

of

geography

and

strategy

have

been

fundamentally

altered; s p a c e a n d w e a t h e r control h a v e r e p l a c e d S u e z or

Gibral-

tar as k e y e l e m e n t s of strategy.

0 . . . In spite of all the parallels to European nationalism, the new nationalism in South Asia is something very different. It differs in many more respects and for more fundamental reasons than appears from the qualifications just listed. The fundamental reason is that an historical process that in Europe spans centuries is telescoped within a few decades and that the order of the happenings is deranged. . . . Nationalism there is needed to provide the impulse for change—indeed, for all the necessary changes, and concurrently. The difficulties in this syncopation of policies, the historical necessity of which is seen by all the enlightened intellectual and political leaders in the region, are immense" (Myrdal, pp. 2118-19).

Global Fragmentation and Unification In

addition

powerful

to

and

improved

more

rocketry,

accurate

well include automated

multi-missiles,

bombs,

or m a n n e d

future

{ 61

and

more

developments

space warships,

may

deep-sea

in-

stallations, c h e m i c a l a n d biological w e a p o n s , d e a t h rays, a n d other with.*

forms

of

These

of one-sided,

warfare—even

new

weapons

relatively

the

could

weather

may

be

either encourage

"inexpensive"

victory;

still

tampered

expectations

permit

proxy

con-

tests that will b e decisive in their strategic political o u t c o m e will b e fought b y only a f e w h u m a n beings

(as in the Battle

Britain) or e v e n b y robots in outer space;46 or s i m p l y create mutual instability that the b r e a k d o w n evitable,

in spite of

mans

rational

but

of p e a c e

recognition

will b e c o m e of

the

of

such in-

futility

of

war. I n a d d i t i o n , it m a y b e p o s s i b l e — a n d

tempting—to

exploit

for

strategic-political p u r p o s e s the fruits of research o n t h e brain on

human

behavior.

Gordon

specializing in p r o b l e m s

J.

F.

MacDonald,

a

and

geophysicist

of warfare, has written that

accurately

timed, artificially e x c i t e d electronic strokes "could l e a d to a

pat-

tern of oscillations that p r o d u c e relatively h i g h p o w e r levels

over

certain regions of the earth. a system

that

would

very large populations riod.

. . .

. . .

seriously

impair

the

develop

brain performance

in selected regions over an e x t e n d e d

N o matter h o w d e e p l y disturbing the thought of

the environment to manipulate to some,

In this w a y , o n e c o u l d

the technology

behavior for national

permitting

using

advantages

such use will very

develop within the next f e w decades."

of pe-

probably

47

Such technology will b e available primarily, and to b e g i n

with

° As one specialist noted, "By the year 2018, technology will make available to the leaders of the major nations a variety of techniques for conducting secret warfare, of which only a bare minimum of the security forces need be appraised. One nation may attack a competitor covertly by bacteriological means, thoroughly weakening the population (though with a minimum of fatalities) before taking over with its own overt armed forces. Alternatively, techniques of weather modification could be employed to produce prolonged periods of drought or storm, thereby weakening a nation's capacity and forcing it to accept the demands of the competitor" (Gordon J. F. MacDonald, "Space," in Toward the Year 2018, p. 34).

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{58 exclusively, to the most advanced countries.*

B u t it is likely

that

in the c o m i n g d e c a d e s s o m e states in the T h i r d W o r l d will taken

major

steps

toward

highly

destructive

using

it a g a i n s t t h e

acquiring—or

weaponry. major

Even

powers

if

will

they

without

have

are

acquired—

not

bringing

have

capable about

of

their

o w n extinction, t h e y m a y b e a b l e a n d t e m p t e d to u s e it in "underworld" wars a m o n g themselves. T h e question t h e n arises such wars would a

direct

threat

be interpreted by the major powers

to

the

fabric of

peace,

and

whether

whether

as a

posing

joint

sponse by them w o u l d be effectively m o u n t e d and imposed.

reThe

a b s e n c e of a c c e p t e d global institutions c o u l d temporarily b e

over-

c o m e b y ad

meet

hoc

arrangements

and agreements designed to

s p e c i f i c t h r e a t s , b u t i t is c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t i n s o m e c a s e s t h e r e n o t b e sufficient u n a n i m i t y to p e r m i t joint reactions. T h e annihilation

of

some

lesser

states thus remains

at least

will

mutual a

possi-

bility.

Toward a Planetary Yet chaos

it w o u l d are

the

be

Consciousness wrong

dominant

c o n s c i e n c e is f o r t h e

first

to

conclude

realities

of

our

that

fragmentation

time.

A

global

mans

human

t i m e b e g i n n i n g to m a n i f e s t itself.

c o n s c i e n c e is a n a t u r a l e x t e n s i o n of t h e l o n g p r o c e s s of personal horizons. In the course of time, m a n s

and

This

widening self-identi-

fication

e x p a n d e d f r o m his family to his village, to his tribe, to his

region,

to

his

nation;

(before World War

more

recently

I I it w a s

it

spread

not as c u s t o m a r y

to

his

continent

a s it is n o w

university s t u d e n t s or intellectuals to d e s c r i b e t h e m s e l v e s

for

merely

as E u r o p e a n s or A s i a n s ) .

* This has led one concerned scholar to comment, "Whether it is used to kill, hurt, nauseate, paralyze, cause hallucination, or to terrify military personnel and civilians, the systematic use of biological and chemical warfare will require the resolution of major moral and ethical problems" (Donald N. Michael, "Some Speculations on the Social Impact of Technology," mimeographed text of address to the Columbia University Seminar on Technology and Social Change, p. 6 ) .

Global Fragmentation and Unification During

the

transnational

last

three

European

centuries aristocracy

the

fading

and

the

of

the

{ 61

essentially

successive

ization of the Christian church, of socialism,

a n d of

national-

communism

h a v e m e a n t that in recent times most significant political

activity

has t e n d e d to b e confined within national compartments. we

are

again

but now

witnessing

the

they are c o m p o s e d

emergence

of

Today

transnational

elites,

of international businessmen,

schol-

ars, p r o f e s s i o n a l m e n , a n d p u b l i c officials. T h e ties of t h e s e elites cut

across

national

boundaries,

their perspectives

new

are

confined b y national traditions, a n d their interests are m o r e tional

than

national.

These

global

communities

are

not

func-

gaining

s t r e n g t h a n d , a s w a s t r u e i n t h e M i d d l e A g e s , it is l i k e l y t h a t fore l o n g the social elites of m o s t of the m o r e a d v a n c e d will be The

highly

creation

internationalist of

the

global

countries

or globalist in spirit a n d

information

grid,

outlook.

facilitating

continuous intellectual interaction a n d t h e p o o l i n g of will further enhance the present trend toward

almost

knowledge,

international

fessional elites a n d t o w a r d the e m e r g e n c e of a c o m m o n

pro-

scientific

l a n g u a g e (in effect, the functional equivalent of L a t i n ) . This, ever, could create a dangerous tically

activated

masses,

whose

gap between

them

and

"nativism"—exploited

nationalist political leaders—could

work

against the

in be-

how-

the

poli-

by

more

"cosmopoli-

tan" elites. Increasingly,

the

intellectual

elites

tend

to

think

in

terms

g l o b a l p r o b l e m s . O n e s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t o f t h i s p r o c e s s is t h e in w h i c h c o n t e m p o r a r y d i l e m m a s are identified: the n e e d to

of way

over-

c o m e technical backwardness, to eliminate poverty, to extend

in-

ternational cooperation in e d u c a t i o n a n d health, to prevent

over-

population, to develop effective peace-keeping machinery.*

These

° "We are discovering the need for coordination at the world level, for looking ahead so that the pieces can be fitted together more precisely. This has brought us to the beginning of global planning. FAO is a pioneer: its Indicative World Plan is the first such attempt, the prototype version of which will be ready in 1969. The ILO is working hard on a World Employment Plan. "The U.N.'s Center for Development Planning, Projections and Policies (CDPPP) is preparing what could well be called the framework for a master

I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{60 are all g l o b a l issues. O n l y thirty y e a r s a g o t h e y w e r e s i m p l y

not

in the forefront of p u b l i c attention, w h i c h w a s riveted at t h e on much

more

specific regional, national,

or territorial

T h e technetronic revolution creates conditions that make

possible

global

suffering in general. social

and

availability

Indeed,

economic of

the

responses

these

needs

a rudimentary

institutions means

to

to

has

conflicts.

increasingly

and

to

human

f r a m e w o r k of

already

cooperate

taken

globally

time

global

shape.*

The

intensifies

the

s e n s e of o b l i g a t i o n t o act. C o n s c i e n c e is e a s i l y p a c i f i e d b y a ing of

futility. A n

uneasy

conscience

is u s u a l l y

one

t h a t it c a n a c t d i f f e r e n t l y . T h e s e n s e o f p r o x i m i t y , t h e

that

to stimulate

an

outlook

that

views

knows

immediacy

of suffering, t h e g l o b a l l y destructive character of m o d e r n all h e l p

feel-

mankind

weapons

as

a

com-

munity. I t is a h o p e f u l which the public

sign

in this c o n n e c t i o n

measures

going a constructive change. present,

territorial

that the

yardsticks

international competition

are

In the recent past, a n d e v e n in

expansion,

population,

and

vague

c l a i m s of cultural a n d i d e o l o g i c a l superiority, as w e l l as

ally these are g i v i n g w a y to rivalry in G N P

military

come and

and consumption

data, educational

scientific attainments,

of h e a l t h a n d nutrition,

research

and

even

and

influence.

figures,

development, national

scores, to s a y n o t h i n g of t h e s p a c e race b e t w e e n

have

Gradu-

per-capita

opportunities,

competitive

the

national

p o w e r in general a n d victory in direct contests in particular, provided the criteria for m e a s u r i n g status a n d

by

under-

in-

creative standards Olympic

the two

super-

powers. T o a n y o n e living in 1914 the current international

rivalry

plan covering all such activities. This is part of the task imposed on it by assembly resolutions which request the secretary-general, in plain words, to prepare future development efforts which are an improvement on the present development decade" (Jan Tinbergen, "The Way Out of the Labyrinth," Ceres (FAO Review), Vol. i, No. 3, May-June 1968, p. 20). * To list but a few: a world health organization, a world food and agricultural organization, a world labor organization, a world educational and cultural organization, a world bank, a global meteorological organization, an international atomic-energy agency, an international civil-aviation organization, an international agency for the peaceful uses of outer space, an agency for tapping the ocean beds, etc.

Global Fragmentation and Unification

{ 61

in p r o d u c i n g m o r e impressive charts a n d in defining n e w for measuring

national

status

would

be

well-nigh

indices

incomprehen-

sible; at that t i m e nationalist geopolitics p r o v i d e d

a more

direct

appeal. Today

a

different

orientation

is

becoming

dominant.

Social

p r o b l e m s are s e e n less as t h e c o n s e q u e n c e

of d e l i b e r a t e evil

and

more

both

and

as

the

ignorance;

unintended

solutions

are

b u t in t h e u s e of m a n s edge. Increasingly,

by-products not

sought

of

in

accumulated

complexity

emotional

simplifications

social and scientific

it is f e l t t h a t t h e v a r i a t i o n s i n b o t h

knowl-

scientific

d e v e l o p m e n t a n d the h u m a n p s y c h e d o not lend t h e m s e l v e s to doctrinal solutions f o r m u l a t e d in a d v a n c e ; in addition, t h e pated consequences

of t h e d i s c o v e r i e s of s c i e n c e h a v e

unanticiproduced,

especially in the m o r e a d v a n c e d countries, an awareness that basic issues facing m a n

have

survival,

international

irrespective

of

a common

significance for

internal

diversity.

T h e c o n c e r n w i t h i d e o l o g y is y i e l d i n g t o a p r e o c c u p a t i o n e c o l o g y . Its b e g i n n i n g s

c a n b e s e e n in the u n p r e c e d e n t e d

with public

p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h m a t t e r s s u c h as air a n d w a t e r p o l l u t i o n , ine, overpopulation, and weather,

radiation, a n d the control of disease,

as w e l l as in t h e increasingly

the

human

famdrugs,

non-nationalistic

ap-

p r o a c h e s to t h e exploration of s p a c e or of t h e o c e a n b e d . T h e r e already widespread

consensus

that functional

planning

is

a b l e a n d t h a t it is t h e o n l y w a y t o c o p e w i t h t h e v a r i o u s

ecologi-

cal threats.48 Furthermore, g i v e n the continuing a d v a n c e s in p u t e r s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , t h e r e is r e a s o n t o e x p e c t t h a t technology

will m a k e

such

planning

more

multi-spectral analysis from earth satellites space race)

The

new

focus. still

in

addition,

( a b y - p r o d u c t of

global

neither

of

the in

resources. consciousness,

however,

is o n l y

beginning

a n i n f l u e n t i a l f o r c e . It still lacks i d e n t i t y , c o h e s i o n ,

Much

com-

modern

h o l d s out t h e p r o m i s e of m o r e effective p l a n n i n g

regard to earth

become

feasible;

is

desir-

humanity—indeed,

shares

nor

is

prepared

the to

majority support

of it.

to and

humanity— Science

t e c h n o l o g y are still u s e d t o b u t t r e s s i d e o l o g i c a l c l a i m s , t o

and

fortify

I:

The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution.{62

national

aspirations,

and

M o s t states are s p e n d i n g

to

reward

more

on

narrowly arms than

national on

interests.

social

services,

and the foreign-aid allotment of the t w o m o s t p o w e r f u l

states

highly disproportionate to their asserted global missions.*

is

Indeed,

it c a n b e a r g u e d t h a t i n s o m e r e s p e c t s t h e d i v i d e d , i s o l a t e d ,

and

c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d w o r l d of old h a d m o r e inner c o h e s i o n a n d

en-

joyed

greater h a r m o n y

than the volatile

global

reality

of

today.

Established cultures, d e e p l y entrenched traditional religions,

and

distinctive

and

firm

national

identities

provided

a

stable

framework

moorings; distance and time w e r e the insulators against

cessive friction b e t w e e n the compartments. T o d a y the

is d i s i n t e g r a t i n g a n d t h e i n s u l a n t s a r e d i s s o l v i n g . T h e n e w unity has yet to

find

its o w n

structure, consensus,

and

ex-

framework global

harmony.

° It was estimated that in 1966 global arms spending was 40 per cent greater than the world's outlays for education and was more than three times greater than the world's public-health budget. In that same year the total foreign aid extended by the United States was approximately $4 billion, by the Soviet Union approximately $330 million (both sets of figures from "World Military Expenditures, 1966-1967," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C., 1968, especially pp. 9 - 1 2 ) .

AMAMM

P A R T II

The Age of Volatile Belief T h e a g e of v o l a t i l e b e l i e f is i n t i m a t e l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e

im-

of

ideologies

and

o u t l o o k s o n life. W h a t m a n t h i n k s is c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o w h a t

man

pact

the

technetronic

revolution

on

experiences.

T h e relationship b e t w e e n

interacting:

experience

the

interpretation

seems

increasingly

of

affects

to b e

that

tured, changing perspectives.

t h e t w o is n o t c a u s a l

thought,

experience.

existing

Today

of highly

and

thought

the

dominant

individualistic,

pattern unstruc-

beliefs, the

result

of the m e r g e r of ideas a n d institutions, n o longer a p p e a r to

many

as vital a n d so

heavily

to

relevant, the

while

Institutionalized

but

conditions

the skepticism

undermining

of

that has

institutionalized

contributed beliefs

now

clashes with the n e w emphasis on passion and involvement.

The

r e s u l t f o r m a n y is a n e r a o f f a d s , o f r a p i d l y s h i f t i n g b e l i e f s ,

with

emotions providing for s o m e the unifying c e m e n t previously

sup-

plied b y institutions a n d with the f a d e d revolutionary slogans the past providing the n e e d e d inspiration for facing an

of

altogether

different future. 63

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

Several b r o a d phases can b e discerned in the formation of collective

human

consciousness

that

conditions

our

reality a n d provides the f r a m e w o r k for intellectually that reality. T h e in

establishing

occupation with source

of

perspective

and

linked

man's

his inner life to a universal

a standard

God-given,

that

of b e h a v i o r

the line b e t w e e n

binding the

upon

finite

crucial

individual

God,

and

to

structuring

great religions of r e c o r d e d history w e r e a

the

response

who

pre-

was

the

all. R e a l i t y

was

the

was

infinite

blurred. T h e ideological phase associated with industrialization and spread

of

literacy

involved

a

much

higher

propensity

social activism a n d e m p h a s i z e d m o r e i m m e d i a t e goals, as either in terms of the nation external

condition

of

man

or s o m e being

other collective

the

primary

the

toward defined

good,

focus.

called for a m o r e explicit definition of our reality, a n d

the

Activism systematic,

even dogmatic, intellectual frameworks were m e a n t to meet

that

need. In our time the established ideologies are c o m i n g under b e c a u s e their institutionalized in mobilizing impediment

the

relatively

to intellectual

character, w h i c h

uneducated adaptation,

was

masses, while

attack

once

has

useful

become

their concern

an with

t h e e x t e r n a l q u a l i t i e s o f l i f e is i n c r e a s i n g l y f e l t t o i g n o r e t h e i n n e r , m o r e spiritual dimension. C o m m i t m e n t to individual action, on moral indignation

and stimulated by

general education, has b e c o m e

a much

higher

a substitute for highly

based

level

of

organized

activity, t h o u g h it a v o i d s t h e p a s s i v i t y a n d i n d i f f e r e n c e t o e x t e r n a l reality that w a s characteristic of the pre-ideological

age.

C o m p e l l i n g ideologies thus are giving w a y to c o m p u l s i v e but

without

the

eschatology

that

characterized

other

ideas,

historical

e r a s . Y e t t h e r e is s t i l l a f e l t n e e d f o r a s y n t h e s i s t h a t c a n

define

the m e a n i n g a n d the historical thrust of our times. In that

search

the

dominating

passion

is e q u a l i t y — a m o n g

men

within

tions, within societies, a m o n g races, a n d a m o n g nations.

instituEquality

motivates both the rebels in the universities—in the W e s t a n d the E a s t — a n d the n e w nations in their struggle against the

in

better

{71

The Quest for a Universal Vision established and

richer

ones. T h i s e m p h a s i s , as w e l l as t h e fear

personal obsolescence, causes concern in m a n y that the n e w industrial

age

competences,

will require

even

differentiation

in

skills,

and intellectual preparation, thereby widening

disparities within the h u m a n fying global

greater

c o n d i t i o n at a t i m e of e v e r

of

post-

the

intensi-

interaction.

1. The Quest for a Universal Vision "Man

came

silently

into the world."

1

But

though

his

coming

is s h r o u d e d i n m y s t e r y — i n t h e s e n s e t h a t w e still k n o w l i t t l e a b o u t the actual beginnings

earliest

known

history m a n has g i v e n e v i d e n c e of an intense y e a r n i n g to

of h u m a n

existence—from

under-

stand himself

primi-

a n d his environment.

However

crudely and

tively, m a n has a l w a y s s o u g h t to crystallize s o m e organizing

prin-

ciple that w o u l d , b y creating order out of chaos, relate h i m to

the

u n i v e r s e a n d h e l p d e f i n e his p l a c e i n it.2 Despite human

the disappearance

evolution—or

in earlier times of entire

social d e v e l o p m e n t — h a s

involved

cultures,3 both

e x p a n s i o n in man's a w a r e n e s s of h i m s e l f a n d his f e l l o w s as a man

entity

endowed

with

certain

common

qualities

an

in-

creasingly systematic intellectual effort to define a n d organize

his

external reality meaningfully. T h e r e has thus b e e n Teilhard d e C h a r d i n has called "an a u g m e n t a t i o n of • . . a stream

whereby

a continuing

and

and

an hu-

at w o r k

transmissible

o f r e f l e c t i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d a n d a l l o w e d t o i n c r e a s e . "

tradition

4

In terms of the entirety of h u m a n existence, that "stream" indeed

be

a short one,

as

the

critics

of the

notion

what

consciousness

of

may

historical

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

progress

readily

point

out.

Nevertheless,

recorded

history

does

provide strong e v i d e n c e of g r o w t h — o f t e n halting a n d uneven, g r o w t h n o n e t h e l e s s — i n man's c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a c o m m o n fate, of dard.*

certain Even

universal

when

they

cravings,

and

compete,

of

religions

common and

but

human

moral

stan-

ideologies

have

increasingly d o n e so in terms of a n d for the sake of principles seem, w h e n v i e w e d f r o m a historical perspective, m o r e a n d

that more

to i n v o l v e s e m a n t i c a n d n o t s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f e r e n c e s . T h i s is n o t deny

that practice

has

often widely

markable that conflicts h a v e b e e n w a g e d over competitive to

a

superior

values

as

interpretation

democracy,

and

welfare,

to

d i f f e r e d ; it is, h o w e v e r ,

application

individual

of

such

dignity,

re-

claims

universal

and

personal

freedom.

The Universal The

Religions

crucial breakthrough

in the

development

of

human

self-

a w a r e n e s s o n a m a s s s c a l e c a m e w i t h t h e g r e a t r e l i g i o n s — t h e first universal

syntheses

that

simultaneously

expanded

man's

b o t h vertically a n d horizontally: vertically, to define in and

complex

small

group's

terms alone

man's

relationship

but everyone's;

to a G o d

horizontally,

that to

series of imperatives that g o v e r n e d man's obligations the

grounds

emerged

that

all s h a r e d

as a state of m i n d

the divine even

spark.

vision

extended not

a

articulate

was

a

to m a n

Universalism

at a t i m e w h e n

man

was

on thus still

* We are talking here about our history—of our historical civilization. Claude Levi-Strauss is otherwise quite right in pointing out that . . it is forgotten that each of the tens or hundreds of thousands of societies which have existed side by side in the world or succeeded one another since man's first appearance, has claimed that it contains the essence of all the meaning and dignity of which human society is capable and, reduced though it may have been to a small nomad band or a hamlet lost in the depths of the forest, its claim has in its own eyes rested on a moral certainty comparable to that which we can invoke in our own case. But whether in their case or our own, a good deal of egocentricity and naivety is necessary to believe that man has taken refuge in a single one of the historical or geographical modes of his existence, when the truth about man resides in the system of their differences and common properties" (The Savage Mind, Chicago, 1966, p. 249).

{71

The Quest for a Universal Vision provincial a n d isolated in mutually exclusive social-cultural

com-

partments. Accordingly, the birth of the universal religions represents appearance

of

humanity

equality before G o d

qua

humanity.

The

assertion

of

man's

in t e r m s of h i s spirit, his c o n s c i e n c e ,

soul, laid the basis for the transcendental

the

or

hu-

m a n b e i n g a n d for the m u c h later assertion of the equality of in their political a n d social dimensions.

his

importance of t h e

In that sense,

men

proselytiz-

ing Christianity, w h i c h universalized the more limited Greek

and

Judaic tradition, w a s

was

a particularly

revolutionary

force and

v i e w e d as s u c h b y e s t a b l i s h e d authority, in spite of t h e

distinction

it m a d e b e t w e e n e q u a l i t y b e f o r e G o d a n d o b e i s a n c e t o C a e s a r Caesars

terms.

struggle

and

If h u m a n

an

history

evolution

can

toward

be

the

said to involve

progressive

on

both

liberation

man, then the attainment of equality before the supernatural

a of

was

t h e first m a j o r s t e p o n t h a t r o a d . But

early

himself

man

or his

could

neither

environment.

given to b e accepted,

control

Both

were

nor

comprehend

essentially

a

either

mystery,

a

w h a t e v e r t h e pains of life m i g h t be. A s

a

consequence, the distant future b e c a m e a m u c h more intense ject of p r e o c c u p a t i o n

than the immediate

present.

The

to c o p e effectively w i t h disease, plagues, infant mortality, a life

span,

prompted

or

natural

man

disasters

to seek refuge

such

as

floods

and

crop

in all-encompassing

ob-

inability short

blights

definitions

of

his reality. T h e s e in turn p r o v i d e d at least partial justification for the v i e w that h u m a n endeavor w a s futile and for the necessity accepting

events

with

fatalism.

By

taking

refuge

in

an

mous, distant, divine future, m a n relieved himself of the tion to struggle

intensely

with

the

present

under

obliga-

circumstances

he w a s neither intellectually nor practically prepared

for.

E v e n the notion of "free will"—a central c o m p o n e n t of the activist of the great religions, Christianity—basically inner

act of

conscience

necessary

for the

state

most

involved

an

grace,

rather

external

action.

N o stress w a s p l a c e d o n t h e struggle to i m p r o v e external

condi-

than a p o i n t of departure for morally m o t i v a t e d

of

of

autono-

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

tions, b e c a u s e t h e u n s t a t e d

assumption

was that they

could

be fundamentally improved. T h e emphasis was on the inner b y riveting his attention o n the universal a n d the divine man

could

master

the

present

by

simply

ignoring

it.

not man;

future,

Minimum

social action w a s m a t c h e d b y m a x i m u m c o m m i t m e n t to the

super-

natural. T o m e e t the central n e e d of their t i m e — m a i n l y , to p r o v i d e w i t h a firm m o o r i n g in a w o r l d w h i c h c o u l d not b e —and

to

assert

crystallized The

more

firm

into

control

dogmas

individually

over

and

mans

were

demanding

the d e g r e e of institutionalization.f

spirit,

organized the

religious into

religion,

the

one

hand

institutionalization holy wars of I s l a m )

and

came

higher

on

activism

the (the

other.)5 Crusades

anal-

ChristianWith

the

and

the

a n d t h e exercise of m u s c l e b y religious

nizations on their environment.

was

(This has prompted the

communism more

beliefs

institutions.*

ogies m a d e b y a n u m b e r of scholars b e t w e e n I s l a m a n d ity o n the

man

comprehended

orga-

P o w e r w a s asserted, however,

to

e x t e n d t h e c o n q u e s t of t h e spirit, n o t to e f f e c t s o c i a l c h a n g e .

The

i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of b e l i e f t h u s c o m b i n e d t w o f u n c t i o n s : it

was

the

zealots' self-defense m e c h a n i s m

against

a

non-believing

en-

v i r o n m e n t , a n d it w a s a t o o l f o r s u s t a i n e d p r o s e l y t i z a t i o n , o n e

de-

signed not only to w i n over adherents b u t to o v e r c o m e the inertial

* I do not propose—nor do I feel qualified—to become involved in the debate among Marxists, Freudians, and Jungians concerning the autonomy and the functionality of religious development. My concern here is with the emergence of a conceptual and institutional framework for defining man's relationship to his reality. t An extreme example is provided by the Catholic Church's insistence on celibacy. As one scholar has noted, "Celibacy ensured for it an exclusive loyalty of its personnel that was unavailable to other modern religious institutions. It often contributed to its amazing capacity to resist secular authority. It is worth noting in passing that churches with married priesthoods, be they Lutheran, Anglican, or Greek Orthodox (the latter allowing marriage only for the lower orders of priests), have not been able to stand up against secular authority in a way comparable to that of the Catholic Church. The Protestant and Orthodox churches have typically been servants and appendages of secular authority. They rarely could afford to resist it. One reason for this was precisely that their clerical personnel was deeply involved in the mesh of civil social life" (Lewis A. Coser, "Greedy Organizations," European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 7, 1967, p. 206).

{71

The Quest for a Universal Vision resistance of the masses, w h o w e r e largely indifferent to

spiritual

requirements.6 Although

Christianity

has

been

the

most

activist of

the

great

religions a n d has thereby laid the basis for the subsequent

secular

revolutionary

history,

movements

that have

dominated

t h e process of institutionalization—and the part of o r g a n i z e d tended

religion of

hence

Western

the emergence

status

a stake in the

to m u t e the radical m e s s a g e

on

quo—has

in the Christian concept

history: the m o v e m e n t t o w a r d salvation "on earth as in

of

Heaven."

Thus in practice the Christian churches have gradually

come

to

a c c e p t s o c i a l stratification a n d e v e n t o b e n e f i t f r o m it ( a s i n

Latin

America), and s o m e Lutheran varieties have even c o m e

sanc-

tion in d o g m a

concepts

of racial

inequality

that

are

to

at

extreme

variance w i t h the initial egalitarian revolution r e p r e s e n t e d b y n e w Christian relationship b e t w e e n G o d and The

other

practice

great

and

religions

in theory.

have

been

Buddhism

does

more not

the

man. passive—both

contain

in

imperatives

for social c h a n g e b u t offers salvation f r o m reality. U n l i k e

Chris-

tianity, nirvana d i d n o t s e r v e as a s p r i n g b o a r d for t e m p o r a l

activ-

ism.

Similarly,

Islam's

dominant

strain

of

fatalism

has

worked

against t h e p r e s e n c e of at least that e l e m e n t of tension

between

" e t e r n a l p e a c e " a n d " h e a v e n o n e a r t h " t h a t is s o s t r o n g i n t i a n i t y a n d t h a t h a s p r o m p t e d its r e p r e s s e d

The National With

the

environment,

Chris-

activism.7

Identity

growth

in

secular

the

West

of

rationalism,

m a n s ability accompanied

to by

master a

his

greater

a w a r e n e s s of social c o m p l e x i t y as w e l l as b y a b r e a k d o w n in existing

structure

of

religious

allegiance,

emerged

institutionalized religion. T h a t religious allegiance

to

simultaneously

rested o n the narrowness a n d o n the universalism of m a n s zons:

the narrowness

derived

from massive ignorance,

and a vision confined to the immediate

the

challenge

environment

communications; the universalism was provided b y the

hori-

illiteracy, by

limited

acceptance

1 oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

o f t h e i d e a t h a t m a n ' s d e s t i n y is e s s e n t i a l l y

in God's h a n d s

and

t h a t t h e l i m i t e d p r e s e n t is b u t a s t e p p i n g s t o n e t o a n u n l i m i t e d

fu-

ture. E m e r g i n g s e c u l a r i s m c h a l l e n g e d b o t h d i m e n s i o n s , a n d in

so

doing required for the external projection of man's identity an

in-

t e r m e d i a r y f o c u s of l o y a l t y — s o m e t h i n g in b e t w e e n t h e and

the

infinite.

The

nation-state

and

nationalism

immediate

were

the

re-

sponses. The

doctrine of sovereignty

created the institutional basis

c h a l l e n g i n g the secular authority of established religion, a n d challenge in turn p a v e d t h e w a y for the e m e r g e n c e of the conception of the nation-state.

of t h e process w h i c h and

American

concept

of

reality.

0

radically

altered

the

the

nation-state

became

man's political Nationalism infinite,

but

to

of

au-

dominant

simultaneously

e m b o d i m e n t of p e r s o n a l c o m m i t m e n t s a n d t h e p o i n t of for analyzing reality. This d e v e l o p m e n t

French

structure

a n d prepared the ground for a n e w The

people,

consummation

in the t w o centuries p r e c e d i n g

revolutions

thority in the W e s t

abstract

Sovereignty v e s t e d in the

instead of sovereignty v e s t e d in the king, w a s the

marked

for this

the

departure

a new

phase

in

consciousness. did

not

activate

seek the

to direct

the

impersonal

individual masses

immediately proximate goals. Paradoxically,

for

toward the

these concrete

w e r e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e still i n t a n g i b l e a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ,

the

sake

of

goals though

• "In both its religious and its secular versions, in Filmer as well as in Hobbes, the import of the new doctrine of sovereignty was the subject's absolute duty of obedience to his king. Both doctrines helped political modernization by legitimizing the concentration of authority and the breakdown of the medieval pluralistic political order. They were the seventeenth-century counterparts of the theories of party supremacy and national sovereignty which are today employed to break down the authority of traditional local, tribal, and religious bodies. In the seventeenth century, mass participation in politics still lay in the future; hence rationalization of authority meant concentration of power in the absolute monarch. In the twentieth century, the broadening of participation and the rationalization of authority occur simultaneously, and hence authority must be concentrated in either a political party or in a popular charismatic leader, both of which are capable of arousing the masses as well as challenging traditional sources of authority. But in the seventeenth century the absolute monarch was the functional equivalent of the twentieth century's monolithic party" (Huntington, p. 102).

The Quest for a Universal Vision

{ 7

n e w , object of worship: t h e nation. T h e nation b e c a m e the

source

o f e c s t a t i c , l y r i c a l a f f e c t i o n , a n d it w a s t h i s h i g h l y e m o t i o n a l lationship, flags,

symbolized by

the n e w

anthems

("La

re-

Marseillaise"),

and heroes, that served to energize the populace. T h e

crete g o a l s took the f o r m of m a s s i v e p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h

con-

frontiers,

irredenta, "brethren" to b e regained from foreign captivity, m o r e generally, t h e p o w e r a n d t h e glory of t h e state as t h e expression of the nation. T h e f o r m for the n e w

state thus b e c a m e

1

the

formal

institutional

dominant belief, with a monopolistic

t h e a c t i v e d e d i c a t i o n t o it of m a n , n o w d e s i g n a t e d ,

and,

first

claim and

on

above

all, as t h e c i t i z e n . T h e designation "man the citizen" symbolically marks

another

milestone in the evolution of m a n as a social being. E q u a l i t y fore G o d was n o w m a t c h e d by equality before the law; egalitarianism of

note

that

was legal

now

reinforced

equality

was

by

legal

asserted

spiritual

egalitarianism.

both

by

the

be-

It

is

American

R e v o l u t i o n , w h i c h s u p p l e m e n t e d its stress o n e q u a l i t y b e f o r e

the

law with a strong attachment

de-

to religious values—indeed,

rived the former from the latter—and by the French which

constructed

its p a n t h e o n

of h u m a n

rejecting the religious tradition.

equality

it

Revolution, by

explicitly

In both cases the legal

equality

of t h e c i t i z e n w a s p o s t u l a t e d a s a u n i v e r s a l p r i n c i p l e — a n d t h u s it m a r k e d another giant step in the progressive redefinition of

mans

nature a n d p l a c e in our world. With plative

nationalism, man,

the

concerned

external man,

concerned

distinction with

his

with

between

the

inner

to

God,

relationship

shaping

his e n v i r o n m e n t ,

blurred. Nationalism as a n i d e o l o g y w a s m o r e lations to m a n were

were

not dependent,

objectivized as w a s

externally

by

contemand

activist; m a n s legal norms

man's relation to God,

on

conscience; yet at the s a m e t i m e the definition of m a n

emotional

vagueness

and

criteria.

even

This

irrationality

outlook when

involved used

as

reand

personal as a

tional" w a s b a s e d largely o n abstract, historically determined, highly

the

became

"naand

considerable a

conceptual

framework within w h i c h relations b e t w e e n nations and

develop-

1oo}

II:

The Age of Volatile Belief

ments within nations might be understood. Nationalism only tially i n c r e a s e d m e n ' s s e l f - a w a r e n e s s ; it m o b i l i z e d

them

par-

actively

b u t f a i l e d t o c h a l l e n g e t h e i r c r i t i c a l f a c u l t i e s ; it w a s m o r e a vehicle

for

human

passion

and

fantasizing

than

a

f r a m e w o r k t h a t m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o d i s s e c t a n d t h e n

mass

conceptual deliberately

reassemble our reality.

Ideological That

Universalism

is w h y

Marxism

represents

a further

vital

and

creative

s t a g e i n t h e m a t u r i n g of m a n ' s u n i v e r s a l vision. M a r x i s m is s i m u l taneously

the

inner,

p a s s i v e m a n a n d a v i c t o r y of r e a s o n o v e r b e l i e f : it s t r e s s e s

a victory

of

the

external,

active

man

over

man's

capacity to shape his material destiny—finite a n d defined as man's only reality—and

it p o s t u l a t e s

the

absolute

capacity

of

man

to

truly u n d e r s t a n d his reality as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e for his

active

e n d e a v o r s t o s h a p e it. T o a g r e a t e r e x t e n t t h a n a n y p r e v i o u s

mode

of political thinking, and

rigorous

Marxism puts a premium

examination

of

material

reality

on the

systematic

and

guides

on

to

action derived from that examination. Though

it

may

be

argued

that

this

intellectually

rigorous

m e t h o d w a s e v e n t u a l l y s u b v e r t e d b y its s t r o n g c o m p o n e n t of matic

belief,

awakening

the

Marxism masses

did to

an

expand intense

popular

dog-

self-awareness

preoccupation

with

by

social

equality and b y providing t h e m with both a historical a n d a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r i n s i s t i n g u p o n it. M o r e t h a n t h a t , M a r x i s m s e n t e d i n its t i m e t h e m o s t a d v a n c e d

repre-

and systematic method

analyzing the d y n a m i c of social d e v e l o p m e n t ,

for

for categorizing

a n d f o r e x t r a p o l a t i n g f r o m it c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s c o n c e r n i n g

it,

social

b e h a v i o r . It d i d s o in a m a n n e r that lent itself to translation

into

highly simplified principles that provided e v e n the relatively

un-

educated with the feeling that their understanding of

phenomena

h a d b e e n basically sharpened a n d that their resentments, tions, a n d v a g u e meaningful

aspirations could b e channeled

actions.

into

frustra-

historically

{71

The Quest for a Universal Vision Because ethical,

of

this,

rational,

Marxism

and

appealed

Promethean

simultaneously

instincts.

The

to

mans

ethical

nent, sustained b y man's emotions, d r e w on the

compo-

Judaeo-Christian

heritage; the rational r e s p o n d e d to m a n s increased desire to prehend

the dynamic

of his

material

environment

com-

more

system-

atically; a n d the P r o m e t h e a n stood for "man's faith in his

powers,

f o r t h e n o t i o n t h a t h i s t o r y is m a d e b y t h e p e o p l e a n d t h a t

nothing

c a n h e m in their a d v a n c e to perfection." I n this sense,

Marxism

has

served

8

as a m e c h a n i s m

of

human

" p r o g r e s s , " e v e n if its p r a c t i c e h a s o f t e n f a l l e n s h o r t o f its Teilhard de

Chardin notes at one point that "monstrous

is n o t m o d e r n magnificent, observes

totalitarianism

and

that

"all

thus the

quite

really near

peoples,

the

to

to

distortion

of

truth?"9

the

remain

something

Elsewhere

human

or

to

has formulated them." outside

the

immediate

10

What

problems the

West

h e d o e s n o t s a y is t h a t f o r

many

influence

of

terms in w h i c h

the

West

and

its

Christian

t r a d i t i o n it h a s b e e n M a r x i s m t h a t h a s s e r v e d t o stir t h e m i n d to mobilize h u m a n energies Moreover,

Marxism has

he

become

m o r e so, are i n e x o r a b l y l e d to f o r m u l a t e t h e h o p e s a n d of the m o d e r n earth in the v e r y s a m e

ideals. as it is,

and

purposefully. decisively contributed

to the

political

institutionalization a n d systematization of t h e deliberate effort define the nature of our era a n d of man's relationship to

to

history

at a n y g i v e n s t a g e in t h a t history. E m p h a s i s o n this q u e s t i o n

has

c o m p e l l e d reflection o n t h e relative i m p o r t a n c e of different forces of c h a n g e ,

the weighing

of

alternative historical

a n d at least the a t t e m p t at t e n t a t i v e j u d g m e n t .

interpretations,

Moreover,

it

has

p r o v o k e d a series of s u b o r d i n a t e q u e s t i o n s , all h e l p f u l in

forcing

r e c o g n i t i o n of c h a n g e a n d i n c o m p e l l i n g a d j u s t m e n t s t o it:

Within

t h e g i v e n era, w h a t particular p h a s e s c a n b e d e c i p h e r e d ?

Is

given phase

one

of i n t e r n a t i o n a l

tension,

s h i f t i n g l o c a l e of conflict, of a n e w present

principal

of

greater stability,

set of alliances? W h o and

objectively?

of our

Who

are

n o w o u r allies? W h a t are t h e s o u r c e s of principal, s e c o n d a r y ,

and

tertiary dangers?

foes—subjectively

are

any

1oo}

II:

The Age of Volatile Belief

Periodic,

formal,

purposeful

examination

of

such

questions

c o m p e l s s y s t e m a t i c p r o b i n g o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c e n e . T h i s is to say that c o n t e m p o r a r y ful

in

accurately

phenomena.

communists

perceiving

always

conviction

of

that

been

new

their

success-

international

analytical

tools often

led them

their

have

meaning

provide a faultless guide to the inner m e a n i n g of things has

and

Indeed,

the

not

astray. U n w i l l i n g to a c c e p t t h e n o t i o n of t h e

elusiveness

of

truth,

they

have

elevated

their

relativity

inescapably

partial insights into absolute d o g m a s and r e d u c e d c o m p l e x to gross

issues

oversimplifications.

Nonetheless, pression

of

to

define

communism—the

Marxism—primarily

from traditional to m o d e r n is, i n f a c t , n o t h i n g b u t

as

status,"

"a 11

institutionalized

disease

ex-

the

transition

or to assert that

"Marxism

an epiphenomenon

of

of technical

develop-

ment, a p h a s e of t h e painful marriage of m a n a n d technique," is t o n e g l e c t

what

of

its r e v o l u t i o n a r y

Marxism:

will probably

remain

major

influence,

which dram-

neglected

broadening

contribution

o p e n e d man's m i n d to previously ignored perspectives a n d atized previously

and

the

12

concerns.

To

say

as m u c h

is n o t

ignore the s u b s e q u e n t l y enslaving effect of institutionalized

to

Marx-

i s m — e s p e c i a l l y w h e n in p o w e r — o r its a n a l y t i c a l i n a b i l i t y to

cope

w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s o f t h e a d v a n c e d t w e n t i e t h - c e n t u r y w o r l d ; it is to assert that in t h e gradual Marxism

represents

evolution

as i m p o r t a n t

of m a n s

and progressive

universal a stage

vision as

the

a p p e a r a n c e of nationalism a n d of t h e great religions. In

all

three

cases—religion,

breakthrough had many about

as

genius.

the

result

of

nationalism,

and

Marxism—the

antecedents and did not suddenly an

entirely

autonomous

Marx capitalized on the intellectual

act

of

come

creative

achievements

of

his

i m m e d i a t e predecessors, for s o m e of w h o m socialism h a d a strong religious

basis.*

Similarly,

nationalism

and

the

great

religions

w e r e t h e articulate s y n t h e s e s of m o o d s , of attitudes, a n d of a

cer-

* Pierre Leroux (1797-1871) was among the first to analyze the term "socialism" conceptually and to use it in his writings. He saw in socialism the fulfillment of religious imperatives.

Turbulence within Institutionalized

{81

Beliefs

tain social receptivity that h a d matured over a very long of time. Also,

in all t h r e e c a s e s t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h

in

was

by

wars

followed

Inquisition;

national

slaughter;

brutal

the

as

mind

perversion hatreds

terror,

well

in practice:

as

expressed

purges,

the

body

and in

religious in

and

unprecedented

totalitarian the

period

perception

name

the mass

subjugation

of

a

of

"humanist"

ideology. N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n all t h r e e c a s e s t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l h o r i z o n s o f once

widened,

could

not

again be

narrowed.

Equality

man,

before

universal G o d and the emphasis on individual conscience,

ity b e f o r e the l a w a n d a c o m m i t m e n t to a social entity larger the i m m e d i a t e one, social equality a n d a concern for dissecting the dynamic

thrust

of

history—all

have

than

analytically cumulatively

h e l p e d to refine a n d enlarge m a n s political and social

conscious-

ness. G i v e n t h e d o m i n a n t role of t h e activist W e s t in s h a p i n g outlook

of

our

times,

now,

in the

second

half

of

century, almost everyone—often without knowing

a

equal-

the

the

twentieth

it—is to

some

extent a Christian, a nationalist, a n d a Marxist.

2. Turbulence within Institutionalized Beliefs It is i n c r e a s i n g l y difficult for institutions to assert cally t h e pristine purity of the doctrines

dogmati-

that they claim

b o d y . T h i s is a s t r u e o f t h e C h r i s t i a n c h u r c h e s

as of

to

em-

communist

parties; in s o m e of t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d c o u n t r i e s this difficulty also involves—especially

on

the

part

of

in

al-

T o d a y t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f i d e a s t o i n s t i t u t i o n s is t u r b u l e n t :

in-

legiance to t h e p r o c e d u r e s of liberal

the

young—a

crisis

democracy.

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

stitutions resist ideas lest t h e y l e a d to c h a n g e s that u n d e r m i n e institutions, a n d the exponents

of i d e a s r e b e l a g a i n s t

the

institutions

b e c a u s e of t h e intellectual constraints said to b e i n h e r e n t in

their

existence. This

development

is p a r t

of

the progressive

secularization

o u r life. A n i m p o r t a n t r o l e in this p r o c e s s is p l a y e d b y t h e character of c o n t e m p o r a r y

communications,

dissemination of ideas a n d

images,

which permits

rapid

a n d requires less reliance

an organized effort to proselytize. T o d a y , m o r e p e o p l e are to impressions that are both m o r e

on

exposed

and more volatile than

ever

b e f o r e . T h e r e is n o l o n g e r t h e s a m e n e e d t o c h a l l e n g e rigid

and

traditional

taboos

with

fluid

of

changed

alternative

and

more

appealing

visions,

or to o v e r c o m e social inertia w i t h o r g a n i z e d m o b i l i z a t i o n of effort. All this puts institutionalized beliefs o n the d e f e n s i v e :

more

m o r e their

loyalty

efforts are

designed

to retain

the positive

and of

their adherents a n d to c o m b a t influences that are inimical to structured, formalized, and highly institutionalized

beliefs.

W r i t i n g a l m o s t a c e n t u r y a g o , M a r x o b s e r v e d t h a t " u p till it h a s b e e n t h o u g h t t h a t t h e g r o w t h of t h e C h r i s t i a n m y t h s the Roman

Empire

was

possible

only because

printing

now

during

was

yet invented. Precisely the contrary. T h e daily press a n d the graph,

which

in

a

moment

earth, fabricate m o r e m y t h s enlarge

upon them)

d o n e in a century."

13

in one When

spread

inventions

over

the

tele-

whole

( a n d the bourgeois cattle believe day

than could have

not

formerly

to t h e p r e s s a n d t e l e g r a p h is

and been

added

the c o n t e m p o r a r y global role of radio a n d television, a n d to

reli-

gion are a d d e d c o n t e m p o r a r y ideologies, Marx's observations

be-

c o m e even m o r e pertinent. In addition to developments

connected with the means

semination a n d t h e p a c e of technologically i n d u c e d social a n o t h e r f a c t o r is at w o r k . I n t h e v i e w of m a n y c o n c e r n e d especially a m o n g

the y o u n g e r generation, t h e f u s i o n of

or i d e o l o g i e s w i t h institutions has resulted in b u r e a u c r a t i c as w e l l as distortion in values. T h e l o n g tradition of

of

dis-

change, people, religions rigidity

institutional-

ized religion's concentration on the inner m a n has p r o m p t e d

social

Turbulence within Institutionalized passivity and

de facto

{81

Beliefs

indifference to concrete h u m a n

dilemmas,

in spite of stated c o m m i t m e n t s to humanitarianism; the m o r e temporary ideological preoccupation with mobilizing the m a n has resulted in political systems

whose

external

practice refutes

moral significance of their o f t e n p r o c l a i m e d humanitarian t i v e s . If i n t h e

first

case the spiritual elevation of m a n

the

objec-

has

m i t t e d his social deprivation, in the s e c o n d t h e assertion of social primacy has precipitated his spiritual

Institutional

con-

perman's

degradation.

Marxism

Moreover, m a n y p e o p l e feel that both o n the external, m e n t a l level of h u m a n e x i s t e n c e a n d o n t h e inner, one, current institutionalized

environ-

contemplative

beliefs no longer provide

adequate

responses to contemporary problems. Despite the intellectual v a n c e t h a t M a r x i s m r e p r e s e n t s i n o u r t h i n k i n g , it d o e s n o t

ad-

suffice

as t h e sole basis for m e a n i n g f u l c o m p r e h e n s i o n of o u r reality. coveries in m o d e r n science, a d v a n c e s in the s t u d y of t h e

Dis-

human

psyche, and even contemporary socio-economic developments no

longer

the

be

Marxist

satisfactorily framework.

spiritual e l e m e n t inner m a n — a

and

At

interpreted the

by

same

the renewed

exclusive

time,

the

can

reliance

neglect

the

search for the true nature

search m a d e m o r e urgent b e c a u s e of scientific

v e l o p m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e nature of the h u m a n brain a n d

basis for defining t h e m e a n i n g of h u m a n limitation

is

accentuated

by

personsole

existence.

the

link

between

ideas a n d institutions in t h e f o r m of bureaucratic

and

Marxist dogmatic

c o m m u n i s t parties. Precisely b e c a u s e M a r x i s m as a b o d y of a n d as a s o c i o - e c o n o m i c

method has become

so m u c h

ideas

a part

t h e W e s t e r n i n t e l l e c t u a l h e r i t a g e , its i n t e l l e c t u a l vitality a n d litical s i g n i f i c a n c e — t h e

latter c o n c e i v e d

of de-

a l i t y — h a v e further e x p o s e d the limitations of M a r x i s m as t h e

That

on

of

of

source of influence for social p r o g r a m s — n o

in b r o a d

terms

of po-

as

longer depend on

a an

organization of zealots. S u c h organization w a s n e e d e d to proselyti z e , t o s e i z e p o w e r , a n d t o h o l d it. S p e c i f i c R u s s i a n c o n d i t i o n s

led

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

to the L e n i n i s t f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e historical utility of s u c h a party a n d o f t h e a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y o f s u b o r d i n a t i n g t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o it. Subsequently,

the

bureaucratic

elements

that

unavoidably

g a i n e d c o n t r o l o v e r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o n c e it h a d c o m e

to

power

naturally t e n d e d to put a higher priority o n the organization

than

on the ideas that the organization was

and,

presumably, parties

has

acceptance bureaucratic

to nourish. come

to

and

supposed

to uphold

As

a result, the existence

of

an

effective impediment

to

be

development

organization,

of

Marxist

their inherent

thought. concern

communist the

further

The

parties'

for their

insti-

tutional vested i n t e r e s t s — e v e n at the e x p e n s e of the Marxist trine that they are said to e m b o d y — t h e i r

doc-

fear of intellectual

ex-

ploration, all h a v e c u m u l a t i v e l y s t i m u l a t e d b o t h o p p o s i t i o n o n

the

outside a n d ideological sterility o n the inside. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f this sterility is t h e s t r i k i n g f a c t t h a t t h e communist party has not produced a tial Marxist t h i n k e r in t h e

fifty

single

creative and

Soviet influen-

y e a r s s i n c e it s e i z e d p o w e r i n

1917.

( M o r e o v e r , its l e a d i n g intellectual lights, t h e b e g i n n i n g s of

whose

creativity antedated 1917, w e r e physically liquidated under

Soviet

rule.)

This

is r e m a r k a b l e ,

considering

the

attached to "creative" Marxism-Leninism party ever to h a v e c o m e

significance

by the

to p o w e r . E l s e w h e r e

probing

ential Marxist philosophers—George

Lukacs,

Schaff, or Leszek

invariably

Kolakowski—have

first

officially

communist and

influ-

Ernst Bloch, either

Adam

come

sharp conflict w i t h p a r t y discipline or h a v e e v e n t u a l l y b e e n

into

driven

out of the party. As l o n g as M a r x i s m w a s a n isolated school of thought, t h e could

serve

as

an

effective

mechanism

for

carrying

it

party

to

the

m a s s e s and, m o r e generally, as t h e s e l f - a p p o i n t e d a g e n t of history, the direction of w h i c h

Marxism

claimed

to have

correctly

tified. B u t o n c e M a r x i s m h a d b e c o m e part of t h e w o r l d s mainstream,

to

insist

on

its

separate,

institutional

iden-

historic

identity

and

e x c l u s i v i t y w a s t o d i m i n i s h its i n f l u e n c e a n d t o stifle its c r e a t i v i t y . Y e t t h a t is p r e c i s e l y w h a t t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s h a v e

continued

to do, a n d the C o m m u n i s t Party of the Soviet U n i o n has e v e n

ex-

Turbulence within Institutionalized

t e n d e d t h a t c l a i m b y a s s e r t i n g its right to p a s s o n t h e of other parties

general

more

increasing indifference to doctrine

membership

creative

Marxist

and

increasing

thinkers.

ideas have b e c o m e discredited. Europe, where communism nationalism, available

on

correctness

interpretations.

T h e result has b e e n the

the

admittedly

public

This

disaffection

is n o t

to

say

limited

attitudes

that

O n the contrary, even in

has h a d to compete and

indicate

very that

with

mass

access

to education,

among

among

the

socialist Eastern

anti-Soviet

fragmentary

data

socialism—broadly

c o n c e i v e d of as a n a t t e m p t to create a m o r e just society public welfare,

{81

Beliefs

through

social services,

public

o w n e r s h i p of t h e principal m e a n s of production, a n d social

egali-

tarianism—has w i d e popular support, whereas c o m m u n i s m

as

institutionalized belief has not.* Similarly, in the W e s t m o s t socialist parties n o w

accept the welfare society

as d e s i r a b l e

an

nonand

* Data to that effect come from polls taken both within a given country and among Eastern European travelers to the West. Thus, in a 1961 poll conducted in Warsaw among university students, 2 per cent identified themselves as "definitely Marxist" in outlook and 16 per cent as "on the whole, yes." One may assume that these two categories would represent the upper limit of student willingness to accept the official ideology, although many among the 16 per cent presumably would rebel against excessive party orthodoxy; 2 7-5 per cent said "definitely no" and 31 per cent "on the whole, no" to the question "Do you consider yourself a Marxist?" At the same time, however, 28.1 per cent expressed the definite desire to see the world "evolve toward some form of socialism" and 44.5 per cent responded "on the whole, yes," for a total of 72.6 per cent expressing a generalized preference for socialism (East Europe, April 1966, p. 19). The gap between the generalized acceptance of socialism and the selfidentification as Marxists is probably a good measure of the distinction made above. Similarly, in a sample of 490 Polish visitors to the West in i960 (people who were subsequently returning to Poland), 61 per cent defined communism as "a bad idea, badly carried out," while 14 per cent felt that it was "a good idea, badly carried out." The overwhelming majority however, endorsed postwar programs providing for a welfare state, education for all, agrarian reform, and nationalization of heavy industry (Some Aspects of the SocialPsychological and Political Climate in Poland, Audience Research Survey, Radio Free Europe, Munich, 1961, pp. 21, 24). A similar poll conducted among 119 Hungarians yielded 73 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, and again there was considerable endorsement of the measures adopted after World War II (Political Attitudes and Expectations of ng Hungarians, Audience, pp. 38, 43).

1 oo}

II:

normal,

The Age of Volatile Belief

though

tion.

The

view

in

not

necessarily

Catholic the

Church

remarkable

requiring

expressed

papal

extensive

much

encyclical

nationaliza-

the

same

"Mater

et

point

of

Magistra"

(1961). Accordingly, "institutional Marxism," or c o m m u n i s m , n o

longer

c o n f r o n t s a n i n t e l l e c t u a l r e a l i t y t h a t is h o s t i l e e i t h e r t o its

social

aspirations or e v e n to s o m e of t h e u n d e r l y i n g assumptions.

It

no

longer faces a w o r l d that intellectually rejects M a r x i s m — t h a t

is,

a virgin territory tively organized.

to b e

attacked

by

zealous

missionaries

B y the same token, the only historical

collecfunction

of the closed Leninist-type party n o w appears to b e to help munists w h o are in p o w e r to stay in p o w e r . A s a result, a thinker can no longer b e

a communist

if h e

wishes

com-

Marxist

to remain

a

thinker. T h a t Leninist link b e t w e e n herent

restraints

and

ideas and p o w e r — w i t h

predispositions

toward

dogmatism

involves—drives away from communism both the and

the

"efficiency-seeking" intellectuals.14

all t h e

The

that

concern with the

external,

it

"truth-seeking" former

group—

typically the philosophers, humanists, and writers—reacts the excessive

in-

active man;

against

it s e e k s

to

restore a n d r e n e w c o n c e r n w i t h t h e inner m e a n i n g of life a n d

to

c o n f r o n t s u c h s o c i o - p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a as a l i e n a t i o n ; it a l s o a basic incompatibility

between

the quest for personal

that M a r x i s m is s a i d to e m b o d y a n d M a r x i s m ' s

institutionalization

as a s y s t e m of p o w e r . T h e m o s t articulate a n d m o v i n g tions of the s y s t e m

have

usually

come

c o m e to be called the " N e w with

the

"larger"

condemna-

f r o m this group.

c o m m u n i s t countries, this g r o u p also contains m u c h

cupied

In

concerning

non-

of w h a t

L e f t , " w h i c h is i n t e l l e c t u a l l y

questions

the

has

preoc-

individual.

C o h n - B e n d i t — t h e radical leader of the F r e n c h students in

1968—

characteristically reserved his sharpest barbs for the French munist

sees

freedom

Com-

Party.15

Another institution

threat

to

is

challenge

the

lectuals—typically

the

the

established from

economists,

link

the the

between

ideology

"efficiency-seeking" scientists,

and

the

and intelnew

Turbulence within Institutionalized managers.

Beliefs

{ 81

T h e y are p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h s o c i o - e c o n o m i c effi-

ciency, a n d t h e y see in the elevation of d o g m a s ordination

of

ideas

tive d o g m a t i s m — a

to

institutions—with

major

impediment

the

and in the

resulting

sub-

conserva-

to positive social

change.

Less concerned with the inner man, more preoccupied with

satis-

fying the d e m a n d s of the external m a n , they d o not p o s e a

head-

o n c h a l l e n g e t o t h e s y s t e m . B u t b e c a u s e t h e i r a t t a c k is and

because

the

attackers

themselves

are b e c o m i n g

oblique— both

numerous and socially m o r e indispensable to an industrial — t h e i r c h a l l e n g e is m o r e

difficult to suppress.

The

more society

truth-seekers

confront h e a d on; in the case of weaker, m o r e disorganized tems

they

crushed

have

by

the

occasionally application

been of

successful,

superior

only

power.

to

The

be

efficiency-

seekers d o not confront; they seek to erode. Both their a n d their d e f e a t s — s e e n in the c y c l e of c o m m u n i s t forms

and

subsequent

retreats—are

less

visible,

syslater

successes

economic less

re-

extensive,

but perhaps more tangible. At some point, however, even the efficiency-oriented group

will

h a v e to a d d r e s s itself to t h e m o r e b a s i c q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g

the

n a t u r e of m a n a n d t h e p u r p o s e of social e x i s t e n c e . U n t i l it

does

so, t h e r e is a l w a y s t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e r u l i n g e l i t e c a n a t

least

temporarily s u c c e e d in c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z i n g

the scientific

commu-

n i t y , i n e x t r a c t i n g its t a l e n t s , a n d i n c o r r u p t i n g it w i t h a s y s t e m rewards—all

the

while

reserving

to

itself

the

definition

of

of the

larger objectives. Conscious

of

bureaucratic been

this

danger

tradition,

inclined

to

and

reacting

contemporary

assert

the

primacy

against

Marxist of

the

dogmatic

philosophers

human

reason

and

have con-

science over vested organizational interests a n d to point out inescapable apply a

to

limitations

reality.

widespread

'Marxist"

as

Leszek

mood no

of

any

Kolakowski,

when

longer

ideological

he

writing

attacked

meaning

"a

framework

the

person

in

one

1956,

degraded who

reflected notion

of

recognizes

a

definite, m e a n i n g f u l v i e w of t h e world, b u t a p e r s o n of a intellectual

make-up

who

is

distinguished

by

his

the may

definite

readiness

to

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

recognize

the views

established

institutionally."

16

Rejecting

stitutional Marxism," Kolakowski asserted that party

"in-

interference

i n s c i e n t i f i c p u r s u i t s is, b y d e f i n i t i o n , u n - M a r x i s t , s i n c e it

contra-

dicts the e s s e n c e of Marxism: a deliberate, scientific, a n d

rational

inquiry similar

aiming vein,

at

the

closest

Yugoslav

philosophical

Praxis—a

journal

that "Marxism" and

approximation

philosophers

of

associated

magazine

the

truth.

with

the

n o t e d f o r its

In

insistence

"institutional truth" are contradictory

— r i d i c u l e d t h e v i e w s of a Soviet p h i l o s o p h e r w h o that the Party's Central C o m m i t t e e

had

terms

"asserted

formed the best solutions

the most important theoretical questions, including

today

is 'the a m a l g a m a t i o n of all f o r c e s w i t h i n t h e socialist c a m p . ' " to the

Soviet

view

a Yugoslav

philosopher

noted

"the resolutions p a s s e d b y the Central C o m m i t t e e are n o phy whatsoever." More

to

philosophical

ones; in his opinion, the m o s t important philosophical task

response

a

Zagreb

In

that

philoso-

17

fundamental

still h a s

been

the

challenge

to

the

notion

that Marxism as a science of history provides b o t h practical

and

ethical

and

guides

to

the

the more outspoken

future.

The

opponents

more

critical

of t h e fusion of

revisionists Marxist

and a Leninist-type party have challenged that premise K o l a k o w s k i p u t it p a r t i c u l a r l y

thought as

well.

eloquently:

A philosophy of history worthy of consideration describes only what has existed, the past, and not the creative future of the historical process. For this reason, those who wish to subordinate their own engagement in future processes to the pronouncements of the philosophy of history are only tourists who write their names on the walls of dead cities. Everybody can, if he wishes, interpret himself historically and discover the determinants to which he was subject in the past. But he cannot do so with respect to the self he has not yet become. He cannot deduce his own future development from the pronouncements of the philosophy of history in which he trusts. To work such a miracle would mean to become the irrevocable past oneself; that is, to cross the river of death which, the poet says, no one ever sees twice.18 Even

relatively

Schaff—who have

orthodox

Marxist

actively defended

thinkers—such

as

the fusion of ideas

Adam and

in-

Beliefs

{81

choice

between

Turbulence within Institutionalized stitutions

have

eventually

had

to

confront

the

intellectual subordination to institutional loyalty and

intellectual

integrity at t h e e x p e n s e of g o o d s t a n d i n g in t h e party. In

belatedly

o p t i n g for the latter, Schaff freely c o n c e d e d that his o w n could no longer be

confined to the conservative,

hence institutional—definition to

acknowledge

that

his

sociology of M a r x i s m

of M a r x i s m

more

thinking

dogmatic—and

and that he n o w

developed

understanding

required reliance on non-Marxist

tives a n d insights.19 A m e r e d e c a d e

had

of

the

perspec-

earlier, Schaff h a d

still

been

o n e of t h e m o s t effective o r t h o d o x critics of v i e w s e x p o u n d e d his

fellow

Pole,

Kolakowski,

Harich, and by the Yugoslav It

has

popular

been level

said in

the

a d v a n c e in m a n s world. that

It e n d e d

of

social

form

ability an epoch

historical dynamic

earlier

by

the

German

that of

Marxism,

to conceptualize in m a n s

stimulated

disseminated

communism,

a

represented

that might

gave

man

conscious

a

to

be

of its a p p e a l — a n

essentially

of

with

it.

ethical message.

d i d s o o n t h e b a s i s o f a d o c t r i n e t h a t a s s e r t e d t h a t it w a s from a totally rational m e t h o d

of inquiry.

Its s u c c e s s ,

oly o n t h e truth. B u t that w h i c h w a s necessary to h e l p age

of

historical

unconsciousness—especially

counterproductive

dissemination, and accelerating

in

the

age

of

on

seem-

terminate a

popular

masses,

rapid

change. relatively

isolated intellectual class that aspired to harness both history popular

It

monop-

science,

Initially the ideology of a narrowly based, w e a k , a n d

the

In the

therefore,

ingly irrational beliefs a n d against institutions asserting a

level—became

the

derived

helped to stimulate a reaction against truths derived from

the

his

called

sense

concern

the

major

his relationship

history It

on a

s p i t e o f its m a t e r i a l i s t i c d e t e r m i n i s m , it c a r r i e d — a n d t h a t w a s s o u r c e of m u c h

by

Wolfgang

revisionists.0

unconsciousness.

and

East

institutionalized

Marxism

has

become

official d o c t r i n e of n o n i n t e l l e c t u a l b u r e a u c r a t s w h o are

and the

supported

* For another example among many, see the December 1968 issue of Partelet (the Hungarian party journal), containing a communique on the expulsion from the Budapest Philosophical Institute of several Hungarian philosophers, some of whom had advocated a "pluralist" concept of Marxism.

1 o o } II: The Age of Volatile Belief b y millions

( r o u g h l y ten per cent of the adult population in

most

c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s ) f o r w h o m f o r m a l m e m b e r s h i p is m o r e an

expression

opportunism To

buttress

of

conservative

than an an

social

orthodoxy

or

ideological or an intellectual

institution

from

which

the

often

professional commitment.

creative

intellectual

c o n t e n t is i n c r e a s i n g l y d r a i n e d , t h e p r e s i d i n g officials h a v e

more

and m o r e taken refuge in state nationalism as the principal

emo-

tional b o n d with the masses. T h e effect—paradoxical a n d cruel its historical i r o n y — i s to m a k e c o m m u n i s m i n p o w e r

reliant o n the unconscious a n d the emotional factors w h i c h ism had sought to

Organized

supersede.

in

increasingly Marx-

20

Christianity

E q u a l l y d r a m a t i c , t h o u g h different in s u b s t a n c e , is t h e confronted today b y established religions, especially Unlike

communism,

system

of p o w e r ;

contemporary

its t e m p o r a l

Christianity

authority

is

is n o t

problem

Christianity. no

only

longer

a

limited

but

s h r i n k i n g . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it is b o t h a s y s t e m o f d o c t r i n e s

and

a n i n s t i t u t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in its C a t h o l i c e x p r e s s i o n . T h e between

the beliefs and

history for the

t h e i n s t i t u t i o n is a n c i e n t ,

new Paul

by

II), to reinvigorate

the

the

the problem

Second 21

Church.

in a setting that simultaneously terest on and

religious

involvement

evidence forms.

in change,

In

of

Ecumenical These

given

Council

(Vatican

efforts are taking

Christians

increasing other

which

been

place

involves both unprecedented

the part of c o n c e r n e d

widespread

scribed

has

painful, a

expressed

but

often

d i m e n s i o n b y t h e efforts initiated b y P o p e s John X X I I I a n d VI, and

Church,

tension

words,

means

(not

only

indifference there

that the

is

in-

Catholics) to

the

both

official

of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n c a n n o t f u l l y c o n t r o l it, a n d u n c e r t a i n t y

pre-

massive guardians concern-

ing the best w a y s to m a k e the Church again truly relevant,

with-

o u t d i l u t i n g its s p i r i t u a l i d e n t i t y . The

fundamental

w o r d s of U n a m u n o ,

dilemma

confronted

by

the

Church,

is t h a t " C a t h o l i c i s m o s c i l l a t e s b e t w e e n

in

the mys-

Turbulence within Institutionalized

{81

Beliefs

t i c i s m , w h i c h is t h e i n w a r d e x p e r i e n c e of t h e l i v i n g G o d i n an intransmittable

experience,

t h e d a n g e r of w h i c h ,

Christ,

however,

t h a t it a b s o r b s o u r o w n p e r s o n a l i t y i n G o d , a n d s o d o e s n o t our vital l o n g i n g — b e t w e e n it

fights

against;

it

mysticism and the rationalism

oscillates 22

scientificized religion."

between

religionized

is

save which

science

and

T o o p t f o r o n e is t o b e d e p r i v e d o f

the

other. Yet neither will d o b y itself: m y s t i c i s m w o u l d m e a n

with-

drawal

mean

from

the

contemporary

world;

scientism

would

a b s o r p t i o n b y it. T h i s is a n o l d d i l e m m a f o r t h e C h u r c h , and

answered

in

different

ways

at

a n d it h a s b e e n

different

posed

historical

stages.

"Mater et Magistra" a n d Vatican I I — o c c u r r i n g in a n a g e

shaped

b y ideological conflict, scientific innovation, mass p o p u l a r ening, political passion, and religious q u i e s c e n c e — c a n b e as an effort to satisfy t h r e e b r o a d objectives: Church's

institutional

structure,

viewed

to u p d a t e

s o t h a t it is n o t a n

to the vitality of the ideological c o m p o n e n t throughout the chapter)

first,

awak-

the

impediment

(to use a term

applied

and so that the institutionalized

beliefs

again b e c o m e m e a n i n g f u l to both the inner and external

dimen-

sions of h u m a n

of

life; s e c o n d ,

better

Church

as a w h o l e

poverty

and social injustice to

to focus the energies

on social problems that range international

bigotry

and

conflict

between

personal

inequality;

nally, to heal doctrinal splits within Christianity of

from

Christianity

and,

and end

and

the

the

fiera

non-Christian

religions. T h e e f f o r t — p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e it d i d m o v e t h e C h u r c h in the desired

directions—produced

ship

ideas

between

and

institutions.

new

somewhat

strains in t h e

relation-

reform,

con-

d u c t e d at a t i m e w h e n p r e s s u r e s for t h e o l o g i c a l a d j u s t m e n t s

have

increasingly c o m e f r o m t h e C h u r c h hierarchy itself ( a s in t h e

case

of c o m m u n i s m ,

these

pressures have

periphery

from

the

the

than

Kremlin

the

center:

Netherlands

has

Institutional

more

what

often come

Yugoslavia

become

to the

from

has

Vatican!),

p r o m p t e d a p r o f o u n d crisis of p a p a l authority. P o p e P a u l s tion of t h e b a n o n artificial c o n t r a c e p t i o n

been

(in "Humanae

the to has

reiteraVitae,"

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

1 9 6 8 ) , w h i c h c a m e shortly after t h e a d o p t i o n b y V a t i c a n II of c o n c e p t of c o l l e g i a l i t y in C h u r c h affairs, p r o v o k e d s t r o n g reactions from various tions

in

which

turn

prompted

departed

of the C h u r c h herself." *

national the

Councils

Pontiff

to

m o r e t h a n a little f r o m and

menaced

of Bishops; against

the

traditional

order in the b o s o m

of

reac-

"attitudes doctrine

the

Church

23

Y e t t h e V a t i c a n c o u l d n o t stifle t h e t h e o l o g i c a l echoing

these

warn

the

negative

the demands

of

Marxist philosophers

Marxist dialogue, Catholic theologians

unrest.

for an

Almost

unfettered

(notably in a public

state-

m e n t released in D e c e m b e r

1968 b y forty of the leading

theolo-

gians )

by

resolve

denounced

efforts

the

theological issues b y administrative

Vatican fiat.

Curia

to

T h e y asserted their

to c o m p l e t e f r e e d o m of inquiry, subject to n o institutional

right

limita-

tions whatever. The

increased

compassion lenge.

but

in "Mater

Intense

ticularly

the

et

on

struggle attention

questions—articulated

i n t h e affairs of

against of

the

placing

the

Church

in direct

munist

movements.

Younger,

saw

social

Magistra"—presented

involvement

in t h e

focus

emphasis

social

on

competition

in that c o m p e t i t i o n — e s p e c i a l l y

could

external

with

socially

different

the world,

injustice,

Church

more

a

the transformation

of

Particularly

movement.

the

Church

par-

not

help

man,

There,

as

elsewhere,

often

socialist or

involved

com-

Catholics

in Latin A m e r i c a — t h e

into merely

bitter

was

the

another conflict

areas w h e r e t h e issue h a d i m m e d i a t e relevance, s u c h as Brazil.24

chal-

and

possible salvation for the Church's mission; conservatives

radical

with

conservatives

felt

that

only feared

temporal in

those

northeast what

the

C h u r c h w o u l d g a i n i n t h e s h o r t r u n w o u l d c o s t it t o o m u c h i n t h e l o n g run: social r e l e v a n c e w o u l d b e g a i n e d at t h e cost of loss identity. M o r e generally, they argued that social s u c c e s s — n o

of less

* The Pope was not alone in facing this quandary. The New York Times of January 16, 1969, reported that Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, general secretary of the World Council of Churches, discussed "the crisis of authority" with Pope Paul VI. It cited Dr. Blake as having said, "We find ourselves facing the same issues in both the World Council and in the member churches."

Turbulence within Institutionalized than economic success—could

{81

Beliefs

b e detrimental to spiritual

It m a y b e a s s u m e d that f r o m their p o i n t of v i e w

the

values.

experience

of Protestantism in t h e U n i t e d States w a s n o t reassuring.® E c u m e n i s m also p r o m p t e d both institutional and doctrinal sion.

Purists

feared

that

it

would

accelerate

the

doctrinal content and transform the Catholic Church in the advanced together

countries with

other

more perplexing

into

a

vague

similar

to the

purists

menical" dialogue between

ethical

bodies, was

in the

organization

social

good

ten-

dilution

engaged,

works.

appearance

of

an

Christians and communists,

in

Catholics took an active part. T h a t such a dialogue c o u l d

Even "ecuwhich

develop,

e v e n t h o u g h it r e c e i v e d r e l a t i v e l y little n o t i c e , w a s itself p r o o f the extent to w h i c h exclusivistic claims to absolute not

formally

abandoned

by

either

side—no

of

more

of

truth—though

longer

dominated

either the W e s t e r n m i n d or e v e n those institutions that w e r e

them-

selves the p r o d u c t s of t h e M a n i c h a e a n tradition, f

* "Protestantism has become so identified with economic success, respectability, and middle-class virtues that large numbers of the clergy and laity alike appear to have lost sight of basic spiritual goals" (Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, Garden City, N.Y., 1963, p. 352). f "Without us, Communists, I fear that your Christian love, marvellous though it is, will continue to be ineffective; without you, Christians, our struggle risks again confinement to a horizon without stars" (Roger Garaudy, as quoted by Le Monde (Hebdomadaire), May 5-11, 1966). These words of a leading French Communist ideologue, once a strong Stalinist and a member of the Politburo, addressing a mixed Christian-Marxist colloquium organized by the Catholics, convey the extent to which previously frozen views are today in flux. Of the many meetings between Christians and Marxists, perhaps the most significant have been those organized by the Paulus Gesellschaft, starting in Salzburg in 1965, followed by meetings in Herrenchiemsee in 1966 (where the above remark was made) and in Marianske Lazne, Czechoslovakia, in 1967. The third meeting brought together two hundred and one Christian and Marxist philosophers, theologians, and scientists from sixteen European countries and the United States (but not from the Soviet Union, which chose to abstain). The theme of the third meeting was "Creativity and Freedom in a Human Society" (the first two having dealt with "Christianity and Marxism Today" and "Christian Humaneness and Marxist Humanism"). At this meeting both sides expressed the view that the human personality can develop only in a setting of freedom; that both Christianity and Marxism must revitalize and open up their institutions and their doctrines; that the human personality cannot be fully understood on the existential and particularly the material

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

It w o u l d , h o w e v e r ,

b e misleading to construe this dialogue

a f u n d a m e n t a l b r e a k t h r o u g h in the doctrinal relationship Christianity dividuals flected

and

who,

Marxism.

given

The

their

participants

intellectual

involved

concerns,

were

in-

themselves

re-

the tension b e t w e e n institutions and ideas; they

resented

institutional

efforts

to limit

inquiry.

Both sides thus represented

not

very

the

centers

of

the

scope

of

power.

The

selves displayed s o m e ambivalence, not so m u c h

inherently

philosophical

the intellectual

bureaucratic

fringes

centers

about

systems

of

respective These

the

degree

thought

were

to

which

about the

said

to

differences

between

have

obscured

been

and

them-

i n g s — w h i c h t h e y tolerated, in part, for reasons of political —but

as

between

meettactics

the

two

by

the

spokesmen.* limitations

notwithstanding,

the

discussions,

doubtless will continue and expand, had broad significance.

which They

level; that the state ought to be neutral on ethical and philosophical problems and that humanist Marxism must guarantee pluralism as the precondition for human freedom; and, finally, that both Christianity and Marxism involve a continuous, never-ending search for the most complete fulfillment of human freedom. (The above is a paraphrase of the conclusions reached by Charles Andras in his research paper on "Christians and Marxists in Marianske Lazne," RFE, July 10, 1967, which contains the best analysis of this meeting that I have seen. See also the valuable study by Kevin Devlin, "The Catholic-Communist 'Dialogue,'" Problems of Communism, May-June 1966, and especially the additional material on Latin America contained in the Spanish edition; and Charles Andras, "The Christian-Marxist Dialogue," East Europe, March 1968.) One outgrowth of this dialogue was a remarkable little volume dealing with the philosophical and social problems of modernity, authored joindy by a leader of the French Communist Party and by a member of the Society of Jesus (Roger Garaudy and Quentin Lauer, S.J., A Christian-Communist Dialogue, New York, 1968). * Subsequent to the meetings, there were reaffirmations from both sides, e.g., by the leadership of the French Communist Party, by the French Council of Bishops, and by Vatican spokesmen, that the dialogue could not be construed as involving any change in basic doctrinal attitudes. In a sense, these statements confirmed the point made by one of the more prominent Catholic participants that a true dialogue will not be possible until each side surmounts the tradition of "monolithism," which elevates both the "ecclesiastical society" and the party into the centers of history (Father Giulio Girardi of the Salesian University of Rome, as cited by Le Monde [Hehdomadaire], May 5-11, 1966; he repeated the same themes at Marianske Lazne [Andras, "The Christian Marxist Dialogue," p. 13]).

Turbulence within Institutionalized

{81

Beliefs

i n d i c a t e d t h a t it is b e c o m i n g i n c r e a s i n g l y d i f f i c u l t t o c o n f i n e search

for

tionally

a

more

meaningful

defined frameworks,

stitutions

depends

on

exclusive

identity.

That

the

universal

since

the

what

within

very existence

maintenance

is w h y

vision

of

their

appears

of

the

and

the surface

T h e reforms and the debates within Catholicism have

already

areas of p e r s o n a l life, of s u p p l a n t i n g

authority of the institution b y the rule of o n e s conscience. for example, has b e e n the reaction of m a n y bishops a n d l a y m e n to the issue of birth control.)

To

a spiritually

ity, b u t f o r m o s t p e o p l e

this d i l e m m a a

which

position—in

spite

reliance

the more of

on

Church and

his

conscience

increasingly

Catholic motivated

inescapably

Paul VI

commitment

to

to

things,

how

was

adopt

anyone

t h a t is t h e p u r i t y o f d o c t r i n e , d o e s n o t

t o o c c u p y first p l a c e i n t h e p s y c h o l o g y many

truths

are

seem

of Christians. H o w

questioned

and

put

has

It

innovation—

m o l d e d b y the n e e d for institutional d e f e n s e : "Today, as can see, orthodoxy,

author-

irrelevant.

more led Pope

earlier

the

(Such,

person, c o n s c i e n c e c a n b e a stricter teacher than C h u r c h

effect of m a k i n g

to

from

anathema.25

the traditional W e s t e r n v i e w of s u c h d i a l o g u e as

the

in-

distinctive

on

be m o d e s t and limited has in fact b e e n a major step a w a y

h a d the effect, in m a n y

the

institu-

up

to

many doubt?

H o w m u c h l i b e r t y is c l a i m e d as r e g a r d s t h e a u t h e n t i c h e r i t a g e

of

Catholic

to

doctrine,

not

only

in order to

. . . better

explain

t h e m a n of o u r t i m e , b u t at t i m e s t o s u b j e c t it t o t h a t in

which

profane

a d a p t it . . .

thought

or

to of

The

Pope

was

s e e m to o c c u p y

new

expression,

26

right first

its

in

noting

that

"orthodoxy

. . . does

p l a c e in t h e p s y c h o l o g y of Christians."

is s o n o t o n l y o n t h e l e v e l o f f o r m a l , o v e r t c o m p l i a n c e tain

established

substance 1968

of

Gallup

relativism

to contemporary taste and the receiving capacity

modern mentality?"

. . . seeks

it

rituals

belief, polls.

attendance—while

as The

but is

even

shown

relatively

significant

in

in by

regard Table

low

to 8,

level

revealing

the

with

more

constructed of

regular

increasing

for t h e m o s t basic b u t also the m i n i m a l ritualistic

not This cerbasic from

church

disregard

requirement—

1oo} was

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

not as revealing as the striking g a p b e t w e e n

those w h o

lieve in G o d a n d those w h o believe in life after death. T h e

be-

essence

o f t h e C h r i s t i a n f a i t h is t h a t t h e f o r m e r g u a r a n t e e s t h e latter. without

belief

in life after d e a t h

from the Christian

is s o m e t h i n g

entirely

God.

T h e poll data, t h o u g h fragmentary and superficial, highlight a problem.

On

nevertheless

the one hand, the poll indicates a

of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e l i e f . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h o w e v e r , it

ance a n d disbelief in life after d e a t h m e a n pervasive the

TABLE

contrary,

it s u g g e s t s

that

authentic

crisis

suggests

t h a t it w o u l d b e m i s l e a d i n g t o c o n c l u d e t h a t l o w c h u r c h

On

God

different

attend-

irreligiosity.

irreligiosity—that

is

8

Do you believe in life after death?

Do you attend church once per week?

Yes

Yes

Yes

98$ 96

73% 57 4* 38 50 55 4i 50 38 35 54 38

43$

Do you believe in God? United States Greece Uruguay (cities) Austria Switzerland Finland West Germany Netherlands Great Britain France Norway Sweden

89 85 84 83 81

79 77 73 73 60

(Ath

28 24

38 30 5 27 42 —

25 14 9

to say, a d e e p l y felt rejection of a reality b e y o n d the

finite—does

n o t exist, or at least n o t yet. A belief in G o d to w h i c h o n e give substance m a y merely be a holdover from a more society in a context that emphasizes

immediate

cannot

traditional

l i f e , b u t it

could

also reflect the search for a highly personal, inner, a n d direct lationship b e t w e e n the individual and

re-

God.

Privatization of Belief In fact, the w a n i n g

of the

Church

as an institution

s y m p t o m of intensifying religiosity. T h e

Church was

a

may

be

a

necessary

Turbulence within Institutionalized

Beliefs

{ 8

i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n G o d a n d m a n in t h e p h a s e of m a n s poverty

and historical unawareness.

behavior,

institutionalized

in severity

as m a n k i n d

It p r o v i d e d

sanctions

was

(which

socialized

though not international, coexistence), As the Church

fades, for some

will doubtless m e a n

on

code

level

of

of

declined personal,

a n d a link to t h e

the disintegration

license; for m a n y

spiritual

a rigid

gradually

the

1

eternal.

of its

it w i l l s i m p l y b e

controls a

matter

o f i n d i f f e r e n c e ; b u t f o r o t h e r s it w i l l b e t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a

much

m o r e direct, m o r e personal, less ritualized relationship to G o d . This could m e a n responses—of what

the emergence

cults,

sects,

different form

much

more

Catholic

of

expressing

personalized

Church.27

For

of highly pluralistic

believers'

form

most

groups,

each

with

its faith, t o s a y

of

people

worship—even the

organized

to

God

will

be

expressed

much

keeping with their specific intellectual The

popularity

tomatic of

our

of

Teilhard

de

age's felt n e e d

more

is,

combine

mystic belief w i t h k n o w l e d g e of the material

of

a

within

the will

relation-

individually

for example, ecstasy

some-

Church

and psychological

Chardin to

a

nothing

continue to provide the basic mooring, but for m a n y the ship

religious

with

and

in

needs. sympscience,

world.*

T h e p r e s e n t f e r m e n t i n C h r i s t i a n i t y is h e n c e p a r t o f t h e

general

aversion toward the institutionalized belief that characterizes

our

time. This aversion reflects the nature of our intellectual style

and

° A French thinker poses the issue more strongly, emphasizing the interdependence of science and ecstasy: "We must conclude that it is far from accidental that ecstatic phenomena have developed to the greatest degree in the most technicized societies. And it is to be expected that these phenomena will continue to increase. This indicates nothing less than the subjection of mankind's new religious life to technique. It was formerly believed that technique and religion were in opposition and represented two totally different dispensations. It was held that, with the development of a purely materialistic society, a struggle was inevitable between the machine and the economy, on the one side, and the ideal realm of religion, art, and culture, on the other. But we can no longer hold such a boundlessly simplistic view. Ecstasy is subject to the world of technique and is its servant. Technique, on the most significant level, integrates the anarchic and antisocial impulses of the human being into society. These impulses take their influence and receive their diffusion strictly by virtue of the technical means brought into play. The ecstatic phenomena of the human psyche, which without technical means would have remained completely without effect, are deployed throughout the world" (Ellul, p. 423).

1oo} the

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

fragmented

and

impressionistic

way

we

ourselves

become

e x p o s e d to reality, as w e l l as t h e instinctive f e e l i n g t h a t i d e a s

are

o n l y relevant as l o n g as t h e y c a n successfully relate to a

reality

t h a t is d y n a m i c . T o i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e a n i d e a is t o i m p e d e its

capac-

ity to adjust to c h a n g e .

The

further evolution

of

the

idea

then

b e c o m e s d e p e n d e n t not on the capacity of the m i n d to sense speed

and

the significance of c h a n g e b u t

on t h e rate of

within the bureaucratic organization which has c o m e to

embody

the idea. V e s t e d p o w e r interests thus b e c o m e m o r e important either ethical or intellectual The

crisis

progressive

of

than

imperatives.

institutionalized

secularization

the

change

of

beliefs

life; that

is

the

is, i n

last

the

stage

in

the

detachment

one's social existence f r o m a f r a m e w o r k of belief. W o r k , play, now,

increasingly,

introspection have

gradually

selves from formal Christian belief,28 and they

separated

them-

are beginning

detach themselves from Marxism under communism

as

cultural

and

hence

also psychological

isolation.

gious fanaticism could thrive in such a context, and religious had

profound

moral

meaning.

Physical

exhaustion

(after

Thirty Years W a r a n d after the Battle of V i e n n a of 1 6 8 3 ) as g r o w i n g

skepticism

have

made

religious wars

to

well.

It w a s easier to establish institutional belief in an a g e of graphical,

of and

as

geoReliwars the well

unfashionable.

In our a g e c o m m u n i s m has b e e n the last great absolutist f o r it c o u l d u s e p o w e r t o a s s u r e e x c l u s i v e n e s s . I t is n o t t h a t i s o l a t e d C h i n a h a s l a t e l y b e e n its m o s t f a n a t i c

dogma,

accidental

proponent—

or t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s e r v a t i s m in t h e c o m m u n i s t s t a t e s is u s u a l l y accompanied

by

efforts to c u t s o c i e t y off f r o m

contact with

external world b y radio-jamming and other devices.* Global gestion—though not necessarily conducive to mutual 0

the con-

comprehen-

Nonetheless, these external controls are increasingly incapable of masking the evident lack of commitment within. It is revealing to note that in 1968, when the anti-intellectual and anti-Semitic purge in communist Poland compelled some communist intellectuals, until that moment quite orthodox in their loyalty, to leave the country, a number of them immediately moved to the "capitalist" United States, seeking employment in various institutions specializing in the study of communism and viewed in the East as intrinsically anti-communist.

Turbulence within Institutionalized

{81

Beliefs

sion—is simply inimical to institutions and ideologies relying

exclusivistic

on

conviction.

Ideally, in this setting m a n s h o u l d seek c o m p l e t e fulfillment combining

spiritual

introspection

social justice. H a r v e y

with

the

moral

by

imperative

of

C o x argues in his thoughtful b o o k that

"if

m e n rather t h a n m e t a p h y s i c a l p h a n t o m s bear the m e a n i n g of

his-

toric life, t h e n p u r p o s e s o t h e r t h a n t h o s e of one's o w n c l a n c a n appreciated rather than repudiated. Separate world-views the occasion not for mutual

destruction but for fashioning a

cietal framework within w h i c h such variance can b e and nourished. vides

a hodgepodge

projects can thrive because

each

of h u m a n

recognizes

so-

encouraged

I d e a l l y t h e s e c u l a r c i t y is s u c h a s o c i e t y .

a setting in w h i c h

It

pro-

purposes

and

itself as

provisional

a n d relative. Authentic secularity d e m a n d s that n o w o r l d - v i e w , t r a d i t i o n , n o i d e o l o g y b e a l l o w e d t o b e c o m e the

no

officially e n f o r c e d

w o r l d - v i e w b e s i d e w h i c h n o others are tolerated. This in turn quires pluralistic social a n d political institutions."

re-

29

T h e shaping of the ideal secular city d e m a n d s e n o r m o u s maturity and responsibility.

be

present

social

It also calls for p h i l o s o p h i c a l

depth

a n d a sense of restraint, since t h e transition f r o m t h e tradition d o g m a t o t h e c o n d i t i o n o f d i v e r s i t y is n o t e a s y . D i v e r s i t y o f

of

belief

is c e r t a i n l y t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r f r e e d o m , a n d it m a y e v e n b e

the

c o n c o m i t a n t of creativity

the

( t h o u g h t h e M i d d l e A g e s as w e l l as

O r i e n t a r g u e a g a i n s t i t ) . B u t c a r r i e d t o its e x t r e m e — t o t h e at

which

diversity

itself

becomes

the

substance

of

c r e a t e s its o w n d a n g e r s . T h e h e a l t h y r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t

institution-

a l i z e d d o c t r i n e s is n o t c o m p l e t e u n l e s s it a l s o i n v o l v e s t h e lation of alternative principles

of social contract a n d

views of the role of the individual. Fluid, fragile, a n d ideas cannot provide

the

underlying

rapidly changing

formu-

alternative fragmentary

either lasting insight or an e n d u r i n g

for action. Popular notions, shifting w i t h the w i n d , m a y reflect

point

belief—it

psychological

and

social

reality, b u t d o they provide

either for understanding

basis

accurately

tensions

of

our

an enduring

basis

it or f o r m a s t e r i n g it? I n t e l l e c t u a l

rela-

tivism m a y not suffice to m e e t t h e challenge of subjective

activism,

1oo}

II:

which

The Age of Volatile Belief

is i n t e n s e l y

intolerant

because

it is d e r i v e d

from

purely

personal criteria for e v a l u a t i n g reality. This

problem

not

only

arises

in

systems

in

which

formalized

beliefs p l a y a d e c i s i v e role. It also c o n f r o n t s t h e W e s t e r n

liberal

democratic states. T h e s e , too, d e p e n d o n a symbiosis of ideas

and

institutions, t h o u g h in m u c h less formal, m o r e implicit w a y s .

The

turbulence

and

afflicting c o m m u n i s m

and

Christianity

is v i s i b l e

direct, w i t h restless ideas confronting unyielding institutions;

the

crisis o f a l l e g i a n c e t o l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y is m u c h m o r e e l u s i v e

but

n o t less real. T h e

effective working of a liberal democratic

state

requires a c o m b i n a t i o n of social devotion to the abstract idea d e m o c r a c y a n d of legalism in practice that c a n easily b e

of

strained

b y c o n d i t i o n s of stress a n d crisis. A d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s ,

moreover,

is d i f f i c u l t t o d r a m a t i z e , i n c o n t r a s t t o s u c h n o t i o n s as

revolution,

injustice, a n d f r e e d o m . I n s t e a d , it calls m o r e p r o s a i c a l l y f o r a h i g h degree

of

procedural

commitment:

that

is,

a

concern

with

the

m e a n s as w e l l as w i t h the e n d of the process. U n l e s s infused n e w moral content, procedural commitment m a y

with

not suffice in

confrontation w i t h issues that are p o s e d as absolutes a n d that said to require passion—rather than p r o c e d u r e — f o r their

a

are

resolu-

tion.

3. Histrionics as History in Transition " W e reject t h e w o r l d , w e are n o l o n g e r e v e n 'traitors,' this w o u l d i m p l y a n affinity w i t h w h a t w e are betraying. W e the Viet C o n g of thought.

. . . T h e p h i l o s o p h y of t o m o r r o w

b e terrorist: n o t a p h i l o s o p h y of terrorism b u t a terrorist p h y allied w i t h an active policy of terrorism."

30

since are will

philoso-

T h e s e words of

a

Histrionics

as History

in Transition

{1o1

y o u n g Sorbonne philosopher c o n v e y the degree to w h i c h has come

to substitute

for reason

as a result of

the

emotion

reaction

w h a t m a n y f e e l h a s b e e n t h e failure of rationalism in action. "rejection" of the w o r l d

is in e s s e n c e t h e r e j e c t i o n o f

to The

prevailing

m o d e s of t h o u g h t a n d t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of e c s t a s y a n d a c t i o n in service of an abstract c o n c e p t

of revolution.

Yesterday's

f r o m f r e e d o m " h a s its e q u i v a l e n t in t o d a y s e s c a p e f r o m

the

"escape reason.

Escape from Reason In

its

riots in

extreme

form,

California,

at

this

mood—dramatized

Columbia

University,

the

student

throughout

by

France,

in W e s t Berlin, in L o n d o n , R o m e , Belgrade, W a r s a w , Tokyo, m u c h m o r e lethally at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of M e x i c o students many

were

less

killed in the

publicized

fall of

imitations

1968),

( w h e r e scores

to say

elsewhere—has

nothing

of

elevated

f o r a c t i o n s s a k e i n t o a m o r a l p r i n c i p l e . " A c t i o n is t h e o n l y n o t o n l y reality b u t m o r a l i t y as well," p r o c l a i m e d A b b i e

and

more

ecstatically

by

his

German

reality;

Hoffman, more

counterpart,

D a n i e l C o h n - B e n d i t , t h e leader of t h e 1968 F r e n c h s t u d e n t who

declared

that

"violence

is

happiness."32

As

of the

action

the leader of the A m e r i c a n Yippies.31 H e w a s e c h o e d b o t h belligerently

and

two

strike

observers

s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e n e w r a d i c a l m o v e m e n t s e x p l a i n e d it, t h e

con-

t e m p o r a r y rebels "think that t h e i v o r y - t o w e r e d m e n of ideas

have

cheated them, lied to them, and that action and spontaneous perience will s h o w t h e m t h e truth." From

ex-

33

t h i s a t t i t u d e is d e r i v e d t h e v i e w

that reason b y

itself

is

s u s p e c t , t h a t it m u s t b e b u t t r e s s e d b y e m o t i o n , a n d t h a t if a c h o i c e h a s t o b e m a d e , e m o t i o n is a b e t t e r g u i d e t h a n r e a s o n . S e e i n g the world around t h e m both hypocrisy and the failure of

in

reason

— w i t h r e a s o n i n t h e s e r v i c e of evil, w h i c h e i t h e r m a k e s it a

slave

of

war-

ideology

or

employs

it

as

a

scientific

tool

to

improve

making efficiency—even moderate dissenters c o n d e m n e d

contem-

porary liberals for their lack of passion.* In cold reason t h e y

saw,

* In December 1968, at a major international conference held at Princeton on the subject of America's future, one of the accusations made by a student

1oo} more

II: The Age of Volatile Belief than

to the and

a mere

status quo,

absence

of moral

a willingness

a determination

to avoid

indignation,

to effect only

confronting the

a

commitment

marginal more

change,

basic

moral

issues.* Reliance o n passion a n d action h a d the a d d e d a d v a n t a g e of requiring a programmatic blueprint. In contrast, the old offered

both

a

critique

of

the

present

and

a

blueprint

for

future, thus o p e n i n g themselves to criticism on the level of practicality

(Is their Utopia attainable?)

not

ideologies

and performance

the both

(Why

hasn't the utopia b e e n a c h i e v e d ? ) . T h e politics of ecstasy d o require a program

to generate action,

and

their adherents

not were

therefore not greatly troubled b y the patronizing criticism of their programmatic

vacuity

from the established argue that programs

it is n o t but

advanced communist

through

through

the

from

the

parties, f

institutional

creation of

a

socialist On

the

reforms

old

left

contrary, spelled

community

of

and they

out

in

emotion

leader was that the established liberal participants tend to rely on reason at the expense of passion. This charge prompted Arthur Schlesinger to remark, "Reason without passion is sterile, but passion without reason is hysterical. I have always supposed that reason and passion must be united in any effective form of public action. I can imagine nothing worse for our society than a rejection of reasoned analysis by the young. If we succeed in destroying the discipline of reason, if we make politics a competition in passion, a competition in emotion, a competition in unreason and violence, the certain outcome would be the defeat of the left." * This charge has even been leveled against scholars engaged in studies of the future, and their "futurism" has been interpreted by critics as an immoral escape from the social dilemmas of the present. It has led to some unconsciously humorous situations, such as the one at the above-mentioned Princeton conference, where a millionaire radical attacked "futurists" for neglecting the role of wealth in American society. Shedding his sartorial elegance in favor of the more revolutionary open-necked-shirt uniform, he urged the assembled to "choose equality and flee greed." f Max Eastman spoke for many old socialists when he expressed himself as "kind of sorry for these young rebels today. . . . They have an emotion not unlike ours. . . . They want to make a revolution but they have no ultimate purpose, I have a certain emotional sympathy for them, but they are rather pathetic because they have no plan. They just seek a revolution for its own sake" (as cited by Tne New York Times, January 9, 1969). Communist spokesmen expressed themselves more pungently, condemning the aspirations of the new rebels as "half-baked pie peppered with sexualism and narcomania" (Trybuna Ludu, May 9, 1968).

Histrionics as History in Transition that

true

freedom

can

be

attained.

state, t h e rebels of t h e late oppression

and

"one-dimensional"

society. Herbert them

with

an

creating

frame

quality

of

Fanons

books

of

in s o m e

areas of t h e T h i r d W o r l d ) ,

emotional

Man

have

the

modern

reference

racial violence

that

to overcome

One Dimensional

Marcuse's

intellectual exalting

By

1960s h o p e d

{1o1

has

provided

(much

done

sexual

industrial

as

Frantz

for the

t h o u g h his advice

rebels

and

pro-

g r a m a r e l i m i t e d : " F o r t h e m o m e n t t h e c o n c r e t e a l t e r n a t i v e is still 34

only the negation." The

call for "true f r e e d o m , " h o w e v e r ,

permits

the

subversion

of c o n v e n t i o n a l f r e e d o m , a n d h e r e i n lies o n e of the b a s i c dictions

of

the

movement.

the striking r e s e m b l a n c e

Leopold

between

contemporary

student

revolution

who

asserted

in

that

than

at

the

1845

individual's

Labedz

on

the

freedom

of

and

the

"a p e o p l e

expense."

those

who

do

35

views

cannot

Thus,

of

be

the

Max

free

Stirner,

rebellion

can entail both

not share

the

the

otherwise against

limitation

ideals

of

a n d relative indifference to the suppression of

in the East.

noted

the romantic anarchism of

the "oppressive f r e e d o m " of the W e s t

freedom

contra-

perceptively

"true"

freedom

M o r e o v e r , the right to speak or write freely c a n

d e n i e d a n d its e x e r c i s e d i s r u p t e d b y v i o l e n c e , s i n c e t h a t is m o t i v a t e d b y a n e m o t i o n a l c o m m i t m e n t

t o f r e e d o m a n d is

s i g n e d t o a s s e r t it. T h e d e f i n i t i o n o f f r e e d o m is t h u s d e r i v e d

guaranteeing

choice

and

de-

from

a s u b j e c t i v e i n n e r c o n v i c t i o n t h a t o n e is r i g h t a n d n o t f r o m external pattern of relations

be

violence

the

protection

to the individual, w h a t e v e r his views. The

intellectual—though

phenomenon level

of

the

social—seriousness

of

w a s further diluted b y a certain artificiality o n

political

inescapably

not

expression.

partakes

of

Though

the past,

every

genuine

it a c q u i r e s

this the

revolution

its o w n

distinctive

c h a r a c t e r , s t y l e , a n d r h e t o r i c p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e it is a

revolution:

a sharp break with the past. T h e Paris C o m m u n e differed in these respects from the French Revolution, and the C o m m u n e was

not reproduced

years a great

deal

by

the

of the

Bolshevik

student

Revolution.

rhetoric,

Yet in

symbolism,

in

turn

recent

and

per-

1oo}

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

sonal behavior

has taken

the

self-conscious

form

of

a

histrionic

" h a p p e n i n g " d e s i g n e d as a historical r e - e n a c t m e n t . A t t i m e s it w a s t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n t h a t s e e m e d the scenario—especially

to

provide

i n F r a n c e — b u t m o r e o f t e n it w a s

grad and H a v a n a that w e r e being re-enacted. T h e student i m a g i n e d t h e m s e l v e s as historical

figures,

b u t in their

Petroleaders

imitativeness

t h e y o f t e n v e r g e d o n t h e absurd. D u r i n g t h e 1968 crisis at

Colum-

bia University, the leader of the student militants issued a

pam-

p h l e t b e a r i n g L e n i n ' s title, " W h a t Is to B e D o n e ? , " a n d

students

occupying

"a

one

of

the

buildings

proclaimed

themselves

m u n e . " T h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of t h e W e s t Berlin militants w e r e "Smolny." Revolutionary beards Castro to M a r x )

comcalled

(in styles ranging from Lenin

a n d c o m b a t f a t i g u e s a la G u e v a r a

were

m a n d a t o r y c o s t u m e s against a decor of either red or black

flags.

E v e n the v i o l e n c e w a s o f t e n m o r e theatrical t h a n real. In it t o o k t h e f o r m of s t y l i z e d b a t t l e s , i n w h i c h a r m o r e d

Tokyo

combatants

e m p l o y e d shields a n d spears; in Paris a tacit a g r e e m e n t

between

the police and their opponents limited w e a p o n s to those used the Stone Age:

rocks, cobblestones,

and

clubs.*

Only

to

almost

in

in

Mexico

w a s v i o l e n c e g e n u i n e in t h e sense that all available m e a n s

were

e m p l o y e d , a s is t r u e i n r e a l r e v o l u t i o n s , f

* In all of France—despite the apparent temporary collapse of authority in May 1968—only one person died, and somewhat accidentally at that, t But though the style and the format of the student rebellion was contrived and its aspirations almost deliberately unattainable (one of the most popular slogans of the May 1968 outbreak in Paris was "Be realists, demand the impossible!"), at least its youthfulness was authentic. The same cannot be said of the middle-aged admirers of the militants, who—though most often physically passive—outdid themselves in their efforts to drink again at the fountain of youth by vicarious identification with youth's exuberance. Verbal excess was most often the means used to attain this identification. Thus, one American scholar accused those critical of the abuses perpetrated by some militants of literally waging "a war against the young," which he compared to the war in Vietnam; he called for a "cultural revolution" in America! (Richard Poirier, "The War against the Young," The Atlantic, October 1968). Cases of middle-aged exuberance were not isolated phenomena. As Labedz put it, "There can be little doubt that in many cases les parents terribles are worse than les enfants terribles. Some of them have moved from revolt against 'poverty amidst plenty' in the thirties to a revolt against affluent

Histrionics as History in Transition

{1o1

T o d e f i n e t h e h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e s e e v e n t s , it is sary

to

look

superficial

beyond

violence

among

the

important

swept

the

closer

an

that

neces-

beyond

cities in s o m a n y parts of t h e w o r l d in so short a time. A reveals

outbursts

slogans,

many

immediately

the

and

so

analysis

similarity

the

distinction:

some

pects of the manifestations w e r e clearly political in character purpose; o t h e r s — t h o u g h linked w i t h the political, t h o u g h w i t h it a c e r t a i n u n i v e r s a l i t y o f a s p i r a t i o n s , a n d t h o u g h it w i t h a m a s s e m o t i o n a l b a s e — w e r e m u c h m o r e cal in origin together,

and

each

vaguely

tended

to

moral

and

obscure

the

ethical

sharing

providing

socio-psychologi-

in content.

specific

asand

Linked

character

of

the

other.

The Political

Dimension

T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o is i m p o r t a n t t o a n i n g of w h a t w a s i n v o l v e d a n d o f w h a t it p o r t e n d s .

understandThe

political

manifestations are in s o m e respects easier to dissect a n d

analyze.

Broadly speaking, they fell into t w o categories. In the W e s t , particularly

in t h e

United

States,

the politically

motivated

tants d r e w o n b o t h the i d e o l o g i c a l l e g a c y of the old left's against capitalist society a n d o n the m o r e recent sense of about the

war

in Vietnam.

As

the

"imperialist"

and

and mili-

attack outrage

"capitalist"

society in the sixties, at the time as they themselves moved from poverty to affluence, to practice alienation at 50,000 dollars a year. The revolutionary Establishment of New York and London, thrilled with revolutionary prospects, and displaying the characteristic Salon-Maoismus, contributes to the orgy of snobbery attendant upon the current Utopian wave. Long before the 'Black Power' spokesmen asked the students assembled at the London School of Economics to establish the Revolutionary Socialist Student Federation, whether they know how to make a petrol bomb, the New York Review of Books published a diagram of and a recipe for a Molotov cocktail on its cover page. This has not prevented, of course, its political writers from deploring 'American violence/ In France the self-abasement of the elderly progressives' reached its peak during the May devolution.' At the meeting of Jean-Paul Sartre with the students at the Sorbonne, Max Pol-Fouchet exclaimed with pathos appropriate to the occasion: 'Representing a generation which has failed, I ask you not to fail!'" (Leopold Labedz, "Students and Revolution," Survey [London], July 1968, pp. 25-26).

1oo }

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

society par excellence, the United States provided the major get. T h e

war

served

as a catalyst for emotions,

international unity a m o n g the y o u n g militants, as a b o n d t h e o l d leftists a n d t h e n e w , a n d as a link b e t w e e n t h e minded and the ethically Those

between

politically-

concerned.0 have

but

they

p r o v i d e d influential leadership. It w a s the politically-minded

who

a relatively

resuscitated vived was

the

(such

who

strictly political c o n c e r n s

small minority

As

restless

the

more

the m o v e m e n t

specifically United

gained

appear youth,

of o r g a n i z e d

slogan of the permanent

defined

as t h e call for i m m e d i a t e

Vietnam).

of the

anarchist critique

the Trotskyite

they

by

for

to

been

motivated

tar-

as the basis

society,

who

revolution; political

and

it

objectives

States withdrawal

momentum

and

re-

from

broadened

its a p p e a l , t h e p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s — p e r h a p s r e s p o n d i n g to t h e less clearly defined ethical a n d psychological n e e d s of the

following—

were widened and became both vaguer and more demanding. w a s n o longer a matter of e n d i n g a particular g o v e r n m e n t a l or of e f f e c t i n g a specific reform; t h e u n d e r l y i n g

policy

"system"—capital-

ist in character a n d h e n c e f u n d a m e n t a l l y i r r e m e d i a b l e — h a d to undone before true reforms could be achieved. mained

obscure,

while

the programmatic

The

language

C o h n - B e n d i t ' s exaltation of a c t i o n — a n d rejection of — t o a rather simplistic r e p e t i t i o n of M a r x i s t

It

specifics ranged

be re-

from

communismf

cant.|

* The war thus served the same function as the earlier campaigns against nuclear bombs in allowing for the expression of essentially moral concerns by the adoption of an anti-United States political posture. Frank Parkin, in his Middle-Class Radicalism: The Social Bases of the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Manchester, 1968), shows how the British CND mobilized middle-class support, drawn from among those with a tradition of moral concern, into a campaign against "evil." The campaign relied heavily on small symbolic gestures, such as eccentric dress, beards, and other forms of distinctive behavior. t Because of this: the Pravda propagandist Yuri Zhukov, with his customary crudeness, characterized Cohn-Benait as a "werewolf" (Pravda, May 30, 1968). t The following may serve as an example: "Marxism is coming more and more to be the common denominator of all student movements in North America and Western Europe, even so in the new left SDS in the United States. I think this is inevitable and is a tribute to the growing sophistication

Histrionics as History in Transition

{ 1o 1

In t h e initial p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n against the V i e t n a m

war,

communist s u p p o r t — j u d g i n g f r o m a p p r o v i n g c o m m u n i s t p r o nouncements—was p e r h a p s i n v o l v e d , b u t c o m m u n i s t a p p r o v a l w a n e d rapidly w h e n t h e anti-institutional character of t h e ment became increasingly evident. militants,

the

communist

conservatism,

since

its

system

original

I n the e y e s of m a n y also

represented

revolutionary

bureaucratic

ideals

had

ized into institutional beliefs. C o m m u n i s t endorsement shifted to criticism and militant

New

Left

then to condemnation;

were

characterized

by

a

move-

political

fossil-

gradually

the views Soviet

of

the

writer

" M a m a i s m , w h i c h incorporates ideas of Marx, M a r c u s e a n d

as

Mao,

a c o m p l e t e l y artificial c o m b i n a t i o n . " 3 6 Though

the

political

manifestations

in

Mexico

City,

Madrid,

Prague, a n d W a r s a w partook of the s a m e reaction against

institu-

tionalized belief a n d similarly capitalized o n s o m e of the

ethical

a n d psychological strains in m o d e r n society, t h e y w e r e m u c h specific in focus, less predisposed t o w a r d emotion,

more

and more

in-

c l i n e d t o w a r d a p r o g r a m m a t i c political a p p r o a c h . I n all f o u r cases, the demonstrators' d e m a n d s w e r e concerned with the loosening direct political restraints, a n d the leaders did not h a v e to an elaborate

"one-dimensional

m a n " thesis

to prove

construct

that

liberal

d e m o c r a c y c a n a l s o b e o p p r e s s i v e a n d t h a t its t o l e r a n c e is i n a m a s k e d form of constraint. level,

their

demands

took

overt political dictatorship: free

assembly,

abandonment

freedom of

both

to

37

the

A s a result, at least o n the familiar

abolition travel,

ideological

of

form

fact

political

the

rejection

of

censorship,

the right

of

political monopoly

of

of

democracy, and

and

oppression

the by

and maturity of the international student new left, inasmuch as Marxism is the most developed, refined and coherent revolutionary philosophy or worldview today and one that as a systematic social theory corresponds to the objective realities of the capitalist era, and inasmuch as it testifies to the realization by the student movements that they must align themselves with the working class in order to achieve the type of social transformation requisite to break the power of monopoly capital and create a new, non-repressive and truly free social order" (Stanley Gray, "Student Radicalism: An American Import?" a speech delivered to the 1968 Couchiching Conference, McGill News, November 1968, p. ).

1oo}

II:

The Age of Volatile Belief

secret police. The similarity of the politically libertarian demands of the students in these four cities is striking.38 It should also be noted that the students who demanded direct political freedom acted in the context of a much more hostile political environment. The student militants in the United States, in Western Europe, and in Japan literally basked in publicity: front-page pictures, television interviews, ecstatic endorsements by middle-aged supporters, epic songs immortalizing their deeds, and books in which the various confrontations were recorded in prose and in photographs.* Given the pluralistic nature of the Western societies and the competitive character of their communications media, youthful militancy was rewarding to the ego— and thus also infectious. This factor must be taken into account both in analyzing the dynamics of events in the West and in comparing them with events in less pluralistic societies.39 There the mass media either ignored the demonstrations or condemned them. The student leaders were abused and arrested. Communications between institutions—not to speak of cities—required great personal effort, sacrifice, and risk. Youthful militancy was not rewarded with social acclaim; Madrid and Warsaw responded with prison sentences for the leaders and university expulsion for the participants. The political environment clearly helped to shape the emphasis and the scope of the students' demands. In a strict authoritarian context, the demands had a politically libertarian content. In a looser, more pluralistic environment, the demands were either focused on more immediate university affairs or took on the form of a broader—and thus inevitably somewhat vaguer—social cri* The publicity bestowed on three female college militants (Peter Babcox, "Meet the Women of the Revolution," The New York Times Magazine, February g, 1969) was characteristic. Similar deference was not paid to girls serving in the Peace Corps or in the war on poverty. In this connection, it was revealing to observe the satisfaction with which the militants would watch themselves on television replays or specially prepared documentaries. The publicity surrounding the militants brought considerable social pressure to bear on those who were less involved.

Histrionics as History in Transition

{1o1

tique. Accordingly, the more specific and libertarian character of the demands made by the student leaders in the authoritarian states provided little basis for a common front with the militants of the West. In fact, there does not appear to have been much actual contact and coordination, although it was charged in Poland's political youth trials in late 1968 that the Brussels headquarters of the IV International (Trotskyite) provided ideological assistance to some Polish activists. If the charge is true, the Trotskyite link was perhaps the sole connection between political activists in the West and in the East. The two movements appear to have been independently led and to have been motivated by profoundly different political aspirations. The slight direct contact that there was between the respective leaders turned out to be abortive. In 1968, in a BBC discussion of the student rebellion, the leader of the English militants attacked the spokesman of the Yugoslav students, while the head of the West Berlin SDS (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund) received a rather cool reception from Prague students, who found his political views primitive.* 40 Nevertheless, important similarities between the respective political youth movements should also be noted. In both cases they were led by the abler students, who on the whole came from more socially established families. According to a study conducted at the University of California, the arrested undergraduate and graduate students tended to have much better than average grades; many of them held scholarships or had won awards. 41 In Poland official comment made much of the fact that the activists came from the relatively well-to-do homes of officials, and some * It is also noteworthy that strictly politically oriented student movements in Mexico, Spain, or Poland avoiaed such manifestations as the "foul language" splinter that developed in California in the aftermath of the crisis, the fascination with drugs, and the deliberate adoption of deviant social behavior as in the case of the Yippies. To be sure, these manifestations were also the product of peculiarly American conditions, but their appearance as a side effect of the student rebellion was made possible by the less focused and also less oppressed character of the rebellion.

1o o }

II:

The Age of Volatile Belief

university professors stressed the fact (in conversation with this writer) that their best students were involved. After the demonstrations were suppressed, measures were taken to favor the admission into the university of workers' and peasants' children. Even in Rumania, where student unrest was suppressed relatively quickly, official reaction emphasized the fact that the young "hooligans" were in the main children of "building-site managers, university professors, instrumentalists in the Philharmonic Orchestra, physicians, engineers, white-collar workers, militia staff members." 42 As in the West, the political leadership for the restless young was in many cases provided by the offspring of former left activists; hence not by rebels against the older generation but, rather, by young people who shared the ideals of their parents but felt that these had been corrupted in practice by the ruling communist elite. In Poland the most outstanding student rebels included the children of high party officials, while in the United States children of the old left formed a high percentage of the activist leaders at Columbia and Berkeley. In both the East and the West the rebel leaders came from environments that were not indifferent but ideologically concerned. Another similarity between the student militants in the West and in the East was the vagueness of their long-range objectives. Though the specific and immediate goals of the students in the more politically oppressive regimes were somewhat more precise, their "demands" rarely went beyond a statement of immediate complaints. To be sure, the transformation of a police dictatorship into a multi-party democracy, or at least into something resembling the Yugoslav model, was a more defined objective—with experiential examples available—than the Western students' plea for a participatory democracy; however, the more specific ramifications of the desired social and political systems tended to be vague in the East as well as in the West.* • One of the more extensive critiques of the existing Polish system was prepared by two young Warsaw sociologists, J. Kuron and K. Modzelewski, sev-

Histrionics as History in Transition

{1o1

Though this may have been a weakness from the strictly political point of view—as was charged by the critics of the militants —it also helped to provide a wider bridge between the political leadership and the more generally restless younger generation. It is doubtful—and this is especially true of the more pluralistic societies—whether a highly specific political program would have attracted the wide support generated by the more undifferentiated attack against the Establishment, vested interests, the status quo, and institutionalized beliefs. The reliance on emotion rather than on reason, on felt aspirations rather than on concrete programs, struck a more responsive chord in a generation that was the most directly affected by the pace of contemporary change and that was the very product of that change.

Historical

Discontinuity

In our time the student generation represents one of the most dynamic variables of change. The growth in their number as well as the simultaneous growth in the number of radios, televisions, telephones (all items that affect personal relationships, both making possible and encouraging the rapid dissemination of ideas) make for a subjectively dynamic mood that stands in sharp contrast to the relatively slower rate of change in such items as income (national or per-capita), the switch from rural to urban eral years prior to the student outbreaks of March 1968. (The authors were promptly sent to prison.) Entided "Open Letter to the Party," it became the source of much of the theoretical inspiration for the political-minded leadership of youth. Written from a Marxist point of view, it provided a scathing critique of the degeneration of Polish communism into an institutionalized bureaucratic despotism, with vested interests suppressing the egalitarian idealism of socialism. When it came to offering a program, however, the authors confined themselves to' urging a new revolution led by workers and intellectuals determined to create a new social order characterized by few institutions, workers' self-government, and true social egalitarianism. In late 1968 Kuron and Modzelewski were again sentenced to prison for having allegedly inspired the March events in collusion with the IV International (Trotskyite).

1o o }

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

employment,

the population

shift to larger urban centers,

or

the

a v e r a g e n u m b e r of p e o p l e living in a room. T h e over-all result the

contradiction,

tween

the pace

already

of

noted

change

in

the

preceding

in t h e state of m i n d

r e a l i t y . ( S e e T a b l e s 6 a n d 7, p p .

chapter,

and

in

material

42-43.)

In the w o r d s of a s t u d e n t of m o d e r n i z a t i o n , c o n t e m p o r a r y —and

this is e s p e c i a l l y

true of the y o u n g e r

u n d e r the d o m i n a t i o n of his environment

man

generation—"is

. . . a n d to this

h e is freer, b u t at t h e s a m e t i m e h e is less c e r t a i n o f h i s

less

extent

purpose

a n d i n t i m e s o f g r e a t u n r e s t h e is p r e p a r e d t o s u r r e n d e r h i s d o m in the interest of p u r p o s e f u l leadership." ting the present longer

defined

Writing

by

43

In that

fluid

difficult to c o m p r e h e n d ,

since

religion

or

either

or

nationalism

freeset-

it is

no

historical-

perspectives.44

ideological

Johan

becomes

about

Huizinga

the

waning

described

marked

by the

eternal

salvation,

collapse

of

of a

the

Middle

world

of

Ages,

traditional beliefs,

widespread

the

historian

discontinuity,

pessimism,

and

a

world

uncertainty

about

intense

violence.

Psychological r e f u g e w a s sought b y m a n y in mystical cults,

while

individual behavior was dichotomized, ranging from emphasis

on

the saintly to i n d u l g e n c e in d e p r a v i t y a n d cruelty. Shifts f r o m extreme

to the

other were

common,

social anchorage in absorbing A

similar

pression,

crisis,

marked

occurred

industrialization Massive

psychological

again

combined

national

and

tension,

as m e n

desperately

Captive

cataclysm

commitment.45

by in

much the

to

more

West

change

secular

when the

spawned

forms

Mind,

drew

World

as a c u t e

all-encompassing

War

perceptive

II, C z e s l a w

portraits

of

of

ex-

nationalism

character

class conflicts, as w e l l

of

one

sought

of

and

society.

social

and

ideologies

that

s e e m e d to p r o v i d e b o t h authority a n d a sense of direction. about the

is be-

Writing

Milosz,

Eastern

in

European

intellectuals as t h e y m o v e d f r o m o n e faith to a n o t h e r in a for the personal stability that their environment failed to

The

search

provide.

T o d a y ' s m o o d h a s m a n y p a r a l l e l s , b u t it a l s o d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y in scope and content. T h e industrial revolution, to say nothing

of

Histrionics as History in Transition the

culture of the

fined,

Christian

Middle

Ages,

was

{1o1

territorially

a n d only g r a d u a l l y — i n t h e course of m o r e than a

societies.46

a n d a h a l f — d i d it spill o v e r t o affect m o r e a n d m o r e Its a p p e a r a n c e

was

accompanied

by

con-

century

t h e rise of n a t i o n a l i s m

other secular ideologies, in w h i c h broad concepts were

and

reinforced

b y the institutions e m b o d y i n g them. In contrast, the current

crisis

of institutionalized belief takes place in the context of the

tech-

n e t r o n i c r e v o l u t i o n , a r e v o l u t i o n w h i c h is n o t territorial b u t

spatio-

temporal. This

new

revolution

almost

simultaneously

affects

the

entire

globe, w i t h t h e result that fads a n d n e w forms of b e h a v i o r rapidly

from

society

to society.

The

student

generation

t h i s n e w t e c h n e t r o n i c a g e , e v e n if i n s o m e c a s e s t h e i r societies

do

not.

Unlike

the

industrial

age, which

move

lives

in

immediate

required

that

a society undergo extensive industrialization before the n e w

pro-

letarian class could b e c o m e socially significant, the

spatiotemporal

t e c h n e t r o n i c r e v o l u t i o n d i r e c t l y r e a c h e s t h o s e r e c e p t i v e t o it

be-

cause they h a v e access to c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d b e c a u s e their

state

of m i n d is f o r m e d b y factors o u t s i d e their i m m e d i a t e

con-

text. T h e

contemporary

student

and

is

of

that

why

forms

mass

behavior

is p r e c i s e l y peculiar

to

social

such

a

group,

Berkeley

were

within a year repeated elsewhere ( W e s t Berlin students e v e n sandals in the cold N o v e m b e r Central European weather!). ican

student

activists

studying

American society—have role

in

this

America,

process,

the

first

abroad—and

highly

tended to play an important

and

are

evidence

to experience

the

of

the

critical

r e p l a c e d E u r o p e as t h e principal s o u r c e of social

age

to

which

fully,

has

change.

T h e p r o b l e m f a c i n g t h e rebels of a century a n d a half a g o h o w to integrate meaningfully the unprecedented, sible

changes

wrought

problem

is p o s e d

apparent

threat

rationalization, perience,

and

by to

its its

by

the

industrial

values,

simultaneous spatial

its

immediacy

to

every

of

The

age,

impersonality,

intensification

was

incomprehen-

revolution.

the onset of the technetronic human

of

energizing

extent

technetronic

wore Amer-

its

personal

human

same

with

its

overex-

suffering

1o o }

II: The Age of Volatile Belief

anywhere

on

especially

those

the

globe. who

industrial

many most

directly,

by

and

workers)—Marxism

the

the

For

were

in

the

nineteenth

affected,

revolution

either

(that

provided

the

is,

century—

vicariously

the

integrative

response.

T o d a y t h e s e a r c h is o n f o r s o m e n e w s o u r c e o f i n t e l l e c t u a l ing, a n d

the

searchers

have

begun

by

rejecting

or

intellectuals

moor-

established

an-

swers. The

younger

generation

is t h e

the transition into the n e w

one

age, and

most

directly

it c o n t a i n s

affected

the most

o p p o n e n t s a n d i n c l u d e s t h e majority of those w h o f e e l to b e victims of the technetronic revolution. emotion and violence, many the Luddites

of

themselves

In their reliance

of the o p p o n e n t s

early-nineteenth-century

England,

who

which

supported

b y local public opinion, the L u d d i t e s — w e l l organized a n d

real

injustices

The

fear, hatred,

among

some

that

the

and

people

machines'

Like

the

echoes

more

Luddites,

and

advanced

decried the

appearance

incomprehension

chine a century a n d a half

nological

and

the

electronic Western

of

the

the denunciations

highly

frequently

had

very

precipitated.

computer of

current

the textile

ma-

ago.* contemporary revolution

opponents

represent,

of

the

especially

states, a response to t h e n e w

techin

the

modes

life. T h e L u d d i t e s w e r e t h r e a t e n e d b y e c o n o m i c o b s o l e s c e n c e r e a c t e d a g a i n s t it. T o d a y

of

reacted

to the machine age with primitive passion, destroying that

machines

on

are reminiscent

they did not understand well e n o u g h to harness. O f t e n

motivated—shattered

by

active

of and

t h e militant leaders of t h e reaction,

as

w e l l as their i d e o l o g u e s , f r e q u e n t l y c o m e f r o m t h o s e b r a n c h e s

of

learning evance.47

which Their

are

most

political

sensitive activism

to

the

threat

is t h u s o n l y

of

social

a reaction

more basic fear that the times are against them, that a n e w is e m e r g i n g w i t h o u t e i t h e r t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e o r t h e i r

irrelto

the

world

leadership.f

* In early February 1969, rioting students in Montreal vented their anger at the "system" by destroying with fireaxes a one-million-dollar university computer. t The insistence on total solutions prompts, at the same time, their characteristic unwillingness to become involved in the more mundane process of

Histrionics as History in Transition

{1o1

T h e attraction that a s e g m e n t of the y o u n g e r generation in more

developed

emotion—and —may

be

world

now

feels

toward

poetry,

lyricism,

their c o n t e m p t for reason and intellectual

concepts

of o n e tradition replacing

an-

other but rather of a clash b e t w e e n emotion a n d necessity. O n

the

one hand

indicative not so m u c h

the and

are the feelings a n d attitudes p r o m p t e d

by the

break-

d o w n of institutionalized beliefs a n d intensified b y the n e w

modes

of c o m m u n i c a t i o n — a l l

stimulating

or creating an

overwhelming

desire for e m o t i o n a l e s c a p e , or at least e m o t i o n a l release "concrete" tedious

feelings

necessity

techniques

and to

associations.

master

of computers,

by

mathematics,

like, o n w h i c h t h e r e s o l u t i o n of m a n y lems

On

the

intensive

other

through

hand

is

conceptualization

systems

control,

the

and

contemporary social

the

the

prob-

depends.*

Though whether class of

this

the

clash

student

the twentieth

may

be

a

generation century.

profound represents

A

one, a

new

it

is

doubtful

revolutionary

truly revolutionary

class

must

making partial improvements, of gradually adapting new techniques, of really becoming involved in the world. John Ardagh, in The New French Revolution (New York, 1969), notes this paradox in regard to the French intellectual left: "Sartre and his friends have preached that literature must be engagee—but in practice they have always shied away from realistic political action. . . . Sartre and his friends have always demanded utopia or nothing . . . So the technocrats have stolen the Sartrians' clothes" (p. 358). * Compare, in this connection, Noam Chomsky's attacks on the new breed of American intellectual-experts (American Power and the New Mandarins, New York, 1968) with the attacks on Plato, who was accused of the sin of "intellectualizing" reality. There are other tantalizing parallels to ancient Athens. The author of a recent study of the impact of Plato's philosophy on the society of his time argues that the term "philosopher" was relatively new and was used by Plato to identify "the man who is prepared to challenge the hold of the concrete over our consciousness, and to substitute the abstract" (Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, p. 281). The concentration on the abstract was associated with the appearance of a new technique of communication—the written, which first supplemented and then displaced the antecedent oral tradition (pp. 292-95). Epic poetry relied on narrative, which both stimulated and depended on emotionally shared experience; the more abstract categorization of reality became possible with the introduction of the alphabet and writing, and it opened the doors of history to conceptualization. Both Christianity and Marxism stepped through these doors.

1

oo}

II:

The Age of Volatile Belief

master the c o n t e m p o r a r y techniques of social organization, than reject them.

This

may

be

difficult for the

student

t i o n a r y class" t o d o , s i n c e it is n e c e s s a r i l y t r a n s i t i o n a l in

character

and subject to constant change. This does not preclude sibility

that

student

permanently

and

militants

students

rebellion.

It

may is

revolutionaries

well

become—especially

experience—professional new

might

alive

however,

will be

after

revolutionaries

keep

not,

the

opt

and

feelings

certain

that

able to maintain

out

rather

"revolu-

the

society

hardening

prison

that of

the

inflow

older

create

its

a "class." E a c h own

student

leadership,

its

their ties w i t h t h e

generation

own

and

ex-student

will

aspirations

then

and

new

increas-

ingly s e p a r a t e d b y age. T h e y will r u n t h e risk of b e c o m i n g of

rebels

have

h i s t o r y is, a f t e r all, a c e m e t e r y o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y y o u t h

becoming

more

willing

to tolerate

that

movements.

Moreover, the c o m i n g w a v e s of students m a y enter a n gradually

the

environexistence

of altogether d e v i a n t subcultures a n d offering social support

even

to those w h o c h o o s e to divorce themselves from society. M a n y the contemporary younger rebels—especially those w h o are ological rather t h a n political in their m o t i v a t i o n — m a y w e l l that path.

Finally,

education

and

student

may

as social c h a n g e

knowledge,

be

blurred;

the as

contributes

distinctive

society

more

of

pathchoose

to the spread

characteristics

becomes

to

techniques,

b e f o r e it t o o f a d e s f r o m t h e s c e n e . It is p e r h a p s n o a c c i d e n t

ment

of

restlessness

the

generation of y o u n g e r students, f r o m w h o m t h e y will b e

outside

pos-

of

of

of the

knowledge-

oriented and the student m o r e socially involved, the g a p

between

student life a n d society will narrow. Nevertheless, the c h a l l e n g e of the s t u d e n t g e n e r a t i o n as a w h o l e to rigid hierarchies a n d institutionalized beliefs a n d to the order of

the

industrial

age

has

had

the

effect of

m o r e basic questions concerning the purposes of social tion. W h a t external

should

definitions

the

organiza-

internal and

whenever

d o m i n a t e s our c o n s c i o u s n e s s of reality.

relationship

the

meaning

new

is

the

liberty to social equality? T h e s e questions acquire n e w for

life? W h a t

between

personal

call

of

the balance

the

of

and

qualities

be

social

reopening

a

major

historical

crisis

Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology

{ 1 11

4. Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology T h e nineteenth century can b e said to represent the lectual s u p r e m a c y of the idea of liberty, but the twentieth is w i t n e s s i n g

the

triumph

f o u n d its p o l i t i c a l

of

equality.

embodiment

For

most

in the nation,

intel-

century

people

liberty

and only for

rela-

t i v e l y f e w w a s it in p r o c e d u r a l g u a r a n t e e s f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l .

The

last c e n t u r y w a s , therefore, primarily t h e t i m e of nationalism,

and

only secondarily

of

liberal

which

of

equality

the

strongest

idea

motivating

democracy. can

impulse

be

behind

The

search

expressed the

is

for forms currently

activities

of

blacks

the

university

students in the W e s t a n d of y o u t h f u l critics of the p r i v i l e g e d m u n i s t e l i t e s ; it a l s o g u i d e s r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n

in

and

both in the U n i t e d States a n d in Africa, and b e t w e e n

the

comwhites richer

and the poorer countries. W e h a v e thus r e a c h e d the stage in mankind's history w h e r e passion for equality

is a u n i v e r s a l ,

self-conscious force. W h a t

m o r e , s i n c e e q u a l i t y is n o t l i k e l y t o b e a t t a i n e d o n t h e

substitute,

with

passionate

conflict

and

hostility

is

objective

p l a n e , it m a y b e s o u g h t m o r e a n d m o r e o n t h e s u b j e c t i v e W i t h real equality impossible, equality through e m o t i o n a

the

plane.

becomes

creating

the

illusion of equality.

The Quest for The

passion

Equality for equality

is s t r o n g

today

because

for the

t i m e i n h u m a n h i s t o r y i n e q u a l i t y is n o l o n g e r i n s u l a t e d b y t i m e distance. N a t i o n a l i s m s p r e a d d u r i n g a century a n d a half as

first and

popu-

lations gradually b e c a m e politicized as a side effect of literacy

and

11 8 }

11: The Age of Volatile Belief

industrialization,

but

the

rejection

tween nations has b e c o m e of

decades.

In

this

of

inequality

the dominant m o o d

regard,

as

in

the

within

and

in a m e r e

rebellion

of

the

younger

generation, the a p p e a r a n c e of global c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d of e d u c a t e d m a s s e s is t h e d e c i s i v e

be-

matter

newly

stimulus.

Accordingly, the relationship b e t w e e n the technetronic age

and

the passion for e q u a l i t y — i f not t h e idea of equality itself—is causal.

From

the

standpoint

of

generating

social

and

quite

political

m o t i v a t i o n , it is a m a t t e r o f e n o r m o u s i m p o r t t h a t " t h e p o o r as m u c h in t h e n e w ment

of

world

software multibillion dollar service

information

as t h e

do."48

wealthy

live

environ-

National

pression a n d class oppression h a d to b e direct a n d personal

op-

before

they could generate counterreaction. T o d a y the sense of inequality can b e vicarious and nevertheless extraordinarily intense, it c a n b e m a g n i f i e d b e y o n d t h e l e v e l of p e r s o n a l But though commands

the commitment

the

to the idea of

greatest allegiance,

mains elusive. In the communist

the

because

experience. equality

definition of

currently

equality

states the struggle for

equality involves the desire to do a w a y with the right to rule a privilege

of

only

a

few;

with

the

right

to read

and

re-

political

to

as

travel

f r e e l y as a p r o f e s s i o n a l p r e r o g a t i v e of o n l y t h o s e at t h e t o p of

the

p o w e r elite; w i t h t h e right to b u y w h a t o n e desires as a n

advan-

tage enjoyed only by those on governmental

abroad

or w i t h

access

to

special

stores

for high

assignments

officials.

Nevertheless,

communist party leaders, w h o have long assumed that the

elimi-

nation

social

of

equality

propertied as

the

classes

basis

for

would

personal

libertarian equality difficult to In

the

new

and

developing

automatically liberty,

find

ensure this

desire

for

comprehend. states,

the

difficulty

in

e q u a l i t y is c o m p o u n d e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t i n m o s t c a s e s

defining

complaints

result not only f r o m i m m e d i a t e social inequities b u t f r o m an

acute

sense of deprivation vis-a-vis the d e v e l o p e d world. T h e small

size

of m a n y of t h e n e w

im-

potence

and

states further intensifies their f e e l i n g of

complicates

the

task

of

redress.*

Their

economic

* "The median population of all states independent before 1776 is today 22.6 million, of those emerging from the first anticolonial revolution and the

Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology dependence

on unstable commodity

{111

markets and foreign

capital

m e a n s t h a t t h e i r l i b e r t y is h i g h l y r e l a t i v e a n d t e n u o u s . T h e is a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h l i b e r t y s e e m s t h r e a t e n e d b y t h e

result

absence

of international equality. It is t h e d e s i r e f o r e q u a l i t y t h a t h a s m a d e m o s t o f t h e of

the

new

states

embrace

socialism.

They

see

in

leaders

socialism

vehicle for e n s u r i n g t h e objectives w h i c h m o s t of t h e m share: flowering

of their nations' o w n

nomic

development,

and

the

the

distinctive cultures, national gradual

erosion

of

eco-

internal

and

external inequality. Their socialism shares the Marxist analysis capitalism

and

the

Leninist

description

of

imperialism,

a

of

though

the leaders t e n d to stress that their e c o n o m i c a p p r o a c h avoids errors n o t o n l y of c a p i t a l i s m b u t of c o m m u n i s m as w e l l . 4 9

the

Indeed,

s o m e leaders h a v e claimed that their socialism—less d o g m a t i c

and

enriched by indigenous traditions—would provide the world

with

a more humane ism

of

communism

50

West.

Writing

Kenya, T o m ism,

alternative than

declared

or

just

Mboya, that

the

before

either the doctrinaire

social the

indifference attainment

of

of

the

materialcorporate

independence

in discussing t h e African c o n c e p t of

eventually

Africa

rest of

the

These views, however, remain essentially unstructured and

un-

world w h a t f r e e d o m really means."

"will

show

the

51

systematized. T h o u g h they have been described by some as

in

social-

an

ideology,

they

tend

to

lack

the

systematic,

scholars

coherent,

tegrated, a n d intellectually sustained character of either

or c o m m u n i s m , a n d t h e r e is a n a b s e n c e of f o r m a l d o g m a s a n d stitutional e m b o d i m e n t . T h o u g h t h e y back their v i e w s b y ocratic political p o w e r a n d phrase t h e m in a terminology derived from Marxism, a n d t h o u g h t h e y are necessarily

in-

socialism in-

undemlargely preoccu-

p i e d w i t h i m p r o v i n g m a n ' s e c o n o m i c life, t h e leaders of t h e

new

dissolution of dynastic empires (1776-1945), 5.2 million, and of those that won their independence in the last two decades, only 3.4 million. There may be some disagreement on the optimum size of a nation-state, but there is little doubt that'it is above three or four million. The very size of the newly proclaimed states, particularly in Africa, makes it difficult for them to realize those aspirations of modernity and power, of dignity and prosperity, which their leaders profess" (Dankwart Rustow, A World of Nations, Washington, D.C., 1967, p . 247).

11 8 }

11:

The Age of Volatile Belief

nations t e n d to lay stress o n t h e p r e - e m i n e n c e of n a t i o n h o o d

and

of t h e s p i r i t u a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e h u m a n b e i n g . T h i s is a l s o

true

of the n e w i n d i g e n o u s intellectuals—those

in the social layer

mediately below

leaders—who

the present Third World

b e e v e n m o r e radical in their outlook, m o r e

im-

tend

susceptible

to

to

racist

appeals, a n d h i g h l y e m o t i o n a l in behavior.52 Their ecstatic

Marx-

i s m is a f a r c r y f r o m e i t h e r t h e s c h o l a s t i c i s m of M a r x or t h e

organ-

izational s i n g l e - m i n d e d n e s s of Lenin. M o r e o v e r , t h e e x p e r i e n c e of several y e a r s of i n d e p e n d e n c e

has

h a d a chilling effect o n those w h o originally s a w in the n e w

na-

tions an expression of a m o r e h u m a n e vision a n d an e x a m p l e

for

others. In m a n y of t h e n e w states the ruling elites h a v e liberty on the

ground

inequality

eliminating

by

mobilizing national

that

such

restriction

privilege

on

efforts to bridge

the

restricted

is n e c e s s a r y home

to

front

the widening

fight

and

gap

by

between

the nation and the outside world.53 T h e passion for equality in s o m e places b e e n d e b a s e d into a racial nationalism that expression in the expulsion of n o n n a t i v e t r i b e s m e n

(Chinese

Indonesia,

generally

Asians

xenophobic world

as

shown

and

the

from

even

principal

a strong

East

racial

propensity

The

problem

of

equality

and

resentment

exploiter.

s o m e expense to their social

more developed

Africa)

The

toward

of new

more the

developed

political

conspicuous

in

have

consumption,

poses

and prosperous

itself

rather

differently in

countries. There, particularly

vote" formula merely obscures the underlying inequality of b e t w e e n the individual and, for example, the corporations. specifically, the notion of equality—rather than that of heart

of

at

the

civil-rights

struggle

in

the in

"bigness" argue

t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s is d e c e p t i v e b e c a u s e t h e " o n e m a n ,

at t h e

a

white

consciousness.

in institutions a n d v e s t e d interests. O p p o n e n t s of "bigness"

been

its

from

elites

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , it h a s t a k e n t h e f o r m o f o p p o s i t i o n t o

has

has

finds

one

power More

liberty—

the

United

States. F o r m a l "liberty" has b e e n gradually a n d painfully

obtained

b y t h e blacks w i t h t h e p a s s a g e of civil-rights legislation,

particu-

larly

legislation

guaranteeing

the

right

to

vote.

That

"liberty,"

Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology

{ 111

h o w e v e r , hardly assures t h e blacks equality in A m e r i c a , black

mans

struggle

today

is t o

obtain

the

"equality"

w h i t e m a n a l r e a d y p o s s e s s e s . D e f i n i n g t h a t " e q u a l i t y " is

and

the

that

the

precisely

w h a t perplexes the college president or the city manager, to liberty has traditionally b e e n s y n o n y m o u s with

T h e social tensions in the d e v e l o p e d w o r l d — a n d

this is t r u e

s o m e c o m m u n i s t countries as w e l l as of m o r e pluralistic —highlight

the

difficulty of

seeking

equality

whom

equality.

purely

on

ternal a n d material plane. A f t e r several centuries of social

the

ex-

activism

— w h i c h e m p h a s i z e d the external m a n — c o n t e m p o r a r y m a n in advanced

industrial countries

for w h i c h

he

finds

no

religion or ideology. ideological

passions,

confronts

satisfactory

With inner

the

a crisis of

answers

gradual

certitude

Syncretic

the

self-definition

in either

established

fading of nationalist and

external

have yielded to inner ambiguity and external

of

societies

and

commitment

uncertainty.

Belief

W h e n M i c h e l F o u c a u l t p r o c l a i m e d "the d e a t h of man," h e

was

expressing in almost N i e t z s c h e a n terms the pessimism inherent

in

the

in

reaction

against

Promethean

ideologies.*

That

reaction,

* This pessimism has been summarized in Robert Bailey's Sociology Faces Pessimism (The Hague, 1958, pp. 116-17) in ten propositions, contrasting the European Zeitgeist of a hundred years ago with that of today: EUROPEAN ZEITGEIST

1. 2. 3-

45-

One hundred years ago There is progress. Social evolution is linear. Western civilization is moving continually toward greater heights in cultural and social development. Man is rational. Society is composed of individuals who, being rational or capable of becoming rational, shall boost mankind to new levels of accomplishment.

Today 1. There is no progress. 2. Social evolution is cyclical. 3. Western civilization is in a period of disintegration and decline.

4. Man is nonrational or irrational. 5. Society is composed of masses who, being nonrational and easily influenced, shall reduce mankind to mediocrity.

11 8 }

11:

The Age of Volatile Belief

turn, reflects t h e

scientific complexity

of

modern

stimulates a f e e l i n g of futility a n d i m p o t e n c e individual.

on

Foucault's views, associated w i t h a school of

called "structuralism," h a v e b e e n characterized b y ideology

of

contemporary

technocracy,

as the object of a process w h i c h and rules h i m impersonally, T h e rejection of conscious the

society,

ideological-religious

for

sees

of a n y

history—thus that

striking has

autonomy

at t h e

heart

dominated

values,

a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d b e l i e f s a n d of t h e c o l l a p s e of all i n t e g r a t e d purposive

Centuries

in the

ago,

that ought to g u i d e time

in

recorded

historical great

religions,

is

man men.

defined Now,

the

norms

for the

beginning—though

first

just

be-

g i n n i n g — t o liberate himself from the oppressive struggle to

sur-

v i v e as a p h y s i c a l b e i n g .

man

and

interpretations.*

the relations a m o n g

history,

of

Western

t h i n k i n g — i s itself a reflection of the c o n t e m p o r a r y crisis in

simultaneously

the man

dynamic.54

according to a structural

approach

the

thought

a critic as

Foucault

deprives him

which

the part of

This has prompted

a renewed

w i t h t h e m o r e e l u s i v e , spiritual a s p e c t s of e x i s t e n c e ; !

concern

it h a s

also

6. Scientific truth and knowledge 6. Scientific truth and knowledge are beneficial for society. may be harmful for society. 7. Myth and superstition are harm7. Myth and superstition may be ful. beneficial. 8. A society represents a harmony 8. A society is composed always of of interests, a communum boconflicting interests. num. 9. Society is ruled by the consent of 9. Society is ruled by the elite, the people. 10. Democracy and the humanitarian 10. Democracy and the humanitarian social values serve to protect insocial values are unfortunate misdividual and community intertakes that result in the rule of unests. educated masses. 0 Structuralism also involves a critique of Sartre's existentialism, which, in its stress on individual moral autonomy, was itself a reaction to the ideological emphasis on the individual's submissive identification with collective and purposive history-making. t In the words of one of the participants in the Harvard University Program on Technology and Science: "With the advent of the affluent industrial societies science tends to replace economic productivity as a primary social goal. As science is able more and more to satisfy its material needs with less human effort, it becomes more preoccupied with the spiritual and intellectual needs. It must develop new goals and aspirations in order to remain viable as a social order. . . . Many times in the past scientists have believed that

Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology created ingly

a state of agitation, in w h i c h systematic d i a l o g u e

breaks

Naturally, though

{111

down

this

the

because

of

is e s p e c i a l l y

reaction

the

true

gradually

politic. A s a c o n s e q u e n c e ,

lack

of

of

the

shared

intellectual

communicates

itself

the

prothey

less a n d of

the

less internal French

commitment

people

during

p o l i t i c a l o r d e r is a c a s e i n p o i n t . ) cussion today

of the n e e d

abide

body

cedural political order o n l y as l o n g as that order works, b u t have

majority of people

community, to

by

havior

the

increas-

assumptions.

t o it.

(The

May

1968

the

passive

be-

collapse

of

T o b e sure, t h e r e is m u c h

to reassert h u m a n

values,

of

ority of m a n against the tyranny of political despots or

dis-

the

pri-

dehuman-

izing technocrats, but in our t i m e — a s o p p o s e d to the situation eras

when

religion

or

ideology

was

dominant—the

means,

forms, a n d the inner significance of these goals remain narily

undefined.

(The

International

Philosophical

extraordi-

Congress

V i e n n a in 1968 was, for example, d o m i n a t e d b y the v i e w that temporary philosophy m u s t b e in the forefront of the b u t how

"struggle,"

it w a s t o c o n t r i b u t e w a s n e v e r s p e c i f i e d . )

abstract a n d the spiritual, a n d e v e n the e v i d e n c e s of n e w in religiosity—in "the

other

quality

of

words,

all

life"—will

matters

in

the

subsumed

near

future

e m e r g e n c e of n e w f o r m a l ideologies or religions. plexity

and skepticism—reinforced

by

against the systematic

and

dogmatic

reality

was

still

and

ideology

dogmatically

were

part

compressible

the

to

Scientific

the com-

effects

(television)

qualities of an

o l o g y . I n this s e n s e it is t h e r e f o r e r i g h t t o s p e a k ideology." Religion

the

interest

under lead

the impressionistic

of increased reliance o n audio-visual c o m m u n i c a t i o n —work

in

con-

It is d o u b t f u l , t h e r e f o r e , w h e t h e r t h e g r o w i n g c o n c e r n w i t h

term

in the

of

an

into

of "the e n d age

in

ideof

which

intellectualized

all the significant questions had been answered, and the only task remaining was to fill in the details, to work out the full ramifications of the conceptual structure whose main framework was completely delineated. Yet each time the expectation has proved to be wrong. Each new major advance has revealed an unsuspected new world, a new conceptual structure embedded in the old, and subsuming it" (Harvey Brooks, "Can Science Be Planned?" Harvard University Program on Technology and Science, 1968, pp. 13-14 Litalics added]).

11 8 }

11: The Age of Volatile Belief

c o m p a r t m e n t s ; b o t h w e r e reinforced b y t h e u r g e n t desire to translate t h e ideal into t h e real. W h a t

more probably

lies a h e a d

is

turn t o w a r d m o r e personal, less structured, m o r e subjectively fined

attempts

at a s y n t h e s i s of t h e scientific a n d t h e

though perhaps din's thinking.

nothing In any

quite

case,

so mystical

this appears

spiritual—

as T e i l h a r d

to b e

the

a

de-

de

trend

Charamong

contemporary Christian and revisionist Marxist thinkers. Though this

it is i n d i v i d u a l l y

development

democracy.

might

Intellectual

enriching,

work

there

against

confusion

and

the

is

the

danger

durability

political

of

that

liberal

disagreement,

to

say nothing of simple insecurity, m i g h t w e l l stimulate a search for external sources of s t a b i l i t y — w h i c h w o u l d take the f o r m of repression

or

the

bestowal

of

confidence

on

a

either

dominant

per-

s o n a l i t y . M o r e o v e r , "a s o c i e t y t h a t c a r r i e s e c l e c t i c i s m t o t h e

point

w h e r e not only the total culture but the individual becomes

a mere

impossible

to

congeries

make

m a k e of man."

55

A

a

of disassociated

collective

decision

consciousness

elements

as

to

what

will

find

man

leader can then b e a substitute for the

grative tasks of society, w h i c h are o t h e r w i s e p e r f o r m e d b y a

formal

or

an

implicitly

social consensus, fused—mass

society's

media

make

of a n i n d i v i d u a l w h o necessary

shared

ideology.*

emotional this

and

easier

to

In

rational

the

achieve—in

is s e e n as b o t h p r e s e r v i n g a n d

innovations

in

the

social

order.

Given

the

may

the

that

authoritarian

even

approaches

personal

leadership,

a

revolutionary it is v e r y

of be

person

making

the

choice

be-

t w e e n s o c i a l a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s o r d e r — a n d b y t h i s is n o t anything

inteeither

absence

needs

it

shall

meant

situation—and

probable

that

s o m e present constitutional a n d liberal democratic societies

even would

o p t for t h e latter.

* Daniel Bell has described the social functions of ideology in the following terms: "Within every operative society there must be some creed—a set of beliefs and values, traditions and purposes—which links both the institutional networks and the emotional affinities of the members into some transcendental whole. And there have to be some mechanisms whereby those values can be not only 'internalized' by individuals (through norms) but also made explicit for the society—especially one which seems consciously to shape social change; and this explicating task is the function of ideology' ("Ideology and Soviet Politics," Slavic Review, December 1965, p. 595).

Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology The

temptation

to

choose

security

as

an

{111

alternative

to

plexity m a y g r o w in t h e years a h e a d , b e c a u s e "the e n d

com-

of

ideol-

ogy," far f r o m d i m i n i s h i n g the i m p o r t a n c e of ideas a n d ideals p o l i t i c s , is u s h e r i n g i n a n a g e i n w h i c h a b s t r a c t i s s u e s

in

concerning

the m e a n i n g of p e r s o n a l a n d social life are again b e c o m i n g

cen-

tral. It is p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e l i e f s n o l o n g e r

both

confine and

define the

framework

of

the

dialogue

l o g u e is b e c o m i n g m o r e i n t e n s e a n d f a r - r a n g i n g .

that

The

r e n e w e d conflict of ideas, but not of institutionalized renewed In

interest in religiosity,

this

new

and

but

passionate

not in organized

dialogue,

are increasingly

talism, democracy,

socialism, and c o m m u n i s m — e v e n

widely

such

as

dominated

societies,

such

as

the

communist

ideolog-

nations,

i n a d e q u a c y expresses itself m o r e a n d m o r e in e v e n overt on

the

values,

official i d e o l o g y ; it

prompts

framework.

a

in

societies

search

In both cases

for

with

some

the accent

looser,

acceptable

is o n

capi-

nationalism

— a r e n o longer a d e q u a t e to provide relevant insights. In ically

a

ideologies;

and

used terminologies

dia-

religions.

established

useless. Terms

the

r e s u l t is

this

attacks

more

implicit

and

relevant

to

combine

the previously dominant emphasis on external m a n with

the n e e d

renewed

attention to his i n n e r life. I n b o t h c a s e s — a s w a s true of

Marxism

in t h e i n d u s t r i a l a g e — t h e r e is t h e felt n e e d for a n e w

intellectual

synthesis. It is s y m p t o m a t i c o f o u r a g e t h a t d e s p i t e its i n t e n s e it h a s n o t p r o d u c e d of

action

designed

with a new stance concept

of

a relevant concept to

replace

set; t h a t is, b o t h

that

change.

(Marxism),

The

process of industrialization.

a

institutions

and

operative a method

industrial

a n d it w a s

turbulence

of revolution:

of

change

age

did

later applied

strategy

and

values

the

produce

sub-

such

to countries in

T h e r e is n o s u c h t h e o r y a v a i l a b l e

the post-industrial societies, nor has the N e w

a the

Left succeeded

to in

providing one. M o r e o v e r , w h e r e a s in the past ideologies of

change

gravitated

areas—

from

the

developed

world

to

less

developed

thereby stimulating imitation of the d e v e l o p e d w o r l d — t o d a y differences b e t w e e n

the t w o worlds are so p r o n o u n c e d

difficult to c o n c e i v e

of

a new

ideological

wave

the

t h a t it

originating

is

from

11 8 }

11:

The Age of Volatile Belief

the developed world developed

and rapidly acquiring relevance

for

under-

nations.

Total integrative revolutions were possible because ideologies

provided

a

framework

for

total

integrative

change

and

recon-

struction. T h e integrative i d e o l o g y w a s in itself a reflection of a g e in w h i c h institutions.

authority rested on clearly established

The

communist

party, with

its c l a i m

w a s thus the e p i t o m e of an a g e of integrated authoritarian

institutions.

Rapid

scientific

beliefs

to

an and

infallibility,

grand visions

change,

the

and

massive

educational explosion, and the intense communications

implosion

are all factors that m a k e for h i g h l y volatile b e l i e f s a n d

reactions

and create a situation in w h i c h

subjective feelings

portant than collective commitment tion and

im-

for social

ac-

to a blueprint

organization.

Accordingly, for the present, both the tensions

are more

that

are

stimulated

on

the

fragmentation-unification

political,

economic,

tellectual planes b y the g a p b e t w e e n the technological tronic a g e

and

social forms

the persistence

derived

from

in a n e w

another

age

era of point

and

and

institutions

toward

a

turbulence rather t h a n t o w a r d a t i m e of f u n d a m e n t a l

consensus;

the

communist

world

is

finding

and

time

of

revolution.

T h e m o r e d e v e l o p e d w o r l d is f a c i n g a crisis of its liberal, cratic

inelec-

demo-

difficult

to

a d a p t its i d e o l o g y ; t h e T h i r d W o r l d s e e k s a f r a m e o f r e f e r e n c e

in

a modified form of socialism that substitutes

it

emotion

doxy. In the past the w o r l d lived in an e n v i r o n m e n t mentalized

uniformity:

socio-economic

structure

agrarian but

societies,

for

of

basically

ortho-

compartsimilar

differentiated in religions

and

in cul-

tures, w e r e isolated f r o m o n e another; t o d a y differentiated

socio-

economic

crum-

realities,

existing

in

an

intellectual

context

bling religions and ideologies, overlap perceptually.

of

The

certitude of the past thus gives w a y to psychic tension;

psychic

confidence

of r i g h t e o u s n e s s yields to f e e l i n g s of guilt or r e s e n t f u l inferiority. *

• Thus, in the past when Christians and Moslems hated one another they did so in self-righteous confidence; today Third World citizens may hate Americans for their wealth but at the same time despise their own felt inferiority, whereas Americans feel guilty about their wealth but savor a feeling of technological superiority.

Ideas and Ideals beyond Ideology It is p o s s i b l e t h a t i n t h e p r e s e n t p h a s e there are for the

first

{111

of intellectual

spective. T h e assertively universalist ideologies of t h e century were they

turmoil

t i m e the s e e d s of a globally relevant

in fact highly parochial

quickly merged

with

nineteenth

in their origins,

nationalism.

(This

per-

turned

and out

thus to

be

particularly true of c o m m u n i s m u n d e r Stalin.) T h e s e e m i n g l y

in-

ner-oriented ideas and ideals that dominate—in a highly

unstruc-

tured m a n n e r — t h e current dialogue are in fact m u c h m o r e c e r n e d w i t h the universal p r o b l e m s of m a n a n d w i t h the

con-

reinte-

gration of t h e spiritual a n d t h e material. M a n ' s vision of h i m s e l f w a s at mentary,

reflecting

eventually though

emerged

each

was

thousands several

first

of

religions

still c u l t u r a l l y

highly primitive and

small

and

cultures.

with

Out

universal

territorially

frag-

of

these

aspirations,

confined.

The

a g e of s e c u l a r i s m g a v e rise to a m o r e political vision, in w h i c h tionalism

(elevated

into

a

universal

with largely European-derived

principle)

was

ideologies that aspired to

univer-

sal a p p l i c a b i l i t y . W h e t h e r o u r p h a s e is a transition or t h e n i n g of a m o r e

fundamental

disintegration

is l i k e l y

na-

combined

begin-

to b e

very

m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y w h a t h a p p e n s in the t w o major societies our time—the United States and the Soviet U n i o n — a n d b y happens

to the t w o

major

world—liberalism and

contemporary

communism.

visions

of

the

of

what

modern

AMMMA

PART III

Communism: The Problem of Relevance Marxism, born of the social u p h e a v a l p r o d u c e d b y the bined

effects of

the

industrial

and

nationalist

vided a u n i q u e intellectual tool for understanding a n d the

fundamental a

forces

response

to

supplied

the best

of

our

particularly

time.

As

traumatic

available

insight

both

phase

of

com-

revolutions,

a

harnessing

product

mans

pro-

and

a

history,

it

reality;

it

into contemporary

i n f u s e d p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n w i t h s t r o n g e t h i c a l e l e m e n t s ; it f o r m e d basis

for a

sustained

attack

on

antiquated

pre-industrial

the

social

i n s t i t u t i o n s ; a n d it r a i s e d t h e b a n n e r o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m i n a n increasingly dominated b y national As the

first

state to h a v e put

Marxist theory into practice,

Soviet Union could have e m e r g e d

as the standard-bearer

century's

of

model

most

influential

for resolving

today

Soviet

trine.

In

Marxist

the

communism

China,

the

principles

to

system

key

scene

of

extreme

thought

dilemmas

is a

age

hatreds.

facing

conservative the

most

industrial

and

as

the

modern

this

social

man.

bureaucratized

extensive

the

of

Yet doc-

application

backwardness,

of

commu123

i 6 2 } nism

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

is a c u r i o u s

mixture

of ethnocentric

nationalism

and

ideo-

logical f u n d a m e n t a l i s m ; in t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d W e s t

communism

is v i t a l o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it b l u r s its i d e o l o g i c a l

identity

c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h its e r s t w h i l e i d e o l o g i c a l rivals; a n d in t h e

by East

its i d e o l o g i c a l m i l i t a n c y f e e d s o n a d e l i b e r a t e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n

with

the most fanatic nationalist passions. In sum, contemporary

com-

m u n i s m has sacrificed Marxism's Promethean c o m m i t m e n t to

uni-

versal humanism. The

tragedy

of

communism

as a universal perspective

is

it c a m e b o t h t o o e a r l y a n d t o o late. It w a s t o o e a r l y t o b e a of true internationalism, b e c a u s e m a n k i n d w a s o n l y just ing

to

national

self-awareness

and

logical m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n

because

the

awaken-

limited

techno-

available were not yet ready

reinforce a universal perspective.

It c a m e t o o late for t h e

trial

and

West,

because

reformism

nationalism

pre-empted

its

that

source

humanist

liberal appeal

concepts through

indus-

of

the

to

statenation-

state. It c a m e too early for t h e pre-industrial East, w h e r e it s e r v e d as

the

ideological

lating in t h e m

alarm

clock

increasingly

for

radical

the

dormant

masses,

stimu-

nationalism.

T o o late in the W e s t , t o o early in the East, c o m m u n i s m its m o m e n t

of

opportunity

in neither

West

nor

East

but

found in

the

h a l f w a y h o u s e of Russia. Its failures a n d successes, as w e l l as specific character, therefore, h a v e to b e seen in the context of peculiar

fifty-year

and

a highly

day

world

tie b e t w e e n

a would-be

universalist

specific Eurasian national setting.

the

practical

reality

of

communism

To is

its

that

doctrine

the

present-

mainly

what

R u s s i a h a s m a d e o f it. To modern man communism

in C h i n a represents o n l y a

tial a n d d o e s n o t offer a relevant e x a m p l e . T h o u g h of

Chinese

permanent the

more

communism—its revolution,

disaffected

its and

alleged

ideological emotional

puritanism,

some its

militancy—may Western

potenaspects

seemingly appeal

intellectuals,

social m o d e l C h i n a offers little g u i d a n c e to t h o s e c o n c e r n e d the problems

of a d v a n c e d

industrial

civilization.

Still

w i t h its o w n b a c k w a r d n e s s , s u f f e r i n g f r o m p o l i t i c a l

as

to a

with

struggling

uncertainties,

The Stalinist Paradox

{

125

m i r e d in conflicts w i t h its i m m e d i a t e n e i g h b o r s , i n c r e a s i n g l y

Sini-

f y i n g its M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m ,

sym-

bol

for

some,

but

China may be

it h a r d l y

offers

the social a n d psychological

a

a revolutionary

blueprint

dilemmas

posed

for

by

coping

the

with

post-indus-

trial age. T o b e sure, C h i n a m a y the would-be

For s o m e of them, tional

discipline

China

and

effort to m o d e r n i z e

of w i l l

example

of

dernity.

The

and

how

in the

provides

ideological

purpose,

dedication,

as a g u i d e

communism of

an attractive

model

responds

the

Soviet

to s o m e

less d e v e l o p e d

of

technological

Chinese

experience

in a different light

elites

in spite of

e v e n o n this level t h e ample

appear

revolutionary

example a massive

only

na-

social

the

Union

But

as an

to the future, to

of

backwardness.

is r e l e v a n t

of

nations.

not

problems provides

ex-

as

an

of the

moonly

a n s w e r to that crucial test.

1. The Stalinist Paradox

One

man

dominated

almost

two-thirds

of

Soviet

history,

a n d h i s n a m e is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h b o t h a s y s t e m of r u l e a n d a ticular approach to constructing communism's

contemporary

within the Soviet Union, Stalin's legacy.

That

communism.

No

role in the world, to say nothing

can afford to overlook

legacy

is r e p r e s e n t e d

by

Stalin's role the

Soviet

two

decades

have

passed

since

Stalin's

death,

any

d i s c u s s i o n of r e f o r m still i n e v i t a b l y r e v o l v e s a r o u n d t h e of breaking with

Stalinism.

of of and

state's

current institutions a n d m o d e s of operation, a n d e v e n t h o u g h most

par-

examination

al-

Soviet

question

i62

}

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

T h i s is q u i t e u n d e r s t a n d a b l e .

The

Soviet

state a n d

the

society of t o d a y w e r e created b y an u n p r e c e d e n t e d social tion deliberately

carried

out

by

the

political

elite.

Soviet revolu-

Violent

costly, that revolution should not b e c o n f u s e d w i t h the

Bolshevik

s e i z u r e of p o w e r in 1917, f o r it o c c u r r e d m o r e t h a n a d e c a d e During

the

crucial years

of

1930-1940,

Soviet society w a s reshaped

that revolution elite. the

It w a s first

as t h e n e w

which

that

spawned

that

revolution

revolution

character was

which

Soviet

which

state

Russia's

is s a i d

to

Marxism

at

took

the

question

The

question

confused bility than

of

with

can

least six

present have

in

what

Marxist p o w e r formed

by

an

first

constructed laid

the

I t is

that

also

specific

to assure the industrial d e v e l o p m e n t

the

that

did

was

political

a n d to h a v e

whether

and

It

as-

society.

Stalinism

of

always

which

aspirations

shape.

sociated so integrally w i t h the creation of the n e w

The Necessity

later.

of

entrance into c o m m u n i s m .

begs

necessary

course

consumed

Soviet

socialist society b a s e d o n

f o u n d a t i o n s for its e v e n t u a l

the

to mirror the ideological

of t h e political rulers, that r e v o l u t i o n a half million lives*

in

and

of

be

"necessity" its

took

autocratic

Stalinism

"inevitability."

more

not.

of

easily

detected

Stalinism

became

In

should

retrospect,

in

what

"inevitable"

root in a specific Russian political

tradition,

did

not

inevitahappen because

environment

intellectual

frustra-

tion, a n d a strong p r o p e n s i t y t o w a r d messianism. A s a result, tain facets of M a r x i s m w e r e reinforced at the e x p e n s e It w a s Lenin's contribution,

be

of

cer-

others.

and the mark of his genius, to

have

* The most detailed accounting is in Robert Conquest's The Great Terror, New York, 1968. He concludes that approximately one million persons were actually executed between 1936 and 1938 (p. 529), that at least two million more died in camps during these years (p. 532), to which one may also add the at least three and a half million who died during the collectivization (p- 533)- My own calculations are that of the ruling party's 2.4 million members, no less than 850,000 were purged during 1937-1938 alone (The Permanent Purge, Cambridge, Mass., 1956, pp. 98-110). It should be noted that estimates made by others have been higher.

The Stalinist Paradox

{

127

b e e n able to a d a p t M a r x i s m to his native Russia, a n d in so to have created both Marxist-Leninist ideology and the

doing

Bolshevik

party. Lenin's victory over his rivals within the Russian Marxist ment

and,

lapse of cessful

more

important,

the old autocratic

his

seizure

structure,

"de-Westernization"

of

of

power

laid

the

Marxism,

despotic propensities over occidental

a

upon

basis

col-

for the

suc-

victory

democratic

move-

the

of

oriental

tendencies.

emphasis on dogmatic belief, o n violence, on conspiratorial

His

activ-

ity, a n d o n t h e a l m o s t total s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l to

(partiinost),

party

paranoid Marx's

as w e l l

suspiciousness

own

as his

(all

behavior),

both

to

can

therefore

leader—and

be

potism1—was

and

and

his

characteristic

dissent

of

extended

the

that

Stalin's

emergence

the oriental style a n d m o o d

facilitated,

brutal

operated.

argued

particularly

of

extent

reflected

autocratic tradition in w h i c h h e It

intolerance some

the

if n o t

dictated,

by

Lenin's

as

top

of his

des-

concept

the party as a n elitist g r o u p suspicious of the "trade-union tality" of the w o r k e r s a n d hostile to t h e inertia a n d

conservatism

of the peasants. Intolerance of opposition a n d insistence o n ence to the party facilitated the emergence

of a

of

men-

obedi-

bureaucratically

skilled dictator c a p a b l e of exploiting these traditions to

paralyze

would-be

different

opponents

perspectives, tainly did both

Leonard

not

conveyed

possible

by

and

see the

eye

rivals.

Schapiro to

degree

inhibiting

Writing and

eye

either

to

which

effective

from

Isaac on

entirely

Deutscher,

Leninism

Leninism

cer-

or

Stalinism,

made

Stalinism

the

party

to

Stalin's c o n s o l i d a t i o n of p o w e r . 2 If L e n i n d i d n o t m a k e

Stalin

in-

evitable, h e at least m a d e

opposition

who

within

effective opposition to h i m within

the

party impossible. T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e " n e c e s s i t y " o f S t a l i n i s m is, h o w e v e r ,

a

ferent one. It pertains to t h e p r o b l e m of w h e t h e r Stalinist

dif-

meth-

o d s — a n d the resulting Stalinist s y s t e m — w e r e n e e d e d to effect the socialist revolution and, particularly, industrialization. is a s s u m e d

that Stalinism as a political

system

was

Even

if

it

"inevitable,"

i 6 2 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

it d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t t h e e n o r m o u s h u m a n

sacrifice that

Stalin

extracted from the Soviet p e o p l e w a s necessary to modernize industrialize

Russia

and

the

non-Russian

T h a t sacrifice m a y h a v e b e e n necessary system,0

but

to a d v a n c e

of the a r g u m e n t

and

nations

the

the

case

Stalinist

is t o s h i f t t h e

that

and

USSR.

to preserve the

that proposition

to m a k e

of

ground

to maintain

Stalin's

p o w e r S t a l i n i s t m e a n s h a d t o b e u s e d . T h e r e is n o g a i n s a y i n g

that

argument. It

does

whether

not,

dustrialize Union. Soviet

however,

provide

Stalinist m e t h o d s Russia

The

and

question

an

had to be

the

non-Russian

is i m p o r t a n t

legitimacy—the

answer used

nations

because

authority

and

to

the

the

question

to modernize of

the

the

entire

power

of

Soviet

the

the

crimes

extraordinarily

made

available

Twenty-second Union

in

1961,

detailed to

Congress the

the of

entire

the

tendency

leaders has b e e n to minimize

and

essentially

only slightly marred

gory

accounts

Soviet

Communist of

the

public Party

of

during

of

the

and

the

Soviet

post-Khrushchev

Stalin's m i s d e e d s

by De-

Stalin's

Soviet

to stress

a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of t h e thirties. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n is t h a t t h e acted correctly throughout,

of

present

Stalin's o c c a s i o n a l m i s c o n d u c t vis-a-vis s o m e of his c o m r a d e s . spite

in-

edifice

S o v i e t e l i t e — i s d e r i v e d f r o m t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e p a s t is o n e of glorious a n d heroic a c h i e v e m e n t ,

and

the

party

a n d h e n c e t h a t its c l a i m t o p o w e r

derived from the essentially infallible leadership

it h a s

is

provided

b o t h in the past a n d in the present. It is o n this c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l

system

b a s e s its c l a i m t o m o r a l i t y a n d universality. T o q u e s t i o n t h e

form

o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e S o v i e t s o c i e t y is t o q u e s t i o n t h e

legit-

imacy

of

the

present

rulers,

albeit

indirectly.

to question the international relevance particularly

its

Leninist-Stalinist

of the

concentration

Even

more,

Soviet model, of

power

in

it

is

and the

0 The Stalinist theory that class struggle intensifies as progress toward socialism accelerates—which conflicts with the notion that class struggle is a consequence of the existence of hostile classes but which justifies increased police terror—was functionally convenient to the interests of Stalin's policies and power.

The Stalinist Paradox

{

h a n d s of a small b u r e a u c r a t i c p a r t y elite. T h e

events in

slovakia

Chinese

in

1968,

Revolution" of

Soviet

attacks

on

the

Czecho"Cultural

b e c a u s e it u n d e r m i n e d t h e p r i m a c y o f C h i n e s e

officials, a n d dilution

the

129

the

long-standing

party

supremacy

Soviet

all

criticism

show

the

of

extent

the to

party

Yugoslav which

the

S o v i e t elite still c o n s i d e r s its p o l i t i c a l m o d e l to b e of b r o a d e r

sig-

nificance. This link b e t w e e n d o m e s t i c interests a n d foreign tions

explains

Soviet

sensitivity

to

suggestions

by

a n d non-Marxist scholars that the Stalinist m o d e of Soviet society w a s wasteful, cruel, a n d — m o s t

aspira-

both

Marxist

transforming

important—neither

outstandingly successful nor necessary. Did

Stalin

have

any

alternative?

At

least

some

Russians—

Marxists as w e l l as n o n - M a r x i s t s — h a d envisaged m e a n s b y Russian industrialization could have b e e n less physically

and

morally

costly

than

achieved

that

in a

pursued

which manner

by

Stalin,

t h o u g h on a c o m p a r a t i v e l y ambitious scale. E v e n b e f o r e the

1917

Revolution, Russian scholars were drawing u p plans for the

mod-

ernization of their country. P e r h a p s the m o s t important p l a n c o n t a i n e d in t h e s t u d y c o n c l u d e d

in

1918 b y

Professor V.

was Grin-

evetskii, rector of t h e M o s c o w Institute of T e c h n o l o g y , w h i c h lined

a

systematic

program,

to

last

several

decades,

for

d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e c o u n t r y . A c c o r d i n g to a n e x t r e m e l y tive analysis of this study,3 in addition to p r o v i d i n g for state

action,

planners

did

Grinevetskii on

price

placed

signals

greater

and

emphasis

profit criteria

as

outthe

informadeliberate

than

Soviet

a means

w h i c h to arrive "in m o s t c a s e s at t h e s a m e priorities, p o l i c i e s , even specific investment choices as those selected by Soviet ners

in

disregard

of

Soviet

these

adopted

by

matched

those envisaged

planners by

criteria." in the

Indeed,

early

Grinevetskii:

the

five-year

top

Soviet from

canal construction,

claim "the

has

granite

been

that

and

plans

closely

electrification, the

so forth.4 T h o u g h

Soviet

foundations

of

plan-

priorities

location of industry a n d population eastward, hydroelectric opment,

industrialization

the was

Marxism-Leninism,"

abundant evidence that Soviet planners, s o m e of t h e m

by and

re-

devel-

standard derived there

is

Grinevet-

i 6 2 }

III: Communism:

The Problem of Relevance

skiis former colleagues, relied heavily o n his work, accepting targets though rejecting his formula for a m o r e making process

and

for greater

(though

not

flexible

his

decision-

exclusive)

reliance

o n price signals a n d profit criteria. Within the c o m m u n i s t party, there w e r e also alternative for industrialization,

most

notably

those

coming

from

a n d t h e so-called "Right Opposition." S o m e w h a t like

plans

Bukharin

Grinevetskii,

they a d v o c a t e d a policy in w h i c h positive i n d u c e m e n t s e m p l o y e d to e n c o u r a g e the peasants to increase their

would

a n d to m a k e the u r b a n p o p u l a t i o n share s o m e of t h e social d e n s of industrialization, the timetable for w h i c h w o u l d b e w h a t extended. T h e y w e r e particularly o p p o s e d to rapid collectivization—the

means

from the peasantry—and

used

by

Stalin

in that opposition

to

extract

they were

Bukharin.

liquidation

By

1930,

of millions

Trotsky had of

kulaks

concluded

was

an

that

immoral

some-

a

surplus

later

physical

"monstrosity," and

violence

a n d to

discredit

communism.5 Perhaps even more damaging from the Soviet of v i e w h a v e b e e n t h e m o r e recent observations of the

Speaking

on November

23,

1961, h e

point

otherwise

orthodox and highly pro-Soviet Polish communist leader, slaw Gomulka.

sup-

opponent

the

w h i c h w a s initiating a vicious circle of c o m p u l s i o n that w a s b o u n d to e n g u l f t h e society as a w h o l e

bur-

coercive

ported e v e n b y Trotsky, w h o initially h a d b e e n a strong of

be

production

Wlady-

similarly

b e l e d c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n "as t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e p r o c e s s of

la-

growing

lawlessness, violation of socialist legality, the establishment of

an

a t m o s p h e r e of fear, a n d the g r o w t h u n d e r these conditions of

the

personality cult, t h e cult of Stalin." * 0 Whether collectivization facilitated rapid industrialization is a matter of debate among the economists. It is indisputable, however, that its extraordinarily brutal character precipitated a rapid decline in agricultural resources that might have contributed to investment. "The gross output of agriculture fell from 124 in 1928 (1913-100) to 101 in 1933, and was only 109 in 1936, while that of cattle farming declined from 137 in 1928 to 65 in 1933 and then rose slowly to 96 in 1936. Throughout the nineteen-thirties the grain crops did not exceed the pre-1913 level or were somewhat below it" (Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, London, 1963, p. 99). A specialist in Soviet agriculture, in reviewing the recent Soviet reconsideration of that difficult period, reached the conclusion that "with larger grain and currency

The Stalinist Paradox It s h o u l d also b e n o t e d of u n p r e c e d e n t e d

that Stalinism put an e n d

creativity in Russian

{

to a

architecture,

131

period

poetry,

and

the sciences. D u r i n g the 1920s, in the i m m e d i a t e

post-revolution-

ary phase,

vibrant

The

Russia exuded

massive

terror

and

a sense the

of

awakened,

ideological

prompted caution and conformity.

orthodoxy

of

energy. Stalinism

E v e n in t h e ideological

realm

Marxist thought w a s r e d u c e d to an intellectually regressive chism,

for w h i c h

Stalin's

Dialectical

and Historical

cate-

Materialism

( 1 9 3 8 ) s e r v e d as the a l l - e n c o m p a s s i n g f r a m e of reference. A

different range

Soviet

of

development,

issues

though

is p o s e d morally

by

the

and

question

physically

whether

costly,

at-

tained goals u n m a t c h e d b y any other society. This, of course,

has

special relevance not only to the internal historical legitimacy

of

t h e p r e s e n t s y s t e m b u t p a r t i c u l a r l y t o its s t a n d i n g as a m o d e l

for

other

societies.

European

This

economic

claim

has

historians

been

disputed

by

as w e l l

as b y

those

some

A m o n g the Westerners, Walt Rostow has developed most pointed ments

in

(and

controversial)

modernization.

He

challenge

argues

that

War

I, a n d

West.

perhaps

the

completion

of

its

modernization."6

"in-

development

that "Stalin

the architect not of the m o d e r n i z a t i o n of a b a c k w a r d country, of

the

achieve-

communists

h e r i t e d a n e c o n o m y that h a d t a k e n off" in industrial in the t w o d e c a d e s prior to W o r l d

in the

to Stalinist the

Eastern

Moreover,

he

was but sees

reserves and the existence of a more effective socialized sector, the government's freedom to maneuver would have been considerably greater. The entire edifice of the industrialization program need not have collapsed and it would have been possible to avoid the catastrophic decline in livestock herds, the necessity of devoting huge amounts of scarce capital to the task of merely replacing the loss of draught power, and the tying up of much scarce administrative talent in the apparatus of control and compulsion. Whether the Soviet government would have been able to remain in power without the mass collectivization of 1929-30 is a problem in which an economist qua economist does not have much to say, but he is entitled to think that a non-Stalinist Soviet government might well have been able to do so" (J. F. Karcz, "Thoughts on the Grain Problem," Soviet Studies, April 1967, PP- 429-30). Thus, although the marketable share of agriculture might (or might not) be smaller in a non-collectivized setting, it is reasonably safe to assume that even a smaller share of a larger total output would mean a larger supply in absolute terms.

i 6 2 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

striking parallels in the pattern a n d p a c e of both Russian

industrialization,

the

former

1860s a n d the latter in the 1880s.7 Similarly,

Cyril

Black,

American

commencing

and

around

the

0

in his study

of

Russian

modernization,

h a s c i t e d c u m u l a t i v e d a t a s h o w i n g t h a t "in t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of years,

the

comparative

nomic

and

social

ranking

indices

per

of

the

capita

USSR

has

in

fifty

composite

probably

not

eco-

changed

significantly. S o far as t h e rather limited available e v i d e n c e mits a judgment,

the

USSR

has not overtaken

per-

or surpassed

country on a per capita basis since 1917 with the possible

any

excep-

tion of Italy, a n d the n i n e t e e n or t w e n t y countries that rank higher t h a n Russia t o d a y in this regard also r a n k e d h i g h e r in 1900

and

1 9 1 9 . T h e p e r c a p i t a g r o s s n a t i o n a l p r o d u c t o f I t a l y , w h i c h is j u s t below

that

of

the

fifty

years ago."

the

Soviet

undergo

8

USSR

today,

was

probably

somewhat

higher

B l a c k s comparisons include countries that,

Union,

extensive

were

badly

economic

devastated

recovery.

parative socio-economic development

by

Other

wars

and

students

like

had of

h a v e also tried to devise

s c h e m e for ranking countries, a n d they agree that the Soviet

to

coma

Union

t o d a y ranks s o m e w h e r e in t h e m i d d l e t w e n t i e s . 9 B l a c k is l e d to t h e over-all conclusion t h a t 4 other societies have achieved similar sults at a substantially l o w e r cost," a n d t h u s p u t s into q u e s t i o n m a j o r S o v i e t p r e m i s e a b o u t its o w n

rea

past.f

0 In such areas as steel, coal, petroleum, and electricity the over-all American rate has been somewhat higher, while in light industry and transportation the American performance has been spectacularly more impressive, t Soviet achievements in space, in weaponry, or in the magnitude of its over-all industrial growth have been admirable. Moreover, the Soviet Union has made impressive strides in education, mass culture, and social services, and it has created a solid and extensive scientific base for the country's further development. Thus, it ranked first among the developed nations in the number of doctors per hundred thousand population, and it provided the highest per-capita annual social-security benefits (Statistical Office of the European Communities, Basic Statistics, Brussels, 1967, pp. 131, 153). At the same time, it is useful to recall that in many respects the Soviet Union is a relatively average society as far as socio-economic development is concerned. The previously cited study by Black provides useful rankings of the Soviet Union in comparison with other states in such fields as education (in the 5-19 age bracket the Soviet Union ranked thirty-ninth among

The Stalinist Paradox

{

Support for these generalizations has also c o m e from a ative study

of

growth

in

steel

production

as t h e

key

133

compar-

aspect

of

the industrialization process. It s h o u l d b e n o t e d that Soviet

econ-

omists, as w e l l as political leaders, h a v e f r e q u e n t l y relied o n

steel

as the major indicator of Soviet industrial g r o w t h . T h e a u t h o r this study, Stefan Kurowski, w r i t i n g in c o m m u n i s t P o l a n d ,

extraordinarily

detailed

Soviet steel production

comparisons did

showing

not increase

that under

at a significantly

Stalin, faster

p a c e than during the m o r e rapid p h a s e of the p r e - W o r l d W a r Russian industrialization, a n d that these rates approximated attained b y other countries, particularly Japan, during their responding

phases

of

rapid

industrialization.*

More

of

offers

I

those cor-

generally,

124 countries for which information was available in i960), communications (in i960 the Soviet Union ranked twenty-sixth in newspaper distribution per capita among 125 countries), in public health (in life expectancy the Soviet Union was thirteenth among 79 countries), and so on. In regard to such indicators of modernity as the availability of air communications, radios, telephones, cars, highways, or computers, the Soviet Union was again in the lower ranks of the more developed countries. Thus, when compared with the more developed twenty-one countries (including the EEC and EFTA nations, Greece, Turkey, Finland, Spain, the United States, Canada, and Japan), the Soviet Union ranked twentieth in the number of telephones, seventh in the number of radio receivers, and twentieth in the number of passenger cars. The Soviet lag in the more complex areas, such as computers, is equally striking. Thus, it has been estimated that by 1968 the United States had approximately 50,000-70,000 computers in use, of which (according to Paul Armor, "Computer Aspects of Technological Change, Automation, and Economic Progress," The Outlook for Technological Change and Employment, Appendix Vol. I to National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, Technology and the American Economy, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. 220-223) only 10 per cent were in use in the Defense Department, AEC, and NASA; the corresponding nonmilitary Soviet figure was somewhere between 2000 and 3500, or approximately as many as were then operating in Japan or West Germany, or the United Kingdom, respectively (see the comprehensive estimates in Richard V. Burks, Technological Innovation and Political Change in Communist Eastern Europe, RAND Memorandum, Santa Monica, Calif., August 1969, pp. 8 - 9 ) . For a fuller discussion of the current problems of innovation in the Soviet Union, see pp. 155-159 of this book. Kurowski shows by projecting rates based on those from 1870 that Russian steel production would have grown between 1914 and 1920 to 11 million tons. In 1929 Soviet steel production had only reached the 1914 level, and b y *935—after Stalin's First Five-Year Plan and the six years equivalent to

i 6 2 }

III:

relying

on

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

a more

extensive

comparative

analysis

that

involves

some dozen countries over the period 1780-1970, Kurowski that

socio-political

systems

have

relatively

little

to

do

acceleration in the p r o d u c t i o n of steel a n d iron, a n d

argues

with

the

that in

the

a c c e l e r a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n t h e r e is a p a t t e r n of u n i f o r m i t y d u e technical innovation.10 This conclusion, quite naturally,

official ire,11 f o r it t o u c h e d u p o n t h e k e y i s s u e i n t h e S o v i e t

Imperial Yet

to

provoked past.

Pacification

though

Stalinism

may

have

been

a

needless

tragedy

for

b o t h t h e R u s s i a n p e o p l e a n d c o m m u n i s m as a n i d e a l , t h e r e is t h e intellectually tantalizing possibility that for the world

at large

was, as w e shall see, a blessing in disguise. A s t h e state

possessing

the

largest

and

richest

land

mass,

inhabited

by

pliant

yet

it

very

creative p e o p l e , as t h e carrier of a strong imperial tradition, as society the

skilled in w a r f a r e

USSR

was

destined

and

statecraft, with

to emerge

in

the

or w i t h o u t

front

ranks

of

powers, with only another continental power, the United

world States,

a s its p e e r . I t is t h u s h i g h l y u n l i k e l y , g i v e n R u s s i a ' s t r a d i t i o n s the ambitions that t h e availability of p o w e r i n e s c a p a b l y

a

Stalin

and

stimulate,

that p o s t - W o r l d W a r I Russia w o u l d have long remained

stagnant,

m i r e d in a morass of inefficiency. T h e q u e s t i o n t h a t t h e r e f o r e arises is w h a t k i n d o f R u s s i a otherwise

have

emerged.

A

democratic

Russia,

either

liberal

socialist, d o e s n o t s e e m to h a v e b e e n a real alternative. have required an unprecedented racy—without

an

intervening

It

leap from autocracy to

period

of

democratic

a n d in a setting of e n o r m o u s social deprivation,

might or

would democ-

gestation—

dislocation,

and

c o n f u s i o n . It is difficult t o s e e h o w p o s t - W o r l d W a r I R u s s i a ,

torn

by national dissension,

class conflicts, c o m p e t i n g

ideological

ap-

those that separate 1914 from 1920—it reached 12.6 million (Stefan Kurowski, Historyczny Proces Wzrostu Gospodarczego, Warsaw, 1963, pp. 132*33•) Moreover, Kurowski compares Soviet and Japanese growth rates during both the 1928-1940 and the 1950-1962 periods in great detail. Again, he demonstrates striking regularities in rates of growth (pp. 134, 138, 175).

The Stalinist Paradox

{

135

peals, and sheer physical misery, could h a v e effectively institutionalized

a

democratic

countries

system,

when

such

systems

have

failed

e n d o w e d with stronger democratic traditions a n d

tioning under circumstances m u c h more propitious to

in

func-

democratic

growth. Given

the massive

political

awakening

of

the

Russian

that h a d b e e n s t i m u l a t e d b y t h e industrialization of t h e

people

preceding

decades, b y the b e g i n n i n g s of literacy, a n d b y the e x p e r i e n c e s the war, the only other alternative appears to have b e e n a n chauvinist linked

with

and

intensely

economic

imperialist

expansion,

dictatorial

similar

phases

regime. in

the

When political

d e v e l o p m e n t of other great n a t i o n s — G e r m a n y , Japan, the States—resulted

in

aggressive,

dynamic

imperialism.

of

openly

United

Expansive

nationalism provided the basis for popular mobilization a n d for a highly assertive, e v e n aggressive, foreign policy. At the very R u s s i a , i n all p r o b a b i l i t y a i d e d b y f o r e i g n i n v e s t m e n t s investment in states that s u b s e q u e n t l y

became

w a s characteristic of t h e capitalist era),* chauvinist

dictatorship,

might

have

least,

(economic

political

enemies

led by

a

modernizing,

experienced

a

burst

of

im-

p e r i a l i s t , n a t i o n a l i s t e n e r g y t h a t w o u l d a l s o h a v e m a d e it a

world

p o w e r , p e r h a p s b o t h at l o w e r d o m e s t i c cost a n d in a fashion

more

threatening to the world. This point deserves s o m e elaboration. marriage of M a r x i s m - L e n i n i s m

and

Stalin c o n s u m m a t e d

Soviet—particularly

Russian

—nationalism. T h e increasing stress on Great Russian state tions, o n frontiers, o n national mission

vis-a-vis

the

aspirations,

non-Russian

Soviet

on

Russia's

nations,

and

the

tradi-

civilizing the

like,

w e n t h a n d in h a n d w i t h t h e p h y s i c a l transformation of t h e

Soviet

communist

lot

party

from

one

dominated

by

a rather

mixed

c o s m o p o l i t a n a n d internationally oriented intellectuals of

of

Russian,

* For impressive evidence of Western participation in the early phase of Soviet economic growth, see Antony C. Sutton's Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1917-1930 (Stanford, Calif., 1968), which argues that "Soviet economic development for 1917-1930 was essentially dependent on Western technological aid" (p. 283), and that "at least 95 per cent of the industrial structure received this assistance" (p. 348).

i 6 2 }

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

Jewish,

Polish,

Baltic,

and

Caucasian

origin

into

a

party

domi-

nated primarily b y Russian, and to s o m e extent Ukrainian, ants turned party

apparatchiki.

T o these men, the Soviet

peas-

political

s y s t e m simultaneously r e p r e s e n t e d the source of their o w n advancement

and

of

their

political

power.

Their

social

loyalty

s y s t e m w a s not unlike that of m a n y peasant priests

to

the

(usually

the

y o u n g e s t sons, for w h o m n o land w a s left) to the Catholic in traditional s o c i e t i e s : it w a s m o r e institutional t h a n

Church

intellectual.

Ideology provided the integrative, intellectual perspective, but w a s n o t t h e principal s o u r c e of m o t i v a t i o n a n d c o m m i t m e n t h a d been to the international-minded intelligentsia w h o

it

as it

preceded

them. Accordingly,

the new

Soviet elite t e n d e d to b e b o t h

tive and nationalist, e v e n w h e n they sincerely believed to be

the

advocates

of

thus act in a m a n n e r and

nevertheless

an

internationalist

essentially

consider

dictated

themselves

ideology. by

conservathemselves

They

their o w n

true

could

interests

internationalists.

t h e m Stalin's f a m o u s d i c t u m that t h e test of a true

To

internationalist

is h i s l o y a l t y t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w a s t h e i d e a l r e s o l u t i o n o f tension that d e v e l o p e d nist internationalism.

between

Soviet nationalism

N o w o n d e r that Brezhnev

the dictum in 1968 to explain the occupation The

cumulative

result of this situation

mixed motivation and

behavior,

of

revived

Czechoslovakia. a pattern

since Stalin b y

considerations that often cynically exploit the ethical

b e c a u s e it t a p p e d t h e i d e a l i s m

universalism only

for the Soviet U n i o n

of Soviet y o u t h , m a k i n g

it

financial

technical aid to China w a s not politically disinterested, the people tors)

genuinely

believe

(as they

occasionally

that the Soviet U n i o n has aided

C h i n a as p a r t of its o b l i g a t i o n t o c o m m u n i s t Moreover,

the

internal

violence

grumble

both Eastern

and

easier

for the r e g i m e to recruit adherents. T h o u g h the Soviet U n i o n e x p l o i t its E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n v a s s a l s , a n d t h o u g h its

of

state

o f M a r x i s m . B u t t h e l a t t e r h a s a l s o h a d t o b e k e p t a l i v e , if b e c a u s e it m o b i l i z e d f o r e i g n s y m p a t h y

the

commu-

in effect

has been

dominated

and

did and

Soviet to

visi-

Europe

and

solidarity.

employed

by

Stalin

and

the

The Stalinist Paradox educational

effect

of

the

communist

{

ideology—even

if

not accepted b y the m a s s e s — h a d a restraining effect on

137

initially

unbridled

n a t i o n a l i s m . A t first b o t h S t a l i n i s t t e r r o r a n d i d e o l o g i c a l l y

induced

social changes perplexed a n d often alienated the people. T h e precedented nomic,

military,

and

intellectual

leadership

inevitably

the vitality of Soviet society. Literally several h u n d r e d

eco-

reduced thousand

of the most talented and best-trained people perished during years.

In addition, though

often violated

the

in practice,

principle

it d i d

restrain

that principle helped

nationalities, despite

Stalin's p u r g e s

nationally,

to shape

it h e l p e d

that worked

states

against

Finland, (at

one

membership

the

and

the

inclination

point

the

including Gustav is a t e m p t a t i o n

Husak,

Union,

the

other

behav-

non-Russian

a state Soviet

some

mind

for

communists,

for Slovakia).

nationalist

of

European

volunteered

Slovak

the same

traditionally

Inter-

of

Union

Eastern

themselves

and

proposed

that m o r e

into

even

Yugoslavs

leaders

was

toward

of their intelligentsia.

incorporation

in the Soviet

to preserve

in Soviet

perhaps

those

of internationalism

G r e a t R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l i s m , if o n l y b y f o r c i n g m o r e c o v e r t ior. D o m e s t i c a l l y ,

Poland,

un-

1936-1938 massacre of the top Soviet political,

and

This

Pan-Slav

R u s s i a n l e a d e r s m i g h t h a v e f o u n d difficult to resist. Paradoxically,

therefore,

though

Soviet

ideology

quently been reinforced and perhaps even increasingly b y the nationalism of t h e m a s s e s

has

subse-

dominated

(particularly since W o r l d

War

I I ) , t h e historical f u n c t i o n of Stalinist c o m m u n i s m m a y h a v e

been

to restrain a n d redefine a p h a s e in w h i c h t h e Russian p e o p l e

went

through

awakening.

It

forced that n e w m a s s nationalism to p a y at least lip service to

an

intense

nationalist,

even

imperialist,

in-

ternational c o o p e r a t i o n , e q u a l i t y of all p e o p l e s , a n d t h e

rejection

of racism. M a r x i s m n o t o n l y p r o v i d e d R u s s i a w i t h a g l o b a l

revo-

l u t i o n a r y d o c t r i n e b u t i n f u s e d it w i t h a u n i v e r s a l p e r s p e c t i v e

de-

rived

in

the

sapped

the

from

ethical

concerns

not

unlike

those

stimulated

W e s t b y the religious and liberal traditions. Despite

its

monumental

achievements,

Stalinism

h u m a n a n d e m o t i o n a l resources of t h e Russians, a n d a

post-Stalin

i 6 2 }

III: Communism:

The Problem of

Relevance

Russia m a y therefore eventually enter into the world

community

as another spent, post-imperial power. Finally, b y creating a ticularly despotic m o d e l of c o m m u n i s m

par-

and b y insisting that

o t h e r C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s s u b m i t t o it, S t a l i n n o t o n l y s e t i n

all

motion

t h e process of f r a g m e n t i n g c o m m u n i s m b u t also vitiated m u c h communism's

appeal

at

a

more advanced West—the for the historical

time

when

the

susceptibility

area originally s e e n b y M a r x as

transformation—might

have

made

of

of

the

ripest

communism

the truly d o m i n a n t a n d vital force of our time.

2. The Bureaucratization of Boredom The

Communist

achievement

Party

t o its credit:

of

it h a s

the

Soviet

Union

succeeded

in

has

a

unique

transforming

the

m o s t i m p o r t a n t r e v o l u t i o n a r y doctrine of o u r a g e into dull

social

a n d p o l i t i c a l o r t h o d o x y . T h a t o r t h o d o x y is r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n

rheto-

ric b u t c o n s e r v a t i v e in practice. T h e political s y s t e m , h i g h l y t r a l i z e d b u t a r r e s t e d in its d e v e l o p m e n t ,

is s e e n b y

some

cen-

Soviet

citizens as increasingly irrelevant to the n e e d s of Soviet society, frozen in a n ideological posture that w a s gether different age.

a response

Soviet society, in w h i c h

to an

elements

of

as

altourban

m o d e r n i t y a r e c o m b i n e d w i t h e x t e n s i v e r u r a l b a c k w a r d n e s s , is n o longer undergoing

rapid,

b i l i z i n g y o u t h f u l elan;

revolutionary

changes

capable

it s e e m s , i n s t e a d , b e n t o n s i m p l y

of

mo-

matching

t h e h i g h e r c o n s u m e r standards of t h e capitalist W e s t . Under those circumstances, more

difficult to justify the

utility of

Soviet

society's

it b e c o m e s i d e o l o g i c a l l y m o r e

historical

continued

legitimacy

subordination

and to

the a

and

social

political

The Bureaucratization system

embodying

increasingly

sterile

of Boredom

{

nineteenth-century

trines. I n d e e d , t h e u l t i m a t e i r o n y is t h a t t h e S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l having thrust Russia into the mid-industrial

age—has

c o m e the principal i m p e d i m e n t to the country's further It k e e p s R u s s i a in a m o l d t h a t is i n d u s t r i a l - b o u r g e o i s dogmatic-authoritarian

politically.

For

the

USSR

truly m o d e r n society, the basic assumptions

more

relevant

vision of

tomorrow

official i d e o l o g y is a l s o n e e d e d

than

now

At one

be-

socially to

and

become

a n d structure of

that

a the

changed.

provided

to c o p e with the highly

by

the

personal

as w e l l as t h e b r o a d e r social c o n c e r n s of t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c

The Innovative

docsystem

evolution.

political forms created to press industrialization must be A

139

age.

Relationship

point the

ary relationship

to

Soviet political society.

system

Consolidated

was

and

in

a

revolution-

subsequently

sub-

ordinated to the will of o n e m a n , the political system i m p o s e d process of radical transformation o n society b y c o m b i n i n g

modern-

ization (largely through intense industrialization and mass tion)

with

ideologically

derived,

novel

social

educa-

institutions

and

relationships. In effect, t h e f u n c t i o n of t h e political s y s t e m in viet society parallels w h a t M a r x d e s c r i b e d as t h e capitalist's cipal role in history:

So-

prin-

bent on making value

expand

itself, h e ruthlessly forces t h e h u m a n race to p r o d u c e for

produc-

tion's

sake;

he

thus

"Fanatically

a

forces

the

development

of

the

productive

forces of society, a n d h e creates those material conditions

which

alone c a n f o r m t h e real basis for a h i g h e r f o r m of society, ciety in w h i c h the full a n d free d e v e l o p m e n t

of e v e r y

a

so-

individual

forms the ruling principle." Domestic

revolutionary

change

fulfilled

the

ideological

of the ruling elite w i t h o u t p u s h i n g that elite into foreign

needs revolu-

t i o n a r y v e n t u r e s t h a t m i g h t h a v e j e o p a r d i z e d its p o w e r . T h e

new

ruling

zeal

elite

was

apprehensive

lest

premature

ideological

p r o v e its u n d o i n g ; y e t it w a s a l s o i d e o l o g i c a l l y c o m p u l s i v e .

Social-

ism in o n e

perma-

country—Stalin's

famous

answer

to Trotsky's

i 6 2 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

nent revolution—was

a b r i l l i a n t c o u p , f o r it f u s e d t h e

dedicated

revolutionaries' genuinely ideological aspirations w i t h their

newly

a c q u i r e d taste for office. Socialism in o n e c o u n t r y a l l o w e d t h e rulers

to

retain

their

ideological

self-righteousness

new

and

their

positions. More basically, the n e w cific, i n n o v a t i v e

role

for

"one-country" concept

the

political

society. T h e political system b e c a m e namism

for social

change,

setting

system

in

defined

and

spe-

relationship

the principal

goals

a

to

source of

defining

dy-

priorities.

O n c e society had taken the desired shape, however, and began mirror

the

official

aspirations

of

the

political

rulers—who

in the m e a n t i m e b e e n transformed into bureaucratic

to

had

officials—the

m o m e n t u m for social c h a n g e started to wane. I n l a t e 1952, S t a l i n h i n t e d t h a t in his v i e w t h e r e w a s still for further

ideologically

transformation.

derived

Subsequently,

and

politically

Khrushchev

on

directed

several

need social

occasions

strove to infuse the relationship b e t w e e n the political system society with n e w programmatic content. At one time he

suggested

a dramatic reconstruction of the Soviet countryside into "agricultural cities." L a t e r h e a t t e m p t e d to define n e w

communism.

When

that

effort

in

social

out b y the party's i d e o l o g u e s in the n e w

so-called

ideological

goals linked to Soviet society's ultimate transition f r o m to

and

socialism

innovation—spelled

party program

adopted

in 1 9 6 1 — t u r n e d o u t t o b e little m o r e t h a n a s h o p p i n g list of

addi-

tional material benefits to b e enjoyed b y the Soviet p e o p l e

some-

time in the

1980s,

Khrushchev

turned

his attention

to the

party

itself a n d b e g a n t o t o y w i t h t h e n o t i o n of r e d e f i n i n g its role. 1962 h e p u s h e d party

into

two

through separate

a drastic reform that in effect split organisms,

one

devoted

to

In the

agricultural

matters and the other to industrial problems. As h e explained

it,

"The

in

production

line

is

the

main

one.

. . . The

main

thing

c o m m u n i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n is e c o n o m i c s , p r o d u c t i o n , t h e s t r u g g l e

for

the creation of material a n d spiritual g o o d s for t h e life of man." Though party

into

Khrushchev's two

separate,

r e f o r m ran t h e risk of essentially

transforming

managerially

oriented

12

the hier-

The Bureaucratization archies

(and was

for that reason

{

of Boredom

immediately

undone

by

160

Khru-

s h c h e v ' s s u c c e s s o r s a f t e r h i s o v e r t h r o w i n l a t e 1 9 6 4 ) , it d i d r e f l e c t a recognition that the relationship b e t w e e n the political system t h e s o c i e t y h a d b e c o m e d y s f u n c t i o n a l , t h a t if t h e p o l i t i c a l was no longer defining new,

and

system

grandiose, ideological objectives

society, t h e n t h e s y s t e m itself h a d to b e r e f o r m e d in k e e p i n g the

more

routine,

which had by now

operational

requirements

acquired the technical

of

Soviet

for with

society,

and industrial

where-

w i t h a l f o r its o w n f u r t h e r , s t e a d y g r o w t h .

Sensing that the

party

w a s in search of a n e w

was

make

role, K h r u s h c h e v

prepared

to

the necessary reforms.

Defensive

Orthodoxy

Khrushchev's

successors

rejected

his

view

and

opted

for relatively minor adjustments—primarily in e c o n o m i c and

control—simultaneously

re-emphasizing

the

instead planning

imperative

ne-

cessity of ideological orthodoxy a n d m o r e vigorous ideological doctrination.

Under

the post-Khrushchev

neither a definition of n e w

regime

in-

there has

been

ideological goals nor any major

tam-

p e r i n g w i t h the political structure. A s a c o n s e q u e n c e , official v i e w s o n t h e state of S o v i e t society, o n f o r e i g n affairs, o n t h e

problems

of t h e future, a n d o n t h e n a t u r e of c o n t e m p o r a r y c o m m u n i s m tain strikingly little r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e n o v e l p r o b l e m s

that

conbeset

m a n , either in terms of his p e r s o n a l c o n d i t i o n or as a m e m b e r the

emerging

global

community.

Difficult problems

are

of

simply

s w e p t under the ideological rug. On

the

domestic

front,

the

prevailing

official v i e w

has

been

that the Soviet Union, h a v i n g c o m p l e t e d socialist construction, now

laying

the

foundations

of

a

communist

society,

and

existing problems are essentially instrumental, n e e d e d to

improve

t h e e f f i c i e n c y of a s y s t e m t h a t i n its b a s i c a s s u m p t i o n s a n d i z a t i o n is o f f i c i a l l y c o n s i d e r e d in the areas

world. of

The

Soviet

life

lag is

in

to b e the most

socio-economic

ascribed

either

to

advanced

development the

ravages

is

that

organ-

and in of

just some

World

i 6 2 } War

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

II or to

writings

the

failures

of revisionist

of

the

pre-revolutionary

Marxist thinkers

on

the

regime.

problems

The

of

per-

sonal alienation in an advanced urban society—to say nothing anti-Semitism in a socialist s o c i e t y — a r e

dismissed

as

inappropri-

ate to Soviet conditions, or as malicious slander. T h e Soviet is s a i d t o h a v e n o g e n e r a t i o n a l

problems,

and

only

of

Union

recently

has

u r b a n c r i m e b e e n d i s c u s s e d as a p h e n o m e n o n in its o w n r i g h t

and

not m e r e l y as a l e g a c y f r o m the pre-revolutionary era. T h e s e v i e w s h a v e b e e n articulated in the context of efforts to reassert a n d

expand

ideological

training

intensified

(thereby

par-

tially c o m p e n s a t i n g for the decline of coercion as a k e y m e a n s integrating Soviet society with the political system). social scope of these t h e r e is o p e n has

been

and

the

efforts has

acknowledgment

focused people

on

the

want

new

to

see

been

expanded,

of the fact that

in recent special

scientific c o m m u n i t y : in

scientists

not

only

fighters

for t h e c a u s e of c o m m u n i s m . "

13

among

scientists

and,

what

is

years

"The

party

creators

even

and

people,

In addition,

h a v e b e e n e x p r e s s i o n s of official c o n c e r n o v e r a l l e g e d indifference

there

ideological

worse,

over

t e n d e n c y in these circles to consider technocrats the natural ers of m o d e r n society.14

Scientists h a v e repeatedly

( a n d t h e very w a r n i n g s reveal t h e attitudes of

the

attention

organizers of scientific-technical progress b u t also political active

of

Though

been

Soviet

a

lead-

warned

scientists)

not to v i e w themselves as "super-class humanists" but to

identify

closely w i t h the class struggle and the people.15 The

issue of "humanism" appears

sensitive one. H u m a n i s m , a

point

of

departure

present Soviet system.

for

to h a v e

been

a

particularly

a central Marxist concern, can serve a

critique

Moreover,

of

both

Stalinism

the dehumanizing

and

potential

as the of

m o d e r n science has g i v e n n e w u r g e n c y to the p r o b l e m of

defining

h u m a n i s m in t h e m o d e r n w o r l d . T h e official v i e w , stated

authori-

tatively in a series of major articles in the k e y ideological

journals,

has

been

unequivocal:

"Socialism

is p r o f o u n d l y

humanistic

c a u s e it e l i m i n a t e s t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n of m a n b y m a n . "

"it is a l s o h u m a n i s t i c w h e n it e r e c t s t h e b u i l d i n g o f a n e w at the price of extraordinary

hardships

be-

Accordingly,

in t h e persistent

society struggle

The Bureaucratization

of Boredom

{

a g a i n s t t h e old. It is also h u m a n i s t i c w h e n c o n d i t i o n s h a v e

143

already

b e e n created for the t h o r o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t of the individual

but

s o c i e t y is still c o m p e l l e d t o c o n t r o l t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a p e r s o n

and

his labor discipline and, w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k a n d in the of all of society individual,

a n d of t h e c o m m u n i s t

does

not

permit

education

individuals

to

interests

of a

particular

the

freedoms

abuse

presented b y socialism, does not permit people with an o p e d s e n s e of responsibility community, etc." "the

16

suppresses

This

argument

so-called

individual

eternal'

dignity

geoisie to mislead

S t a l i n i s m is e s s e n t i a l l y Views

to violate the n o r m s of the

the

opposition

has been

s u c h as t h e s e

of

buttressed

values—freedom,

. . . are a w e a p o n and

undevel-

by

the

17

and

forces,

assertion

democracy,

in the h a n d s

fool the masses,"

socialist

anti-socialist

that

humanism, of

the

that the

bour-

issue

of

irrelevant.0 have

been

expressed

in the

context

broader emphasis on the argument that an ideological

o n c o n t e m p o r a r y r e a l i t y is a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l i n o r d e r t o accurate insight into that reality, a n d that scientific

of

obtain

communism—

as defined b y the Soviet l e a d e r s — p r o v i d e s the only valid

perspec-

t i v e . A l t h o u g h t h e l a t t e r is n o t a n e w p r o p o s i t i o n , t h e r e is i n t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h it h a s b e e n l i n k e d in t h e m o r e

novelty

prestigious

S o v i e t s c h o l a r l y journals, as w e l l as in m a s s m e d i a , w i t h a n

attack

o n W e s t e r n theories of i d e o l o g i c a l erosion, of t h e e m e r g e n c e of general

type

bureaucratic

of

industrial

political

society,

elites

Soviet critics h a v e m a d e

in

all

and

of

the

developed

a

perspective

ubiquity political

of

a

new

systems.

it c l e a r t h a t t h e y v i e w t h e s e t h e o r i e s

not only scientifically erroneous but politically harmful a n d

as

prob-

ably designed deliberately to u n d e r m i n e c o m m u n i s m , f 0 "At the present time attempts are being made to discredit what was done in the process of building socialism by using the bugbear of 'Stalinism.' The Stalinism' bugbear is being used to intimidate unstable persons, to spread the thought that all firmness and revolutionary character in politics, uncompromisingness in ideology, and consistency in the defense of Marxism are, if you please, 'Stalinism' " (D. I. Chesnokov, "Aggravation of the Ideological and Political Struggle and Contemporary Philosophical Revisionism," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 12, 1968). f For a systematic and well-documented Soviet criticism, see L. Moskvichev, The 'Deideologization' Theory: Sources and Social Essence," Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenia, No. 12, 1968.

i 6 2 }

III:

Communism:

The Problem of

Relevance

Soviet scholars h a v e b e e n particularly vigorous in rejecting theory of " c o n v e r g e n c e " of the Soviet

and

Western,

American, systems. In the Soviet view, the crucial and element the

of

the

expression

Soviet of

system—rule

proletarian

by

the

distinctive

communist

dictatorship—has

been

party

characteristics

of

a

modern

industrial

society,

d e l v i n g m o r e p e n e t r a t i n g l y i n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of its essence. merit

Though

(and

some

of

the

Soviet

t h e r e is a c u r i o u s t o u c h

criticisms

are

of neo-Marxist

not

without

determinism

i n s o m e o f t h e W e s t e r n t h e o r i e s o f c o n v e r g e n c e ) , it is s t r i k i n g

system.

the

without

socio-political

m u c h intellectual effort has b e e n invested in asserting a n d the distinctive character of the c o m m u n i s t

as

underesti-

m a t e d b y W e s t e r n thinkers, w h o have superficially focused o n external

the

particularly

how

proving

It o n c e

reveals the importance attached to the notion that the Soviet

again past

is l i n k e d t o a f u t u r e t h a t is a b s o l u t e l y d i s t i n c t i v e a n d n o t p a r t o f a broader stream of m a n s political evolution.*

It also m a k e s

possi-

In the Soviet view, both the Marxist revisionists and Western theorists of ideological evolution, erosion, or deideologization of Soviet Marxism have essentially been engaged in a political stratagem designed to undermine the ideological foundations of Soviet power. The present author was particularly singled out for criticism in this connection. See, for example, Professor E. Modrzhinskaya's "Anti-Communism Disguised as Evolutionism" (International Affairs [Moscow], No. 1, 1969). She sees in Western sociological writing an effort to pave "the ideological way for subversion against Socialism. Among these theories are: the theory of stages in economic growth propounded by Walt Rostow (a well known U.S. reactionary politician and sociologist); the doctrine of the single industrial society, whose most famous propagandist is the reactionary French publicist and sociologist Raymond Aron; the convergence doctrine, and—the capstone of them all—the theory of evolution, which has been elaborated in greatest detail by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs at Columbia University. . . . "The principal features of the evolutionary theory are set out in Brzezinski's writings of the last few years. . . . A distinctive and highly notable feature of the evolution theory is the desirable sequence of change: from ideology to politics leading to changes in the socio-economic system, and not the other way round, from economic changes to subsequent political transformation, as the votaries of convergence suggest" (p. 16). * This emphasis sometimes leads to statements that verge on the comical, as when it was asserted in a major analysis of "Problems of the Last Third of the Century" that "Marxism-Leninism has no need to reconcile ideas with facts." The author—apparently in all seriousness—added that "according to

The Bureaucratization

of Boredom

{

b l e t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m is f r e e o f t h e

145

dilemmas

t h a t b e s e t c o n t e m p o r a r y m a n e l s e w h e r e , a n d it f r e e s S o v i e t munists f r o m the responsibility of e n g a g i n g in a dialogue about these The

com-

cross-ideological

dilemmas.

official Soviet definition of f o r e i g n p r o b l e m s

is

character-

i z e d b y s i m i l a r i n t e l l e c t u a l i n f l e x i b i l i t y . T h i s is n o t t o s a y t h a t Soviet

leadership

and

elite

are

basic facts or d e v e l o p m e n t s .

misinformed

There

meet

and

anticipated

that

factual

ideological

ignorant

the

about

is n o d o u b t t h a t t h e l e v e l

Soviet overt a n d covert reporting of considerably,

or

world

affairs h a s

of

improved

misrepresentation—designed

preferences—has

declined.

to

Special-

ized Soviet scholarly journals o n Africa or Asia, Soviet analyses the

Common

Market,

or

Soviet

efforts

to

develop

studies of t h e U n i t e d States g o b e y o n d p u r e l y i d e o l o g i c a l las a n d reflect the i m p o r t a n c e attached to the d e e p e r ing of regional d e v e l o p m e n t s . w o r l d affairs ( f o r e x a m p l e ,

nye Otnoslienia)

Some

Mirovaia

scholarly

formu-

understand-

Soviet journals

Ekonomika

i

on

Mezhdunarod-

c o m p a r e very favorably with their best

Western

counterparts in terms of systematic coverage, documentation, scholarly rigor. S p e c i a l i z e d

of

systematic

research institutes, such as the

tute of W o r l d E c o n o m y a n d International Affairs, are

and Insti-

apparently

b e i n g m o r e f r e q u e n t l y c o n s u l t e d in the preparation of policy, this d o u b t l e s s contributes to greater sophistication in the

and

decision-

making process. Yet, in spite of this, t h e S o v i e t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e b r o a d w o r k of c o n t e m p o r a r y even

as p r e s e n t e d

dogmatic.

The

in

basic

reality, as articulated scholarly premise

journals, continues

by

top

remains to

be

frame-

leaders

and

fundamentally

the

Manichaean

notion of the antagonistic d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n the socialist a n d

the

capitalist worlds

be-

(or

between

good

and

evil).

Though

war

t w e e n t h e s e t w o w o r l d s is n o l o n g e r s a i d t o b e "fatalistically

in-

evitable," a n d the destructiveness of nuclear w e a p o n s dictates

the

the recent decree of the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee . . . the outstanding revolutionary events of the twentieth century have all been associated with Leninism" (V. A. Cheprakov, Izvestia, August 18, 1968).

i 6 2 }

III:

Communism:

The Problem of Relevance

necessity of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e — i n d e e d ,

sometimes

c o o p e r a t i o n is t a c t i c a l l y d e s i r a b l e b e c a u s e o f o t h e r (for of

example,

our a g e

systems: against and

the

is still

"Two each

The

said

to b e

antagonistic

other

violence

aspects.

Sino-Soviet

today

which

in

affects

antagonists

are

conflict)—the the

a the

underlying

competition

socio-economic struggle life

of

capitalism

of

even

closer

considerations

between

systems

reality the

are

unprecedented

human

society

in

and

socialism."

tually o n e or the other will h a v e to p r e v a i l /

and Soviet

two

pitted scope all

18

Even-

analysts

are c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e y k n o w w h i c h o n e it w i l l b e . T h i s t h e m e like a t h r e a d t h r o u g h all major s p e e c h e s , f o r e i g n - p o l i c y

its

runs

analyses,

or s c h o l a r l y c o m m e n t a r i e s o n w o r l d affairs. It w o u l d b e a n error to dismiss the a b o v e as m e r e l y a ritualistic a c t o f o b e i s a n c e t o d o c t r i n e , o r t o v i e w it a s a s i g n o f f a n a t i c a l implacable militancy. ideological

Its i m p o r t a n c e

framework

well-informed,

policy

on more

immediate,

judgments.

and

lies in t h e influence of

Though

and far

otherwise

from

committing

Soviet leaders to short-term militancy, the ideological does inhibit t h e m from thinking of a c c o m m o d a t i o n

the

quite

framework

and

stability

as e n d s in themselves, since that w o u l d b e t a n t a m o u n t to

negating

the c o m m u n i s t v i e w of history as a

fluid,

dialectical process.

cordingly, an official Soviet analysis of the issues c o v e r e d first

t w o chapters of this b o o k w o u l d run a l o n g these lines:

p r e s e n t e r a is d o m i n a t e d b y t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e w o r l d

Ac-

in

the

"The

socialist

s y s t e m . Its e m e r g e n c e is a d e c i s i v e f o r c e of c h a n g e , n o t o n l y celerating

the

pace

of

socialist

revolution

but

also

ac-

successfully

d e t e r r i n g t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s f r o m c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s . W a r is t h e r e f o r e no longer inevitable,

a n d p e a c e f u l rivalry b e t w e e n

the two

sys-

tems, and especially b e t w e e n the U S S R

a n d the U n i t e d States,

possible.

competition

The

eventual

outcome

of

the

is,

is

however,

0 Thus, a Soviet scholar, in an ambitious effort to analyze contemporary world affairs, asserts that "the outcome of the competition rules out accident. Victory or defeat are necessary, that is, unavoidable, and law-governed. Defeat comes but once in such competition. There will be no return match, no replay/ no chance of revenge" (Kh. Momjan, The Dynamic Twentieth Century, Moscow, 1968, pp. 107-108).

The Bureaucratization foreordained, munist

of Boredom

given the inherent historical superiority

{ 147 of

the

com-

system. In the m e a n t i m e , in m a n y areas m o r e active

coop-

e r a t i o n is to b e s o u g h t , i n o r d e r to a v e r t w a r or t o p r o m o t e n o m i c or social d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e Third World. In s o m e the preconditions for the p e a c e f u l transition to socialism exist; in s o m e of t h e less d e v e l o p e d countries a violent w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y , b u t it w o u l d

be

places already

revolution

a tactical error to

it t o o s o o n ( a s u r g e d b y t h e M a o i s t s o r t h e

eco-

precipitate

Castroites)."

Authoritative Soviet analysts have, moreover, argued that d e t e c t signs of intensified crisis in t h e m o r e

advanced

they

capitalist

states. "Political crises n o w o c c u r far m o r e o f t e n than, let us

say,

ten to t w e n t y years ago, a n d n o longer only o n the 'periphery'

but

in t h e chief the

centers

capitalist

exacerbated nomic

of

states

are

financial

situation

of

imperialism. now

The

spreading

socio-political under

crises

conditions

of

crisis a n d deterioration in t h e over-all the

f a c t o r is s a i d to b e

imperialist

the

growing

camp."

19

radicalism

An of

new

intellec-

tuals, the majority of w h o m — u n l i k e those of the p r e - W o r l d II e r a — a r e the Soviet

now

"becoming

a more

view,

this p o i n t s

to the

internal crisis of more important

the

advanced

than the

active progressive further

changes

or e v e n

heavals that are likely to occur in the Third The

decisive

equation

thus

remains

the

War

force."

intensification

capitalist world,

an eco-

important

Western

in

In

of

a factor

the

that

revolutionary

is up-

World.

that

of

American-Soviet

competition. Accordingly, the crucial operational

question—leav-

ing

not

aside

immediate

tactical

considerations—is

g i v e n course of action will a d v a n c e

whether

t h e c a u s e of w o r l d

n i s m b u t h o w it w i l l a f f e c t t h e S o v i e t - A m e r i c a n b a l a n c e : of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n or a g a i n s t it? T h e no contradiction b e t w e e n national movement, barrassment

and

in

Soviet policymaker

favor senses

Soviet interests a n d those of the he

thus experiences

in assisting anti-American

no

elements

ideological otherwise

logically foreign to c o m m u n i s m or in seeking to reach

interemideo-

accommoda-

tion w i t h the U n i t e d States o n specific issues. This close identification of purely Soviet state interests w i t h the

a

commu-

subjective ideological

i 6 2 }

III: Communism:

The Problem

cause, and the resulting goal-oriented impossible

the

simplistic

judgment

the

the opinion

in tactics, Soviets

stage

in

have

historical

d e v e l o p m e n t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d b y i n t e n s e s h a r p e n i n g of t h e capitalism

either

Soviet leaders

that "the c o n t e m p o r a r y

ical struggle b e t w e e n

render

are

cynical.

In regard to t h e ideological confrontation, ventured

Relevance

flexibility that

ideologically obsessed or ideologically

of

a n d socialism." This

ideolog-

conclusion

w a s formally expressed b y the Soviet Central C o m m i t t e e in April 1968.20 It w a s f o l l o w e d b y a systematic d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e

propo-

s i t i o n t h a t t h e w o r l d is w i t n e s s i n g " t h e r i s i n g r o l e o f i d e o l o g y " that ideological intensity. T h e

competition

in international

affairs is g a i n i n g

Soviet invasion of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a

g a v e rise to particularly

extensive

and

elaborations

in August

in

1968

of this t h e m e .

w a s explicitly a r g u e d that internal c h a n g e in C z e c h o s l o v a k i a abetted by Western

It was

policies of "peaceful e n g a g e m e n t " that

had

as their u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e t h e transformation of c o m m u n i s m

into

social d e m o c r a c y . T h i s p o l i c y w a s l a b e l e d b y S o v i e t writers as the n e w W e s t e r n strategy of "peaceful counterrevolution."

21

The emphasis put on the continuing confrontation between t w o conflicting ideological systems—and

the

thus on the notion

that

c o n t e m p o r a r y reality c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d in terms of s u c h a dichoto m y — i s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ' s d e f i n i t i o n of its role in international c o m m u n i s m a n d of c o n t e m p o r a r y itself.

In

spite

of

the

enormous

changes

in

own

communism

international

com-

munism precipitated by the Sino-Soviet dispute, by the decline Soviet

authority,

and

by

the

demoralization

military invasion of o n e c o m m u n i s t

state b y

resulting another,

from the

of the

Soviet

leaders h a v e c o n t i n u e d to u p h o l d t h e o r t h o d o x c o n c e p t of a single m o v e m e n t still l e d b y M o s c o w . T h e y h a v e a c c o r d i n g l y

continued

to press for "unity c o n f e r e n c e s " of as m a n y c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s possible, e v e n t h o u g h the results h a v e often w o r k e d against T h e y have also continued ideology and have

to assert a d o g m a t i c

consequently

as

unity.

interpretation

b e e n u n d e r t h e necessity of

of ex-

c o m m u n i c a t i n g t h o s e w h o differ. * 0 "Only one social theory, one teaching, is capable of expressing the content and direction of world processes in our epoch in depth—this is Marxism-

The Bureaucratization

of Boredom

{

149

T h e result has b e e n not only the oft-repeated c o n d e m n a t i o n

revisionists

or of C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s b u t the increasing

tual inability practice The

or

to

the

assimilate

in doctrine

progressive

evolution

Soviet attitude toward

the

either of

new

revolutionary

communism

rebellion of

in

Western

power.

youth

c a s e in p o i n t . A s s o o n a s it b e c a m e c l e a r t h a t t h e s e y o u n g were not prepared to accept established communist a n d that their i d e o l o g u e s w e r e critical of Soviet the Soviet attitude b e c a m e

vehemently

hostile.

of

intellec-

is

leadership—

bureaucratism— Marcuse

was

es-

pecially attacked for o v e r e m p h a s i z i n g the role of the y o u n g the intellectuals at t h e e x p e n s e of the classical c o n c e p t of a

and revo-

lution b y the w o r k i n g class.* In effect, Soviet theorists refused take

seriously

into

account

the

potentially

revolutionary

q u e n c e s of t h e e d u c a t i o n a l u p s u r g e in the d e v e l o p e d Similarly,

when

the

Castroite

revolution

in

Here,

parties too,

directed, political

objected,

the

preference

proletarian leaders

guide

for

they

was

for

revolutionary

began

specifically Russian suitable

and

to

suggest

conditions, the

further

was

were

world.

Latin

the

supported tried,

model.

America

that

Leninism,

perhaps

evolution

of

by

no

Com-

Moscow.

city-based,

When

to

conse-

m o v e d into direct guerrilla action, the established pro-Soviet munist

a

people

party-

Czechoslovak a

product

longer

the

Czechoslovak

of

most com-

m u n i s m , t h e Soviet reaction w a s to c h a r g e deviation. Thus, in spite of m a n y p r o n o u n c e m e n t s

concerning multiple roads to

socialism,

the Soviet party has r e m a i n e d w e d d e d to the c o n c e p t of

dogmatic

Leninism. Only one philosophy is capable of interpreting all the contradictions of the present stage of historical development. . . . Communists have always regarded Leninism—and continue to regard it—not as a purely Russian but an international Marxist doctrine" (F. Konstantinov, "MarxismLeninism: A Single International Teaching," Pravda, June 14, 1968). The foregoing view permits Soviet ideologues to assert that "the philosophical 'thoughts of Mao Tse-tung' are philistine, often anarcho-idealistic eclecticism which has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist philosophy" (A. Rumyantsev, writing in Kommunist, No. 2, 1969). It should be noted that Rumyantsev and Konstantinov are leading Soviet ideologues. These attacks sometimes took grotesque forms. Thus, a Radio Moscow commentator, Valentin Zakharov, devoted an entire program to the theme that Marcuse and Brzezinski were jointly involved—naturally in behalf of the CIA—in organizing "the Czechoslovak counterrevolution" in 1968 (Radio Moscow, August 19, 1969).

i 6 2 }

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

u n i v e r s a l i s m , w h i c h is u n i v e r s a l o n l y i n t h e s e n s e t h a t it s e e s

the

Soviet e x p e r i e n c e as f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n i v e r s a l in r e l e v a n c e .

Perspective on Tomorrow T h i s rigidity b o t h conditions a n d restricts Soviet t h i n k i n g the future. Studies and widespread

of

the future have

in the West.

become

both

about

fashionable

They have involved systematic

at-

t e m p t s to link t e c h n o l o g i c a l projections w i t h social forecasting, w e l l as w i t h m o r e critical, n o r m a t i v e discussions. T h e

cal ramifications of scientific discoveries, especially as they

pertain

to the h u m a n being, h a v e b e c o m e the object of a particularly tense dialogue. T h e political implications of t e c h n o l o g y h a v e attracted the

attention

of

scholars

and

increasingly

as

philosophi-

even

inalso

of

po-

litical leaders. G i v e n t h e future-oriented thrust of Marxist

thought,

one w o u l d have expected the Soviet Union to be in the

forefront

of these investigations a n d analyses. This has only b e e n

partially

true. Systematic

Soviet efforts to study the future w e r e

spurred

by

high-level decisions taken at the Twenty-third Party Congress. its w a k e , s p e c i a l s t u d y g r o u p s w e r e in a n u m b e r of

established for that

Soviet institutes—for

emy's group for Social and

example,

Technological

the

Soviet

Forecasting.

In

purpose Acad-

In

addi-

tion, m a n y informal g r o u p s w e r e set u p to bring Soviet

scholars

and intellectuals

entirely

together.

A

special

annual

publication

d e v o t e d to the future of science w a s established in 1966, a n d first

numbers

have

included

contributions

by

both

its

Soviet

and

non-Soviet scholars.22 Soviet scholars also established useful

con-

tacts w i t h similar study groups a n d publications in the W e s t , cluding the United

Solid work has been d o n e by area of t e c h n o l o g i c a l - e c o n o m i c the Soviet philosophical journal,

Soviet scholars, primarily in forecasting. F o r e x a m p l e , in

Voprosy Filosofii,

ing a series of articles o n the t h e m e Revolution

and

Its

in-

States.

Social

of " T h e

Consequences."

began

the 1964

publish-

Scientific-Technical

On

the

whole,

these

The Bureaucratization

of Boredom

{

articles h a v e b e e n serious a n d frequently very informative

151 treat-

m e n t s of s u c h subjects as t h e m e t h o d o l o g y of forecasting, t h e ganizational problems

explosion,

of

science

in the context of

the

scientific

the role of cybernetics, comparative analyses of

tific d e v e l o p m e n t

and

projections

for the

United

States

Soviet Union, to say nothing of m o r e specifically economic and technological

or-

scien-

and

the

Soviet-oriented

prognoses.23

In contrast to these efforts, there has b e e n a striking p a u c i t y

of

political, ideological, or p h i l o s o p h i c a l studies f o c u s e d o n t h e interactions with projected

technological-economic

no doubt that Soviet intellectuals

are a w a r e

changes. of

the

There

link b e t w e e n the two,* b u t p u b l i s h e d Soviet discussions h a v e limited primarily to critical evaluations the subject. In their cruder

of W e s t e r n

forms—particularly

tions" h a v e b e e n limited to d e n u n c i a t i o n . !

More

been

literature

when

i n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l o r g a n o f t h e p a r t y , Kommunist—these

is

unavoidable

on

appearing "evalua-

serious—though

0 In a statement remarkably free of ideological cant, one Soviet scientist— and novelist—remarked, "The future has borne the brunt of all kinds of emotions: optimism, blind irrational hope, and black despair. It has been threatened by both hysterical seers and precise calculations. Attempts have been made to poison it or simply to annihilate it, to turn it backward, to return it to caves. It has survived. Today we have the opportunity to give it serious and thoughtful study. Today, perhaps as never before in human history, the future depends on the present and demands a new approach. It is fraught with crises we cannot assess today. Crises connected not only with a different conception of freedom, but also a different idea of individuality" (Daniil Granin, "And Yet . . . ," Inostrannaia Literatura [Moscow], No. 1, 1967). In contrast, the five-volume work Socialism and Communism, prepared by the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in a comprehensive effort to sum up the likely shape of Soviet society under communism, refrains from any analysis of the social tensions brought on by the scientific revolution. It presents a uniformly blissful picture of the future, t For examples of particularly primitive writings, see G. Gerasimov, "The Falsifiers of the Future," Kommunist, No. 2, 1968, for criticism of Aron, Fourastie, and others; or Yuri Zhukov's various articles attacking my earlier article, "America in the Technetronic Age." Soviet commentators were particularly incensed by my observation ("America in the Technetronic Age") that "the world is on the eve of a transformation more dramatic in its historic and human consequences than that wrought either by the French or the Bolshevik revolutions. Viewed from a long perspective, these famous revolutions merely scratched the surface of the human condition. The changes

i 6 2 }

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

still p r i m a r i l y n e g a t i v e — a s s e s s m e n t s h a v e a p p e a r e d i n o t h e r journals, particularly in the o r g a n of the Institute o n W o r l d ics. I n b o t h c a s e s , h o w e v e r , possibility

of

either

the

the tendency

evolution

of

has

been

Western

Econom-

to d e n y

polities

into

post-industrial forms n o longer determined b y the capitalist of industrialization

or the

capacity of

these n e w

new phase

forms to

c o m e t h e i n d i v i d u a l crisis of alienation a n d frustration

the

over-

associated

w i t h the capitalist system. T h i s is w h y s o m e P o l i s h c o m m u n i s t s , t h o u g h l o y a l to t h e

com-

m o n ideology, h a v e n o t e d critically that "we h a v e to give a

more

specific a n s w e r to t h e q u e s t i o n as to w h a t really h a p p e n s in

mod-

ern monopolistic capitalism and what influence the technical

revo-

l u t i o n h a s o n it." T h e y h a v e o b s e r v e d t h a t c o m m u n i s t t h e o r y n o c o n c e p t of t h e transition f r o m m o d e r n c a p i t a l i s m to that it h a s n o t f a c e d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e i n c r e a s i n g obsolescence

of

communist

the advanced West,

economies

has

socialism,

technological

as c o m p a r e d

to those

t h a t it h a s still t o c o n f r o n t t h e f a c t t h a t

c i a l i s m — t h o u g h it h a s p r o v e n its m e t t l e i n o v e r c o m i n g

of so-

industrial

b a c k w a r d n e s s — h a s y e t to p r o v e its c a p a c i t y for scientific

innova-

tion, a n d t h a t it h a s n o t g i v e n a n y t h o u g h t t o t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e conflicts b e t w e e n discussion,

a

generations.24

Rumanian

In a far-ranging

communist,

T h e o r y of t h e Technical-Scientific

appealing

and "For

a

with

the

scientific-technical tions. unified

theoretical revolution

elaboration and

of

its social

the and

more

sustained

essence human

. . . W e c a n n o t as y e t speak of the existence of a

Marxist

Marxist

R e v o l u t i o n , " p u t it e v e n

bluntly: "In r e c e n t y e a r s t h e W e s t has e v i d e n c e d a m o r e concern

of

thoughtful

of

the

conneccoherent,

theory of the scientific-technological revolution."

2f)

I n short, Soviet political t h o u g h t has failed to p r o v i d e a n y

sys-

tematic d e v e l o p m e n t of ideas concerning the future political

and

i d e o l o g i c a l e v o l u t i o n of t h e S o v i e t s y s t e m itself or, for that

matter,

they precipitated involved alterations in the distribution of power and property within society; they did not affect the essence of individual and social existence. Life—personal and organized—continued on much as before, even though some of its external forms (primarily political) were substantially altered. Shocking though it may sound to their acolytes, by the year 2000 it will be accepted that Robespierre and Lenin were mild reformers."

The Bureaucratization

of Boredom

of the w o r l d revolutionary process u n d e r novel historic

{

153

conditions.

T h i s is n o t o n l y b e c a u s e i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s s e n t h a s b e e n r e s t r i c t e d informal,

"underground"

forms

of

expression

but

cause there has been no open-ended creative discussion

among

no longer shaped

Soviet

Marxists

through

the

primarily

political-ideological

themselves.

Soviet

creative interaction

ideology

of

tion,

a

Ideology

entirely

emanates

monopolized

from

the

offices

by of

career

the

before

being

proval. A n

ideology

process

not

is

likely

submitted whose to

to

the

content

be

party

Central

w h e r e it is p r e p a r e d o n t h e b a s i s o f c o m m i t t e e papers

became

is t h e p r o d u c t of a b u r e a u c r a t i c p r o c e s s of

process

for

is d e t e r m i n e d

preoccupied

with

defini-

officials.

Committee,

reports

Politburo

is

theoretical

thought a n d practice—as w a s the case until Stalin s p o w e r supreme—but

to be-

by

and

staff

group a

ap-

political

speculative,

and

t h e r e f o r e p o t e n t i a l l y disruptive, issues. It h a s little to d o w i t h

in-

tellectual creativity a n d a great deal to do with bureaucratic

im-

peratives. Paradoxically,

bureaucratic

sterility in t h o u g h t

prompts

sified emphasis on revolutionary rhetoric a n d symbolism. the once revolutionary doctrine has b e c o m e

inten-

Because

so intertwined

the vested interests of guardians w h o are themselves highly

with sensi-

t i v e t o R u s s i a n n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y t o t a k e ological refuge in increased emphasis on revolutionary

ide-

symbolism.

T h i s is a m a n i f e s t a t i o n c o m m o n t o all d o c t r i n e s in t h e i r i n t e l l e c t u a l decline: as practice increasingly deviates f r o m prescription,

sym-

bolism and rhetoric gain in importance.

how-

The

consequence,

e v e r , is t o c o n g e a l c e r t a i n f o r m u l a s a n d c l a i m s , m a k i n g innovation

more

difficult,

even

when

ideological restraints are increasingly T h e r e s u l t is a c o n d i t i o n o f of

ideological

petrifaction

the

operational

level

evaded.

arrested

rather

on

intellectual

than

ideological erosion,

r e m a i n i n g vital only outside the Soviet U n i o n .

0

development,

Marxist

thought

T h e vision of

to-

* This matches the Victorianism and grayness of much of contemporary Soviet life. Lincoln Steffens exclaimed, on visiting the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, "I have been into the future and it works!" Today more and more visitors to the Soviet Union come back saying, "I have been into the past and it is a bore."

i 6 2 }

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

morrow is reduced to meaningless and increasingly vague declarations, such as the conclusion to the official Soviet prognosis for the remainder of this century: "Armed with Marxist-Leninist thought and filled with historical optimism, the leading revolutionary forces of the world will march into the future." 2 6

3. The Soviet Future

The crucial question today is: When will the Soviet Union break with the Stalinist legacy? Without such a break it will remain difficult for the Soviet leaders to diagnose the problems of their own society accurately and to make the Soviet Union truly relevant to the intellectual and international dilemmas of our time. Such a break need not require the abandonment of socialism or of Marxism, but it would require the transformation of a political system that today both reflects and is buttressed by an obsolescent and bureaucratized ideology of power into one more in keeping with the emerging humanist, universalist mood of our time. It is no exaggeration to say—though some anti-communists may be loath to admit this—that the peace of mankind depends in large measure on the Soviet Union's return to the occidental Marxist tradition from which the more oriental Leninism-Stalinism had diverted it, but not necessarily on the outright abandonment of Marxism. Ideological change in the Soviet Union will inevitably be closely connected with socio-economic change, but it would be a mistake to view the latter as dictating the former. A Marxist framework of analysis is the one least suited to understanding

The Soviet Future

{

155

communist politics, in which the political superstructure actually dominates the economic base. Political change in the Soviet Union will necessarily be influenced by the emergence of a new social elite, more technological in its orientation, but it will be even more affected by the changes in the internal character and outlook of the professional, ruling party bureaucracy, and by the degree to which this elite succeeds in coping with internal Soviet problems.

Internal

Dilemmas

These problems are likely to develop on the levels of both economic-technological efficiency and political-ideological dissent. There can be little doubt that the Soviet economy will continue to grow in the years ahead, but it does appear likely that, barring some unforeseen development in either the United States or the Soviet Union, the absolute gap between the two countries will widen even further.* The growth will therefore probably be insufficient to satisfy the ideological ambitions of the political elite, and it is even less likely to satisfy rising social aspirations. These aspirations are certain to escalate as comparison with the West makes it more and more apparent that major sectors of Soviet society have remained extraordinarily antiquated. Soviet backwardness is particularly evident in agriculture. Agricultural productivity has leapfrogged during the last several decades in most developed countries and lately even in a number of the underdeveloped ones. Not so in the Soviet Union, where pro0 It can be estimated that if the GNP of the United States grows at 3.5 per cent per annum, by 1985 it will be over $1.5 trillion; if the rates of the 1960s continue, it will already be $1.7 trillion by 1980; if the Soviet GNP grows at the higher rate of 5 per cent, by 1985 it will be just under $800 billion; if it grows at the even higher rate of 7 per cent, by 1985 the GNP will be approximately $1.1 trillion. Thus the absolute gap will not narrow and could even widen considerably between 1965 and 1985. In 1961 the Soviet leaders formally adopted a party program which, among other things, promised that by 1970 the Soviet Union will have surpassed the United States in industrial output. Clearly, this has not happened.

i 6 2 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

ductivity steadily declined and has only recently risen somewhat. The Soviet rural population is underemployed, undercompensated, and underproductive. The resolution of the Soviet agricultural problem is one of the more urgent—but also ideologically more sensitive—problems on the Soviet agenda. (The technological underdevelopment of Soviet agriculture is reflected in a laborforce distribution that places the Soviet Union considerably behind the more advanced sectors of the globe.) TABLE 9 .

DISTRIBUTION OF LABOR FORCE PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR

AREA Industry Agriculture Services United States 8 39 53 Western Europe 14 45 4I Oceania 23 43 34 Japan 28 33 39 USSR 27 28 45 48 Latin America 20 3* Source: International Labor Review, January-February 1967.

In the industrial sector, more advanced than agriculture, the remarkable achievements of Soviet science in such areas as space and weapons technology have obscured a situation that is also far from satisfactory for a modern, industrialized society. It has been estimated that the Soviet Union (allowing for the differential in actual costs) has in real terms been spending approximately as much for research and development as the United States.27 Moreover, Soviet scientific manpower has been growing at an impressive rate and now matches that of the United States. In addition, Soviet theoretical work in a number of fields, particularly physics, has been of the first order. Yet the over-all socio-economic benefits of the Soviet scientific effort have been relatively meager. Though Soviet leaders were quick to capitalize ideologically on their initial space successes by claiming that they proved the superiority of communism (an assertion quietly allowed to fade after the American landing on the moon), the fact remains that the Soviet Union has not been

The Soviet Future

{

157

able to produce technologically advanced products capable of penetrating economically rewarding world markets in the face of Western competition, nor has it satisfied more than the rudimentary needs of domestic consumption. Even in such a relatively elementary industrial field as automobile production, the Soviet Union has been compelled to rely on foreign help (currently Italian) to produce workable and economically feasible automobiles.28 The rigid separation of secret military research from the rest of the economy, as well as the concentration of Soviet scientific researchers in institutes remote from industry, has meant that research breakthroughs have either never been developed, developed only for military purposes, or developed only after considerable delay.* The Soviet lag is unmistakable in computers, transistors, lasers, pulsars, and plastics, as well as in the equally important areas of management techniques, labor relations, psychology, sociology, economic theory, and systems analysis.f * Soviet Academician V. Trapeznikov estimated that 98 per cent of Soviet researchers work in institutes, whereas 60 per cent of American researchers work directly in the relevant industries. He also estimates that approximately half the Soviet research discoveries are obsolescent by the time of their development (Pravda, January 19, 1967). See also the interview with Academician V. M. Glushkov, in Komsomolskaia Pravda, May 15, 1968, in which he calls for the rapid training of "systems managers," a skill in which he feels that Americans excel and which has no equivalent in the Soviet Union. He also urged the regular retraining of Soviet managers, again citing American precedents. f "Certain sectors, including of course space and some military R & D, and an important part of the iron and steel industry, are technically very advanced; but many industries, particularly in the consumer goods sector, are far less technically developed than in major Western countries. . . . "The impression which emerges from both Soviet and Western studies is that the Soviet Union is less technically advanced than the United States in all but a few priority industries, and that in a number of major industries the Soviet Union is technologically behind the industrialized countries of Western Europe" (Science Policy in the USSR, pp. 9, 476). According to a study of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Soviet Union, which in 1954 was the first nation to adapt nuclear energy for peaceful uses, had by 1969 been surpassed by the United States and the United Kingdom; by 1975 it will be behind the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Sweden, and Germany, with its megawattage approximately fourteen times less than that of the United States (Power and Research Reactors in Member States).

i 6 2 }

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

To correct this condition, the government initiated in 1968 a series of reforms designed to spur scientific research and development and to improve the quality of management. The Central Committee of the party passed a special resolution in October 1968 ("On Measures to Raise the Efficiency of the Work of Scientific Organizations and to Accelerate the Utilization of Scientific and Technical Achievements in the National Economy"), highly critical of Soviet research and development and initiating a series of reforms, which in essence upgraded the status of researchers working directly in industry to that held by scientists employed in purely scientific institutes, created research laboratories based in industrial enterprises, and offered bonuses and awards for innovation. As Academician Trapeznikov put it, "An important item in the resolution is the establishment of competition in scientifictechnical ideas and proposals." 29 It is far from certain that these reforms will suffice to generate a creative and socially significant burst of innovation and adaptation. Soviet scientists recognize that creativity requires "an atmosphere of free discussion, polemics, and airing of ideas, even if some of them are radically wrong." 30 This factor is in turn related to the ideological and institutional organization of society as a whole, and cannot be corrected merely by a few organizational adjustments. The OECD study, Science Policy in the USSR (1969), which reveals in a detailed, statistically documented manner the extraordinary disproportion between the scale of the Soviet effort and its relatively meager socio-economic consequences, reinforces the view that ideological-political centralizaAs Burks puts it, "The curve of technological development in the West is exponential. Synthetic fibers, plastics, nuclear energy, transistors, digital computers, xerography, lasers, succeed one another in seemingly endless succession. As Western technology becomes more complex, furthermore, the time lag involved in its reproduction by East Europeans becomes greater. Borrowing time runs anywhere from two to fifteen years with the odds at least 50-50 that the product will be, in Western terms, obsolescent when it first appears on the Eastern market. In computers, the time lag for Soviet (not to speak of East European) borrowing varies between two and ten years" (Burks, p. 8). See also data cited on p. 133, supra, especially as it concerns computers.)

The Soviet Future

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159

tion results at best in a capricious science policy and at worst in a catastrophic one.* There can be no doubt that in the years to come the Soviet Union will accomplish many remarkable scientific feats, especially in the internationally prestigious realm of space investigations and in scientific areas related to defense research. Its military technology will also continue to match America's and in some areas will doubtless surpass it. This will be done by crash programs concentrating economic resources and scientific talent. The Soviet organizational structure is remarkably suited to such programs. But the crucial question is whether Soviet science and industrial management can provide Soviet society with the broad-gauged pattern of scientific innovation necessary both to assure internal progress and to advance the international position of the Soviet Union. The forces opposing far-reaching scientific and economic reforms are formidable. They are primarily the bureaucratic party elite, especially the ideological sectors, and some of the upper echelons of the armed forces, who fear that decentralization would also mean the transfer of some key research institutes to nonmilitary uses. The upper echelons of party officialdom are still largely the products of the Stalinist era, and many among them got their start during the purges. Paradoxically, and contrary to Western speculation, the managerial elite has also been part of the opposition. The present Soviet managerial generation, trained to operate in a highly confined, hierarchical setting, is not predisposed to assume the greater personal hazards that a more decentralized, competitive system would necessarily involve. t Proposals for economic reforms have characteristically come mostly from the theoretical economists. 0 An example of the latter result is the Lysenko affair and its disastrous effects on Soviet biology. An extraordinarily vivid and informative account of the affair is provided by the Soviet scientist Z. A. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall of T. D. Lysenko, New York, 1969. Medvedev's book was written in the Soviet Union, but its publication there was not permitted, t Moreover, as Jeremy Azrael has convincingly argued in his Managerial Power in Soviet Politics (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), it must be recognized that

i 6 2 }

III: Communism:

The Problem of Relevance

The problem of intellectual freedom prompts considerations that are more directly concerned with politics and ideology. It is impossible to judge the extent of fundamental, unorthodox dissent in the Soviet Union of the late 1960s and early 1970s.* In late 1968 two successive issues of the magazine Problems of Communism were devoted to the underground writings, petitions, protests, and appeals of dissenting Soviet intellectuals. They made for remarkable and profoundly moving reading, as did some separately published documents in which Ukrainian intellectuals protested the suppression of their country. 31 These publications indicated the existence of an active and articulate group of intellectuals, largely concentrated in Moscow and Leningrad, composed in some cases of the offspring of the Soviet political elite but more often of the children of prominent communists who had perished under Stalin. Though a number of these dissenters have been tried both privately and publicly in Moscow and Leningrad, they have not been deterred from "occupational specialization can attain a high level without giving rise to social or political pluralism; that engineers and managers can be governed at least as much by transfunctional ideological and political commitments as by their 'objective' interests as incumbents of economic roles; that these interests can be largely, if not completely, satisfied within the framework of a political system that is neither democratic nor technocratic; and that men who are oriented toward the maximization of political power can successfully maintain a position of dominance over men who are oriented toward the optimization of economic utilities, although their doing so may require important sacrifices" (p. 175). * It is important to differentiate here between instrumental, orthodox dissent and fundamental, unorthodox dissent. The two are sometimes confused by outside observers, with the result that instrumental dissenters are lionized for having run nonexistent risks and the government's tolerance of them is interpreted as the sign of a basic departure from the Leninist-Stalinist tradition. The classic contemporary example is Yevgeny Yevtushenko. His "dissent" has been primarily instrumental in content: it has aimed at making the relationship between the political system and society more compatible, without addressing itself to the question whether in fact the more basic, ideological underpinnings of the system needed rethinking and revision. In contrast, precisely because Alexander Solzhenitsyn's or Pasternak's works have had the effect of questioning the historical antecedents of the political system more searchingly, they have been objects of more assertive official displeasure.

The Soviet Future

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161

protesting, and they did so again, at grave personal risk, following the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. For the time being and for some time to come, the intellectual and orthodox dissenters will in all probability remain a relatively small, isolated group. Like their predecessors in the nineteenth century, at the moment they do not appear able to attract broader popular support. The majority of the Soviet Union's urban population—only one generation removed from their rural setting—are characterized by a social orthodoxy based on a rather simplistic internalized ideology and by a sense of satisfaction in their recent social advancement. Moreover, in its social origins and ways of thinking, the party is closer to the masses than the masses are to the intellectuals.* A very special and particularly perplexing kind of dissent is posed by increasing restlessness among the Soviet Union's nonRussian nations. The political significance of this phenomenon has largely been ignored by American scholars of Soviet affairs. Yet about one-half of the two hundred and forty million inhabitants of the Soviet Union are non-Russian, and many of them possess a distinctive sense of their own cultural heritage, their own language, territory, and history. Their intelligentsia, almost entirely Soviet-reared, tends to be increasingly assertive though not necessarily secessionist in attitude. It is beginning to demand a larger share in Soviet decision-making as well as a bigger part of the economic pie, and it is becoming increasingly leery of Russification. To some extent this Russification is deliberately * "For all its modernization, the Soviet Union still contains a very massive 'dark' population aspiring to bourgeois amenities on the one hand, yet immersed in socialist rhetoric on the other. And within this population there is a strong element of 'grudge'—crude, primitive, often all too wellfounded, a kind of legendary force in its own right—which views all privilege as corruption, and which is directed equally against the political and managerial elite of the party and against the intelligentsia. Here, however, the intelligentsia is at a disadvantage, for it still carries the traditional burden of guilt toward the people, and the lines of manipulation are in the hands of the party" (Sidney Monas, "Engineers or Martyrs: Dissent and the Intelligentsia," Problems of Communism, September-October 1968, p. 5).

i 62 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

fostered by Moscow, but it is also the natural result of industrialization and modernization. Official Soviet discussions of this problem, as well as attacks on the dangers of local nationalism, indicate that Soviet leadership is becoming apprehensive; indeed, a number of non-Russian intellectuals have been tried and sentenced in recent years. For the moment, the Soviet government has succeeded in confining nationalist tendencies to a relatively few intellectuals while evidence on the attitude of non-Russian party cadres tends to be ambiguous; however, the very scale of this problem, as well as the fact that nationalism tends to be infectious whether suppressed or tolerated, would suggest that in the years to come the Soviet Union might well be faced with a nationality problem graver in its political consequences than the racial problem in the United States. The rumblings of ideological discontent within the scientific community have probably been more immediately disturbing to the party. The now well-known manifesto by the prominent Soviet nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov, which was published in the West in mid-1968,32 had apparently first been circulated among Soviet scientists and then revised by the author in the light of comments. The fact that subsequent Soviet responses to Sakharov took an indirect form, never mentioning him by name, and that he was not denounced by the usual device of a public statement of condemnation signed by his colleagues, seems to indicate that the government thought it preferable to avoid direct confrontation and public discussion. This document is remarkable in that it not only challenges the right of ideological orthodoxy to continue but also attempts to offer an alternative vision of the future. In so doing, it exposes Soviet reality to a scathing critique. Sakharov s principal underlying assumption is well summarized by his assertion that "any preaching of the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is a madness and a crime." He categorically rejects any restraint whatsoever on intellectual freedom and condemns "the ossified dogmatism of a bureaucratic oligarchy and its favorite weapon,

The Soviet Future

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163

ideological censorship/' In rejecting intellectual subordination to the will of "the party's central apparatus and its officials," he also asks, "Who will guarantee that these officials always express the genuine interests of the working class as a whole and the genuine interests of progress rather than their own caste interests?" * His thesis is that our age requires and compels increasing international cooperation—both to avoid a nuclear war and to overcome the dangers to mankind posed by hunger, overpopulation, and pollution—and that this cooperation will eventually come from the increasing convergence of the currently distinctive political and social systems. In this connection, he specifically asserts that, given the productive energies of the American economy, a revolution in the United States—in contrast to a similar upheaval in the Third World—would not be advantageous to the workers. His long-range vision for the remainder of the century involves a four-stage development: In the first stage the communist countries, and notably the Soviet Union, will become more democratic, overcoming the Stalinist legacy of single-party * In criticizing the persisting backwardness of Soviet society, a condition which the officially idyllic view has ignored, Sakharov reveals the extraordinary fact that some 45 per cent of the population, or approximately 110 million Soviet citizens, live in underprivileged conditions. He compares this to the United States where "about 25 per cent of the population is on the verge of poverty. On the other hand, the 5 per cent of the Soviet population that belongs to the managerial group is as privileged as its counterpart in the United States," implying a condition of considerable social inequality in the Soviet Union. Sakharov's observation is important because the attainment of social equality has long been a major Soviet claim. In fact, Soviet statistics and, more recently, sociological studies confirm the fact that in higher education the children of white-collar officials have considerably greater opportunities than do those of workers or of collective farmers. For example, in the late 1950s, 75 per cent of Moscow University students were children of officials; 20 per cent and 5 per cent were, respectively, the children of workers and of collective farmers. During this period the population distribution was approximately 20 per cent, 48 per cent, and 31 per cent, respectively (see the collective volume Kulturnaia Revoliutsia, Moscow, 1967, p. 151). Considerable disproportion also exists in levels of remuneration, with the Soviet minimum wage fixed as of 1968 at approximately $65 per month.

i 6 2 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

dictatorship; the second stage will see the transformation of the United States and other "capitalist" countries by reformers who will effect internal changes and adopt a policy of peaceful coexistence; the third stage will involve a massive Soviet-American effort to cope with the problems of the Third World and to promote disarmament; the fourth stage will see the remaining global problems attacked on the basis of broad international cooperation. Sakharov's views, even if somewhat Utopian, are noteworthy because they reveal how the world view of some in the new Soviet intellectual-scientific elite contrasts with the official perspective. Their importance, however, should not be exaggerated. His argument is simply inaccessible not only to the overwhelming majority of literate Soviet people but also to the majority of Soviet intellectuals. It may be assumed that where there are large concentrations of intellectuals (Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Akademgorodok, Obninsk), unorthodox viewpoints circulate somewhat more widely, but even there much depends on the degree to which at any particular moment the government is prepared to apply administrative pressure in order to enforce at least formal orthodoxy. Given the party's monopoly of communications, the extensive efforts to inculcate the official ideology, and the growing emphasis on nationalism, the government's view of the world and of Soviet society is still the basic source of information and interpretation for most Soviet citizens.

Alternative

Paths

It is in the light of the foregoing considerations that possible alternative paths of Soviet political development should be evaluated. For analytical purposes, these have to be reduced to a manageable number and, accordingly, the discussion that follows will concentrate on five rather broadly conceived variants, with attention focused on the role of ideology and the party. The five developmental variants can be capsuled as (1) oligarchic petrifaction, (2) pluralist evolution, (3) technological adaptation, militant fundamentalism, and (5) political disintegration.

(4)

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165

Oligarchic petrifaction would involve the maintenance of the dominant role of the party and the retention of the essentially dogmatic character of the ideology. In effect, more of the same. Neither the party nor the ideology would be in a particularly revolutionary relationship to society; instead, the main thrust of the relationship would be for the party to retain political control over society without attempting to impose major innovations. Strong emphasis would be placed on ideological indoctrination and the confinement of ideological deviations. Political leadership could remain collective, for the absence of deliberately imposed change would not require major choices. The domestic result would be rule by an ossified bureaucracy that would pursue a conservative policy masked by revolutionary slogans. Pluralist evolution would involve the transformation of the party into a less monolithic body, somewhat like the Yugoslav party, and the ideological erosion of the dogmatic LeninistStalinist tradition. The party would become more willing to tolerate within its own ranks an open ideological dialogue, even ferment, and it would cease to view its own doctrinal pronouncements as infallible. Its role would be more that of a moralideological stimulant than that of a ruler; the state as well as society itself would become the more important source of innovation and change. Because so much of the party's history has been contrary to the above pattern, in addition to sustained social pressure from key economic and intellectual groups, either a basic split in party leadership, or, paradoxically, a strong leader (like Tito) would be necessary to condition party officialdom into acceptance of such political and ideological pluralism. Technological adaptation would involve the transformation of the bureaucratic-dogmatic party into a party of technocrats. Primary emphasis would be on scientific expertise, efficiency, and discipline. As has already happened in Ulbricht's East Germany, the party would be composed of scientific experts, trained in the latest techniques, capable of relying on cybernetics and computers for social control, and looking to scientific innovation for the preservation of Soviet security and industrial growth. Na-

i 6 2 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

tionalism would replace ideological dogmas as the basic integrative principle linking society and the state. The younger, more technologically oriented leaders of the military establishment would, in all probability, favor this pattern. Political leadership, as in the first variant, could remain collective, though it would probably involve a wider coalition of party-state-military-economic leaders. Militant fundamentalism would involve a revivalist effort to rekindle ideological fervor, which would in turn require a more revolutionary relationship between the political system and society. The notion of progression toward communism would have to be given new programmatic content, and hence politically induced social changes would be necessary. In all probability, this development would necessitate the application of force to overcome both actual resistance and sheer social inertia. Even if it fell short of Stalinist methods, the effort to shake up the Soviet system's rigidly bureaucratized structure would require highly centralized leadership, ideological militancy, perhaps a more hostile attitude toward the outside world, and something along the lines of Mao Tse-tung's "Cultural Revolution." Political disintegration would involve internal paralysis in the ruling elite, the rising self-assertiveness of various key groups within it, splits in the armed forces, restiveness among the young people and the intellectuals, and open disaffection among the nonRussian nationalities. In the wake of the intensifying contradiction between the political system and society, the crisis that could arise would be made more acute by an inadequate economic growth incapable of satisfying popular demands. The petrified ideology— no longer taken seriously by the elite—would be incapable of providing the system with a coherent set of values for concerted action. Looking approximately a decade ahead and using as a guide the present distribution of power in Soviet society, it would appear from the nature of the more immediate political-economic

The Soviet Future

{ 167

problems facing Soviet leadership and from the general pattern of contemporary Soviet social development that the Soviet leadership will seek to strike a balance between the first and the third variants. The combination comes closest to satisfying elite interests, the imperatives of social orthodoxy, and the needs of the Soviet Union as a global rival of the United States. In the short run, development toward a pluralist, ideologically more tolerant system does not seem likely. The years 1964-1969 have even seen movement in the opposite direction. The political system is not in the near future likely to elevate to leadership a man with the will and the power to democratize Soviet society, and that society lacks the cohesion and the group pressures necessary to effect democratization from below. As the experience of Czechoslovakia has shown, democratization from below must be an organic process that links the intellectuals, the workers, and the students with some segments of the leadership in a deliberate effort to reform the political structure as well as the economic structure. Moreover, such a process must either draw on a democratic tradition (as was the case in Czechoslovakia) or create one by accepting the priority of legal norms over political expediency. For Soviet communism this would be tantamount to a new concept of politics.* Furthermore, the Soviet problem with nonRussian nationalities inhibits democratization: the Great Russian majority would inevitably fear that democratization might stimulate the desire of the non-Russian peoples first for more autonomy and then for independence. Given the thrust of Soviet social development and the interests of the present ruling elite, it is unlikely that an effective democratizing coalition could emerge during the 1970s. 0 As one Czech scholar observed in commenting on the Czech experience with Stalinism, "One of the possible methods of preventing the recurrence of political trials in any form is a change in the concept of politics, with which is connected the birth of a new political system. I have in mind such a concept of politics as would not contain the elements of, or an assured basis for, displays of illegality of the kind that happened most frequently in the period of the political trials" (K. Kaplan, "Thoughts about the Political Trials," Nova Mysl, No. 8, 1968).

i 6 2 }

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

Militant fundamentalism under a one-man dictatorship,

though

perhaps s o m e w h a t m o r e probable in the short run t h a n a pluralist evolution, also w o u l d h a v e to o v e r c o m e e n o r m o u s inertia and collective stake of the party oligarchs in p r e v e n t i n g the

reappear-

a n c e of o n e - m a n rule. Pressures t o w a r d s u c h a rule c o u l d in the f a c e of d o m e s t i c u p h e a v a l

or a major f o r e i g n

a talented a n d effective political leader w o u l d h a v e

the

develop

threat, to b e

but

avail-

able. T h e p r e s e n t S o v i e t b u r e a u c r a c y is c o n s t i t u t e d i n s u c h a as to w e e d

out and

revolutionary party in w h i c h individual courage a n d ness m a k e for

the fundamentalist

alternative

m i s s e d o u t o f h a n d , e s p e c i a l l y if it b e c o m e s to political disintegration as a w h o l e .

leadership's

resulting

Protracted

inability

to

from

should not be the only

the

petrifaction

internal decay

as

to

current

come

grips

with

dis-

alternative

a result

of

the

of

the

problems,

continued failure to catch u p with the United States in the

scien-

tific c o m p e t i t i o n , a n d i n t e r n a l t h r e a t s t o n a t i o n a l u n i t y c o u l d i n context

of

increasing

international from

a

a

resourceful-

advancement.

Nonetheless,

system

way

snuff o u t i n d i v i d u a l talent; it is n o l o n g e r

ideological

security

section

of

threat

the

to

elite.

indifference spark

Such

a

combine

with

fundamentalist

spasms

are

a an

spasm

characteristic

of

political faiths in their decline. The

alternatives of f u n d a m e n t a l i s m

or of

disintegration

b e precipitated b y a Sino-Soviet war. Such a war w o u l d i m p o s e major strains o n the Soviet system.

Even

could

inevitably

if w o n

rapidly

b y t h e S o v i e t s i d e , it w o u l d e n t a i l m a j o r e c o n o m i c c o s t s a n d even involve lengthy postwar counter-guerrilla

activities.

tracted w a r w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e itself a direct d e f e a t for t h e r e g i m e , a n d it is a l m o s t c e r t a i n that t h e r e g i m e w o u l d b e from power by

dissatisfied e l e m e n t s in the ruling circles.

e v e r its o u t c o m e , trigger

highly

Union,

creating

militant

of

this m a g n i t u d e

and

pressures

pulling the regime Given

a war

on

volatile behalf

would

feelings of

be

within

one-man

rule

could

A

pro-

Soviet toppled What-

certain

to

the

Soviet

or

simply

apart.

the conditions

prevailing

in the

early

1970s,

oligarchic

The Soviet Future petrifaction

would

be

the

probable

consequence

of

rule b y the present majority of the a g i n g u p p e r party ( t h e average a g e of Central C o m m i t t e e

{

169

continued

bureaucracy

members was over

sixty

in 1969, m a k i n g t h e m p r o b a b l y the oldest political leaders in world,

except

for those

of

the

Vatican

and

Mao

and

his

the

asso-

ciates ), of t h e o l d - t i m e a r m y m a r s h a l s ( s o m e of w h o m h a v e

more

party

party

seniority

than

the

top

political

rulers),

and

of

the

ideologues. This coalition represents not only the political but t h e t o p s o c i a l elite of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t its g i v e s it p r e r o g a t i v e s e q u i v a l e n t to t h o s e a s s o c i a t e d u n d e r ism

with

ruling

wealth:

class,

it

luxury,

tends

to

convenience, become

c h a n g e s that t h r e a t e n its position. important

consideration—the

and

prestige.

conservative

and

Moreover—and

Soviet

middle

also

power capital-

Like

any

resistant

this is a

class

is

to

very

highly

bu-

reaucratized a n d consists a l m o s t entirely of state officials w h o rather conservative in their political a n d social mores a n d are

are only

o n e generation r e m o v e d f r o m their proletarian or p e a s a n t

origins.

This class d o e s not w a n t

it

major political

change,

though

desire m o r e m a t e r i a l g o o d s . It p r o v i d e s t h e u n d e r p i n n i n g conservatism of the The elite

upper

has,

stratum

however,

of

Soviet

too

ambitious

social

and

this stratum has g a i n e d

of

professional

broad,

too

and

well

the

and that

Though concerned with domestic

scientific increasing

number

areas

requiring

and

In

access to the

expertise.

political

international

innovation.

of Sciences has n o t e d

of scientists called

scientific

a pattern

recent

bargaining, of

the

that "in r e c e n t t i m e s ,

the

on to participate

The

organ

in the work

governmental apparatus, e v e n at the highest levels, has

of

influence,

added

in to

the the

economic

sphere."

increasingly

33

Their

widespread

the

increased.

T h e y should b e called o n m o r e often to organize production to direct planning

imyears

decision-makers

a n d thus participates informally in a process of g r o u p especially in policy Soviet A c a d e m y

the

educated,

to b e satisfied w i t h

status quo.

it is a l s o a w a r e for

the

become

merely preserves the stability,

for

leadership.

too nationalistically

peratives

does

and

innovative

political

ap-

i 6

2

}

III: Communism:

The Problem of Relevance

preciation of the i m p o r t a n c e

of scientific innovation,

feelings of rivalry w i t h the U n i t e d and

security

aspirations

ented military leaders, sion of the

first

adaptation)

of

the

States, a n d

younger,

is a l r e a d y

to

to the

more

scientifically

stimulating pressures

(oligarchic petrifaction)

and third

variants, in an attempt to construct

national

nationalist ori-

for a

fu-

(technological

a novel kind

of

"technetronic communism." * T h e e x a m p l e of Ulbricht's E a s t G e r m a n y m a y b e c o m e larly relevant. revolution's

Though

in R u m a n i a

significance

have

that this revolution requires

led

explorations some

a new

of

the

communists

particuscientific

to

suggest

theoretical framework

based

o n the principle of universality,34 Ulbricht has a t t e m p t e d to bine

scientific innovation

Stalinist ideological highly centralized,

with

tradition.

adherence

Political

leadership

has

remained sup-

emphasized

that

"the

been

com-

Leninist-

other

has

dissent has

the

firmly

leader,

ideological

to

pressed. At the s a m e time, Ulbricht, perhaps more than any communist

and

strict

development

t h e socialist s y s t e m , a b o v e all t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e system as a whole, leadership.

is t o a g r o w i n g

. . . W e

orient

extent

ourselves

on

a matter

the

control of c o m p l e x p r o c e s s e s a n d s y s t e m s b y

made

an

the second intense

order to c o m b i n e

half of the

effort to

scientific

conscious

scientific

the people

initiative

economic with

an

and

for

35

1960s, E a s t G e r m a n

rationalize

lower-level

economic

of

the people. W e m a k e u s e of cybernetics in this sense." During

of

leadership

management

in

effective

system

of controls a n d coordination. T h e S e v e n t h P a r t y C o n g r e s s

(April

9 This process would provide the political expression for the impressive growth in both the over-all number of specialists engaged in scientific activity and services (including those with specialized secondary education) and in the number of those members of the political elite who have had extensive backgrounds in technical and scientific fields. Between the years 1950 and 1966 the former grew from 714,000 to 2,741,000 (Science Policy in the USSR, p. 679); George Fischer has gathered evidence showing that the latter are becoming the predominant group among the younger members of the Central Committee of the CPSU ( T h e Soviet System and Modern Society, New York, 1968, especially pp. 125-34). Technical competence is as widespread in the Soviet political elite as legal background is in its American counterpart.

The Soviet Future

{

171

1 9 6 7 ) set itself t h e task of d e v e l o p i n g a g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of relations system East

between as

a

whole;

Germany

electronic

the

various

more

utilized

data

than

Committee

proudly

reported—and

any

Two

Plenum, he

with

other

cybernetics,

processing.

Central

part-systems

the

communist

operational

years

later,

Politburo

repeatedly

at

member

used

this

country,

research, the

the

economic

and

April Kurt

1969 Hager

formula—that

East G e r m a n y w a s not only ideologically sound but "correctly programmed." In

line

with

this

"correct

phasized the importance

of

programming," expertise

the

among

has

em-

its m e m b e r s , 3 6

party

and

the e d u c a t i o n a l s y s t e m h a s b e e n r e f o r m e d in order to link closely

with

transformed into the most

industry.*

By

itself

one

from

economically

oriented communist tion

of

the

Prussian

Leninist-Stalinist

of and

the

discipline, ideology

1960s, most

fifty-year

German

has

East

thus

advanced lapse, the

scientific again

made

science

Germany

war-ravaged

ideologically

state. After a

m u n i s m a m o d e l f o r its e a s t e r n

0

late

had

societies sciencecombina-

efficiency, German

and com-

neighbors.

Under these reforms universities and polytechnical schools have been transformed into new "science combines" directly linked with industrial enterprises. For example, the Technical University of Dresden works jointly with the nearby Radeberg computer factory, and other institutions of learning have been similarly linked with the basic industrial efforts of their cities or regions. In this reform a major effort was made to obtain student participation, and students are said to have made a number of constructive proposals along the above lines. At the same time, Marxist-Leninist indoctrination has continued to be assigned high priority in the educational process, but stress has been placed on the necessity to combine it with scientific social forecasting: "It is necessary to impart to the leadership personnel of the socialist state a complex knowledge which enables them to carry out the party resolutions with a high degree of quality; this must be done on the basis of the social longrange forecast, in teamwork with the Socialist Economic Management Institute, the Social Sciences Institute, the 'Karl Marx' Party College, and other institutions" (a speech by Erich Honecker, member of the Politburo and Secretary of the Central Committee of the German Socialist Unity Party, April 29, 1969). Honecker's speech was remarkable for its emphasis on the technetronic features of a modern society and for its relative neglect of the ideological question.

i 62 }

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

In the Soviet

Union,

however,

other considerations

will in

all

likelihood i m p e d e the p a c e of a similar "technologization" of Soviet

political

system.

For

one

thing,

the

Soviet

Union

is

m u c h b i g g e r c o u n t r y , is m o r e difficult t o i n t e g r a t e , a n d h a s m o r e areas of s o c i o - e c o n o m i c b a c k w a r d n e s s dition,

over

the

last

fifty

years

the

ruling

to overcome. party

has

style, a n d t h o u g h

acquisition

its officials, it is l i k e l y

technical

skills b y

attached to ideology.

37

since that w o u l d

many In

ad-

it f a v o r s to

tinue to resist t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a n essentially technical t i o n a m o n g its m e m b e r s ,

dilute the

a

developed

its o w n t r a d i t i o n s a n d i d e o l o g i c a l of

the

the con-

orienta-

importance

Moreover, perhaps intensified in the

years

to c o m e b y the Sino-Soviet dispute, the role of the security

factor

in policymaking a n d of the military in the political process

might

tend to increase. urgent

and

Indeed,

Soviet

increasingly

if t h e s e c u r i t y

leadership

difficult to d e n y

first

rigidity

and

the third

with

process.

variants

technological

transformation during the

collective,

of

more

become

participation

in

In that case, the fusion

of

(striving

expertise)

to

combine

would

also

ideological involve

1970s of t h e p r e s e n t c o m m u n i s t

dictatorship into a c o m m u n i s t praetorian

The Problem

becomes it w i l l

the military direct

the political decision-making the

remains

problem

oligarchy.*

Vitality

T h e q u e s t i o n t h e n is: W i l l s u c h a p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t tate the resolution

of

the

economic

and

political

to

be

even

bine

more

it w o u l d

ideological

speculative appear

than

doubtful

orthodoxy

with

the

prognosis

whether

an

technological

facili-

dilemmas

f r o n t i n g t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ? T h e a n s w e r t o this q u e s t i o n is

whole,

the party

itself.

attempt

con-

bound On

to

innovation,

the comper-

* This view is held also by some Yugoslav observers. Thus, V. Stanovcic, writing in the Yugoslav Central Committee weekly Komunist (September 26, 1968), has argued that the present Soviet system has proven itself unable to liberalize gradually and that as a consequence it will very likely "logically develop into a Bonapartist form of rule, with managerial-militarist groups assuming the role of nne prescribers' and 'organizers' or society."

The Soviet Future haps

buttressed

by

increasing

reliance

on

{

nationalism

and

military, will create a setting propitious to intellectual a n d tific creativity. S u c h a n a t t e m p t is m o r e l i k e l y t o p r o d u c e contradictions, pulling

in

with

the

opposite

ideologues

directions.

This

and

the

will

be

internal

especially

ingly r e c o g n i z e d as n e c e s s a r y for e c o n o m i c reasons, b u t

the

scien-

technocrats

often

true

concerns the complex issue of e c o n o m i c decentralization,

( s u c h as h a v e b e e n characteristic of

increas-

tempo-

Brezhnev)

or drastic policy shifts f r o m o n e emphasis to the other. T h e sequent tension will w i d e n the gap b e t w e e n and

society;

the

political

internal dilemmas, ated for a m o r e relevance

of

and

system

increasing

fundamental

the

will

and

of

con-

system

unresponsive

social pressure

reassessment

ideological

the political

appear

as

neverthe-

less f e a r e d for political reasons. T h e result will b e either rary c o m p r o m i s e s

173

will b e

the

institutional

to

gener-

contemporary

character

of

the

Soviet state. Accordingly, the that

spread

to

Spain,

it m a y the

be

Soviet

Yugoslavia,

expected Union

Mexico,

that

of

the

1970s

convulsions

and

Poland

will

witness

similar

began

to

to

in t h e late 1960s. T h e S o v i e t s t u d e n t p o p u l a t i o n will h a v e during tween

the

1960s

1958 and

(it

increased

1965),

and

by

seventy-seven

it is u n l i k e l y

that the

per

doubled cent

Soviet

will altogether avoid student unrest. T h e late 1970s will

the party

ideologues

will

not

find

it e a s y

to

be-

Union

probably

see the sexual revolution spread to the more urban Soviet and

those

undergo

centers,

accommodate

w i t h i n the prevailing official mores. T h e s e factors c o u l d create broader

social

basis

for

the

currently

isolated

ideological

a

dis-

senters and, together w i t h the likely g r o w t h in the

self-assertive-

ness

more

of

the

social and ting,

a

non-Russian

political

red

flag

tensions.

flag

Given

spontaneously

their university will h a v e the same

intelligentsia,

fluttering

much

make

the

flown

authoritarian

by

graver

Moscow

political

o v e r C o l u m b i a or the

B u t it w i l l n o t b e u n t i l t h e e a r l y

for

visible

Soviet

set-

students

over

symbolism

than

Sorbonne.

1980s that the

first

fully

Stalin political leadership will enter the political arena. A n

postaspir-

i 6

2

}

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

ing forty-five-year-old leader in 1980 will h a v e b e e n o n l y

eighteen

at t h e t i m e of Stalin's d e a t h a n d t w e n t y - o n e w h e n

de-Stalinization

actually began

generation

probably ten

or

in the

find

its

even

Soviet

access

twenty

Semichastnys,

Union.

to

power

years

Tolstikovs

of

mittee.

more

Given

the

the have

probably

more

European

states,

(the

today),

immediately

it w i l l

blocked

older

from the echelons

which

Though

volatile

matured, flexible

will

press the

its

character

it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e

political

that of

domestic

given

by

Polyanskis,

it

below

his

and

for

even

resisted

introduction

of

deliberate ideas,

then by

political

decision

to let e a c h

to

open

Soviet

Eastern

that

the

emerging

political

the level of

the party's ideological

sion-making

and

thus

to share

a

at s o m e

he

control,

system

oligarchy. point

Union

what

power

pluralist

political

Soviet

citizen read

development

power.

into

will

the

in

given

adjoining

entrenched

pluralism

setting

education,

the

evolution

the

Com-

of

requires intense concentration of political Nevertheless,

influence

Central

elite will b e less c o m m i t t e d to the notion that social

likely to b e

leaders

Shelepins,

global

higher

will

to

require

a

competitive

wants,

to

reduce

to decentralize

with

is

The

society:

in

deci-

effect,

a

major t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of t h e s y s t e m as a w h o l e . U n i n t e n d e d

conse-

quences

of

suffice

to bring

about

pre-1968

Czechoslovakia,

economic-technological

adjustments

significant political at

some

change. point

As

the

will in

not

Yugoslavia

political

elite

or

must

decide to embark o n deliberate political reforms. Thus, and more

barring an upheaval resulting

dramatically likely,

dissent—the

bringing

a revivalist more

about

dictator

probable

from internal

either

capable

pattern

social of

for the

shift t o w a r d the c o m b i n a t i o n of the s e c o n d and third (technological adaptation) political

pluralism

petence,

within

representing

a

the

and

intense

context

coalition

of

of the

still

upper

controlling 1980s

is a

(pluralist

on

internal marginal

economic-

technological

authoritarian echelons

of

or,

evolution)

variants: limited

emphasis a

paralysis—

democracy

com-

government the

principal

interest groups. This c o u l d b e the b e g i n n i n g of t h e return to

the

The Soviet Future

{

175

Western Marxist tradition, but only a slow and cautious beginning at best.* It w o u l d therefore b e rash to e x p e c t in the near f u t u r e a damental revision of the Soviet attitude toward the world. will

be

change,

rivalry w i t h the ideology

and

but

it w i l l

United

be

slow.

Moreover,

States, reflecting the

reinforced

by

the

likely to continue to b e dominant, Soviet recognition that increased

element

vestigial

middle-class-urban

fun-

There of

legacy

of

nationalism,

is

e v e n if t e m p e r e d b y

United States-Soviet

growing collabora-

t i o n is d i c t a t e d b y t h e b a s i c i m p e r a t i v e s o f h u m a n

survival.

Sino-Soviet

contradictory

conflict

may

also

have

a

double

and

effect: while intensifying the Soviet desire for a secure a n d ful western

flank,

The

peace-

it is l i k e l y t o h e i g h t e n S o v i e t s e c u r i t y

concerns,

a n d thus strengthen the d o m e s t i c position of the m o r e

conserva-

tive and nationalist This

elements.

combination

tionalism

makes

of

eroding

it u n l i k e l y

that

ideology the

Soviet

and

intensifying

Union

will

c o m e involved either in militantly a d v a n c i n g the cause revolution

or in actively

promoting

a policy

of

soon of

global

world

coopera-

tion. A m o r e likely result is a n a m b i g u o u s p a t t e r n d e t e r m i n e d short-range spective.

In

expediency that

rather

context,

than by

precisely

a broad,

because

long-range

the

Soviet

nabe-

by per-

Union

* It might be relevant at this juncture to put to rest the popular analogy frequently made between the evolution of the French Revolution into a bourgeois democracy and the allegedly similar political consequences of the embourgeoisement of Soviet society. The analogy overlooks several salient differences between these revolutions. The French Revolution took place in a setting shaped by a rationalist, idealistic intellectual tradition and ineffective absolutism. The Russian Revolution was preceded by increasing intellectual fanaticism and utopianism, reacting to the absolutist and autocratic political setting. The French Revolution was effected by an idealistic and highly disorganized professional middle class; the Bolshevik Revolution by a highly professional, ideological, and disciplined party. The French revolutionaries did not have the time during their relatively short stay in power to reorganize French society fundamentally; the Bolsheviks, particularly under Stalin, ripped apart and rewove the entire social fabric, while effecting a far-reaching industrial and urban revolution. The French middle class was an innovative and intellectually restless class; the new Soviet middle class is Victorian, conservative, and orthodox. Last but not least, the legatee of the French Revolution, Napoleon, was defeated; Stalin was victorious.

i 6

2

}

III: Communism: The Problem of

Relevance

does not appear likely to experience in the near future a phase

of

open

attractiveness

as

communism, ing

the

intellectual

one

the

socio-economic

capable

imagination

creativity

of

and

model

of intellectually

mankind,

will

domestic

experimentation, for

and

morally

probably

its

contemporary captivat-

continue

to

de-

cline.

4. Sectarian Communism

In our age a universal ideological m o v e m e n t pluralist one.

And

if it is t o b e

pluralist—that

can only be

is, r e s p o n s i v e

rapidly changing, differentiated global conditions and the ing

volatile

intellectual

mood—its

ideological

content

result-

must

highly generalized, m o r e ethical than practical, a n d m o r e

An

be

human-

istic than nationalistic. I n effect, an e c u m e n i c a l c o m m u n i s m h a v e to b e a deliberately pluralist c o m m u n i s m .

a to

would

international

pluralist c o m m u n i s m w o u l d in turn inevitably generate

pressures

for internally pluralist c o m m u n i s t parties. Pluralist c o m m u n i s m Communist

d o e s not exist a n d

universalism

matism. That dogmatism as l o n g as c o m m u n i s m conditions political power.

in the

in

these

stages

disparate

dogmatism

began

to

new

to

the

own

national

pow

of

intellectuals

states,

rulers

see

is u n l i k e l y t o

victim

to

had

merge

r interests.

world

of

to define

power

the

through

Dogmatism,

and

in

natural the

no

its

seeking different

propensity

prism

longer

only global

found

intellectuals

seized

with

dog-

with universalism

industrialization groups

appear.

communist

an abstract attempt

of

the

fallen

was compatible

was

early

expression Once

has

of

their

operating

Sectarian Communism

{

177

o n the level of universal abstraction b u t o n that of national tice,

facilitated

anism—with

the

each

transformation sect

truly universal o n e

insisting

and

of

communism

that

its

internal

establishing

into

perspective

prac-

sectariwas

the

party discipline

on

that basis. The

Soviet

Union

into sectarian among more of

all

led

communist

established

conflicting

patched-up

transforming but

the

parties

communist

claims,

temporary

communism mankind.38

in

and

forms Far

power

and

out

communism

developed

of

even

and

power.

a mosaic

latent

almost

helping

naturally

among As

excommunications, active

from

universal

process

parties

mutual

compromises,

nations

of

in

communism,

a

result

occasional

conflicts,

as varied

to e n d

the

the

con-

as

the

intellectual

f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f t h e g l o b e , s e c t a r i a n c o m m u n i s m i n t e n s i f i e s it.

Phases Four broad phases can be munism first

as an international

communist

state

in the

responding roughly to the to

the

1930s,

which

Soviet society—can tially W e s t e r n

discerned in the evolution movement Soviet

be

Union.

the

ideological

first

responding

com-

setting

setting.

and

This

redefined

involved

ported and readapted Domestication

An

meet

the

political

and

needs

dogmatizing

matization

that

formulations

as defined

cratic

setting

largely into

Rusthat

the

im-

ideology.

considerations was

of

of

first

by

derived

Lenin

and

from even

specific more

b y Stalin, increasingly p e r m e a t e d t h e doctrine; as a result, parochial

of

essen-

to the specific conditions

domesticating

meant

Russian conditions,

to

cor-

particularly

W e s t e r n capitalist industrialization, w a s transplanted to the sian

the

phase,

restructuring

transplantation.

called that of

doctrine,

The

1920s a n d the 1930s—but

witnessed

of

since the creation of

were the

which

dogmatically

consequence Marxism

was

of

so

purely

universalized.

Dog-

the

auto-

primitive,

transplanted,39

arbitrary p e r s o n a l traits of t h e t o p i d e o l o g u e s ,

a n d of the

of

the

power

2

i 6

}

needs

III: Communism:

of

what

the

Marx

new

saw

communist

as

proletarian base

The Problem of

the

that

elite

that

foundation

capitalist

for

Relevance

found

itself

socialist

development

without

rule—the

had

created

solid in

the

West. The

second

phase,

the

universalization

active

of

specific, c o r r e s p o n d e d approximately to the 1930s a n d the

1940s. It s a w

the

Soviet

particularly

the Stalinization of foreign c o m m u n i s t

parties,

the forcible export of the Soviet version of c o m m u n i s m

to

ern E u r o p e , a n d t h e s p o n t a n e o u s e x p a n s i o n of the m o r e Leninist

adaptation

Centralized Soviet

by

of

Marxism

Moscow,

experience

to China,

international

without

taking

a

common

mold

became

more

Indeed,

intense

leadership

for

groups

adjustments;

in

came time

under the

imitated

insistence because

phase, the

particularization

the

1950s.

Yugoslav

and

and national

growing

national

It saw,

first

leadership

power

through

Polish

leadership,

of

(in

its o w n the

demands. of

complete

measure

domestic

leaders

of

pres-

themselves interests

such

third

communism

during

self-assertion

of

because

efforts), the partial beginnings

com-

result w a s the

international

all, t h e

large

The

a

conditions.

b e g a n to see a divergence b e t w e e n their o w n needs and and Soviet prescriptions

the

conditions

Soviet

precisely

This state of affairs c o u l d n o t l o n g endure,

sures

Vietnam.

consideration

major gap existed b e t w e e n ideology and local

munist

and

communism

into

prevailing within the different nations. on

Korea,

East-

oriental

it h a d

come

self-assertion self-assertion

the to

of

the

by

the

R u m a n i a n s , a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t of all, t h e i n c r e a s i n g

inclination

of

version

of

relevance

of

the

Chinese

communism

leadership

and

both

to generalize

to

practice

its

the significance

its e x p e r i e n c e f o r o t h e r r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o m m u n i s t The

1960s accordingly witnessed a n e w

international c o m m u n i s m . tween process

the by

process which

by

and

parties.

stage in the history

It w a s d o m i n a t e d b y o p e n t e n s i o n

which

specific

own

doctrine

points

of

was

view

relativized were

made

For the sake of unity, Soviet leadership s e e m e d at tolerate increasing diversity; in the early

first

and

of bethe

absolute. willing

1 9 6 0 s it f o r m a l l y

to

aban-

Sectarian Communism

{

179

d o n e d b o t h its c l a i m t o l e a d e r s h i p a n d its i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e for a c o m m o n

general

however,

place

took

perhaps

generated

line.40

in

by

the the

A

shift in

second fear

the

half

that

of

opposite the

decade;

relativization

stage in the erosion of the ideology,

and

need

direction, it

was

was

the

first

that the resulting

ecu-

m e n i c a l unity w o u l d b e d e v o i d of a n y political substance.

Czech-

oslovak political d e v e l o p m e n t s in 1968 a n d the persistent

Chinese

challenge

were

in all p r o b a b i l i t y

the

catalysts

that

precipitated

the Soviet leaders' turn t o w a r d sectarianism: the reassertion of absolute universality of certain c o m m o n

laws,

largely as

the

defined

by the Soviet leaders themselves. T h e inescapable price that to b e

paid

their o w n

was

that

those

divergent

communist

position

would

parties

do

that

so—and

could

would

have

d o so in t h e context of m u t u a l ideological denunciations. larism,

instead

translated

of

during

being the

a

stage

1960s

into

toward the

ecumenism,

fourth

had

assert to

Particuwas

and

current

is t h u s

devoid

thus phase,

sectarianism. Communist substantive appeals Soviet

unity

as of

meaning.*

for

popular

Union

offers

the

early

Western support

a

by

relevant

1970s

communist

parties

increasingly model.

denying

Indeed,

the

the

voters

would

be

only to the

that

a

degree

French

different

from

or

an

the

that they Italian

Soviet

successfully

communist

model.

that

the and

parties

convince

government

Despite

persisting

Soviet pressures, the ruling Eastern E u r o p e a n communist continue to m a k e

any their

Italian

French c o m m u n i s t leaders have c o m e to realize that their will succeed

of

fortify

parties

quiet adjustments to domestic necessities,

and

in so doing they increasingly diverge from the Soviet model.

The

Chinese

Communist

Party

not

only

practices

its o w n

brand

of

* Failure to perceive this reality still prompts some Western conservative scholars to speak of "the foreign policy of communism," and to be critical of the view that communist ideology is no longer capable of mobilizing unified global support. See Hans Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States, New York, 1969, p. 32. Presumably for the same reason, Professor Morgenthau argued in 1965 that the Vietnam war would bring the Soviets and the Chinese together.

i 6

2

}

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

communism

b u t e x p l i c i t l y d e n i e s t h a t t h e S o v i e t p a r t y is a

munist party—indeed, process of restoring

it c h a r g e s t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n

particularly

fateful for international

Stalinist

model

of

the

Czechoslovak

democ-

communism

H a d the Soviet leaders permitted the liberalization tially

the

capitalism.

T h e Soviet decision in 1968 to snuff out C z e c h o s l o v a k ratization w a s

com-

is in

of the

communist

essen-

state,

major a n d vitally important step in the democratization of

a

Euro-

p e a n c o m m u n i s m w o u l d h a v e b e e n taken. T h e democratization Czechoslovakia w o u l d h a v e significantly affected the other m u n i s t states, i n c l u d i n g t h e Soviet U n i o n ,

eventually

of

com-

generating

similar tendencies within them. This w a s the primary

reason

the Soviet decision to intervene in Czechoslovakia. R o g e r

for

Garaudy,

a m e m b e r of the Politburo of t h e F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t Party at the time, w a s

correct in stating

feared the

democratization

that the of

Soviet leaders

Czechoslovakia

instinctively

precisely

because

they h a v e b e e n so c o m m i t t e d to the Stalinist m o d e l of

socialism

that a n y a t t e m p t to adjust socialism to t h e c o n d i t i o n s of m o r e v a n c e d societies h a s c o m e to b e v i e w e d as a m e n a c e to

ad-

socialism

itself. D e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w e n t against t h e grain of their entire traini n g a n d outlook; the o c c u p a t i o n of C z e c h o s l o v a k i a w a s

therefore

system.41

not an error b u t a logical c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e Stalinist

T h e spectacle of a democratic Czechoslovakia, ruled b y a munist party tolerant of individual f r e e d o m press),

would

Western

com-

these parties to

effect

their

rapidly,

internal

had

an

enormous

democratization

impact

more

on

com-

speech,

munist parties. It w o u l d h a v e e n c o u r a g e d own

have

( f r e e travel,

and

it

would

h a v e m a d e t h e m m o r e a p p e a l i n g to their national electorates. would have meant

a major turning point

This

in the history of

com-

m u n i s m itself. It w o u l d h a v e c r e a t e d in t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d

West

a d e m o c r a t i z i n g c o m m u n i s m p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h humanistically harn e s s i n g t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c c h a l l e n g e ; it w o u l d h a v e l e d t o a m i l i t a n t , more

revolutionary

communism,

violently

reacting

against

b a c k w a r d n e s s a n d social i n a d e q u a c y of the conditions

in the Third W o r l d . U n w i l l i n g n e s s to tolerate C z e c h o s l o v a k i a thus

meant

not

only

that

the

Soviet

Union

will

for

the

prevailing

some

has time

Sectarian Communism

{

181

persist in a congealed, highly bureaucratized mold, but that will b e

many

sectarian

communisms,

presses a universally valid

Assimilated The

message.

each

claiming

there

that

it

Communisms

1970s

diversified

and

the

1980s

communisms

are h e n c e

merging

likely

with

to see

specific

increasingly

local

conditions

w h i l e f a d i n g as part of an international m o v e m e n t a n d a ideology. In Eastern E u r o p e this m i g h t m e a n

universal

the appearance

some regimes that w o u l d more appropriately qualify for the "social

fascist" t h a n

inforce their o w n who

in

ex-

0

any

way

communist;

dogmatism tend

to

that

by

is,

ruling

forcing from

deviate

from

the

parties their

norm.

that

ranks

Intensely

of socially a n d politically conservative

middle-class

officials w h o

have

vaguely

re-

those

tionalistic, the m i d d l e a n d u p p e r e c h e l o n s of their elite w o u l d composed

of

label

nabe

first-generation the

official

ideology—especially the belief in the paramountcy of the

internalized

state—

ruling in an alliance w i t h an ideologically neutral, expert

class

disdainful

of

the

more

technologically

"old-fashioned"

intellectual

humanists, a n d s u p p o r t e d b y the military. In addition to the

Soviet

* Soviet spokesmen have occasionally argued that a democratic Czechoslovakia would have ceased to be a communist Czechoslovakia, that the communist party would have been put out of power. This is doubtful, though it cannot be either proven or disproven. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that other political parties could have actually appeared in Czechoslovakia, for neither the social basis nor the personnel for them appears to have existed. Indeed, as of 1968 the predominant attitude among the Czechs and Slovaks was in favor of working within and through a more democratic, pluralist communist party that would have been communist without being LeninistStalinist. The Soviet argument, however, is deserving of note because it reveals something else. The charge is tantamount to an admission that democracy and the Soviet version of communism are still incompatible. It thus reflects not only a deeply ingrained bureaucratic suspicion of the popular will but the persistent incapacity of Soviet communist officials to relate meaningfully to the contemporary preoccupation with political and social equality, to the contemporary search for a new humanism relevant to the "scientifictechnological revolution," which communists themselves admit that they have tended to neglect (see p. 152, supra).

i 6

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}

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance

Union, East G e r m a n y and perhaps Poland and Bulgaria are

likely

to a p p r o x i m a t e t h e a b o v e "social fascist" c a t e g o r y . * T h e s e regimes, however, are not likely to b e stable. T h e elites suffer f r o m increasing

cynicism

and

tend

to b e

ruling

more

and

more fragmented; cliques, intrigues, and personal feuds

dominate

t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l p r o c e s s e s , w h i c h still l a c k d e f i n e d

constitu-

tional procedures. Societies are b e c o m i n g m o r e restless u n d e r isting political restraints a n d are fearful lest their systems insufficiently innovative in technological

areas. M o r e o v e r ,

a n d e v e r l a r g e r g e n e r a t i o n o f s t u d e n t s is b e g i n n i n g

ex-

prove a

new

to leave

the

universities a n d t o l a y c l a i m to p o w e r . T h e o u t b u r s t s of 1 9 6 8

are

likely to b e r e p e a t e d in the 1970s. S h o u l d t h e y occur in a in w h i c h W e s t e r n E u r o p e exerts a social attraction for

setting

frustrated

E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n s , a n d i n w h i c h t h e r e is p o l i t i c a l w e a k n e s s division in M o s c o w ,

the

next w a v e

of

Eastern

European

and

unrest

could b e explosive o n a regional, a n d not just national, scale. In Yugoslavia t h e m a i n source of uncertainty for the future the possibility of dissension

among

the various

nationalities,

is es-

pecially after T i t o s death. That dissension could lead to a military c o u p d e s i g n e d to preserve the state, a n d Soviet leadership

would

t h e n b e likely to m a k e a major effort to i m p r o v e relations w i t h

such

a p r a e t o r i a n Y u g o s l a v r e g i m e . If t h a t d a n g e r — w h i c h is q u i t e

real

— i s s u r m o u n t e d b y a c o m b i n a t i o n of political skill a n d

continued

economic

toward

more

growth,

Yugoslavia

pluralist pattern

West—no

and

will

continue

to cultivate

to

closer

evolve contacts

with

d o u b t including s o m e t h i n g like associate status in

E u r o p e a n C o m m o n Market. It m a y e v e n b e g i n to e x p e r i m e n t m u l t i - p a r t y e l e c t i o n s , a n d it is likely t o b e less a n d less about the classical issue of state versus private

a the the

with

doctrinaire

ownerships

Yu-

* It is interesting and relevant to note here that Central European fascism was primarily an urban development. For example, in 1937, 50 per cent of the members of the Hungarian Arrow Cross party were industrial workers, 12 per cent were professional and self-employed people, and only 8 per cent were peasants. At the same time slightly over half the population was peasant (Istvan Deak, "Hungary," in The European Right, Eugene Weber and Hans Rogger, eds., Berkeley, 1965, pp. 396-97)f In the more developed parts of Yugoslavia there is already strong senti-

Sectarian Communism

{

183

goslav theoreticians have already argued publicly that a multiparty system is a necessary mechanism for avoiding the political degeneration inherent in the communist party power monopoly. They have warned that "nothing is so irrational as a closed rational system which does not allow other ideas and contrary views to live, which does not permit any intellectual unrest." 42 The example provided by such a Yugoslavia would be

attractive

to the m o r e d e v e l o p e d E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n states, s u c h as

Czecho-

slovakia and H u n g a r y , a n d eventually to the currently m o s t pendent-minded

member

of

the

Eastern

bloc,

inde-

Rumania.

f o r m e r are likely to c o n t i n u e quietly p u r s u i n g the road of

The

democ-

ratization from within, eventually heading toward

independence;

Rumania

by

the

is l i k e l y t o c o n s o l i d a t e

scope

of

popular

its i n d e p e n d e n c e

participation

political life. All t h r e e

countries

in

the

country's

increasingly

increasing social

appreciate

sirability of substituting a m i x e d e c o n o m y for the highly ized Soviet model.

Moreover,

Czechoslovak

and

the

sociologists h a v e

cently b e e n d r a w i n g attention to the transformation of their society into one in w h i c h

the intelligentsia,

"the fastest

ship of the proletariat."43 implications nomic model gentsia,

of

the

a n d of

have

also

Hungarian

increasingly

sociologists,

decentralized

a similar increase in the

called

for

direction of "comprehensive

a

redefinition

own

this

dictator-

discussing

Hungarian Hungarian

the eco-

intelliin

the

social reforms, including broad

sec-

tions of social life (political a n d cultural as

of

re-

growing

g r o u p i n s o c i e t y , " is p l a y i n g t h e d e c i s i v e role. I n t h e i r v i e w , necessarily c o m p e l s a r e d e f i n i t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t of "the

de-

central-

socialism

well)."44

Moreover, the Eastern E u r o p e a n states fear that scientific

obso-

lescence m a y b e the price that t h e y will h a v e to p a y for r e m a i n i n g too closely associated with an Eastern bloc and for b e i n g cut

off

from

not

extensive

contacts

with

the

West.

(These

fears

are

ment on behalf of widening the private sector in the economy. The group with the strongest anti-private-property feelings is that of the white-collar workers with the least education (see the public-opinion poll published in the Zagreb Vjesnik, December 24, 1968).

i 6

2

}

III:

Communism:

groundless. See Table

10.)

The Problem of Relevance T h i s f e a r is s h a r e d e v e n b y E a s t

Ger-

m a n y , w h o s e t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t is i n c r e a s i n g l y t u r n i n g toward Western

markets,

with the result that

n o l o g i c a l s u c c e s s is i n t e n s i o n w i t h its p o l i t i c a l In the West munism

of

TABLE 10.

the

the

bureaucratized

Stalinist

variety

and

is

the regime s orientation.

ideologically

likely

to

sterile

continue

to

INVENTIONS REGISTERED PER 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 INHABITANTS

Country Belgium Austria Denmark Norway

it

tech-

com-

fade

in

(1964)

No. of Inventions 164

147 131 121

Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Rumania

52 20 10

7 Source: Burks, Technological Innovation and Political Change in Communist Eastern Europe, p. 12. socio-political relevance. passed into the hands groups;

as a result,

to

political

seek

T h e revolutionary

of m o r e

the

ideologically

established

relevance

by

standard

has

already

volatile

and

activist

communist

minimizing

parties

their

are

likely

orthodoxy

emphasizing their acceptance of constitutional procedures.*

and Their

f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m is l i k e l y t o c o n t i n u e t o b e t h a t t h e y h a v e attractive m o d e l communist

of

power

a modern

highly

sophisticated

to offer as an e x a m p l e

and

no

pluralist

to their electorates;

in

a d d i t i o n , t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e i r p r o g r a m m a t i c m e s s a g e is f u r t h e r reduced

by

the fact that the W e s t

has preceded

states in experiencing the social a n d technological

the

communist

revolution.

Thus, both in order to exploit the tensions connected with transition from the

industrial

to the technetronic

society

and

the to

* Or even participation in their national establishments. A moving account of the efforts of a devoted communist militant to arouse her party s officials to the plight of the Neapolitan masses and to stimulate a more revolutionary attitude in them is provided by M. A. Macciocchi, Lettere dall'interno del PCI a Louis Althusser, Milan, 1969. In her diary she describes her efforts to gain the confidence of the workers and—even more futile—to make the party bureaucrats more sensitive to the workers' abysmal conditions.

Sectarian Communism provide the

the

Italian

basis

orthodoxy. S o m e the need

for effective

communist

political

parties

have

action,

been

of their theoreticians h a v e

to redefine the

communist

the

forced

already

communist

parties

politically

isolated;

ceeded

gaining

in

have moved

to

in

the

the

support,

and

not be

that w o u l d

structure.

West

extent the

To

the

remain

that

the

communist

both

integrated,

and

certainly

These visions can no longer encompass

that

leaders,

sectarian

reformists parties

exclusivist

new ideo-

extent

and

have

in

toward diluting their nineteenth-century

tradition of dogmatic,

their

emphasized

these reformists have b e e n thwarted b y conservative party the

and

dilute

party as a n altogether

logical in t h e strict s e n s e of t h e w o r d , in its b u r e a u c r a t i c

185

French

in

party that w o u l d i n c l u d e the entire left, that w o u l d

not be Leninist

{

the

sucWest

ideological

grand

visions.*

either the n e w

scientific

revolution or the revolutions of the students and intellectuals, have replaced

the communists

our time. W h a t e v e r the W e s t

the response,

the communist

who

as the anti-establishmentarians the basic fact remains

parties are no longer either

of

that

in

innovative

or revolutionary.

China and Global

Revolution

T h o u g h it c a m e t o o l a t e i n t h e W e s t , c o m m u n i s m h a s c o m e e a r l y f o r t h e E a s t , or, m o r e

generally, for the Third

World

too as

a

0 The first situation has been more true of the French Communist Party, and George Lichtheim was quite correct in stating that "if the role of Marxist doctrine in contemporary France can be reduced to a formula, it may be summed up by saying that from the vision of a revolutionary future it has turned into the critical contemplation of an eternal and seemingly unchangeable present" (George Lichtheim, Marxism in Modern France, a study by the Research Institute on Communist Affairs, New York, 1966, p. 169). The second situation is more applicable to the Italian party, in which the most explicit concept of the new broad party was developed by one of its theoreticians, G. Amendola, in a series of articles published in the fall of 1964 in the theoretical journal of the Italian Communist Party, Rinascita In these articles he called for the creation of a single party of the left, which would be neither communist nor social democratic, neither shackled by ideology nor dominated by the party cadres.

i 6

2

}

III:

whole.

Communism:

Instead

of

being

The Problem of Relevance

the

internationalizing

and

humanizing

force that M a r x c o n c e i v e d socialism to be, c o m m u n i s m in the is at b e s t a n i n s p i r a t i o n for i n t e n s e l y n a t i o n a l i s t i c

East

modernization

or o f r e v o l u t i o n a r y r e s i s t a n c e t o s o c i a l e x p l o i t a t i o n ; a t w o r s t , it is the basis for despotic the

West,

fanaticism

communisms

virtues

and

massive

have

more

oppression.

often

As

been

s t r a t e d w h e n it h a s b e e n o u t o f p o w e r a n d h a s a c t e d a s a

catalyst

in the struggle against inequality, social injustice, or foreign ination. I n p o w e r , it h a s t e n d e d t o b e c o m e e x t r e m e l y fanatical, a n d intensely

dom-

oppressive,

nationalistic.

C o m m u n i s m in the East, e v e n m o r e than in the West, has a particularly important force in stimulating populist This

is

World

quite

understandable.

masses

before

their

Communism

political

came

awakening,

been

nationalism.

to

the

and

Third

it h a s

suc-

c e e d e d o n l y w h e r e it h a s b e c o m e b o t h t h e e x t e r n a l e x p r e s s i o n the internal c o n t e n t of the n e w sense of national identity.

tions o n b o t h external a n d d o m e s t i c levels, c o m m u n i s m of inferiority t o w a r d

b e c a u s e of this, c o m m u n i s m

the more

advanced

in the Third World

and

Focusing

o n industrialization as the w a y in w h i c h to fulfill p o p u l a r

feelings

aspira-

galvanized

West.

Indeed,

has been

espe-

cially vulnerable to the racism t h a t — g i v e n t h e bitter l e g a c y of white

mans

in

demon-

imperialism—inevitably

national-

i s m . 4 5 R a c i s m , h o w e v e r , is o n e of t h e m o s t p r i m i t i v e a n d

irrational

and

a communist

the

the

new

sources of motivation,

infected

ideology

reinforced

i t — w h e t h e r in Asia or in A f r i c a — c a n n o t h e l p b u t b e d e p r i v e d

by of

b o t h its u n i v e r s a l i t y a n d its rationality. An

altogether

different

challenge

to

communism's

and institutional global relevance has b e e n p o s e d of C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s m .

ideological

by

the

Chinese communism has not only

leled t h e claim of Soviet c o m m u n i s m

t o b e the

pure

victory paral-

communism

of o u r t i m e , b u t h a s b e e n w i l l i n g t o b a c k its c l a i m w i t h

domestic

revolutionary action. T h e "Cultural Revolution" of the late

1960s,

w h i c h f o l l o w e d b y a f e w years the "Great L e a p Forward" of late 1950s, w a s d e s i g n e d to o v e r c o m e the ruling party's tendency

toward

bureaucratic

stagnation

and

the

dangerous

ideological

petri-

Sectarian Communism

{

187

faction. T h e C h i n e s e h a v e explicitly stated that, in their v i e w , Soviet party

had

already

T h e Cultural Revolution economic

shake-up

become

a victim

of

such

( t h e intellectual equivalent of the

effected

by

the

Great

Leap

the

petrifaction. socio-

Forward)

was

d e s i g n e d to b e the internal, d o m e s t i c expression of the living continuing

revolution.

Its over-all effect, h o w e v e r ,

was

the Chinese Communist Party what Khrushchev's aborted of 1963 almost d i d to t h e Soviet party: to t h o r o u g h l y

and

to d o

to

reforms

disorganize

it, a n d , w i t h it, t h e C h i n e s e e c o n o m y a s w e l l . 4 6 By denigrating the party and by simultaneously elevating Tse-tung's personal rule a n d role, C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s m separated

itself

from

the

traditional

communist

Mao

inevitably

mainstream—in

spite of the C h i n e s e theory that the g e o g r a p h i c vortex of

revolu-

tionary leadership has over the years shifted from France to m a n y to Russia a n d n o w to China. Moreover, unlike Stalin,

Ger-

whose

role in the international c o m m u n i s t m o v e m e n t w a s reinforced a towering personal standing a n d b y leadership of the only

by

com-

m u n i s t party in p o w e r , M a o w a s f a c e d b y a n u m b e r of other ruling communist

parties,

all d i s p u t i n g

his claim

to orthodoxy

and

all

e a g e r t o p o i n t o u t his d o c t r i n a l errors. T h e effect w a s t o

weaken

China's

and

international

claim

to

ideological

universality

tarnish both the revolutionary prestige of the C h i n e s e and their undeniably impressive overcome China's

achievements

communists

in the struggle

to

backwardness.47

China's c a p a c i t y to serve as a m o d e l of c o m m u n i s m w a s c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e u n i q u e character of C h i n a itself. T h e communists

to

further Chinese

c a m e to p o w e r not in a single country b u t in a

society that represents a comprehensive and sophisticated

vast

civiliza-

tion. N o t o n l y is t h a t c i v i l i z a t i o n h i g h l y d i s t i n c t i v e b u t it h a s a l o n g t i m e h a d its o w n c o n c e p t of a w o r l d o r d e r i n w h i c h is t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c e n t e r . T h o u g h t h e h i s t o r i c a l a n d u n i v e r s a l gories of Marxist t h o u g h t h a v e b e e n assimilated into that f r a m e w o r k a n d b e c o m e a n e x t e n s i o n o f it, t h e c u l t u r a l ,

for

China cate-

Chinese

linguistic,

a n d racial distinctiveness of the Chinese has automatically their c o m m u n i s m m u c h m o r e difficult to export or emulate.

made

i 6

2

}

III: Communism:

Moreover,

unlike

the

The Problem of Relevance

Russians,

who

have

often

referred

M o s c o w as the "Third R o m e / ' the Chinese h a v e traditionally played no intense missionary

zeal.

Effective performance

in

missionary role requires, in addition to personal inclination,

to disthe

some

cultural, philosophic, a n d e v e n ethnic kinship, to say n o t h i n g of

a

p r o s e l y t i z i n g t r a d i t i o n . It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t , d e s p i t e its m i s s i o n a r y z e a l , E u r o p e a n - b a s e d C h r i s t i a n i t y w a s m u c h less s u c c e s s f u l in its efforts to spread to Asia t h a n w a s the East's M i d d l e Islam.

Perhaps

a racial appeal—explicitly b a s e d o n color a n d ideologically m i z e d b y t h e identification of t h e w h i t e m a n w i t h may

create

a bridge

between

Chinese

legiti-

imperialism—

proselytizers

and

foreign

m a s s e s , b u t e v e n t h a t a p p e a l is m o r e likely to b e e f f e c t i v e i n a r e a s sufficiently distant tionalism

and

from

China's

China

not

cultural

to b e

hegemony.

fearful of Hence

Chinese

Africa,

than Asia, m a y b e a m o r e promising long-range C h i n e s e

target.

These considerations provide s o m e clues to the probable of C h i n a s tremism

revolutionary

nor

even

world

China's

role.

crash

Neither

program

to

Chinese

limits

verbal

establish

na-

rather

a

ex-

nuclear

a r s e n a l ( t h e o l d q u e s t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n s o r c a p a b i l i t i e s ) is a s i m p o r t a n t as t h e f a c t t h a t C h i n a h a s b e c o m e a s o m e w h a t

self-contained

civilization-nation-state. China's p o w e r will probably g r o w in y e a r s t o c o m e , a n d w i t h it C h i n a ' s c a p a c i t y t o t h r e a t e n its

Union.48

bors a n d eventually e v e n the U n i t e d States or the Soviet B u t it d o e s n o t f o l l o w t h a t C h i n a w i l l t h e r e f o r e b e c o m e a n director of militant a n d globally relevant revolutionary O n the contrary,

as m e m o r i e s

of C h i n e s e

find

activist

processes.

revolutionary

ments gradually recede into the past, China will

achieve-

it m o r e

m o r e difficult to p r e s e n t itself as the historically relevant tionary model. China's aid will b e accepted by n e e d y

the

neigh-

and

revolu-

revolution-

aries, b u t it w i l l p r o b a b l y b e c o m e m o r e rather t h a n less

difficult

for t h e C h i n e s e to c o n v i n c e the recipients of s u c h aid that

China

has a universal mission. N o r is it c e r t a i n ,

as has b e e n

years to c o m e

communism

tractive m o d e l

combining

occasionally

argued,

will offer to the Third sustained

economic

that in

World

an

development

the atand

Sectarian Communism

{

s o c i a l m o d e r n i z a t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . E v e n if C h i n a impressive

strides a n d its G N P

makes

g r o w s steadily at 5 p e r c e n t

a n n u m , i n t h e y e a r 2 0 0 0 it w i l l still b e a m o n g t h e p o o r e r

The

Third World

relevance

of

Soviet

is a l s o d o u b t f u l .

economic

Analysis

of

the

factor

economic

experience Soviet

per

nations

o f t h e w o r l d . T h e f a c t is t h a t its n u m b e r s , f a r f r o m b e i n g a of strength, m e r e l y m a g n i f y t h e s c a l e of its social a n d dilemmas.

189

to

the

experience

strongly suggests that industrialization need not b e derived

from

the impetus provided b y extraordinarily coercive m e a n s

from

t h e p h y s i c a l d e s t r u c t i o n o f a s o c i a l c l a s s . M o r e o v e r , it is

or

important

to note that Soviet industrialization occurred in a society that

had

s o m e thirty years of prior industrial d e v e l o p m e n t

that

was

endowed

working

and

with

matchless

disciplined

and that even

natural

population

before World

War

behind

resources

(but

I had

not

and

Stalinist Paradox.") the

Third

World

These

countries

now

the advantages

a n y case, relatively w e l l

developed

provide

examples

can rarely

undertaking

Whether

can

hard-

of

solid

preliminary

( S e e our earlier discussion of

conditions

industrialize themselves.

over)

a

overpopulation),

statistics, relatively w e l l - t r a i n e d t e c h n i c a l cadres, a n d plans for future development.

it,

of

to

be

modernize

China or C u b a

by and

( t h e latter,

at t h e time of

sustained

"The

matched

Castro's

growth

in

take-

and

political

power

without

stability is uncertain. Of

the

countries

where

communism

being imposed by foreign intervention Cuba, Yugoslavia, Albania, Vietnam), succeeded

in achieving

sustained

came

to

(the Soviet Union,

China,

only Yugoslavia has so

economic

growth,

social

far

mod-

ernization, a n d political stability w i t h o u t e m p l o y i n g m a s s i v e terror or experiencing violent p o w e r conflicts; e v e n Yugoslavia, required record

of

extensive

outside

economic

financial

development

aid. of

Moreover,

communist

however,

though

countries,

t i c u l a r l y t h e m o r e p r i m i t i v e o n e s , is g o o d , it h a s n o t b e e n than

that

of

some

non-communist

countries.

In

better

addition,

c o m m u n i s t political systems ( e x c e p t for Yugoslavia, Vietnam, Cuba)

have

been

characterized

by

sporadic political

the par-

most and

instability.

i 6

2

}

III:

Communism: The Problem of Relevance

which in some cases h a d to be put d o w n through Soviet

interven-

tion. T h u s t h e o v e r - a l l r e c o r d is, at b e s t , a m i x e d o n e a n d

hardly

sufficient to justify the a r g u m e n t that only the c o m m u n i s t s found the key to effective modernization. Nor, for that matter, have they found revolution-making. only

one

Cuba. when

Communism

country

not

came

previously

the answer

to p o w e r

devastated

I n s e v e r a l o t h e r c o u n t r i e s it c a m e communists

experienced economy

picked

complete

during

a

up

the pieces

destruction

major

war.

revolutionary record since

of

Other

have

0

by

to

effective

indigenously a

major

to power after these

war—

indigenously nations

had

their

state

machinery

and

than

that,

the

communist

1917 has b e e n o n e of rather

frequent

f a i l u r e , ! w h i l e in P o l a n d , H u n g a r y , a n d R u m a n i a it w a s t h e army that established

Soviet

communism.

N e v e r t h e l e s s , it is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t i n t h e y e a r s t o c o m e vidual,

highly nationalistic,

perhaps

even

by

appealing

both

to

the

indi-

racist c o m m u n i s t

ties will c o m e to p o w e r in s o m e Asian, African, or L a t i n countries

in

populist

par-

American

nationalism

of

masses a n d the statism of impatient intellectuals. In his s t u d y

munism and the Politics of Development, that "Communist economic

John Kautsky has

p a r t y s t r e n g t h is l o w e s t

development,

rises

gradually

economic

m e n t , crests at a fairly h i g h l e v e l of s u c h d e v e l o p m e n t , clines sharply with the highest level."

49

shown

at t h e l o w e s t s t a g e

with

the Com-

of

developand

This generalization

not b e mechanically applied to the Third W o r l d w i t h the

de-

should conclu-

sion that c o m m u n i s m w i l l f a d e as s o o n as d e v e l o p m e n t h a s

made

substantial progress. A s e i z u r e of p o w e r could, for e x a m p l e ,

occur

during the intermediary

phase.

• In these respects, useful comparisons can be made between communistruled countries and countries ruled by modernizing non-communist elites; Poland-Spain-Italy; Rumania-Yugoslavia-Spain; Czechoslovakia-Sweden; Hungary-Austria; North Korea-South Korea; North Vietnam-South Vietnam; China-India; and so on. These comparisons are more revealing of certain uniformities than of significant disparities. The disparities are sharper when the comparison is made with non-modernizing, non-communist countries, t A partial list of more significant revolutionary efforts by the communists includes: Hungary 1919; Poland 1920; Germany 1918, 1923; China 1927; France and Italy 1947; Greece 1948; Indonesia 1949, 1965; Bolivia 1966.

Sectarian Communism I t is, h o w e v e r ,

unlikely

that

these

seizures

of

{

power

191

will

be

effected b y the orthodox a n d formal c o m m u n i s t parties, w h i c h some

countries

(particularly

coming assimilated revolutionaries,

into the

in

Latin

America)

are

social establishment.

in

already

The

though perhaps labeling themselves

be-

successful

communists,

will probably b e loosely o r g a n i z e d coalitions of impatient

middle-

class intellectuals, y o u n g e r officers, a n d students. I n s t e a d of

being

adherents of a d o g m a t i c a n d a l l e g e d l y universal ideology, t h e y are m o r e likely to b e m e n combination Communist

of

motivated

by a vaguer and more

radicalism,

nationalism,

and

parties, t h o u g h

experienced

in organizing

disadvantaged

workers

even

volatile

some

racism.

exploited,

a n d in transforming landless b u t

nation-

alistically aroused peasants into revolutionary armies, h a v e so b e e n u n a b l e to discipline, either i d e o l o g i c a l l y or

the students a n d the intellectuals fermenting in the m o d e r n less-steel-and-glass universities. T o these men, F a n o n a n d dienne,

or Bolivar a n d

Marx and Lenin,

Guevara,

are m o r e

rather than

relevant symbols.

Marx The

Mao,

or

revolutions

and

to

c o m e will hence neither signify an automatic addition of

The these

ideologically novel

stain-

Boume-

strength

to "international c o m m u n i s m " nor represent a step forward the intellectual unity of

far

organizationally,

toward

mankind.

more

revolutionary

volatile, forces

less

would

disciplined be

in

character

keeping

of

with

broader trends already noted. Conditions during the early

the

indus-

trial a g e c a l l e d for i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l integration, the dynamic congestion

of

t h e g l o b a l c i t y is i n i m i c a l

to a

but

disci-

p l i n e d , c e n t r a l i z e d i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w h o s e p u r p o s e is

to

disseminate a particular system

to

create a globally uniform

of t h o u g h t

social order on

a n d of v a l u e s a n d that basis.

The

that proximity paradoxically dictates not uniformity but Moreover, the chances of truly revolutionary cally and

rapidly

revolutionizing

both

fact

is

pluralism.

upheavals—radi-

social values

and

institu-

tions—are in any case not high. In m o d e r n times only the

French,

the M e x i c a n , a n d the C u b a n revolutions c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as thentically

indigenous

and

far-reaching

internal revolutions

w e r e achieved without the benefit of the cataclysmic

authat

dislocations

i 6

2

}

III: Communism:

The Problem of Relevance

w r o u g h t b y the t w o w o r l d wars. Otherwise, e v e n the most ineffective

social

highly

and

resilient

political and

that

systems

have

shown

difficult to overthrow.

been

found

meal

and that superimposed

social

inertia

can

only

In be

themselves

to

be

most

cases

it

has

coped

with

radical efforts to o v e r c o m e

pieceit

have

p r o m p t e d effective resistance. A t o n e t i m e Soviet theorists t o y e d w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of t h e tional

democracy

as

a

transitional

stage

toward

a

na-

communist

people's democracy. T h e o v e r t h r o w of B e n Bella, Goulart,

Kassem,

Keita, N k r u m a h , P a p a n d r e o u , a n d Sukarno has c o m p e l l e d the viets to think in terms of m u c h lengthier a n d m o r e g r a d u a l lutionary processes; at t h e s a m e time, the C h i n e s e a n d t h e have moved

toward emphasis

So-

revo-

Cubans

on various forms of guerrilla

often in the f a c e of o p e n criticism f r o m local c o m m u n i s t

war,

parties.*

B o t h cases h a v e i n v o l v e d an i m p l i e d admission of the

increasing

irrelevance of the classical revolutionary theory a n d a

concession

to social particularism, matism—means

which—when

linked

to ideological

dog-

sectarianism.

S e c t a r i a n i s m is t h e n e g a t i o n of u n i v e r s a l i s m . turn out to h a v e b e e n

Communism

t h e last great integrative

dogmatic

T o the extent that s o m e c o m m u n i s t parties are today joining

may faith. their

national establishments, they are conforming to reality rather than forming

are

em-

bracing racism a n d intense nationalism in the Third World,

it. T o

the

extent

that

some

communist

parties

they

a r e c a p i t u l a t i n g t o r e a l i t y r a t h e r t h a n r e s h a p i n g it. I n e i t h e r

case

t h e r e is a l o s s o f i d e n t i t y w h i c h , o n c e l o s t , is n o t l i k e l y t o b e g a i n e d . T h u s , e v e n if o n e is n o t a M a r x i s t , it is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y

rea

9 The issues at stake were sharply posed by the secretary-general of the Venezuelan Communist Party, Jesus Faria, who stated in an interview printed in the Hungarian party organ, Nepszabadsag (February 17, 1968): "Experience has shown that the masses are withdrawing from the previous armed struggle. . . . Four million people are participating in the election campaign and we believe that we can orient the people better if we also participate in this campaign. . . . The ultraleftist groups in Venezuela, which disregard the combat readiness of the masses and persist in the slogan of armed struggle at any price, commit one mistake after another and find themselves more and more isolated."

Sectarian Communism

{

193

cause for rejoicing to note that c o m m u n i s m — w h i c h h e l p e d to

en-

large the collective consciousness of m a n k i n d a n d to mobilize

the

m a s s e s for s o c i a l p r o g r e s s — h a s f a i l e d in its o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i v e linking humanism with

internationalism.

of

AMAMM

PART IV

The American Transition There

is s o m e t h i n g

awesome

and

baffling about

that can simultaneously c h a n g e man's relationship to the by placing a man on the moon, w a g e and

finance

a

a

society universe

thirty-billion-

dollar-per-annum foreign w a r despised b y a significant portion its

people,

maintain

the

most

powerful

and

far-flung

forces in history, a n d confront in t h e streets a n d a b e t in t h e a r e v o l u t i o n in its internal

racial relations,

doing

of

military courts

all this in

the

c o n t e x t of t h e e x p l o s i o n of h i g h e r l e a r n i n g in its r a p i d l y

expand-

ing and turbulent universities,

of

bling

political

institutions,

and

of rotting u r b a n of

dynamically

centers, growing

fum-

frontier

i n d u s t r i e s that are t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e w a y its c i t i z e n s l i v e a n d m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e another. A n y o n e of t h e a b o v e aspects

comwould

suffice to transform the values a n d self-image of a society, a n d few might be enough

to o v e r t h r o w its s y s t e m . A l l t o g e t h e r ,

create a situation that defies analogy to other societies and lights the

singular character

of

the

contemporary

a

they high-

American

ex-

perience.

195

196

}

TV: The American

Contemporary

America

Transition

is

the

world's

social

laboratory.

p r o b l e m s t h a t t h e m o r e a d v a n c e d w o r l d is b e g i n n i n g t o —and and

the

Third

World

often painfully.

is w i t n e s s i n g — a b s o r b

It is in

the

United

America

States

that

The

confront directly

the

crucial

d i l e m m a s o f o u r a g e m a n i f e s t t h e m s e l v e s m o s t starkly; it is i n U n i t e d States that m a n s

t o d e f i n e h i m s e l f m e a n i n g f u l l y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o it is b e i n g intensely tested.

the

capacity to master his e n v i r o n m e n t

Can man

and most

master science for fundamentally

hu-

m a n e ends? C a n liberty a n d equality coexist, a n d d o so in a multiracial environment? C a n merit a n d a c h i e v e m e n t

flourish

without

special privilege? C a n technology b e socially creative without ducing excessive social control? C a n a society w i t h diverse avoid

complete

American

disbelief?

life—the

These

focus

of

issues

global

dominate

American

contemporary

attention—and

conflicting a n d o f t e n critical assessments

of

in-

beliefs

they

prompt

the meaning

of

the

experience.1

Unlike the situation in the Soviet Union, in America the l e n g e of c h a n g e

chal-

is h i g h l y v i s i b l e . I n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n s o c i e t y

like a boiling subterranean

volcano that strains against the

is

rigid

surface crust of the political system. In the m o r e volatile

United

States, social, e c o n o m i c , a n d political forces o p e n l y clash,

change,

a n d interact o n a b r o a d front. T h e resulting t u r m o i l is as

creative

as it is d e s t r u c t i v e , unique

a n d it l e a d s t o m e t a m o r p h i c

combination

of

order

and

chaos

changes

known

as

in

the

that

United

States. In the next twenty will 80

approach per

under

cent twenty

three will years

years the population hundred

be

million,

metropolitan

of

age.

of

and

Intensely

of

the

which almost

scientific

United

States

approximately 50 in

per

cent

orientation,

A m e r i c a n society will h a v e greater m a s t e r y of b o t h terrestrial spatial e n v i r o n m e n t

than

and

any other society. At the s a m e time

will h a v e experienced intense social conflicts in w h i c h racial siderations w i l l b e p a r a m o u n t b u t in w h i c h

antagonism

it

con-

between

g e n e r a t i o n s w i l l also b e a b a s i c a n d p a i n f u l b u r d e n . I n all

likeli-

h o o d it w i l l a l s o b e a s o c i e t y c o n f r o n t i n g a n a c u t e c u l t u r a l m a l a i s e ,

/V: The American Transition uncertain

of

its a e s t h e t i c

standards,

and

{ 197

searching

for

common

from

industrial

integrative values. Contemporary

America

the technetronic

age.

is i n t r a n s i t i o n

As

the world's

first

the

post-industrial

to

society,

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s is n o l o n g e r s h a p e d b y t h e s a m e f o r c e s t h a t

have

stimulated

since

England

social

first

change

in

the

advanced

countries

confronted the machine. This broad

ever

transformation

is c a u s i n g a crisis of e s t a b l i s h e d A m e r i c a n v a l u e s a n d

institutions,

particularly the tradition of liberal d e m o c r a c y , a n d as t h e two-hundredth

birthday

approaches,

definition of t h e A m e r i c a n

it t h e r e f o r e

calls

nations

for a

system.

L i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y is a p e c u l i a r b l e n d of t h e a r i s t o c r a t i c tion,

constitutional

legalism,

and

mass

democracy.

tradi-

Unlike

com-

m u n i s m , it w a s n o t i n t e l l e c t u a l l y e x t r a c t e d f r o m a t e l e s c o p e d t r a u m a t i c h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , a n d it is n o t e m b o d i e d i n a

and

move-

m e n t w h i c h d r a w s its f e r v o r a n d d e d i c a t i o n f r o m t h e d e e p l y bedded

Manichaean

growth—though

re-

tradition.

occasionally

Rather,

it is t h e p r o d u c t

accelerated

by

em-

of

slow

revolutionary

h e a v a l s in E n g l a n d , t h e U n i t e d States, a n d F r a n c e — w h i c h

up-

cumu-

latively created a b r o a d tradition of social behavior, a set of

only

partially explicit values, a n d highly defined legal procedures

and

institutions. T h e aristocratic tradition put a p r e m i u m o n excellence

and

achievement,

though

in time

standards

personal of

excel-

lence c h a n g e d a n d b e c a m e less exclusive. Legalism, w h i c h in past

doubtless

served

to

protect

established

interests,

regularity and objectivity in social relations and therefore

gradu-

ally c a m e to protect the individual. T h e democratic element, ulated through universal suffrage, not only diluted the

the

stressed

stim-

aristocratic

c o m p o n e n t but infused liberal d e m o c r a c y with a strong

concern

for social welfare. These components uneasy manner, clashed. though major

In on

American the

have

combined

in a loose a n d

occasionally

and from time to time they have conflicted

whole

exception,

and

history rather its

such

clashes

sporadic.

outcome

The

have

been

Civil

War

effectively

and

and

violent, was

the

rapidly

de-

l 98 }

IV: The American

stroyed

the

aristocratic

Transition

element

in

American

tradition,

whereas

t h e d e c l i n e of E u r o p e a n aristocracy w a s s l o w . T h e industrial r e v o l u t i o n p r o d u c e d its o w n

strains a n d violence, b u t the rapid

pace

of g r o w t h as w e l l as t h e availability of E u r o p e a n capital a n d f o r e i g n m a r k e t s e a s e d t h e g r o w i n g p a i n s e v e n a s it e n l a r g e d then consolidated the democratic component. T h e resulting wealth and democratic freedom have made of a n e w f o r m of social organization,

America

all t h e m o r e

c a u s e its s p e c t a c u l a r s u c c e s s e s o b s c u r e d its s o c i a l T h i s p h a s e is c o m i n g t o a n e n d . T h e

the

social symbol

attractive

social blinders that

and the painful awareness

of A m e r i c a n society's lingering

quacy has been

more

whose

rendered

In a word,

America

acute by

have

a new

d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e is t h a t it s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

off,

inade-

the intensity and

is u n d e r g o i n g

be-

blemishes.

m a d e A m e r i c a u n a w a r e of its s h o r t c o m i n g s h a v e b e e n r i p p e d

of change.

of and

pace

revolution, maximizes

A m e r i c a ' s p o t e n t i a l a s it u n m a s k s its o b s o l e s c e n c e .

1. The Third American Revolution I t is e a s y t o p i n p o i n t tions, or the Bolshevik, It is a l s o n o t From

the

French

and the

Mexican

the Chinese, and the C u b a n

difficult to

identify

a colony that revolution

t h e first A m e r i c a n

created a nation;

a

Constitution,

both

of

which

articulated

revolution.

implicit

strongly felt beliefs g a v e birth to a Declaration of and

revolu-

revolutions.

though

Independence

novel

principles

of political a n d social order. Historical definition b e c o m e s more complex w h e n dealing the

second

American

revolution.

Precisely

when

did

it

with

happen

The Third American Revolution

{

a n d w h a t d i d it d o ? T h o u g h t h a t r e v o l u t i o n c a n n o t b e w i t h the s a m e a c c u r a c y as t h e

first,

199

pinpointed

it is a f a c t t h a t a n

essentially

rural, partially aristocratic, a n d e v e n s l a v e - o w n i n g s o c i e t y w i t h limited

representative

urban-industrial equality

political

nation0

extended—at

system

whose

least

of its p e o p l e a n d w h o s e

in

public

was

transformed

relative form—to

ethos was

into

almost

90

dominated

per

cent

largely

It took the Civil W a r , the

the N e w

not

indus-

trialization of t h e country, t h e m a s s i v e influx of immigrants, finally,

by

govern-

m e n t a l i n t e r v e n t i o n . T h u s , it t o o w a s a real r e v o l u t i o n , t h o u g h first.

an

legal-political-social

w i d e s p r e a d acceptance of social welfare, effected through

as contained in time as the

a

and,

D e a l t o t r a n s f o r m A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y . T o c a l l it a

r e v o l u t i o n is a d m i t t e d l y t o s t r e t c h t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f r e v o l u t i o n ,

but

t h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t b o t h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d t h e v a l u e s o f

the

U n i t e d States w e r e t h e r e b y p r o f o u n d l y altered in a little over

a

century. T h e third A m e r i c a n r e v o l u t i o n is e v e n h a r d e r t o d e f i n e , f o r are n o w i n t h e m i d d l e of it a n d t h u s c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n of its come.

In one respect,

however,

it is e a s i e r t o i d e n t i f y t h a n

we outthe

s e c o n d , f o r its i m p a c t a n d its e f f e c t are m o r e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n t i m e . T h e third revolution b e g a n gathering m o m e n t u m after W o r l d

War

II, w i t h t h e m a s s i v e e n t r a n c e into c o l l e g e s of ex-GIs; w i t h t h e

con-

comitant explosion in higher learning a n d the g r o w i n g of t h e

social primacy

of

education;

with

the

union

acceptance of

national

p o w e r and m o d e r n science c r o w n e d b y the harnessing of

nuclear

energy a n d the federal g o v e r n m e n t e m e r g i n g as a major

sponsor

of scientific investigation; nental

communications,

with the

ranging

s u d d e n birth of rapid

from

the

world's

most

a n d d e v e l o p e d h i g h w a y s y s t e m , t h r o u g h r a p i d air p a s s e n g e r port,

to

a

uniquely

effective

instant

transcontinental

conti-

modern trans-

telephone

0 In 1800 the rural population of the United States accounted for about 94 per cent of the total; in 1850, for approximately 85 per cent; in 1900, 60 per cent; in 1950, 35 per cent. It is estimated that by the year 2000 the rural population will be approximately 50 million out of a total of 300 million, or 17 per cent. In 1969, 73 per cent of all Americans lived on one per cent of the land ( T i m e , January 24, 1969, pp. 18, 3 0 - 3 3 ) .

l 9 8 }

IV: The American

system, and

finally

Transition

to a nation-wide television intimacy; with

transformation in managerial techniques wrought b y the

the

appear-

a n c e of c o m p u t e r s a n d o t h e r electronic d e v i c e s t h a t c o n q u e r

com-

plexity, distance, a n d e v e n the diffusion of authority; a n d w i t h fading of industry as the m o s t for most

Americans.

Prompted

important by

source

technology

the

of

employment

and

particularly

e l e c t r o n i c s , t h e t h i r d r e v o l u t i o n is c h a n g i n g t h e b a s i c

institutions

a n d values of A m e r i c a n society and, as w a s also t h e case w i t h preceding

revolutions,

it is e n c o u n t e r i n g

resistance,

the

stimulating

violence, causing anxiety, a n d stirring hope. In the process, the of

emerging learning,

it is c r e a t i n g

new

America

research,

and

three Americas

symbolized

development

higher learning with society

by that

in one.

the

new

link

There

institutions

and create unprecedented

new

museums

electronics

and

fine

and

sparking

arts a n d c u l t u r e , a s is e v i d e n c e d

art centers.

laboratories

of

opportu-

nities for innovation a n d experimentation, in addition to increased interest in the

is

complexes

Technetronic

America

centers of learning

along

s u r r o u n d i n g B o s t o n , 2 it is i n t h e a c a d e m i c - s c i e n t i f i c

by

is in

the

Route

128

conglomerates

a r o u n d L o s A n g e l e s a n d S a n F r a n c i s c o ; a n d it is i n t h e n e w tier industries. T h e s u b u r b a n m i d d l e class i n c r e a s i n g l y

fron-

gravitates

t o w a r d this A m e r i c a , t h o u g h f r e q u e n t l y r e s e n t i n g its scientism

and

nostalgically y e a r n i n g for m o r e c o m m u n i t y a n d stability. Industrial A m e r i c a — t h e second America—is in the

established

factories a n d steel mills of Detroit and Pittsburgh, w h o s e

skilled

blue-collar

of

workers

are

gradually

forgetting the

traumas

Great Depression and beginning to enjoy both security and but are fearful lest their n e w social position b e below.

For the

this

slums

of

racial

minority

second

industrial that

America big

is m o r e

cities,

lives

increasingly

difficult to

absorb

leisure

threatened

alongside

the

the

from

decaying

populated because

by

the

a so-

c i e t y w a s l a t e i n d r a w i n g it i n t o t h e i n d u s t r i a l a g e . F i n a l l y , t h e r e i s t h e o r i g i n a l , t h e first A m e r i c a , t h e A m e r i c a of sharecroppers

pre-industrial

and migrant workers from the

Missis-

sippi delta and of obsolescent miners from Appalachia, w h o s e

in-

The Third American Revolution come access

has fallen behind to

education

is

the American considerably

nation, a n d racial discrimination

average.

less

is o v e r t .

than 3

In

{

this

201

America

elsewhere

This America

in is

the seek-

ing to enter both the industrial and the post-industrial ages, and to do

s o it m u s t

obtain

the

assistance

of

the n e w

America,

whose

v a l u e s a n d c o n c e p t s it o f t e n m i s t r u s t s a n d r a r e l y s h a r e s . The new

A m e r i c a is o n l y n o w

taking shape. "Today,

not

only

does a child face a radical rupture w i t h the past, b u t h e m u s t trained for a n u n k n o w n future. A n d this task confronts t h e society as well." philosophical

4

T h e current transformation also poses

issues

concerning

the

very

essence

of

of

scientific p o w e r

over both

self.* Studies of c h a n g e 5 society undergoing

man's

environment

profound

social

e n c e , s i n c e it is l a r g e l y d e r i v e d f r o m a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d and

be

entire

exist-

expansion man

him-

cumulatively reinforce the picture of

a far-reaching,

technologically

induced

a

revo-

lution.

The Pace and Thrust of Progress T h e facts reflecting c h a n g e in A m e r i c a are familiar a n d f o r e n e e d n o t b e r e l a t e d i n d e t a i l . T h e r e i s , first o f a l l , t h e expansion knowledge.

in

the

sector

of

This

means

a

society

concerned

significant

with

growth—more

theremassive

science

and

rapid

than

that in the other s e c t o r s — i n the n u m b e r of scientists, college dents,

and,

of

course,

the

institutions

that

nurture

them.f

stuAs

a

0 The discussion in the first section of Part I of this book is particularly relevant to understanding contemporary America, since it deals with the basic differences between an industrial and a technetronic society, t The scale of that change can be illustrated by a few figures. College enrollments increased by 45 per cent in the years 1964-1969. In 1965 more than 50 per cent of all adults were high-school graduates; in 1900 the corresponding figure was only one per cent! (For background data, see A. J. Marrow, D. G. Bowers, S. E. Seashore, Management by Participation, New York, 1967.) The number of teachers increased from about 1.3 million in *954 to about 2.1 million a decade later; the number of engineers grew from about half a million to almost a million. An OECD study of American science estimates that between 1963 and 1970 the scientific population of the United States will have grown from 2.7 million to 4 million, with doctorates

202 }

TV:

The American

Transition

result, t h e u n i v e r s i t y h a s e m e r g e d as t h e c r e a t i v e c o r e of t h e sive learning-communications complex, the source of m u c h tic a n d international influence,

strategic

the university

innovation.

is d i s p l a c i n g

of t h e m o r e traditional A m e r i c a :

mas-

domes-

In social prestige

the

equivalent

and

institutions

the church and big

business.

T h e emphasis on science and learning goes h a n d in h a n d the

rationalization

teaching,

of

techniques

and

the

managerial,

computing,

and

communications

introduction

w h i c h are altering established practices a n d c h a n g i n g

of

the

meth-

national

information grid that will integrate existing electronic data already

being

knowledge.

6

developed

Increasingly

to

pool

swamped

the

libraries

nations may

a two-thousand-page

parency

smaller

than

feasible

for every

the

soon

small

book can be reduced

average college

book

to

page;

possess

a

banks

accumulated find

by shifting to the ultramicrofiche technique, pioneered b y by which

new

devices,

ods u s e d to store a n d retrieve accumulated k n o w l e d g e . A

is

with

relief NASA,

to a

trans-

this will m a k e library

inferior

none.7 T h o u g h American educational theorists disagree about d e g r e e to w h i c h t h e educational systems c a n adapt the n e w niques, their debates reveal the extent to w h i c h technical

it to the

tech-

assimila-

tion rather than philosophical issues dominates their thinking.8 Contemporary and

the

pooling

rapid of

business puts a similar p r e m i u m

adaptation

resources,

and

of

new

techniques.

collective

on

This

organizational

frequent a n d systematic retraining of top personnel,

knowledge

requires efforts, and a

tie w i t h the centers of k n o w l e d g e . Linear p r o g r a m m i n g , a approach

to problems,

coordinated

teamwork,

and

the the close

systems

a highly

so-

in science increasing from 96,000 to 153,000 and those in engineering from 10,000 to 17,000. In 1869-1870, roughly at the beginning of America's industrial revolution, the number of all degrees awarded by institutions of higher learning was just under 10,000; in 1889-1890 it was 17,000; in i939~ 1 940> 216,000; a decade later it was 497,000; and in 1963-1964, 614,000. In the past twenty years investments in research and development have increased fifteenfold, expenditures in education sixfold, while the GNP has tripled (see Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," pp. 201, 206, 228; and Reviews of National Science Policy: United States, OECD, pp. 45, 54).

The Third American Revolution phisticated attitude t o w a r d h u m a n relations and labor are

becoming

the

dominant

According to Lawrence agement

Association,

fessional

management

features

of

{

psychology

managerial

processes.

Appley, chairman of the A m e r i c a n

the

number

societies

of

and

managers working

involved

with

in

dred

thousand

in

1962.

Operationally,

business

resembles a political hierarchy or a personal

fiefdom;

ingly similar to a systematic scientific undertaking

less

In

pro-

and

hunless

it is i n c r e a s that not

p r o d u c e s w h a t is k n o w n b u t s y s t e m a t i c a l l y s e e k s to e x p l o r e is t o

Man-

management

consultants has risen f r o m t e n t h o u s a n d in 1948 to o v e r six 9

203

only what

come.* summarizing

nology,

Daniel

the

Bell

social

listed

transformation

five

key

areas

wrought

of

change:

by "(1)

p r o d u c i n g m o r e g o o d s at less cost, t e c h n o l o g y has b e e n t h e engine

of

raising

the

living

standards

of

the

world.

. . .

techBy chief (2)

* "The new style of dealing with the future has no accepted, inclusive name, but the names of its more highly developed techniques have become familiar in the last ten years to most businessmen, government officials, military officers, scientists, and technicians. The techniques themselves, which are apt to be called 'systems analysis' or 'systems planning/ are now widely used both with and without the help of computers. 'Cost-benefit' or 'cost-effectiveness' analysis is a major ingredient of the new techniques; this involves ways of arraying ends and means so that decision makers have clearer ideas of the choices open to them and better ways of measuring results against both expectations and objectives. "Among characteristics of the new pattern are these: ( 1 ) A more open and deliberate attention to the selection of ends toward which planned action is directed, and an effort to improve planning by sharpening the definition of ends. ( 2 ) A more systematic advance comparison of means by criteria derived from the ends selected. ( 3 ) A more candid and effective assessment of results, usually including a system of keeping track of progress toward interim goals. Along with this goes a 'market-like' sensitivity to changing values and evolving ends. ( 4 ) An effort, often intellectually strenuous, to mobilize science and other specialized knowledge into a flexible framework of information and decision so that specific responsibilities can be assigned to the points of greatest competence. ( 5 ) An emphasis on information, prediction, and persuasion, rather than on coercive or authoritarian power, as the main agents of coordinating the separate elements of an effort. ( 6 ) An increased capability of predicting the combined effect of several lines of simultaneous action on one another; this can modify policy so as to reduce unwanted consequences or it can generate other lines of action to correct or compensate for such predicted consequences" (Max Ways, "The Road to 1977/' Fortune, January 1967, pp. 9 4 - 9 5 ) .

204

}

TV:

The American

Transition

T e c h n o l o g y has created a n e w class, hitherto u n k n o w n in of

the

engineer

created

a new

and

The

. . .

of

a new

in

transportation

technology,

have

and

created

d e p e n d e n c i e s a n d n e w social interactions. ceptions, altered." To

(3)

society,

Technology mode

of

has

thought,

functional relations and the quantitative.

revolutions

consequence

technician.

definition of rationality,

which emphasizes (4)

the

particularly

of

space

and

. . .

communication, new . . .

time,

as

economic (5)

have

Esthetic

been

a

interper-

radically

10

these

should

be

added

the

new

sense

of

self-awareness

i n d u c e d b y society's increasing ability to see itself

in t h e

mirror

provided b y television, buttressed b y increased reliance o n

statis-

tical analysis,* a n d intensified b y a systematic p r e o c c u p a t i o n

with

m a n a g i n g not only the present b u t the future. Moreover, for perhaps the

first

t i m e in its h i s t o r y A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y is b e g i n n i n g

acquire a national outlook o n s u c h matters as race a n d

hence, inadequacies in o n e sector are n o longer a matter of tive indifference to another prompts

a

more

deliberate,

social inadequacies, injustice w i t h over-all

and

a more

region or class or minority. less

haphazard

effort

operational preoccupation Man's

with

inhumanity

rela-

All

to

at

social

improving

to m a n

was

tainly easier to accept in a setting in w h i c h h u m a n relations distant,

class

interests

were

compartmentalized,

and

this

identify

it t h e r e b y links m o r a l o u t r a g e

social performance.

to

poverty;

social

cerwere con-

science w a s rarely a r o u s e d b y visible injustice. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e is n o t o n l y u n d e n i a b l y r a p i d p r o g r e s s i n

many

areas a n d increased social awareness of existing failings, b u t the intensification of old p r o b l e m s lenges. can's makes

The

economic

material the

lot

has

American

base

that

expanded per-capita

and the posing

determines in

recent

GNP

the years

increase

at

of n e w

average at

a

chalAmeri-

pace

a rate

also

that

greater

than that enjoyed either b y other advanced societies or b y

those

* It is useful to recall that a century ago a citizen would rarely, if ever, see the charts, graphs, and tables that a contemporary American reads almost daily in his press and that are a standard feature of any report or study.

The Third American Revolution

{

205

that are b e c o m i n g so.11 This c h a n g e has b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d in years

1959-1967

income

by

distribution

significant,

even

in patterns

of

accelerating,

employment

shifts

the in

(see

Tables

11 a n d 1 2 ) . T h e s e shifts i n d i c a t e t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g of t h e

middle

levels of A m e r i c a n

and

and

society, a development

of greater social e g a l i t a r i a n i s m

but

not only

symptomatic

also significantly

relevant

the political aspects of the current A m e r i c a n transition

TABLE 1 1 .

(on

to

which

CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND IN EMPLOYMENT

Percentage of Families with Income of:

$ 5 0 0 0 - $ 15,000

1959 3-1 52.3

1963 54 58.3

Under $5000

44.6

36.2

Over $15,000

1959-1963 Change +23

1963-1967 Change

1967 12.2 62.7

+6.0

+6.8

+4.4 — 11.1 25.1 Based on "Consumer Income," Current Population Reports, Department of Commerce, August 5, 1968, pp. 2-7. The data in this table are based on income only, prior to deductions for taxes. However, the report states, "Even after allowance for changes in consumer prices, family income has risen by to 4 percent in each of the last 4 years" (p. 1). TABLE 12.

-8.4

CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT IN PERCENTAGES

White-Collar 1958 1967

Blue-Collar

42.6 46.0

Service

Farm

11.9 12.5

8.5 4.8

37.1 36.7

Source: Manpower Report of the President, Department of Labor, Washington, D.C., April 1968, p. 232. more later). In addition to these over-all percentages, note be

taken

of

the

fact that as of

the

end

of

the

1960s

should

Americans

o w n e d close to 70 million automobiles, that 95 per cent of

Ameri-

can households h a d at least o n e television set a n d 25 per cent at least t w o , a n d that o v e r 6 0 p e r c e n t of A m e r i c a n f a m i l i e s their o w n homes.12 D e s p i t e the indisputable persistence of in the United

States, A m e r i c a n

s o c i e t y is a c h i e v i n g

an

had

owned poverty

unprece-

d e n t e d affluence t h a t t o u c h e s all classes. That

poverty

documented

in

besets recent

millions years,

of

and

Americans the

has

majority's

been

amply

indifference

to

l 9 8 }

IV:

The American

Transition

this p r o b l e m h a s b e e n at least s o m e w h a t shaken. T h e p o v e r t y w a s initially defined, b y arbitrary a n d very b r o a d

as i n c o m e less t h a n $ 3 0 0 0 per a n n u m for a f a m i l y of four, or for an individual. acute

hardship

even more

There

is n o

for most,

debilitating

doubt

and

even

that

such

a level

malnutrition

is t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l

line

approximation,

sense

$1500

involves

for many, of

but

deprivation

in relationship to the society's over-all w e a l t h . * N o n e t h e l e s s , too the p a c e of e c o n o m i c growth, c o m b i n e d w i t h m o r e

efforts, h a s b r o u g h t progress: f r o m 1961 to 1969 t h e g r o u p the poverty line—as defined b y the Social Security

13 per c e n t of t h e population.13

below

Administration

a n d taking into a c c o u n t t h e rise in p r i c e s — d r o p p e d cent to

here

deliberate

Moreover,

from 22

t h e C o u n c i l of E c o n o m i c A d v i s o r s ' R e p o r t of e a r l y 1 9 6 9 , if 1968 rates in r e d u c i n g the n u m b e r of poor persons are "poverty"

will

be

entirely

eliminated

in

ten

years;

the

five

a cost of $9.7 billion annually

GNP

(one

p e r c e n t of t h e

1968

years and

58 per

In

cent

of

1966

their

the

median

g r o w n to 60 per cent.14 housing, inhabited

poor by

schooling, a much

at 5

budget).

Poverty has p l a g u e d particularly, but not exclusively, the Americans,

to

1961-

continued, if

r a t e s a r e c o n t i n u e d , it w i l l d i s a p p e a r i n a little o v e r

p e r c e n t of the federal

per

according

nation-wide income

Blacks and

greater

of

median

income

whites;

by

black

was

1968

are the principal victims of unemployment. percentage

of

The blacks

only

this

had poor

urban

slums,

than

whites

( a n d blacks in the U n i t e d States t o d a y are m o r e h i g h l y

urbanized

than whites),

the

impose

living conditions

phases of industrialization—and

reminiscent

of

all t h e m o r e i n t o l e r a b l e

worst

because

t h e y are n o longer a part of e c o n o m i c g r o w t h b u t a vestigial m i n d e r of a n a g e w h i c h A m e r i c a is i n c r e a s i n g l y l e a v i n g

re-

behind.

Nevertheless, here too economic growth and the appearance

of

* It is this psychological dimension that some foreign commentators neglect when they comment, with a touch of envy, on the United States' definition of poverty. For example, . . America draws its poverty line at levels that would be considered generous abroad. Amid all the sad statistics poured forth about the ghettos, it is worth remembering that in 1967 some 88 per cent of all black American families had a television set" ("The Neurotic Trillionaire," The Economist, special issue, May 10, 1969, p. 51).

The Third American Revolution

{ 207

n e w social values m a k e accelerating progress visible. T h e

obvious

breakthroughs h a v e b e e n o n t h e legal level of civil rights, cially in e d u c a t i o n on the economic

and housing,

level.

In

but they have

also taken

1961, 5 6 per cent of A m e r i c a n

w e r e classified as poor, b u t b y

1969 the

figure

place blacks

had dropped to

per cent; in 1956, o n l y 9 p e r cent of N e g r o families h a d of m o r e than $7000, b u t b y

espe-

incomes

1968 this h a d g r o w n to 28 p e r

and the m e d i a n income of a black family w a s $5360.15

cent,

Between

i 9 6 0 a n d 1966 the n u m b e r of blacks in professional, technical, managerial jobs doubled,

and

substandard

housing

to a Gallup poll, b e t w e e n

1963 and

and

occupied

blacks d r o p p e d from 4 0 p e r cent in i 9 6 0 to 2 4 per cent in According

33

1969 the

by

1968.

number

of blacks expressing satisfaction w i t h their jobs increased f r o m per cent to 76 per cent, a n d the n u m b e r of those blacks

54

satisfied

with their housing rose from 43 per cent to 50 per cent.16 E x t e n s i v e c h a n g e is a l s o t a k i n g p l a c e i n A m e r i c a ' s o v e r - a l l tural

life.

Increased

education,

greater

leisure,

and

unconscious reaction to the danger that technology cultural

emptiness

have

led

to

a

heightened

cul-

perhaps could

interest

in

an

breed music,

d r a m a , a n d t h e v i s u a l arts. T h i s h a s n o t o n l y i n v o l v e d a s p u r t the

construction

of

art

centers

and

renewed

life

for

in

American

m u s e u m s b u t has also led to t h e extensive a d o p t i o n of n e w

tech-

niques—such

make

easily

as

available

required

a

video in the

great

tape

or

home

expenditure

stereophonic

sound—to

cultural

pleasures

of

and

time

that

money.

previously

In

addition,

closed-circuit television has o p e n e d u p n e w opportunities for both local

and

even

home-based

university-

or

museum-sponsored

adult education. Culture and education have therefore ceased b e aristocratic privileges; they h a v e increasingly b e c o m e an available to more

and more

ostentatious s y m b o l of n e w Economic

progress

Americans—as

well

as a

people

higher education.

from

and elevated

families with

Of the

sometimes

opulence. social expectations

cipitated an influx into colleges a n d universities of large of y o u n g

to

option

no

previous

have

pre-

numbers

background

s o m e 4.3 million family-supported

lege students in 1966, 63 p e r cent c a m e from h o m e s in w h i c h

of colthe

227

}

TV:

The American

Transition

h e a d of the family h a d n e v e r c o m p l e t e d a single y e a r in

college.

M o r e s t r i k i n g still is t h e f a c t t h a t 3 0 p e r c e n t , o r a l m o s t

one-half

of t h e

above

63 per

cent,

came

from homes

in w h i c h

the

of the family h a d not h a d e v e n four years of h i g h school.17 1

head

During

963-i9f>9 the n u m b e r of m a l e blacks w h o h a d c o m p l e t e d a

high-

school education increased from 36 to 60 per cent; the n u m b e r those w h o

had

obtained

college

degrees

almost

doubled

in

just

t w o years, f r o m 4 per cent in 1963 to 7.5 per cent in 1965.18 A s the late 1960s, 83 per c e n t of sixteen- to seventeen-year-old

of

of

black

A m e r i c a n s w e r e still i n s c h o o l , a n d t h e p r o p o r t i o n g o i n g t o c o l l e g e was

higher

than that for the same

age

bracket in Western

Eu-

rope.19 the

extent

that

important

To

means

of

figures Thus, from

higher

social

education

advancement

has in

become

America,

are e v i d e n c e of potentially significant u p w a r d as of

1969 some

blue-collar,

37 per cent of

service,

or

farm

all c o l l e g e

families.20

the

most

the

above

movement.

students

0

came

Educational

back-

ground a n d intellectual-scientific achievement are increasingly

be-

c o m i n g t h e m e a s u r e of s o c i a l w o r t h . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t is of

par-

ticular i m p o r t a n c e to race relations.

Neither the hucksters

cut nor the Horatio A l g e r story offers m u c h incentive or

short

promise

to millions of y o u n g blacks, b u t m a s s education, c o m b i n e d w i t h the e c o n o m y ' s e x p a n d e d n e e d s , d o e s p r o v i d e a w i d e c h a n n e l f o r satisfying individual ambitions o n a socially significant scale. tion could therefore serve as the point of departure for a

socially

egalitarian

and

politically

democratic

Educaattaining

multi-racial

ciety. T h e attainment of s u c h a society w o u l d b e a historic

so-

victory

* One related and intriguing aspect of this development is the increasing entrance into the country's political elite of previously nonparticipating ethnic and racial groups. Jews, Negroes, Italians, and, to a lesser extent, Poles and Greeks, have been making an appearance in the national government on levels and on a scale previously rarely attained by non-" WASPS." While precise statistics are not available, these new "elites"—whose Americanism is sometimes as intense as it is new—may have had something to do with the reappearance of the activist, nationalist, dynamic orientation noted by David Riesman in his "Some Questions about the Study of American National Character in the Twentieth Century," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1967, especially p. 47.

The Third American Revolution for mankind,

vulnerable

for the

brutal fact

is that

{ 209

race relations

are

most

to the irrational forces of h u m a n motivation: the visual,

instinctive,

exclusivistic

selection that operates

almost

automati-

cally o n the racial front.

The Uncertainty of Progress But

it m u s t i m m e d i a t e l y

becomes

be

added

such a society—indeed,

America

fully

i n o r d e r f o r it t o b e c o m e

that

before

such

a s o c i e t y — t h e u n a s s i m i l a t e d l e g a c y of industrial A m e r i c a as

well

as t h e u n u s u a l p r o b l e m s i n h e r e n t in t h e A m e r i c a n transition to technetronic

society

must

first

be

surmounted.

The

initially

luctant b u t increasingly w i d e s p r e a d social recognition of the that t h e p a s t h a s still to b e being

harnessed

has

settled

created

an

a l r e a d y t a k e n its toll a n d c o u l d g r o w An

economic

recession

with even

while

inflammable

fact

the n e w

situation

that

a

re-

is has

worse.

thwarting

aroused

hopes

would

have

especially calamitous c o n s e q u e n c e s for the stability of the

Ameri-

c a n social order. M u c h

econo-

clearly depends on the expanding

my's capacity to absorb a n d ameliorate existing tensions. growth

at

a

relatively

stable

and

high

three a n d a half per cent per annum, tions, s e e m s

to b e the

sine qua non

rate

of

Economic

approximately

allowing for annual for the continued

of A m e r i c a n society t o w a r d a situation in w h i c h liberty a n d ity will buttress b u t not vitiate o n e another.

T h i s is

varia-

evolution equal-

particularly

true of p o v e r t y a n d race relations, in w h i c h e v e n social g o o d

will

will b e powerless to a c c o m p l i s h m u c h in t h e e v e n t of a significant economic slowdown. poor

and

the

The

blacks,

first

who

victims of a recession will b e always

absorb

a m o u n t of the suffering, o w i n g to e c o n o m i c

a

the

disproportionate

malfunction.®

Unfortunately, it is not even certain that the relatively strong pace of economic growth in the 1960s will suffice to liquidate the * The 3.2 per cent unemployment figure at the end of 1968 meant that 21.5 per cent of all black teen-agers were unemployed (for whites the corresponding figure was 11.6 per cent); and that 3.4 per cent of black men were without jobs (for whites the figure was 1.6 per cent).

2i o }

/V: The American

Transition

unfinished business of America's industrialization, b o t h in absolute t e r m s or relative to t h e g r o w t h of s o c i e t y at l a r g e . 0

Indeed,

what

a m o u n t s to the coexistence of t w o rather separate A m e r i c a n

econ-

omies—the

lagging

and

even

creasingly exposed to more

decaying

industrial

economy

effective foreign competition,

(in-

highly

vulnerable to cyclical swings, and e m p l o y i n g the poorer and skilled workers) and the expanding technetronic e c o n o m y on

aerospace

and

better-trained, made

other

frontier

better-educated,

the assimilation

and

industries and

and

(based

employing

better-paid

upgrading

less

the

workers)—has

of the poorer segments

of

A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y m o r e difficult. T h i s g a p is c o m p l i c a t i n g t h e efforts to c r e a t e a racial

harmony

based on both liberty and equality. T h e N e g r o should have integrated into American revolution.

society

during

the American

Unfortunately, that revolution c a m e

before

America,

if n o t t h e N e g r o , w a s r e a d y f o r f u l l i n t e g r a t i o n . If t h e b l a c k ican h a d represented only an e c o n o m i c legacy of the

been

industrial

Amer-

pre-industrial

age, perhaps h e could have b e e n more effectively integrated the industrial age. But racial prejudice kept h i m from the

necessary

more

skills.

advanced

The

American

problem

is c u m u l a t i v e ,

urban-industrial

regions

and

today

are

difficult to integrate b l a c k s — b o t h a racial minority a n d only feudal legacy—precisely

because

these regions

into

acquiring

finding

it

America's

are

into a n e w a n d m o r e c o m p l e x phase that requires m o r e

the

moving

developed

s o c i a l skills. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , it c a n b e a r g u e d t h a t t h e S o u t h

today

* With a 4 per cent growth in GNP (in constant dollars, which is higher than the average growth since i 9 6 0 ) , there are likely to be close to 17 million in poor households in 1974 compared to 26 million in 1967. Of these, more than 4 million will be families headed by non-aged working males compared to 10 million in 1967" (Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Toward a Social Report, Washington, D.C., p. 47). "In 1947 the poorest 20 per cent of the population received 5 per cent of the income, and it held this same 5 per cent share in 1964. . . . The second lowest fifth got 12 per cent in 1947 and 12 per cent in 1964. In short, 40 per cent of the American people were held to a 17 per cent share of the income throughout the entire postwar period. The 5 per cent at the top got about the same proportion as that 40 per cent" (Michael Harrington, Toward a Democratic Left, New York, 1968, p. 26).

The Third American Revolution

{

211

stands a better long-range chance of fully integrating the blacks: American consciousness is changing, the black has awakened, and the American South is beginning to move into the industrial age. It might, if it moves rapidly enough, take the black along with it.21 T h e larger q u e s t i o n still r e m a i n s : W i l l t h e p a c e of

development

be rapid enough to meet the challenge posed by the

simultaneous

and

mutually

reinforcing

processes

set

in

action

by

the

black

A m e r i c a n s awakening a n d b y his disillusionment w i t h the

Ameri-

can

black's

system?

Numerous

growing conviction

public-opinion

that h e

polls

record

the

out of

the

political system, to rely o n exclusiveness, e v e n o n violence, as

the

basic m e a n s of progress.

22

e n c e of w h i t e i m m i g r a n t

has no choice but to opt

This m o o d was absent from the groups, which

on the whole

experi-

aspired

enter the A m e r i c a n c o m m u n i t y as rapidly as possible. I n

m a n y blacks see in exclusiveness a n d in building a separate munity longer

the

only

way

necessarily

to

the

implies

future—a

future

eventual

merger

an

that

to

with

to

contrast, com-

them

no

the

larger

of

blacks

American society. N o r is it c e r t a i n t h a t t h e e n t r a n c e of l a r g e n u m b e r s into integrated Though

universities

this d e v e l o p m e n t

ticipation

of

the

black

factors point to an increased

black

to alleviate racial

is n e c e s s a r y to p r o m o t e the

increase

educational

uncertain that

in

will help

United

States,

tensions.

full-scale

several

par-

short-term

in racial tensions as a result of

opportunities graduates

will

for blacks. in fact

First of

obtain

the

magnified by

the predisposition

of s o m e blacks to insist o n

intelligentsia of the global ghettos;

finally,

be sep-

academic

standards, w h i c h will inevitably p r o d u c e in g r o w i n g n u m b e r s A m e r i c a n equivalent of the frustrated a n d b a d l y e d u c a t e d

is

positions

t h e y w i l l f e e l e n t i t l e d t o ; ° s e c o n d l y , this difficulty is l i k e l y to

arate "black studies" programs, not subject to prevailing

the

all, it

the

pseudo-

as the A m e r i c a n

black

* New York City statistics indicate, for example, that white dropouts have better employment opportunities tiian black high-school graduates ( T h e Negro Almanac, New York, 1967, chart on p. 292).

2 i o }

/V:

The American

Transition

gains self-confidence a n d as his social position improves, h e temporarily b e less responsive to the a r g u m e n t that his d e p e n d s o n cooperation w i t h whites, a n d his s h a r p e n e d

may

progress awareness

of social injustice is likely to b e e x p r e s s e d in a m o r e r a d i c a l political p o s t u r e t h a t is i n d i f f e r e n t t o w h i t e The

problem

broader White build

society a

of

question

race

of

may

better

the

relations place

continue

society/'

inferior social condition

of to

but

the

sensitivities.

gives

added

violence

proclaim black

in that

will

as t h e basic reality.

urgency

to

American "violence

continue To

the

cannot

to

see

m u n i t y t o r e d r e s s injustices, t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t v i o l e n c e is to

black

progress

becomes

stronger

and

stronger.

other hand, this reliance o n v i o l e n c e t e n d s to blur the

his

extent

violence precipitates bursts of reform d e s i g n e d b y t h e w h i t e

sary

the

society.

that com-

neces-

On

distinction,

important to the functioning of any society, b e t w e e n political criminal violence fugitive?),

and

( w a s Eldridge Cleaver a political or a

re-

pressions b y society at large a n d rationalizations of v i o l e n c e b y

the

more

so-

and

prompts

educated

both

legally

segments;

formalized

and

criminal

massive

liberal

it

the

either

result

destroys

ciety's c a p a c i t y for discriminating b e t w e e n the necessity for order a n d t h e imperative of

change.

A s o c i e t y ' s c a p a c i t y f o r m a k i n g s u c h j u d g m e n t s is b o u n d t o undermined

by

the

degree

to w h i c h

it b e c o m e s

be

psychologically

inured to living w i t h violence a n d to a c c e p t i n g v i o l e n c e as a m e a n s f o r s o l v i n g its p r o b l e m s . T h a t A m e r i c a ' s s o c i a l history, as w e l l its p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y , h a s b e e n v i o l e n t is n o t d i s p u t e d . T h a t

as

America

h a s b e e n a m o r e v i o l e n t s o c i e t y t h a n o t h e r s is d e b a t a b l e . * B u t

the

° The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, in its report "Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives" (New York, 1969), states: "Despite its frequency, civil strife in the United States has taken much less destructive forms than in many non-Western and some Western countries. . . . The nation has experienced no internal wars since the Civil War and almost none of the chronic revolutionary conspiracy and terrorism that plagued dozens of other nations. . . . "Although about two hundred and twenty Americans died in violent civil strife in the 5 years before mid-1968, the rate of 1.1 per million population was infinitesimal compared with the average of all nations of 238 deaths per

The Third American Revolution

{

question of violence g o e s b e y o n d statistics or e v e n race

213

relations;

it i n v o l v e s t h e b a s i c p a t t e r n of a n a t i o n ' s culture® a n d t h e w a y

in

w h i c h a s o c i e t y s o l v e s its p r o b l e m s . Today adept

the

problems

psychological

of

poverty

sensitivity

to

or

of

race

nuances

and

relations

demand

restraint

in

ancing many complex and competing individual and group This

is a p o i n t

which

many

impatient

reformers

overlook.

assimilation of a n y ethnically or racially distinctive g r o u p into m a j o r i t y c u l t u r e is p o s s i b l e o n l y i n a c o n t e x t o f s t a b l e

bal-

rights. The the

institutions

a n d v a l u e s e x p r e s s e d i n o r d e r l y p r o c e d u r e s . It is p o s s i b l e t o m a i n tain majority d o m i n a t i o n b y v i o l e n c e or to reverse t h e p o w e r tions b e t w e e n races b y violent revolution, but to create ious race relations a society must b e conditioned to accept peacefully

and

to

resolve

social

issues

nonviolently.!

rela-

harmonchange

But

this

million, and less than the European average of 2.4 per million" (pp. 7 9 9 800). On the other hand, a later report by the same commission points out that "a comparison of reported violent crime rates in this country with those in other modern, stable nations shows the United States rape rate clear leader. Our homicide rate is more than twice that of our closest competitor, Finland, and from 4 to 12 times higher than the rates in a dozen other advanced countries, including Japan, Canada, England and Norway" (as cited by The New York Times, November 24, 1969). 0 Though it may not be more violent than other societies, contemporary America is psychologically permeated by violence. This is not only—and not even largely—because of the dramatic assassinations of the 1960s. It is above all attributable to American television, almost entirely controlled by three profit-oriented corporations and only loosely checked by the national government. In 1969 the University of Pennsylvania School of Communications reported in the research study prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence that in two weeks of viewing the three major networks from 4:00 to 10:00 P.M. it had counted 790 persons killed or injured in television dramas (not news reports), and that it had found 15 acts of violence for every hour of television viewing (as reported in The New York Times, July 6, 1969). To this dubious record should be added sensation-seeking "documentaries" such as NBC's "exclusive interview," prominently advertised in advance, with Sirhan Sirhan, Robert Kennedy's convicted assassin, filmed (according to NBC's advertisements) "the day after Sirhan was formally sentenced to die." For a perceptive discussion of the television magnates' attitude toward their educational-social responsibilities, see Harrington, Toward a Democratic Left> pp. 19-20. t This is not to deny that violence did play a constructive social role at

214}

The American

automatically

Transition

tends to strengthen the forces that oppose

change,

w h e t h e r t h e s e f o r c e s r e p r e s e n t e n t r e n c h e d interests or, m o r e

gen-

erally, i n g r a i n e d social or racial attitudes. A social setting in w h i c h a

large

change

part

of

the

and

to

equate

population order

comes

with

to

the

identify

absence

violence

of

setting in w h i c h an escalation of conflict b e c o m e s

with

change

is

a

unavoidable.

The Futility of Politics The

responsiveness

of

political

institutions

c h a n g e is of g r e a t i m p o r t t o A m e r i c a ' s f u t u r e .

to

the

need

for

S o m e citizens

see

the p r e s e n t A m e r i c a n s y s t e m as i n c a p a b l e not o n l y of the

needed

social

changes

but

even

of

reacting

to

promoting

pressure

behalf of s u c h c h a n g e s . In such a setting, p r o c e d u r e s a n d tions that in t i m e s of stability are v a u n t e d for their

institu-

deliberateness

b e c o m e in t i m e s of m o r e rapid c h a n g e e x a m p l e s of delay, ciency, and even fundamental

on

ineffi-

injustice.*

different stages of history. In overthrowing tyranny or in defying exploitation, violence has often acted as history's scalpel. The exaltation of historical violence should not, however, be carried too far. Barrington Moore, in his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston, 1966), suggests that the physical cost of revolutionary regimes should not be held against them, for the absence of a revolution might have been even more costly. He does not, however, examine the possibility that the reforms undertaken by revolutionary regimes, often with monstrous brutality, might have been less physically costly if alternative schemes of reform successfully undertaken by other nations had been followed. Indeed, it can be argued that much of the violence undertaken by revolutionary regimes was in fact dysfunctional to the positive tasks they had set themselves. The real comparison, therefore, should be between the physical costs of alternative ways of changing society rather than between the cost of not changing it and the cost of changing it by very violent means. Historical judgments aside, it is noteworthy that modern man is still educated in terms that promote aggressive feelings. In the West, films and television emphasize violence, and the teaching of history stresses wars, victories, defeats, and conflict between "good" and "bad" nations. These aggressive instincts are also expressed by children's games as well as by adult forms of entertainment. In communist countries ideology similarly stimulates aggressive feelings and hostility toward "evil" forces, thus continuing the more fundamental dichotomies introduced by the religious tradition. 0 American justice is a particularly glaring example. It is as antiquated as it is often absurd. It appears to have benefited neither by the legal reforms

The Third American Revolution The government

{

215

as a n expression of the national will

increas-

ingly tends to b e s e e n as u n a b l e to direct a n d coordinate

national

c h a n g e effectively. It a p p e a r s neither to articulate national nor to d e v e l o p

a sense of national

direction.

This feeling

c e r t a i n t y a b o u t n a t i o n a l p u r p o s e is a l s o m a g n i f i e d b y

goals of

the

un-

fading

of the established political elite that has g u i d e d the nation

since

W o r l d W a r II. P r i m a r i l y c o m p o s e d of m e n c o m i n g f r o m t h e

east-

ern

high

seaboard

financial

and

connected

with

legal,

corporate,

circles, t h e political elite p r o v i d e d a s e n s e of

within

the

framework

nature

and

character

of of

a

pragmatic

modern

stability of t h e late 1940s a n d t h e L a t e l y this elite has c o m e

under

liberal

industrial

and

continuity

consensus

society.

The

1950s reflected that increasing challenge

on

the

relative

consensus. both

from

the newer, geographically m o r e dispersed economic interests

asso-

ciated with the n e w scientific-defense a n d frontier industries,

and

from the more ideologically inclined intellectual forces, w h i c h

are

becoming more The

breakup

influential. of

the

postwar

elite

highlights

the

dichotomy

carried out decades ago in Europe, nor even by the English pattern of relatively swift justice. Its extraordinarily cumbersome procedures, dominated by theatrical stratagems and showmanship and involving lengthy and complex appeals, lead to delays and even occasionally to results that defy the most elementary concepts of justice. The trial of Martin Luther King's killer —during which period Ray's lawyers competed in selling his memoirs—was a travesty; Sirhan Sirhan's protracted show in Los Angeles was hardly dictated by the needs of abstract justice; highly paid "exclusives" by the killers of Sharon Tate were a disgrace. Soviet secret trials are certainly deplorable, but are American judicial circuses really needed to protect the defendant and render fair judgment? At the same time, the intermeshing of private and public interests, exemplified by the outside economic interests of congressmen and senators, reinforces many Americans' inclination to dismiss the political process as dominated by inherently conservative, socially unresponsive, profit-oriented interests. For example, 8 members of the House Commerce Committee have financial interests in railroads, airlines, radio stations, and moving companies, all of which come under their legislative purview; 90 members of the House, including 12 on the Banking Committee, have interests in banks, savings and loan associations, or bank holding companies; 77 members, including 19 on the Judiciary Committee, maintain private law practices; 44 members have interests in oil or gas companies, and so on. (The New York Times, Mav n , 1969).

2 i o }

/V:

The American

Transition

b e t w e e n the qualities n e c e s s a r y to g a i n political p o w e r in

Ameri-

can d e m o c r a c y a n d those necessary to exercise effective leadership of t h a t d e m o c r a c y . T h e c o u r t s h i p of t h e p r e s s a n d t h e m a s s

media

is a n e c e s s a r y c o n c o m i t a n t o f c o u r t i n g t h e m a s s e s , s i n c e t h e

masses

are influenced not only b y direct appeal but also through the t e r m e d i a r y o f a n " i m a g e , " w h i c h is i n p a r t b u i l t u p b y t h e themselves.

The

advocating

the

desirability immediately

of

this

image

popular

and

puts

the

a

in-

media

premium

fashionable

on

rather

than on formulating broader objectives b y focusing attention basic philosophical questions concerning the m e a n i n g of a

on

modern

society. Since social c o n s e n s u s has b e e n f r a g m e n t e d b y the p a c e of change

and

society's

value

structure

has

itself

tactical, t h e larger strategic questions t e n d to b e

become

highly

obscured.

T o m a k e matters worse, the American institutional

framework

has not k e p t u p w i t h t h e p a c e of societal c h a n g e . G i v e n t h e try's

enormous

transformation

communications

through

industrial

m o b i l i t y , its f e d e r a l a r r a n g e m e n t s

increasingly d e v o i d of e c o n o m i c or g e o g r a p h i c arrangements vested

are

interests,

kept

alive

rather

by

than

by

local

actual

growth have

and

become

substance.

traditional

their

coun-

These

sentiment

functional

and

utility.

T h e price of this has primarily b e e n p a i d b y the n e w b i g

cities,

for w h o s e

little

allow-

of the

means

growth

ance and which

the constitutional

have consequently

of coping w i t h their

structure m a d e been

deprived

dilemmas.

T h e national government, particularly because of the

two-party

s y s t e m , h a s a l s o f o u n d it difficult t o d e v e l o p t h e n e e d e d

mecha-

nisms for openly channeling the n e w major competitive forces

on

t h e p o l i t i c a l s c e n e , a n d it still o p e r a t e s as if t h e p o l i t i c a l

"game"

revolved

interest

around

the

two

relatively

loose

alliances

of

g r o u p s that largely reflected the industrial-rural d i l e m m a s of earlier

age.

In

general,

that

arrangement

had

been

the

effective

in

expressing, as w e l l as moderating, the p o p u l a r will a n d in striking a b a l a n c e b e t w e e n c o n t i n u i t y a n d c h a n g e . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is w o r t h noting that in past times party system

occasionally

of stress a n d sharper c h o i c e s broke up, though

only

the

two-

temporarily.

It

The Third American Revolution

{

217

w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t t h e b r e a k u p of t h e t w o - p a r t y s y s t e m is under way, precisely because become

intensified b y

the dilemmas

the extraordinary

again

of t h e c o u n t r y

pace

of c h a n g e

have

and

by

t h e w i d e n i n g s p e c t r u m o f o f t e n i n c o m p a t i b l e c h o i c e s it s t i m u l a t e s . As work

a result, t h e no

longer

political

forces:

industrial-rural adequately

the

or liberal-conservative

encompasses

existing

frame-

competitive

agrarian-conservative-anti-communist

largely congressionally based bastion; the n e w

scientific conglomerates that uneasily collaborate w i t h the

former

o n political-ideological g r o u n d s b u t are in conflict w i t h it in of economic

thrust;

and

the

emerging,

very

and

industrial-military-

loose,

terms

welfare-civil

rights-intellectual coalition that shares s o m e of the second's e c o n o m i c d y n a m i c s b u t is i n b a s i c conflict w i t h b o t h t h e

socio-

first

the s e c o n d in t h e m a t t e r of priorities. T h e t w o latter forces operated largely outside of direct participation in the process

of

the

country,

and

so reflect the

degree

to

and have

legislative which

representative aspects of A m e r i c a n d e m o c r a c y h a v e failed to

the keep

u p with social change.® Several political sub-Americas thus coexist uneasily, a n d America

is b e g i n n i n g

America

tends

American

to

to project

reality.

The

think

of

onto

the

relationship

itself

as

whole

an

entity,

its o w n

between

these

each

sub-

perception

of

sub-Americas

is t h e r e f o r e t e n s e ; e a c h t e n d s t o s e e k its o w n p o l i t i c a l rather than to m e r g e in t h e larger w h o l e . In the 1968 contest, Robert K e n n e d y

though

expression presidential

personified the politics of anxiety,

pas-

0 The heavy representation of small-town lawyers is symptomatic of this condition. In contrast, the first National Assembly of France's Fifth Republic contained 67 professors and teachers, 48 medical men, 45 high professional civil servants, 34 lawyers, 32 workers, 27 businessmen, 25 scientists and engineers, 20 journalists, and so on. It is evident that from a representative standpoint the French Assembly more accurately reflected the character of a relatively modern society. The benefits of greater scientific competence in society's representative bodies are beginning to be recognized in Britain: The House of Commons would benefit enormously by having, say, 50 engineers who could ensure that parliamentary discussions were more closely geared to the technical realities of the day," Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Minister of Technology, wrote in his weekly magazine Engineering News (quoted by the Associated Press, August 21, 1965).

2i o }

/V:

The American

Transition

sionately articulating t h e grievances of the u n d e r p r i v i l e g e d though h e shared the fears and uncertainties of established icans

who

sensed

and

desired

major

k n o w w h a t that c h a n g e ought to be; petulant

spokesman

of

the

change

23

politics

but

did

even Amer-

not

quite

Eugene McCarthy was

of

nostalgia,

the

lackadaisically

promising to take d o w n the fences around the W h i t e H o u s e

lawn,

responding to the suburbanites' desire for a pastoral life a n d social justice—provided

the

l a t t e r is i m p l e m e n t e d

from them; Hubert H u m p h r e y

for

at a

distance

p r e a c h e d t h e politics of

compro-

mise b e t w e e n classes a n d races, a n d his passion e v o k e d the conflict atmosphere of the N e w

Deal; George Wallace

class-

expressed

t h e politics of resentment, speaking for those A m e r i c a n s w h o that m u c h of the social a n d racial progress w a s b e i n g

at their e x p e n s e b y A m e r i c a n s w h o w e r e m o r e c o m f o r t a b l y lished; won

Richard

Nixon

practiced

because significant numbers

the

politics

of

caution,

and were

uncertain

estaband

of A m e r i c a n s f r o m t h e

s u b - A m e r i c a s b e c a m e f e a r f u l t h a t "their" A m e r i c a w a s as to w h a t t h e n e w

America

felt

promoted

he

several

endangered

might hold

in

store for them. This

inclination

potence

to

stress

personal

interests

felt b y

some

constituencies

national policy.

Many

citizens sensed

reflected

concerning change

the

the

shaping

but felt that

personally

congressional

political preference. fragmented less

In

consensus,24

adequate

dential

elections

satisfying method

form

election,

served

of expressing

a t i m e of

election

for expressing given

the

the

and

increasingly

campaigns

popular

will.

importance

fluence

rather the

than

nation's

incrementally by

an

exercise

direction.

of

basic

These

administrative

fiat

choices

choices

are

became The

they

are

more

responsive

to

influences

instead

from

the

con-

national

meant

or in congressional

a

presi-

television

to

in-

made

commit-

tees; since b o t h these processes are largely r e m o v e d f r o m view,

and

generalized

fers o n personal looks a n d style, has for m a n y b e c o m e a pageant

presi-

acceptable

a highly

discontinuity

national

especially

as a n

of

they

h a d l i t t l e c o n t r o l o v e r it. I n a t i m e o f r e l a t i v e c o n t i n u i t y , dential and

im-

public various

The Third American Revolution special interests—with

which

administrators

{

219

or c o n g r e s s m e n

are

often in close r e l a t i o n s h i p — t h a n they are to the voters.

Related

t o t h i s s i t u a t i o n is t h e o f t - n o t e d r e m o t e n e s s ,

complexity,

a n d impersonality of b o t h p u b l i c a n d private institutions. A s

the

old traditional

the

affiliations of t h e

industrial age p r o d u c e d

fessional

societies.

But

agrarian

society

crumbled,

its e q u i v a l e n t s t h r o u g h u n i o n s unions

are n o

longer

and

pro-

institutions,25

vital

a n d the "atomization" of m o d e r n life accentuates the citizens' feelings

of impotence.

Social

institutions

appear

to provide

an outlet for individual idealism nor a rapid response to demands.

neither

collective

Moreover, the state or a b i g private organization

ines-

capably schematizes social dilemmas in order to cope with

their

complexities;

though

this

schematization

permits

a

large-scale

r e s p o n s e , it f r e q u e n t l y c o n f l i c t s w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l l y f e l t sions of t h e

same

problem

and

therefore

limits the

dimen-

individual's

f r e e d o m e v e n as it fails t o p e r c e i v e t h e b e s t s o l u t i o n t o h i s

prob-

lems. T h u s , t h e m o r e t h e state tries to h e l p , t h e m o r e it t e n d s reinforce the individual's f e e l i n g of T h e r e s u l t is p a r a d o x i c a l :

to

impotence.

the situation described stimulates

a

more intense public interest in politics while increasing the

sense

of the futility of politics;

consensus

while

prompting louder appeals for a sense of c o m m o n national

direc-

tion;

finally,

it f r a g m e n t s

it s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

national

confronts the

individual

with

t w i n dangers of f r a g m e n t a t i o n a n d of excessive

control.

national

government

policy

seems

to

fragment

pands.26 A s a result, m a n y

as

Indeed, ex-

feel that their f r e e d o m

is

contracting. This feeling s e e m s to b e c o n n e c t e d with their loss

of

purpose,

since freedom

Americans

national

the

implies

choice

of

action,

and

action

re-

q u i r e s a n a w a r e n e s s of goals. If A m e r i c a ' s p r e s e n t t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e technetronic a g e d o e s n o t result in personally satisfying ments,

the next

phase

could

be

social and political involvement,

one a

of

flight

sullen

from social a n d

responsibility through inner retreat and o u t w a r d In

the

meantime,

the

scientific

and

achieve-

withdrawal

from

political

conservatism.

technological

revolution,

itself s o b a s i c a l l y c e r e b r a l i n c h a r a c t e r , still t e n d s to a f f e c t

Ameri-

2 i o }

/V:

The American

Transition

c a n s o c i e t y i n a l a r g e l y u n p l a n n e d f a s h i o n t h a t is d e t e r m i n e d decisions and impulses reflecting the values a n d interests

of

earlier A m e r i c a . I n t e l l e c t u a l p o w e r is m o b i l i z e d t o a n s w e r but not to ask "why?" America civilization means

committed

to carelessly

to

the

examined

still to d e v e l o p m e c h a n i s m s the

second

question.

consequently quest

ends."

for 27

The

"how?"

risks b e c o m i n g

continually political

that

fundamentally

"a

improved system

and procedures to raise a n d

Matters

by the

has

answer

affect the

na-

tional w a y of life, s u c h as t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a s u p e r s o n i c

aircraft,

or that

such

pose

industrial handled

an

ecological

pollution by

a

as w e l l

or radiation

decision-making

as

a

from

human

threat,

atomic-energy

process

that

inhibits

plants, the

tunities for a n intelligent expression of t h e p o p u l a r will. ing

to

the

National

Science

Foundations

are

oppor-

(Accord-

seventeenth

annual

report, less t h a n 5 p e r cent of the m o r e t h a n 200,000 scientists engineers

employed

by

the

federal

government

in

concerned with social or psychological disciplines. cording to the defense,

and

energy

research

were

were

Moreover,

relatively

limited

frontiers. In addition,

resources

to a

systematic

absorbing

approxi-

our society concern

ac-

Advisers,

m a t e l y two-thirds of the scientists w o r k i n g o n t h e nation's tific a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l

and

1967

1963 report of the C o u n c i l of E c o n o m i c

space,

as

sciendevotes

with

social

p r o b l e m s , w h i l e it d e v o t e s e n o r m o u s r e s o u r c e s t o e c o n o m i c ,

tech-

nical, a n d scientific matters. T a b l e 13 tells part of t h e story.)

Even

higher education, b y not focusing on the underlying questions by emphasizing tion:

t e c h n i q u e s , runs t h e risk of b e c o m i n g

of creating large n u m b e r s

they k n o w

the

miseduca-

of " e d u c a t e d " p e o p l e w h o

the

T h e third A m e r i c a n revolution highlights the sharp contrast

be-

tween

but who

in fact do not

even

think

know

truly important

answers,

but

questions.28

our technical

success

and

our social failure,

and

it

raises

basic questions concerning the control and direction of the

thrust

of technological innovation. H o w are choices m a d e ? W h y are

they

m a d e ? B y w h o m are they m a d e ? W h a t values are involved in these choices, and h o w can they b e crystallized so that a coherent

policy

The TABLE 13.

Third

American

Revolution

{221

ANNUAL BUDGET IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS

Physical Health

Industrial General Motors Ford Standard Oil (N.J.) General Electric Chrysler Mobile Oil Texaco U.S. Steel I.B.M.

Natl Cancer Inst. Nat'l Heart Assn. Nat'l Inst, of Arthritis Nat'l Inst, of Neurology Nat'l Inst, of Allergy Nat'l Inst, of Child Health American Cancer Society American Heart Assn. Nat'l Tuberculosis Assn.

20,210 12,240 12,190 7,180

5,650 5,250 4,43o 4,36o 4,250

186 164 141 119

90 66

59 37 27

Social and Psychological National Inst of Mental Health* Stanford Research Inst.* Menninger Foundation Planning Research Corp.* Inst, for Social Research American Inst, for Research in Behavioral Sciences Brookings Institution Human Resources Research Office Mental Health Research Inst.

31 18 9.5 8 5.5 5 5 4.5 2

Source: Thomas Jefferson Research Center, June-July 1969, p. 5. * Approximate portion of budget allocated to social problems. can

be

shaped?

societies,

but

These

given

questions

the

extensive

increasingly social

beset

scope

of

all

modern

contemporary

A m e r i c a n s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y , this c h a l l e n g e is e s p e c i a l l y portant in the

United

States because

it a f f e c t s — a n d

im-

potentially

t h r e a t e n s — t h e m o s t i n t i m a t e a s p e c t s of A m e r i c a n life. S i n c e it a p p e a r s t r u e t h a t "this s o c i e t y h a s c h o s e n t o

emphasize

t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e as its c h i e f m o d e of c r e a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n basis for e c o n o m i c

growth,"

29

it f o l l o w s

and

that this society's

most

i m p e r a t i v e t a s k is t o d e f i n e a c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h

tech-

nological change can b e given meaningful and h u m a n e ends. less

this

is

directionless

done, the

there third

is

the

real

American

danger

revolution,

that so

by

pregnant

possibilities for individual creativity a n d fulfillment, can socially destructive.

Un-

remaining with

become

2 i o }

/V:

The American

Transition

im/m 2. The New Left Reaction A

revolution

not

only

breeds

its

own

children—it

repels

t h e m . It is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e t h a t a s o c i e t y w h i c h p u t s a p r e m i u m change, w h i c h m a k e s k n o w l e d g e the basic vehicle of

w h i c h vastly e x p a n d s t h e institutions of a d v a n c e d learning, for the

first

time

in history

creates a large

on

innovation, which

class of p e o p l e

throughout their late adolescence and early maturity of the

free

limita-

tions inherent in the b u r d e n of self-support, w h i c h e n d o w s

intel-

lectual activity w i t h a h i g h d e g r e e of social prestige b u t n o

direct

political p o w e r , s h o u l d b r e e d rebels w h o are t h e p r o d u c t s of very revolution that torments and repels them. T h e supreme of that loose a n d volatile socio-political p h e n o m e n o n porary itself

middle-class the

America

creation

of

the

named

the

technetronic

New

Left

revolution

of

contem-

is t h a t as

the

irony

well

it

is

as

a

of

a

r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t it.

Infantile The rather

Ideology

New fluid

Left,

a

complex

combination

from a m o n g the N e w professorial

circles)

of

and

elusive

individual

entity

made

sympathizers

York City literary establishment and

a

scattering

of

w h i c h Students for a Democratic Society

up

(especially and

some

new

organizations,

(SDS)

has b e c o m e

of the

b e s t - k n o w n , is t h e p o l i t i c a l - i d e o l o g i c a l e x p r e s s i o n o f a m o r e

exten-

sive restlessness

youth.

among

American

A s of the late 1960s, m e m b e r s h i p tions w a s

relatively

confrontations

with

limited, the

but

middle-class

university

in the m o r e militant in m o m e n t s

authorities)

these

of

stress

organiza(such

organizations

as

were

The New Left Reaction quite successful in mobilizing broader support.

{

Moreover, at

ferent times a n d in response to different issues, the N e w able to d r a w on the deep-rooted traditions of A m e r i c a n Quaker pacifism, and

the pre-World

War

II largely

as

well

as

a

widespread

though

passive

dif-

Left

was

populism, immigrant-

imported socialism and communism. T h e tension b e t w e e n tions

223

genera-

alienation

also

p r o m p t e d expressions of solidarity w h i c h occasionally c r e a t e d

the

impression of youth's m a s s i v e identification w i t h t h e goals of

the

more militant N e w

Left.*

T h e outer b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e N e w L e f t are, therefore,

imprecise.

At o n e time or another essentially reformist m e m b e r s of t h e cal establishment, s u c h as Robert K e n n e d y and E u g e n e

politi-

McCarthy,

w e r e a b l e to s i p h o n off a g r e a t d e a l of t h e volatile y o u t h f u l port that otherwise w a s attracted by the more extreme of the

New

Left.

The

N e w

Left

m o r e militant in its rhetoric, m o r e

itself, h o w e v e r , sectarian in its

tendencies

tended

to

broader

coalition endeavoring to forge the " n e w politics" in America. difference, however,

was

the

New

be

organization,

more intellectually and generationally exclusive than the

key

sup-

Left's militancy—a

The mili-

tancy derived f r o m t h e belief that reforms will n o l o n g e r suffice. It has often b e e n said that the rather sporadic identification

of

broad s e g m e n t s of y o u t h w i t h the militant N e w L e f t reflected

the

m o r e intense idealism a n d social consciousness of the current

col-

l e g e g e n e r a t i o n , i m p a t i e n t w i t h t h e crass m a t e r i a l i s m of its s o c i e t y and distressed b y

the political system's delay in m o v i n g

against

* It should, however, be noted that the number of students participating in the more overt manifestations of militancy and strife was relatively limited. In the period October 1967-May 1969, one-fifth of the eruptions took place on six major campuses: Berkeley, San Francisco State, Columbia, Harvard, University of Wisconsin, and Cornell. Of the nation's 2374 colleges, there were outbreaks on only 211 campuses, and in a total of 474 such confrontations with authority 6158 arrests were made (according to data compiled for the United States Senate and reported in The Washington Post, July 2, 1969). Dues-paying members of the SDS were estimated at about 6000; those vaguely sympathetic to some New Left appeals, at about 700,000; the total number of students, about 7 million (Fortune, special issue on youth, January 1969). The number of SDS activists was estimated in early 1969 as ranging between 70,000 and 100,000 (Guardian, January 11, 1969).

224 }

JV- The American

Transition

s o c i a l injustice. T h i s is d o u b t l e s s so. T h e y o u n g h a v e b e e n in the struggle for racial equality;

they responded

active

initially

enthusiasm to the call of global service in the ranks of the Corps;

they

have

flocked

into

the

ranks

of

the

many

efforts to m o u n t a struggle against urban p o v e r t y

and

with Peace

domestic ignorance.

I t is e q u a l l y t r u e t h a t t h e e s t a b l i s h e d s y s t e m d i d n o t f u l l y t a p idealism. T h e idealism of the y o u n g required a sense of

that

deliberate

n a t i o n a l e f f o r t i n o r d e r t o g i v e it f u l f i l l m e n t , a n d it w a s n o t t o y o u n g alone that this effort s e e m e d to b e lacking.

the

Cumulatively,

the resulting frustrations created an intense alienation,

first

from

the political system a n d then from the socio-economic system as a whole. Both were denied moral legitimacy, and the

combination

of frustrated idealism a n d historical uncertainty c r e a t e d circumstances

for

simple dichotomic

appeals

based

on

passion

and

a

propitious

desire

for

a

formula.

Major catalysts for youthful disillusionment w i t h liberal

democ-

racy's d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d c a p a c i t y t o c o p e w i t h e i t h e r its o l d o r its n e w problems were provided b y the Vietnam war and the

white

majority's indifference to the black man's quest for equality.

Both

reinforced the argument that the existing system w a s

preoccupied

with self-preservation and not with change, and that federal funds w e r e readily available for remote causes b u t not for curing

Amer-

ica's i m m e d i a t e ills. B o t h a l s o p r o v i d e d t h e y o u n g w i t h

convenient

rationalizations

intellectual

for failing to c o m e

to grips w i t h the

c o m p l e x i t y of our t i m e a n d for turning their b a c k s o n the difficult a n d i n e s c a p a b l y s l o w task of social renewal. This

same

kind

of

self-serving

intellectual

rationalization

for

the more immediately convenient and emotionally gratifying posture of c o m p l e t e n e g a t i o n also plays a part in the broader malaise, w h i c h Explanatory

theories

major emphasis values

the more militant N e w

on

of

the

student

idealism

of

the

militancy

psychological

in contemporary activists.

America, For

Left has been

on

have

dimension the

example,

typically of the

stifling of t h e Robert

student

exploiting.

Liebert

placed crisis

of

genuine has

co-

g e n t l y a r g u e d t h a t "it is n e c e s s a r y t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e l i v e s o f

the

The New Left Reaction

{ 225

participants [in student militancy] in a psycho-historical' . . The

result

is

a

sense

of

the

profoundly

in

tenuousness

its

of

unconscious

life

context. which

manifested

more

specifically,

it h a s p r o v i d e d t h e m w i t h a s e n s e o f u r g e n c y t o e f f e c t

c h a n g e so that life c a n g o on."

30

stressed that in rejecting the

existing society,

aspects.

is

Similarly, K e n n e t h Keniston the

student

p r e s s i n g "a r e v u l s i o n a g a i n s t t h e n o t i o n o f q u a n t i t y ,

quality.

revolt

. . . Another

against

mogenization.

goal

uniformity, . .

of

the

new

equalization,

revolution

ex-

concepts

involves

standardization

and

dimension. Mark Gerzon s

psychological

The Whole World Is Watching,

pathetic account by a young Harvard undergraduate, put psychological

aspect,

a

sym-

primary

n o t i n g that at b o t h

Harvard

a n d Berkeley "the psychiatric units at the health services of

the

t w o universities, normally quite busy, f o u n d that the n u m b e r students

coming

in

for

psychiatric

help

declined

during the period of c o n c e r t e d political action. must

be

a

ho-

."31

S t u d e n t participants h a v e also t e n d e d to stress t h e

stress o n t h e

has

is

particularly

economic quantity and materialism, and a turn towards of

More

concluded,

found

an

external

concern a n d so w e r e less c a g e d not m e a n

that their personal

however,

sublimated

in

outlet

in their o w n

problems

something

solved;

the

students,

their

minds."

were

beyond

The for

of

dramatically

32

This

they

student.

it

intense did

were, Gerzon

also cited data s h o w i n g that b o t h militancy a n d drug-taking

were

m o r e p r e v a l e n t a m o n g s t u d e n t s in t h e "soft" sciences, w h o

were

more preoccupied

w i t h the "habit of self-analysis" a n d less

pared for active participation

in the more

scientifically

pre-

oriented

society.33 T h e r e is d o u b t l e s s m u c h m e r i t i n t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l tion of student militancy.

interpreta-

T h e existing system and especially

e m e r g i n g system put so extensive a p r e m i u m o n individual p e t i t i o n t h a t a n x i e t y is g e n e r a t e d e a r l y i n life. P a r t o f t h e against authority in education can b e attributed to the

com-

rebellion

understand-

able desire of the y o u n g to get a w a y f r o m a competitive in w h i c h success or failure, at so early an age, has s u c h

the

structure

potentially

226 }

TV: The American

lasting

consequences.

family

structure

At

Transition

the

creates

same

pressures

time, for

the

weakening

compensatory

of

the

sources

of

psychological reassurance, and peer groups b e c o m e important

in

setting patterns of b e h a v i o r a n d p r o c l a i m e d b e l i e f s . In addition,

so highly

rationalized

a society

0

as the

tends to b e a dangerously boring society. B e c a u s e boredom

as t h e s o u r c e of a l i e n a t i o n — t h a t

planation—should

not be

underestimated

American

of this,

sheer

oft-cited catch-all as a n important

of restlessness. I n our society "the e x c i t e m e n t of the

unexpected,

the invigorating state of m i n d p r o d u c e d b y shifts in pleasure, tranquility

and

anxiety

are

largely

missing.

ex-

cause

Underlying

pain,

the

wards of b e i n g a c o g in the w h e e l can b e a sense of b o r e d o m thinness of self." pening" can be personal

refusal

34

T o e s c a p e f r o m it i n t o a r e v o l u t i o n a r y

freedom, to

and

participate

endless in

discussions

the

"hap-

exalting

"automated

one's

society,"

"gadget economy," a n d "corrupting affluence" b e c o m e

reand

the

a form

of

This m o o d p r o m p t s a search for n e w sources of feeling a n d

of

group therapy.

authority,

which

the

simultaneously

impersonal

and

permissive

existing institutions fail to p r o v i d e . It creates a r e s p o n s i v e n e s s

to

* According to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (1967): "In America in the i96o's, to perhaps a greater extent than in any other place or time, adolescents live in a distinct society of their own. It is not an easy society to understand, to describe, or, for that matter, to live in. In some ways it is an intensely materialistic society; its members, perhaps in unconscious imitation of their elders, are preoccupied with physical objects like clothes and cars and indeed have been encouraged in this preoccupation by manufacturers and merchants who have discovered how profitable the adolescent market is. In some ways it is an intensely sensual society; its members are preoccupied with the sensations they can obtain from surfing or drag racing or music or drugs. In some ways, it is an intensely moralistic society; its members are preoccupied with independence and honesty and equality and courage. On the whole it is a rebellious, oppositional society, dedicated to the proposition that the grownup world is a sham. At the same time, it is a conforming society; being inexperienced, unsure of themselves and, in fact, relatively powerless as individuals, adolescents to a far greater extent than their elders conform to common standards of dress and hair style and speech, and act jointly in groups—or gangs" ( T h e Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, New York, 1968, p. 176).

The New Left Reaction highly generalized mobilization

{

status quo.

against the

227

Paradox-

ically, the v a g u e r a n d m o r e a m b i t i o u s the d e m a n d s , the closer more rapidly narrowing the g a p b e t w e e n the reality a n d Finally,

there

appears

to

be

an

element

of

and

hope.*

uneasy

guilt

and

self-gratification in the m o t i v a t i o n of s o m e of the a l i e n a t e d

young

p e o p l e , a n d t h i s f a c t o r s h o u l d n o t b e i g n o r e d . It is c e r t a i n l y

easier

to c o n d e m n VISTA

the

social system

programs

an extension

as a w h o l e

or t h e P e a c e

Corps.

than

to participate

Condemning

of i m p e r i a l i s m b e c o m e s

in

the latter

a self-serving

as

explanation:

the militants' "deep dissatisfaction w i t h t h e m s e l v e s a n d their inner confusion first,

is p r o j e c t e d

against

the

institutions

of

the

university

a n d a g a i n s t all institutions of s o c i e t y s e c o n d a r i l y , w h i c h

blamed

for their

own

weakness."35

inner

This

especially important in v i e w of the e c o n o m i c a l l y secure, class character of m a n y

of

self-indulgent

somewhat

life

style

the

youthful militants. belies

their

ents or b y their colleges.

support provided There

Indeed,

their

professed

anti-

either by

are accordingly

is

middle-

materialism, especially as their material existence t e n d s t o on the relatively generous

are

consideration

depend

their

some

par-

analogies

b e t w e e n the restless A m e r i c a n middle-class student a n d the

Latin

American student rebels, w h o are generally d r a w n from the upper classes a n d similarly q u i t e certain that, g i v e n the social of their societies,

they

can

count

on

a relatively

structure

successful

materially r e w a r d i n g life, w h a t e v e r the o u t c o m e of their The

outlook

of

alienated

but

idealistic y o u n g

people,

trast to that of t h e activist political i d e o l o g y of t h e much logical

smaller

New

infantilism:

Left, can relying

perhaps

on

be

as

their

in

as

equality,

and

so o n )

but

act

ideo-

intellectual

source, they use the current political slogans of the adult (freedom,

con-

numerically

characterized

psychology

and

studies.

a s if t h e w o r l d

world were

a

* Involved here was "the general American tendency, perhaps the human tendency, to assume that if things are presently bad, they were once better, rather than realizing that they are likely to be considered bad precisely because they are getting better" (Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Role of Student Subcultures," The Record, Teachers College, Columbia University, October 1967, p. 1 [italics in original]).

2 i o }

/V:

The American Transition

g i v e n c o n s t a n t . F o r e x a m p l e , in G e r z o n s b o o k t h e r e is n o sion of h o w racial injustice can b e eliminated, h o w the

discus-

economy

s h o u l d create t h e n e e d e d w e a l t h , or w h o s h o u l d m a k e t h e fly,

planes

the hospitals operate, the social system work. T h e book

however, contain the usual emotional elements system:

the

enemies

righteousness

of

are

adults

and

of a n

technology,

t h e i d e a l i s t i c y o u n g is r e p e a t e d l y

and

the

function

is

abandoned

to

others,

and

the

self-

stressed.

r e s u l t i n g d o c t r i n e is s e l f - s e r v i n g , s i n c e t h e t e d i o u s t a s k o f society

does,

ideological

The

making

future

is

left

vague.*

Revolutionaries

in Search of

The extreme N e w

Revolution

Left represents the p h e n o m e n o n

of

middle-

c l a s s r e b e l l i o n a g a i n s t m i d d l e - c l a s s s o c i e t y . I t is n e w i n t h e that in exploiting the psychological unrest of s o m e of the g e n e r a t i o n it d r a w s m u c h of its s u p p o r t f r o m a s o c i a l g r o u p is itself n o t y e t e n g a g e d in p r o d u c i n g s o c i a l w e a l t h a n d

sense

college which

therefore

c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d as b e i n g exploited; o n the w h o l e , that g r o u p enjoys

social a n d

material

security,

but

it is p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y

secure, frustrated, bored, and guilt-ridden. This also appears to the c a s e w i t h s o m e older supporters of the N e w

Left,

inbe

particularly

* The psychological interpretation fits well some of the points made by Konrad Lorenz: "During and shortly after puberty human beings have an indubitable tendency to loosen their allegiance to all traditional rites and social norms of their culture, allowing conceptual thought to cast doubt on their value and to look around for new and perhaps more worthy ideals. There probably is, at that time of life, a definite sensitive period for a new object-fixation, much as in the case of the object-fixation found in animals and called imprinting. If at that crucial time of life old ideals prove fallacious under critical scrutiny and new ones fail to appear, the result is complete aimlessness, the utter boredom which characterizes the young delinquent. If, on the other hand, the clever demagogue, well versed in the dangerous art of producing supranormal stimulus situations, gets hold of young people at the susceptible age, he finds it easy to guide their object-fixation in a direction subservient to his political aims. At the postpubertal age some human beings seem to be driven by an overpowering urge to espouse a cause and failing to find a worthy one may become fixated on astonishingly inferior substitutes" (On Aggression, New York, 1966, p. 258).

The New Left Reaction those from the intellectual

community,

whose

{ 229

recently

acquired

social a n d m a t e r i a l p r e s t i g e is i n t e n s e l y t h r e a t e n e d b y a s e n s e political i m p o t e n c e a n d increasing fear of historical T h e difficulty e n c o u n t e r e d b y the militant N e w

of

obsolescence. L e f t in

i n g t h e " m a s s e s " is r e l a t e d t o t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n i n t h e

reachUnited

States. D u r i n g t h e 1930s, radical m o v e m e n t s h a d a real basis

for

their h o p e to radicalize the A m e r i c a n laboring masses, w h o

were

suffering f r o m t h e deprivations of t h e Great D e p r e s s i o n a n d

only

then beginning to develop their o w n organizational There was,

in effect, at least

the potential

consciousness.

for a historical

biosis b e t w e e n radical ideology a n d the frustrated a n d

sym-

impover-

ished masses.* T o d a y t h e s i t u a t i o n is e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t f o r v e r y m a n y cans, t h o u g h n o t f o r all: as h a s a l r e a d y b e e n n o t e d , t h e

Americhildren

of A m e r i c a n s w i t h o u t a n y higher e d u c a t i o n ( t h e blue-collar ers

of

the

still

industrial,

second

America)

are

work-

flocking

c o l l e g e s , a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y s o c i e t y t h r o u g h its a p p a r e n t

into

openness

r e i n f o r c e s t h e r e l a t i v e f e e l i n g o f w e l l - b e i n g c r e a t e d b y its m a t e r i a l a d v a n c e s . T h a t s e c o n d A m e r i c a i n c r e a s i n g l y s e e s its w a y c l e a r the

long-range

opportunities

held

out

by

the

new

to

scientific-

t e c h n o l o g i c a l society. It is s i m p l y n o t c o n v i n c e d b y t h e N e w

Left's

argument that "more opportunity plus more d e m o c r a c y equals less freedom."

36

America,

whose

The

New

Left

various

holds

anxieties

selves in a politically c o n s e r v a t i v e

little p r o m i s e tend

rather

to

for the

second

express

them-

and even anti-intellectual

pos-

L e f t m i l i t a n t s , still i n s e a r c h of m a s s

sup-

ture. This leaves for N e w

p o r t , o n l y t h e first A m e r i c a , t h e p r e - i n d u s t r i a l a n d t h e moribund America.

industrially

B u t h e r e t h e p r o b l e m is c o m p l i c a t e d b y

f a c t t h a t m u c h of t h a t A m e r i c a is b l a c k a n d t h a t A m e r i c a n

the

blacks

are either inclined to take a d v a n t a g e of gradually enlarging

eco-

0 But only a potential. As Paul Buhle, the editor of Radical America, noted in the radical weekly Guardian (June 21, 1969): . . the most notable characteristic of American society, in contrast to that of Europe, has been the absence of a stable, class conscious proletarian movement."

2

5 4 }

nomic

TV:

The American Transition

opportunities

or

to

seek

their

identity

racial exclusiveness. I n either case, the N e w to

many

of

middle-class

them

as

a

diversion,

quarrelsome, perhaps

of

not

through

militant

Left tends to overly

marginal

appear

serious

nuisance

white

value

shaking s o m e w h i t e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t institutions a n d in stirring white

consciences,

but generally lacking

and defined political The

N e w

Left

consistency,

continuity,

direction.* might

have

become

therefore more constructive—political

a

more

serious—and

force in the U n i t e d

t o d a y if its p r o p h e t s h a d b e e n i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a b l e t o m o v e either their

dated

antirationalism.f

in

some

European

For

radicalism

example,

modern

or their society

newer poses

States beyond escapist

especially

* The assessment of the SDS by David Hilliard, chief of staff of the Black Panther party, is revealing in this connection: "We don't see SDS as being so revolutionary. We see SDS as just being another pacification front that's given credit by the fascist establishment in order to cause disfusion [sic] in hopes that this would weaken the support for the Black Panther party. . . . ". . . we'll beat those little sissies, those little schoolboys' ass if they don't try to straighten up their politics. So we want to make that known to SDS and the first motherfucker that gets out of order had better stand in line for some kind of disciplinary actions from the Black Panther party" (interview in Berkeley Barb, August 4, 1969, as cited by Guardian, August 16, 1969). f The intellectual roots of both Marcuse and Chomsky are grounded in nineteenth-century European radical dogmatism (on Chomsky and communism, see the particularly perceptive comments by Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Left, the Jews and Israel," Encounter, December 1969, p. 34). In this regard, comments by Walter Laqueur are particularly pertinent to Marcuse's ponderous justifications for his preferred brand of dictatorship and to Chomsky's political banalities: "The American youth movement, with its immense idealistic potential, has gone badly, perhaps irrevocably, off the rails. For this, a great responsibility falls on the shoulders of the gurus who have provided the ideological justification for the movement in its present phase—those intellectuals, their own bright dreams having faded, who now strain to recapture their ideological virginity. . . . The doctors of the American youth movement are in fact part of its disease. They have helped to generate a great deal of passion, but aside from the most banal populism they have failed to produce a single new idea" ("Reflections on Youth Movements," Commentary, June 1969, p. 40). This "banal populism" is expressed in the case of some writers (such as A. Mendel, in his trivial "Robots and Rebels," The New Republic, January 11, 1969) by an intensely Manichaean escapism and by attempts (for example, in the more intellectually serious effort by Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture, New York, 1969) to legitimize the antirational posture of some of the young as a new and enduring culture. The prevailing passion of the "gurus" is revealed by the sympathetic comments on Roszak's

The New Left Reaction

{

c o m p l e x p r o b l e m s relating to equality, a n issue of m a j o r to the N e w

Left; but those problems

231

concern

cannot be resolved b y

v o k i n g n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y criticisms of capitalism.

37

In failing

assimilate intellectually the n o v e l t y of the current A m e r i c a n sition, t h e N e w

Left has made

designed

society. This has created a

tion d e p l o r e d b y e v e n radical critics of the c o n t e m p o r a r y States.*

In addition, the

New

Left's exuberant

immaturity

of

the

young

rhetoric, militants

historical a n a c h r o n i s m o f its p r o p h e t s , h a s r e s u l t e d i n a

and

Marxist

rhetoric and exaltation of passion appears to h a v e b e e n

with the ideological

to

tran-

itself an essentially n e g a t i v e

obsolescent force. Indeed, the N e w Left's combination of

to shock rather than to c h a n g e

in-

situaUnited

coupled and

the

program-

matic posture and ideological debates that occasionally verge

on

the hilarious.f

book by philosophy professor Robert Wolff. After noting that Roszak argues that "modern industrial society in general, and American society in particular, is ugly, repressive, destructive, and subversive of much that is truly human," Wolff goes on to say that the above proposition " . . . I take it, is now acknowledged to be true by virtually every sensible man and woman. Anyone who still imagines that the United States is the land of opportunity and the bastion of democracy is a candidate either for a mental hospital or for Richard Nixon's Cabinet" ( T h e New York Times Book Review, September 7, 1969, p. 3 ) . 0 The Guardian, for example, condemned the SDS for its "intoxication with sectarianism, dogmatism, obscure rhetoric and empty sloganeering which tends to permeate the upper reaches of its leadership. Such practice can only further isolate the leadership from a membership which has never enjoyed a serious, national educational program designed to eliminate gaps in political consciousness that exist on the chapter level. . . . We question tendencies leading to the application by rote of important and intricate concepts such as the dictatorship of the proletariat and vanguard party, without regard for the present nature of U.S. monopoly capitalism or to adjustments which would have to be made in these formulations to be applicable to the world's most industrially advanced nation" (Guardian, July 5, 1969, p. 1 2 ) . t For example, at the SDS National Convention in 1969 the following dialogue took place: "The next speaker, Chaka Walls, minister of information of the Illinois Black Panther party . . . then began to explain the role of women in the revolution. 'We believe in the freedom of love, in pussy power/ he said. A shock wave stunned the arena, and PL responded with chants of Tight male chauvinism.' 'We've got some puritans in the crowd,' responded Walls. 'Superman was a punk because he never tried to fuck Lois Lane.' Fight male chauvinism,' PLWSA and many others began to chant.

254}

TV:

The American Transition

Cumulatively, the N e w Left has loosely linked the the abstainers,

and the

excluded

obsolescents,

of t h e t e c h n e t r o n i c

age, but

it

has offered little p r o s p e c t of a realistic r e s p o n s e to this age's d i l e m mas.

It is t h u s

more

interesting as a s y m p t o m

of

social

change

t h a n for its p r o g r a m m a t i c m e s s a g e . It is a n e s c a p i s t

phenomenon

rather than

it

a determined

revolutionary

movement;

proclaims

its d e s i r e t o c h a n g e s o c i e t y b u t b y a n d l a r g e o f f e r s o n l y a from society.*

More

concerned

with

refuge

self-gratification than

with

Anger was so intense that Walls stepped down and left the podium to Jewel Cook, another Panther spokesman. Cook, not understanding what was wrong with 'pussy power,' quickly made matters worse. . . . Cook said: 'He [Walls] was only trying to say that you sisters have a strategic position for the revolution . . . prone'" (Guardian, June 28, 1969). PLWSA: Progressive Labor-Worker—Student Alliance. Similarly, the Berkeley Liberation Committee's revolutionary program, designed to set a "revolutionary example throughout the world,' contained the following thirteen points (Oakland Tribune, June 5, 1969): "1—We will make Telegraph Avenue and the South Campus a strategic free territory for revolution. 2—We will create our revolutionary culture everywhere. 3—We will turn the schools into training grounds for liberation. 4—We will destroy the university unless it serves the people. 5—We will struggle for the full liberation of women as a necessary part of the revolutionary process. 6—We will take communal responsibility for basic human needs. 7—We will protect and expand our drug culture. 8—We will break the power of the landlords and provide beautiful housing for everyone. 9—We will tax the corporations, not the working people. 10—We will defend ourselves against law and order. 11—We will create a soulful socialism in Berkeley. 12—We will create a people's government. 13—We will unite with other movements throughout the world to destroy this racist capitalist imperialist system.". * Kenneth Keniston, though suggesting that youth really is shaping the future, has characteristically not indicated how it is shaping it, and thus appears to take their rhetoric for reality. (See his article "You have to Grow Up in Scarsdale to Know How Bad Things Really Are," The New York Times Magazine, April 27, 1969.) The same is largely true of Roszak. Keniston, moreover, seems to be excessively influenced by prevailing moods. Thus in 1961 he wrote that "the drift of American youth, I have argued, is away from public involvements and social responsibilities and toward a world of private and personal satisfactions. . . . They will assure a highly stable political and social order, for few of them will be enough committed to politics to consider revolution, subversion, or even radical change . . ." ("Social Change and Youth in America," in The Challenge of Youth, Eric H. Erikson, ed., New York, 1961, p. 215).

The New Left Reaction the social consequences engage

of its acts,

in the wildest verbal

the

abuse,

N e w

without

Left can

{

233

afford

any regard

for

the

f a c t t h a t it a l i e n a t e s e v e n t h o s e w h o a r e p o t e n t i a l s u p p o r t e r s . c o n c e r n is t o c r e a t e a s e n s e o f p e r s o n a l i n v o l v e m e n t f o r its ents

and

to

safety valve fulfillment

release

their

for its y o u t h f u l

for

its

more

D e s p i t e its i n c r e a s i n g l y is m o r e

reminiscent

style—and

passions;

quite

of

it

militants

passive,

provides and

affluent,

Marxist-Leninist Fourier

in

symptomatically

and

since

Dadaism were themselves reactions to a n e w

of

older

rhetoric, 38

Its

adher-

psychological

sense

and

content so,

a

a

to

the of

both

vicarious admirers.* N e w

Left

Dadaism Fourier

in and

age.

* For some the sexual revolution also became a partial substitute for political action. With political institutions too difficult to tackle, social conventions and the universities became convenient targets guaranteed to gain the desired mass-media coverage. As one actress explained the political significance of nudism in a statement to The New York Times: "I considered (and still do) the naked human body the height of beauty, innocence and truth. I wished to oppose my nakedness to the intimate realism of Vietnam, in itself only symptomatic of the corruptions and hypocrisies of our time. The nude body on stage was the Truth; Vietnam, the Lie. "Vietnam, Chicago, and Berkeley made me realize that my body could not be my own 'property' any longer, and that trust and vulnerability were our only salvation. I wished to say that, in reaching the natural end of their emancipation, women of my generation can no longer consider themselves as 'property.'" A response by a black actress, asked to comment on the same subject, was much more to the point: "This preoccupation with nudity under the guise of 'sexual liberation' is a white hang-up. Too many white 'artists' are constantly making a pretense of coming up with new forms, new ideas, and experiments. This is due to the fact that they are bankrupt when it comes to the tormenting business of artistic creation out of the human condition as it is. This task is much more difficult to confront. "Any endeavor which employs the blatant and aggressive display of bodily nakedness in the glare of public voyeurism, all under the label of artistic merit, is not one step above those girlie magazine stores and movie houses on 42nd Street. It is what it has always been, pornography for thrill-seeking consumers. For the actor, this is nothing short of debilitating and exhausting to his artistic individuality. And as for liberation, sexual or otherwise, I as a black person am concerned with but only one liberation, and that is the total liberation of all black people. This is a reality which is quite naked" (Sally Kirkland and JudyAnn Elder, respectively, as quoted in The New York Times, June 22,

2

5 4 }

TV:

The American Transition

The Historic Function On

balance,

the

of the Militant

militant

New

Left

Left

appears

to

be

largely

^

transient p h e n o m e n o n , a s y m p t o m of the tensions inherent in interaction of t h e several A m e r i c a s coexisting in a t i m e of American tinue

transition.

to spark

besetting

In

all probability,

additional

some

young

violence,

people

this transition

and

may

the

broader

prompt

a

more

or g o v e r n m e n t

careers

may

deny

will

youth

(especially

which

America's

elite

social

equalizer

by

opening

up

drawn,

system

a

source well

opportunities

from

act

as

a

for

first-

generation, post-blue-collar urban youth w h o h a v e in recent

years

gained greater access to advanced

career

may

attractive-

middle-class

from the better universities), the is t r a d i t i o n a l l y

con-

protracted

the

m e a s u r e of social talent, b u t this alienation of s o m e

general

frustrations

alienation from the existing system. T h e decline in the ness of business

the

education.

T h e long-run historic f u n c t i o n of t h e militant N e w L e f t largely fade

or

on be

politically change, New

the

circumstances

suppressed. futile,

revolution

itself

Though

it m i g h t

accelerating

Left

serve

some

have

been

it w i l l

itself

ideologically additional

an

If it d o e s ,

its f u n c t i o n positive;

if

in

it

to

and social

though

third

will

either

barren

spur

even

the

not,

depends

eventually

as

reforms.

disappears,

will

in w h i c h

the

American

have

been

catalyst for a m o r e reactionary social response to the n e w

a

dilem-

mas. T h e anarchistic e l e m e n t in the N e w L e f t has often b e e n

noted.

L e s s a t t e n t i o n h a s b e e n p a i d t o its totalitarian p r e d i s p o s i t i o n .

Yet

both

and

mood.

elements Despite

with equality, words

of

elitist a n d Its

a

are

influential

the democratic the demands

sympathetic

aristocratic,

membership,

in

and

terms

in

the

N e w

rhetoric

and

of the N e w

of

both

behavior

proclaimed

Left—in

observer—have should be

Left's

been

the

perceptive

"fundamentally

frankly faced

social

concern

as

composition

c h o l o g i c a l m a k e - u p , is r e m a r k a b l y a n a l o g o u s t o t h a t of

such."39 and

psy-

European

groups which, in response to overwhelming complexity and

times

The New Left Reaction of

stress,

such

gravitated

groups

were

toward

recruited

totalitarian from

movements.

among

uprooted

and

In

marginal

the m i d d l e class, t h e unaffiliated intellectuals,

{

235

Europe

members

new

and

of

recently

trade

union-

ists.40 I n A m e r i c a , g i v e n t h e n e w f o r c e s s h a p i n g its s o c i e t y ,

mem-

proletarians,

s o m e of t h e m o r e isolated

bers have to a greater extent b e e n d r a w n from a m o n g

unaffiliated

intellectuals, s t u d e n t s — w h o in effect form a n e w c l a s s — a n d m e m b e r s of t h e m i d d l e class, all of w h o m , unlike their counterparts,

are r e s p o n d i n g less to e c o n o m i c

and more to

chological anxieties. T h e s e e l e m e n t s are united b y their for total solutions mental

and

their b o r e d o m

some

European

or i m p a t i e n c e

psy-

proclivity

with

incre-

change.

T h e strong totalitarian t e n d e n c i e s of t h e N e w f r o m its c o n d u c t a n d p r e s c r i p t i o n s . *

Left are

evident

Y e t it m o r e a c c u r a t e l y

war-

rants t h e t e r m "neo-totalitarian," b e c a u s e it h a s l a r g e l y f a i l e d forge

sufficient unity

to

emerge

ganized totalitarian m o v e m e n t .

as

a

relatively

disciplined,

Its totalitarian m o o d

and

aspira-

tions h a v e not yet b e e n m a t c h e d b y totalitarian organization, t h o u g h the bitter internal factional conflicts a n d m u t u a l are strongly reminiscent of earlier d o g m a t i c Moreover, the sharp edge

of the N e w

even

expulsions

movements.

Left's

intellectual—and

sometimes e v e n p h y s i c a l — a t t a c k s has b e e n a i m e d at those

Ameri-

can institutions w h o s e n o r m a l operation relies m o s t o n reason nonviolence. T h e university, a peculiarly defenseless and able

social

institution—and

liberal t h o u g h t — h a s

been

in A m e r i c a

the

principal

a primary target because

greatest c h a n c e for success w i t h the

least a m o u n t

generally, leading N e w Left s p o k e s m e n have b e e n of free speech,

democratic

procedures,

and

to or-

and

vulner-

haven

for

it o f f e r s

the

of risk.

More

contemptuous

majority

rule.

h a v e left little r o o m for d o u b t as to h o w t h e y w o u l d h a n d l e

They their

critics if t h e N e w L e f t w e r e e v e r t o g a i n p o w e r .

Though they seemingly conflict, the anarchistic and the totali* By no means the most glaring example of the latter is the explicit advocacy of repression of views divergent from those approved by the New Left. See Robert Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Boston, 1965, especially pp. 81-110.

2

5 4 }

TV: The American Transition

tarian strands of the N e w The

anarchistic

Left have been

component

is

in

tune

mutually

with

the

reinforcing. uncertainties

c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e r a p i d a n d baffling p a c e of c h a n g e ; t h e tarian c o m p o n e n t , derived from the M a n i c h a e a n sense of self-righteousness,

totali-

absolute

provides a secure point of departure for

fronting that change.

It s h o u l d

totalitarianism

proclaims

rarely

be

remembered,

itself

in

con-

moreover,

advance;

it

that

emerges

t h r o u g h practice. Since the F r e n c h Revolution, the over-all political style of t h e W e s t e r n w o r l d has called for reliance o n

slogans

expressing

fascism

claimed

devotion

to

freedom

t h a t its d i s c i p l i n e

made

and men

equality. free.

The

Even

left

has

b e e n shrill i n p r o c l a i m i n g its c o m m i t m e n t t o t r u e d e m o c r a c y ,

radical

but

t h e r e a l t e s t o f d e m o c r a c y is n o t u l t i m a t e g o a l s b u t t h e

procedures

used in attaining them. New

Left militants have

thus threatened

American

liberalism

in a m a n n e r r e m i n i s c e n t of the h a r m d o n e to d e m o c r a t i c conservatism

and

n o m e n o n of the

liberal

anticommunism

1950s. T h e N e w

social progress b y providing more

conservative

social

by the

American

McCarthy

Left has jeopardized

a convenient

attitudes.

rationalization

Beyond

this,

it h a s

to the surface a n d intensified—but not c a u s e d — t h e

phe-

American for

the

brought

current

crisis

of A m e r i c a n liberalism. T h a t has p e r h a p s b e e n the m o s t significant political result of the N e w third American

Left's neo-totalitarian reaction to

the

revolution.

3. The Crisis of Liberalism T o a great extent, m o d e r n A m e r i c a n liberalism h a s itself b l a m e f o r its p r e s e n t crisis. L o n g t h e a l m o s t e x c l u s i v e of

industrial

America,*

liberalism

has

not

only

to

philosophy

dominated

the

* "For along with its agrarianism the new nation was imbued with liberalism,

The Crisis of Liberalism political discourse

of

the country but

s c o n c e d in t h e seat of p o w e r ,

{ 237

lately has b e e n

from which

firmly

entrenched but largely defensive congressional

needed

thirty-six years, a w o r l d war, t w o A s i a n wars, a n d d o m e s t i c social unrest in order to regain the W h i t e H o u s e .

racial-

(Eisenhowers

victory in 1952 w a s a personal triumph, not a party one; h e won

Republican

as

a

Democratic

Party did

so less b y

candidate.)

the

rural-conservative

forces. S w e p t out of office in 1932, the R e p u b l i c a n Party

also have

en-

it h a s c o n f r o n t e d

Yet

even

offering an alternative

philosophy than b y capitalizing on the divisions within liberalism a n d o n the nation's uneasiness w i t h liberal

would

then

the

political American

prescriptions

a n d style. T h e prescriptions and style w e r e once a creative and response to the pressures and About

these

dilemmas

and American

iniquities

American

conservatism,

of industrial

conservatives

had

humane

capitalism.

little to

preaching puritan homilies

tolling the virtues of free enterprise,

did not succeed

say,

and

in

ex-

making

a full adjustment to the industrial a g e or to the m a s s i v e social p o l i t i c a l a w a k e n i n g it p r o m p t e d . T h i s l e f t t h e trinaire radicals, to liberals, w h o

who

largely

sought to

drew

adapt

on

field

European

the idealism

and

either to

experience, the

or

optimism

of the A m e r i c a n tradition to t h e n e w industrial age. T h e

success

of the liberals p r e s e r v e d America's u n i q u e n e s s — a n d this h a s their c r o w n i n g

and doc-

been

achievement.

Whig to the bone. Neither throne nor altar, nor, above all, reverence for the past existed as barriers to the new leveling forces unleashed by industrial technology. "The political turning point was the defeat of the South in the Civil War, which ended forever any possibility of a nation based on agrarian values— and, indeed, destroyed forever the possibility of a conservatism that was anything other than intellectual preciousness or a shield for particular business interests. Bryan's constituents in the crucial election of 1896 were small farmer capitalists who were resentful of their disadvantaged position within the system rather than of industrial processes as such. When in the i93o's a group of southern writers responded to the American economic crisis and the attendant cultural crisis of industrial capitalism with their manifesto III Take My Stand, looking to agrarianism and rejecting both socialism and industrial capitalism in favor of small property, they found little resonance. Dixieland reacted to the Depression by standing in the vanguard of those supporting the state capitalism of the N e w Deal" (Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality, New York, 1969, pp. 6 5 - 6 6 ) .

2

5 4 }

TV:

Without

The American Transition

the

economically

liberal, A m e r i c a

or,

perhaps

might

even

well

more

have

likely,

a n t i d e m o c r a t i c social a n d political crisis. T h e Deal

liberal

solution

was

to fuse

the

either

fallen

decayed

victim

to

genius of the

individualism

an

New

intrinsic

in

American historical e x p e r i e n c e — a n individualism that has

inher-

ently reinforced a conservative reluctance toward collective

social

action—with

a

the

process.

political

avoided

the

they have

sense

dogmatic

tended

of social responsibility In

so

doing,

rigidities

to share with

of

as defined

American European

them

the

through

liberals

initially

socialists,

though

inclination

to rely

on

the g o v e r n m e n t as the principal instrumentality for social reforms. This inclination, philosophical preference

apart, w a s in a n y

case

dictated b y the situation prevailing in America: the national

gov-

ernment

was

the

only instrument

that w a s

relatively

responsive

to the democratic process, that could b e u s e d to express a n d fill

the welfare needs

of

the masses,

that

could

blunt

the

ful-

sharp

e d g e of e c o n o m i c and social inequality.

The Liberal

Janus

In the process, however, the American liberal b e c a m e ingly

a statist

establishmentarian,

confident

of

and convinced that h e h a d discovered the w a y change.

Indeed,

the American

liberal b e c a m e

his

increas-

prescriptions

to m a n a g e

social

a Janus-like

crea-

ture, g r a d u a l l y a c q u i r i n g t w o faces. T h e relatively p r a g m a t i c

lib-

eral w h o

and

was

rooted

in the

American

democratic

tradition

w h o s e social values provided the broad f r a m e w o r k for a matic

approach

to

problem-solving

came

to

be

nondog-

matched

by

m o r e ideological, eventually m o r e d o g m a t i c liberal, w h o w a s creasingly draw

inclined toward

his intellectual

abstract

inspiration

social engineering,

from

European

left

prone

tient with the nonideological "expedient" attitude of the

with the growth

in prestige

and

impa-

pragma-

tic liberal p o w e r practitioner. T h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e s e c o n d closely linked

to

radicalism,

ideologically hostile to the business community, a n d rather

was

a in-

liberal

influence

of

t h e A m e r i c a n i n t e l l e c t u a l c o m m u n i t y after W o r l d W a r II. Increas-

The Crisis of Liberalism ingly, it w a s this m o r e who

doctrinaire liberal w h o

dominated American

{ 239

set the tone

liberalism, though h e w a s

still

during t h e 1960s to gain full control of the D e m o c r a t i c

and

unable

Party.

T h e accession of t h e doctrinaire liberal to p r o m i n e n c e a n d l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e , if n o t t o p o w e r — a d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h

with the intensifying stresses in the American s o c i e t y — h a d to d o w i t h a subtle b u t important

change

much

of tone in t h e

discourse. Both the procedural elements rooted in liberal

liberal democ-

racy's a t t a c h m e n t to legal order a n d the patriotic pride in ica's

constitutional

achievements

tended

to

be

po-

coincided

Amer-

downgraded

favor of greater e m p h a s i s o n rapid social change, on

in

restructuring

e c o n o m i c relations, a n d o n a m o r e general a n d highly critical appraisal of the A m e r i c a n

re-

tradition.

T h e doctrinaire liberal, moreover, w a s not innocent of the

sin

of intellectual arrogance.41 Since neither the conservative nor

the

communist

was

able

to

match

his

social

success,

his

self-confi-

dence gradually developed into arrogance, often expressed b y

an

intolerance of critics a n d a n inclination to label as reactionaries

all

w h o d e v i a t e d f r o m t h e l i b e r a l n o r m a s h e h i m s e l f d e f i n e d it. inclination b e c a m e

most

vironment increasingly were more inclined ceptualize

statist

in the a c a d e m i c

dominated

world,

b y liberal intellectuals,

than the liberal p o w e r practitioners

liberalism

a result, a h u m a n e tones of d o m i n a n t

marked

and

and

creative

to

excommunicate

creed

gradually

This

an

en-

42

who

to

con-

deviants.

acquired

As

over-

orthodoxy.

T h i s m a d e it m o r e d i f f i c u l t e i t h e r t o p e r c e i v e or to r e s p o n d n e w and unusual circumstances. T h e A m e r i c a n liberal

the dilemmas p o s e d b y the third A m e r i c a n revolution w i t h a Deal strategy tried and tested during the recent

New

industrial-capital-

ist crisis. T h e r e w a s little i n t h e d o c t r i n a i r e - l i b e r a l a n a l y s i s o f problems facing the U n i t e d States in the 1960s that d e p a r t e d the principles a n d r e m e d i e s d e v e l o p e d in the p r e c e d i n g

the from

decades;

there w a s little r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e g r o w i n g r e s p o n s i v e n e s s t o

social

problems of societal institutions a n d organizations other than federal

to

approached

the

government.

Moreover, the doctrinaire liberals were by and large late in

2

5 4 }

TV:

recognizing New

Left.

The American Transition the

antidemocratic

Various

factors

and

played

antiliberal a

role

w h i c h w a s that in the past s o m e of t h e m h a d nism.

Though

Stalinism

had

character

here,

eventually

not

flirted

the

of

with

disenchanted

most

reflex, w h i l e t h e crudities of M c C a r t h y i s m h a d m a d e

less

highly

risky

fashionable,

socially

acceptable,

and

political counterparts, w h o

tune w i t h the m o o d of the e l e c t o r a t e — r e s p o n d e d

sounded

the slogans voiced b y the N e w Left

of

strong

anti-anticompolitically

than fellow-traveling. Thus m a n y doctrinaire

unlike their pragmatic

liberals—

were

more

to the fact

The

downgrading

t h a t it h a d

become

that

ex-

idealism.

of

orderly

a buttress

legal of

procedure,

conservative

on

the

ground

institutions,

tributed directly to the crisis of l e g i t i m a c y of t h e A m e r i c a n

con-

system.

T h i s crisis is c l e a r l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e u n w i l l i n g n e s s of a m a j o r tor of t h e d o m i n a n t

liberal c o m m u n i t y

to insist o n

legal

sec-

proce-

dures. T h e a m b i v a l e n c e of so m a n y p r o m i n e n t liberals, a n d inclination

in

democratic; their un-

democratic procedures w e r e excused as examples of youthful uberance and admirable

of

commu-

them, the fear of b e i n g "outflanked o n the left" r e m a i n e d a

munism

the

least

to rationalize

abuses

by

militants—reflecting

their

in

part

their highly permissive educational c o n c e p t s — c o n v e y e d the w e a k ening liberal c o m m i t m e n t

to w h a t has traditionally b e e n

a

vital

ingredient of d e m o c r a c y : respect for majority rule as expressed established democratic

The Price of Victorious

Skepticism

T h i s crisis of liberal v a l u e s ( a n d t h e N e w L e f t q u i t e

accurately

d i a g n o s e d it a s s u c h a n d t h e r e b y g a i n e d c o n f i d e n c e i n its on

liberal

democracy)

by

procedures.

is in

turn

related

to

more

basic

attack causes.

Liberalism w a s initially not only an expression of a relevant, ern, a n d h u m a n e r e s p o n s e to t h e conditions c r e a t e d b y

mod-

industrial-

ism but also an attack on the then prevailing orthodoxies.

These

orthodoxies, r o o t e d in t h e traditional society, w e r e a b l e n d of

re-

ligious

re-

views

and

conservative

instincts

reinforced

by,

and

The Crisis of Liberalism inforcing,

established

church

and

rural-aristocratic

{

241

institutions.

T h e liberal attack o n these d e e p l y ingrained orthodoxies a n d beliefs w a s part of the e m e r g i n g

mood

of rationalism

and

skepti-

cism. This m o o d w a s remarkably well suited to the n e e d s of new

industrial age.

Liberals

reflected the

spirit of

the

the times

in

attacking institutionalized religion; t h e y w e r e fashionable in their anti-Catholicism; t h e y w e r e m o d e r n a n d m o d e r n i z i n g in a t t a c k i n g the rural-aristocratic c o n c e p t s of life. T h e y w e r e also successful,

and by the mid-twentieth

century

remarkably

the United

States

h a d b e c o m e a n e s s e n t i a l l y s e c u l a r society, its m a s s m e d i a a n d educational system d o m i n a t e d — e x c e p t for parochial

its

schools—by

an essentially rationalist a n d skeptical philosophy. Liberal success also m a r k e d the b e g i n n i n g of the liberal W i t h success c a m e evidence that the United States w a s a society without institutions.

The

any mass

integrating media

values

could

not

or integrating replace

crisis.

becoming cultural

religion

as

the

source of integration, since their orientation w a s itself d e v o i d

of

more fundamental concerns, and unalloyed nationalism alone

was

clearly

a

not

enough

when

danger

to

liberal

it e m e r g e d

values.

as the

Skepticism

triumphant

was

simply

antithesis

of

tional religion. T h e gravitation of s o m e doctrinaire liberals the radical left w a s h e n c e success. had

Understandably

always

combated,

also partially a c o n s e q u e n c e

unable

these

to turn toward the

doctrinaire

liberals

traditoward

of

their

values

they

were

attracted

to the m o r e intensely h e l d beliefs of the radical left, since beliefs were

similarly

derived

m o s t liberals, h o w e v e r ,

from

a rejection

of

the turn to the extreme

the

such

old.

For

left w a s not

a c c e p t a b l e solution, for it i n v o l v e d a b e t r a y a l of their democratic ideals. But what, they w e r e forced to ask

an

traditional themselves,

w a s to b e the s u b s t a n c e of a victorious skepticism? Belief

is a n i m p o r t a n t

social cement.

A

society

that does

b e l i e v e i n a n y t h i n g is a s o c i e t y i n a s t a t e o f d i s s o l u t i o n . T h e ing

of

common

aspirations

and

a

unifying

faith

not shar-

is e s s e n t i a l

c o m m u n i t y life. T h i s is a f a c t t h a t t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y

a n d s k e p t i c a l l i b e r a l is b e g i n n i n g t o c o n f r o n t , e s p e c i a l l y a s a s e q u e n c e of his a m b i v a l e n c e in d e f e n d i n g p r o c e d u r a l

to

doctrinaire con-

democracy.

2

5 4 }

TV:

The American Transition

I n d e e d , the chief beneficiaries of this liberal c o n f u s i o n h a v e

been

the American conservatives who, though largely unresponsive the social d i l e m m a s of contemporary America, h a v e reaped ical

rewards

by

advocating

nationalism,

private

to

polit-

property,

and

constitutional order. From

the standpoint

of the liberal w h o sees himself

as a

g r e s s i v e f o r c e , b e l i e f is n e c e s s a r y t o t h e e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l

pro-

assimila-

tion of c h a n g e . T h e social costs of t h e a b s e n c e of c o n v i c t i o n

and

t h e p a r a l y z i n g effects of s k e p t i c i s m as a ruling principle h a v e most

graphically

shown

by

t h e liberal's

ambivalent

been

response

the n e w b l a c k challenge. T h e liberal w a s in the forefront of s t r u g g l e f o r r a c i a l e q u a l i t y a s l o n g as it w a s o p p o s e d b y t h e servatives;

the

conservative

dams

had

crumbled

con-

and

the

black e m e r g e d with d e m a n d s that w e r e n o longer defined for

him

b y the w h i t e liberal, t h e liberal b e c a m e baffled. This w a s the

case

in N e w

once

to the

York City's struggle over c o m m u n i t y

control

of

schools,

a n d it w a s a l s o t h e c a s e at C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y , w h e r e a r m e d students presented

their d e m a n d s

As a consequence,

some

liberals

in the form appeared

of an

to turn

conservative:

they rejected black d e m a n d s for separate social institutions. turned into undifferentiated capitulators:

they

black

ultimatum.

granted

d e m a n d s i n a n a t t e m p t t o e x p i a t e t h e i r g u i l t as w h i t e

Others

all

black

men.

0

Yet w h a t society n e e d e d m o s t in this t i m e of transition w a s actly tional

what

the

enemy

liberal—uncertain

was

of

prostrate—found

himself most

because

difficult to

his

ex-

tradi-

provide:

definition of his principles, an affirmation of his convictions, a willingness to act on his devotion to liberal democracy.

a

and

Ameri-

* It is truly remarkable that no prominent liberal educator was willing to say to his black students: 4T will not engage in reverse discrimination by granting indiscriminately any demands that you choose to make simply because you are black. I will treat you as I treat all my students. The era of discrimination is over and I will not return to it under a new guise. I can understand the psychological roots of your demands, as well as some of your fears in having to compete with better prepared whites. I will, therefore, do everything I can to remedy the situation, even at considerable cost and organizational effort, but I will not grant those demands which will have the effect of perpetuating your exclusion from this society."

The Crisis of Liberalism can blacks also n e e d e d assimilation

of

any

such a response

ethnic

or

racial

{

243

from the liberal, for

group

into

society

the

requires

stable institutions and defined, t h o u g h not dogmatic, values. integration of blacks, difficult e n o u g h

under most

The

circumstances,

b e c o m e s h o p e l e s s if e x i s t i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d v a l u e s f a i l t o

provide

a f r a m e w o r k resilient e n o u g h to absorb the strains inherent in

the

unprecedented

so-

cietal

entrance of a large racial minority into e q u a l

participation.

The

a n d e v e n racist y o u n g

emergence

of

black leadership

radical, was

antidemocratic,

doubtless

d u e to the w h i t e community's slow response to black it w a s also, h o w e v e r ,

due

to the

growing

contempt

primarily

aspirations; by the

New

Left and younger black leaders for democratic procedures and their realization that s u c h c o n t e m p t could b e expressed w i t h punity, g i v e n the liberal's o w n a m b i v a l e n c e a b o u t the

belief.

T h e ramifications of this situation w e r e e v e n broader a n d

of

liberal

values

by

the

they led to increased

lower-middle-class

im-

legitimacy

of d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s a n d t h e m e a n i n g of d e m o c r a t i c

ically m o r e painful to the liberal:

to

polit-

rejection

blue-collar

workers,

w h o b e g a n to v i e w the doctrinaire liberal as their natural

enemy.

T o an industrial w o r k e r of the 1930s the s y m b o l of the class

enemy

w a s a rich capitalist b a n k e r or industrialist. E v e n as late as Harry

Truman

appealing replaced:

was

able

to bring

to that sentiment.

By

the class e n e m y w a s

about

the late

an

electoral

1960s

1948

victory

that s y m b o l

the black, b a c k e d b y

a

by was

dogmatic

liberal intellectual, preferably a college professor. There has been an undeniable

e l e m e n t of justice in t h e

blue-collar American's r e s e n t m e n t of the liberal's social

white

idealism.

T h e long d e l a y e d a n d imperatively n e e d e d racial revolution launched

in

the

United

States

by

the

comfortably

established

u p p e r m i d d l e class at a relatively l o w cost to themselves; the less

financially

secure a n d less racially tolerant w h i t e

class w h o b o r e the brunt of the c h a n g e in education, and in social mores.

To

many

was

in

it

was

working housing,

industrial w o r k e r s it s e e m e d

that

the rich w e r e not sharing t h e e c o n o m i c costs of the revolution hiring practices or in social p r o g r a m s ,

and that the militant

in lib-

2

5 4 }

TV: The American Transition

erals w e r e

unwilling to m a k e

the

compromises

necessary

tain broader p o p u l a r a c c e p t a n c e of painful social

to

ob-

readjustments.*

T h e resentment of the N e w Left b y m u c h of the A m e r i c a n

public

thus tended to b e coupled with white industrial labors feeling betrayal b y the liberal forces, again to the a d v a n t a g e of the

of

more

conservative e l e m e n t s in A m e r i c a n politics. This

sense

of

disaffection

was

intensified

by

the

frustrations

bred b y the t e n d e n c y to multiply governmental agencies in

order

to o b t a i n p o s i t i v e social c h a n g e s , f H e r e t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e

prag-

matic liberal m e r g e d w i t h the ideological preferences of his trinaire counterpart. remote, vast, a n d

The

combination

of abstract

theory

complex instrumentality had m u c h

to do

the alienation a n d irritation felt b y w h i t e sectors of the

doc-

with

a

with

American

public.

* It is striking that it was only in the wake of the 1968 presidential elections that organizations such as the Americans for Democratic Action began to stress the need to remedy the liberal's neglect, and even abuse, of the industrial working class. On the eve of the presidential elections, a series of newspaper articles in The New York Times explored the ethnic and economic sources of northern-urban support for Wallace, repeatedly pointing its finger at the Slavic ethnic minority. Subsequently, it turned out that both in that election (in which, according to the NBC voting profile, Wallace obtained nationally 22 per cent of the Italian ethnic vote, 17.8 per cent of the Slavic, and 13 per cent of the Jewish [Newsweek, November 11, 1968, pp. 35-36]) and in the 1969 metropolitan elections the conservative swing was a much more generalized case of urban disaffection with the liberal approach. f "We now have ten times as many government agencies concerned with city problems as we had in 1939. We have increased by a factor of a thousand or so the number of reports and papers that have to be filled out before anything can be done in the city. Social workers in New York City spend some 70 or 80 per cent of their time filling out papers for Washington, for the state government in Albany, and for New York City. No more than 20 or 30 per cent of their time, that is, almost an hour and a half a day, is available for their clients, the poor. As James Reston reported in The New York Times (November 23, 1966), there were then 170 different federal aid programs on the books, financed by over 400 separate appropriations and administered by 21 federal departments and agencies aided by 150 Washington bureaus and over 400 regional offices. One Congressional session alone passed 20 health programs, 17 new educational programs, 15 new economic development programs, 12 new programs for the cities, 17 new resources development programs, and 4 new manpower training programs, each with its own administrative machinery" (Peter F. Drucker, "The Sickness of Government," The Public Interest, Winter 1969, p. 8 ) .

The Crisis of Liberalism N o r w a s it a l w a y s privileged

groups

in believing

that

good remedial

concerned. social

economic ill-being

social policy for the

Just as the

unrest

{

communists

(revolution)

was

under-

had

erred

the product

of

(exploitation), the doctrinaire liberal erred

in

assuming that e c o n o m i c progress w o u l d prompt social Both underestimated

well-being.

the psychological a n d spiritual

S o m e liberals s e n s e d this, a n d e x p e r i m e n t s

dimensions.

designed to

combine

social initiative, free enterprise, a n d g o v e r n m e n t a l support as R o b e r t

245

Kennedy's

Bedford-Stuyvesant

effort)

were

(such

meant

to

provide a n e w direction. Yet, t h o u g h c o m m u n i t y action as a b r o a d g o a l w a s a n o b l e i d e a , in p r a c t i c e it t o o b e c a m e a m e a n s o f ing the g a m e according to established political rules:

play-

organizing

to gain p o w e r in order either to extract m o r e public f u n d s or create a base for m o r e radical politics.

In the meantime, increased governmental intervention and liberate social e n g i n e e r i n g — t h e social c h a n g e

crosscutting

group

a blend

conflicts,

of

social

lic c o n s e n s u s a n d t h e alienation of t h e y o u n g e r finally

obtained

a

unique

opportunity

to

indifference, pub-

generation. do

much

Hav-

of

what

h e h a d long aspired to do, the pragmatic liberal discovered his intellectual arsenal, d e r i v e d f r o m a highly successful to

the

crisis

of

an

advanced

industrial

society,

of

operational

and political complexity that m a d e for b o t h a b r e a k d o w n of

ing

de-

latter d e r i v e d f r o m "theories"

and development—created

incompetence,

to

43

was

that

response

exhausted;

the doctrinaire liberal—confident that he h a d the right

remedies

and theory, impatient w i t h the s e e m i n g conservatism of the pragmatic p o w e r practitioner, and ambivalent toward the

more

anarch-

ism a n d totalitarianism of t h e N e w L e f t — u n d e r m i n e d the liberal's base of

support

by

destroying

c o m m i t m e n t to liberal The

contemporary

public confidence

in the

liberal's

democracy. liberal

thus

faces

the

threat

of

being

de-

prived of his greatest assets: his optimism, his faith in

America's

future, his vision. I n r e s p o n s e to t h e crisis that h e f e e l s

acutely—

and

than

has

in

many

conservative—the

respects

anticipated

more

correctly

liberal, especially the intellectual

the

doctrinarian,

tends m o r e a n d m o r e to w i t h d r a w into an ideological shell,

savor-

254

}

TV: The American Transition

ing t h e pleasures of indiscriminate attacks o n t h e n a t u r e of ican society

and

thoroughly

enjoying

apocalyptic

Amer-

predictions

of

A progressive society has b e e n defined as o n e that involves

an

the i m m i n e n t d o o m of this society.

Utopian

interplay of

goals a n d practical steps,44 b u t the

doctrinaire

liberal s e e m e d increasingly to offer society only a c o m b i n a t i o n

of

pedestrian prescriptions and dogmatic solutions. H i s attitude

to-

w a r d space exploration, w h i c h linked the explosion of

knowledge

with

suggestive.

The

deeply

felt

human

doctrinarians

cial opportunity politically

aspirations,

symbolically

response to the adventure,

provided

unwise,

is

and

by

the

space

psychologically

age

challenge, was

and

anachronistic.*

for c o n c e n t r a t i n g all a t t e n t i o n o n A m e r i c a ' s u n f i n i s h e d

His

call

terrestrial

business simply ignored the psychological fact that a nation c o m e s m o r e a w a r e o f its s h o r t c o m i n g s a s it e x p a n d s — r a t h e r contracts—its

so-

unimaginative,

bethan

ambitions.

It w a s t h e frontier tradition that stirred t h e A m e r i c a n

imagina-

* President Kennedy's goal of reaching the moon was the object of particular scorn. For example, Lewis Mumford asserted that "the moon landing program . . . is a symbolic act of war, and the slogan the astronauts will carry, proclaiming that it is for the benefit of mankind, is on the same level as the Air Force's monstrous hypocrisy—'Our Profession Is Peace.' . . . It is no accident that the climactic moon landing coincides with cutbacks in education, the bankruptcy of hospital services, the closing of libraries and museums, and the mounting defilement of the urban and natural environment, to say nothing of many other evidences of gross social failure and human deterioration" ( T h e New York Times, July 21, 1969). In contrast, Michael Harrington noted that "there is a certain puritanism on the Left whenever the question of space comes up. It is the fashion to denigrate spending money on heaven when the earth is still so shoddy. But this view ignores two important points. First, if peace were to break out, a massive cutback in the billions for defense plus the normal growth of a fullemployment economy would provide sufficient funds for rebuilding America ana going to the stars. Second, space is not empty of social, scientific, and even aesthetic significance. It could conceivably provide room for human beings, vast new resources for the development of the world, and it will certainly incite a deeper knowledge of both man and the universe. Beyond these pragmatic considerations, there is a moral imperative which requires that humanity live up to the fullness of its powers, and men can rightly boast that they have always experimented and innovated" (American Power in the Twentieth Century, p. 31).

The Crisis of Liberalism

{

tion, c r e a t e d a society of m o v e m e n t a n d g r o w t h , a n d g a v e i c a its i n t e g r a t i v e m y t h .

Scientific exploration,

including

tion of space, has b e c o m e the functional equivalent of frontier tradition,

and

such

endeavor

is i m m e d i a t e l y

247

Amer-

exploraAmericas

relevant

to

the educational a n d scientific attainments of the country. This not to argue

against

greater social expenditures.

I t is,

to argue that a broadly g a u g e d i m p r o v e m e n t of A m e r i c a n

society

will b e a deliberate b y - p r o d u c t of a society that thrusts w i t h its a c q u i r e d including process

those

energy, that seeks altogether n e w beyond

achieving

its i m m e d i a t e

greater

social

forward

objectives—

confines—thereby

consciousness

is

however,

and

in

the

successfully

confronting the u n r e s o l v e d p r o b l e m s of t h e past. Even

aside from

the possibility that the

of the space program

may

end

up by

technological

contributing

impact

more

to

the

resolution of c i t y - g h e t t o p r o b l e m s t h a n all t h e p r o g r a m m a t i c sociological

doctrines

currently

so

fashionable,

there

is

and

also

important international a s p e c t to the s p a c e effort: a major

an

world

p o w e r such as the U n i t e d States has to pioneer in those areas life w h i c h are historically relevant a n d crucial. T o the extent o u r s is a scientific a g e , t h e f a i l u r e of

States to

push

b e y o n d existing frontiers—and space offers a very dramatic

chal-

lenge—would mean

the

United

of

that

the loss of a major p s y c h o l o g i c a l

motivation

for i n n o v a t i o n . T h o u g h it m a y n o t b e p o p u l a r t o s a y so, t h e

fact

is t h a t a c o n t i n e n t a l s o c i e t y like t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d n o t

sur-

vive by becoming

it w o u l d

not

survive

i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y a n d it is n o t e v e n c e r t a i n t h a t it w o u l d

find

a

factory

balance

merely another

between

Sweden;

domestic

material

needs

and

aspirations. S p a c e e x p l o r a t i o n is m o r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e

tradi-

tion of a pioneering country w h o s e greatness has b e e n linked innovation ment, To

in

in constitutional

continental

many

arrangements,

exploration,

Americans,

and

in

contemporary

in e c o n o m i c scientific

liberalism

investigation. offers

b o t h a crisis of c o n f i d e n c e a n d of historical r e l e v a n c e . bleak

prospect

that

liberalism,

historically

with

develop-

neither

p r i n c i p l e n o r p r o g r e s s . T h e crisis o f A m e r i c a n l i b e r a l i s m is

the

satis-

spiritual

45

the

hence

It p r e s e n t s most

vital

2 54

}

TV:

The American Transition

source of innovation in contemporary A m e r i c a n b e c o m e the critical expression of a doctrinarian

democracy,

i n g l y r e a c t i v e in s p i t e of its r h e t o r i c — a n d a h a v e n f o r protest active

against shaping

somewhat

the

dehumanizing

of the

future passes

conservative

The End of Liberal

effects

but

of

philosophic

science,

into the hands

technologically

while

of

a

innovative

only

one

elite.*

Democracy?

American

lead to some

possibility.

f o r m of technological

Other

socio-economic

alternatives tensions

could

could

be

phase

managerialism be

more

and technological

is

extreme.

aggravated

by

loss of m o m e n t u m in e c o n o m i c g r o w t h a n d therefore in t h e of scientific research

the

socially

A technologically innovative and politically conservative that w o u l d

may

minority—increas-

development—an

the pace

impor-

tant s o u r c e of n a t i o n a l pride. Racial strife, u r b a n guerrilla

activity,

a n d alienation of the young,

national

split over America's down

of national

in addition to a p r o f o u n d

g l o b a l role, c o u l d result in a further

consensus

and

the extreme right to capitalize

lead either the

break-

extreme

on America's political

left

or

disintegra-

tion b y attempting to seize power. O n balance, t h e c h a n c e s for t h e success of a serious

revolution-

ary attempt do not appear to b e very good. T o b e c o m e tive revolutionary

instrument the present

New

not only to relate m o r e m e a n i n g f u l l y to the n e w issues our times but also to develop the techniques,

an

quire

modern, the

technologically

transformation

of

advanced a

t h e skills, a n d

society.

somewhat

This

petulant

have

confronting

organizational forms required to effect a revolution in the most

effec-

Left would

the

world's

would

re-

middle-class

* Though public opinion can shift dramatically, it is worth noting that in 1969 polls showed that a consistent majority of younger people and those with college education were in favor of increased space exploration; those opposed were most numerous among the more elderly and among those with grade-school education (cf. Gallup poll, as cited by The New York Times, August 7, 1969, and Harris poll, The Washington Post, August 25, 1969). At the same time, college graduates tended to favor more energetic law enforcement, including more wire tapping (Gallup poll, as cited by The New York Times, August 21, 1969).

The Crisis of Liberalism youth

{

249

movement, supported from a safe distance b y some

sectors

of the m o r e esoteric u r b a n intellectual c o m m u n i t y , into an

organ-

ization w i t h a systematic theory of action that takes into

account

the

of

specificity

of

contemporary

America.

SDS

worship

G u e v a r a , a t r a g i c rural r e b e l , a n d its g r o w i n g r e l i a n c e o n Marxist-Leninist

phraseology

may

be

a compensation

Che turgid

f o r its

a b i l i t y t o m a k e t h a t a d a p t a t i o n , b u t it h a r d l y a u g u r s its

in-

emergence

as an effective revolutionary force. T h e r e is a s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r e v o l u t i o n a r y and

revolutionary

success.

Revolutionary

rorism, sabotage, selective assassinations,

activity

activity—through urban guerrilla

is p o s s i b l e a n d e v e n l i k e l y i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 7 0 s . I t w i l l c o m e n o t t h e N e w L e f t b u t f r o m its e m e r g i n g s u c c e s s o r — t h e

and

confusion but

from

those

among

them

b e e n hardened, disillusioned, and embittered b y their in prisons a n d penitentiaries. prepared the

for real violence,

sitdowns

and

the

raids

These

and on

men

they

will b e

offices.

w o u l d then have to confront a major internal

infuse

who

experiences

as child's

American

as

well

as

the

coercive

might

of

play

society

threat.

B u t e v e n then the collective w e i g h t of political a n d social tutions,

it

have

psychologically

will dismiss

deans'

from

professionally

Violent Left; not from the idealistic y o u n g people w h o with zeal

ter-

strife—

organized

insti-

authority,

w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y prevail. A s l o n g as the N e w L e f t largely i n e f f e c t i v e in its s p o r a d i c r e l i a n c e o n v i o l e n c e ,

remains

it w i l l

be

s p a r e d ; s h o u l d it b e c o m e t h e V i o l e n t L e f t , s u p p r e s s i o n w o u l d

be

its a l m o s t c e r t a i n f a t e . T h e

f a c t is t h a t r e v o l u t i o n s

are

historical

rarities, a n d in m o d e r n t i m e s their s u c c e s s h a s g e n e r a l l y

required

a c o m b i n a t i o n of internal social dissolution a n d external

military

defeat.

The

organization

of

power

must

itself

break

elites m u s t b e split, t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c s y s t e m m u s t

down,

the

malfunction,

an alternative leadership m u s t crystallize, a n d the m o r e

creative

social forces m u s t be, at least in significant part, c o n v i n c e d a b e t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e is a v a i l a b l e . S h o r t of t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s ,

that

reliance

o n r e v o l u t i o n a r y v i o l e n c e is likely to b r e e d s u p p r e s s i o n , a n d

even

effectively brutal suppression. *

* On this point there is agreement among such dissimilar observers as the

2

5 4 } The

TV:

The American Transition

suppression

of

the

Violent

Left

would

almost

certainly

p u s h t h e country to the right. O r g a n i z e d coercion w o u l d the

introduction

of

a variety

of

controls

over

the

require

individual.

undertaken systematically b y the legitimate institutions, the ess w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y s t r e n g t h e n

the conservative

forces;

would

if

undertaken

ineffectively,

it

prompt

right-wing vigilantism, b a s e d on a variety of paramilitary

Such a coup would

require the development

of

proc-

political

probably

tions. B u t e v e n t h e n a right-extremist c o u p s e e m s m o s t

forma-

unlikely.

a degree

ganizational cohesion and conceptual relevance that seems

of

The would

more

likely probability,

or-

beyond

the capability of the e x t r e m e rightists—most of w h o m h a v e left b e h i n d b y the p a c e of A m e r i c a n

If

been

change.46

then,

is that

sporadic

lead to a polarization of public opinion,

with

civil the

strife Demo-

cratic Party gradually b e c o m i n g identified w i t h s o m e

of t h e

extreme N e w

Republican

L e f t positions a n d / o r splitting, a n d the

less

Party striving to exploit this situation a n d to consolidate a national conservative majority. This could c o m e about gradually; the

more

National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and Barrington Moore, a severe critic of the present American system. The commission concluded that "collective violence seldom succeeds as an instrument for accomplishing group objectives. It can succeed when one group so overpowers its opponents that they have no choice but to die or desist. But modern governments are much more likely to succeed in such contests than their opponents. "In the contemporary United States, attempts at revolution from the left are likely to invite massive repression from the right. The occurrence of violence in the context of protest activities is highly likely to alienate groups that are not fundamentally in sympathy with the protesters. "The chronicles of American labor conflicts suggest that violence, when it occurred, was almost always ineffective for the workers involved. The more violent the conflict, the more disastrous the consequences for the workers" (conclusions of a report to the Commission on Violence in America, The New York Times, June 6, 1969). Very much in the same vein, Moore warned that the prospects for an urban revolution in America are very dim and that successful radical revolutions have so far failed to provide "a lasting contribution to human freedom" ("Revolution in America?" The New York Review of Books, January 30, 1969, p. 10. See also the thoughtful study by Bruce Smith, "The Politics of Protest: How Effective Is Violence?" Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, July 1968).

The Crisis of Liberalism adventuresome empted

by

Agnew's

aspects

the

call

more

for

a

of

the

American

conservative

mission

to

dream

leaders

Mars),

(for

while

{

would

251

be

pre-

example,

Spiro

lower-middle-class

America's disillusionment w i t h liberalism, resentment of the

N e w

Left, a n d fear of the blacks w o u l d p r o m p t

con-

centration on order that concern

such an extreme

w i t h progress in race

relations

would b e c o m e merely w i n d o w dressing and eventually fade the public agenda. T h e e m e r g e n c e of a more reactionary response w o u l d neither b e dramatic nor have the overt

from

political overtones

of fascism. This

process

could be

accelerated

by

the

doctrinaire

liberals'

determination either to r e m o l d the D e m o c r a t i c Party in their

own

i m a g e or to create their o w n political party. T h e insistence o n doctrinaire response to complexity and the impatience with generalized

compromises

in t i m e s

historical

of

are characteristic

discontinuity;

social

as has

been

more

manifestations already

t h e y are particularly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e y o u n g a n d of

noted,

marginal

m e m b e r s of society. T h e political c o n s e q u e n c e w o u l d b e an greater s q u e e z e o n the p r a g m a t i c , less ideological liberals, from one side by engineering other

by

the doctrinarians

advocating

conservatives

preaching

the

even

pressed

large-scale

a n d opting out of external challenges

the

a

and

merits

of

social

from

social

the con-

solidation a n d of n e w scientific frontiers. T h e latent anti-intellectualism of a great m a n y

Americans—in-

tensified b y college disorders, aggravated b y the a m b i v a l e n c e the intellectuals, a n d s h a r p e n e d b y class hostility t o w a r d bellious offspring of m i d d l e - c l a s s A m e r i c a — c o u l d also public

support

matching

the

for

the

perilous

country's challenge

educational from

the

the

undermine

institutions,

left w i t h

an

issues, sorts

politicized: with

of

either constantly agitated over

its f a c u l t i e s

extraneous

and

matters

students and

passing

increasingly

thus

equally

perilous challenge f r o m the right. T h e A m e r i c a n university become

would

nonacademic

resolutions injecting

on

assemblies

and

trustees w h o

all

political

criteria into their intellectual pursuits; or subject to stricter side control b y conservative

of re-

out-

would

} impose mia.°

IV: The American Transition their political biases

The

itself

be

resulting

a

grave

on the

destruction

symptom

of

of the

internal workings the

liberal

decline

of

of

acade-

university

would

American

liberal

democracy, f In such equitable trends

a context,

the

multi-racial

augur

a

already

society

worsening

staggering

could

crisis

unless

a m e l i o r a t i o n is p r o m p t l y u n d e r t a k e n . ence are

or, e v e n two

equally

in America: Either

worse,

one

public

horrendous

suppression could

be

of

the

pressures

toward

a

creating

social

for

only

such

effort

and/or

and would

their

context

itself

Suppression,

separation. a

more

generate

of

over-

including

s t r i f e , f o r t h e A m e r i c a n b l a c k is n o l o n g e r p l i a n t a n d , whites

would

flock

to his side. T h o u g h

desperation

suppression

at the a b s e n c e

of

scope

of

American

democracy

has

deepened

major

could black

progress—

the price p a i d w o u l d b e a tragic reversal of the process b y the

ef-

moreover,

effectively b e u n d e r t a k e n — e s p e c i a l l y in the w a k e of m a s s i v e uprisings p r o m p t e d b y

there

relations

forts at s o m e f o r m of s e p a r a t e resettlement, w o u l d i n v o l v e

many

at

indiffer-

efforts,

white-black

in the

an

Present

Assuming public

blacks

reaction.

of

hopeless.

major

toward

prospects

reactionary political atmosphere whelming

47

hostility

undertaken

task

become

and

which

enlarged

over the course of the country's history. Another democracy.

threat, More

less

overt

directly

but

no

less basic,

linked to the i m p a c t

confronts

liberal

of technology,

involves the gradual a p p e a r a n c e of a m o r e controlled a n d

it

directed

* Examples of this are provided by the Columbia University Senate's first major act in 1969, which was to express its judgment on the Vietnam war, and by the objections of UCLA's trustees to a young black philosophy professor because of her political associations. f The long-range consequences of the attack on the universities appear to be of little concern to the New Left. For example, the demand for the separation of defense research from universities could create a separate complex of government-operated military research institutes whose secrecy would shield their operations from outside intellectual influence, as is true in the Soviet Union. This is precisely what has already happened in the case of bacteriological-warfare devices, which were developed in closed governmental research laboratories far removed from the overview of the scientific community. The removal of ROTC could similarly accelerate rather than slow down the emergence of a separate large professional career-officer corps —in other words, a warrior caste.

{

The Crisis of Liberalism society.

Such

a society

would

be

dominated

by

an elite

253

whose

claim to political p o w e r w o u l d rest o n allegedly superior scientific k n o w - h o w . U n h i n d e r e d b y the restraints of traditional liberal valu e s , this elite w o u l d n o t h e s i t a t e to a c h i e v e its p o l i t i c a l e n d s

by

using the latest m o d e r n techniques for influencing public behavior a n d keeping society u n d e r close surveillance a n d control. such circumstances, of

the country

the

would

scientific and

not be

reversed

technological but

would

Under

momentum

actually

feed

o n t h e s i t u a t i o n it e x p l o i t s . T h e e m e r g e n c e of a large d o m i n a n t party, a l o n g s i d e t h e

more

narrowly focused and more intensely doctrinaire groupings o n right a n d the left, c o u l d a c c e l e r a t e the trend t o w a r d s u c h logical managerialism.

the

techno-

Such a large dominant party w o u l d

com-

b i n e A m e r i c a n society's q u e s t for stability w i t h its historical affinity for innovation.

Relying

on

scientific g r o w t h

to p r o d u c e

m e a n s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h s o c i a l ills, it w o u l d t a p t h e n a t i o n s lectual talent for broad target planning and exploit the

the

intel-

existence

of doctrinaire g r o u p s b y u s i n g t h e m as social b a r o m e t e r s a n d s o u r c e s of n o v e l i d e a s . P e r s i s t i n g social crisis, t h e e m e r g e n c e of charismatic

personality,

and

the

exploitation

of

mass

media

as a to

obtain public confidence w o u l d b e the steppingstones in the piecem e a l transformation of the U n i t e d States into a highly

controlled

society. *

0 This could also produce a historical paradox. The traditionally democratic American society could, because of its fascination with technical efficiency, become an extremely controlled society, and its humane and individualistic qualities would thereby be lost. (Such a society is the subject of Kurt Vonnegut's novel Player Piano.) On the other hand, the communist countries, because of their organizational inefficiency and the gradual loosening of political controls, might become more preoccupied with questions of humanism; their socialist inefficiency, combined with these more humane concerns, could eventually produce a more flexible social order in some of them. It should, however, be noted that this extremely unlikely prospect is applicable only to the more advanced communist countries. The weight of the political tradition and great power aspirations of the Russian form of communism, as well as the relative socio-economic backwardness of most communist states, argue against it. For a critique of the concept of convergence, i.e., the evolution of a communist system into a traditional liberal democracy, see the concluding chapter of the book I wrote with Samuel Huntington, Political Power: USA/USSR, New York, 1964.

2

54 }

TV: The American Transition

In different ways, might

find

cial control

both

the

doctrinarian

and

the

conservative

the temptations inherent in the n e w t e c h n i q u e s of too

difficult to

resist.

The

inclination

of

the

naire left to legitimize m e a n s b y ends could lead t h e m

to

justify

m o r e s o c i a l c o n t r o l o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t it s e r v e s p r o g r e s s . T h e servatives, preoccupied w i t h public order a n d fascinated b y ern gadgetry, w o u l d b e t e m p t e d

to u s e the n e w

Such

an outcome—were

it t o c o m e

conmod-

techniques

response to unrest, since they w o u l d fail to recognize that c o n t r o l is n o t t h e o n l y w a y t o d e a l w i t h r a p i d s o c i a l

so-

doctri-

as

a

social

change.

to p a s s — w o u l d

represent

a profoundly pessimistic answer to the question whether

American

liberal d e m o c r a c y can assimilate a n d give philosophical t o t h e r e v o l u t i o n it is u n d e r g o i n g .

meaning

This matter not only has

v a n c e f o r t h e U n i t e d States; it h a s l a r g e r i m p l i c a t i o n s :

rele-

American

success or failure m a y p r o v i d e a significant indication w h e t h e r modern democracy with highly educated citizens can u n d e r g o a n e x t e n s i v e s o c i a l c h a n g e w i t h o u t l o s i n g its democratic

character.

Fortunately,

the

contains the potential for an American

American

redemption.

a

successfully essentially

transition

also

MMMM

PART V

America and the World America's relationship w i t h the world m u s t reflect domestic values and preoccupations.

American

A profound discrepancy

be-

t w e e n t h e e x t e r n a l c o n d u c t of a d e m o c r a t i c s o c i e t y a n d its i n t e r n a l n o r m s is n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e ; m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s q u i c k l y

expose

the gulf and undercut the support n e e d e d

policy.

f o r its f o r e i g n

Just as a n a t i o n p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e c o m m u n i s t threat at

home

can conduct a vigorously anti-communist policy abroad, or a tion fearful of revolution c a n b e c o m e intensely involved in terrevolutionary activity, so a nation concerned w i t h social and

technological

adaptation

committed on an international In his

cannot

help

but

become

justice

similarly

level.

Second Treatise on Government,

John Locke wrote,

in t h e b e g i n n i n g , all t h e w o r l d w a s A m e r i c a . " T o d a y all t h e is A m e r i c a , in t h e s e n s e t h a t A m e r i c a is t h e

first

. . world

to experience

social, psychological, political, a n d i d e o l o g i c a l d i l e m m a s by mans

na-

coun-

the

produced

s u d d e n acquisition of altogether u n p r e c e d e n t e d

over his e n v i r o n m e n t a n d o v e r himself. T h e third A m e r i c a n

power revo-

255

2

5^ }

V; America and the World

lution, occurring in an era of volatile beliefs a n d of rapidly

spread-

ing technological change, thus clearly dictates America's role:

that

of the

man

but

social innovator,

without

exploiting

dogmatically

science

prescribing

the

in the service of destiny

of

man.

The

success of A m e r i c a in building a healthy democratic society

would

h o l d p r o m i s e f o r a w o r l d still d o m i n a t e d b y i d e o l o g i c a l a n d

racial

conflicts, b y only

would

economic be

a

a n d social injustice.

setback

for trends

America's

under

way

failure

since

the

not

great

revolutions of the late eighteenth century b u t c o u l d signify a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l h u m a n failure: man's inability to o v e r c o m e his

baser

instincts a n d his capitulation before the complexity a n d p o w e r

of

science.

1. The American Future If t h e p r o b l e m s t h a t c o n f r o n t A m e r i c a w e r e

neither

nized nor anticipated, the inherent dangers w o u l d b e even

recoggreater.

S u c h is n o t t h e c a s e . C o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a is p e r h a p s m o r e didly

critical

and

more

demanding

of

itself

than

any

ciety: national reports pinpointing the society's failures, ing critiques of national shortcomings, stocktaking—all

reflect

sober national mood. scale

(both

endowed

by

a

more

elaborate

introspective

academic

commissions

social

deliberately

S t u d i e s of t h e future, o r g a n i z e d

special

so-

devastat-

efforts at and

can-

other

on a

large

by

well-

and

private institutes), indicate mounting national

recogni-

tion that the future can a n d must b e planned, that unless there a m o d i c u m of deliberate choice, c h a n g e will result in chaos.*

is

This

* The concern is not limited to intellectuals but includes businessmen as well. Thus, in March 1969 Fortune unveiled a plan to remedy the condition of "a second-rate nation with a civilization only half-built/' offering a pro-

The American Future does

not

guarantee

that

a

national

response

will

{273

actually

m o u n t e d , b u t it d o e s i n d i c a t e a m o r e p e r v a s i v e a w a r e n e s s leading sectors of society of the n e e d for a deliberate

be

among

response.

T h e historical vitality of the U n i t e d States system derives

from

the deeply rooted c o m m i t m e n t of the American people to the of

democratic

change.

The

American

a n d of hierarchically u n f e t t e r e d been

an

important

factor

in

tradition

of f r e e

idea

dialogue

expression of d i s a g r e e m e n t 1

developing

this

c h a n g e ; it h a s m a d e it p o s s i b l e t o e x p l o i t p r o t e s t m o v e m e n t s thereby

render

adopting violence

them

historically

their programs. in A m e r i c a n

superfluous)

by

T h i s is t o d e n y n e i t h e r

history

nor

the

has

responsiveness

oft-noted

to

(and

adapting

and

the element

of

conservatism

of

the electorate. Nevertheless, the f u n d a m e n t a l reality of

American

life has b e e n the assimilation of the rapid c h a n g e i n d u c e d b y frontier, b y

immigration,

socio-economic servatism

and

reality has

and

created

in the past p r o v e n

by

industrial

blended

a pluralist

with

growth.

A

a certain political

socio-political

itself to b e r e m a r k a b l y

system

resilient in

the

dynamic con-

that

has

absorbing

e x t r a o r d i n a r y c h a n g e ; it p o s s e s s e s a s t r u c t u r a l q u a l i t y c a p a b l e generating

and

deciphering

warning

signals

of

mounting

of

social

stress. T o d a y ' s A m e r i c a h a s set h i g h e r s t a n d a r d s for itself t h a n h a s other society: equality,

at

it a i m s a t c r e a t i n g r a c i a l h a r m o n y

achieving

social

welfare

while

on the basis

preserving

less—but

in

its

ambitious

S t a t e s m i g h t b e less w e r e it t o

goals

America

retains

its

of

personal

liberty, at eliminating p o v e r t y w i t h o u t shackling individual dom. Tensions in the U n i t e d

any

freeseek

innovative

character. Though the N e w

L e f t — a n d particularly the Violent

Left—has

gram for extensive rehabilitation of the nation. It would require a massive public and private effort. See also a more extensive study by Leonard A. Lecht, Goals, Priorities and Dollars: The Next Decade (New York, 1966), which outlines in extraordinary detail a plan for allocating the GNP for various tasks of national renewal, with special concentration on the scientific-technological and ecological structure of society.

2

58 }

V: America and the World

temporarily tionary likely

served

trends,

the

to p e r m e a t e

to fortify socially conservative impatience the

of

the

socio-political

young system,

is

or e v e n

more

especially

b e g i n to o c c u p y m o r e influential positions a n d m a k e sponsive

to the

creasingly

need

for c h a n g e

international

and

experience

reform.

of

the

and business elite has already p r o m p t e d

reac-

and

more

as

they

it m o r e

Moreover,

American

a greater inclination

States from both the

there-

political

A s a result, m o r e A m e r i c a n s r e c o g n i z e that t h e t w o b r o a d of n e e d e d a n d — i t is t o b e h o p e d — d e v e l o p i n g and

former

largely,

sphere,

the

concerns

the

though

latter

the

cultural

to

content

not

the and

aspects

of

exclusively,

educational the

shaping

pertains

of

areas

change involve

American

domain,

to

countries.0

evolution a n d t h e social innovation of other a d v a n c e d

institutional

in-

intellectual

consider contemporary problems within a larger framework, b y drawing lessons for the United

re-

the

society.

to

the

political

particularly

national

the The

values.

as

it

More

d e l i b e r a t e c h a n g e in b o t h r e a l m s w o u l d s e r v e as a catalyst for ref o r m in o t h e r areas of n a t i o n a l life, p r o v i d i n g b o t h t h e and the motivation for the timely adoption of n e e d e d

Participatory

framework remedies.

Pluralism

T h e a p p r o a c h i n g t w o - h u n d r e d t h anniversary of the of I n d e p e n d e n c e c o u l d justify the call for a national convention to re-examine

Declaration

constitutional

the nations formal institutional

frame-

work. E i t h e r 1976 or 1 9 8 9 — t h e t w o - h u n d r e d t h anniversary of

the

C o n s t i t u t i o n — c o u l d serve as a suitable target d a t e for c u l m i n a t i n g a national d i a l o g u e o n the relevance of existing arrangements,

the

w o r k i n g s of t h e representative process, a n d the desirability of imitating t h e various E u r o p e a n regionalization reforms a n d of streamlining

the

administrative

structure.

More

important

still,

either

0 For example, it is now more candidly admitted that America has much to learn from Western Europe in metropolitan planning, in local urban planning, in regionalization, in the development of new towns, and in social and legal innovation.

The American Future

{ 273

date w o u l d provide a suitable occasion for redefining the of

modern

democracy—a

task

admittedly

challenging

n e c e s s a r i l y m o r e s o t h a n w h e n it w a s u n d e r t a k e n b y t h e f a t h e r s — a n d for setting ambitious a n d concrete social Realism,

however,

political innovation form, desirable

forces will not

us

as that w o u l d

scope

may

be

recognize

come

from

be.f

likely to d e v e l o p incrementally eventual

to

The

that

meaning but

goals.*

the

necessary

direct constitutional needed

change

is

far-reaching,

in the political sphere the increased of

make possible to the

lower

more

efficient

especially

of

flow

more

as

the

of

government

and

Thus,

coordination

of authority a n d society.

its

political

of i n f o r m a t i o n a n d

techniques

greater devolution levels

re-

a n d less overtly. Nonetheless,

process gradually assimilates scientific-technological change.

development

not

founding

the may

responsibility

In

the

past

the

division of p o w e r has traditionally c a u s e d p r o b l e m s of inefficiency, poor coordination, a n d dispersal of authority, b u t today the communications

and computation techniques make possible

increased authority at the l o w e r levels a n d almost instant

highly

advanced national

analytical

planning—in

methods, the

would

looser

also

French

make sense

both

national

coordination.! T h e rapid transferal of information, c o m b i n e d

broad

new

with

possible of

target

* For example, 1976 could provide a target date for a massive effort to terminate poverty as currently defined, or to bring Negro education up to the national average; 1989, for ecological targets. t For example, one simple—though admittedly unattainable—constitutional reform would go a long way toward making Congress more responsive to social evolution: the passage of a congressional equivalent of the Twentysecond Amendment limiting the presidential term of office, t These techniques could also be used to improve electoral procedures and to provide for closer consultation between the public and its representatives. Existing electoral machinery in the United States—in regard to both registration and voting procedure—has simply not kept up with innovation in electronic communications and computation. Reforms (such as electronic home-voting consoles) to make it possible for representatives of the public to consult their constituents rapidly, and for these constituents to express their views easily, are both technically possible and likely to develop in view of growing dissatisfaction with present machinery. More intense consultation, not necessarily only on the national level or only in regard to political institutions, would further enhance the responsiveness of the American social and political system.

26o }

V: America and the World

definition—not

only

concentrating

on

clearly defining ecological and cultural Technological

developments

ciety will require more ment

of t h e A m e r i c a n

and

make

more

economic

goals

but

it c e r t a i n

planning.

future will b e c o m e

that

modern

Deliberate

with

tor a n d manipulator. This will p u t a greater e m p h a s i s o n goals and, b y the s a m e token, on a more self-conscious

so-

manage-

widespread,

p l a n n e r e v e n t u a l l y d i s p l a c i n g t h e l a w y e r as t h e k e y social

tion with social ends. H o w

more

objectives.

the

legisladefining

preoccupa-

to c o m b i n e social p l a n n i n g w i t h

s o n a l f r e e d o m is a l r e a d y e m e r g i n g as t h e k e y d i l e m m a o f

per-

techne-

tronic America, replacing the industrial age's preoccupation balancing social n e e d s against requirements of free T h e strengthening of local, especially metropolitan, is a l r e a d y r e c o g n i z e d

as an urgent

process in the U n i t e d States. T h e sibility to l o w e r e c h e l o n s both the

flow

of t h e political

of better talent

and

government

necessity for the

devolution of system

greater

with

enterprise.

democratic

financial may

responencourage

local participation

more important local decision-making. National coordination local

participation

coordination.

This

could has

thus

already

be

wedded

been

tried

by

new

systems

successfully

in and

by

of

some

large businesses. The would

trend

toward

be

keeping

in

more with

sharp distinctions b e t w e e n tutions such as T V A

coordination the

but

American

less

centralization

tradition

of

blurring

public and private institutions.

or the F o r d

Foundation

perform

Insti-

functions

difficult for m a n y E u r o p e a n s to understand,

since they are

accustomed

between

either

to

differentiate

sphere and the private

sharply

the

more public

(as has b e e n typical of the industrial

or to s u b o r d i n a t e the private to the p u b l i c

( a s is f a v o r e d b y

socialists a n d s o m e liberals) or to absorb t h e private b y the lic ( a s has b e e n the case in c o m m u n i s t

political

issue

of

a

society

the pub-

states).

A t o n e t i m e t h e q u e s t i o n of o w n e r s h i p w a s and

age

undergoing

the decisive

social

modernization.

forms of land o w n e r s h i p customary in the feudal-agricultural w e r e e x t e n d e d t h r o u g h force of habit as w e l l as historical

The age

accom-

The American Future modation

into the industrial

age; o w n i n g

{273

a factory was

b e i n g largely the s a m e as o w n i n g a p i e c e of land. T h i s

seen

as

eventually

led to a severe conflict b e t w e e n

old forms and modes

of

ating

new

industrial

individual

rights

and

the

requirements

of

evalu-

organization, of collective e m p l o y e e rights, a n d of c h a n g e d political institutions. more

advanced

Socialism

one extreme

depersonalized

socio-

solution;

the

ownership

and gen-

accommodation.

The

corporate

in

the limited sharing of authority w i t h organized labor w a s the eral pattern of

West

was

q u e s t i o n of

ownership

was

thus redefined into o n e of control a n d regulation, w h i l e the of exploitation

associated

with

ownership

was

replaced

problems concerning the economic participation cal w e l l - b e i n g of the

and

by

question

new

psychologi-

employed.

In the process, e v e n in A m e r i c a the federal g o v e r n m e n t as the k e y

issue

institution for restructuring

of the extent of

emerged

social relations,

t h e state's role in e c o n o m i c

and

the

affairs

be-

c a m e crucial. U n l i k e the agricultural age, during w h i c h f e w

state

institutions w e r e involved in organizing and assisting man's

daily

existence, the industrial age p r o d u c e d both greater

opportunities

for national direction a n d a greater social d e m a n d for g o v e r n m e n t imposed seemed

social the

justice.

only

More

alternative

centralized to

chaos

direction

and

the

only

by

the

state

response

to

social injustice. Our age has b e e n m o v i n g toward a n e w pattern, blurring tinctions

between

public

and

private

bodies

and

m o r e cross-participation in b o t h b y their e m p l o y e e s a n d In Europe co-determination but

has

increasingly

led

not only has involved

to participation

members.

profit-sharing

in policymaking;

sures in the s a m e direction are clearly building u p in the States as well. A t t h e s a m e time, t h e w i d e n i n g social

dis-

encouraging

presUnited

perspectives

of the A m e r i c a n business c o m m u n i t y are likely to increase the v o l v e m e n t of business executives in social problems, t h e r e b y

in-

merg-

ing private and public activity on both the local and the

national

levels. This m i g h t in turn m a k e for m o r e effective social

applica-

tion of t h e n e w

bureau-

management

techniques,

which,

unlike

262} cratized

V: America and the World governmental

procedures,

and responsive to external

have

proved

both

efficient

stimuli.0

Such participatory pluralism m a y prove reasonably effective subordinating science and technology for s o m e the introduction

of

to social ends.

the machine

was

In the

t e c h n o l o g y is s e e n b y s o m e m o d e r n c o n s e r v a t i v e s a s t h e of a h a p p y n e w

as t h e

symbol

of

social evil.2

Yet

the

beginning many

replacing

crucial

issue

mains the e n d s to w h i c h science a n d t e c h n o l o g y are applied, a s o c i e t y i n w h i c h e f f e c t i v e c o o r d i n a t i o n is c o m b i n e d w i t h tralization

is m o r e

likely

to

crystallize

the

necessary

of

today

a g e b e c a u s e it p r o m i s e s t o f r e e m a n f r o m

s o c i a l p r o b l e m s , w h i l e f o r t h e N e w L e f t t e c h n e t r o n i c s is property

past

the beginning

Utopia; f o r o t h e r s it m e a n t t h e u n l e a s h i n g o f e v i l . S i m i l a r l y ,

in

reand

decen-

discussion

a n d reflection. Scientific expertise c a n t h e n b e m o b i l i z e d for social ends

without

granting

scientists

a dominating

political

c a u s e of their scientific credentials, f P a r t i c i p a t o r y

role

pluralism

bewill

* This is especially ironic since the government has sponsored the transfer of many technological innovations from defense to private industry (see R. Lester and G. Howick, Assessing Technology Transfer, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1966, especially pp. 42, 48, 76, and 79). At the same time, the internal bureaucratic procedures of many government agencies lag in technological innovation as compared with major banks or corporations. Bureaucratic rigidity appears to be a function of size and hierarchy. A study by sixteen leading research administrators reported in the spring of 1967 that small, independent companies have been much more innovative technologically than large companies (see Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity, New York, 1969, p. 62.) t On the complex question of the role of scientists in policymaking, comments by Don K. Price in The Scientific Estate (Cambridge, Mass., 1965) and by Sanford A. Lakoff and J. Stefan Dupre in Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962) are especially pertinent. There is no reason to believe that scientific competence is sufficient for relevant judgments concerning all areas of social existence or public policy. Indeed, though somewhat exaggerated, the observations of a French social thinker on the dangers of excessive deference to the nonscientific opinions of scientists have some merit: "We are forced to conclude that our scientists are incapable of any but the emptiest platitudes when they stray from their specialties. It makes one think back on the collection of mediocrities accumulated by Einstein when he spoke of God, the state, peace, and the meaning of life. It is clear that Einstein, extraordinary mathematical genius that he was, was no Pascal; he

The American Future automatically sibility,

but

ensure neither political w i s d o m it m i g h t

make

for

a

society

{273

nor social

that

more

respon-

nearly

ap-

proaches both. Anticipation

of

the

social

effects

of

technological

offers a g o o d e x a m p l e of the necessary forms of

innovation

cross-institutional

c o o p e r a t i o n . O n e of t h e nation's m o s t u r g e n t n e e d s is t h e of a variety of m e c h a n i s m s

that link national

ments, academia, and the business community of N A S A m a y b e e s p e c i a l l y r e w a r d i n g )

and

creation

local

govern-

(there the

example

in the task of

evaluating

not only the operational effects of the n e w technologies b u t

their

cultural and psychological

local

effects. A series of national a n d

c o u n c i l s — n o t restricted to scientists b u t m a d e u p of various

social

groups, including the c l e r g y — w o u l d b e in k e e p i n g w i t h b o t h

the

n e e d a n d the e m e r g i n g pattern of social response to c h a n g e . * T h e trend t o w a r d the progressive b r e a k d o w n of sharp

distinc-

tions b e t w e e n the political a n d social spheres, b e t w e e n public

and

knew nothing of political or human reality, or, in fact, anything at all outside his mathematical reach. The banality of Einstein's remarks in matters outside his specialty is as astonishing as his genius within it. It seems as though the specialized application of all one's faculties in a particular area inhibits the consideration of things in general. Even J. Robert Oppenheimer, who seems receptive to a general culture, is not outside this judgment. His political and social declarations, for example, scarcely go beyond the level of those of the man in the street. And the opinions of the scientists quoted by L'Express are not even on the level of Einstein or Oppenheimer. Their pomposities, in fact, do not rise to the level of the average. They are vague generalities inherited from the nineteenth century, and the fact that they represent the furthest limits of thought of our scientific worthies must be symptomatic of arrested development or of a mental block. Particularly disquieting is the gap between the enormous power they wield and their critical ability, which must be estimated as null" (Ellul, p. 435). For some suggestive analogies, see R. Todd, "George Wald: The Man, the Speech," The New York Times Magazine, August 17, 1967. This would go beyond the task set the National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, authorized by Congress in 1964, and also address itself to the issues with which, for example, the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science has been grappling. An editorial in Science (August 1, 1969) on "The Control of Technology" errs in implying that the above matter should be restricted to scientists. Social scientists, the clergy, and humanists should also be involved, and the Special Commission on the Social Sciences, established in 1968 by the National Science Board, could well be drawn in.

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

private

institutions,

will

not

lend

itself

to

easy

classification

as

liberal, conservative, or socialist—all terms d e r i v e d f r o m a different

historical

context—but

participatory democracy

it w i l l

be

a

major

toward Left

in to

through

a

progressive

symbiosis

of t h e N e w

the

t h e l a t e 1960s. I r o n i c a l l y , this p a r t i c i p a t o r y d e m o c r a c y is l i k e l y emerge

advocated by some

step

of

the

institutions

of

society a n d of g o v e r n m e n t rather t h a n t h r o u g h the r e m e d i e s

the

New

and

Left

had

been

advocating:

economic

expropriation

political revolution, b o t h distinctly anachronistic remedies of

the

earlier industrial era. T h e evolutionary e m e r g e n c e of participatory pluralism m a y s e e m a sufficient r e s p o n s e t o t h o s e sectors of A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y have b e c o m e entirely alienated—and

it m a y

a p p e a r as too

much

c h a n g e to those w h o h a v e a vested interest in the

status quo.

for

the

that

gradual terns

of

large

body

change social

of

and

Americans

who

value

involvement

who

procedural

could

expert-oriented.

political decline

parties

as

In

that

setting

traditionally

in i m p o r t a n c e ;

order,

provide

o u t l e t f o r a s o c i e t y t h a t is i n c r e a s i n g l y and

accept

the

known

in their stead,

multiple

becoming

it is e v e n in

concept

desired more

possible

America

organized

ad

hoc

and

shifting national coalitions

basis a r o u n d specific issues of national

complex that

dominate

Less

the

visible

visible—indeed,

vailing progress

rhetoric toward

sometimes

about a

ticipatory pluralism

dimensions

new

the

of

regional,

will form on

"repressive

democracy

in m a n y

areas

term crises d o not deflect the U n i t e d

by

society"—is

from

life.

the

the

based

life. A s s u m i n g States

an

likely

political

obscured

increasingly of

for

import.*

American

totally

the

further

In the i m m e d i a t e future, the politics of street protest are to

of pat-

urban, professional, and other interests will provide the focus political action,

But

creative

will

local,

not that

pre-

gradual on

that

parshort-

redefining

the

• These coalitions are less likely to form along the traditional dividing line of Republicans and Democrats or—as more recently—of conservatives and liberals, but rather to divide according to basic philosophical attitudes toward the problems of modern life. In greatly simplified terms, the humanists and idealists on one side might be pitted against the pragmatists and modernizers on the other.

The American Future

{273

s u b s t a n c e of its d e m o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n , t h e l o n g - r a n g e e f f e c t o f

the

p r e s e n t t r a n s i t i o n a n d its t u r m o i l s w i l l b e t o d e e p e n a n d w i d e n

the

scope of the d e m o c r a t i c process in America.

Change in Cultural The

Formation

evolutionary

development

of

American

democracy

will

h a v e to b e m a t c h e d b y c h a n g e s in t h e processes of f o r m i n g shaping

the

political

change,

through

evolution—in

stimulated matic

content

by

of

its

cultural

reform

part

over-all

engineering.

national is

more

deliberately

social

The

culture.

As

in

the

likely

to

come

encouraged

change—than

element

of

and

through

deliberate

and

case

of

about in

part

program-

and

conscious

choice m a y b e e v e n m o r e important here than in the

transforma-

tion

of

complex

institutional

in

modern

society the educational system and the mass media have

become

the principal social m e a n s for defining the substance of a

national

c u l t u r e . T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y downgraded traditional The regard

arrangements,

because

which

has

such alternative sources of culture as c h u r c h e s

true in A m e r i c a n

society,

and

customs.

educational to black

system

has

Americans.

a

special

Here

the

social

responsibility

simultaneous

needs

e n h a n c e t h e black c i t i z e n s dignity a n d to enlarge his

will be

quest for his separate identity

to c o m b i n e

the black

to

long-range

opportunities. These needs h a v e occasionally clashed, but the short-term r e m e d y

in

are

perhaps

American's

(through such institutional

devices

as separate courses a n d r e s i d e n c e s ) w i t h m a s s i v e a n d scientifically oriented

remedial

training.

The

for several decades to c o m e — i s the

late-industrial

cannot

be

matched

done

by

stage

unless

of

challenge

of

probably

to help the black A m e r i c a n

America's

sensitivity

a recognition

today—and

to

his

development, psychological

the necessity

skip

and

this

needs

for a disciplined,

is fo-

c u s e d i n t e l l e c t u a l e f f o r t . T h e t w o w i l l b e h a r d t o c o m b i n e , b u t it is m

this area that e v e n t u a l

relations will be

progress

or disaster in America's

race

shaped.

Racial calamity will be avoided only if society at large defines

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

m o r e c l e a r l y t h e v a l u e s it s e e k s , is w i l l i n g t o c r e a t e a

responsive

f r a m e w o r k t o p r o m o t e t h e m , a n d is p r e p a r e d to insist o n for orderly

procedure.

wide

swings

any

demand

from

Nothing

permissive

made

by

could and

black

be

more

respect

destructive

guilt-ridden

than

acquiescence

extremists—such

m e r e l y stimulates an escalation of e x t r e m i s m — t o insensitive sivity or o p p o s i t i o n to black d e m a n d s for a fair share of tion

in

American

society.

A

massive

educational

pas-

participa-

effort

is

c r u c i a l f a c t o r , b u t t o b e s u c c e s s f u l it m u s t b e g e a r e d t o t h e range thrust of A m e r i c a n society's d e v e l o p m e n t a l

general

question

whether

needs.

mechanically

technical

and

duration

industrial

needs of

of

the

current

emphasis

on

emerging

mass

society.

education

minimum

mass

the

psychological

The

social

differs f r o m literacy

raises

extending

duration of e d u c a t i o n w i l l suffice to m e e t b o t h t h e and

the long-

T h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d spread of m a s s e d u c a t i o n in A m e r i c a the more

to

acquiescence

for

scope

the

early-

males

(and

f r o m the e v e n m o r e elitist m e d i e v a l pattern of v e r y limited

learn-

i n g for v e r y f e w ) . C o n t e m p o r a r y p r o g r a m s a i m at t h e e d u c a t i o n of a h i g h proportion of b o t h sexes and call for periods of lasting a n y w h e r e f r o m ten to almost t w e n t y years more advanced degrees).

schooling

(in the case

I n A m e r i c a h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n is

of

carried

on within a relatively self-contained organizational and e v e n social f r a m e w o r k , m a k i n g for a p r o t r a c t e d p e r i o d of s e m i - i s o l a t i o n

from

p r o b l e m s of social reality. As a result, b o t h organizationally in terms of content, a divorce b e t w e e n e d u c a t i o n a n d social ence has tional

tended

and

to

develop,

psychic

leading to

manifestations

of

the

already

student

and exist-

noted

emo-

frustration

and

immaturity. By

extending

education

the lifetime of the citizen, meeting

this

problem.

relatively

isolated

shortened.

Taking

maturation

of

The

phase into

young

on

an

intermittent

society w o u l d duration of

initial

account

people

the

today,

of

go the

basis

it c o u l d

toward

self-contained

education earlier

throughout

a long way

could

physical be

then

and

more

and be

sexual

generally

p u r s u e d w i t h i n a w o r k - s t u d y f r a m e w o r k , a n d it s h o u l d b e

supple-

The American Future

{273

m e n t e d b y periodic additional training throughout most of

one's

a c t i v e life. A g o o d c a s e c a n b e m a d e for e n d i n g initial e d u c a t i o n

(more

w h i c h c o u l d b e o b t a i n e d in t h e h o m e t h r o u g h electronic

s o m e w h e r e a r o u n d t h e a g e of e i g h t e e n . T h i s f o r m a l initial c o u l d b e f o l l o w e d b y t w o years of service in a socially cause;* then b y direct involvement

period

desirable

in s o m e professional

activity

a n d b y advanced, systematic training within that area; a n d by

regular

periods

of

one

and

eventually

even

two

one's

life, s o m e w h e r e

medical

or

college,

thus

legal both

up

training

to

the

could

begin

after

only

two

years

of

attracted

into

retraining—as

well as b r o a d e n i n g — c o u l d m o s t of one's professional

to

example,

these

formally

needed

decade

For

training and probably also increasing the n u m b e r and

time

sixty, f

the

Regular

the

of

of

complete

professions.

shortening

age

finally

years

broadening, "integrative" s t u d y at the b e g i n n i n g of e v e r y of

of

devices)

required

e n s u e at regular intervals

throughout

career.

C o m b i n i n g initial specialization w i t h a s u b s e q u e n t

broadening

* This cause could be either national or international, publicly or privately tackled. It would be in keeping with the humanitarian idealism of the young not to limit such service to national causes. One good way to handle the matter would be to maintain a list of acceptable humanitarian activities, service on behalf of which would be an acceptable equivalent for military duty. * This would go beyond the task set for the National Commission on Techintegrative needs of the modern age. It would thus combine science with philosophy but no longer act as an intellectual cafeteria, offering studies ranging from physical education through classics, from "sour courses to the latest specialized sciences. In effect, the roles of the "junior" college and of the university would become separate in time and place, probably to the advantage of both institutions. This would permit concentration on the larger social questions and keep higher education from being an aristocratic process; at the same time, it would allay some of the dangers inherent in the illusion that an educated citizenry is created by simply running a lot of people through the educational mill. In addition, the traditional titles of learning, such as "doctor of philosophy," imply a terminal educational process and reflect the situation of an earlier stage in social history. Since learning will become a continuous, lifetime process that involves almost the entire community, degrees become a symbolic anachronism and should be drastically reclassified to indicate more accurately the various stages of specialized and generalized knowledge.

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

of philosophical a n d scientific horizons w o u l d s o m e w h a t act the present trend, w h i c h

makes

increased

rising professional standing g o h a n d in hand.

counter-

specialization

narrowness of general outlook. T h e trend c o u l d b e

gradually

versed b y a situation in w h i c h specialization at the a g e of absorptive

capability

integration

at

approach

a

would

would

stage

of

be

followed

increased

encourage

the

society's underlying h u m a n e scientific

specialization

is

by

personal

gradual

grative, m o d e r n i z i n g elite that w o u l d

more

a re-

greatest

intellectual

maturity.

emergence

Such

of

an

an

inte-

show greater concern

with

values in a n a g e in w h i c h

fraught

and

This encourages

with

dangers

of

intensive

intellectual

fragmentation. * The formal educational ploiting

the

education vices.

new

through

It has

also

nongovernmental

system has b e e n relatively

opportunities television been

for

supplementary

consoles

suspicious

organizations

of

to

slow in

and the

other

growing

develop

their

home-based

electronic

tion,

for

Greater

and business

psychological multiplicity

in

are b e c o m i n g as

well

as

educational

m o r e pluralistic national community, ment

of

business

companies

in

more

for

own

involved

will

in

education

may

make

lead

black educa-

reasons.f

and the increasing

rapid adaptation of the latest techniques a n d scientific

of

learning

professional

training

de-

inclination

and training programs. In different ways, however, both the community

ex-

to

for

a

involvea

more

knowledge

* "One of the paradoxes of the future is that while an increasing number of managerial decisions will be handled by automatic data processing, buttressed by clear and swift communications networks, the intelligent direction and coordination of large-scale systems will place an even greater premium than at present upon the wise, artful, and broadly-experienced general manager in organizations characterized by operational decentralization. In short, the proposition that effective decentralization can occur only where organizational centralization has become efficient will have become increasingly recognized, not as a paradox, but as a logical reality" ( T h e United States and the World in the 1985 Era, p. 44). f For example, Olin Corporation, noting in an advertisement that "there is no growth potential in ignorance," has instituted literacy and high school training programs in three of its plants. Other major corporations have similar training programs.

The American Future to

the

extent, grams

educational the

process.

government

of managerial

American

have

in

educational

and,

undertaken

"retooling" and

toward the intermittent educational Change

business

already

retraining,

{273 to

a

lesser

extensive

thereby

moving

pattern.

procedures

and

philosophy

should

also b e a c c o m p a n i e d b y parallel c h a n g e s in the broader

national

processes b y w h i c h values are generated and disseminated. Americas niques,

role as a w o r l d

this is b o t h

a

disseminator

national

other country has permitted

and

a

of n e w

values

be

almost

advertising,

exclusively

tech-

global

obligation.

Yet

its m a s s c u l t u r e ,

taste, daily

amuse-

the

or permitted

Given

and

m e n t , a n d , m o s t i m p o r t a n t , t h e i n d i r e c t e d u c a t i o n of its to

domain

both

of

standards

private of

taste

and

entrepreneurs

television, tively

located

in w h i c h

small

group,

tions process

to the

in

one

a cultural reflects tastes

metropolitan

the

monopoly

the and

center.

is e x e r c i s e d

insensitivity

of

philosophical

values

and intelgroup

American by

the

no

children

business

lectual content of culture to b e defined largely b y a small of

pro-

a

rela-

communicaof

much

of

America.* Rising public dissatisfaction with

this state of affairs

that perhaps s o m e c h a n g e has to c o m e geographical

decentralization

and

in this

dispersal

of

field

as well.

the

television

dustry into more numerous

units, the separation of

from

and

program

production,

tional p r o g r a m m i n g

will

the

probably

further be

of

opposed

i n g i n t e r e s t s ; if p a s t A m e r i c a n e x p e r i e n c e c a n s e r v e a s a guide,

change

will

come

by

attrition

and

The in-

broadcasting

extension

sharply

indicates

piecemeal

educa-

by

exist-

relevant reform,

* . . broadcasting has imposed upon American society what in the supreme civic sense may be a fatal contradiction. The extension of communication should be an extension of democracy. Yet while the participatory base of democracy has been broadening, the ownership and control of the means of communication have narrowed. Tt could be said indeed that far from being an expression of majority desire, as the networks say, television programs are die imposition of a social minority on the majority, the minority consisting of the fifty top advertisers, the three networks, and a dozen or so advertising agencies" (Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time: The Life of Edward R. Murrow, Boston, 1969, PP- 1 2 - 1 3 ) .

2. j 2. } rather and

V: America and the World than

by

wholesale

technological

of constructive

readjustment.

developments

change;

may

they may

Here,

become

make

again, the

possible

scientific

handmaidens

(through

home

video tapes, h o m e - o p e r a t e d lenses, closed-channel

programming)

far

well

greater

diversity

than

is

today

available,

as

extensive exploitation of the audio-visual m e d i a b y

as

more

more institu-

tions and organizations.

Instead of limiting intellectual

horizons,

television could b e c o m e

a diversified and intellectually

enriching

source of this society's over-all cultural Cultural growing sexual

change

female

mores.

in

our

society

rebellion,

The

massive

a

generation

tunity.

away,

and

restlessness

Such

into American

may

also

be

accelerated

by

entrance

women

sions, into executive positions,

mounting

growth.

of

education

The

into

there

is

already

abundant

of

current

inequalities

feminine

society's

the

and the

because

increased

by

new

profes-

a n d i n t o p o l i t i c s is p r o b a b l y

cultural

assertiveness front,

only

evidence of

could

enhancing

general social interest in cultural g r o w t h a n d

Rational

spurred

spill

over

somewhat

the

standards.

Humanism technological

thrust

and

the

economic

wealth

of

U n i t e d S t a t e s n o w m a k e it p o s s i b l e to g i v e t h e c o n c e p t of

the

liberty

and equality a broader meaning, going b e y o n d the procedural external to the personal and ence. By focusing more of life, A m e r i c a m a y

inner spheres

of man's

deliberately on these

social

qualitative

avoid the depersonalizing

inherent

mechaniza-

tion of e n v i r o n m e n t a n d b u i l d a social f r a m e w o r k for a of man's external a n d inner

synthesis

dimensions.

S u c h a synthesis m a y eventually result from the current between

the

and the impersonal

and exist-

aspects

dangers

in the self-generating b u t philosophically m e a n i n g l e s s

conflict

of

oppor-

irrational

personalism

of

the

rationality of t h e "modernizers." T h e

group, source of m u c h of the rhetoric of the literary

intense

"humanists" former

community,

t h e s t u d e n t activists, a n d t h e doctrinaire liberals, p a r t a k e s of

the

tradition of skepticism a n d disbelief that p l a y e d s u c h a vital

role

The American Future in

overthrowing

the

industrial America

religious

on

the

and

values

of

philosophical industrial

{273

hold

of

America;

pre-

it

seeks

to fortify this tradition b y a n e w e m p h a s i s o n e m o t i o n a n d

feeling.

G i v e n its D a d a i s t style a n d its L u d d i t e - i n s p i r e d historical

posture,

it is u n l i k e l y t h a t t h i s c a m p w i l l l o n g r e m a i n vital. T h e

potential

transformation of the N e w L e f t into the Violent L e f t will

certainly

n o t e n h a n c e its a p p e a l t o t h e A m e r i c a n p u b l i c . T h e l a t t e r more

typical of

commercial

the n e w

establishment,

seeks to c o m b i n e

since

tional or philosophical idealistic y o u n g The

clash

remnants

of

and

self-interest

tionalist innovation;

threatening

business

executives,

the with

scientific

group,

governmental-

organization

a detached

it fails to p r o v i d e

rationale

the

emphasis

men, on

ra-

a satisfactory

emo-

for either, it a l i e n a t e s t h e

more

people.*

between to

these

American

the

two

orientations

liberal

consensus

of

is

democracy.

the

industrial

destructive

and

fragments

the

It age

and

polarizes

a r t i c u l a t e p u b l i c o p i n i o n . Y e t it a l s o h o l d s t h e p r o m i s e o f a perspective

that

is b e t t e r

suited

A m e r i c a n s o c i e t y , s i n c e it m o v e s vant

framework

that

now

to

the

needs

beyond

confines

of

the

the increasingly

modern

man's

new

emerging irrele-

outlook.

This

n e w perspective involves growing recognition that man's

propen-

sity for scientific i n n o v a t i o n

as

as man's m i n d expressions.

functions,

cannot

be

restrained—that

scientific innovation

B u t it a l s o i n v o l v e s

a heightened

will b e

one

awareness

l o n g as m a n c o n c e i v e s of himself as a distinctive being, will b e the central m o d e need

for both

innovation

of e x p r e s s i n g his spirit. T h e and

idealism

is t h u s

long of

its

that

as

idealism

imperative

stimulating

a

ra-

* Modern psychology increasingly recognizes that the non-concrete, more abstract qualities of life, such as goodness, aesthetic beauty, and morality, are becoming more and more important in satisfying individual wants in modern society (see, for example, Abraham Maslow, Motivation and Personality, New York, 1954, and Toward a Psychology of Being, Princeton, 1962). However, the quest for these more abstract and emotional satisfactions often takes ludicrous forms. The late sixties have seen in America a proliferation of various institutes and seminars in which businessmen and others engage in special "sensitivity" seances, expose themselves to "brainwave conditioning,' undertake yoga exercises and sustained "meditation," and the like. These fads reflect the fracturing of the broader, more integrative frameworks of belief, as noted in our discussion in Part II.

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

tionalist h u m a n e

outlook

t h a t is g r a d u a l l y

liberal skepticism of s o m e humanists indifference of s o m e

supplanting

both

and the conservative

modernizers.

T h i s r a t i o n a l h u m a n i s m is e x p r e s s e d in s e v e r a l w a y s :

first,

in an

e m e r g i n g international consciousness that m a k e s so m a n y cans

and

concerns human

American and

institutions

become

growth

and

deeply

go

beyond

involved

nourishment,

and

second,

ingrained human

in

a

growing

and

not

with

view

as political

problems in

spite

of

a

international

confrontations

and

dilemmas fact

that

often intolerant

immediately. Americans,

In

addition,

instead

science, are attempting

desire

of

to resolve it

can

trying

to

also flee

of

still

ecoldeeply

problems between

all be

the

a Utopian,

seen

in

the

problems

to balance their fascination with

quest

definitions

for of

more

human

philosophical nature.

This

and

religiously

suggests

revival of religiosity of a m o r e personal,

the

problems

likelihood

noninstitutional

of

prescriptive

nature.

nine-

concepts

social organization b u t stresses cultural a n d e c o n o m i c versity. I n s o d o i n g , r a t i o n a l h u m a n i s m is l i k e l y t o b e

a

contingent

in t h e s e n s e t h a t it d o e s n o t i n v o l v e — a s w a s t h e c a s e w i t h ideology—universally

and

ecumenical

F i n a l l y , t h e e m e r g i n g r a t i o n a l h u m a n i s m is h i s t o r i c a l l y

teenth-century

of

science

b y a m o r e intense c o n c e r n w i t h the personal qualities of life a

as

good

outstanding

a n d t h e i r r e l i a n c e o n it a s a t o o l f o r d e a l i n g w i t h h u m a n

by

of

American

problems

a n d evil; third, in a s t r o n g p u b l i c i d e a l i s m t h a t is f r e e of impatient,

Ameri-

nationalistic

global

is p r o m p t i n g

tendency—in

anticommunism—to

issues

purely

in

youth such a constructive preoccupation ogy;

the

social

global

of di-

historically

m o r e relevant t h a n w a s the case w i t h earlier responses

to

dilemmas.

and

his-

of the m i n d

into

Unlike

the

industrial

torical discontinuity i n d u c e d a t a v i s m or futuristic availability

of

means

Utopias, permits

age,

when

ideological

complexity

flights

in the technetronic the

definition

of

age the more

social

greater

attainable

ends, thus m a k i n g for a less doctrinaire a n d a m o r e effective

re-

l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n " w h a t is" a n d " w h a t o u g h t t o b e . " T h e great revolutions of the nineteenth a n d twentieth

centuries

The American Future sought

both

liberty

and

equality,

but

even

in

the

{ 273 absence

r a c i a l c o n f l i c t it w a s f o u n d t h a t t h e t w o w e r e difficult t o

in an age in w h i c h the traditional institutions of a religious, cratic,

and

skeptical

agricultural

rationalism,

era

were

legalistic

clashing

with

democracy,

the

nascent

aristo-

effects social

sciousness, a n d t h e n e e d s of a d e v e l o p i n g urban-industrial In

America

hindered

the

by

linkage

deeply

of

liberty

embedded

and

equality

was

fundamentalist

especially values

the

gressing w h i t e c o m m u n i t y a n d t h e artificially arrested b l a c k Inequality

became

a self-fulfilling prophecy,

an economic necessity to the industrially developing

of

con-

society.

religious

that were reinforced b y the ever widening gap b e t w e e n

munity.

of

combine

procom-

as w e l l

as

North.

T h e positive potential of the third A m e r i c a n revolution lies its p r o m i s e t o link l i b e r t y w i t h e q u a l i t y . T h i s l i n k a g e is a and

will

not

be

several decades expected.

attained

all

reversals

Nevertheless,

and

at

once.

even

though

Indeed,

increased

frequently

during

tensions

"cultural

revolution"

that

America

cultural revolution more enduring

has

the

been

next

are to

obscured

sionate polemics, the e m e r g i n g rational h u m a n i s m

in

process,

by

be pas-

is p a r t o f

the

experiencing,

and deeper than the one

a

that

initiated the term. L i n k e d to political reform, the current

cultural

revolution could gradually enlarge the s c o p e of personal

freedom

by

increasing

the

sense

of

self-fulfillment of

an

unprecedented

n u m b e r of citizens a n d g i v e greater m e a n i n g to equality b y ing knowledge

the basis

for

social

and

racial

could create the preconditions for a socially creative and ually gratifying society that w o u l d inevitably have a world role to play.

mak-

egalitarianism.

It

individ-

constructive

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

Mmm 2. International Prospects T e n s i o n is u n a v o i d a b l e as m a n s t r i v e s t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e into the f r a m e w o r k of the old. F o r a t i m e t h e e s t a b l i s h e d work

resiliently

familiar

shape.

integrates But

at

the

some

new

point

by the

adapting old

it

in

framework

a

forms,

force. Today, —with

and

eventually

it

asserts

though the old framework

itself

with

more

becomes

overloaded. T h e n e w input can no longer b e redefined into tional

new

frame-

tradi-

compelling

of international

politics

their spheres of influence, military alliances b e t w e e n

tion-states,

the

fiction

of

from nineteenth-century

sovereignty, crises—is

doctrinal

clearly

no

conflicts

longer

na-

arising

compatible

w i t h reality. Indeed,

it

is

have changed

remarkable

how

rapidly

d u r i n g t h e last t w o

the

dominant

moods

decades.

The

1950s w e r e

era of certainty. T h e t w o s i d e s — C o m m u n i s t

and

Western—faced

each other in a setting that pitted conviction

against

Stalinist

missionaries.

mood

Manichaeans

quickly

gave

confronted

way

Dulles's

to another,

with

the

communist

world

prompted

an

conviction.

Khrushchev

n e d y serving as transitions to an era of confusion. ideological

the

That

and

Ken-

Dissension

crisis,

while

W e s t i n c r e a s i n g l y b e g a n t o q u e s t i o n its o w n v a l u e s a n d

in the

righteous-

ness. C o m m u n i s t cynics c o n f r o n t e d liberal skeptics. There

are

indications

growing awareness

that

the

1970s

will

that the time has c o m e

be

dominated

for a c o m m o n

to shape a n e w f r a m e w o r k for international politics, a

framework

that c a n serve as an effective c h a n n e l for joint endeavors. must b e recognized that there will b e n o real global

by

effort

Yet

it

cooperation

u n t i l t h e r e is f a r g r e a t e r c o n s e n s u s o n its p r i o r i t i e s a n d

purposes:

International Prospects I s it t o

enhance

development? international

man's

Is

material

economic

educational

well-being

growth effort

to

Should health h a v e priority? H o w to

the

perhaps

less

important

the be

and

answer, the

{ 275

his or

point

intellectual

is

a

of

massive

departure?

is p e r s o n a l w e l l - b e i n g more

easily

related

measured

gross

national p r o d u c t ? Is there a n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n

scien-

tific a d v a n c e a n d p e r s o n a l

but

happiness?

T h e r e is a l r e a d y w i d e s p r e a d

agreement

about

the

desirability

of cutting arms b u d g e t s a n d d e v e l o p i n g international

peace-keep-

i n g f o r c e s . T h e r e is a l s o a m o r e s e l f - c o n s c i o u s a w a r e n e s s o f inherent

aggressiveness

and

of

the

need

to

control

it.

3

man's Totally

destructive w e a p o n s m a k e the effects of conflict incalculable thus r e d u c e the likelihood of a major war. Here, again, a n ing global consciousness

is f o r c i n g t h e a b a n d o n m e n t

pations with

national

supremacy

dependence.

In

United

awareness

has

the

sometimes

and

States

taken

accentuating this

the

growing

form

of

obstructed

the

unlimited

c h e m i c a l w e a p o n r y a n d its u s e i n c o m b a t .

4

sensitivity and

advanced

countries,

particularly

it

has

of

biological-

It h a s also

stimulated

pressures for a re-examination of defense requirements, other

inter-

international

greater

development

preoccu-

global

to t h e influence of t h e "military-industrial c o m p l e x , " effectively

of

and

emerg-

in

Japan

while

and

in

Western

E u r o p e , it h a s p r o m p t e d s t r o n g pacifist m o v e m e n t s . Nonetheless, a realistic assessment c o m p e l s the conclusion there will be

no

global

security

future. T h e most that can b e

arrangement

expected

and

in the

that

foreseeable

effectively sought

a w i d e n i n g of arms-control treaties, s o m e unilateral restraints defense

spending,

machinery.

The

and

some

conflicts

expansion

between

in

nations

U N

is on

peace-keeping

are

still

very

real;

r e a d i n g s of w o r l d c h a n g e still differ s h a r p l y , a n d n a t i o n a l

aspira-

tions remain divergent.

in

Japan,

the

Soviet

Western Union

Europe,

nor

in C h i n a

development pose

and

and

restraints

on

Moreover, the

is t h e r e

defense views

unlike

United any

States, public

spending. that

the situation neither

discussion

Secrecy

diverge

in

from

and the

of

weapons

censorship official

im-

position,

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

a n d thus limit the influence of a g r o w i n g global consciousness policy choices o p e n to the leaders of these

T h e p i c t u r e is s o m e w h a t m o r e a m b i g u o u s i n t h e nomic tries

and

now

educational-scientific accept

the

principle

developed

countries.

This

important

component

of

development. that

is a n e w the

new

they

global

All

ought

moral

n a t i o n s still a s s e r t t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y i n

fields

have

in

effect created

a binding

of

eco-

major

coun-

to

aid

the

position,

and

it is

consciousness.

fixing

less

Though

precedent:

despite persisting conflicts a m o n g

the

states,

ex-

available), extension

of a i d h a s b e c o m e a n i m p e r a t i v e . It s e e m s likely t h a t i n t h e to come,

an

the scale of aid

t e n d e d ( m o s t m a k e less than o n e per cent of their G N P they

on

states.

years

economic

aid

will g r o w in scale a n d b e u s e d less a n d less as a v e h i c l e of political influence. A t t h e s a m e time, h o w e v e r , short of a v e r y major it s e e m s

unlikely

that aid will b e

forthcoming

crisis,

in amounts

suffi-

c i e n t t o o f f s e t t h e t h r e a t e n i n g p r o s p e c t s d i s c u s s e d i n P a r t I. In

some

respects

technological-scientific

developments

m o r e p r o m i s e for t h e rapid global spread of e d u c a t i o n a l a n d of n e w

techniques.

Television

satellites

regional educational programs possible

are already

(as in Central

a n d there has b e e n progress in setting u p regional institutes

augur

programs making

America),

technological

(this m i g h t eventually reduce the brain drain, w h i c h

is

c a u s e d in part b y the temptations inherent in resident studies

in

the more advanced countries). T h e Development Assistance mittee of O E C D meeting

the

educational

and unlike U N E S C O them.

5

needs

of

the

less

developed

Such an approach w o u l d b e consistent with the

to

adopt

a

common

of the d e v e l o p e d

development

strategy.

emergence

E n g l i s h as a g l o b a l scientific l a n g u a g e is a c c e l e r a t i n g

the and

increasingly

mobile

one

spread

tion of a global

scientific family,

from

nations,

The

to

countries,

it is n o t s u b j e c t t o p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s

of a m o r e cooperative c o m m u n i t y able

Com-

offers the potential for a systematic a p p r o a c h

of

formainter-

changeable. Yet

this

progress

social incapacity

could

to digest

be and

vitiated

in

absorb

the

many

countries

positive

by

potential

a in-

International Prospects herent

in

educational

economic

and

resources—only

scientific

growth.

marginally

foreseeable foreign a i d — m a y

even

Their

augmented

cause

some

{ 277 inadequate

by

reasonably

positive

changes

to backfire, p r o m p t i n g not social a d v a n c e b u t costly conflict, policy innovation but political paralysis. knowledge the

role

of

the

played

psychology,

factors

in

that

hinders

the

inducing

I n d e e d , o u r still

social

development formulation

development,

by of

religion,

an

not

limited and

culture,

effective

of and

strategy

the dissemination of technical k n o w - h o w a n d for the

for

application

of material aid.* In

this

ments

of

setting, chaos,

which two

combines

general

rudiments

prospects,

of

both

order

more

and

relevant to United States foreign policy, s e e m probable: Third

World,

turbulent

though

changes,

revolutionary

it

will

is n o t

experience common

rival to t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s b u t t o o w e a k internally to b e its

global

externally

will

a

global

strong

Union

to by

a

too

Soviet

swept

be

remain

the

continue

to b e

the

the

future

second,

likely

first,

in

seeable

wave;

obviously

very

ele-

immediately

not

to

fore-

partner.

The Revolutionary

Process

T h e c o n c e p t of an international revolution inspired b y mon ideology had some seemed

meaning

when

the industrial

com-

to indicate that certain f o r m s of social organization

of social crisis h a d a g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n .

parochialism.

It

processes

assumed, was

in

relatively

framework could be postulated p e r i e n c e of a f e w

Western

part

because

limited,

and

That view combined

universal intellectual perspective with a geographically

world

a

revolution

that

information a

common

about global

o n the basis of t h e historical

countries.

It is n o w

a

historical

increasingly

exevi-

• T h i s is why there is special merit in the National Planning Association's proposal (1969) that a Technical Assistance and Development Research Institute be established in Washington to provide technical assistance to underdeveloped nations and to make a broad-gauged study of the problems connected with development.

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

dent that social conditions, and

technology

this variety tural,

are

includes

religious,

as well as the w a y

socially

and

very

applied,

subtle

historic

vary

but

in w h i c h

enormously,

important

tradition,

in

science

and

nuances

addition

to

that

of

cul-

economic

and technical factors.* Moreover, in Russia a n d in China the revolutionary

intelligent-

sia of t h e late n i n e t e e n t h a n d early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s w a s in the the

forefront of the

most

advanced

process

segments

of modernization. of

society,

and

It

itself

represented

hence

a

political

v i c t o r y b y it i n h e r e n t l y i n v o l v e d a h i s t o r i c a l s t e p f o r w a r d f o r s o c i e t y a s a w h o l e . T h i s is n o l o n g e r t h e c a s e . T h e intelligentsia

in the

its v i c a r i o u s

middle-class

States,

often

modernization

less

developed

intellectual

represents process

countries,

a

social

to

anachronism.

is c o n c e r n e d ,

this

revolutionary

say

equivalents

the

nothing

of

in

the

United

As

far

as

intelligentsia

has

left b e h i n d b y d e v e l o p m e n t s in science a n d t e c h n o l o g y , in

the been

which

it is l a r g e l y "illiterate." It is p o s s i b l e , t h e r e f o r e , the even

more

modern

succeed,

industrial their

by

values,

societies

ones,

by

that

clinging in

in s o m e

these to

essentially

effectively

insisting

countries,

anachronistic

that

blocking it b e

perhaps

aristocratic the

and

until

disseminated through

by the

mass

communications,

impact

of

mass

it

after

the

tronic revolution could partially b e c o m e a self-limiting

antithesis

techne-

creates

its on

trained

intelligentsia, w h o are m o r e receptive to doctrinal appeals, more

socially

concerned

and

innovative

own some

countries

this m i g h t e v e n t u a l l y pit the traditional humanist-legalist

younger,

of an

phenome-

communications

sectors of the intelligentsia. In s o m e of the d e v e l o p i n g

the

may anti-

modernization

postponed

ideological revolution has taken place. In this sense,

non:

even

intelligentsias

against officers,

engineers, and students, w h o h a v e c o m b i n e d to effect a

moderni-

zation that

program-

matically

is i n d i g e n o u s

and

socially

radical,

though

eclectic.

0 For earlier discussion of the prospects of revolutionary success, see pp. 48, 119, 188-191, and 248-249.

International Prospects

{ 279

In Latin America the more extreme reforms m a y b e more niscent

of

Peronism

and

the student population

fascism

will be

than

of

communism.

approximately

one

remi-

By

1970 6

million,

thus

creating an ambitious a n d politically volatile base for reform.

In

addition, b o t h the o p p o s i t i o n of Latin A m e r i c a n

to

governments

United States e c o n o m i c a n d political influence7 and their tion to undertake

radical

domestic

reforms m a y

be

inclina-

expected

increase, but to do so within a framework that c o m b i n e s socially responsible Catholicism

with nationalism,

a

in a setting

considerable national diversity. This will produce a highly entiated

pattern

of

change,

but

are not likely to b e m o d e l e d since

the relative

elites

reduces

Soviet

models.

cultural

the

appeal

The

even

its

sophistication of

officer

radical

on communist

the

corps,

of

stodgy

manifestations especially

the

American

Latin

Eastern of

European

socially

or

radical

a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y i n n o v a t i v e y o u n g e r officers, is m o r e l i k e l y than the local

ideology but by continuing anti-Yankeeism—pure and

trinally

religious

oriented.

that will compensate and

Iraqi

intellectual

and

Sudanese

for the

traditions coups

of

probably

weakness

by

being

the

late

carried out b y alliances of officers a n d intellectuals, will be repeated elsewhere

in Africa a n d

the

Middle

commitment

o f it is h i g h l y v o l a t i l e a n d

Doubtless,

these

There

of these n e w

S o m e of t h e i r i d e o l o g y is s h a p e d b y e x t r a n e o u s f a c t o r s

drastic changes.*

regimes

will

be

1960s,

is,

genuineness

t i o n o f I s r a e l a n d o f t h e S o v i e t a t t i t u d e ) ; s o m e is m e r e l y fashionable rhetoric; m u c h

of

doc-

probably

East.

however, s o m e reason for skepticism concerning the a n d d e p t h of the ideological

by

simple.

In other parts of the g l o b e similar social combinations will result in regimes

to

communist

parties, a n d Latin A m e r i c a n discontent will b e g a l v a n i z e d not

indigenous

of

differ-

countries,

composed

b e the source of revolutionary c h a n g e

to

more

regimes.

(the

ques-

currently subject

assisted

to and

* Moreover, these regimes have difficulty in moving into what Huntington has called the second phase of a revolution: "A complete revolution, however, also involves a second phase: the creation and institutionalization of a new political order. The successful revolution combines rapid political mobilization and rapid political institutionalization. Not all revolutions pro-

2. j 2. }

V:

exploited ample,

America and the World

by

the

have

Soviets

already

and

made

the

Chinese.

political

(The

inroads

latter,

into

for

East

ex-

Africa.)

E v e n so, it w i l l still b e m o r e a m a t t e r o f t a c t i c a l c o o p e r a t i o n

than

of actual control a n d a c o m m o n strategic policy. Similarly, are

likely

in

to

South

have

and

an

Southeast

essentially

Asia

revolutionary

indigenous

and

patterns

differentiated

c h a r a c t e r . It is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e t w o l a r g e p o l i t i c a l India and nomic

Pakistan—which

and

ethnic

entities,

likely as t h e p r e s e n t

combine may

a variety

split up.

elites, w h o s e

This

of

units—

disparate

will b e

internal unity

eco-

especially

was

forged

by

the struggle against t h e British, f a d e f r o m t h e scene. T h e

waning

of t h e C o n g r e s s Party in India has b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d b y

intensi-

fying ethnic stresses a n d b y the polarization of political Should the Indian Union break down, southern Tamil p r o b a b l y left-wing radical in orientation, w o u l d b e northern

Hindu

right

radicalism,

perhaps

more

contested

of

the

other.

As

happened

earlier

in

ori-

indigenous China,

any

tendency toward c o m m u n i s m that might result from such a frontation w o u l d

soon b e culturally absorbed

w h e l m e d b y the w e i g h t of economic In

China

inescapable shattered

the

Sino-Soviet

Siniflcation

the

of

revolution's

commitment

to

the

Soviet

ably

increasingly of

ideological

share

the

modernization. tenacity

and

already

communism.

universal

perspective

Hence,

Chinese

experience This

lead

to

over-

accelerated That

may more

whatever

development of

both

other

from

its

happens

in

will

nations

dilute

eclectic

the

conflict

and—perhaps

Chinese modernization

model.

con-

perhaps

backwardness.

conflict has

the short run, in years to c o m e

process

and

Chinese

even more important—detached

by

religiously

ented; each w o u l d tend to intensify the doctrinal and distinctiveness

opinions.

separatism,

the

probin

the

regime's

experimentation

in shaping the C h i n e s e road to modernity.

duce a new political order. The measure of how revolutionary a revolution is is the rapidity and the scope of the expansion of political participation. The measure of how successful a revolution is is the authority and stability of the institutions to which it gives birth" (Huntington, p. 266).

International Prospects Many

of the u p h e a v a l s

in the T h i r d W o r l d

will

{

unavoidably

h a v e a s t r o n g a n t i - A m e r i c a n b i a s . T h i s is l i k e l y t o b e

particularly

true w h e r e American presence and p o w e r has traditionally m o s t visible. In areas near t h e Soviet U n i o n a n d China, anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese

281

attitudes are likely to

been

however,

predominate

in the long run, irrespective of the character of the internal

re-

forms a n d of the external c o m p l e x i o n of the ruling regimes.

This

again highlights the point that the revolutionary process as

such

will

not

necessarily

determine

the

foreign-policy

stance

of

the

n e w elites, w h i c h is m o r e l i k e l y t o b e s h a p e d b y a c o m b i n a t i o n

of

traditional antipathies, current fears, and domestic political needs. Moreover, the basic orientation of t h e n e w elites will m o r e m o r e respond to the intellectual i m p a c t

of d o m e s t i c

and

changes

the more advanced world, changes directly a n d personally

in

visible

to these elites t hr o u g h travel, study, a n d global mass media.

This

intimacy w i t h life abroad will further r e d u c e the importance

of

integrative ideologies, w h i c h had previously provided a substitute for a clear vision of the future a n d t h e outside world. uniformity was

the prescription for remaking

Ideological

a world

that

was

both distant and largely u n k n o w n , but proximity and global

con-

gestion n o w dictate revolutionary diversity. Accordingly, the real v a l u e s — a s distinguished from the rhetoric — o f the aspiring elites of t h e d e v e l o p i n g nations will b e b y tangible developments rather than by abstract T h e s u c c e s s of t h e U n i t e d

shaped

generalizations.

States in shaping a workable,

multi-

racial d e m o c r a c y w h i l e p i o n e e r i n g in science a n d technology,

the

ability of E u r o p e

and

and Japan to overcome

the psychological

social stresses of m a t u r e modernity, and—last, b u t not

least—the

degree to which the Soviet U n i o n breaks a w a y from the

doctrinal

orthodoxy

critically

that inhibits

its s o c i a l d e v e l o p m e n t

will be

i m p o r t a n t in s h a p i n g t h e o u t l o o k of T h i r d W o r l d leaders.

2. j 2. }

V:

America and the World

USA/USSR: The

Less Intensive,

extent

to

which

Americans

a b r o a d as a u t o m a t i c a l l y

inimical

extent to which these seem fitted

More Extensive view

Rivalry

revolutionary

changes

to their interests reinforces

beneficial to the Soviets

and

can

into a global communist framework; conversely, the

to w h i c h America views these changes

in a neutral

the be

extent

light

dimin-

ishes the intrinsic attraction of the Soviet m o d e l for Third

World

revolutionaries and encourages indigenous factors to surface

more

rapidly. T h e Soviet attraction has already b e e n w e a k e n e d b y

the

a p p e a r a n c e of states m o r e militant than the Soviet U n i o n a n d groups m o r e activist than the pro-Soviet c o m m u n i s t parties. Soviet appeal has also declined because internal Soviet ratization

and

dogmatic

restraints

on

intellectual

of

The

bureauc-

creativity

social innovation h a v e m a d e the Soviet U n i o n the m o s t

and

conserva-

tive political a n d social order of the m o r e a d v a n c e d world. * A m e r i c a n - S o v i e t r i v a l r y is h e n c e l i k e l y t o b e c o m e

less

ical i n c h a r a c t e r , t h o u g h it m a y b e c o m e m o r e e x t e n s i v e cally

and

more

dangerous

in

terms

of

the

ideolog-

geographi-

power

involved.

Increased direct contacts b e t w e e n the t w o nations, restraints posed

by

weapons

mutual systems,

recognition and

of

lessened

Third World could make

the

destruetiveness

ideological

American-Soviet

of

expectations relations

for

more

Soviet military capabilities,

and countermoves

forces,

extends

particularly

if t h e

growth

conventional

American-Soviet

rivalry to

in

air-

and

areas

c o u l d t e m p t e i t h e r s t a t e t o e m p l o y its p o w e r to offset or creating situations

analogous

the

long-range sea-lift

previously

considered b e y o n d the Soviet reach. Instability in the Third

the other, t h e r e b y

the

stable.

Nevertheless, m o r e a n d m o r e areas o n the globe could b e c o m e objects of m o v e s

im-

present

to the

World

pre-empt Fashoda

0 Some Soviet scientists (particularly Kapitsa and Sakharov) have already warned of the resulting long-run cost to Soviet scientific and intellectual growth.

International Prospects

{ 283

incident, w h i c h at the e n d of the nineteenth century almost

caused

a war between

powers

were

moving

France

(and

a n d Britain at a t i m e w h e n t h e s e

a European

ac-

O n the whole, close cooperation b e t w e e n the United States

and

commodation.

continued

to m o v e )

toward

8

the Soviet Union

seems

a very unlikely prospect

in the

coming

d e c a d e . T h i s is o n l y p a r t i a l l y d u e t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i d e o l o g i c a l political

character

of

the

two

countries.

A

communist

and

America

w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y r e m a i n a rival of t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , as C o m m u n i s t C h i n a s o o n b e c a m e o n e . G i v e n its s i z e a n d a democratic and creative

Soviet Union might be

just

power,

an even

more

p o w e r f u l c o m p e t i t o r f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t h a n is t h e p r e s e n t reaucratically

stagnant

and

doctrinally

orthodox

bu-

Soviet

system.

Moreover, d e m o c r a t i c nations are not necessarily pacifist

nations,

as A m e r i c a n history a m p l y demonstrates. Rivalry b e t w e e n is

inherent

in

an

international

global

consensus—the

mans

outlook

dividual

by

result of

competitive

superiority,

and

system

that

centuries nations

particular

of the

that

values.

nations

functions

without

conditioning

insisted Such

on

their

rivalry

is

likely to b e terminated b y a n y t h i n g short of a f u n d a m e n t a l struction in the nature of relations b e t w e e n

of innot

recon-

nations—and

hence

in t h e character of n a t i o n a l s o v e r e i g n t y itself. At

present,

the

formation

of

a

new

cooperative

international

p a t t e r n is g e t t i n g l i t t l e h e l p f r o m t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , i n s p i t e o f f a c t t h a t it c o n s i d e r s itself i n t h e f o r e f r o n t of historical

progress

a n d w a s until recently the standard-bearer of an ideology that cut across traditional national lines. T h e

i r o n y of h i s t o r y is

t h a t t o d a y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a s a f o r e i g n p o l i c y t h a t is nationalistic

and a domestic policy

of non-Russian minorities;

that calls for the

it a c t i v e l y c a m p a i g n s

patterns of international cooperation, grants a

the

had such

intensely

domination

against

regional

disproportionately

small a m o u n t of h e l p to the less d e v e l o p e d nations

(roughly

ten

p e r cent of U n i t e d States f o r e i g n a i d ) , a n d rejects a joint explorat i o n o f s p a c e ( c l o a k i n g its o w n e f f o r t s i n u t m o s t

secrecy).

I n d e e d , o n e of t h e u n a n t i c i p a t e d effects of t h e Sino-Soviet

dis-

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

p u t e m a y b e a h a r d e n i n g of t h e S o v i e t o u t l o o k a n d a m o r e noid view

of t h e world.

Though

Soviet leaders

want

two-front confrontation and are h e n c e p u s h e d t o w a r d dation

with

either

the

West

or the

East,

the

very

para-

to avoid

a

accommo-

scale

of

the

C h i n e s e c h a l l e n g e intensifies their fears, puts a p r e m i u m o n

mili-

tary preparedness,

with

and stimulates an intense preoccupation

the sacredness of frontiers.* E q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t b u t less generally r e c o g n i z e d inhibiting the Soviet U n i o n from seeking more

as a factor

binding

forms

i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n is t h e d o m e s t i c w e a k n e s s a n d of Soviet leaders. E v e n

fifty

relies which

heavily

on

coercion

is a c q u i r e d

through

not by

protracted,

insecurity

y e a r s a f t e r its i n c e p t i o n , t h e

s y s t e m t h e y h e a d still lacks e l e m e n t a r y l e g i t i m a c y : and

censorship

regular,

bureaucratic

to

constitutional infighting.

political

its r u l i n g

retain

its

elite

power,

procedures

(The

struggles

succession are a case in point.) B e c a u s e of the doctrinal

social innovation, broad a c c o m m o d a t i o n

of the w o r l d — w h i c h ruling party—is

no

with the West,

that the Leninist

in turn justifies the L e n i n i s t c o n c e p t longer relevant,

would

inevitably

Soviet-dominated Eastern In

large

Russia's

measure,

delayed

this

conservative

terms of the global city, the

not quite yet

vision of

cause

Union

and

and

Leninist political

Soviet Union

attitude

the farin

reflects

development.

represents

an

In

archaic

that experiences modernity existentially

normatively.

of

Europe.

modernization

religious c o m m u n i t y

for

carrying

dichotomic

reaching internal political instability in the Soviet

but

incapacity

of the Soviet political s y s t e m to r e s p o n d to the internal n e e d s

w i t h it t h e a c k n o w l e d g m e n t

in of

but

9

* To appreciate Soviet fears, one would have to imagine a situation in which the United States was confronted by eight hundred million Mexicans who had nuclear arms and rockets and who were loudly insisting that the United States had seized vast expanses of Mexican territory, that the American system was inherently evil, and that the American government was their enemy. Such a situation would doubtless stimulate intense fears in the American public. Soviet apprehensiveness is further increased by the fact that Siberia —relatively undeveloped and uninhabited—serves as a magnet to the Chinese masses, and that Russo-Chinese territorial arrangements are of a historically dubious character.

International Prospects

Policy

{

285

Implications

T h e foregoing general propositions point to several

immediate

i m p l i c a t i o n s for A m e r i c a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y , in t e r m s b o t h of assumptions a n d of the desirable foreign posture. Before

guiding elaborat-

i n g , l e t u s first p o s i t t h e s e i m p l i c a t i o n s i n t h e i r m o s t s u c c i n c t

form:

a posture based on ideological considerations has b e c o m e

dated;

a n A m e r i c a n - S o v i e t axis is n o t l i k e l y t o b e t h e b a s i s f o r a n e w

in-

ternational system; traditional spheres of influence are increasingly unviable; economic

determinism

countries

communist

or to

the

basis for policy; regional becoming

obsolescent;

a b r o a d is b e c o m i n g

in regard to the less states

alliances

an

does

not

developed

provide

a

sound

against individual nations

extensive

American

military

are

presence

counterproductive to American interests

to t h e g r o w t h of a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y ; A m e r i c a n

and

diplomatic

m a c h i n e r y — d e v e l o p e d in the pre-global and pre-technetronic — h a s b e c o m e o u t m o d e d and requires extensive

modernization.

Although American foreign policy has not been tiated^ anti-communist

as

undifferen-

a s its critics h a v e f o u n d it c o n v e n i e n t

assert,* there has b e e n a strong rhetorical t e n d e n c y in official circles to r e d u c e international p r o b l e m s

to an

Henceforth,

local

transformations

American

addition,

the

gradual

pluralization

of

the

Ameri-

in various

of the w o r l d are less likely to b e s e e n as part of a universal in

parts threat;

communist

world

will continue to accelerate differences a m o n g the c o m m u n i s t tems. This will reduce reliance on active American m a k i n g it i m p e r a t i v e

to an overt hostile

act b y

sys-

intervention,

primarily in d e f e n s e of concrete

interests or in response

to

ideological

confrontation a n d to identify radical c h a n g e as contrary to c a n interests.

age

American

a power

with

the potential to threaten the U n i t e d States, f

* The charge that the United States has conducted its foreign policy on the assumption of a monolithic world communist conspiracy is dear to some scholarly critics. In point of fact, the United States pioneered in aid to Yugoslavia in the late 1940s; it was the first to initiate American-Soviet cultural exchanges, visits between heads of state, and so on. t i n more specific terms, it would be desirable and proper for the United

2. j 2. }

V:

America and the World

A less ideological perspective will r e d u c e relationship Soviet

to

Union

its

proper

poses

proportions.

to the

United

The

States

is

the

American-Soviet

principal

threat

military:

a

the

stronger

Soviet U n i o n therefore inescapably tends to threaten America; weaker

Soviet

between

the

arms-control tated by

Union two

feels threatened

superpowers

arrangements

common

sense.

would

between

The

by be

the

continuing

America.

Since

mutually two

a

war

destructive,

countries

SALT

a

are

dic-

(Strategic

Arms

Limitation Talks) b e t w e e n the United States and the Soviet

Union

c a n b e s e e n as m o r e t h a n a n e g o t i a t i o n b e t w e e n t w o rivals; vertently, precisely b e c a u s e t h e y will b e lengthy, t h e talks a

de facto

Although

b e g i n n i n g of a joint c o m m i s s i o n o n a r m s a n d limited

in

actual

power,

the

"commission"

inad-

signify

strategy. gradually

a n d p e r h a p s increasingly will affect the w a y e a c h side acts,

stimu-

lating greater m u t u a l sensitivity to felt n e e d s and fears.* I n t h e m e a n t i m e , u n t i l a b i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t is r e a c h e d , c a n t e c h n o l o g i c a l s o p h i s t i c a t i o n is s u f f i c i e n t t o p r o v i d e t h e

Amerineces-

States to aid Thailand with arms and equipment should that country be threatened by North Vietnam. The same response would apply to a North Korean threat against South Korea, or a threat by the Arab states against Israel. But in none of these cases should American forces be committed unless a major power, i.e., the USSR or China, becomes directly involved. Total American abstention would encourage aggression, but American aid should suffice to make the war either useless or very costly to the aggressor. To repeat—direct involvement should be reserved for situations in which a power with the capacity to threaten the United States is involved. * Science and technology have already revolutionized the exercise of sovereignty by the two countries vis-a-vis each other. The utilization of the U-2S, and subsequently of reconnaissance satellites, vitiated the claim to unlimited sovereignty over national air space, somewhat undoing Soviet military secrecy. The acquiescence of the Soviet Union to the U-22 flights was necessitated by its inability to shoot these planes down; in spite of the May i960 incident, the precedent of unilateral inspection was thereby asserted and has since become a practice followed by both states. The inherent complexity of reaching an arms-control agreement is suggested by the following conclusion by a specialist in the field: "There is basis for hope [of a possible agreement] if both sides can accept the fact that for some time the most they can expect to achieve is a strategic balance at quite high, but less rapidly escalating, force levels; and if both recognize that breaking the action-reaction cycle should be given first priority in any negotiations" (George W. Rathjens, The Future of the Strategic Arms Race, New York, 1969, p. 4 0 ) .

International Prospects sary

degree

of

ambiguity

to

p o w e r relationship b e t w e e n of destructive parity,

the

qualitative

and

{ 287

quantitative

the t w o states. In t h e current

this strategic

and

psychological

phase

posture

n e e d e d in order to replace earlier reliance o n manifest a n d ble deterrence born of A m e r i c a n superiority in destructive Parity

deterrence

requires

some

deterrence demanded precise But

outside

this

ambiguity,

just

as

is

credipower.

superiority

credibility.

relationship

the

opportunities

for

a

wide-

ranging settlement are relatively restricted.10 A n

American-Soviet

axis w o u l d

therefore

both

be

resented by

Washington

and

too m a n y

Moscow

to

states

exploit

and these

tempt

resentments.

In

effect, t h e m o r e s u c c e s s f u l t h e efforts to c r e a t e s u c h a n axis, stronger the impediment

t o it. I n a d d i t i o n ,

as h a s

already

argued, the Soviet U n i o n d o e s not represent a vital social tive

that

offers the

world

an

attractive

h a n d l i n g e i t h e r its o l d d i l e m m a s posed

by

America

science

and

joint s p a c e exploration, tively,

seek

in international

these may

help

As

a

result,

is a g r a d u a l

cooperation

undersea shape

relevant

studies,

a pattern

the

increase

through and

of

alternafor

new

ones

most

that

in

such

been

model

or—particularly—the

technology.

can reasonably

volvement

and

the

Soviet

in-

projects

as

so forth.

Cumula-

collaborative

involve-

ment that will eventually embrace other spheres. M e a n w h i l e , it is l i k e l y t h a t A m e r i c a n a n d R u s s i a n i n f l u e n c e

will

decrease in areas that both nations h a v e traditionally

considered

their o w n

out"

special

domains.

In

a modern

city "staked

areas

are possible only in relations a m o n g criminal gangs; in t h e city

sealed

least

spheres

costly—to

of

influence

remain

Eastern

Europe

happen

to a larger

quite

European

will not b e able to halt this process

is

bound

at

impede

otherwise

Europe

difficult—or to

would

Eastern

increasingly

attracted to the West, a n d only direct Soviet coercion can what

maintain.

are

global

rapidly: entity.

the

Even

linkage Soviet

entirely; the traditional

t u r a l a t t r a c t i o n o f t h e W e s t is t o o s t r o n g , a n d it is c u r r e n t l y forced

by

of

technological

the

growing

Eastern gap

European

between

the

recognition East

and

that,

the

of

force culrein-

because

West,

Rus-

2. j 2. } sia

V: America and the World

cannot

effectively

help

Eastern

industrial age. This attraction

Europe

is h e a l t h y ,

to

enter

the

for the gradual

postexpan-

s i o n of E a s t e r n E u r o p e a n links w i t h W e s t e r n E u r o p e is b o u n d a f f e c t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n as w e l l a n d l e s s e n its d o c t r i n a l

orientation.

T h e notion of a special relationship b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d and Latin America tionalism, will

be

more

is a l s o b o u n d

and

directed

more

with

radical

increasing

to decay.

Latin

a s it w i d e n s animosity

to

States

American

na-

its p o p u l a r

against

the

base, United

S t a t e s , u n l e s s t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s r a p i d l y s h i f t s its o w n p o s t u r e .

Ac-

c o r d i n g l y , it w o u l d b e w i s e f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o m a k e a n

ex-

plicit m o v e to a b a n d o n the M o n r o e D o c t r i n e and to c o n c e d e in the n e w

global

age

geographic

or hemispheric

that

contiguity

no

longer n e e d be politically decisive. N o t h i n g could b e healthier

for

Pan-American relations than for the U n i t e d States to place

them

o n t h e s a m e l e v e l as its r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e rest o f t h e w o r l d ,

con-

fining

does

itself t o e m p h a s i s o n c u l t u r a l - p o l i t i c a l a f f i n i t i e s ( a s it

with Western Europe) w i t h the less d e v e l o p e d

a n d e c o n o m i c - s o c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s ( a s it d o e s countries).

It w o u l d also b e a d v i s a b l e to v i e w the q u e s t i o n of t h e

political

d e v e l o p m e n t of b o t h the c o m m u n i s t a n d the d e v e l o p i n g

countries

with

a great

power may

deal

of patience.

not always be

infusion

of

American

the solution, so reliance

Just as the

on

economic

g r o w t h is n o g u a r a n t e e o f e i t h e r d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n ,

political

stabil-

ity, or p r o - A m e r i c a n i s m . A s h a s b e e n p o i n t e d out, p o l i t i c a l in the c o m m u n i s t

states is n o t a s i m p l e b y - p r o d u c t of

development,

the susceptibility

and

change

economic

of the less d e v e l o p e d

coun-

tries to radical a p p e a l s rises as t h e y b e g i n to d e v e l o p . F o r e i g n and closer e c o n o m i c contacts are not a palliative for crises or a r e m e d y

for the

ills of

deeply

entrenched

aid

deep-rooted ideological

institutions. This argues for an approach to international e c o n o m i c

relations

a n d f o r e i g n a i d t h a t is i n c r e a s i n g l y d e p o l i t i c i z e d i n f o r m , e v e n t h e u l t i m a t e u n d e r l y i n g p u r p o s e r e m a i n s political. If t h a t

is t o p r o m o t e t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a m o r e c o o p e r a t i v e c o m m u n i t y nations, irrespective of their

individual

internal

systems,

if

purpose

then

of it

International Prospects

{

w o u l d b e a step in the right direction to g i v e international a larger role in e c o n o m i c

development

and

to start

289

bodies

eliminating

r e s t r i c t i o n s o n t r a d e . S u c h a c t i o n is all t h e m o r e l i k e l y t o b e tually

successful

geared

to

because

expectations

it

is

of

less

rapid

achieved through direct e c o n o m i c

overtly and

political

basic

and

a less anxious

is

political

preoccupation

with

the

Soviet

processes

Union

would

also help the U n i t e d States to d e v e l o p a different posture China.

China

and

South

Asia

not

change

leverage.*

A more detached attitude toward world revolutionary and

even-

are

heavily

populated

toward

areas

have inherited from the past complex challenges to social

that

organ-

ization, a n d are still s t r u g g l i n g w i t h t h e s e o l d p r o b l e m s at a when new

the advanced dimensions.

these

can

Western

world

Until

initially

be

is b e g i n n i n g

links

are

sought

Europe—China

will

to confront

established

and

directed

remain

an

with

of

China—and

through

excluded

time

problems

Japan and

and

a

self-

e x c l u d e d p o r t i o n of m a n k i n d , all t h e m o r e t h r e a t e n i n g b e c a u s e backwardness will increasingly be combined with massive power. indirect viously

Accordingly, Soviet

ally

the

United

against

wants—should

States,

instead

China—which

encourage

efforts

of

is w h a t by

other

its

nuclear

becoming Moscow countries

s e e k t i e s w i t h C h i n a . I n a d d i t i o n , it s h o u l d l a u n c h its o w n tives,11 a n d a v o i d b e c o m i n g e n t a n g l e d in overt a n t i - C h i n e s e

an obto

initiasecu-

rity arrangements. Indeed, to

in

resemble

our those

age

international

of

large

security

metropolitan

arrangements

centers:

such

ought

arrange-

m e n t s are directed not against specific organizations or individuals but against

those w h o

association based on a variety of purposes,

depart

from

a concept including

established

of c o o p e r a t i v e

Thus,

an

nations linked

norms.

for

security, ought

gradually

to

place existing alliances, w h i c h are usually formulated in terms

reof

0 This need not exclude the concentration of effort on specific states when prospects for economic development coincide with more strictly political American interests. In other words, international economic aid for humanitarian purposes can go hand in hand with more selective and more intensive efforts in regard to specific countries.

2. j 2. }

V:

America and the World

a potential aggressor,

explicitly identified either in the

treaty

in the a c c o m p a n y i n g rhetoric. T h o u g h initially this w o u l d b e a formalistic

change—for

the

association

of states

would

sarily involve o n l y t h o s e that share certain interests a n d

necesfears—a

deliberately o p e n - e n d e d structure, with the security elements a partial and secondary aspect, w o u l d avoid perpetuating tionally

the

but

often

transient

conflicts

only

institu-

of

interests

E v o l u t i o n in t h e forms of international security w o u l d

facilitate

between

inevitable

or

only

states.*

the gradual restructuring

of the A m e r i c a n

defense

posture,

ticularly b y concentrating A m e r i c a n military presence

par-

abroad

in

a f e w k e y countries. E x c e p t in countries that feel themselves rectly

threatened,

prolonged

United

States

military

presence

tends to galvanize political hostility t o w a r d the U n i t e d States in traditionally friendly countries presence

was

once

wanted

by

on the waging

of nuclear w e a p o n s World

violence

the

countries

concerned,

of an all-out w a r b y

the

replace

the

previous

that

it

has

restraint

destructiveness

and with the likelihood that sporadic

will

even

(like Turkey), and though

t e n d e d to b e c o m e a n A m e r i c a n v e s t e d interest. W i t h the imposed

di-

preoccupation

central war, American forces stationed abroad on the

Third with

a

assumption

that t h e y will b e n e e d e d to assure the security of different nations f r o m a c o m m o n threat are less a n d less r e q u i r e d for that With some exceptions Germany),

by

terests w o u l d

and

large both

probably

fense posture became true of t h e

Soviet

purpose.

(for example, South Korea, Berlin, or

not be

global stability jeopardized

territorially m o r e

Union,

with

and

if t h e

confined

little a p p a r e n t

curity), and relied increasingly on long-range

West

American American (this has

damage

inde-

been

t o its

se-

mobility.!

* This may be especially relevant to efforts to construct a system of cooperation in the Pacific. By itself, it is unlikely that Southeast Asia, even with improved economic performance, can create the foundations for regional security. But enlarged through Japanese, Australian, and American participation —and not specifically directed against China—some forms of cooperation could gradually develop, and the system might eventually involve more and more nations. f Some stand-by facilities for international peace-keeping forces could be provided if, with the agreement of the host country, some vacated United

International Prospects

{

291

Finally, the opportunities a n d the dangers inherent in the entific-technological in American

age

attitudes

require

and

subtle

organization.

but

important

These

changes

c o m e rapidly; they cannot b e blueprinted in detail; they likely to b e achieved tive

world

exploits

the

role

will

not

are

un-

dramatically. Nonetheless, to play an

America

latest

needs

foreign-relations

communications

techniques

effec-

machinery and

sci-

changes

uses

a

that style

a n d organization responsive to the m o r e congested pattern of

our

global existence. T h i s is h a r d l y t h e c a s e t o d a y . O u r d i p l o m a t i c m a c h i n e r y is still the product of the traditional arrangements

that w e r e

contrived

after 1815 a n d that w e r e ritualistically p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h It

is

predominantly

geared

tions, often n e g l e c t i n g social

developments.

the

to

currently

It is n o

protocol.

government-to-government far more

accident

that

important

newspapermen,

d e p e n d e n t on governmental contacts and m o r e inclined to a b s o r b e d in a g i v e n society's life, h a v e o f t e n b e e n m o r e

of less

become sensitive

to the b r o a d pattern of c h a n g e in foreign countries than h a v e local American diplomats. Contemporary foreign relations

rela-

role

the

increas-

States bases were taken over by the UN. It should in any case, be noted that American public opinion seems little disposed to back the use of American forces to protect foreign nations. In a mid-1969 public-opinion poll, which asked whether America ought to aid foreign states if these were invaded by outside communist military forces, those who were willing to rely on force were in the majority only with respect to Canada and Mexico (57 per cent and 52 per cent respectively); the figure for West Germany was 38 per cent, for Japan 27 per cent, for Israel 9 per cent (here the foreign aggression postulated was not necessarily communist), for Rumania 13 per cent; when combined with those willing to help short of force, the percentage for Canada was 79 per cent, for Mexico 76 per cent, for West Germany 59 per cent, for Israel 44 per cent, for Rumania 24 per cent, for Japan 42 per cent (Harris Poll, as cited by Time, May 2, 1969). The national mood could easily change in the light of circumstances, but the above poll is significant in indicating a general attitude. It suggests a more selective approach toward military commitment and may have some bearing on the likely public response to the formation of a professional volunteer army. A large, conscript-based army was to some extent a reflection of the populist nationalism stimulated by the French Revolution, which saw every citizen as a soldier. This had greater meaning in an age of relatively unsophisticated weaponry and intense ideological motivation. With both factors changing drastically, the case for a more professional armed force, employed for more selective purposes, gains weight.

2. j 2. } ingly

V: America and the World

require

skills

in

intellectual-scientific

cluding the ability to c o m m u n i c a t e

communications,

effectively with

the

in-

creative

s e g m e n t s of o t h e r s o c i e t i e s , a n d it is p r e c i s e l y i n t h e s e

fields

the existing diplomatic training and procedure are most

deficient.

M o r e o v e r , t h e entire tradition of secret dispatches a n d

that

lengthy

cables, w h i c h daily o v e r w h e l m State D e p a r t m e n t headquarters

in

Washington,

in

modern

has simply

not taken into account

communications,

the

development

reporting in the leading A m e r i c a n e v e n the role of television.*

of

the

explosion

excellent

foreign

and foreign newspapers,

In commenting on the

1969

report, w h i c h w a s similarly critical of t h e British f o r e i g n

service,

Canadian political scientist James Eayrs noted: "Too m a n y p u s h too m a n y p e n s across too m a n y pieces of paper, with

worthless

messages/'12

Thomas

Jefferson o n c e

and

Duncan

people

filling

them

complained

that h e h a d not h e a r d f r o m o n e of his a m b a s s a d o r s for a year; present

Secretary

of

State

could

legitimately

daily hears too m u c h from too m a n y u n n e e d e d The

United

States

is t h e c o u n t r y

complain

the

that

he

ambassadors.

that most

urgently

needs

r e f o r m its f o r e i g n s e r v i c e a n d p o l i c y m a k i n g e s t a b l i s h m e n t , is b e s t e q u i p p e d t o u n d e r t a k e s u c h r e f o r m . It is t h e

first

to

and

t o b e c o m e g l o b a l l y o r i e n t e d , a n d it is t h e o n e w i t h t h e m o s t

exten-

sive a n d intensive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s involvement. Its business

com-

munity, moreover, has also acquired extensive experience in e i g n operations a n d has effectively m a s t e r e d the arts of reporting,

foreign

representation,

relying on enormous

and

central

staffs a n d r e d u n d a n t operations.

conferences,

shared-time

for-

accurate

control—without It h a s

p i o n e e r e d in t h e a d o p t i o n of t h e latest t e c h n i q u e s , s u c h as circuit television

it

society

computers,

and

also

closedother

devices. T h o u g h this is h a r d l y t h e p l a c e to o u t l i n e t h e n e e d e d r e f o r m s in detail, the point remains that, g i v e n the f u n d a m e n t a l

changes

in

* This writer can state on the basis of personal experience while serving in the Department of State that in most cases a better or at least as good a picture of foreign developments can be obtained by reading the better newspapers—including, of course, the foreign ones—than by perusing the hundreds of daily telegrams, often reporting cocktail-party trivia.

A Community

of the Developed

Nations

{ 293

the w a y nations interact, an extensive study and drastic reform the existing, h i g h l y traditional structure a n d style of t h e

of

American

f o r e i g n s e r v i c e is l o n g o v e r d u e . W i d e r d i p l o m a t i c u s e o f

compu-

ters a n d direct s o u n d - a n d - s i g h t electronic c o m m u n i c a t i o n

should

p e r m i t the r e d u c t i o n in t h e size a n d n u m b e r of U n i t e d States foreign

missions,

efficient

making

international

them

operationally

corporations.

similar

to

Washington's

the

more

policymaking

p r o c e s s n e e d s t o b e s i m i l a r l y s t r e a m l i n e d a n d f r e e d f r o m its t a n g l e of bureaucratic red tape.13

3. A Community of the Developed Nations These

more

immediately

necessary

changes

must

be

forced b y a broader effort to contain the global tendencies

rein-

toward

chaos. A c o m m u n i t y of the d e v e l o p e d nations must eventually f o r m e d if t h e w o r l d serious

is t o r e s p o n d

effectively to the

crisis t h a t in d i f f e r e n t w a y s

now

threatens

both

the

ad-

vanced world and the Third World. Persistent divisions a m o n g developed

states,

particularly

those

based

on

outmoded

in the m o r e

contribute to a resurgence of

Western

Europe

and

advanced

world

they

could

aid even

nationalism.

Japan

From an American standpoint, the more important and ing changes

the

ideo-

logical concepts, will n e g a t e t h e efforts of individual states to the Third World;

be

increasingly

in the years

to c o m e

will have

to involve

promisWestern

E u r o p e and Japan. T h e ability of these areas to continue to

grow

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

economically a n d to maintain relatively democratic political forms will m o r e crucially affect the gradual evolution of a n e w tional

system

tions.

Western

initiatives tions,

than

will

Europe

designed

and

like

changes

Japan

in

ward

a

they

possibilities

they

in

the

for rela-

forefront

represent

the

the vitality

cooperation

and—much

consciousness.0

is a l r e a d y

For

an entity

of E u r o p e a n

European

the

more

chieftains

(occasionally

visited

seriatim

the

Europeans, political

by

the

repro-

foreign

p o t e n t a t e f r o m W a s h i n g t o n ) , t h e i r E u r o p e is f r o n t i e r l e s s , o p e n unlimited

tourism,

to the almost

and increasingly to the free

flow

unlimited

movement

of

of students and workers. T o

the n e e d e d psychological basis for a n e w

to

goods,

s u r e , a p o s i t i v e r e g i o n a l i s m is y e t t o m a t u r e , b u t t h e f o r e g o i n g least provides

is

important—to-

younger

in all b u t

na-

development

spect: t h o u g h still anachronistically g o v e r n e d b y a series of vincial

of

most

globe.

European Europe

are

innovation,

some scholars emphasize

increasing

Western

rela-

fabric of international

tionalism, the b r o a d thrust of W e s t e r n toward

interna-

American-Soviet

offer greater

a new

America,

technological

vital regions of t h e Though

and

to w e a v e

because,

scientific a n d

likely

be at

Europe.

T h e technetronic revolution h a s a c c e l e r a t e d t h e a p p e a r a n c e of this E u r o p e , a!nd t h e a u t a r k i c i d e a s o f t h e i n d u s t r i a l a g e h a v e l i t t l e

or

n o h o l d o n it t o d a y . In Europe ruptive

the impact

within

some

of s c i e n c e

societies

and

technology,

(particularly

Italy,

though

which

c o m p l e t i n g t h e i n d u s t r i a l p h a s e of its d e v e l o p m e n t ) ,

has

is

disjust

inspired

increased cooperation; in Japan, however, w h i c h lacks the

imme-

* This has been dramatically illustrated in France by polls which show that French public opinion, long held to be strongly nationalist, supports the emergence of a European government that would have decisive powers over a local French government in such areas as scientific research (66 per cent for a European government, 15 per cent for a decisive French government) and foreign policy (61 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively). These polls indicate that most Frenchmen favored retaining the French government's decisive role only in purely internal affairs, such as social policy, vacations, education, and so forth (Alain Lancelot and Pierre Weill, "The French and the Political Unification of Europe," Revue jrangaise de science politique, February 1969, pp. 145-7°) •

A Community diate external

outlet

that

of the Developed

European

Nations

{ 295

unification provides

for

the

W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n s a n d w h i c h is s u b j e c t t o a h i g h l y v i s i b l e A m e r i c a n military-political p r e s e n c e , it h a s h a d a n internally

aggravat-

i n g e f f e c t . It t e n d s t o s h a r p e n t h e n a t i o n s i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l c o n f l i c t s , polarizing of

the

public

country

evident

in m o s t of the

Japan,

given

World

War

its

opinion

traditions

Japanese

the II

and

uncertain.*

and

the

modern

nationalism

or

world

upheaval

only

turn

future

have

generations

special by

achieved

gravity

in

defeat

in

its

balance

institutions.

toward

orientation

between

produced

recently

democratic a

the

conflicts

advanced

cultural

and

rendering

The

A

ideological

between revival

of

radicalism

w o u l d seriously threaten t h e h i g h l y t e n u o u s structure of p e a c e the Pacific and directly affect the interests of the U n i t e d the Soviet Union, and

in

States,

China.

Accordingly, an effort m u s t b e m a d e

to forge a c o m m u n i t y

of

the d e v e l o p e d nations that w o u l d e m b r a c e the Atlantic states, more

advanced

nations

need

European

not—and

communist

for a very

states,

and

time

could

long

homogeneous community resembling E E C

Japan.

These

not—form

or the o n c e h o p e d

Atlantic c o m m u n i t y . N o n e t h e l e s s , progress in that direction h e l p to terminate the civil w a r that has d o m i n a t e d politics fifty

among

the

developed

nations

for

the

last

international hundred

that

both

has

precluded

democratic

and

a constructive communist

and

among

these nations h a v e less a n d less relevance to mankind's real

dilemmas

a for

would

years. T h o u g h the nationalist and ideological disputes

lems, their persistence

the

prob-

response

to

states

increas-

ingly r e c o g n i z e as b e i n g t h e k e y issues of our times. T h e

absence

of a u n i f y i n g process of i n v o l v e m e n t has kept old disputes

alive

a n d has obscured the purposes of statesmanship. T o postulate the n e e d for such creation

as

the

coming

decade's

a community major

task

is

and to define not

its

utopianism.

* Thus, the center-right coalition that has governed Japan in the postwar period has gradually shrunk: in 1952 it obtained 66.1 per cent of the popular vote; in 1953, 65.7 per cent; in 1955, 63.2 per cent; in 1958, 57-8 per cent; in i960, 57.6 per cent; in 1963, 54.7 per cent; in 1967, 48 8 per cent; and in 1969, 47.6 per cent.

2. j 2. }

V:

America and the World

U n d e r the pressures of economics, science, and technology, k i n d is m o v i n g

steadily

toward

p e r i o d i c reverses, all h u m a n

large-scale

cooperation.

history clearly indicates progress

t h a t d i r e c t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r a s p o n t a n e o u s will

suffice

to

counterbalance

the

dangers

already

calls for deliberate efforts to accelerate the process of cooperation a m o n g the advanced toward

a

larger

tions will necessarily h a v e clude

more

homogeneous

And

response

international

nations.

community

of

to be piecemeal, relationships

the and

within

developed

larger

of r e a s o n i n g

derived

pre-

entity.

Moreover, such a community cannot be achieved by fusing

f o r m a l s t a t e is itself a n e x t e n s i o n

na-

it w i l l n o t

the

ing states into o n e larger entity. T h e desire to create o n e

existlarger,

from

a g e of n a t i o n a l i s m . It m a k e s m u c h m o r e s e n s e to a t t e m p t t o ciate existing states t h r o u g h a variety of indirect ties a n d developing limitations on national In this process, t h e one hand

Soviet

and Western

l o n g time to enjoy m o r e

The

and

Eastern

Europe

States-Soviet

nuclear rivalry, w h i c h

would

colonial competition:

emerging European

a or

sweep remain

cooperative

setting, the competition b e t w e e n the U n i t e d States a n d the

Anglo-French

a

own

regional

But in the broader

U n i o n could eventually r e s e m b l e in f o r m

the

for

is t o d e v e l o p

in various

functional forms of cooperation. S u c h a structure w o u l d not aside United

on

within their

point, however,

b r o a d e r structure that links the f o r e g o i n g

t h e axis of w o r l d military m i g h t .

already

on the other will continue

intimate relationships

a r e a s . T h a t is u n a v o i d a b l e .

the asso-

sovereignty.

Union

Europe

in

movement noted.

s i n c e t h e a n s w e r is p r o b a b l y n o , it f o l l o w s t h a t a r e a l i s t i c

Movement

man-

Despite

Soviet

late-nineteenth-century

Fashoda

did

not

vitiate

the

entente.

M o v e m e n t t o w a r d s u c h a c o m m u n i t y will in all probability

re-

q u i r e t w o b r o a d a n d o v e r l a p p i n g p h a s e s . T h e first o f t h e s e

would

involve the f o r g i n g of c o m m u n i t y links a m o n g the U n i t e d

States,

W e s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d Japan, as w e l l as w i t h other m o r e countries

(for

example,

Australia,

Israel,

Mexico).

advanced

The

p h a s e w o u l d i n c l u d e the extension of these links to m o r e

second

advanced

A Community

of the Developed

Nations

{ 297

communist countries. S o m e of t h e m — f o r example, Yugoslavia Rumania—may more

rapidly

move

than

toward

others,

necessarily b e sharply

Structure

and

and

closer

international

hence

the

two

or

cooperation

phases

need

not

demarcated.

Focus

The emerging community

of d e v e l o p e d

nations w o u l d

require

s o m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , e v e n t h o u g h it w o u l d b e u n w i s e seek to create too m a n y binding integrated processes

A case can b e m a d e for initially setting u p only a high-level sultative

council

for

gether the heads cuss

their

global

of g o v e r n m e n t s

common

nations.

with

Some

problems,

their moral

permanent

continuity to these Accordingly,

con-

bringing

to-

world to

dis-

educational-scientific,

as

well

obligations

supporting

as

to

toward

machinery

deal

and

from

the

that

developing

could

provide

consultations.

such

a

council

something more than O E C D level and would

regularly

of the d e v e l o p e d

political-security,

economic-technological perspective

cooperation,

to

prematurely.

for

global

cooperation

would

in t h a t it w o u l d o p e r a t e o n a

be

higher

also b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h political strategy, but

would be more diffused than N A T O

in t h a t it w o u l d n o t s e e k

it to

forge integrated military-political structures. Nevertheless, a council of this s o r t — p e r h a p s Japan, and Western litical leaders problems common

of

initially linking only the

Europe,

states

and

sharing

of m o d e r n i t y — w o u l d programs

unavoidably

thus bringing together

certain be

by

the

Cold

common

more

t h a n is t h e U n i t e d

limited

United

War

effective in

by

the

po-

aspirations

and

developing

Nations, whose and

States,

efficacy

north-south

is

divi-

sions. T h e inclusion of Japan w o u l d b e particularly important, b o t h the internal d e v e l o p m e n t such

a community.

Japan

of Japanese is a w o r l d

life a n d power,

to the

and

in a

vitality world

e l e c t r o n i c a n d s u p e r s o n i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n s it is a p s y c h o l o g i c a l political error to t h i n k of it as p r i m a r i l y

an Asian nation.

to of of

and

Japan

2. j 2. }

V:

needs

an

ment,

not

pygmies

America and the World

outlet

commensurate

one

and

that

places

that excludes

real world powers.

with

it i n

its o w n

the

de facto

it

advanced

position from

of

a

the

develop-

giant

among

councils

T h e regular American-Japanese

of

cabinet-level

talks are a desirable bilateral arrangement, b u t J a p a n will more

fully

and

creatively

involved

in

world

the

affairs

in

become a

larger

setting of e q u a l partners. W i t h o u t s u c h a l a r g e r s e t t i n g , t h e r e is d a n g e r t h a t t h e

extraor-

dinary p a c e of J a p a n e s e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t will

become

destructive.

The

automatic

projections

of

Japanese

growth

into

the future, m a d e w i t h increasing f r e q u e n c y in the late 1960s, misleading;

they

do

not

make

allowance

for

effect of t h e i m p a c t of c h a n g e o n J a p a n e s e

the

are

destabilizing

t r a d i t i o n s . T h e r e is

real possibility that in the 1970s Japan will u n d e r g o extremely

setting internal conflicts unless in s o m e w a y Japanese idealism b o t h stimulated a n d turned to goals larger t h a n insular a n d sonal hedonism.

International cooperation,

w i t h J a p a n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y

as w e l l

involving

as of p o w e r ,

a

upis

per-

the

sharing

could

provide

such an outlet. a political-security

frame-

w o r k in w h i c h t h e security concerns of e a c h state c o u l d b e

Such

a council

would

also

provide

viewed

in a context that takes into account between Soviet

such

crisis,

matters Chinese

as

Soviet

nuclear

the inescapable

policy

in

Berlin

development

and

connections

and its

the

Sino-

implications

both, for J a p a n e s e security a n d for E a s t - W e s t relations in

Europe,

a n d so on. Similarly, m a t t e r s s u c h as J a p a n e s e r e a r m a m e n t , bly

even

Japan's

creasingly second

half

large of

acquisition numbers

the

of

1970s),14

of

nuclear

arms

Japanese

to

could

viewed

be

be

(thought likely in

possiby

in-

during

terms

the

of

this

b r o a d e r significance rather t h a n as a r e s p o n s e to p u r e l y local

con-

siderations. I n d e e d , g i v e n t h e n a t u r e of m o d e r n scientific

develop-

ments

of

and

communications,

it is n o t

too early to

think

tech-

nological c o o p e r a t i o n b e t w e e n W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n d Japan, as w e l l as b e t w e e n b o t h of t h e m a n d t h e U n i t e d States, in s o m e defense.

fields

of

A Community Political-security second

the

efforts w o u l d ,

in importance

tional-scientific most

of the Developed

and

advanced

however,

to efforts to b r o a d e n economic-technological

industrial

nations

that

Nations

{

299

in all p r o b a b i l i t y the

scope

be

of

educa-

cooperation

among

are

becoming

industrial a n d are in s o m e regards m o v i n g into the

post-

post-national

age. T h e projected w o r l d i n f o r m a t i o n grid, for w h i c h Japan,

West-

ern Europe, and the U n i t e d States are most suited,0

create

could

the basis for a c o m m o n e d u c a t i o n a l program, for the a d o p t i o n common

a c a d e m i c standards, for t h e o r g a n i z e d p o o l i n g of

mation, a n d for a m o r e rational division of labor in research development. "conversing"

Computers with

Latin

at M.I.T.

already

no for

City, a n d Milan. easier to set u p

of

New

York,

and

and

regularly is

15

universities,

been

technical obstacle to p e r m a n e n t information linkage b e t w e e n , example, the universities

American

have

of

infor-

Moscow,

there

Tokyo,

Mexico

Such scientific-informational linkage w o u l d

than joint educational

programs

and

would

courage an international educational system by providing an tional

stimulus

to

an

international

division

of

academic

addilabor,

u n i f o r m a c a d e m i c standards, a n d a cross-national p o o l i n g of demic

aca-

resources.

Steps in that direction could b e accelerated by s o m e

symbolic

j o i n t a c t i o n s . S p a c e e x p l o r a t i o n is p r o b a b l y t h e m o s t d r a m a t i c ample

be en-

of

human

adventure

made

possible

by

science,

but

excur-

• "Western Europe and Japan present the most immediate opportunities for the world-information-grid. The Europeans and the Japanese are both increasingly sensitive to the importance of information storage and transfer network, similar to the one now evolving in this country. "The Europeans' success in this project will depend, in part, on their ability to modify a number of present restrictive attitudes. One is the lingering tradition of secretiveness in their research-and-development work. Another is the nationalistic inhibition in sharing regional information resources. It would be unfortunate if these attitudes held up formation of the network, since Europeans, over the long run, cannot think in terms of 'Italian research' or 'Norwegian research' any more than they are able to make a distinction between research done in California or New Jersey. "There is every reason to encourage the Europeans to overcome these problems. The American information-transfer network should be linked directly into their regional system, permitting a broader exchange of information" (Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, pp. 10-11).

2. j 2. }

V:

America and the World

r e n t l y it is a l m o s t e n t i r e l y m o n o p o l i z e d o n a c o m p e t i t i v e b a s i s the U n i t e d States a n d the Soviet Union. T h e p o o l i n g of European, Japanese, undertaking could

and American resources

do

much

to accelerate

by

Western

for a specific

international

joint

coopera-

t i o n . 1 6 I n a d d i t i o n , it m a y b e d e s i r a b l e t o d e v e l o p a n

international

convention

science

on

the

social

consequences

of

applied

and

technology. This not only w o u l d permit the ecological and effects of n e w

techniques

to b e w e i g h e d

in advance

social

but

would

a l s o m a k e it p o s s i b l e t o o u t l a w t h e u s e o f c h e m i c a l s t o l i m i t manipulate man

and

to prevent other scientific abuses

some governments may be

to

and

which

tempted.

In the economic-technological

field

some international

coopera-

tion has already b e e n achieved, but further progress will

require

greater A m e r i c a n sacrifices. M o r e intensive efforts to s h a p e a world monetary structure will have to b e undertaken, with c o n s e q u e n t risk t o t h e p r e s e n t relatively f a v o r a b l e A m e r i c a n tion. F u r t h e r p r o g r e s s w o u l d in all p r o b a b i l i t y r e q u i r e t h e d o n m e n t of restrictions, i m p o s e d b y C o n g r e s s on

the international

activities

their foreign subsidiaries international

structure

of

of

American

and plants.

The

production

and

to g o h a n d in h a n d with the e m e r g e n c e

in

appearance financing

posiaban-

1949 and

corporations

new some

1954,

and

of

truly

would

have

of a "theory of

interna-

tional production," n e e d e d to s u p p l e m e n t our present theories international trade.* Progress along these lines w o u l d 0

on

a

also

of

facili-

Judd Polk argues that "what we need is not a theory of international trade that abstracts from production, but a theory of an international production which, being specialized, presupposes trade." He goes on to note that "the question is not one of intruding into the economy of others; it is a matter of releasing the production capabilities of all nations. The problems of production seen from the standpoint of an economy vastly larger than that of the nation are new to everyone. The United States cannot abandon its concern for the national balance of payments, but, as noted, it is beginning to perceive the urgent need for a system of international accounts as comprehensive as the present national accounts. It particularly needs to follow the whole picture of the international movement of factors of production. Just to feel this need is to have made extraordinary progress in a short 20 years, for there cannot occur a dislodgment of the dollar from its international function without a crippling dislodgment of the production and trade it supports. Nor can there be a practical improvement in this function except

A Community

of the Developed

Nations

{

301

tate t h e creation of a free-trade area, w h i c h c o u l d b e t a r g e t e d

in

progressive stages.

The Communist The

Soviet

framework the

West

States Union

of

may

cooperation

for the

Eastern

come

to

because

participate of

the

in

such

inherent

Europeans—whom

the

a

larger

attraction Soviet

of

Union

w o u l d h a v e t o f o l l o w lest it l o s e t h e m a l t o g e t h e r — a n d b e c a u s e

of

the Soviet Union's o w n felt n e e d for increased collaboration in the technological

and

scientific revolution.

That

Eastern

Europeans

w i l l m o v e c l o s e r t o W e s t e r n E u r o p e is certain. T h e e v e n t s of in Czechoslovakia

are m e r e l y

an augury

of w h a t

1968

is t o c o m e ,

s p i t e of f o r c i b l e S o v i e t e f f o r t s t o t h e c o n t r a r y . It is o n l y a

of t i m e b e f o r e individual c o m m u n i s t states c o m e k n o c k i n g at doors of E E C or O E C D ; h e n c e , b r o a d e r E a s t - W e s t may even become

a w a y for M o s c o w

with the Eastern European

the

arrangements

to maintain effective

links

capitals.

T h e evolution of Y u g o s l a v thinking a n d b e h a v i o r attests to fact that the communist

in

matter

states are not i m m u n e

the

to the process

of

c h a n g e a n d to intelligent W e s t e r n initiatives. Slightly m o r e

than

twenty years ago, Yugoslav pronouncements were not unlike

those

of

the

Chinese

today.

states in e c o n o m i c ideological

Yet

moderation.

Yugoslavia's

Yugoslavia

now

reform, in the openness

association

In the with

late

1960s

leads

all

communist

of its s o c i e t y , a n d it j o i n e d

EFT At—and

GATT,°

perhaps

of

"socialism," Yugoslavia's

views

on

and

eventually

w i t h t h e C o m m o n M a r k e t — i s a p r o b a b i l i t y . W h i l e still to the notion

committed

international

politics are moderate, a n d they h a v e h a d a significant i m p a c t c o m m u n i s m in Eastern Similar

trends

are

in

on

Europe. slowly

developing

elsewhere

in

the

com-

in the context of the cash and credit requirements of the new world economy" ("The New World Economy," Columbia Journal of World Business, January-February 1968, p. 15). * GATT: General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, f EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

2. j 2. }

V:

America and the World

m u n i s t world. T o b e sure, t h e y are o p p o s e d b y e n t r e n c h e d crats, b u t in t h e l o n g r u n t h e reactionaries

are

bureau-

fighting

a

losing

battle. Social forces are against them, a n d the conservative

elites

a r e o n t h e d e f e n s i v e e v e r y w h e r e . It is d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r t h e y reverse, t h o u g h they certainly can delay, the trend toward a open, humanistic,

and

less ideological

society.

those regimes dominated by entrenched cies will be further w e a k e n e d

The

resistance

conservative

if t h e W e s t

views

of

bureaucra-

the

Cold

War

as primarily d u e to the f a d i n g self-serving doctrines of the m u n i s t r u l e r s , if it a p p r o a c h e s t h e C o l d W a r m o r e

can more

as an

Comaberra-

tion a n d less as a mission. Over

the

long

run—and

our

earlier

analysis

would be a long run—Soviet responsiveness

indicates

could be

t h r o u g h the deliberate o p e n i n g of E u r o p e a n c o o p e r a t i v e to

the East

designed

and

through

initially

only

the

creation

to p r o m o t e

a

information, and the encouragement deliberate

definition

of

certain

development,

technological

arrangements

could

and

the growth

example, O E C D

of

through and

help

formal

links

institutional

in

security purpose

framework. sphere

Economic

and

through

United

States-Soviet

(For

between Assistance

( C E M A ) ; in the security sphere b e t w e e n N A T O a n d the Pact,

Warsaw

arms-control

arrange-

ments; or b y t h e creation of an informal E a s t - W e s t political sultative body.) * A

larger

effects. initially Western

For

con-

17

cooperative one

of The

economic

common

economic

Mutual

ethos.

East-West of

bodies

exchange

objectives and

a sense

in the

for

the

it

ventures

East-West

of a c o o p e r a t i v e

common

stimulate

Council

new

dialogue,

assistance,

a rudimentary

the

of

that

stimulated

thing,

demonstrate initiative.

goal

would

it is l i k e l y

hesitancy

Therefore,

or an

also

that even

have

the

hostility

approach

other

Soviet

beneficial

Union in

based

the on

would face

of

bilateral

0 This is not only a matter of technological and multilateral determinism, as suggested by Pierre Hassner in his "Implications of Change in Eastern Europe for the Atlantic Alliance" (Orbis, Spring 1969, p. 246), but also a deliberate, though very long-range, strategy.

A Community American-Soviet

of the Developed

accommodation—as

Nations

{ 303

advocated by some

Ameri-

c a n s — m i g h t prove to b e abortive a n d w o u l d consequently sify tensions. B u t efforts to create a larger cooperative

inten-

community

n e e d not b e halted b y initial Soviet reluctance, nor c a n they

be

easily exploited b y M o s c o w to perpetuate the Cold War. O n

the

contrary, Soviet resistance w o u l d only result in m o r e costly

Soviet

isolation. B y s e e k i n g to c u t E a s t e r n E u r o p e off f r o m t h e W e s t , S o v i e t U n i o n w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y also d e n y itself t h e fruits of

closer

East-West technological cooperation. In 1985 the c o m b i n e d of the U n i t e d States, W e s t e r n E u r o p e , a n d Japan will b e

the

GNP

roughly

s o m e w h e r e a r o u n d three trillion dollars, or four t i m e s t h a t of

the

likely

the

Soviet

Soviets); toward

GNP

with

(assuming

some

greater

Eastern

cooperation

a

favorable

European with

growth

rate

for

states gradually

EEC

and

OECD,

shifting

the

Soviet

U n i o n c o u l d a b s t a i n o n l y a t g r e a t c o s t t o its o w n d e v e l o p m e n t

and

world position.

Risks and

Advantages

T h e shaping of such a c o m m u n i t y

may

well provoke

charges

t h a t its e m e r g e n c e w o u l d a c c e n t u a t e t h e d i v i s i o n s in a w o r l d ready tions

threatened is t w o f o l d :

problem

is h o w

by

fragmentation.

First, best

division

to deal

The

already

with

it. A s

answer exists, long

to

and as

such our

the

present

advanced

w o r l d is i t s e l f d i v i d e d a n d i n c o n f l i c t , it w i l l b e u n a b l e t o late coherent benefiting

goals.

from

the

The

less d e v e l o p e d

internal

w h i c h i n c i t e it t o c o m p e t e tends

to

be

focused

on

rivalries

in

in extending

short-term

countries the

may

formu-

even

developed

advantages

be

world,

aid; b u t s i n c e s u c h

political

al-

objec-

to

aid the

d o n o r , it is s u b j e c t t o p o l i t i c a l f l u c t u a t i o n s a n d m a y d e c l i n e a s t h e rivalry declines in intensity.

Second, the emergence of a more cooperative structure among the more developed nations is likely to increase the possibility of a long-range strategy for international development based on the emerging global consciousness rather than on old rivalries.

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

It c o u l d h e n c e

diminish

the desire for immediate

political

offs a n d thus p a v e t h e w a y for m o r e internationalized,

pay-

mutilateral

f o r e i g n aid. W h i l e t h e v e x i n g p r o b l e m s of tariffs a n d t r a d e w i t h t h e Third W o r l d are not likely to disappear, they m i g h t b e c o m e manageable

in

a

setting

truly international

that

reduces

production

and,

both

the

consequently,

a

given

try's s t a k e i n this or t h a t p r o t e c t i v e a r r a n g e m e n t . T h e motivation

for

such

a

community

p o r t a n t . If this c o m m u n i t y

is,

more

impediments

however,

underlying

extremely

does not spring from fear and

but from a wider recognition that world

to

coun-

affairs will h a v e

to

c o n d u c t e d o n a d i f f e r e n t b a s i s , it w o u l d n o t i n t e n s i f y w o r l d sions—as h a v e alliances in the p a s t — b u t w o u l d b e a step

im-

hatred be

divi-

toward

greater unity. Its

appearance

would

therefore

celerate the further development as the W o r l d

Bank—which

of the d e v e l o p e d greater help

sense

of

world

support

are in any

geared

community

to strengthen of p u b l i c

these

and

case

perhaps

world

within

it m i g h t

backing

also

ac-

institutions

Third

the developed by

even

bodies—such

de facto

to assisting the

institutions

opinion;

possibility of s o m e t h i n g

assist

of present

World.

world

them

eventually

would

with

lead

A

the

to

the

a l o n g t h e lines of a g l o b a l taxation

sys-

tem.0 M o r e specifically, A m e r i c a w o u l d gain several advantages its identification w i t h

a larger goal.

Such

a goal

would

r e d u c e the increasing d a n g e r of American isolation in the t h i s i s o l a t i o n is u n a v o i d a b l y b e i n g i n t e n s i f i e d associated over,

the

with

America's

United

States

domestic

cannot

leap

shape

into

the

18

by

the

world

the

from

tend

world;

problems

future.

efforts to d o

so.

By

encouraging

and

More-

singlehanded,

e v e n t h o u g h it m a y b e t h e o n l y f o r c e c a p a b l e o f s t i m u l a t i n g mon

to

becoming

com-

associated

w i t h other major p o w e r s in a joint response to the p r o b l e m s

con-

* In my view, such a community would also provide a base for implementing more far-reaching and visionary proposals for global cooperation; for example, those contained in the stimulating "Bulletin of Peace Proposals" prepared by the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, in the autumn of 1969.

A Community fronting man's

life o n

of the Developed

this planet,

and

by

Nations

jointly

{ 305

attempting

m a k e deliberate u s e of t h e p o t e n t i a l offered b y s c i e n c e a n d

to

tech-

n o l o g y , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d m o r e e f f e c t i v e l y a c h i e v e its o f t e n proclaimed The

goal.

quest

for

that

goal

cannot,

however,

be

geographically

c o n f i n e d t o t h e A t l a n t i c w o r l d , n o r s h o u l d its m o t i v a t i o n b e

even

implicitly derived from security fears stimulated b y a major

out-

side power.

O n e reason for the declining popular

appeal

of

the

A t l a n t i c c o n c e p t is t h e l a t t e r s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h t h e c o n d i t i o n s p o s t - W o r l d W a r II E u r o p e a n d w i t h t h e fear of Soviet

W h i l e s u c h a c o n c e p t w a s a b o l d i d e a a t t h e t i m e , it is n o w torically a n d geographically

limited. A

broader, more

his-

ambitious,

a n d m o r e r e l e v a n t a p p r o a c h is c a l l e d f o r b y t h e r e c o g n i t i o n the problems

of t h e

diffuse—they

will

1970s will be

more

t h a t is still u n s t r u c t u r e d

widely

that

less overtly ideological,

reflect

politically

the

malaise

and highly

of

aggression.

of

more

a

world

inegalitarian

eco-

nomically. Such

an

American

approach globalism.

would The

also

tend

to

f a c t is t h a t m u c h

end

the

debate

over

of the initiative

impetus for an undertaking o n so grand a scale will h a v e to f r o m the U n i t e d States. G i v e n the o l d divisions in the world—and

the weaknesses

nations—the

absence

of

and

parochialism

constructive

of the

American

and come

advanced developing

initiative

would

at t h e v e r y least p e r p e t u a t e t h e p r e s e n t drift in w o r l d affairs. T h a t d r i f t c a n n o t b e h a l t e d if t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o l l o w s t h e p a t h it is n o w

de-

s p i t e t h e w e i g h t a n d m o m e n t u m o f its p o w e r , A m e r i c a c o u l d

dis-

itself,

there

is

advocate—disengagement.

something

quaintly

Even

which if,

engage

fashionable to

old-fashioned

in

e l o q u e n t denunciation of U n i t e d States global involvement, c i a l l y w h e n it c o m e s f r o m E u r o p e a n s , w h o h a v e s h o w n a l e s s admirable most

ability

brilliant

to maintain

indictment

of

world

peace.

Moreover,

United

States

policy

even

cannot

the espethan the erase

t h e f a c t that, d e s p i t e its a l l e g e d l y l o n g r e c o r d of errors a n d

mis-

conceptions,

the

only

p o w e r that has b e g u n to think in global terms and actively

seek

the

United

States

has

somehow

become

2. j 2. }

V: America and the World

constructive

world-wide

arrangements.

revealing to note that initiatives such

In

this

connection,

as t h e T e s t - B a n

it

the Non-Proliferation Treaty were opposed by governments itually praised ment.

This

by

global scale has and

the

some

country's

only

been

critics

of

commitment decided

remaining

by

relevant

United to

States

global

international

history. question

is w h a t

be

or

hab-

involve-

affairs

It c a n n o t

is

Treaty

on

a

undone,

its f o r m

and

goals will be. The

debate

on

globalism

did,

however,

perform

one

function. T h o u g h m u c h of the criticism did not provide a ingful policy program,0

the debate prompted greater

useful mean-

recognition

of t h e n e e d to redefine America's w o r l d role in t h e light of historical c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h r u s t into t h e w o r l d b y its o w n and by the cataclysms

of t w o world wars, America

first

new

growth actively

promoted and then guaranteed the West's economic recovery

and

° Even a critic who identifies himself as sympathetic to the "isolationist or neo-isolationist" school concludes that the alternatives offered by the more traditional students of international politics, such as Lippmann or Morgenthau, have relatively little of a constructive nature to offer (Charles Gati, "Another Grand Debate? The Limitationist Critique of American Foreign Policy," World Politics, October 1968, especially pp. 150-51). Moreover, the propensity of even some perceptive writers to concentrate almost entirely on the shortcomings of American foreign-policy performance makes it difficult for them to account for its relatively respectable performance during the last twenty years as compared with, for example, that of the European powers. Thus, Stanley Hoffmann's massive (556 pages) and in places stimulating book, Gullivers Troubles (New York, 1968), focuses almost entirely on the impatience, wrongheadedness, misunderstanding, self-righteousness, gullibility, condescension, inflexibility, and paranoid style of American foreign policy. This leads him, on a more popular level, to say in a magazine article ("Policy for the Seventies," Life, March 21, 1969) that "Americans . . . have been prepared by history and instinct for a world in black and white, in which there is either harmony or an all-out contest." He does not explain why, in that case, the United States and the Soviet Union were successful in maintaining peace, whereas in the past the European powers had failed to do so. At the same time, traditionalists who emphasize the continued vitality of nationalism are inherently inclined to postulate policies that are no longer in tune with the times. Thus, on the very eve of De Gaulle's repudiation by the French people, Hoffmann could speak of a "fundamental rapprochement" with De Gaulle ("America and France," The New Republic, April 12, 1969, p. 22).

A Community military security.

This

of the Developed

posture—of

Nations

necessity

{ 307

heavily

marked

by

military preoccupations—has increasingly shifted toward a greater i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h the less political a n d m o r e basic p r o b l e m s

that

m a n k i n d will f a c e in the r e m a i n i n g third of t h e century. John Kennedy

caught

the essence

of America's

novel

i n t h e w o r l d w h e n h e s a w h i m s e l f a s " t h e first A m e r i c a n for w h o m

the w h o l e w o r l d was, in a sense,

Indeed, Kennedy was the

first

position President

domestic politics."

"globalist" president of t h e

States. R o o s e v e l t , f o r all his i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m ,

essentially

United believed

in an 1815-like global arrangement in w h i c h the "Big Four" have

specific spheres

to

specific

a

a

clear

regional

course,

These

States

role.

influence.

and

Eisenhower

applying

shifts With

Truman

challenge,

priority.

occasionally

gions.

of

communist

were

European

came

a

of

the

sense

and

that America

same

other

changing

that

owed

the

to

every

and every people h a d the right to expect leadership tion from America,

indicated

on

precedents

would

responded

policies

continued

symptomatic

Kennedy

primarily

his

to

style

which

intellect,

mission,

in

some

stressed

while

his

the

ways

appealed

and

an almost

universal

romantic

more

to

humanism

United

inspira-

equal

fascination

with

the

the

in-

evoca-

emotion

of

re-

continent

volvement to every continent and every people. Kennedy's tive

19

than

American

conquest

space reflected his conviction that America's scientific

of

leadership

w a s n e c e s s a r y t o its e f f e c t i v e w o r l d role. Global

involvement

is,

however,

w h a t has to date b e e n k n o w n clear-cut formulas

and

qualitatively

as foreign policy.

traditional preferences.

different

from

It is i n i m i c a l But

this

to

intellec-

tual c o m p l e x i t y d o e s not n e g a t e the fact that for better or for w o r s e t h e U n i t e d States is s a d d l e d w i t h m a j o r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y the framework for change.

This point of v i e w

for

shaping

is s u b j e c t t o

misrepresentation a n d is h i g h l y u n p o p u l a r in s o m e circles.

easy

World

c o n d i t i o n s d o n o t c a l l f o r a P a x A m e r i c a n a , n o r is this t h e a g e American omnipotence. U n i t e d States, the

first

Nevertheless,

it is a f a c t t h a t u n l e s s

g l o b a l s o c i e t y , u s e s its p r e p o n d e r a n t

ence to give positive direction and expression to the

of the

influ-

accelerating

3o8 }

V: America and the World

p a c e of c h a n g e , that c h a n g e n o t o n l y m i g h t b e c o m e linked

to

threaten

old

conflicts

and

antipathies—but

the effort to improve

the

nature

chaos—when

could

and

the

eventually

character

of

a community

of

A m e r i c a n d o m e s t i c life. To sum up:

Though

t h e o b j e c t i v e of s h a p i n g

the developed

nations

is less a m b i t i o u s

government,

it is m o r e a t t a i n a b l e .

It is m o r e

c o n c e p t of an Atlantic c o m m u n i t y to the n e w sions

by

to

the

goal

of

ambitious

world

than

but historically m o r e

the

relevant

spatial revolution. T h o u g h cognizant of present

between

tempts

than

communist

create

exploiting

a

new

these

and

non-communist

framework

divisions

but

for

international

rather b y

striving

it

at-

affairs

not

to

preserve

a n d c r e a t e o p e n i n g s f o r e v e n t u a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . F i n a l l y , it nizes that the w o r l d s

developed

nations have

divi-

nations,

a certain

recogaffinity,

a n d that o n l y b y n u r t u r i n g a greater s e n s e of c o m m u n a l i t y

among

t h e m c a n an effective response to the increasing threat of

global

fragmentation—which

itself

intensifies

the

impatience with human inequality—be

growing

world-wide

mounted.

T h e r e is t h u s a c l o s e c o n j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e h i s t o r i c

meaning

of America's internal transition a n d America's role in t h e Earlier

in

this

large areas:

book,

can democracy

distinctions

social

processes; the

change;

between the

need

unintended

the need

priorities

were

reduced

for a n institutional realignment

to e n h a n c e

tional

with

domestic

the need

social responsiveness governmental for

and

anticipatory

consequences

for educational

of

and

to of

The lar:

international

the

gradual

tradi-

nongovernmental

institutions

to

cope

technological-scientific

reforms to mitigate

the

effects

humanist

society.

equivalents

shaping

three Ameri-

blur

of g e n e r a t i o n a l a n d racial conflicts a n d p r o m o t e rational values in the e m e r g i n g n e w

world.

of

of our d o m e s t i c

a community

of

the

needs

are

developed

tions w o u l d b e a realistic expression of our e m e r g i n g global sciousness; concentration logical

knowledge

would

on disseminating reflect a m o r e

man's problems, emphasizing

simi-

scientific a n d

functional

nacon-

techno-

approach

ecology rather than ideology;

to

both

A Community

of the Developed

Nations

{ 309

the foregoing would help to encourage the spread of a more personalized rational humanist world outlook that would gradually replace the institutionalized religious, ideological, and intensely national perspectives that have dominated modern history. But whatever the future may actually hold for America and for the world, the technetronic age—by making so much more technologically feasible and electronically accessible—make deliberate choice about more issues more imperative. Reason, belief, and values will interact intensely, putting a greater premium than ever before on the explicit definition of social purposes. To what ends should our power be directed, how should our social dialogue be promoted, in what way should the needed action be taken—these are both philosophical and political issues. In the technetronic era, philosophy and politics will be crucial.

AMMAM Reference Notes I: The Global Impact of the Technetronic Revolution 1. Part of this section is adapted, in a revised form, from my "America in the Technetronic Age," Encounter, January 1968. In this connection, I wish to acknowledge the pioneering work done on this general subject at Columbia University by Daniel Bell and at Michigan University by Donald Michael. 2. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings, N e w York, 1967, pp. 1 8 9 - 9 0 . 3. Testimony by Dr. D . Krech, Government Research Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee, as reported by The New York Times, April 3, 1968, p. 32; see also Gordon R. Taylor, The Biological Time Bomb, N e w York, 1967. 4. The New York Times, January 18, 1969. 5. Donald N. Michael, "Some Speculations on the Social Impact of Technology," mimeographed text of address to the Columbia Seminar on Technology and Social Change, 1966, p. 11. 6. Michael, pp. 6 - 7 . 7. Sir Julian Huxley, "The Crisis in Man's Destiny," Playboy, January 1967, p. 4. 8. See Neal J. Dean, "The Computer Comes of Age," Harvard Business Review, January-February 1968, pp. 8 3 - 9 1 . On the computerinitiated "profound revolution in our patterns of thought and communication," see Anthony G. Oettinger, "Educational Technology," in Toward the Year 2018, Foreign Policy Association, N e w York, 1968. 9. The United States and the World in the 1 9 8 5 Era, Syracuse, N.Y., 1964, pp. 9 0 - 9 1 . 10. See John P. Robinson and James W. Swinehart, "World Affairs and the TV Audience," Television Quarterly, Spring 1968. 11. Cyril E. Black, "Soviet Society: A Comparative View," in Prospects for Soviet Society, Allen Kassof, ed., N e w York, 1968, p. 36; A. B. Trowbridge, "The Atlantic Community Looks to the Future," Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1967, p. 72. 12. "The Technological Gap in Russia," The Economist, February 9, 1969. 311

}

Notes

13. John Diebold, "Is the Gap Technological?" Foreign Affairs, January 1968, pp. 2 7 6 - 9 1 . 14. For some examples of the predominance of American communications among the engineering-technical elite in Latin America, see Paul J. Deutschmann et a l , Communication and Social Change in Latin America, N e w York, 1968, especially pp. 56, 70. 15. See Leonard H. Marks, "American Diplomacy and a Changing Technology," Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, pp. 7, 9. 16. Bruce M. Russett, "Is There a Long-Run Trend toward Concentration in the International System?" Journal of Comparative Political Studies, April 1968. For somewhat forced analogies to past empires, see George Liska, Imperial America, Baltimore, 1966; and for a highly critical appraisal, see Claude Julien, L'Empire americain, Paris, 1968, especially chaps. 1, 6 - 1 1 ; also Ronald Steel, Pax Americana, N e w York, 1967. For a criticism of the "imperial" approach, see Stanley Hoffmann, Gullivers Troubles, N e w York, 1968, pp. 4 6 - 5 1 . 17. The New York Times, November 17, 1968, cites government sources as indicating that 200,000 American civilians are serving abroad; for commitments, see US Commitments to Foreign Powers, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., 1967, especially pp. 4 9 - 7 1 ; for data on bases, see The New York Times, April 9, 1969. 18. Judd Polk, "The N e w World Economy," Columbia Journal of World Business, January-February 1968, p. 8, estimates that United States investment abroad accounts for total deliveries of some $165 billion. 19. Joseph Kraft, "The Spread of Power," The New York Times Book Review, September 22, 1968, p. 10 (a review of Amaury de Riencourt's The American Empire, N e w York, 1968). 20. In this connection, compare Harry Magdoff's The Age of Imperialism, N e w York, 1969, which sees America simply as a politically motivated imperial power, with the Rockefeller Foundation's President s Five-Year Review and Annual Report, 1968, which describes the Foundation's foreign activities. The Ford Foundation could also be cited. 21. Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000, N e w York, 1967, p. 149. 22. See Kahn and Wiener, tables pp. 1 6 1 - 6 5 and 1 2 3 - 3 0 , for a fuller discussion of the assumptions on which these calculations are based. See also, however, Everett E. Hagan, "Some Facts about Income Levels and Economic Growth," Review of Economics and Statistics, February i 9 6 0 . Hagan points out that comparisons between developed and underdeveloped countries are in some respects misleading and tend to exaggerate the disparities. 23. ILO conference, September 1968, as reported by The New York Times, September 3, 1968. For some equally staggering population projections for Latin America, see Louis Olivos, "2000: A No-Space Odyssey," Americas ( O A S ) , August 1969.

Notes

{

313

24. The United States and the World in the 1 9 8 5 Era, pp. 7 8 - 7 9 . 25. Lester R. Brown, "The Agricultural Revolution in Asia/' Foreign Affairs, July 1968, p. 698, and Brown's address before Kansas State University, "A N e w Er& in World Agriculture," December 3, 1968. For 1967 data, showing f o o d production outstripping population growth in the Third World, see Ceres ( F A O R e v i e w ) , September-October 1968, pp. 1 7 - 1 8 . For a more pessimistic assessment, see Myrdal, The Asian Drama, N e w York, 1968, pp. 417, 1 0 2 9 - 4 9 . 26. See United Nations Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, 1966, Table 7B. 27. Myrdal, pp. 322, 5 4 0 - 4 1 , 5 5 2 ff., 1585. See also United Nations Statistical Yearbook, 1967, for data on physicians per inhabitants in the early 1960s (p. 6 9 6 ) ; on number of occupied dwellings, average size, density of occupation, and general housing facilities (Table 202, p. 7 0 8 ff.); and on calories per day, proteins, and industrial consumption of cotton, wool, rubber, steel, tin and fertilizer in the years 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 6 5 , covering general consumption (pp. 4 9 8 - 5 1 1 ) . 28. For a discussion of some pertinent examples, see Twenty-Third Report by the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 1968, hereinafter cited as Report. . . . Also Hearing before a Subcommittee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1968, hereinafter cited as Hearing. . . . 29. Joseph Lelyveld, "India's Students D e m a n d — A Safe Job in the Establishment," The New York Times Magazine, May 12, 1968, pp. 53, 58; for an equally damning judgment, see also Myrdal, pp. 1 7 8 4 - 9 0 . 30. Myrdal, pp. 1645, 1649. 31. Raul Prebisch, "The System and the Social Structure of Latin America," in Latin American Radicalism, Irving Louis Horowitz, Josue de Castro, and John Gerassi, eds., N e w York, 1969, p. 31. 32. Report . . . , pp. 7 - 8 . 33. Hearing . . . , p. 96. 34. Report . . . , p. 17. 35. Report . . . , p. 9, quoting the testimony of Dr. C. V. Kidd, head of the Physics Department of the American University in Beirut. 36. William K o r n h a u s e r , The Politics of Mass Society, G l e n c o e , 111., 195937. H. Jaguaribe, "Foreign Technical Assistance and National D e v e l opment," paper submitted at Princeton, 1965, pp. 2 5 - 2 6 , as cited in Hearing . . . , p. 57; see also Irving Louis Horowitz, "Political Legitimacy and the Institutionalization of Crises in Latin America," Comparative Political Studies, April 1968, especially pp. 6 4 - 6 5 . 38. See, for example, William H. Grier and Price M. Cobbs, Black Rage, N e w York, 1969. 39. Myrdal, p. 471; see also pp. 4 6 7 - 6 9 for urban-growth data compared with national growth; for fuller data on the growth of cities in

314}

Notes

the Third World, see G. Breese, Urbanization in Newly Developing Countries, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966. 40. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, N e w Haven and London, 1968, p. 290, citing also Bert F. Hoselitz and Myron Weiner, "Economic Development and Political Stability in India," Dissent, Vol. 8, Spring 1961, p. 177, and Benjamin B. Ringer and David L. Sills, "Political Extremists in Iran," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, 1 9 5 2 - 1 9 5 3 , PP- 6 9 3 - 9 4 . 41. Myrdal, p. 117. 42. For a useful and pertinent discussion of the relationship of violence and economic development, see Bruce M. Russett et al., World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, N e w Haven, 1964, especially pp. 3 0 4 - 3 1 0 ; and John H. Kautsky, Communism and the Politics of Development, N e w York, 1968, especially chap. 10, "Communism and Economic Development," co-authored with Roger W . Benjamin. For a somewhat different breakdown of societies, see Cyril E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, N e w York, 1966, p. 150. For a much more optimistic prognostication, see Walt Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, Mass., i 9 6 0 , p. 127. 43. Myrdal, p. 300. 44. A. Barber, "The 20th Century Renaissance," private paper, Institute of Politics and Planning, Washington, D.C., 1968, pp. 1, 8. 45. In Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Duhrings Revolution and Science, as cited by D. G. Brennan, "Weaponry," in Toward the Year 2018, N e w York, 1968, p. 2. 46. See Brennan, ibid., p. 19. This possibility is developed further by M. W. Thring in his essay "Robots on the March," in Unless Peace Comes, Nigel Calder, ed., London, 1968, pp. 1 5 5 - 6 4 . 47. Gordon J. F. MacDonald, "How to Wreck the Environment," in Unless Peace Comes, p. 181. 48. Victor C. Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality, N e w York, 1969, p. 199; Michael Harrington, American Power in the Twentieth Century, N e w York, 1967, pp. 39, 43, 48; also the eloquent plea by Aurelio Peccei of Olivetti Corporation, "Considerations and the N e e d for Worldwide Planning," delivered in Akademgorodok, USSR, September 12, 1967 (mimeograph).

II: The Age of Volatile Belief 1. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, N e w York, 1961, p. 183. 2. See Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind, Chicago, 1966. 3. In this connection, see Jacques Soustelle, Les Quatre Soleils, Paris, 1967. In lively terms, Soustelle attacks the progressive theory of history as expressed by Marx, Spengler, Toynbee, and Teilhard d e Chardin.

Notes

{ 315

For a more complex analysis, see Michel Foucault, Volte et deraison, Paris, 1961; American edition, Madness and Civilization, N e w York, 1965. 4. Teilhard de Chardin, pp. 1 7 8 - 7 9 . 5. See, for example, Jules Monnerot, Sociology and Psychology of Communism, Boston, i 9 6 0 . 6. In this connection, interesting data are provided by Jacques Toussaert, he Sentiment religieux en Flandre a la fin du Moyen^tge, Paris, 1963^ 7. "The writer knows of no instance in present day South Asia where religion has induced social change" (Myrdal, p. 1 0 3 ) . See also Teilhard de Chardin, pp. 2 0 9 - 1 1 , for a discussion of the passivity of oriental religions, and Kavalam M. Panikkar, Hindu Society at Cross Roads, Bombay, 1955. 8. Kh. Momjan, The Dynamic Twentieth Century, Moscow, 1968, p. 21. 9. Teilhard d e Chardin, p. 257. 10. Ibid., p. 211. 11. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, pp. 1 6 2 - 6 3 ; see also p. 158, where Marxism is described as "a system full of flaws but full also of legitimate partial insights, a great formal contribution to social science, a monstrous guide to public policy." 12. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, N e w York, 1965, p. 290. 13. Karl Marx, writing in 1871, as cited by Lewis S. Feuer, "Karl Marx and the Promethean Complex," Encounter, D e c e m b e r 1968, p. 3i. 14. These terms were used by James H. Billington, "Force and Counterforce in Eastern Europe," Foreign Affairs, October 1968, p. 34. 15. Daniel and Gabriel Cohn-Bendit, Le Gauchisme, remdde a la maladie senile du communisme, Paris, 1968. 16. Leszek Kolakowski, "The Permanent and Transitory Meaning of Marxism," Nowa Kultura, No. 4, 1957. 17. Praxis, May-June 1967, p. 431. 18. Kolakowski, "Hope and the Fabric of History," Nowa Kultura, No. 38, 1957. For a recent and very perceptive analysis of Kolakowski's thought, see Leopold Labedz, "Kolakowski on Marxism and Beyond," Encounter, March 1969, pp. 7 7 - 8 8 . 19. See Adam Schaff, Marxsizm a Jednostka Ludzka, Warsaw, 1965, p. 56, and p. 2 8 ff., where Schaff acknowledges his debt to Professor Erich Fromm for his improved understanding of Marxism. Schaff was expelled from the Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party in 1968. 20. This result makes it also reminiscent of fascism. See m y "Democratic Socialism or Social Fascism?" Dissent, Summer 1965. See also the next chapter for further discussion.

3 i 6 }

Notes

21. On the problem of authority and legitimacy in contemporary Catholicism, see George N. Shuster, ed., Freedom and Authority in the West, Notre Dame, 1967, especially the contribution of the late John Courtney Murray, S.J. 22. Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, N e w York, 1954, p. 7723. Letter to Cardinal Konig, Archbishop of Vienna, January 14, 1969. 24. For an account generally sympathetic to the conservative point of view, see Ulisse Floridi, S.J., Radicalismo Cattolico Brasiliano, Rome, 1968. For a more general account, Ernst Halperin, Nationalism and Communism in Chile, Cambridge, Mass., 1965; and William V. D'Antonia and Frederick B. Pike, Religion, Revolution and Reform, N e w York, 1964. 25. These two words are the title of Garaudy's book De Tanath&me au dialogue, Paris, 1965, discussing the Christian-Marxist dialogue. 26. As cited by the Washington Post, January 7, 1969. 27. For a similar point of view, see Emile Pin, S.J., "Les Motivations des conduites religieuses et le passage d'une civilisation pretechnique a une civilisation technique," Social Change, Vol. 13, 1966. 28. See Harvey Cox, The Secular City, N e w York, 1965. 29. Ibid., p. 69. 30. Pierre Trotignon in L'Arc, Paris, No. 3, 1 9 6 6 - 1 9 6 8 , as cited by Raymond Aron, "At the Barricades," Encounter, August 1968, p. 23. 31. Abbie Hoffman, Revolution for the Hell of It, N e w York, 1968. The best analysis of the ideology of the "student revolution" is the article by Leopold Labedz, "Students and Revolution," Survey (London), July 1968. 32. As cited by N. Molchanov, "Students Rebel in the West: The Meaning, the Causes and Goals," Literaturnaya Gazeta, November 6, 1968. 33. Paul Jacobs and Saul Landau, The New Radicals, N e w York, 1966, p. 7. 34. Speaking in 1967 at the Free University in West Berlin, as cited by Labedz, "Students and Revolution," p. 6. 35. Ibid., p. 7. 36. Molchanov. 37. See Robert P. Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse, A Critique of Pure Tolerance, Boston, 1965. 38. Compare, for example, the demands of the Warsaw students, adopted in March 1968, with the demands of the Mexican students of September of the same year (Survey, July 1968, p. 114; The New York Times, March 28 and September 9, 1968). 39. This point is well made by Professor Z. Bauman, a well-known Warsaw sociologist expelled from Poland in 1968 after the student outbreak of March, in his introduction to a special documentary volume on

Notes

{ 317

those events, published in Paris by Instytut Literacki, Wydarzenia Marcowe 1968, 1969.

40. See Melvin Lasky, "Revolution Diary," Encounter, August 1968, pp. 88-89.

41. The New Left, memorandum prepared for the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 23, citing also data from Jack Newfield, A Prophetic Minority, New York, 1966. 42. "The Hooligans of Peace Square," Scinteia Tineretului, July 5, 1968.

43. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, p. 31.

44. On this, see also Kenneth Keniston, "Social Change and Youth in America," in The Challenge of Youth, Erik H. Erikson, ed., New York, 1961. 45. See Johan Huizinga, Waning of the Middle Ages, especially chap. 1 on "The Violent Tenor of Life," New York, 1954. r 46. See Black, The Dynamics of Modernization, for descriptive and sequential analysis. 47. On this, for United States examples see Mark Gerzon, The Whole World Is Watching, New York, 1969, pp. 5 2 - 5 4 , 73, 1 8 9 - 9 0 ; for a more systematic treatment pertaining to the Third World, see Donald K. Emmerson, Students and Politics in Developing

Nations,

New York, 1968, including a similar conclusion on p. 414. 48. Marshall McLuhan, The Marshall McLuhan Dew-Line, No. 1,

p. 15. 49. See Paul Sigmund, ed., The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, New York, 1963, especially pp. 1 2 - 1 7 . For a systematic evaluation of the appeal and meaning of the concept of equality within one 1968,

new nation, see James C. Scott, Political Ideology in Malaysia: Reality and the Beliefs of an Elite, New Haven, 1968, pp. 1 9 4 - 9 6 . For more

general treatment, David Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent, Glencoe, 111., 1964; and Clifford Geertz, ed., Old Societies and New States: The Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa, New York, 1963.

50. For example, see Leopold Senghor, African Socialism, New York, 1963. 51. Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, Boston, 1963, p. 262. 52. It is among them that Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth (New York, 1965) has the widest appeal. See also F. J. Marsal, "Latin American Intellectuals and the Problem of Change,^ Social Research, Winter 1966, pp. 5 6 2 - 9 2 . 53. They have thus become "tutelary democracies." Cf. Edward Shils, Political Development in the New States, The Hague, 1965, pp. 60-67. 54. See the highly stimulating review of Michel Foucault's book, Les Mots et les choses (Paris, 1 9 6 6 ) , by Jean-Marie D o m e n a g u e ,

Temoignage Chretien, March 1968.

55. Victor C. Ferkiss, p. 241.

3 i 8 }

Notes

III: Communism: The Problem of Relevance 1. For insights into Stalin's character, see Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin, N e w York, 1962; and Svetlana Alliluyeva, Twenty Letters to a Friend, N e w York, 1967. 2. See Leonard Schapiro, The Origin of Communist Autocracy, London, 1956; and Isaac Deutscher, The Prophet Outcast, London, 1963. 3. Leon Smolinski, "Grinevetskii and Soviet Industrialization," Survey, April 1968, p. 101. See also the critical comment b y Alec N o v e on Smolinski's analysis and Smolinski's reply in Survey, Winter-Spring, 1969. 4. Smolinski, p. 109. 5. Deutscher, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 1 5 . 6. Rostow, p. 66. 7. Rostow, p. 95. See also pp. 9 6 - 9 7 for detailed tables by Warren Nutter, in which the persistent lag in certain areas of Russian industrial production is compared with American production. 8. Black, "Soviet Society: A Comparative View," in Prospects for Soviet Society, pp. 4 2 - 4 3 . 9. Black, pp. 4 0 - 4 2 , provides a useful summary of their findings and the basis for reaching the conclusions. 10. See the fascinating cumulative table, in Stefan Kurowski, Historyczny Proces Wzrostu Gospodarczego, Warsaw, 1963, p. 335. 11. See Tryhuna Ludu, July 8, 1963, and Nowe Drogi, No. 8, 1963. 12. Speech of November 19, 1962. 13. N. Sviridov, "Party Concern for the Upbringing of the ScientificTechnical Intelligentsia," Kommunist, No. 18, p. 38. 14. P. Demichev, "The Construction of Communism and the Goals of Social Sciences," Kommunist, No. 10, p. 26. 15. E. G. R. Kosolapov and P. Simush, "The Intelligentsia in Socialist Society," Pravda, May 25, 1968. 16. D . I. Chesnokov, "Aggravation of the Ideological and and Political Struggle and Contemporary Philosophical Revisionism," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 12. This important article discusses the general state of contemporary Marxism as well as the significance of contemporary revisionism. 17. D. I. Chesnokov, "Current Problems of Historical Materialism," Kommunist, No. 6, 1968, p. 48. See also G. Smirnov, "Socialist Humanism," Pravda, D e c e m b e r 16, 1968. 18. G. Khromushin, "Sharpening of World Ideological Struggle," International Affairs ( M o s c o w ) , No. 12, 1968. 19. T. Timofeyev, "The Leading Revolutionary Force," Pravda, December 24, 1968. Timofeyev is the director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Working Class Movement and a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Notes

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319

20. Pravda, April 11, 1968. 21. S. Kovalev, "On 'Peaceful' and Non-Peaceful Counterrevolution," Pravda, September 11, 1968. 22. A useful source on Soviet "futurology" is the report by a Soviet scholar, I. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Les Etudes sur lavenir en URSS," Analyse et Prevision (Futuribles), No. 5, 1968. 23. See, for example, A. D. Smirnov, "Socialism, the ScientificTechnological Revolution and Long-Range Forecasting," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 9, 1968; I. G. Kurakov, "Forecasting Scientific-Technological Progress"; and M. K. Petrov, "Some Problems of the Organization of Knowledge in the Epoch of the Scientific-Technological Revolution," Voprosy Filosofii, No. 10, 1968; and V. G. Afanasev, Nauchnoe Upravlenie Obshchestvom, Moscow, 1968. 24. "A Discussion: The Problems of the Unity of the Communist Movement," Zolnierz Wolnosci, January 21, 1969, particularly the contributions by S. Trampczynski; J. Urban, "Hands Close to Pulse," Politykay June 9, 1969. 25. V. Roman in Contemporanul, January 3, January 10, 1969 (italics his). Roman, a member of the Central Committee and a former minister in the Rumanian government, is a professor and engineer by training. He is the author of several books on the scientific-technical revolution. 26. Cheprakov, Izvestia, August 18, 1968. 27. See C. Freeman and A. Young, The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union, OECD, p. 33; also the exhaustive study Science Policy in the USSR, OECD, 1969. 28. For other examples, see Science Policy in the USSR, p. 95. 29. Izvestia, October 28, 1968. 30. Academician P. L. Kapitsa, Komsomolskaia Pravda, January 19, 1968.

31. Problems of Communism, July-August and September-October 1968. See also V. Chornovil, The Chornovil Papers, New York, 1968. 32. Text published in The New York Times, July 22, 1968. (Citations in the text are from this version.) 33. Vestnik Akademii Nauk, No. 3, 1966, p. 138. 34- V. Roman, "For a Marxist Theory of the Technical-Scientific Revolution," Contemporanul. 35- Walter Ulbricht, "The Significance and Vital Force of the Teachings of Karl Marx for Our Era," pamphlet, Berlin, May 2, 1968. 36. See Peter C. Ludz, Parteielite im Wandel, Cologne, 1968. 37- See, for example, the warning by P. Demichev, "The Construction of Communism and the Goals of Social Sciences," Kommunist, No. 10, 1968, p. 26. For a provocative discussion of the trend toward greater fusion of party bureaucratic experience with technical com-

3^0}

Notes

petence, see George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society, N e w York, 1968. 38. For an excellent general survey, see Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith, N e w York, 1966. 39. See in this connection the perceptive essay by Henry L. Roberts, "Russia and the West: A Comparison and Contrast," The Slavic Review, March 1964. 40. See the statement in Kommunist, No. 15, 1963, especially p. 26, which attacks the Chinese concept of an absolute line for the international movement, and the letter of the Soviet leadership of July 1963 to the Chinese leaders, explicitly rejecting the concept of a general line for the international movement. This period has been analyzed by me in my The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict, rev. ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1967. 41. Roger Garaudy, Pour un modele frangais du socialisme, Paris, 1968, pp. 148-49. 42. D. Susnjic, Knjizevne Novine, March 2, 1968. For useful summaries of Yugoslav views concerning a multi-party system, see also the RFE research papers of October 6, 1967, and May 21, 1968, both of which summarize the evolution of Yugoslav thinking on the subject. 43. For data on the growth of the Czechoslovak intelligentsia and for a discussion of its implications, see Z. Valenta, "The Working Class and the Intelligentsia," Nova Mysl, February 1968. 44. See the very thoughtful discussion by A. Hegedus, "On the Alternatives of Social Development," and "Reality and Necessity," Kortars, June, July 1967. For a conservative response to the above, see P. Varkonyi, "The Development and Problems of the Socialist Society," Kortars, November 1968. Even the more conservative response did concede the desirability of such discussion, which went much further than anything recently published in either the Soviet Union or the other more conservative Communist states. 45. See in this connection the revealing polemics between the Soviets and the Chinese on the subject of the revolutionary role of the American Negro: R. A. Remington, "Revolutionary Role of the AfroAmerican: An Analysis of Sino-Soviet Polemics on the Historical Importance of the American Negro," Center for International Studies, M.I.T., October 1968. 46. Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," The China Quarterly, April-June, 1969. 47. Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, N e w York, 1966. 48. O. E. Clubb, Twentieth Century China, N e w York, 1964, pp. 4 1 3 - 2 4 . See also Ping-ti H o and Tang Tsou, eds., China in Crisis, Chicago, 1967; and for a more general discussion, J. K. Fairbank, The Chinese World Order, Cambridge, Mass., 1968. 49. John H. Kautsky, p. 187.

Notes

{ 3 2 1

IV: The American Transition 1. See, for example, Ronald Segal's Americas Receding Future, N e w York, 1968; or Giose Rimanelli, Tragica America, Genoa, 1968. 2. A highly informative account is contained in the full-page article by Henry Lieberman, "Technology: Alchemist of Route 128," The New York Times, January 8, 1968. 3. An excellent and well-documented summary can be found in The Advancing South: Manpower Prospects and Problems, N e w York, 1968. 4. Daniel Bell, "The Measurement of Knowledge and Technology," in Indicators of Social Change, Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert Moore, eds., N e w York, 1968, p. 149. 5. Notably Bell, above; also the more general, less documented reflections in the fourth annual report of Harvard University, Program on Technology and Society; and Victor Ferkiss, Technological Man: The Myth and the Reality. For an extremely useful summary of present trends in America, see Toward a Social Report, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D.C., 1969. For a revealing and in places moving account of the impact of all this on some of the young, see Mark Gerzon, The Whole World Is Watching. 6. Television Quarterly, Spring 1968, p. 9. 7. For a fuller discussion, see NASA: The Technology Utilization Program, 1967, p. 10; and editorial in Saturday Review, April 19, 1969. 8. See Anthony G. Oettinger and Sema Marks, "Educational Technology: N e w Myths and Old Realities" (discussion and r e p l y ) , The Harvard Educational Review, Fall 1968. 9. As cited by Return to Responsibility, a report by the Thomas Jefferson Research Center, Pasadena, 1969, p. 5. 10. Bell, p. 175. 11. Toward a Social Report, p. 43. 12. Ibid., p. 42. 13. Bureau of the Census report, cited by The New York Times, August 20, 1969. 14. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Washington, D.C., 1968, p. 337. A breakdown of the distribution of the poor is contained in the report of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance Programs, released on November 12, 1969; see also Joint Report of the Commerce and Labor Departments cited by The New York Times, February 2, 1970. 15. Bureau of the Census report; Nathan Glazer, ' T h e Negroes' Stake in America's Future," The New York Times Magazine, September 22, 1968, p. 31; The Economist, May 10, 1969, p. 51. 16. The New York Times, May 11, 1969. It should, however, b e noted that in 1949, 59 per cent of the blacks expressed satisfaction with

322

}

Notes

their housing. This presumably indicates higher expectations in 1969. On housing, see Joint Report (note 14, above). 17. "Characteristics of Students and Their Colleges," a study by the Bureau of the Census, as cited in The New York Times, June 15, 1969. 18. Glazer, pp. 31, 90; see also Joint Report. 19. The Economist, p. 51. 20. Toward a Social Report, pp. 1 5 - 2 7 ; Time, October 31, 1969,

p.

42.

21. But for a rather pessimistic projection and assessment, see "America's Frustrated South," The Economist, June 14, 1969. 22. See the special report "Black America," Newsweek, June 30, ^69, p. 23. For a broader analysis, see The Politics of Protest (The Skolnick Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence), New York, 1968, especially chap. 4, "Black Militancy." 23. Gloria Steinem, "Link between the New Politics and the Old," Saturday Review, August 2, 1969, p. 19.

24. For a useful discussion of the fragmentation of political culture in democracy, see Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," Comparative Political Studies, April 1968.

25. Gus Tyler, The Political Imperative, New York, 1968. 26. For strikingly conflicting assessments of the impact of that expansion, see Emmanuel Mesthene, "How Technology Will Shape the Future" (Science, July 12, 1 9 6 8 ) , who argues strongly that the role of government is enhanced; and Ferkiss, pp. 1 4 6 - 4 7 , who argues quite the contrary point of view. For a broad-gauged and stimulating discussion, see Peter Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity, New York, 1969. 27. From the introduction to Ellul, The Technological Society, by Robert K. Merton, p. vi. 28. See our earlier discussion, Part IV, p. 201. 29. Donald N. Michael, The Next Generation, New York, 1965, p. 16.

30. Robert S. Liebert, "Towards a Conceptual Model of Radical and Militant Youth: A Study of Columbia Undergraduates," presentation to the Association for Psycho-analytic Medicine, April 1, 1961, p. 28. 31. Kenneth Keniston, "You Have to Grow Up in Scarsdale to Know How Bad Things Really Are," The New York Times Magazine, April 2 7> 1969, p. 128. The foregoing reflects the argument of his larger book, Young Radicals: Notes on Committed Youth, New York, 1968.

32. Gerzon, p. 26. 33. Ibid., pp. 52-53, 73, 185, 190. 34. Michael, The Next Generation, p. 41; see also Robert A. Nisbett, "Twilight of Authority," The Public Interest, Spring 1969. 35. Testimony of Dr. Bruno Bettelheim, professor of psychology and psychiatry, University of Chicago, to the House Special Subcommittee on Education, March 20, 1969.

Notes

{

323

36. See the argument developed by Edgar C. Friedenberg, "The Hidden Costs of Opportunity," Atlantic Monthly, February 1969, pp. 84-90. 37. See T. B. Bottomore, Critics of Society: Radical Thought in North America, N e w York, 1968. 38. See Daniel Bell, "Charles Fourier: Prophet of Eupsychia," The American Scholar, Winter 1968-69. 39. Friedenberg, p. 89. 40. William Komhauser, The Politics of Mass Society. 41. For some perceptive comments, see Andrew Knight, "America's Frozen Liberals," The Progressive, February 1969. 42. For a discussion of the position of the liberal in the academic world, see Irving Louis Horowitz, "Young Radicals and the Professorial Critics," Commonweal, January 31, 1969, pp. 5 5 2 - 5 6 . 43. For a good discussion, see particularly p. 54 of the special issue of The Economist, May 10, 1969. 44. From a lecture by Professor Joseph Blau, Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies, January 1969. 45. Quite symptomatic is the title of the recent book by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of Confidence, Boston, 1969. 46. A good account of right and left extremist groups is in George Thayer, The Farther Shores of Politics, N e w York, 1967. 47. For the outlines of the needed effort, see the Report . . . on Civil Disorders, especially pp. 2 2 5 - 2 6 .

V: America and the World 1. For some comparative data, see Toward a Social Report, pp. 81-82. 2. Strong overtones of this view are to be found in John McDermott's "Intellectuals and Technology," The New York Review of Books, July 31, 1969; it is even more strongly argued in Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter-Culture, N e w York, 1969. 3. See particularly Konrad Lorenz, On Aggression, N e w York, 1966; also N. Tinbergen, "On War and Peace in Animals and Man," Science, June 28, 1968. v 4. For a criticism of the radical attacks on the industrial-military complex, see Stanley Hoffmann, Gullivers Troubles, p. 149. 5. See Frank S. Hopkins, "American Educational Systems for the Less Developed Countries," Washington, D.C., 1967 (mimeograph), and his proposal for an Educational Development Administration. 6. Irving Louis Horowitz et al., Latin American Radicalism. Student partisanship in Latin America is well covered in chapters 8 - 1 1 in Donald K. Emmerson, Students and Politics in Developing Nations.

3

i

4 }

Notes

7. See Claudio Veliz, "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, October 1968. 8. See my article, "Peace and Power," Encounter, November 1968. 9. For a stimulating interpretation of Russian history and of its "lag" vis-a-vis the West, see Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 18011Q17, Oxford, 1967, especially pp. 7 2 8 - 4 2 . 10. I share in this respect the conclusions reached by Theodore Draper in his "World Politics: A N e w Era?" Encounter, August 1968, p. 12. 11. See my article, "Meeting Moscow's 'Limited Coexistence,'" The New Leader, December 16, 1968. 12. Montreal Star, September 9, 1969. 13. For a fuller discussion, see my "Global Political Planning," Public Interest, Winter 1969. 14. See on this the public-opinion polls analyzed in Peace Research in Japan, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 2 5 - 7 1 . They point to rising Japanese expectations of nuclear proliferation. 15. See in this connection the speech by Leonard Marks, director of USIA, "A Blueprint for a N e w Schoolhouse," November 8, 1967. 16. For detailed calculations of the likely financial share of contributors other than the United States, see The Economist, August 9, 1969, P- 13. 17. For a fuller elaboration of these proposals, see my "The Framework for East-West Reconciliation," Foreign Affairs, January 1968. 18. See the revealing analysis of foreign attitudes toward the United States in the polls cited by The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy, report by the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., December 22, 1968, especially pp. 15-18. 19. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days, Boston, 1965, p. 559.

Index

Age of Discontinuity, The (Drucker), 26211. Agnew, Spiro T., 251 Agrarianism, 236n., 237*1. Agricultural revolution, in Asia, 38 Albania, 189 Algeria, 20, 21, 27, 40 Amendola, G., 18571. "America in the Technetronic Age" (Brzezinski) 15m. American Challenge, The (ServanSchreiber), 30 American Power and the New Mandarins (Chomsky), logn. American Power in the Twentieth Century (Harrington), 49fi., 246m American Revolution, 71, 198 Americanization, 31 Americans for Democratic Action, 24 4 n. Anarchism, 97, 100, 234 Andras, Charles, 88n. Anti-anticommunism, 240 Appley, Lawrence, 203 Ardagh, John, quoted, 10971. Argentina, 20, 21, 4511. Armor, Paul, 13311.

Arms spending, global (1966), 62n. Aron, Raymond, 144/1., 15 m. Asian Drama (Myrdal), 3on. Assessing Technology Transfer, 262n. Audio-visual communications: in selected countries ( i 9 6 0 and 1966), 20, 21; in technetronic society, 11, 18-19 Australia, i7n., 296 Austria, 90, 184 Automation, 11, 13, 41 Ayub Khan, Muhammad, 49 Azrael, Jeremy, quoted, 15971.-16on. Babcox, Peter, i02n. Bailey, Robert, i i 5 n . Belgium, 26n., 55, 184 Bell, Daniel, gn., 1411., 202n.; quoted, n 8 n . , 203-204 Benelux, zSn. Benn, Anthony Wedgwood, quoted, 2i7n. Berkeley Liberation Committee, 232 n. Birth control, 37, 89 Black, Cyril, 23n., 132 and unquoted, 132

325

326

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Index

Black Americans, 46 and n., 47, 48, 114, 115, 206-207, 210-12, 229230, 242-43, 252, 265, 266 Black Panther party, 230n., 23m., 232 ft. Blake, Eugene Carson, 86n. Bloch, Ernst, 78 Blue-collar workers, American, 200, 205, 229, 243 Bolivar, Simon, 191 Bolivia, 190 n. Bolshevik Revolution, 98, 126, i75n. Boumedienne, Houari, 191 "Brain drain," 29-30, 3on., 276 Brazil, 20, 21, 27, 36, 4in., 42, 43, 45n., 86 Brezhnev, Leonid I., 136, 173 Britain, see Great Britain; United Kingdom Brooks, Harvey, quoted, n 6 n . - i i 7 n . Bryan, William Jennings, 237/1. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, i44n., i49n. Buddhism, 69 Buhle, Paul, quoted, 229n. Bukharin, Nikolai, 130 Bulgaria, 182 Burks, Richard V., 133n.; quoted, 158ft. Burma, 38, 45n. "Can Science Be Planned?" (Brooks), 117ft. Canada, 20, 21, 28n., 50, 55, 133ft., 15771., 213ft., 291ft. Capitalism, and technical revolution, 152 Captive Mind, The (Milosz), 106 Carstairs, G. N., 17ft. Castro, Fidel, 189 Catholic Church, 68ft., 80, 84-86, 87, 89, 91, 136 Ceylon, 41ft. Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, The, 226ft. Cheprakov, V. A., 145ft. Chesnokov, D. I., quoted, 143ft. Chile, 45ft. China, 29, 36, 92, 123-24, 125, 129, 136, 178, 179, 275, 278, 280, 281, 286ft., 290ft., 298; Communist Party of, 179-80, 187; "Cultural Revolution" in, 129, 166, 186, 187; and global revolution, 185189; and "Great Leap Forward," 186, 187; gross national product of, 189; and United States, 289

Chomsky, Noam, logn., 23on. Christian-Communist Dialogue, A (Garaudy and Lauer), 88ft. Christianity, 59, 67, 68, 69, 75, 76, 84-90, 9i, 94, 109ft., 188; and Marxism, 87-88 City life, 17 and ft. Civil-rights legislation, in United States, 114, 207 Civil War, American, 197-98, 199, 212ft., 23yn. Class struggle, i28n. Cleaver, Eldridge, 212 Cohn-Bendit, Daniel, 80, 95, 100 and ft. Cold War, 51 and ft., 297, 302, 303 Columbia University, 98, 25271. Common Market, European, 55, 145, 182, 301 Communications, audio-visual, see Audio-visual communications Communism, 24, 33, 59, 68, 74, 75, 79 and n., 83, 84, 92 and ft., 94, 113, 119-26 passim, 138, 240, 253ft.; and community of developed nations, 301-303; despotic model of, 138; diversified forms of, 181-85; phases in evolution of, 177-81; sectarian, 177, 179193; technetronic, 170; and Third World, 185, 186, 188, 190; see also China; Leninism; Marxism; Marxism-Leninism; Soviet Union; Stalinism Communism and the Politics of Development (Kautsky), 190 Communist parties, 77, 78-79, 96, 191; Stalinization of, 178 Community of developed nations, 293-309; and communist states, 301-303; risks and advantages of, 303-309; structure and focus of, 297-301 "Computer Technology" (DeCarlo), i5ftComputers, American lead in, 2yn., i33ft"Conflict in the Twentieth Century" (Wood), 7ft. Conquest, Robert, 126ft. Conservatism, 236, 237 and ft., 242, 250, 257 Constitution, U.S., 198, 258 Convergence theories, 144 and ft., 163, 253n. Cook, Jewel, 232ft.

Index Cornell University, 242 Coser, Lewis A., quoted, 68n. Cost-effectiveness analysis, 20371. Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), 302 Council of Economic Advisers, 206, 220 Cox, Harvey, quoted, 93 Crime, organized, 6 Crime rates, 21371. Critique of Pure Tolerance, A, 23571. Cuba, 189, 190, 191 Cybernetics, 11, 55, 151, 165, 170, 171 Czechoslovakia, 20, 21, 42, 43, 55, 8771., 149, 167, 174, 179, 183, 184, 301; Soviet occupation of, 129, 136, 148, 161, 180, 18m. Dadaism, 233 Deak, Istvan, 18271. Debray, Regis, 48 DeCarlo, Charles R., 1571. Declaration of Independence, 2971., 198, 258 Democracy, liberal, see Liberal democracy; participatory, 264 Democratic Party, 239, 250, 251 Denmark, 184 Deutscher, Isaac, 127; quoted, 13071. Development Assistance Committee of OECD, 276 Devlin, Kevin, 88n. Dialectical and Historical Materialism (Stalin), 131 Drucker, Peter, 26271.; quoted, 24471. Dupre, J. Stefan, 26271. Dynamics of Modernization, The (Black), 2371. East Germany, 165, 170, 171 and n., 182, 184 Eastman, Max, quoted, g6n. Eayrs, James, quoted, 292 Ecology, 61, 272, 308 Ecstasy: politics of, 95, 96; and science, 91 and n. Ecumenism, 87 Education: in France, 26, 27, 43; in Germany, West, 26, 27, 43; in India, 27, 41, 43, 44; in Italy, 26, 43; in Japan, 27, 43; in Latin America, 44; in Soviet Union, 26, 2 7> 43; and technetronic society, 11; and television, closed-circuit, 207; in Third World, 41; in United

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States, 26, 27, 43, 207-208, 2 6 6 269 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 237, 307 Elder, Judy-Ann, quoted, 23371. Elites: of Third World, 47-48; transnational, 59; of United States, 20871., 215-16 Ellul, Jacques, 1771.; quoted, 9171., 26271.-26371. Emergence of Modern Russia 18011917, The (Pushkarev), 3971. Engels, Friedrich, 56 England, see Great Britain; United Kingdom Equality, 71, 111, 205, 231; lacking in Soviet Union, 16371.; quest for, 111-15 Escapist antirationalism, 230 Europe, Western, see Western Europe European Common Market, 55, 145, 182,301 European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 301 Evolution: ideological, 14471.; of participatory pluralism in United States, 264; pluralist, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165, 174 Existentialism, Sartre's, 11671. Fanon, Frantz, 48, 97, 191; quoted, 45"Faria, Jesus, quoted, 19271. Fascism, 18271., 236, 251, 279 Federal government, 215-17, 261; complexity of, 24471. Ferkiss, Victor C., quoted, 23771. Finland, 90, 13371., 137, 21371. Fischer, George, 17071. Ford, Henry, 13 Ford Foundation, 260 Forecasting, technological-economic, 150-Si Foucault, Michel, 115, 116 Fourier, Frangois, 233 Fourth International (Trotskyite), 103, 10571. France, 24, 26 and n., 28n., 31, 55, 19071., 283; city population of, 42; Communist Party of, 80, 88n., 179, 180, 185 and n.; education in, 26, 27, 43; government of, 21771.; gross national product of, percapita, 42; newspapers in, 20, 21; radio in, 20, 21, 43; religious

328

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Index

France (cont'd.) belief in, 90; student riots in, 95, 98 and n.; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Freeman, C., 26ft. French Revolution, 24, 71, 97, 98, 175^-, 191, 236, 29m. Frontier industries, 2771., 200, 210, 215 Garaudy, Roger, 88n., 180; quoted, 8 in. Gati, Charles, 3o6n. Gaullism, 55 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 301 Generation gap, 17-18, 223 Gerasimov, G., 15m. Germany, see East Germany; West Germany Gerzon, Mark, 225, 228; quoted, 225 Ghana, 36 Ghettos, urban, of United States, 46, 48 Girardi, Giulio, 88n. Global City, The (Von Laue), 7n. Globalism, American, 305, 306, 307 Glushkov, V. M., 157*1. Goals, Priorities and Dollars: The Next Decade (Lecht), 257n. God: belief in, 90; man's relationship to, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 75> 85, 91; see also Religions Gomulka, Wladyslaw, 130 Government: federal, see Federal government; local, in United States, strengthening of, 260 Granin, D., quoted, 15m. Gray, Stanley, quoted, l o o n . - i o m . Great Britain, 28n., 90, 217ft., 283; see also United Kingdom Great Depression, 200, 229, 237ft. Great Terror, The (Conquest), 126ft. Greece, 90, 133ft., 190ft. Grid: national information, 202; world information, 32, 59, 299 and ft. Grinevetskii, V., 129, 130 Guardian, 223ft., 231ft., 232ft. Guevara, Che, 48, 191, 249 Gullivers Troubles (Hoffmann), 306ft. Harich, Wolfgang, 83

Hager, Kurt, 171 Harrington, Michael, 49ft., 51ft., 213ft.; quoted, 246ft. Hartz, Louis, 12 Hassner, Pierre, 302ft. Havelock, Eric A., 109ft. Hearing before Subcommittee on Government Operations (1968), 30 ft. Hilliard, David, quoted, 230ft. Hoffman, Abbie, 95 Hoffmann, Stanley, 306ft. Holography, 1571. Honecker, Erich, quoted, 171ft. Hoselitz, Bert F., 48 Howick, G., 262ft. Huizinga, Johan, 106 "Humanae Vitae," 85 Humanism: as Marxist concern, 142; rational, 270-73, 308, 309 Humphrey, Hubert H., 218 Hungary, 182ft., 183, 184, 190 and n. Huntington, Samuel P., quoted, 40ft., 5 in., 70ft., 279ft.-28on. Husak, Gustav, 137 Huxley, Julian, quoted, 17 Idealism, 271, 272; of young, 223, 224, 26771. Ideology: "end" of, 117, 119; social functions of, 118ft.; Soviet, as product of bureaucratic process of definition, 153; theory of evolution of, i44n. "Ideology and Soviet Politics" ? (Bell), n 8 n . I'll Take My Stand, 23771. India, 13, 40 and ft., 41ft., 44, 51, 55, 280; city population of, 42; education in, 27, 41, 43, 44; and gross national product, per-capita, 36, 42; illiteracy in, 4571.; newspapers in, 20, 21; radio in, 20, 21, 43; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Individualism, and liberalism, 238 Indonesia, 27, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 4 5 n . , 1 1 4 , 19071.

Industrial revolution, 106, 107, 108, 123, 198, 210, 277 Institute for Politics and Planning, 32 ft. Integration, of black Americans, 210211, 243 International Atomic Energy Agency, 2771., 157ft.

Index International Labor Organization (ILO), 37, 5971. International Peace Research Institute, 30471. International production, need for theory of, 300 and n. Inventions: American lead in, 2771., 2871.; registrations of, in selected countries (1964), 184 Iran, 46, 48 Islam, 68, 69, 188 Israel, 37, 279, 28671., 29m., 296 Italy, 2871., 19071.; city population of, 42; Communist Party of, 179, 185 and 71.; education in, 26, 43; gross national product of, percapita, 42, 132; radio in, 43; telephones in, 43; television in, 43 Izvestia, 14571. Japan, 9, 2871., 31, 50, 133 and n., 275, 281, 289, 29171., 295 and 71., 298; city population of, 42; computers in, 13371.; crime rates in, 21371.; education in, 27, 43; and Europe, Western, 293-97 passim, 298; and grid, world information, 299 and 71.; and gross national product, per-capita, 37, 42; labor force in, 156; newspapers in, 20, 21; nuclear energy used in, 15771.; radio in, 20, 21, 43; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Jefferson, Thomas, 292 Jencks, Christopher, quoted, 22771. John XXIII, Pope, 84 Jury trials, American, absurdities of, 21471.-21571. Kaganovich, Lazar, 13 Kahn, Herman, 5071. Kaplan, K., quoted, 16771. Karcz, J. F., quoted, 13m. Kautsky, John, 190 Kendrick, Alexander, quoted, 26971. Keniston, Kenneth, 23271.; quoted, 225, 23271. Kennedy, John F., 24671., 307 Kennedy, Robert F., 213ft., 217, 223, 245 Kenya, 113 Khrushchev, Nikita S., 140, 141, 187 Kirkland, Sally, quoted, 23371. Kolakowski, Leszek, 78, 81, 82, 83; quoted, 82 Kommunist, 14971., 151 and n.

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Konstantinov, F., quoted, 14871.14971. Kuron, J., 10471., 10571. Kurowski, 133 and n., 134 and n. Labedz, Leopold, 97; quoted, 9871.99". Lakoff, Sanford A., 26271. Laqueur, Walter, quoted, 23071. Lasers, American lead in, 2771. Latin America, 34, 36, 4171., 44, 4571., 69, 86, 149, 156, 191, 279, 288 Lauer, Quentin, 88n. Lecht, Leonard A., 25771. "Left, the Jews and Israel, The" (Lipset), 23071. Lenin, Nikolai, 114, 126, 127, 177, 191 Leninism, 127, 14571., 149, 154, 284 Lenski, Gerhard, quoted, 8771. Leroux, Pierre, 7471. Lester, R., 26271. Levi-Strauss, Claude, quoted, 66n. Liberal democracy, 197, 224, 239, 271; alternatives to, 248-54 Liberalism, 121, 236-37; ambivalence of, in defending democracy, 241; crisis of, 236-54; doctrinaire, 238-40, 241, 245, 246, 251, 270; and individualism, 238; and New Left, 240, 245; and space age, unimaginative response to, 246 and 71.; statist, 238, 239 Lichtheim, George, quoted, 18571. Liebert, Robert, quoted, 224-25 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 23071. Locke, John, 255 Lorenz, Konraa, quoted, 22871. Luddites, 108 Lukacs, George, 78 Lysenko, T. D., 15971. McCarthy, Eugene, 218, 223 Macciocchi, M. A., 18471. MacDonald, Gordon J. F., quoted, 57 and 71. McLuhan, Marshall, 19 Management by Participation (Marrow et at), 20171. Managerial Power in Soviet Politics (Azrael), 15971. Managerial processes, 202-203 Managerialism, technological, 253 Mao Tse-tung, 101, 149"-, 166, 169, 187, 191

330 }

Index

Marcuse, Herbert, 97, 101, 149 and ft., 23cm., 235ft. Marx, Karl, 74, 101, 114, 127, 138, 186, 191; quoted, 76, 139 Marxism, 48, 72-74, 92, 108, 109ft., 113, 114, 119, 123, 324, 126, 127, 13§, !37, 154» 177; and Christianity, dialogue between, 87 and n., 88 and ft.; institutional, 77-84; Leninist adaptation of, to Orient, 178; pluralist concept of, 83ft.; see also China; Communism; Leninism; Marxism-Leninism; Soviet Union; Stalinism Marxism in Modern France (Lichtheim), 185ft. Marxism-Leninism, 78, 125, 127, 12 9> ^ 5 , 144ft., 148ft.—149*1. Maslow, Abraham, 271ft. Mass media, 21, 253; and liberalism, 241; political courtship of, 216 "Mater et Magistra," 80, 85, 86 Mathematics, 28ft. Mboya, Tom, 113 "Measurement of Knowledge and Technology, The" (Bell), 14ft., 202 ft. Medvedev, Z. A., 159ft. Mendel, A., 230n. Mexico, 95, 98, 103ft., 1 73, 191, 29in., 296 Meyn, Hermann, i8n. Michael, Donald N., quoted, 58n. Middle Ages, 59, 93, 106, 107 Middle-Class Radicalism (Parkin), 100ft.

Militant fundamentalism, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 166, 168 Milosz, Czeslaw, 106 Mine, Hilary, 13 Modrzhinskaya, E., quoted, 144ft. Modzelewski, K., 104ft., 105ft. Momjan, Kh., quoted, 146ft. Monas, Sidney, 16 in. Monde, Le, 87ft., 88ft. Monroe Doctrine, 288 Moore, Barrington, 214ft., 235ft., 250 ft. Morgenthau, Hans, 179ft., 3o6n. Moskvichev, L., 143ft. Motivation and Personality (Maslow), 271ft. Multi-spectral analysis, from earth satellites, 61 Mumford, Lewis, quoted, 246ft.

Myrdal, Gunnar, 3on., 45ft.; quoted, 4on., 56ft. Mysticism, 84-85 NASA, 23n., 202, 263 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 49 National Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence, 213ft., 25on. National Commission on Technology, Automation and Economic Progress, 263ft. National Planning Association, 277ft. National Science Foundation, 220 Nationalism, 4, 54, 55-56, 70-72, 74, 106, 107, 111, 114, 121, 123, 124, 135, 191, 192, 293, 3o6n.; "new," 55-56, 56ft., 186 Nation-states, 54, 55, 56, 70, 113ft. NATO, 302 Netherlands, 26ft., 85, 90 New Deal, 199, 218, 23jn. } 238, 239 New Foreign Policy for the United States, A (Morgenthau), 179ft. New French Revolution, The (Ardagh), iogn. New Left, 80, 101, 119, 222-36, 243, 244, 248, 249, 251, 252ft., 257, 264, 271; anarchistic element in, 2 34> 235, 236, 245; historic function of, 234-36; infantile ideology of, 222-28; and liberalism, 240, 245; in search of revolution, 228233; and technetronics, 262; totalitarian tendencies of, 234, 235, 236, 245; see also Violent « Left "New World Economy, The" (Polk), 30m. New York City, 242 New York Times, 15, 28ft., 29ft., 4on., 96ft., 2i3n., 215ft., 233ft., 244ft., 246ft., 248ft., 250ft. Newspapers, in selected countries ( i 9 6 0 and 1966), 20, 21 Nigeria, 36, 41ft. Nixon, Richard M., 218 Nobel Prizes, 28ft. Non-Proliferation Treaty, 306 North Korea, 286ft. North Vietnam, 286n. Norway, 90, 184, 213ft. Oceania, 17ft., 156

Index Oligarchic petrifaction, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165, 168-69, 17° On Aggression (Lorenz), 228ft. One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse), 97 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 25ft., 26ft., 28 and n., 2971., 158, 20ift., 276, 301, 302, 303 Overpopulation, 37, 61 Pakistan, 36, 37, 38, 44, 4511., 280 Parkin, Frank, loon. Parks, Ford, 28n. Particularization, of international communism, 178-79 Pasternak, Boris, i6on. Paul VI, Pope, 84, 85, 86n., 89; quoted, 89 Paulus Gesellschaft, 87ft. Peace Corps, 224, 227 Permanent Purge, The, 126ft. Peru, 45ft. Philippines, 38 Piore, E., 30ft. Planning, functional, 61 Planning-programming-budgeting systems (PPBS), 18 Plato, 109ft. Pluralism, participatory, in United States, 258-65 Pluralist evolution, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165, 174 Poirier, Richard, 98ft. Poland, 13, 26ft., 27, 42, 43, 79ft., 92ft., 103 and ft., 104, 133, 137, 173, 178, 182, 184, 190 and ft. Pol-Fouchet, Max, 99ft. Political disintegration, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 166, 168 Political Order in Changing Societies (Huntington), 40ft. Political Power: USA/USSR (Brzezinski and Huntington), 253ft. Polk, Judd, quoted, 300/1.-30 lft. Pollution, industrial, 61, 220 Pravda, 100 ft., 157ft. Price, Don K., 262ft. Problems of Communism, 160 Production, international, need for theory of, 300 and n.

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Prophet Outcast, The (Deutscher), 130ft. Protestantism, 87 and ft. Public Interest, The (Drucker), 244ft. Pushkarev, S., quoted, 39ft. Racism, 186, 191, 192 Radio: in selected countries, 20, 21, 43; in Third World, 40, 43 Radio Free Europe, 79ft. Rashin, A. G., 39ft. Rathjens, George W., quoted, 286ft. Rational humanism, 270-73, 308, 309 Reason, escape from, 95-99, 109 "Reflections on Youth Movements" (Laqueur), 230ft. Regionalism, as American foreignpolicy formula, 34, 53 Religions, 74, 116; privatization of belief in, 90-94; of recorded history, 64; universal, 66-69; s e e also God Religious Factor, The (Lenski), 87ft. Renaissance, 56 Report by the Committee on Government Operations (1968), 26ft. Republican Party, 237, 250 Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America, and the Soviet Union (Freeman and Young), 26ft. "Revolution in America?" (Moore), 250 ft. Richardson, J., 28ft. Riesman, David, 208ft.; quoted, 227ft. "Road to 1977, The" (Ways), 203ft. Roosevelt, Franklin D., 307 Rostow, Walt, 131, 144ft. Roszak, Theodore, 230ft., 231ft., 232 ft. Rumania, 104, 170, 178, 183, 184, 190, 291ft., 297 Rumyantsev, A., quoted, 149ft. Russia, 44; industrial revolution in, 39 and ft.; revolutionary intelligentsia of, 278; see also Soviet Union Rustow, Dankwart, quoted, 112ft.113"Sakharov, Andrei, 162-63, 163ft., 164, 282ft. Sartre, Jean-Paul, 99ft., 116ft.

3 32 }

Index

Savage Mind, The (Levi-Strauss), 66 n. Schaff, Adam, 78, 82, 83 Schapiro, Leonard, 127 Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., quoted, , 96n. Science: dehumanizing potential of, 142; and ecstasy, 91 and n.; social significance of, 15 Science and the Nation: Policy and Politics (Lakoff and Dupre), 262 n. Science explosion, 22-23, 53 Science Policy in the USSR (OECD), 26n., i57n., 158, 170ft. Scientific Estate, The (Price), 262n. Seaborg, Glenn T., 23n. Second Treatise on Government (Locke), 255 Servan-Schreiber, J. J., 30 Sexual revolution, 173, 233n. Siberia, 284FT.

Sirhan, Sirhan, 213n., 215ft. Slovakia, 137 Smith, Bruce, 250ft. Social explosion/implosion, 14-18 Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Moore), 214ft. Social patterns, new, 10-14, 203204 Social Security Administration, 206 Socialism, 59, 74ft., 79 and ft., 113, 120, 152, 261 Socialism and Communism, 151ft. Sociology Faces Pessimism (Bailey), 115ft. Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, i6on. South Korea, 36, 44, 286ft., 290 Soviet Academy of Sciences, 169 Soviet System and Modern Society, The (Fischer), 170ft. Soviet Union, 7, 9, 25ft., 26ft., 29, 54, 8 7ft., 121, 123, 125, 132ft., 133ft., 136, 177, 196, 275, 280, 281, 283, 284, 286ft., 287, 288, 289; agriculture in, 155-56; bureaucratization of, 138-54 passim; and China, 168; city population of, 42; Communist Party of, 78-79, 135-36, 138, 161, 165; and community of developed nations, 301, 302, 303; Czechoslovakia occupied by, 129, 136, 148, 161, 180, 18m.; dissent in, 160 and n., 161, 162-63; education in, 26, 27, 43; foreign aid by (1966); 62ft.; future of, 154-

176; and gross national product, 37, 42, 132, 155ft., 303; industrial sector in, 156-57; labor force in, distribution of, 156; lag in economic-technological development of, 132, 133ft., 155, 157 and n., 158 and ft., 159; military technology of, 159; newspapers in, 20, 21; Nobel Prizes won by, 28ft.; non-Russian nationalities in, 55, 161-62, 166, 167; possible alternative paths of political development in, 164-72; radio in, 20, 21, 43; and socialism-in-one-country concept, 139-40; steel production of, 133 and ft.; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43; and United States, rivalry between, 146-47, 277, 282-84, 296; see also Communism; Marxism; Russia; Stalinism Space exploration, 61, 156, 159, 220, 246 and ft., 247, 248ft., 283, 287, 299 Spain, 55, 103ft., 133ft-, 173 Stalin, Joseph, 121, 125, 127-31 passim, 133-40 passim, 160, 174, i75ft-, 177, 187 Stalinism, 125, 137, 142, 143 and ft., 154, 167ft., 240; "necessity" of, 126-34 passim Stanovcic, V., 172ft. Steffens, Lincoln, 153ft. Stirner, Max, 97 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 286 Structuralism, 116 and ft. Student rebellion, 95-105 passim, 107, 110; Soviet attitude toward, 149; see also New Left Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), 222, 223ft., 230ft., 231ft., 249 "Students and Revolution" (Labedz), 99ftStudies in a Dying Colonialism (Fanon), 45ft. Sutton, Antony C., 135ft. Sweden, 20, 21, 28ft., 50, 90, 157ftSwitzerland, 28n., 90 Systems analysis, 203ft. Taiwan, 36, 44 Technetronic communism, 170 Technetronic revolution, 10, 60, 107, 108, 278; contradictions in cumu-

Index lative effect of, 52; in Europe, Western, 294; impact of, on existing ideologies, 63$.; and New Left, 222; Third World as victim of, 35#Technetronic society, 9, 10, 11, 12, !3> 5 2 , 200, 20m., 209, 309 Technological adaptation, as possible Soviet political development, 164, 165-66, 170, 174 Technological Man (Ferkiss), 237/1. Technological Society, The (Ellul), 17/1. Technology, social transformation wrought by, 203-204 Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, 73, 91, 118; quoted, 65, 73 Telephone dialing, global, 19 Telephones, in selected countries, 43 Television, 10, 13, 19, 117, 204, 269/1., 269-70, 292; American, violence on, 213/1.; closed-circuit, and education, 207; in selected countries, 20, 21, 43; in Third World, 40, 43; and world affairs, 22 Television satellites, 19 and n., 4on., 276 Test-Ban Treaty, 306 Thailand, 38, 286/1. Third American revolution, 198-221, 239, 255-56, 273 Third World, 6, 7/1., 39, 45, 50, 51 and n., 97, 120, 147, 163, 164, 180, 185, 189, 192, 196, 277, 281, 282, 290, 293, 304; anarchy in, growing, 52-53; and communism, 185, 186, 188, 190; education in, 41; elites of, 47-48; radio in, 40, 43; revolutionary intellectuals in, 48; social fragmentation in, 54; television in, 40, 43; United States influence on, 53-54; as victim of technetronic revolution, 35$.; weaponry of, in "underworld" wars, 57/1. Tinbergen, Jan, quoted, 5971.-60/1. Tito, Marshal, 165, 182 Todd, R., 263/1. Toward a Democratic Left (Harrington), 213/1. "Towards the Year 2000" (Piore), 30/1. Transplantation, of international communism, 177-78 Trapeznikov, V., 15771., 158

{

333

Trotsky, Leon, 130, 139 Truman, Harry S, 243, 307 Turkey, 38, 133™-, 290 Two-party system of government, 216-17 Ulbricht, Walter, 165, 170 Ultramicrofiche technique, 202 Unamuno, Miguel de, quoted, 84-85 UNESCO, 41, 276 United Arab Republic, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43 United Kingdom, 26, and n., 28/1., 3i> 55; computers in, 133/1.; crime rates in, 213/1.; newspapers in, 20, 21; nuclear energy used in, 157/1.; radio and television in, 20, 21; see also Great Britain United Nations, 5, 59/1., 275, 291/1., 297 United States, 7, 9, 44, 45, 50, 121; affluence of, 205; and arts, interest in, 207; budget of (industrial, health, social, and psychological), 221; and China, 289; city population of, 17/1., 42; civil-rights legislation in, 114, 207; and community of developed nations, 296, 304-305; crime rates in, 213/1.; as disseminator of technetronic revolution, 24-35 passim; education in, 26, 27, 43, 207-208, 266-69; elites of, 208/1., 215-16; employment in, changes in (1958-1967), 205; foreign aid by (1966), 62/1.; frontier industries in, 2771., 200, 210, 215; future of, 256-73 passim; as global society, first, 34, 53, 292, 307; government of, see • Federal government; and grid, world information, 32, 299; and gross national product, 37, 42, 155/1., 204; income distribution in ( 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 7 ) , 205; and international prospects, 274-93; labor force in, distribution of, 156; media used in, by audience groups, 21; newspapers in, 20, 21; Nobel Prizes won by, 28/1.; and novel relationships with world, 32-35; nuclear energy used in, 157/1.; poverty in, 205-206, 206/1.; radio in, 20, 21, 43; religious belief in, 90; and Soviet Union, rivalry between, 146-47, 277, 282-84, 296; surplus commodity

334 }

Index

United States (cont'd.) production of, 38; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43; third ' revolution in, 198-221, 239, 255256, 273; in transition, from industrial to technetronic age, 197$., 209^., 219; violence in, 212 and n., 213 and n., 257; as world's social laboratory, 196-98 United States and the World in the 198s Era, The, 4in., 268n. Universalism, 66, 69, 176, 192; ideological, 72-75 Universalization, as phase in evolution of communism, 178 University: politicized, 251-52, 252n.; in technetronic society, 12, 202 Uruguay, 90 Vatican II, 84, 85, 86 Venezuela, 45n., 192ft. Vietnam, 25, 98ft., 99, 100, 101, 178, 179ft., 189, 224, 233ft., 252ft. Violence, 6, 214ft.; in United States, 212 and ri., 213 and ft., 257 Violent Left, 249, 250, 257, 271 Von Laue, Theodore H., 7ft. Vonnegut, Kurt, 253ft. Voprosij Filosofii, 150 Wallace, George, 218, 244ft. Walls, Chaka, 231ft., 232ft. "War against the Young, The" (Poirier), 98ft. Warfare: new weaponry for, 57; nuclear, 7; secret, 57ft. Warsaw Pact, 5, 302 Ways, Max, quoted, 203ft. Weather modification, in warfare, 57 and n. Weiner, Myron, 48 Welfare society, 79-80 Werblan, A., 26ft.

West Germany, 26 and ft., 28ft., 31, 290, 291ft.; city population of, 42; computers in, 133ft.; education in, 26, 27, 43; gross national product of, per-capita, 42; newspapers in, 20, 21; nuclear energy used in, i57ft.; radio in, 20, 21, 43; religious belief in, 90; telephones in, 43; television in, 20, 21, 43 Western Europe: and Japan, 293-97 passim, 298; and world information grid, 299 and ft. Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development (Sutton), 135ft. White-collar workers, American, 205 Whole World Is Watching, The (Gerzon), 225 "Why Europe Lags Behind" (Richardson and Parks), 28ft. "Why Is Man Aggressive?" (Carstairs), 17ft. Wiener, Anthony J., 50ft. Wiener, Norbert, 10 Wolff, Robert, 235ft.; quoted, 231ft. Women, 270 Wood, David, yn. World Bank, 304 World Council of Churches, 86n. World of Nations, A (Rustow), 113ft. World War II, 33, 106, 141-42, 295 Year 2000, The (Kahn and Wiener), 50ft. Yevtushenko, Yevgeny, i6on. Yippies, 95, 103ft. Young, A., 26ft. Yugoslavia, 55, 85, 165, 173, 174, 178, 182 and n., 183 and ft., 189, 285ft., 297, 301 Zakharov, Valentin, 149ft. Zhukov, Yuri, loon., 151ft.