A Political And Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901

A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN BRILL’S INNER ASIAN LIBRARY edited by NICOLA DI COSMO DEVIN DEWEESE ...

Author: M. Hassan Kakar

244 downloads 1779 Views 2MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!

Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN

BRILL’S INNER ASIAN LIBRARY edited by NICOLA DI COSMO DEVIN DEWEESE CAROLINE HUMPHREY VOLUME 17

A POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN 1863-1901 BY

M. HASSAN KAKAR

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2006

On the cover: Amir "Abd al-Rahman Khan This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kakar, M. Hassan. A political and diplomatic history of Afghanistan, 1863-1901 / Mohammad Hassan Kakar. p. cm. - (Brill’s Inner Asian library ; v. 17) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7 ISBN-10: 90-04-15185-0 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Afghanistan—Politics and government—19th century. 2. Afghanistan—Foreign relations. I. Title. II. Series. DS364.K35 2006 958.1’03—dc22 2006043934

ISSN 1566-7162 ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7 ISBN-10: 90-04-15185-0 © Copyright 2006 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill Academic Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

To my teachers and professors especially the late Najm al-Din Tarakay of the high school in Laghman and Malcolm Edward Yapp of the University of London.

CONTENTS

Preface ........................................................................................ Other books and translation of books by M. H. Kakar ...... Abbreviations .............................................................................. Introduction ................................................................................

ix x xi 1

PART ONE

POLITICAL HISTORY Chapter One: Chapter Two:

Chapter Three: Chapter Four: Chapter Five: Chapter Six: Chapter Seven: Chapter Eight: Chapter Nine:

The Reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan ........ The British Afghan War and the Accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan .......................................................... The Afghan Victory at Maiwand and the Reuniﬁcation of Afghanistan ...... The Paciﬁcation of Eastern Afghanistan ................................................ The Great Ghilzay Uprising and its Suppression ................................................ The Revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq and its Suppression .................................... The Paciﬁcation of Border Principalities in Northern Afghanistan .......................... The Paciﬁcation of the Hazaras .............. The Conquest of Former Kaﬁristan ........

9

25 45 63 87 96 106 120 139

PART TWO

EXTERNAL RELATIONS Chapter Ten:

Relations with the British Government of India and the Durand Agreement ...... Chapter Eleven: Relations with Russia and the Russian Occupation of Panjdeh ............................ Chapter Twelve: Relations with Persia and the Ottoman Turkey ........................................................

159 193 210

viii

contents

Conclusion .................................................................................. Appendices ................................................................................ Select Bibliography .................................................................... Glossary ...................................................................................... Index ..........................................................................................

217 231 241 247 251

PREFACE My ﬁrst work in English entitled, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, was published in 1971. It covered only sixteen years of the 21-year reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (pronounced Abdur Rahman) and was based only on the unpublished and published documents of the British Government of India, which I had collected from the India Oﬃce Library and Records in London (now a part of the British Library Asia, Paciﬁc and Africa Collections), for my M.Phil. thesis. In the following years of the 1970s, I overhauled the entire 1971 publication on the basis of new source material that I had obtained from the archival centers in Kabul and New Delhi. The Afghan oﬃcial chronicle, Siraj al-Tawarikh, became another valuable source which was not available to me in London. I completed the revision of the 1971 work at Princeton and Harvard universities where I served as a visiting Fellow. These new sources enabled me to cover the entire reign of the amir, not only politically but diplomatically also, and to add some new topics as described in the Introduction of the present study. Subsequently, I revised the previously overhauled 1971 text on the basis of two important books: Sirdar Abdul Qadir Eﬀendi’s Royals and Royal Mendicant (1948?) and Major General Sir Charles M. MacGregor’s War in Afghanistan, 1879–80 (1985). I have performed the revision of my original study over an extended period of time, in line with the advice of Socrates, who had advised that “. . . the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him.”1 As a result of the thoroughness of this revision, the excellence of the historical sources, and my specialist knowledge of the subject, it is now possible to state that the national as well as the local history, of Afghanistan during this period (1863–1901) has become clearer than its history, during any other comparable period. I would like to express my thanks to Stanley Barton for reading the entire manuscript and oﬀering valuable editorial suggestions.

1 Plato, The Trial and Death of Socrates, Translated by Grube, C. M. A., Hacket Publishing Co. Indianapolis, Cambridge, 1975, 18.

OTHER BOOKS AND TRANSLATION OF BOOKS BY M. H. KAKAR

In English Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880–1896 (1971) Government and Society in Afghanistan, The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (1979) Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982 (1995) In Pashto The Geneva Compromise on Afghanistan (1988) Afghans in the Spring of 1987 at War with the Russians (1990) Light and Defense or Essays on the Population, History and Current Aﬀairs of Afghanistan, Editor (1999) Journey to the Homeland; The Taliban and Islamic Fundamentalism, (2004) The Reign of King Aman Allah Reconsidered (2005) In Dari Afghan, Afghanistan and Afghans and the Organization of the State in India, Persia and Afghanistan (1978) The Second Anglo-Afghan War (1989) Translation (Pashto or Dari) Gorky on Literature (1961) What is History? E. H. Carr, author (1968) The Real World of Democracy, C. B. McPherson, author (1971) An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 2 vols., M. Elphinstone, author (1982) Introduction to the Philosophy of Education, George Knelle, author (2002) Manuscript in Pashto Journal of Political Developments, 1979–1982

ABBREVIATIONS*

ARAMFA

The Archives of the Royal Afghan Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, Kabul BACA Biographical Accounts of Chiefs, Sardars and others of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1888 BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies CD Chitral Agency Diary DSCD Dir, Swat, Chitral Agency Diary GAK (1895) Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Kabul, pt. 4, 1895 GD Gilgit Agency Diary IGA Imperial Gazetteer of India, Afghanistan and Nepal, (Calcutta, 1908) IOL India Oﬃce Library, Commonwealth Relations Oﬃce, London HD Herat Diary Kand. D. Kandahar Diary KD Kabul Diary Kh.D. Khyber Agency Diary Mala. D. Malakand Agency Diary MM Monthly Memorandum MRA Military Report on Afghanistan, (Calcutta, 1906) MRA (1925) Military Report on Afghanistan, (Delhi, 1925) NAI National Archives of India, Delhi PD Peshawar Agency Diary PNEA Papers relating to Afghanistan, Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, 1878–1880 PSLI Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received [in London] from India

* References to the records without ARAMFA or NAI indicate records of the India Oﬃce Library, and Commonwealth Relations Oﬃce, now a part of the British Library, London. Archival sources are cited without special marks while their volumes and pages are cited only by their numbers. The pattern of the archival sources varies toward the end of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s reign. Siraj al-Tawarikh without the mention of volume refers to its third volume which is devoted entirely to the sixteen years of the amir’s reign.

xii

abbreviations

SJD Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati (Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s interviews with the viceroy of India), Mohammad Nabi, (author), Kabul 1915 (T) Telegram

Amir Sher 'Ali Khan (1823–1879). Source: Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 1895.

Amir Dost Mohammad Khan (1791–1863). Source: Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 1895.

Sketch Map of Afghanistan and Adjoining Countries. Source: Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman Khan, 1895.

INTRODUCTION

This work begins with the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan in 1863 and ends with the death of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan in 1901. It is an in depth study of the political history and external relations of Afghanistan during the second reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and the entire reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan (pronounced Abdur Rahman), who ruled from July 20, 1880 to October 2, 1901. The reigns of these two amirs were characterized by their eﬀorts in centralizing and consolidating state order as never before. It was also during their reigns that the boundaries of Afghanistan were internationally agreed for the ﬁrst time in its long history albeit to its disadvantage. The centralization eﬀorts also became signiﬁcant because they became a model for their successors. The introductory remarks of this study begin with the reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, who founded the Mohammadzay dynasty following a long period of civil war, which broke out after the Sadozay dynasty fell from power, in 1818. He was the father of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and the grandfather of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, and these three ﬁgures were the giant players of nineteenthcentury Afghanistan. The Sadozays and Mohammadzays, who played a pivotal role in the history of modern Afghanistan for almost two and a half centuries (1747–1978) were respectively sections of the Popalzay and Barakzay divisions of the Pashtun Durranay tribal confederation, while the Pashtuns have dominated the political scene of the country in modern times.1

1

The Pashtuns (or Pakhtuns) also called the Afghans, and the Pathans are among the ancient inhabitants of Afghanistan, constituting linguistically ﬁfty ﬁve percent, and genealogically sixty two percent of the present population of the country. The Tajiks, the Hazaras, the Uzbeks, the Turkmen, the Char Aimaq and others are the other ethnic groups of the country. (Wak Foundation of Afghanistan, The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan, Sapay Center for Pashto Research and Development, Peshawar, 1998, 62, 73). The name ‘Pashtun’ is probably the ‘Pakthas’ of the Vedic period, which Herodotus in the ﬁfth century B.C.E. recorded as ‘Pactyes’, in describing the inhabitants of “the Pactyic country, north of the rest of India,” who, he states, “live much like the Bactrians.” The word Afghan appears in ancient Indian, Persian and Chinese

2

introduction

Dost Mohammad Khan assumed power ﬁrst as the governor of Kabul in 1826 and later as the amir of Afghanistan, in 1834, but the British deported him to India in 1840 after they had invaded Afghanistan in 1838. The invasion resulted in a full-scale war

sources as ‘Asvaka’, ‘Asva-Ghana’, ‘Abgan’, ‘Apakan’, ‘Avagana’, ‘Ap-o-kien’ and, ﬁnally, ‘Afghan’. The Persian-speaking people still pronounce ‘Afghan’ as ‘Aoghan’. In modern times the word ‘Afghan’ has come to signify all of the inhabitants of Afghanistan. According to many authors, the name ‘Pathan’ is derived from ‘Pakhtana’, the plural of ‘Pakhtun’. However, this does not seem to be true as the name has come into use since the twelfth century in India when some Pashtuns settled in the Patna district in the Bahar province. The Indians then called them, according to the historian Firishta, as ‘Pathan’ after Patna. Although the Pashtuns are genealogy-conscious they have no written records of their ancestors. Herodotus mentions Gandaharii, Aparytae, and Sittagydae, names that may refer to the inhabitants of Gandahara, Apriday (or Afriday), and the Khattak. But according to one legend, the present-day Pashtuns are the descendants of a person known as Qays, who may have lived in and around the Kisay Ghar, or in Ghor, in western Afghanistan in the seventh century. This Qays, according to the legend, visited the Prophet Muhammad in Medina, who named him Qays 'Abd al-Rashid. The name ‘Qays’ is probably the Arabicized form of ‘Kisay’, a name that signiﬁes a series of ranges that came to be known in the Islamic period the ‘Sulaiman Mountains’, described by Morgenstierne “as the earliest known home of the Afghans.” ‘Kisay’ was probably also the given name of the person in question, and that he changed it to Qays 'Abd al-Rashid under the Islamic impulse, as was common practice in Islamic Afghanistan. The change of Isapzai or Asapzai to Yusufzay is another example of this type. Groups of people have also related themselves to the Arabs. The Shinwaray Pashtuns, for example, formerly called themselves sayyeds—that is, the descendants of the Prophet, Muhammad, through his daughter, Fatima. Even Pashto has been considered by some to be a Semitic language. The Kam tribe of the former Kaﬁristan too believed that they were related to the Quraysh tribe to which the Prophet, Muhammad, belonged. These associations were made because in Islamic Afghanistan the sayyeds were (and still are) respected, and the government paid them as well as the mullas and religious leaders ( pirs) allowances. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, however, compelled the sayyeds to present the ﬁrmans on the basis of which they received allowances. Since only a few could, he discontinued the allowances, saying, “I am tired of these Soyids (sic). How is it that the soyids are found in such large numbers everywhere? I can not accept the genealogical table of any of them”. In general, it is probably impossible for Afghan sayyeds to prove that they are Arabs by descent. Qays 'Abd al-Rashid had four sons: Beett (or Beettnai), Ghorghasht, Sarbun, and Korla. The contradiction is obvious between these names and the name ‘Qays 'Abd al Rashid’. If ‘Qays’ had converted to Islam, as the legend says he had, he certainly would have given his sons Muslim names, not purely Pashto names such as these. Also, how can the descendants of one person multiply in the course of fourteen centuries to about forty million known souls of the present day Pashtuns, who now live on both sides of the Durand Line? Recently (1976), Afghan historian, Ahmad 'Ali Kohzad, has advanced the view according to which Beett, Ghorghasht, and Sarbun were the illustrious ancestors and heroes of the Pashtuns in the Avestan

introduction

3

(1838–1841) that came to be known in the Afghan sources as the First Anglo-Afghan war and in the English annals as the Afghan war. After the British had lost more than 16, 500 soldiers and their Indian camp followers, and that the war had ended, they allowed Dost Mohammad Khan to return to Afghanistan. Upon his return home in 1843 he assumed power once again as an independent amir and ruled the country until his death in June 1863. By the time of his death he had reunited the fragmented country more by statesmanship than by force, and reorganized the shattered economy and the government along traditional lines. The Afghanistan that he ruled stretched from the Oxus River (Amu Darya) to the territories up to Peshawar. Dost Mohammad Khan was assisted by his numerous sons and grandsons some of whom served as provincial governors, known as sardars (‘persons in command; general’), and governed almost autonomously, subject only to Amir dost Mohammad Khan. After the heir-apparent, Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan (b. 1822), became amir some of the provincial governors rebelled. The rebellion lasted intermittently for four years (1864–1868) during which time Afghanistan

period who were then known respectively by the names of Atratt, Gharshasib, and Sarand. According to the aforementioned legend, the present-day divisions of Pashtuns have descended from the ﬁrst three sons: for example, the Durranays (formerly called Awdaul or Abdaul), the Barezh, the Tarin, the Ghoryakhel, and the Yusufzays are said to be descended from Sarbun; the Kakars, the Daways, the Babis and others from Ghorghast; and the Ghilzays, the Lodays, the Suris, the Niazays and others are descended from Beett. Korla is said to have had no issues. (For details see, Neamet Ullah, History of the Afghans, Trans. from Persian into English with annotations by Dorn, Bernard, Vanguard Books (PVT), Lahore, 1999 (Reprint), 26–42. Herodotus, The History, Translated by Grene, D., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1987, 3–91, 3.102, 7.67, 7.85. Khattak, Tarikh-e-Murrasa" (in Pashto), A. General History of the Pashtuns, ed. Kamil Momand, D. M., University Book Agency, Peshawar, 606–624. Afzal Khan Khattak was a grandson of the great poet and warrior Khushhal Khattak. Morgenstierne, G., “The People; The Pashto Language; Pashto Literature”, The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 1, 1960, 216–221. Durranay, Sultan Mohammad, The History of Sultani, (in Dari) Bombay, 1298 H. Q., 14–23. Kakar, M. H. Afghan, Afghanistan and the Afghans and the Organization of the State in India, Persia and Afghanistan, (in Dari), Kabul University Press, 1978, 1–37. Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 1880–1901, Texas University Press at Austin, 1979, 157–158. Kohzad, Ahmad 'Ali, Gharghasht ya Gharshasib, (in Persian), [Gharghasht or Gharshasib], Kabul, ﬁrst published in 1976, reprint by the Daunish Book Store, Peshawar, 1999. Siyal, Mira Jan., Da Zeeno Pashtano Qaba"ilo Shajaray aw da Hugho Mainay aw Lund Tarikh, (in Pashto) [ The Genealogy of Some Pashtun Tribes and Their lands and Short History], University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1986. I am grateful to Dr. Zamin Mohmand for lending me this important book.

4

introduction

was plunged into a war in which many sons and grandsons of the late amir participated. In the course of the war Sardar 'Abd alRahman Khan, the only son of the eldest son of the late amir, distinguished himself by helping his father and his full-uncle to the throne one after the other. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan became a fugitive within his own country, but did not give up the ﬁght. Finally in September 1868, he regained the throne with the help of his eldest son, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan ﬂed to Samarqand in Central Asia after his father and his full-uncle had died one after the other. In Samarqand Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan remained on a Russian pension for eleven years. During his second reign, described in Chapter One, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan organized his administration, and introduced some reforms, which put Afghanistan on the road to becoming a nation-state. However, the British, in the pursuit of their Forward Policy of the 1870s, occupied the country once again in 1878. This occupation resulted in the Second Anglo-Afghan war, and it destroyed all that Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had accomplished. The viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, even decided to break up the country, and help the fugitive Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman ascend the throne of what he called “Northern Afghanistan.” Lytton opposed the rise to power of any member of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, after the Afghans had massacred the personnel of the British embassy in Kabul in an uprising. However, subsequent events obliged him as well as his immediate successor to abandon the scheme of fragmentation. His successor even assisted the new ruler, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, in reuniting the whole country. This occurred after Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, a son of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had inﬂicted a stunning defeat on the British army at Maiwand, threatening the position of the British as well as that of the new amir. To overcome the common foe, the British assisted the amir, not only with money and weapons, but also by handing him over the province of Kandahar, which they had oﬃcially declared independent in the name of a local ruler as part of their scheme of fragmenting the country. To the relief of the British the amir expelled his rival cousin to Persia, and succeeded in reuniting the country. But the reuniﬁcation was incomplete since the British retained the Khyber and the Michni Passes, along with the districts of Kurram (Kurma), Pishin and Sibi that they had acquired by the treaty of Gandumak, of 1879. Additionally, the

introduction

5

British were to conduct the external relations of the country, and later by the Durand Agreement or the Kabul Convention of 1893, they even deprived the amir of ruling over a vast region in the eastern hinterland. As amir, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan began the work which his predecessor, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had begun, but focused more on state building than nation building. Consequently, he concentrated on order and security, and drastically curtailed the traditional liberty that the Afghans especially their rural magnates enjoyed. He had reasons for doing so. Externally, by then Afghanistan had been encircled almost entirely by the British and Russian empires. They also curbed the amir’s drive for regaining the territories that Afghanistan had lost previously, and also seized additional territory. Later in his reign they even reached an understanding between themselves and made Afghanistan a buﬀer state. The amir suspected both powers, and made their understanding a further justiﬁcation for consolidating the government and his dynastic power, thereby demanding sacriﬁces from his subjects. Internally, the amir also had problems not less demanding. He was to establish his rule in the face of opposition of dynastic rivals. The more popular son of the late amir, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, proved a formidable rival, as noted above. While Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan succeeded in expelling him to Persia in 1881, his struggle with him, as well as his close ties with the British, alienated from the amir the Durranays and most of those who had fought the British during their occupation of Afghanistan. In 1888 the amir’s full-cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, the virtual autonomous governor of Afghan Turkestan, rebelled, but failed to unseat the amir. The defeated sardar took refuge in Samarqand a second time and the expansionist empires of Britain and Russia became homes to his dynastic rival cousins, including the former amir, Mohammad Ya'qub Khan. The external threats coupled with those from dynastic rivals as well as potential threats from provincial magnates convinced the amir that for Afghanistan to survive as a country it must have a strong central government with a strong military force. But this scheme required the allocation of a large proportion of ﬁnancial resources and the curtailment of traditional autonomy of tribal communities and elders. Considering the country’s meager resources and the unwillingness of its people to live under a police state this was a most stupendous task that the amir set for himself. This scheme

6

introduction

resulted in over 40 rebellions of which I have studied only the major ones. The paciﬁcation of Hazarajat and the conquest of Kaﬁristan for the ﬁrst time were diﬀerent in nature. All of these events as well as the encirclement of the country by the British and Russian empires, and the demarcation of its boundaries make the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan as the most formative period in the history of modern Afghanistan. In view of their importance to the history of Afghanistan, Afghan relations with the British Government of India and with Russia constitute the major part of this study. Britain and Russia which had started the so-called Great Game to dominate the Central Asian lands much earlier in the century had ﬁnally besieged Afghanistan in the period under discussion. To them Afghanistan was a land without borders, an alibi for their forward movements. On the other hand, it was the policy of Afghan rulers in particular Amir 'Abd alRahman Khan to restore to Afghanistan the outlying territories she had previously lost. Afghanistan became, thus, a theatre for these powers to carry on their forward policies in opposite directions. All this made the period not only rich in events internally but also internationally. I have studied the external developments in particular the Durand Agreement and the Russian occupation of Panjdeh in detail mainly in reference to the internal politics of Afghanistan, the kind of study no other scholar has previously attempted. The foundation of the present study is my M.Phil thesis entitled Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880–1896, published privately in Lahore in 1971. This work was narrower in scope and covered only the sixteen years of the twenty-one-year reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. After its publication I located a great number of new sources particularly while performing research for my Ph.D. thesis, entitled, Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Published in 1979, this work, as its title indicates, is a study of the government structure and some aspects of society to the exclusion of political and diplomatic history. The source materials drawn upon in the present study, as well as my previous works, are varied and extensive, and have been evaluated in detail in my 1979 publication. Among the new unpublished sources that I have consulted for the present work are those that I collected from the National Archives of India, in New Delhi. I have also collected source materials from the India Oﬃce Library and Records, in London, (now part of the British Library Asia Paciﬁc

introduction

7

and Africa Collections), and in the Royal Ministry of External Relations, in Kabul, where I was the only scholar to be given access to the ﬁles relating to the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Among a number of oﬃcial and un-oﬃcial printed sources in Persian, mention should be made of volume three of Siraj al-Tawarikh, (The Lamp of Histories) and the works of Mohammad Yusuf Riyazi. As an oﬃcial chronicle, the ﬁrst covers in minute detail the ﬁrst sixteen years of the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan while the second addresses the events of the period in a general way. These works I was unable to consult before. An especially important and rare work not consulted previously is Royals and Royal Mendicant by Sirdar Abdul Qadir Eﬀendi (b. 1888), the eldest son of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. Based on family archives it is a biographical account of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan and Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, as well as that of the hero of Maiwand, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. It is the ﬁrst major book of its kind in which an educated prince describes events surrounding his fallen dynasty, and is noteworthy for the author’s objectivity, and critical attitude. In his own words, “With these exposures I feel proud that I have got nothing hidden from the reader. I would never sacriﬁce truth for any consideration.”2 I remain permanently grateful to Sardar Mohammad Yahya Eﬀendi, a relation of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and now a retired army oﬃcer in Rawalpindi in Pakistan, for granting me a copy of it. Mention should also be made of an unpublished pamphlet, Reminiscences: A Short History of an Era, 1869–1881 by Mahmud Tarzi (1865–1933) who was a grandson of a brother of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan. As a patriotic poet, a proliﬁc author, and a distinguished journalist and diplomat, Tarzi inﬂuenced his contemporary politicians and intellectuals, and as the minister of external aﬀairs in the reign of King Aman Allah Khan he played a leading role in state aﬀairs. His account, although brief and sometimes unreliable contains some useful information and insights. I am grateful to Dr M. Ibrahim Majid Seraj, a grandson of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, for providing me with a copy of its English translation.

2 Eﬀendi, Sirdar M. A. K., Royals and Royal Mendicant, A Tragedy of the Afghan History, 1791–1947, Lion Press, Lahore, year of print unknown (1948?), 284. Eﬀendi was the eldest son of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub and a grandson of Amir Sher 'Ali.

introduction

8

One important work in English is War in Afghanistan, 1878–80, the Personal Diary of Major General Sir Charles Metcalf MacGregor, published only recently (1985) with an introduction by Dr. William Trousdale. As the compiler of the Gazetteer of Central Asia (a large part of which is devoted to Afghanistan), MacGregor, who served as the Chief of Staﬀ of the British forces in Kabul was well informed. His diary is in sharp contrast to the oﬃcial statements and published reports of the British government oﬃcers of the era which were composed within strict limitations. Although “. . . clumsy in matters of diplomacy and hopeless in strategy and realpolitik, in all of which he mistakenly believed he excelled . . . but he had, nonetheless, telling insights into personalities and issues.”3 The diary complements the oﬃcial reports as well as Royals and Royal Mendicants. While the latter is a valuable source about the Mohammadzay rulers and princes and elders, MacGregor’s diary is a valuable source with regard to their British counterparts in Kabul. I remain grateful to Dr. Trousdale for giving me a copy of this important work. It is due to the excellence of source materials, both Afghan and non-Afghan, that this work meets the requirement of historiography. These materials are not only abundant but also highly reliable, given the complexity of human aﬀairs and the limitations and fallibility of those who record them. The sources, as well as my specialist knowledge of the subject, have enabled me to give a balanced and proportionate account of the whole story. Now and then during the past thirty years or so I have revised and developed as well as compressed the entire text of the original work, especially the chapter on the former Kaﬁristan. The Introduction is entirely new as is Chapter I as well as the following subsections: Waziristan, Bar Duarranays and Afghanistan, Maymana, Roshan and Shighnan, Wakhan, and International Signiﬁcance of the Conquest of Kaﬁristan. Part Two, which deals exclusively with external relations, is likewise an entirely new addition as is the Conclusion.

3

Trousdale, W. Introduction, in MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 1879–80, The Personal Diary of Major General Sir Charles, Metcalfe MacGregor, with an Introduction by Trousdale, W., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1985, 68.

CHAPTER ONE

THE REIGN OF AMIR SHER 'ALI KHAN

The Accession After Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the founder of the Mohammadzay dynasty, died of asthma on June 9, 1863 at the age of seventy-two, his ambitious sons from among his twenty-seven sons and twenty— ﬁve daughters born of sixteen wives fought among themselves in a conﬂict that lasted intermittently for four years. During the 21 years of his second reign, which had begun in 1843, the amir had succeeded in reunifying the fragmented country which stretched from the Oxus River to the plains of Peshawar mainly through statesmanship and strategy. From an early age, during the Sadozay rule (or the Durranay Empire), he held high oﬃcial posts along with his many brothers, most of whom also served the dynasty. The Sadozay dynasty had been founded by Ahmad Shah Durranay, who ruled from 1747 to 1773. Following the dynasty’s fall, in 1818, Dost Mohammad Khan distinguished himself greatly in the ensuing struggle for power even though he was one of the youngest of his brothers, and born of a Sipahmansur Qizilbash mother, from a minority Turkoman ethnic group. Of the twenty-one sons of Sardar Payanda Khan, called the Barakzay or Mohammadzay sardars, it was the eldest, Wazir Fatih Khan, and one of the youngest, Sardar Dost Mohammad Khan, who played the most important roles in the downfall of the ruling Sadozay dynasty. While the former acted as a state minister (wazir) and promoted his brothers to high posts the latter ﬁnally grabbed the throne when the former had died. In 1826 Sardar Dost Mohammad became the governor of Kabul, and in 1834 he became amir. During this long period of civil war he, along with his brothers, ﬁrst overcame members of the former dynasty and afterward sidelined his own rival brothers. Some of his rival brothers had already died of natural causes. However, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s ﬁrst reign did not last long as the British deported him to India in 1840, after they had invaded Afghanistan in 1838. During his second reign, which began in 1843, his many sons and

10

chapter one

grandsons helped him extend his authority throughout the country. Known as the great amir (amir-e-kabir), he died in Herat shortly after he incorporated that province into his kingdom. Herat had been autonomous since 1818.1 At the time of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s death his third son, Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan held the position of heir—apparent (wali'ahd ). The amir had designated him as such after the two heirs-designate— Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan and Sardar Ghulam Haydar Khan had died one after the other in 1847 and 1859 respectively. Just before his own death the amir “. . . pulled himself together to don the turban [of rulership] on the head of our hero, the “Lion of 'Ali”2 after which he was called Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. On the subject of state power, however, Pashtun princes have seldom heeded the words of their dead fathers. It is alleged that even before the late amir was buried the new amir’s “. . . youthful brother [Sardar Mohammad] Aslam intended to dispatch him [to the grave] with a pistol bullet, when the enlightened elder brother Sardar [Mohammad] A'zam prevented regicide.”3 However, the “enlightened elder brother” was among the ﬁrst to raise the standard of rebellion.

The Civil War Amir Sher 'Ali Khan ruled in relative peace for two years with the exception of minor expeditions such as the one undertaken against Sardar Mohammad A'zam Khan, the governor of Zurmula (Zurmut) who was exiled to India. In 1864, the amir undertook the ﬁrst major expedition against his eldest half- brother, Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan, the governor of Turkestan, who had refused to pay revenue and read the Friday sermon (khutba) in the amir’s name. This was an open act of rebellion as reading khutba in the name of the reigning amir as well as paying revenue was the obligation of a governor. The amir feared that he might claim the throne, since he was the eldest of their father’s sons, and further, possessed an army of

1 Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 72. According to Fayz Mohammad, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan had 27 sons and 25 daughters born of 16 wives. Siraj alTawarikh, vols. 1 and 2 in one cover, Kabul, 1331 H.Q., 250. 2 Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 81. 3 Ibid.

the reign of amir sher 'ali khan

11

twenty-ﬁve thousand troops, and had ruled the important frontier region for almost ten years after it had been paciﬁed in 1855. A former British oﬃcer, William Campbell, re-christened Sher Mohammad, who had been taken prisoner in a battle that Dost Mohammad Khan had waged against Shah Shuja" east of Kandahar, in 1834, had helped Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan in organizing his army. All of these events inﬂuenced Amir Sher 'Ali Khan to reconcile himself with his rebellious brother after their armies had fought inconclusively in Bajgah, in June 1864. However, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the only son of Afzal Khan, worked against this arrangement because “. . . he could not bring himself to see his father’s legitimate right of succession as the eldest son of Dost [Mohammad Khan] trampled.”4 While [Sardar Mohammad] Afzal and the amir were walking hand in hand in the shrine [of 'Ali in Mazar] to endorse [the] peace, 'Abd alRahman exposed his mala ﬁde to arrest the king and shoot the crown prince [Sardar Mohammad 'Ali Khan]. Sher 'Ali was convinced that the father and the son had resolved to end the ruling house.5

The amir then seized his brother and took him to Kabul in custody, while the latter’s son, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman, fearful for his life, had already escaped to Bukhara. In 1865 Amir Sher 'Ali Khan set out for Kandahar at the head of his army. At the time his younger full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Amin Khan, the governor of Kandahar, had rebelled, and, further, had occupied Kalat-e-Ghilzay. In the ﬁghting that took place at Kajbaz in June 1865 the rebel governor, the crown prince, Sardar Mohammad 'Ali Khan, as well as many others were killed. The deaths were too much for the amir to bear, and losing all interest in world aﬀairs he took refuge in the khirqa (the location of the reputed robe of the Prophet, Muhammad) in Kandahar just as Shah Mahmud Hotak had become a recluse after his conquest of Persia, in 1722. Repeated pleas from oﬃcials failed to move Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and his opponents, led by Sardar Mohammad A'zam Khan and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who had earlier ﬂed to India and Bukhara respectively, proceeded toward Kabul and occupied it. They then helped the imprisoned

4 5

Ibid., 84. Ibid., 87.

12

chapter one

Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan become amir in Kabul, in May 1866. Only then did Amir Sher 'Ali Khan leave the khirqa and dedicate himself to organizing an army. In a short time he succeeded in doing so, but his army suﬀered defeats in Sayyedabad in May 1866, in Muqur in January 1867, and in Panjsher in September 1867 by the armies of his opponents. In the battle of Sayyedabad alone “the belligerents sustained casualties to the tune of eight thousand warriors.”6 If true, this was indeed an enormous toll. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan retreated to Herat, and Amir Mohammad Afzal Khan died in October 1867. The latter was succeeded by his full-brother, Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan. Sher 'Ali Khan, still did not resign, but instead he doubled his eﬀorts in regaining the lost throne. His son, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (b. 1849), and several of his full-nephews helped him in his endeavor. However, his eﬀorts to march on Kabul via Balkh failed, and he returned to Herat and planned to recover Kabul by way of Kandahar. The ﬁrst successful step in this recovery was taken by Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, who expelled from Kandahar the sons of Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan who ruled over it despotically. Sher 'Ali followed his triumphant son and proceeded from Kandahar toward Kabul, engaging Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan in a battle near Ghazni. It was at this time that a few sardars in Kabul, tired of Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan’s tyranny, occupied the capital city for Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Having lost the capital city and failed in overcoming their opponent in military engagements Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan left Afghanistan once again. A'zam Khan died on the way to Tehran, and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan took asylum in Samarqand where he lived as a Russian pensioner for eleven years. Sher 'Ali Khan entered Kabul on September 8, 1868 and began to rule as amir for the second time.7 There were particular reasons why the sons and grandsons of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan fought among themselves. The amir had divided his kingdom among his sons, just as Timur Shah Durranay

6

Ibid., 92. For the best account of the civil war, see Mawlawi Nur Ahmad Nuri, Gulshane-Amarat, [The Garden of the Amirate], History Association, Kabul, 1334/1956. Nuri was a contemporary of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. 7

the reign of amir sher 'ali khan

13

had done earlier, and they, therefore, regarded themselves as autonomous rulers, subject only to their father. Each of these governors had his own military force, and the authority to collect taxes and send the surplus to Kabul after deducting his own expenses; and each ruled his province as he pleased, and consequently, each looked upon it as his own domain. Another serious problem was the lack of unity among Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s numerous sons, who were the progeny of many mothers of diﬀerent ethnic background. Princes born of the same mother joined forces against their rival half-brothers, but sometimes even they fought against each other in disputes over inheritance and power. The rivalries between those born of diﬀerent mothers may be explained by the fact that full-brothers and half-brothers were brought up in diﬀerent milieus under diﬀerent tutors (lalas). Also, in the competitive atmosphere of dynastic circles mothers in general, and cowives in particular, raised their sons with a view to making them manly, competitive, partisan, and contentious. Only with these qualities, as well as skill in horsemanship, was a prince able to compete eﬀectively in the hard and unpredictable profession of politics. Rivalry was always present in the families of the sardars, among whom it “. . . would start with the governors and pages and end up with their ladies.” The rivalry and all that was connected with it “. . . would then spread among the sardars and the sons of lesser nobles, resulting in ever growing feuds over power and inheritance.” 8 However, competitiveness and rivalry were not conﬁned to the families of the governing sardars; they were characteristics of the Pashtuns among whom it was said that in the tribe you may not be without cousins, among cousins not without brothers, and among brothers not without sons. All this is due to the custom of turburi or rivalry among paternal cousins that exists among them with force even to the present day. The immediate causes of the civil war were personal. Sardar Mohammad Afzal and Sardar Mohammad A'zam felt that their father had wronged them by passing over them in the succession. As the eldest sons of their father, they believed that it was their

8 Tarzi, M. Reminiscences, “A Short History of an Era, 1869–1881,” Trans. from Persian into English by Wahid Tarzi, Unpublished manuscript, 4.

chapter one

14

“natural and legal rights”9 to succeed him, one after the other. They felt especially wronged since as governors, they had proved themselves to be able administrators and soldiers, though not as able as Amir Sher 'Ali had been. They were, however, the sons of a provincial Pashtun mother, whereas Amir Sher 'Ali Khan was the son of a Sadozay mother, connected to the inner dynastic circle. This is not to suggest that the mother of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had directly inﬂuenced the great amir in his decision. It is said that “Amir Dost Mohammad Khan was too strong a character to be swayed by the gust of love for woman.”10 Besides, “Sher 'Ali’s mother was too ugly to appeal to a man with aesthetic taste.”11 But the great amir had “. . . stupendous regards for her” as she had been the mother of Wazir Mohammad Akbar Khan, the ‘Liberator of Afghanistan.’12 By all accounts “. . . it was the astounding qualities of Sher 'Ali, which led his father away from the path of justice”.13 The unjust path, however, “. . . not only knocked the bottom out of his house, but opened a wide chasm in the ﬁdelity and the faith of the people, which unfortunately still [as of 1948] endure[s] and emit[s] a nasty smell of a festering sore.”14 Thus, the death of the great amir followed by a civil war as the death of Timur Shah Durranay (who had also shown a preference for his third son as his successor) had been. During the civil war many other sardars also played roles, since, by custom, each commanded contingents of private soldiers, enjoyed rent-free lands, and received allowances in return for military services in times of emergency. Some of these sardars, who had been deprived by the amir of many of their privileges, entered the war, as did tribal and community elders. However, during the entire period of this struggle, the triumphant Mohammadzay sardars did not treat their fallen rivals brutally as some of the triumphant Sadozay princes had done earlier. Nor did they treat harshly the sardars who had changed sides and by doing so had contributed to the prolongation of the war. With the one exception of the execution of a

9 10 11 12 13 14

Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 84. Ibid., 85. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 84.

the reign of amir sher 'ali khan

15

non-Mohammadzay general, Mohammad Raﬁ' Ludin, they only imprisoned or expelled their fallen opponents. Among a people whose high politics were associated with violence this was indeed an achievement. This was perhaps because the Mohammadzay sardars viewed the war as a dynastic struggle, and they considered the punishment they inﬂicted on their fallen opponents to be ﬁtting for disloyalty to a member of their own dynasty, rather than to a ruler representing heaven, the fatherland, the people, or the state.

The Reforms The civil war in Afghanistan coincided with the gigantic stride of Russia in Central Asia, as a result of which it became coterminous with Afghanistan for the ﬁrst time. (See Chapter Eleven). Understandably, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan feared that Afghanistan would be probably Russia’s next target. To forestall this danger, he tried to consolidate his government at home and gain the support of the British Government of India. First, on November 12, 1868, he ordered the expulsion under guard of Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani (1830s–1897) via Kandahar and Quetta to India, in opposition to his own desire to proceed to the Russian-dominated Bukhara. As an instigator of the Muslim world determined to oppose the European domination of the Muslim countries and working for the revival of Islam, Afghani advocated the Pan-Islamic movement as well as the overthrow of the Muslim absolutist rulers. However, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan charged that “. . . this person has an object of his own in view,” and consequently considered his continued residence in Afghanistan “to be full of hazard to the country.” Afghani had entered Herat in 1866, and since October 1867 had lodged at the Bala Hissar in Kabul. There, as a leading member of Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan’s Privy Council he advised him “to follow an anti-British course.” Apparently, he also intended to advise the new amir to follow a similar line. In the words of his biographer, “It is plausible that Jamal al-Din, who had already evinced a strong hostility to the British, was simply trying to marshal all the persuasive power he could to turn the amir to an anti-British policy.” However, this much was known that in addition to being an Anglophobe he was also a Russophile, and in response to his desire

16

chapter one

for the conclusion of an alliance between “the Russian and Afghan Governments” Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had bluntly told him that “I perfectly know my neighbors, and am well acquainted with the circumstances of the Russian Government; your further residence in this country is contrary to my pleasure.”15 Second and more importantly, early in 1869 the amir visited India oﬃcially, and held meetings in Ambala with the governor-general and viceroy, Lord Mayo, who received him well, but did not share his fear of Russia. However, he granted him weapons, and the latter, in addition, brought back with him “. . . many Indian [Muslim] artisans and retired non-commissioned oﬃcers of the Indian Army” as well as “scores of workers to train his forces and trim his subjects.”16 Thus, it is clear that the reforms the amir introduced began during his visit to India, which . . . convinced him that a primitive Afghanistan will scarcely expect to be treated on terms of equality by the two powerful neighbors, Russia and England, nor will she remotely command recognition and respect abroad.17

The amir would openly say that “. . . all people are advancing in the arts of peace and civilization. It is we Afghans who remain the ignorant asses we have always been.”18 The amir’s reforms had many dimensions, and the military attracted most of his attention. According to Eﬀendi the amir “. . . dedicated 15 Keddie, N., Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”, A Political Biography, University of California Press, Berkeley, London, 1972, 37, 58. Roy Mottahedeh has characterized the great instigator of the Muslim world in the following words: “He had a madrasah education both in Iran and Iraq. He also acquired training in ‘erfan from an Iranian teacher and himself wrote a treatise on Islamic mysticism. From then on he shifted from country to country and role to role in an attempt to revive Islam as a political force. At the court of the Ottoman emperor, the Egyptian khedive, in exile in Paris or British India or czarist Russia he proved a tireless and fearless adopter of roles and philosophies, to many of which he proved inconstant: he was at various times a Scottish freemason, a defender of Islam against European materialism, an advocate of parliamentary government within Islam, and an admirer of the messianic politics of the mahdi of the Sudan.” The Mantle of the Prophet, Religion and Politics in Iran, Pantheon Books, New York, 1985, 183. 16 Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 130. Ghobar, Mir Ghulam Mohammad, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh [Afghanistan along the Highway of History, or A General History of Afghanistan], Kabul, 1967, 596. For a description of the workshops in Kabul where weapons were made in the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan see Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, 193–194. 17 Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 130. 18 Ibid., 129.

the reign of amir sher 'ali khan

17

his life and soul” to the military and viewed it as a “private religion”.19 Toward the end of his decade-long reign the amir had organized a large regular army. Thus, he became the ﬁrst Afghan ruler to do so, while his predecessors had relied mainly on irregular army and the notables of the land. Based on the British model, the regular army of 56,173 troops was grouped into 42 regiments of cavalry, 73 of infantry, and 48 batteries.20 The British Supreme Commander, General Frederick Roberts, reporting from Kabul in 1879, stated the following: Before the outbreak of hostilities last year [1878] the amir had raised and equipped with arms of precision, 68 regiments of infantry and 16 of cavalry. The Afghan artillery amounted to nearly 300 guns. Numbers of skilled artisans were constantly employed in the manufacture of riﬂed cannon and breach-loading small guns. More than a million pound of powder and, I believe, several million rounds of homemade snider ammunition, were in the Bala Hissar. Swords, helmets, uniforms and other articles of military equipment were stored in proportionate quantities.”21

The amir had turned Kabul into a military city where “. . . shouts, marches and trumpets were heard everywhere.”22 Amir Sher 'Ali also attempted to popularize the army by inducing royal princes to serve it. He “. . . enlisted Crown Prince 'Abd Allah to don the apron of a shoe-maker, while his favorite grandson Ahmad 'Ali would discharge his duty with a pair of scissors to be a good cutter of the soldiers uniforms.”23 The amir “. . . would admonish the royal clan of the Mohammadzays to take to martial

19

Ibid., 135. Figures on the army of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan are many and at variance with each other. Those noted by J. Lambert are probably accurate, because he had compiled them from the oﬃcial pay rolls in Kabul when the British had occupied it in 1879. These I have cited in the text. Lambert, J. “Statement of the Revenue and Expenditure of Afghanistan, 1877–78,” Pros. Sept. 1886, Nos. 161–166, 1886, Foreign Department, Secret-F, The National Archives of India, New Delhi (Henceforth, NAI). Mahmud Tarzi’s ﬁgures also tally with them when he states that “. . . the army was organized into about 80 battalions of 800 soldiers.” Reminiscences, 7. 21 Roberts F., (from Kabul), to Alfred C. Lyall, Secretary to the Government of India, 22 Nov. 1879, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received (in London) from India, (Henceforth PSLI), vol. 23, p. 1579. India Oﬃce Library, London. Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 139. 22 Tarzi, Reminiscences, 7. 23 Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 137. 20

18

chapter one

life and hard work, while to the aristocracy to cut oﬀ from ease and see his hearth and home well protected”.23a However, the Mohammadzays and the aristocracy showed little interest in the military service. In order to train oﬃcers in the science of war, the amir set up a military academy where mathematics, geography, map- reading and strategy were taught. The manuals of instruction were translated into Pashto in which words of command and military titles, as well as decrees were also issued. These words of command are still in use. Lingual reform became necessary as the Pashto—speaking Ghilzays and Wardaks, and their notables dominated the army, and held high civil and military posts. The amir regarded Persian as “borrowed feathers”, and therefore felt that it was necessary to replace it with Pashto, the language of the overwhelming majority. During this period, the large tract of Pashtun land up to Peshawar was still a part of Afghanistan. According to Eﬀendi, “Soon the grateful monarch found himself in a position to claim Pashto, to be the national language of his countrymen.”24 The reform was well received, since the Pashtuns constituted the great majority of the population, members of the dynasty still spoke Pashto, and the Persian-dominated bureaucracy was only limited. Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir (Yusufzay), known as Qazi Qadiro, whom the amir had brought with him from Peshawar assisted him in his reforms. A competent tradesman, wellversed in Pashto, English, Urdu and Persian and privy to the innermost circle of the Afghan court, Qazi Qadiro “would always point out the path of progress to his powerful master.” Through his devotion and skill he “had so won his master’s mind that he sat safe against attackers.”25 In 1876 The Qazi had even supervised the enumeration of the residents of the city of Kabul, which then had a population of 140,700 men and women. To author Abdul Qadir Eﬀendi, Qazi Qadiro was “a genius.” Contrary to the assertion of some scholars it was not Jamal al-Din Afghani, but Qazi Qadiro, who had advised the amir to introduce the reforms. Military service was for life on a voluntary basis26 and soldiers were paid in cash instead of by drafts (barat ) which had been the

23a 24 25 26

Ibid. Ibid., 135. Ibid., 130. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 612.

the reign of amir sher 'ali khan

19

practice previously.27 The military expenditure strained the economy, since out of the yearly income of over thirteen million Kabuli rupees over ﬁve-and-a-half million (or nearly forty-three percent) were spent on the army28 The military expenses made it necessary for the amir to revamp the system of taxation. Information on the overall system of taxation is not available. However, reports on certain districts indicate that the revenue on land was assessed either on the basis of se-kot [one-third] or jam’ bast [assessment on a tribal community]. Under the former system, the government took one-third of the produce, and this was usually farmed out, while under the latter a ﬁxed lighter amount was assessed. The rate of revenue on the state land (khalisa) was, of course, higher.29 For revenue purposes, districts were classiﬁed on ethnic lines. Various other types of taxes were also imposed, as was the custom duty of two-and-a half percent on the original price of merchandises. Further, occasionally additional taxes were also levied. In 1878, when the amir believed that Afghanistan was threatened by foreign powers, he levied four Kabuli rupees on each male to strengthen the army. This led to general discontent,30 and eroded the good will that the amir had caused to generate when he had abolished payment of land revenue by landowners and various other types of taxes collected three months in advance of the actual produce taken from the land.31 Meanwhile, the amir took some austerity measures, and even decreased the allowances of the royal household including those of his wives so that “every penny saved would go to strengthen the country’s defense, which was that patriotic sovereign’s one and only desire.”32 Through this and other measures the budget, which was in deﬁcit in the ﬁrst years of the amir’s rule33 remained in surplus towards the closing years of his reign.34 State revenue was then

27 Sykes, Sir Percy, A History of Afghanistan, London, 2, 78. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masiri-e-Tarikh, 594. 28 Lambert, “Statement of the Revenue,” 7. 29 Hastings, Major, “A Short Account of the Ghazni District,” 4, PSLI, 26, Pt. 3, 358. 30 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, [The Lamp of Histories], Kabul, vol. 3, 339. 31 Nuri, Gulshan-e-Amarat, 186. 32 Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 134. 33 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 336. 34 Lambert, “Statement of Revenue,” 7. The total surplus for the year 1877–78 was 1,482,062 Kabuli rupees.

20

chapter one

increased by over ﬁve million Kabuli rupees from the annual total at the end of the reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan. In the latter’s reign state revenue was eight million Kabuli rupees.35 Amir Sher 'Ali Khan also envisaged opening a naval base to deliver the country from isolation and lay the ground for prosperity: He made neither a mistake nor a secret of his cherished ambition to have Gawadir, the forlorn harbor of southern Baluchistan, on the entrance to the Persian Gulf, for a naval base, where-from his strong, small but smart navy should proudly emerge, to show his royal standard of the head of the Bengal tiger, on a crimson background, to all countries and all climes.36

At the time Baluchistan was a part of Afghanistan. The amir also introduced administrative reforms by setting up a twelve-member state council composed of civic leaders and military oﬃcers, whom he himself selected.37 After Ahmad Shah Durranay, Amir Sher 'Ali was the ﬁrst Afghan ruler to do so, but his council was only consultative. Additionally, although the council was devised to be permanent38 toward the latter years of his reign it was not heard of. Instead, the amir acted in consultation with a few trusted advisers from the royal court and the executive branch of government the latter of which he had enlarged in 1873 on the occasion of the festivities that were held that year in honor of the oﬃcial nomination of his younger son, Sardar 'Abd Allah Jan, as heir apparent. Also on the occasion of the oﬃcial nomination, Amir Sher 'Ali promoted oﬃcials to ministerial positions with prestigious titles, in Pashto: Nur Mohammad Shah Foshanji as loy mukhtar (prime minister), 'Asmat Allah Khan Ghilzay as loy mayan de ghro mulk (minister of home aﬀairs), Aersala Khan Ghilzay as loy mayan de baunday (minister of foreign aﬀairs), Habib Allah Khan Wardak as loy mulk (minister of ﬁnance), Hussayn 'Ali Khan as tol mishr (minister of war), Ahmad 'Ali Khan Timuri as loy tolawunay (minister of treasury), and Mohammad Hassan Khan (Qizilbash) as loy kishil (chief secretary to the amir). The amir adopted the title of Assistant to the Religion (Mo'in al-Din) for himself.39 No one from the royal dynasty was made 35 36 37 38 39

Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-eTtarikh, 575. Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 135. Nuri, Gulshan-e-Amarat, 186. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 595. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ' [Events Observed] in Kulliyat-e-Riyazi (in Persian) [The

the reign of amir sher 'ali khan

21

a member of the ministerial cabinet, and the amir gave full weight to the principle of personal qualiﬁcation. The standing army enabled him to do so as it freed him from traditional dependence on the Mohammadzay sardars as well as the magnates. The system worked, and during the critical days before and after the amir’s death some of these oﬃcials, especially Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Khan Foshanji and Mustauﬁ Habib Allah Wardak, distinguished themselves.40 Out of “expediency” the amir did not abolish polygamy, but he would exercise his full powers, to secure her [widow] the freedom of [re] marriage and the guardianship of her brood [sic] from her deceased husband. . . . Polygamy had made life intolerable to the parties concerned, and would cultivate antagonism from generation to generation.”41

Also, out of “expediency” the amir did nothing to abolish slavery even though both men and women “would be bought and sold like so many chattels, to perform [domestic duties] and labor under shocking conditions.” In particular, “The slave-girls would satiate the lust of their masters, to be mercilessly punished by their jealous mistresses.”42 However, slavery was practiced on a small scale in Afghanistan. Other measures included the establishment of postal services, the building of the Sherpur (also Sher Abad) cantonment, and the setting up of a lithographic printing press in which Shams al-Nahar, the ﬁrst oﬃcial periodical in Afghanistan, was published. Coins were issued bearing the verses: “By the favor of the Eternal Creator, the money of Sher 'Ali has found circulation”, and “Through the abundant kindness of the Beneﬁcent King of Heaven, Amir Sher 'Ali coined money like the bright, full moon.”43 Previously, coins bore the names of rulers with anonymous titles such as sahib-e-zaman (lord of the age) or Sahib-e-mulk (lord of the land). Also, important was the use of the word “Afghan” on his coins.44 Additionally, for the ﬁrst

Collected Works of Riyazi], Mashhad, 1904, 173. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masire-Tarikh, 595. Rishtia, Afghanistan Dar Qarn-e-Nuzdah [Afghanistan in the Nineteenth Century] 273. 40 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 173. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masiri-e-Tarikh, 595. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 332. 41 Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 133. 42 Ibid. 43 Gulzad, Zalmay A., External Inﬂuences and the Development of the Afghan State in the Nineteenth Century, Peter Lang, New York, San Fransisco, 1994, 70. 44 Ibid.

22

chapter one

time the government opened a school along with a military academy. The schools were, of course, in addition to the madrasas (traditional seminaries) which had existed in Afghanistan since the time of Emperor Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna, in the eleventh century. Even after it had been reformed the government was still unable to rule directly over the entire country. It controlled only cities, towns and their dependencies as well as those areas where contingents of troops were stationed. Tribal communities, especially those of the frontier regions, remained self-administered as before, and their aﬀairs were settled by elders mainly through jirgas in accord with the Shari'a and Pashtunwali (Pashtun code of behavior). In cases in which disputes between individuals and tribes were unsettled the conﬂicting parties often resorted to violence. Thus, in these rural autonomous communities anarchy and order co-existed, and the government intervened only when general order was disrupted. In the new state that emerged from these reforms the most important force was the amir himself. History, social conventions and Islam sanctioned allegiance to him, but the ties between him and his subjects were still personal in character rather than institutional. Thus, allegiance to his successor was not automatically transferred; rather, the successor had to command it, and the moment the reigning amir disappeared for whatever reason, powerful forces were ready to assert themselves. Among these forces, personal ambition was the most important, while the forces of regionalism and tribalism were still strong against which centralism and modernism had begun to operate on a large scale for the ﬁrst time. As previously noted, the most important instrument of power in the hands of the government was the army. However, the army itself was organized along tribal and regional lines. Even districts were organized in this way. Likewise names which referred to region and ethnicity such as Kandaharay, Heratay, Tajik, Wardak and so forth, were widespread and emotionally charged. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan was the ﬁrst Afghan ruler to organize (or reorganize) the state or more speciﬁcally the government along relatively modern lines. He started an extremely important movement, which his successors strengthened. It is then ﬁtting to describe him an enlightened and a visionary ruler, and also relate him to the “beginnings of a new Afghanistan”, as some historians have done.45

45 Gregorian, Vartan, The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968, 93.

the reign of amir sher 'ali khan

23

The Sons against the Father Despite his successful reforms’ Amir Sher 'Ali experienced serious problems with his two eldest sons: Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan (b. 1849) and Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan (b. 1858). As previously noted, in 1873, the amir nominated his minor son, Sardar 'Abd Allah Jan (b. 1866) as heir-apparent in a grand ceremony. By doing so, he provoked his eldest sons, and demonstrated that he was unable to run his family aﬀairs smoothly. Amir Sher 'Ali’s troubles have been traced to his unequal treatment of his wives, and the recalcitrance of Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan. The amir favored the mother of the heir apparent to the mother of Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, and he had provided the former with ﬁve hundred Kabuli rupees a month as allowance, while the same amount was provided for the latter for the whole year “because of the rebellions of her sons.”46 However, Eﬀendi states that his grandfather was a “misogynist” and that the reason he bypassed his eldest son was due to his “vindictiveness.” However, while the amir may have been a “misogynist” as Eﬀendi claims he was still open to the inﬂuence of the mother of heir-apparent. This may have been due to the fact that she was a woman of the dynasty, whereas Qamar Jan, the mother of Sardar Mohsammad Ya"qub and Sardar Mohammad Ayyub, was the daughter of Sa"adat Khan, the Khan of the frontier tribe of Mohmand. Further, Eﬀendi also states that in Herat Ya"qub Khan had accorded a “rude reception [to] his fugitive father”, and that later in Kabul he had associated himself with a party, known as “Yakubzais”, which had, for its purpose, the unseating of his father. He describes the situation thus: A party hostile to the amir for their [sic] ends, was secretly forming under the intriguer Bahadur Khan Kabuli, with the grandiose title of Yakubzais. Bahadur had earmarked premiership with dictatorial powers for himself while his lieutenant Shahpisand Khan Barakzai was appeased to be the commander-in-chief of the Afghan army. Yakub was to be a mere puppet while Shere Ali had either to end [his] days as a blind prisoner in jail or be banished from hearth and home.”47

46 47

Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicants, 134. Ibid., 107.

chapter one

24

The intrigue surfaced when Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan “set out for rebellion at the head of six thousand irregular horse”, warning his father with a bluﬀ that “he would raise piles of skulls of the dead if he was pursued” while he was on his way to Herat of which province he took control after some vicissitudes.48 Surprisingly, after his brother, Mohammad Ayyub joined him in Herat, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan reappeared in Kabul and sought a pardon, which his father granted him and sent him back to his post in Herat. The amir, thus, pardoned him, but had lost hope in him to succeed him. In 1873, the amir bypassed him as well as his full-brother, and nominated his seven-year-old son, Sardar 'Abd Allah Jan, as his heir—apparent (wali"ahd ). According to Eﬀendi, “Yakub again kicked his traces”, but the amir “immediately summoned [him] to account for his misdeeds, which had become too much to tolerate.”49 On the condition that he would not be “molested” which the amir apparently granted, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan appeared before his father yet again, but this time he was detained “in solitary conﬁnement in the royal palace.”50 The amir did so because he also suspected him of making “Herat an independent principality under the protection of Persia.”51 Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan ﬂed to Mashhad in Persia. Thus, the amir got rid of his troublesome sons, but he also deprived himself as well as the country of the services of the most able and dynamic members of his house.

48 49 50 51

Ibid., 108. Ibid., 112. Ibid. Ibid., 160.

CHAPTER TWO

THE BRITISH AFGHAN WAR AND THE ACCESSION OF AMIR 'ABD AL-RAHMAN KHAN

Prelude to War After Lord Edward Robert L. B. Lytton assumed power as governor-general and viceroy in India, in 1876, Indo-Afghan relations worsened. Lord Lytton came to India with explicit instructions to deal with Afghanistan in line with the aims of the ‘Forward Policy’ that will soon be described. In India “Lytton won the grudging support of his Council and set in motion a diplomatic policy toward the Amir Sher 'Ali [which] he knew could only culminate in the Indian army’s advance into Afghan territory.”1 This subject has been described in Chapter Ten. In order to obviate the assumed Russian advance on India via Afghanistan, Lord Lytton formulated a policy the purpose of which was to establish actual control over Afghanistan. This required a military advance on Afghanistan similar to the one that his remote predecessor, Lord Auckland, had undertaken forty years earlier. As a result of that invasion the British had lost almost an entire army, but Lord Lytton was not deterred by that defeat. Instead, he made a strenuous eﬀort to implement the new Forward Policy the advocates of which . . . believed not only that England had no choice but to meet this Russian challenge, but that there was an implicit obligation in the Administration of the Indian subcontinent to extend that form of government to the numerous fragmented tribal groups who would be the ultimate beneﬁciaries of European values and civilization.2

In reality, the notion of the importation of “European values and civilization” was a screen for expansion and domination. Afghanistan had a history that extended back thousands of years, and the country

1 Trousdale, W., Introduction, in War in Afghanistan, 49. This topic is discussed in Chapter Ten. 2 Ibid., 48.

chapter two

26

already possessed a rich culture, including the attributes of Islamic civilization. Further, under Amir Sher 'Ali Khan a central government had been instituted on modern lines. (See Chapter One). As William Trousdale states: For most of the Forward Policy believers, the Scientiﬁc Frontier was a temporary screen for their real aim. If the [British] government would support annexation of the southern half of Afghanistan [Kandahar and Herat] it would in time tolerate annexation of the whole.3

To reach this goal, Lytton took certain steps, among them, the occupation of the city of Quetta, as part of a treaty, which India concluded with the Khan of Qalat in Baluchistan, a feudatory of Afghanistan, in 1876. The viceroy was willing to conclude an oﬀensive and defensive treaty with Amir Sher Ali Khan, provided he placed his external relations under him, and accepted British oﬃcers stationed around the frontiers of his country. In return, Lytton was willing to oﬃcially recognize the young heir-designate, 'Abd Allah Jan, and thus ensure the amir’s dynastic rule. Since Lytton’s proposal was meant to turn the independent country of Afghanistan into the protectorate of the British, whom the Afghans considered “inﬁdels”, the amir did not accept the proposal, and a stalemate prevailed over Indo-Afghan relations. At this juncture General Constantine P. von Kauﬀmann, Russia’s governor-general in Tashkand, forced a mission of his own, under the command of General Stolietoﬀ on the amir. After its arrival in Kabul in the summer of 1878, the mission was said to have concluded a defensive and oﬀensive treaty with him. However, the real purpose of the mission was for Russia to embroil the British in Afghanistan, so hoping that the latter would recall the Indian troops that they had sent to Malta in support of the Ottomans, with whom Russia was then at war.

The Second Anglo-Afghan War The Kaufmann scheme succeeded, and this provided an excuse for Lytton to force his own mission under Neville Chamberlain. However, when the Afghans blocked the mission’s entry at the Khyber Pass, 3

Ibid., 49.

the british afghan war

27

he declared war on Afghanistan, on November 21, 1878. The Second British War with Afghanistan began as simple as that. Three columns of the British army overran some frontier cities and districts on their way to Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad in the ﬁrst phase of the Second British Afghan War or the Second Afghan War, as the British sources describe it.4 Amir Sher 'Ali Khan did not opt to ﬁght the invaders with his own army, telling his people “I am leaving in order to unite with the Russians and acquire ﬁnancial and military assistance so that I may return to avenge myself.” He also said that “The British have not accepted our right to freedom and independence, and want us in captivity.”5 After touring the city, and while he had already sent “the families, luggage and the multitudes of soldiers” he left for Mazar in the north of the country to seek the help of Russia. Surprisingly, Kauﬀmann refused to extend Russia’s assistance, instead advising the amir to come to terms with the British, and even refused him entry into his domain. Russia had duped Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. He remained in Mazar where because of “. . . his chronic ailments of gout and tuberculosis, which for years had obliged him to move around in his special litter, suddenly recurred with such severity that” he died on February 21, 1879.6 Before his departure for Mazar Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had, as requested by the courtiers, released Sardar Mohammad Ya"qub Khan from prison and introduced him to a specially convened darbar (court) “in regal uniform as regent.” The young heir-designate, 'Abd Allah Jan, had already died. Following Amir Sher 'Ali Khan’s death, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan became amir, in Kabul. However, he was no longer the enterprising man that he had been. His imprisonment (1874–1878) had taken its toll and he had become “all pale with poor eyesight and no strength to walk straight.”7 Additionally, he had dynastic rivals, each of whom had a faction of his own. Weakened

4

Among the many books dealing with the Second Anglo-Afghan War those that describe it in detail are Kakar, M. H., Jang-e-Dowom Afghan-Englis, (Persian) [The Second Anglo-Afghan War], The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1989. Forbes, A., The Afghan Wars, London, 1892. Hanna, H. B. The Second Afghan War, 1878–79, 3 Vols. London, 1899–1910. Hensman, H., The Afghan War of 1879–80, London, 1881. 5 Tarzi, Reminiscences, 6. 6 Ibid. 7 Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 41.

chapter two

28

by imprisonment, and also fearing that his rivals would outbid him in dealing with the British, he accepted the advice of his “pro-British” companions who “would say to him that it is all over; you must surrender to the British so that at least, as the amir, you may continue in luxury and success.”8 He then accepted Lytton’s demands by concluding a treaty with Major Pierre Louis N. Cavagnari, an envoy of the British government of India, on May 26, 1879. The treaty was concluded in a British military camp in the Safed Sang village in Gandumak, in eastern Afghanistan, where the last troops of the British army retreating from Kabul had perished, in 1842. Its main points were the control of Afghanistan’s external relations by the British, and the stationing of British oﬃcers in Afghanistan. The British were also to control the Khyber Pass and Michni Pass, and, for only administrative purposes, British India, was assigned the populous districts of Kurma (Kurram), Pishin and Sibi. All of these concessions were made in return for British support against foreign aggression on Afghanistan, plus a small subsidy and a promise of non-interference in the internal aﬀairs of the country. Since the treaty had made the ‘inﬁdels’ preponderant in Afghanistan and transformed the country’s ruler into their vassal, it was bound to turn most Afghans against it even though there were some who “[i]n their sectarianism, preferred non-Muslims to Sunnis.” They were mostly the Shi'i Qizilbzshes, who lived in Chindawal, a distinct quarter in the city, protected by strong walls and a moat.9 This explains why the amir did not make the treaty public, and why he disclosed its contents to only a few of his courtiers. The author D. P. Singhal, in his book, India and Afghanistan, 1876–1907, states that the aim of the treaty was to reduce Afghanistan into principalities.10 This does not seem to be the case, since the treaty had no provision by which to split Afghanistan. Actually, Lytton intended to rule Afghanistan through the amir as he hoped that his power “. . . would gradually be transferred to the British envoy.”11 In this way, the country was

8

Tarzi, Reminiscences, 7. Ibid., 11. 10 Singhal, D. P. India and Afghanistan, 1876–1907, A Study in Diplomatic Relationns, The University of Queensland Press, Australia, 1971, 46. Based mainly on oﬃcial records of the British Government of India, this is a specialized and highly commendable book. It covers the external relations of Afghanistan during the reigns of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. 11 Ibid., 49. 9

the british afghan war

29

to eventually become a part of the British Empire as Baluchistan had become in 1876, and as Chitral became later in 1895. If the Afghans revoked the treaty the British would then feel justiﬁed in taking military actions against them. William Trousdale even goes as far as to state that “The British were determined that the Afghans should abrogate this agreement in order to gain the fullest support for their military aims.” He also states that “There is every reason to believe that everything happened as planned, though the ultimate goal was postponed by the signing of the treaty of Gandumak.”12

The Destruction of the British Embassy in Kabul The amir claimed that by concluding the Gandumak treaty he had saved Afghanistan from destruction. In fact, the British had already started withdrawing their army, but the withdrawal had not been completed by the time the British embassy in Kabul was destroyed. This occurred after Cavagnari along with a few oﬃcials and a large number of retinue had taken up residence inside a thick high walled compound, the Bala Hissar, near the amir’s palace, on July 24, 1879. There, contrary to the terms of the treaty and in line with its real purpose, he began to act like a ruler. This made the residence a target of popular attack, and, on September 3, 1979, three regiments followed by thousands of people set it on ﬁre and massacred its occupants; a total of four British and seventy ﬁve Indian retainers.13 The British were quick to inﬂict revenge.

The British Occupation of Kabul Following the massacre the British armies occupied the cities of Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad, entering the second phase of the

12

Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanistan, 49. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 183. Ghobar maintains that to account for the uprising the British authors have fabricated the payment issue to Afghan soldiers. He, further, states that the Afghan people and the soldiers who were opposed to foreign domination and the Anglophile government of Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan had actually resolved in a meeting to destroy the enemy’s military residence. Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 620. 13

30

chapter two

war. They occupied the city of Kabul in early October after Afghan warriors unsuccessfully resisted them in Char Asia. Fearing humiliation in front of his rivals for his failure to save his British allies, the amir was said to have oﬀered his resignation to General Frederick Roberts, Supreme Commander of the occupying forces in Kabul.14 Later in India, Ya"qub Khan claimed that he had been unjustly forced to resign, and that Britain had no right to force him to do so.15 While it is true that the British did not have the right to force the amir to resign, they had the might to do so. At ﬁrst they kept the amir in custody pending a decision on his fate, but it was soon clear that he had become a prisoner. As Sir Charles M. MacGregor, Chief of Staﬀ of the British forces in Kabul, notes in his War in Afghanistan, 1879–80 “Had meant to examine the amir tomorrow, but Bobs [Roberts] said we had better not awhile, as he might look as if he was a prisoner, which he is,”16 Further, the amir himself “. . . complained of having been made a prisoner and being badly treated.”17 The British also detained some senior oﬃcials except for General Dawud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, who tried to save the lives of the British. On October 12th, Roberts held a public darbar in Kabul. There, in the presence of some pro-British Mohammadzay sardars, he proclaimed that, as the chief civil and military administrator, he had appointed Major General Sir James Hill-Jones as the military governor of Kabul, and a few sardars as governors of provinces. Among them were Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan and Sardar Mohammad Hassan Khan, who were proclaimed as the governors of Turkestan and Maidan respectively. Both were brothers of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. The takeover of the government and the brutal punishment of those who had been implicated or assumed to be involved in the destruction of the embassy created the impression that the British intended to stay in Afghanistan, and rule the country. While there

14 According to Riyazi, Roberts imprisoned Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, and compelled him to resign. 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 188. 15 Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 76. 16 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 108. 17 Roberts, F., Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879, 9 (909), Dispatches from the Government of India Containing a Statement of the Cases Tried before the Military Commission, London, 1880.

the british afghan war

31

is no oﬃcial policy pronouncement to conﬁrm this, the British oﬃcials in Kabul behaved as if it was actually the case. MacGregor for one is explicit about it in the following passage, . . . under the present juncture of aﬀairs, the thing to do is to say to the Afghans. You shall give in, you have killed Cavi[gnari], and his 100 men, but we are sending another representative with 10,000 men, and he shall stay there whether you like it or not. We wish one thing from you, and that is friendship, but whether we get this or not, we will have your obedience, you may chafe as much as you please, but we will be your masters, and you will ﬁnd that the only escape from our heavy hand will be your entire submission.18

Next, Roberts arranged for the execution of those had been implicated or assumed implicated in the destruction of the embassy. In his own words: “Every soldier and civilian who took part in the massacre of the British Embassy on the 3rd of September last will be executed.”19 It was, of course, impossible for him to execute all of those who had participated in the massacre, but about those who were apprehended “. . . he gave an order that the prisoners were to be tried and hung.”20 The word “hung” indicates that Roberts had already decided to hang all those who were caught whether tried or not. This and other similar actions led MacGregor to conclude that “. . . Bob is the most bloodthirsty beast I know.”21 Roberts’ order made the political commission that had been set up to determine who had taken part in the massacre almost meaningless. However, some oﬃcials, including MacGregor, saved the lives of a few Afghans who would otherwise have been. As an alien non-Muslim military despot, Roberts had a logic of his own which was to employ force in order to intimidate the Afghans into submission and also to inﬂict revenge. Even as early as September 14th, which was about a month before his arrival in Kabul, he had decided to do so. At that time, writing from Ali Khel to General Baker, he stated the following: Until we have proof that any soldiers actively befriended the Embassy, we must consider all as belonging to the one lot, and, get rid of them, 18

MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 77. Roberts, Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879, 9 (909), Dispatches from the Government of India containing a Statement of the Cases Tried before the Military Commission, London, 1880. 20 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 111. 21 Ibid. 19

32

chapter two whether their regiments were in Kabul or not—for soldiers caught with arms in the ﬁeld trial is unnecessary. A bullet will do if you are pressed for time otherwise hanging, which does not waste ammunition.22

This was why, according to Trousdale the “. . . vengeful hangings at Kabul were far more indiscriminate than Roberts cared to admit.” Also, MacGregor “. . . knew that innocent and guilty alike were hanged in that autumn of retribution, that the military tribunal was a sham.”23 He also states that he “[f]ound that men were being simply murdered under name of justice,”24 and that Roberts “. . . has shot some 6 men already in cold blood.” Further, MacGregor states that “I have saved three from his clutches already.”25 According to an oﬃcial report, eightynine suspected persons, including Mohammad Aslam Khan, chief of the security forces (Kabul Kotwal), and those who had shot some Qizilbashes for their cooperation with the British were hanged.26 But Hayat Khan, an Indian Muslim member of the commission, has been quoted as saying that “. . . 170 men were hung and that 70 of them were for ﬁghting against us.”27 It appears that Roberts resorted to brutal punishment because, according to MacGregor, as a “favorite of fortune” he “. . . was like an active ﬂea, and jumped whichever way the Viceroy ordered.”28 Lytton had instructed him that [f ]or such a crime the whole Afghan nation should be held responsible, and that the punishment for such an act should be inﬂicted not only on the Afghan nation, but also on every individual who had taken part in the event.29

While it appears that Roberts was simply carrying out the instructions of his superior, in reality he himself held a similar view even before he received Lytton’s instructions: Lytton’s instructions were dated September 29th, while Roberts had already—made up his mind about the punishment by September 14th, as previously noted. 22

Roberts quoted in MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, n. 167. Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanistan, 60. 24 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 112. 25 Ibid., 101. 26 Roberts, Siah Sang, Kabul, 9 Oct. 1879. 5 (905), Dispatches from the Government of India Containing a statement of the Cases Tried before the Military Commission, London, 1880. 27 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 192. 28 Ibid., 171. 29 Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 79. 23

the british afghan war

33

The instructions strengthened him still further in his resolve, since he then committed excesses in aﬀecting the killing of so many Afghans that news of this outraged the liberal press in India, as well as England. Fredrick Harrison argued that the punishments were illegal and unlawful for the simple reason that people can not be considered guilty for defending their country.30 The public in Britain was also outraged and this in part contributed to the defeat of the government in the general election that was held later, in April 1880. The executions were followed by the deportation to India of the amir, and his principal advisers, among them Sardar Yahya Khan (the amir’s father-in-law), Shah Mohammad Khan, Minister of External Aﬀairs; and Sardar Zakria Khan. Only Mustauﬁ Habib Allah Wardak (b. 1828), the minister of ﬁnancial aﬀairs was not deported, but was left in Kabul because the authority needed his skills in administrative and ﬁnancial aﬀairs. In addition, in Kabul, the family of the deported amir was placed under house arrest. Also, MacGregor “[g]ot orders out for the occupation of the Sherpur Cantonment and the destruction of the Bala Hisar.”31 The Bala Hissar citadel, which was the seat of Afghan rulers after 1776, had been the scene of an explosion in which some Gorkha soldiers were killed on October 16th. Afterward, the British destroyed it because Cavagnari and others had been massacred there, and because MacGregor believed that it would be diﬃcult to guard after the army moved to the Sherpur Cantonment. The well-cultivated Cantonment had water ducts running through it, large halls, broad verandas, and substantial gateways, and it could accommodate over twenty thousand men.32 The destruction of the Bala Hissar, which was associated with the glory of the kingdom, contributed even more to the anger of the people.

The Afghan Response The takeover of the administration, the brutal punishments, the deportation and the house arrest of the amir’s family aroused the Sunni population of the regions around Kabul to action. They believed 30 31 32

Ibid., 81. MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 110. Ibid., 103.

34

chapter two

that because the invaders were ‘inﬁdel’ and tyrant, they must leave their homeland. The feelings of ordinary Afghans are summed up well by Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam to a large gathering of people in Ghazni: Oh people! Our land has been seized by the inﬁdels. It is our duty to God and his Prophet to ﬁght against the enemy of our faith and country. If we kill them, we will be heroes, and if we die, we will be martyrs. Either way, paradise will be our reward.33

Observing the response of the Afghans to the revengeful measures, especially the hangings, MacGregor notes, “All these rows prove to me that we are thoroughly hated, and not nearly enough feared.”34 He also states that . . . there is no doubt a very strong feeling of hostility against us, which all this indiscriminate hanging and burning villages intensiﬁes, in fact we have not got a single friend in the country.35

After several major battles in and around the city, known locally as the Battle of Three Days and Nights, or the Battle of Mount Asamai and Sherdarwaza, ﬁnally approximately ﬁfty thousand Pashtuns and Tajiks overwhelmed the occupying forces and restored the city. On December 13th, they besieged them as well as the pro-British sardars in the Sherpur cantonment. Columns of these warriors, called ghazis, fought under commanders such as General Mohammad Jan Wardak, General Ghulam Haydar Charkhay of Logar, Mohammad 'Osman Khan of Tagab, and Mir Bacha of Kohistan. The man who personiﬁed the resistance spiritually was Mulla Din Mohammad, known as Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam Akhundzada, from the Andar tribe of the Shilgar area near Ghazni. He was the most inﬂuential religious leader ( pir) south of the Hindu Kush. However, the insurgents failed to force the besiegers to surrender. Afghan historians, Sayyed Qasim Rishtia and Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, maintain that the British bribed Zar Pacha Surkhabay and Mohammad Shah Surkhabay, Afghan elders from Logar, whose retreat at a critical moment, reputedly due to their acceptance of bribes led to the

33 34 35

Tarzi, Reminiscences, 12. MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 133. Ibid., 142.

the british afghan war

35

general retreat.36 This is a scapegoat view of history. A more likely explanation for this is that after they restored Kabul the Afghans preferred to loot the quarters of the pro-British Qizilbashes, the Hindus37 and the houses of the rich pro-British Mohammadzay sardars to defeating the invaders.38 For ten days the insurgents left the besieged army almost unmolested, even though it was vulnerable at the time. Only General Mohammad Jan Wardak proposed to the besieged General Frederick Roberts that the British evacuate Afghanistan, and surrender their weapons,39 presumably in return for a safe passage. The proposal was similar to the one that Sardar Mohammad Akbar Khan had made to the besieged British army in Kabul forty years earlier. However, while Mohammad Akbar Khan had succeeded in his plan, Mohammad Jan Wardak did not. His proposal as well as the delay gave Roberts and his oﬃcers time to fortify their position. On December 23, 1879, the Afghan warriors, who were either unarmed or lightly armed,40 assaulted the besieged army but failed to overcome it. The British soldiers, whose oﬃcers were informed of the planned attack in advance, drove them away by their counter-shelling ﬁred from superior artillery and riﬂes.41 Ultimately, the cold, the shortage of provisions, and the lack of a uniﬁed command contributed to the retreat. More importantly, as MacGregor has noted the Afghan “. . . power is a good deal broken and we have got most of their arms and ammunition and nearly all their guns.”42 It was, 36 Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 630. Rishtia, S. Q. Afghanistan Dar Qarn-e-Nuzdah, 253. 37 Forbes, The Afghan Wars, 255. 38 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 190. 39 Hensman, The Afghan War of 1879–80, 245. 40 Ibid., 248. 41 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 190. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, [The Lamp of Histories] vol. 1, Kabul, 1915, 358. 42 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 111. For details and diﬀerent versions of the campaigns see Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 623–633. Riyazi, 'Ayn alWaqayi ' 186–193; Hensman, The Afghan War of 1879 –80, 218–259; Hanna, The Second Afghan War, 111, 168–25; Forbes, The Afghan Wars, 202–265; and Kakar, Jange-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 90–105. Fayz Mohammad alleges (Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1, 358) that during the anti-British campaigns, General Mohammad Jan Wardak accepted a bribe from the British. This is not true. In the ﬁrst place, I have found no such a reference either in the unpublished or published British oﬃcial records. In the second place, such an accusation can not be true because Wardak was the most dynamic leader of the campaigns and for this the people revered him as a saint and a hero. He is the ﬁrst

36

chapter two

however, only a retreat, not a defeat. Thereafter, the insurgents continued their resistance, though intermittently, until the invading army left Afghanistan (short of Kandahar) in August 1880. The insurgents, who have been described in the British oﬃcial papers as constituting “the bulk of the Afghan people,”43 chose Ghazni as their temporary center after they drove away from there the Hazaras who had occupied it at the instigation of General Roberts, when he and his army were besieged in Sherpur. Represented by the Ghazni Party or the National Party, as it was referred to in the British oﬃcial reports, they chose Sardar Musa Jan, a young son of the exiled amir, as the new amir. The National Party did not have a single leader, but several leaders of equal status, and wanted to restore the former amir and observe the “old engagements,”44 a reference to the treaties of 1855 and 1857 concluded between Amir Dost Mohammad Khan and the British Government of India. In these treaties, the amir had agreed to be “the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the British.”

The “New Order” for Afghanistan As a result of the December uprising the Kabul administration headed by Major-General J. Hill-Jones collapsed. General Roberts decided to set up a new one and give it an indigenous appearance, with a Mohammadzay sardar, assisted by oﬃce holders to head it. However, the Mohammadzays were in their twilight years, and even less inﬂuential than the mullas had been.45 Away from their power base— that is, Kandahar, they could not count on the active support of others in times of war, when the government and the army had

military oﬃcer in Afghanistan whom the rank and ﬁle of the army elected to the rank of general ( ghatmushr) to lead them in the campaigns against the British invaders. For these reasons as well as for his support of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan feared him and arranged to have him killed in 1881. Since Siraj al-Tawarikh is an oﬃcial chronicle the accusation that Wardak accepted a bribe is probably a fabrication created by the chronicle’s author in order to defame him. 43 Papers relating to Afghanistan, Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, 1878–1880, (Henceforth PANEA), Oﬃcial publication, India Oﬃce Library, London, 103. 44 Afghan elders to Roberts, one dated 25 Dec. 79, PANEA, 103. 45 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 193.

the british afghan war

37

collapsed. During such times, even the people of Kabul were at the mercy of the people from the countryside, or whoever controlled the city. Despite their state of decline, the Mohammdzays were still viewed as the ruling dynasty. Among them, speciﬁcally among the descendants of Sardar Payanda Khan (father of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan), most were hedonists, interested in good food, women, music and the watching of female dancers. Even Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan was “. . . enjoying the dance and song of a dancing girl, called Sobi” sometimes from evening to dawn.46 Among the Mohammadzays, who were politicians, two groups had emerged: the “English Party” known locally as the “Cavagnarizays”, or the party of Cavagnari, and the “Ya"qubzays”, or the party of Ya"qub Khan. The former was led by Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan (an uncle of Mohammad Ya"qub Khan) and the latter by Sardar Yahya Khan, (father-in-law of Mohammad Ya"qub Khan).47 General Roberts tried to reduce the anti-British Mohammadzays into insigniﬁcance by elevating their opponents to oﬃcial positions. He appointed Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan in place of MajorGeneral J. Hill-Jones as governor (wali ) with Mustauﬁ Habib Allah Wardak to assist him in ﬁnancial aﬀairs. However, although he had numerous sons, cousins and relatives, the wali had no control outside the city, and within the city too his power had to be maintained by force. By associating himself with the British he had become so much unpopular with the people that they referred to him as lawti (from lord). Likewise, they disparagingly called Roberts “Rawpite-Kal ” (Roberts the Bald). Despite all of this, Roberts was optimistic, maintaining that with the wali’s help and the assistance of the Qizilbashes “. . . it would be possible in time to bring over and attach to our interest a considerable part of the population.”48 After the massacre, Lord Lytton had changed his mind about Afghanistan. While before the massacre he intended to rule over it through Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, afterward he wanted to split it into sections. In this way he wished to punish the “Afghan nation” which he regarded “responsible” for the massacre, and he

46 47 48

Tarzi, Reminiscences, 8. Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 51–54. PANEA, 103.

38

chapter two

resolved to punish those Afghans who had taken part in it. The British government supported him in his scheme. Lytton then resolved to severe Kandahar from Afghanistan, and oﬀer Herat to Persia on certain conditions, even though it was beyond his control. He was undecided about the provinces north of the Hindu Kush and “. . . philosophical about the eventual loss of Badakhshan and Wakhan to Russia;”49 and did not mind if the Kabul ruler extended his rule over them. The frontier districts of Pishin, Sibi and Kurma (Kurram), as well as the Khyber and Michni passes were to be annexed to India. The scheme or the “new order of aﬀairs in Afghanistan” as Lytton referred to it meant the division of Afghanistan among Russia, Persia and Britain with the latter holding the territories south of the Hindu Kush. Had Lytton’s plan succeeded, it would have obliterated Afghanistan as a country, just as the Russians had eliminated Khoqand as a country. It would have given Lytton the appearance of a Mughal emperor, whose Indian empire at its zenith had reached the Hindu Kush range. Indeed, Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli had referred to him as such after he had imposed the Gandumak treaty on Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan. However, the ‘new order’ collapsed after the Afghans rejected it in defense of their country and religion. They also punished its enforcers, and in a way also Lytton as their patriotic determination ﬁnally brought about the collapse of his Afghan policy as well as his own recall from his position as the viceroy of India. More importantly, the collapse of the ‘new order’ resulted in the reemergence of Afghanistan as a united country under Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Homecoming of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan In January 1880, when the ex-Amir, Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, had been deported to India, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan arrived at a location near Rustaq, on the border of Badakhshan, with the connivance of the Russian authorities. The sardar chose to travel through Badakhshan because he had relatives there, through his former wife, a daughter of Jahandar Shah, the late mir of Badakhshan. The then

49 Alder, G. J., British India’s Northern Frontier, 1865–95, A Study in Imperial Policy, Longmans, London, 1963, 172.

the british afghan war

39

mir of Badakhshan, Shahzadah Mohammad Hasan, opposed the entry of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman. Eventually, however, the mir was driven out of his domain to Gilgit by his rivals, Mir Baba and Mohammad "Omar, who brought Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman to Fayzabad, the capital city of Badakhshan.50 In the middle of March Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan left for Qataghan where by a stroke of luck he was joined by a detachment of the Afghan army, which had been sent there by General Ghulam Haydar Wardak from Mazar to chastise Sultan Murad, the mir of Qataghan. This was a turning point for the sardar. Among the predominantly non-Pashtun inhabitants he became the acknowledged leader of a regular army. His power increased still further when the whole army of Mazar joined Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, who supported the cause of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Ishaq Khan was a full-cousin of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, and like the latter, had been in exile in Samarqand. Afterward, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan doubled his eﬀorts in extending his inﬂuence throughout the country. In Kabul, opposition to the occupation lasted longer than the British had anticipated. The British government, in London, was getting restless, and was unwilling to continue to sanction the war.51 Further, the executions in Kabul had aroused fury, even in England, as previously noted. Under pressure, Lord Lytton decided to evacuate ‘Northern Afghanistan’ by the following autumn, and this made it necessary for him to make new arrangements. As part of his plan, he replaced General Roberts with General Donald M. Stewart as the supreme commander of ‘the Northern Afghanistan Field Force.’ No reason was given for the replacement, but MacGregor maintained that “. . . our misfortune was in having a man like Bobs, when we wanted a strong, honest and able man.”52 This implies that General Stewart whom MacGregor viewed as “. . . a masterful man, a real commander”53 would have succeeded where Roberts had failed. This was highly unlikely because, as the massacre and the resistance

50 Kushkaki, B., Rahnomay-e-Qataghan wa Badakhshan, [A Guide to Qataghan and Badakhshan], Kabul, 1302/1924, 171. 51 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 59. 52 MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 171. 53 Ibid., 184.

40

chapter two

demonstrated, the Afghans opposed the occupation of their homeland whether it was by Cavagnaris, Roberts, Stewarts or any other representative of a foreign power. Lytton placed under Stewart a skillful diplomat, Sir Lepel H. Griﬃn, to undertake negotiations with a prospective claimant to the kingdom of ‘Northern Afghanistan.’ In line with the guidelines that he had issued to Griﬃn, Kandahar was to be separated from ‘Northern Afghanistan’ and a suitable individual, other than the deported amir, was to be approached.54 In truth, Lytton was against the coming to power of any member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, as he believed that no member of the family would go along with his scheme. Further, he held a grudge against the entire family because of the massacre, even though the Investigation Commission had declared Mohammad Ya"qub Khan only “inculpably negligent.” The diﬃculty of Griﬃn can be appreciated in the context of this melodrama, in which the views of the Afghans and of Lytton were poles apart. In Kabul, the search for a ruler aroused various factions to action. The strongest party was probably that of Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan, a cousin and brother-in-law of the deported amir, but the National Party did not trust him, and the British withdrew their support when they began negotiating with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. The wali of Kabul also aspired to the throne, although it was known that without the British military support he could not succeed. With regard to the choice of a ruler the National Party was the most inﬂuential voice, and it would support only a member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Although it opposed the occupation vehemently, it still preferred a closer relationship with British India to one with Russia. Roberts had already sent Mustauﬁ Habib Allah Wardak to Ghazni to impress upon elders of the National Party the necessity of naming someone to rule over “Northern Afghanistan.”55 They named the deported amir, guaranteeing his friendship with the British,56 but Griﬃn declined to accept him.57 During this time, Sardar 'Abd 54

Balfour, B., The History of Lord Lytton’s Administration, 1876–1880, London, 408. PANEA, 178. 56 Afghan elders to Lepel Griﬃn, Political and Secret Letters and Enclosures Received from India, (Henceforth PSLI), India Oﬃce Library, London, Undated, vol. 25, p. 509. 57 Kabul Diary (KD), 1880, PSLI, 25, 325. 55

the british afghan war

41

al-Rahman Khan had been communicating regularly with both sides, giving the British oﬃcials the impression that he stood for a negotiated settlement, while simultaneously giving the Afghans the impression that he had come home to deliver them from the invaders. The Accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan Even before 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had stirred the Afghan people, Lytton had regarded him as a suitable ruler for ‘Northern Afghanistan.’ Lytton knew that he opposed the family of the late amir as much as he himself did. When it became known that the sardar had established himself in Qataghan, Griﬃn sent him three separate messengers. In his ﬁrst written message, Griﬃn only asked the sardar the purpose of his return to Afghanistan.58 His verbal message was more speciﬁc. In it he informed the sardar that the British government was not hostile to him on account of his residence in the Russian empire, and that it was able to help him more than Russia could.59 In reply the sardar informed Griﬃn that he had not entered into an agreement with Russia, that he was bound to it simply by having “eaten its salt, and that under him, Afghanistan would be friendly to Britain as well as Russia.60 Despite the sardar’s reference to Russia as a co-guarantor of a neutral and, by implication, undivided Afghanistan, Lytton was still willing to negotiate with him.61 However, the sardar delayed accepting ‘Northern Afghanistan’ as his domain, and asked the deputation which Griﬃn had sent to him the following searching questions: When the British Government tells me what are to be the boundaries of Afghanistan; will Kandahar as of old, be left in my kingdom or not? Will a European Envoy and a [British] Government remain within the boundaries of Afghanistan, after friendship is made between us two or not? What enemy of the British Government shall I be expected to repel, and what manner of assistance will the Government wish me to give? And what beneﬁts will the Government undertake to confer on me and on my countrymen?62 Griﬃn to Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, PSLI, 25, 225. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 64. 60 Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman to Mohammad Sarwar, . . . 1880, PSLI, 25, 603. 61 Lytton to Cranbrook, . . . , PSLI, 25, 43. Balfour, Lytton’s Indian Administration, 415. 62 Sardar Mohammad Afzal and his companions to Griﬃn, 18 May 80, PSLI, 25, 1272. 58 59

42

chapter two

After it became known that the British had started negotiations with Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the other sardars lost hope. Only the Mustauﬁ tried to thwart the negotiations63 and, as a result, he was soon deported to India. His removal made the situation in Kabul stable, but elsewhere in the country, excitement was building up. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan’s communications with leaders of the National Party and others had made the jihad livelier, and encouraged General Mohammad Jan Wardak and the people of Kohistan to advance on Kabul.64 By this time, the sardar’s delaying tactics had exasperated Griﬃn, who concluded that the sardar was “. . . a Russian nominee.”65 For the second time Griﬃn as well as General Stewart, suggested that the “. . . negotiations with him should be broken oﬀ ”, and that either the ex-amir or his son, or Mohammad Ayyub be brought to power.66 At ﬁrst, the new viceroy, the Marquis of Ripon, did not go along with the suggestion, stating that “. . . the grounds upon which it is proposed at once to break oﬀ correspondence with Abdur Rahman are as yet inadequate.”67 Later, he instructed Griﬃn to ask the representatives of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan to organize the government.68 However, before they were able to do so, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had set out for Charikar, north of Kabul, to accept the kingdom on British terms. Upon his arrival in Charikar, on 20 July 1880, Sardar 'Abd alRahman Khan was publicly hailed as amir,69 by a large assembly of men representing the National Party. In Kabul, on the following Friday, the Khan-e-mulla (the chief judge), Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan Barakzay, read the Friday sermon (khutba) in his name as amir, in a grand mosque. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, thus, became the legitimate ruler of Afghanistan. Lepel Griﬃn recognized him as such on behalf of the British government. The Second Anglo-Afghan war in northern Afghanistan ended, and the British forces left shortly afterward.

63 64 65 66 67 68 69

Griﬃn to Stewart, 21 May 80, PSLI, 25, 1069. Griﬃn to Stewart, 5 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1146. Griﬃn to India, (T), 3 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1077. Griﬃn to India, 11 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1146. Ripon to Hartington, 15 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1136. Ripon to Hartington, 6 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 2, 11. Mahomed, Sultan, The Life of Abdur Rahman, London, 1900, 1, 159.

the british afghan war

43

The accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was the result of general opposition to the invaders, Lord Lytton’s choice of him; and his own realistic approach. The great majority of the people, especially the Pashtuns and Tajiks, whom the government oﬃcials including Lord Ripon referred to as the Ghazni Party, or the National Party, opposed the invaders almost continually; only a few groupsthat is, the ‘Cavagnarizays’, some Qizilbashes and Hazaras—and some elders such as the pacha of Konarr and the Khan of Lalpura, collaborated with them. Throughout the period of occupation, the British controlled only the cities where they had stationed troops, and failed in their eﬀorts to dominate the countryside. Moved by patriotic and religious feelings, most Afghans fought the invaders to live under a Muslim ruler of their own in an independent land. The choice by Lytton of 'Abd al-Rahman Khan as an alternative to the former amir meant that the negotiations with him would be continued, while Lepel Griﬃn and General Stewart suggested otherwise. This was due to the statesmanship of Lord Ripon, the successor of Lord Lytton. The deportation to India of the former amir also inﬂuenced events in 'Abd al-Rahman Khan’s favor. Griﬃn’s last-minute eﬀorts in winning the support of Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam and others of the National Party for the cause of Sardar 'Abd alRahman Khan also helped. 'Abd al-Rahman Khan still might have failed had he persisted in his original claim to the Afghanistan ruled by his grandfather. In Kabul, Griﬃn and his colleagues had come out against him, and in favor of either Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan or the former Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan. MacGregor even suggested that “. . . the thing to do is to assemble the Chiefs and tell them frankly that we are going, and they must settle amongst themselves, who to put up or whether to put up any one at all.”70 In mid-June, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan gave up his demand, and expressed his willingness to accept ‘Northern Afghanistan’ in accord with the Lytton’s scheme of fragmentation. This change of heart can be explained when the movement of his rival cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, in southwest Afghanistan is taken into account. Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was popular with the National Party as well as the Durranays. 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was popular

70

MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 196.

44

chapter two

with neither, and consequently, he was unwilling to ally himself with Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan against the British, instead opting to come to terms with them. On June 9, 1880, about three weeks before 'Abd al-Rahman Khan set out for Kabul, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan left Herat for Kandahar. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan thought that if his rival cousin came to Kandahar, the Durranays and Ghilzays would rally behind him. He also feared that his rival might negotiate with the British before he did. 'Abd al-Rahman was eager to become a ruler, while Mohammad Ayyub Khan was ﬁrst and foremost concerned with ousting the invaders. This explains why the former speedily appeared near Kabul and accepted the British terms. The Ghilzays supported the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, but their opposition to the invaders was stronger than their loyalty to the family. Consequently, in the absence of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, they accepted Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan at the last minute. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman did not have a substantial support among the Mohammadzay sardars in Kabul. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had suppressed those sardars who had supported the family of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman in the civil war. The other sardars were either ‘Cavagnarizays’, or Ya'qubzays, or had ambitions of their own. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan bypassed them all, and appealed directly to the people. It is a tribute to his insight and skill that he gained the support of those who had opposed the British along with the support of those who had been committed to the family of the late amir, while at the same time successfully negotiating with the British. However, by accepting only ‘Northern Afghanistan’ he went along with the British scheme to divide Afghanistan. Further, he surrendered the external independence of the country for which his compatriots had fought.

CHAPTER THREE

THE AFGHAN VICTORY AT MAIWAND AND THE REUNIFICATION OF AFGHANISTAN

The negotiations conducted between the British oﬃcials and Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan in 1880 resulted in the establishment of the latter’s rule in northern and eastern Afghanistan. In western Afghanistan, Kandahar and Herat remained outside his domain. The British, who had stationed a contingent of troops in Kandahar, had formally placed it under Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, while Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan ruled Herat independently. This chapter describes how after the British had evacuated Kandahar as a result of the defeat of their army at Maiwand, Ayyub Khan occupied it and soon afterward lost it in a military encounter with the new amir, 'Abd alRahman Khan. The victory made it possible for the amir to occupy Herat, and to reunify the whole country.

Kandahar a Separate Principality Of all the provinces of Afghanistan, Kandahar was the most important, since it was large, fertile, and the home mainly of the Durranay tribal confederation with its main divisions of Popalzay, Barakzay, Alkozay, Achakzay, Nurzay, Alizay, Ishaqzay, Khugianay and Maku. The Durranays were formerly called Audaul (or Abdaul). Ghilzays, Qizilbashes (or Parsiwans) and other groups also lived there, and it was the Ghilzay elder, Mir Wais Hotak who liberated Kandahar from the Safavi occupation in 1709. After his death, ﬁrst his brother and afterward his son ruled over it until 1738. However, in 1747 the Durranays, under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Durranay, following the death of Nadir Shah Afshar, founded a more permanent rule that lasted for about two and a half centuries, until 1978. Thus, Kandahar was associated with the ruling dynasties of the two most important divisions of the Pashtuns. Kandahar was the site of human settlement from prehistoric times. Alexander the Great founded a city there too, as did Nadir Shah

46

chapter three

Afshar in the eighteenth century. The modern city of Kandahar was founded in 1761 by Ahmad Shah Durranay, and it remained the capital city of imperial Afghanistan until Timur Shah Durranay transferred the capital seat to Kabul, in 1776. Having produced emperors and kings, the Durranays looked upon themselves as a proud people, calling other inhabitants of the city opras (strangers). In 1880, Viceroy Lord Lytton in line with the “divide-and-rule policy” which the British reputedly applied in their colonies intended to separate Kandahar from Afghanistan and subject it to the British rule. He considered Kandahar to be necessary for India strategically and commercially. To secretary of state for India, Lord Cranbrook, he wrote, Although our primary reason for holding and improving this route [Quetta-Kandahar-Herat-Central Asia] is, no doubt, the undisputed command of southern Afghanistan and the means for forestalling Russian inﬂuence at Herat, we cannot lose sight of the fact that this route has been at all times one of the main tracts of Central Asian traﬃcs.1

To maintain a hold over the province of Kandahar, Lytton arranged to link it to India by a railway, the construction of which had already begun, and was scheduled to be completed by the end of 1880.2 Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan, a son of Sardar Mehrdil Khan, was a cousin of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Following his accession, Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan appointed him the governor of the province. He was still the governor when a British army under General Donald Stewart occupied it in 1879. The governor threw in his lot with the British in return for their recognition of him as wali (governor) of the province. Lytton even went so far as to hold that the wali was “. . . well able to hold his own entirely subject to our control.”3 On May 11, 1880 Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan was recognized oﬃcially in a public durbar as the “Wali of Kandahar and its dependencies.” In a letter that was read on the occasion the viceroy addressed had him thus: “I have the pleasure in announcing to you that Her Majesty the Queen-Empress has been pleased to recognize Your Highness as an independent ruler of Kandahar.”4

1 2 3 4

Lytton to Cranbrook, 20 Nov. 80, PANEA, 110. Ibid. Balfour, Lytton’s Indian Administration, 382. PANEA, 109.

the afghan victory at maiwand

47

Colonel St. John, the Political Representative was more eloquent in a statement that he read in Persian, stating the following: Under the just rule of the Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, and under the protection of England, Kandahar will, if it pleases God, remain free from foreign aggression, and will rise to such a height of wealth and prosperity that it will be the envy of the whole of Islam.5

The wali’s rule was declared hereditary, but his foreign relations were to be conducted by a British political representative quartered in Kandahar. The wali was allowed to have the Friday sermon (khutba) read and coins issued in his name, and he was also granted weapons and money. He was, thus, allowed to enjoy the appearance of an independent ruler. However, the wali’s dependence on the British soon turned his countrymen against him. Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and the mullas (religious functionaries) denounced him as a ‘kaﬁr’ or ‘inﬁdel’.6 The latter also declared their support for Mohammad Ayyub Khan, and their opposition to the wali.7 Except for a few Barakzay relatives of the wali the bulk of the Durranays of Kandahar boycotted him, and even his mother and family advised him to oppose the British.8 Only the Ghilzays of Qalat paid him revenue, but most of the inhabitants of Kandahar refused to do so, and, also, deﬁed his authority. The wali, nevertheless, remained loyal to the British, and organized an army. In June 1880 the wali moved with his army to Girishk west of Kandahar to fortify his frontier and, further, incite people in Taimani and Farah against Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who was rumored to be advancing on Kandahar. However, the wali made it clear to the British that he needed their military support if he was to move beyond Girishk. When, in late June, Ayyub Khan’s advance became certain, a British force 2,400 strong under Major General G. R. S. Burrows, was dispatched to Helmand, near Girishk.

5 6 7 8

Wheeler, S., The Ameer Abdur Rahman, New York, 1895, 94. PANEA, 118. Kandahar Diary (Kand D), 1–8 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1025. Stewart to Lyall, 12 May 80, PSLI, 25, 1025.

chapter three

48

Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan at Herat After having spent four years and four months in Mashhad, in Persia, where he “cultivated a great taste for politics, history and poetry” Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan (b. 1858) returned to Herat with the permission of the shah of Persia, and in possession of seventyﬁve-thousand Persian qirans (roughly half of rupees). He had gone to Mashhad after his father, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had imprisoned his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan (See Chapter One). In Herat, Ayyub Khan had already received “. . . military training from one Colonel Mehdi Khan, a Russian convert to Islam, who was ﬁnally banished for espionage.”9 Toward the end of his life when he had traveled from Lahore to Kashmir and Japan Ayyub Khan composed diaries in Persian that were “. . . simple, lucid and full of useful information and observations, though replete with grammatical errors and idiomatic slips.” He was, however, so much conservative that he had become, according to his son, “the creature of the clergy”10 and his “narrow-mindedness” shut him oﬀ from “. . . things which are at once the master keys to human advancement and progress.” However, this Ayyub Khan came to impress the image of a real hero in the minds of Afghans by inﬂicting a most stunning defeat on the British invaders. As his son correctly states, the “secret of his prominence [lay] in his patriotism, for which he sacriﬁced everything and spared nothing.”11 Early in 1879 Ayyub Khan assumed the administration of Herat after his full-brother, Sardar Mohammad Ya'qub Khan, had become amir in Kabul. As the result of having had little contact with his father, when he was young, and because he had overseen his own entourage from an early age, the sardar had developed an independent personality. He was so sensitive about his independence that even the command of his brother, the amir, irritated him much, despite the fact that all along he had been his “true brother and henchman.”12 In response to his brother’s “bossing” him “which was too much for the pride and the prestige of Ayyub”13 he deliberately stirred a rebellion in the army in which the Herati regiments battered 9 10 11 12 13

Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 166. Ibid., 173, 235. Ibid., 151. Ibid., 178. Ibid.

the afghan victory at maiwand

49

the Kabuli regiments. Soon afterward he skillfully suppressed the rebellion, but then requested that the amir relieve him of the post, because as he explained, “In consequence of the injury [rebellion], my reputation has suﬀered. I can no longer live in Afghanistan, in company of my peers.”14 Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan had purposefully orchestrated the rebellion to demonstrate that he was indispensable to the ruling of Afghanistan. However, the British reinvasion of the country and the deportation to India of his brother forced him to shoulder his responsibility as the most important member of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Speciﬁcally, he believed that it was his duty to restore his family’s rule, and to oppose the British and their Afghan quislings, even though Na"ib Fath Allah, elder of the Firozkohi tribe, advised him to make peace with the British and consolidate his position in Herat.15 Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan decided “. . . to commence a religious war and drive the inﬁdels out of the country.”16 The Kabuli troops and his Kandahari advisers who wished to return to their homes inﬂuenced him in his decision17 as did the unpopularity of the wali and the fact that even individual Kandaharis attacked the British personnel here and there, hoping to become ghazis (anti-inﬁdel ﬁghters), or martyrs.18 In truth, many of these attacks were the result of what he and his followers had instigated. Col. St. John, the British Political Representative, wrote from Kandahar that “for months Ayyub Khan and his partisans have used every eﬀort to inﬂame the religious and patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against us and our protégé, Sher 'Ali Khan.”19 The wali, too, was “. . . fearful of Ghaza [a raid against ‘inﬁdels’] and jihad against him.”20 However, because of the discord between his Herati and Kabuli troops21 Ayyub Khan postponed his advance on Kandahar until June 1880. 14

Ibid., 179. Ibid., 182. 16 Sardar Mohammad Ayyub to Yaru Khan, Kand D, 1–28 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt 6, 1618. 17 Ripon to Hartington, 17 Aug 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 4, 718. 18 Riyazi, 'Ayn Waqayi', 200. 19 Kand D, 17 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 495. 20 St. John to Lyall, 17 July 80, PSLI, 25, 1373. 21 PANEA, 111. According to Ghobar the people of Herat and the Herati army in his service pressured the reluctant Ayyub Khan to march against the British. Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 631. 15

50

chapter three The Battle of Maiwand

On June 15, 1880 at the head of a regular and irregular army, Ayyub Khan set out for Kandahar with “plans of attack on the British forces at Kandahar, to be followed in good time by an advance on Kabul.”22 According to Eﬀendi, “To encourage him in his task the public inﬂuenced by the clergies oﬀered him the title of the amir, which he . . . rejected with the excuse that it was premature.”23 Before his departure Ayyub Khan appointed Sardar 'Abd al-Wahhab Khan Mohammadzay with the power of governor, General Mohammad Jan Barakzay, as the commander of the garrison. He likewise set up a state council to administer the province in his absence, composed of the ‘four pillars of Herat’: Na"ib Fath Allah Khan Firozkohi, Mahmud Khan Hazara, Akram Khan Jamshedi and 'Abd Allah Khan Taimani.24 When Ayyub Khan arrived at Girishk, most troops of the wali deserted and joined him.25 From there he moved upward along the Helmand River toward Zamindawar, with a view to avoiding the British troops and reaching the city of Kandahar.26 However, Col. St. John made the battle of Maiwand unavoidable. At his suggestion, Major General G. R. S. Barrows withdrew his forces to the Kishk-e-Nakhud area apparently to meet the forces of the sardar on the plain.27 The viceroy, Lord Ripon, supported the plan, later arguing that if the sardar were left unchecked he would have advanced on Qalat and Ghazni in which case “. . . the eﬀect upon our [the British] military reputations, and upon the political situation generally in Afghanistan would have been exceedingly damaging.”28 On July 27, 1880 the two armies met on a plain chosen by the British near the village of Maiwand. At 9.00 a.m. General Barrows ordered his army to attack. Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan responded with the cry of “ya char yar” [“oh the four companions” of the Prophet], the war slogan of Afghans. Eﬀendi provides the following account of the battle: 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 185. Ibid. Ibid. St. John to Lyall, 17 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 495. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 195. St. John to Lyall, 17 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 495. Ripon to Hartington, 17 Aug 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 4, 718.

the afghan victory at maiwand

51

The ﬁrst British shell caught the scarlet umbrella held over the prince, and the Afghans responded with a general frontal assault. They doubled [sic], while the adversary was searching every corner of the battleﬁeld with perfect impunity. The passive resistance of the Afghans was due to their muzzle loading ﬁre-arms, which were no match to the Martini Henry and the Snider riﬂes of the adversary. One battery of the Armstrong alone kept the kettle boiling, while the rest of the Afghan guns [said to be 30 or 35] kept mum. This state of aﬀairs placed the endurance of the warriors of the crescent to a most severe test. Their condition was worsened with Loynab’s retreat at the head of 4,000 Herati irregular cavalry. For a while victory awaited the English with open arms, when the Afghan oﬃcers in utter desperation rushed their men with drawn swords against the enemy squares. Though their death rate cost them appalling casualties, yet it, nonetheless, sealed the fate of the enemy. The attackers [Afghans] tightened the cordon and their smooth bore guns, conﬁdent of their range, belched out with the perceptible result of British lines swinging to and fro. In spite of the tenacity of their oﬃcers, an orderly retreat seemed impossible to perform.29

Toward the end of the battle a handful of the British infantrymen, . . ., literally fought to the last man and the last shot, to uphold the honor of the British ﬂag, which won them the ever-lasting appreciations of their adversaries . . . They kept the Afghans at bay, and held their standard high, till the last man fell.30

Many of those “. . . who were hiding in streams, wells, and gardens perished at the hands of women, who, from the roofs hurled heavy objects such as millstones, rocks, well-pulleys and stone mortars at them.”31 Eﬀendi states: “Thus the entire British forces were annihilated [in four hours] with the exception of three scores, who were destined to reach Kandahar, to relate the tale of woe.”32 According to St. John the Afghans killed and wounded numbered 2,150, and the English about 1,100. Ayyub’s army was made up of 4,555 infantry, about 3,200 cavalry, and 4,000 ghazis [ﬁghters against the ‘inﬁdels’] many of whom were talibs (students of Islamic studies), while that of General Burrows made up of 2,800 regular with 2,000

29 30 31 32

Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 187–188. Ibid., 188–189. Tarzi, Reminiscences, 14. Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 189.

52

chapter three

followers. The Afghans captured, according to their account, 20 enemy guns and, according to the British account, only two, but the former stuck to their number. In Maiwand both sides fought tooth and nail, and in this pitched battle only one British oﬃcer had been made as a prisoner, an indication of the ferocity of the killing. Women also helped the ghazis in their ﬁght by “. . . carrying water skins over their shoulders, and singing odes in praise of heroism.”33 The triumphant Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan stayed in Maiwand for ten days to supervise the burial aﬀairs of his fallen warriors in line with Islam and tradition. In doing so, he probably lost the chance to overcome the remaining vulnerable British troops in the city or to compel them to surrender. The delay, which by coincidence lasted the same length of time as the one in Kabul six months earlier, when the Afghans had besieged the British army, gave time to the demoralized British army to entrench itself in the citadel of the city and devise defensive measures. The result was the same as the outcome in Kabul. By the time of Ayyub Khan’s arrival in Kandahar, about thirty thousand men had joined him34 including people as far as Qalat, in Baluchistan. Shortly after his arrival, Ayyub Khan repulsed a sortie of the besieged British army, but despite his advantageous position did not try to force it into submission. On the contrary, to the annoyance of his oﬃcials35 he commenced negotiations. Afghan chronicler Ya'qub 'Ali Khaﬁ maintains that the leader of the British army obtained a forty-day grace period, through the good oﬃce of Bibi Hawa, a widow of Sardar Rahimdil Khan, who had adopted the British oﬃcer as her “son.”36 In a letter to Bibi Hawa, Ayyub Khan wrote, “From the beginning we had no intention of ﬁghting with the British Government, but [had] only wishes of friendship and peace.”37 In one of his letters to St, John, he also expressed similar sentiments, stating that “. . . the kindness [?] which was extended by the British Government to the late Amir should be granted to me.”38 Ayyub

33

Tarzi, Reminiscences, 14. Akbar to St. John, Jan 81, PSLI, 27, 595. 35 Khaﬁ, M. Ya'qub, Shahan-e-Muta"khir-e-Afghanistan, [The Recent Kings of Afghanistan], Kabul, 1336/1957, 2, 192. 36 Ibid. 37 Kand D, 29 July–1 Sept. 80, PSLI, 26, pt 7, 1923. 38 Ibid. 34

the afghan victory at maiwand

53

Khan probably felt that he either could not force the British army, or because of the presence of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, he saw it advisable to come to terms with the British from a position of strength. Whatever the truth, despite the fact that the negotiation bore no fruit, the Maiwand battle dealt a deadly blow to the British scheme of dividing Afghanistan. Battles are organized by generals and fought by warriors. When the battles are won the generals are viewed as heroes, and the warriors are forgotten perhaps because people want to have heroes and forget about those who have actually made them. That is why Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan is known to this day as the hero or victor of Maiwand, and the actual ﬁghters are forgotten, although it was they who fought the battle with a ﬁerce determination, at an enormous cost, to the point of ﬁnal victory. Of course, they did so when a dynastic prince led them to the battleﬁeld to defend the fatherland, Islam, and independence. The Maiwand victory compares with the victory that was won over forty years earlier in Kabul against a strong British army and camp followers from among whom only about three hundred survived, and only one, Surgeon William Brydon, escaped. Both damaged the reputation of the British, a superpower of the time. But at Maiwand according to Sir Charles M. MacGregor it was not “. . . so bad in the way of the losses . . . but worse for our honor as they [the British soldiers] ought all to have been killed.”39 On the other hand, both victories established the reputation of Afghans as Spartans and rescued them from being conquered by a European colonial superpower. That is why they left a deep mark not only on Afghans of the time, but on Afghans of the future generations as well. The victory in Kabul was the outcome largely of the statesmanship and generalship of Ghazi Mohammad Akbar Khan, and that in Maiwand largely of the eﬀorts of his nephew, Ghazi Mohammad Ayyub Khan. These individuals as well as the memory of Maiwand have come to symbolize Afghan gallantry and patriotism. Both have contributed much toward consolidating the Afghans as a nation, a notion actually inherited from Mir Wais Hotak and Ahmad Shah Durranay. Emotionally evocative, all these names have become the ingredients of Afghan culture. However, in the long run, the victories

39

MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 217.

54

chapter three

at Kabul and Maiwand kept the Afghans isolated from the currents of science and technology, and other progressive aspects of modern life, and they also contributed to a legacy of xenophobia.

The Zimma Meeting The British oﬃcials in Kabul feared that the Afghan victory at Maiwand would upset the arrangement that they had made with Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Griﬃn wired the foreign secretary, Alfred Lyall the following message: The Kandahar news alters the position here and unless Ayyub can be beaten decisively and quickly, may cause all arrangements to collapse. Amir will not be able to stand against Ayyub, victorious. Many of his adherents will abandon him and his troops here and in Turkestan may mutiny. If he marches to Ghazni, the country will join him.40

The amir himself shared this fear, and he and Griﬃn agreed to cooperate. During a two-day meting in Zimma41 just north of Kabul, on July 31–August 1, 1880, the amir pressed Griﬃn to conclude a treaty with him. However, Griﬃn was not authorized to do so, because at the time, the British Government of India viewed the amir’s position as precarious. Alternatively, in order to help the amir consolidate his position, the Government granted him a few light guns and nearly two million rupees which actually belonged to the Afghan treasury. More importantly, Griﬃn promised him that the British troops would leave soon, a promise that enabled the amir to tell his people that he was sending the invading army away. In return for the British assistance, the amir promised to persuade the Ghilzay elders to allow a British force to pass through their land on the way to Kandahar. A select army of ten thousand strong, with artillery guns and nine thousand camels appeared to be for the purpose of evacuating Kabul, but in reality had been sent to relieve the besieged army in Kandahar, as the British found it diﬃcult to send troops there from their nearest base, in the city of Quetta. Starting

40

Griﬃn to Lyall (T), 28 July 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 47. For the text of the Zimma meeting, see Kakar, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880–1896, Punjab Educational Press, Lahore, 1971, 256–281. 41

the afghan victory at maiwand

55

on August 7, the army, under General Roberts, covered 324 miles in twenty-three days, which was a remarkable feat, although the army was traveled unhindered, and MacGregor who had accompanied it, states, “People, civil, they say apologetically by order.”42 As previously noted, the amir had asked their elders not to molest the British army. The army arrived at Kandahar on August 31 and found that the besieged British oﬃcers there had been under tremendous pressure. According to MacGregor, as they had lost over 200 men, with eight oﬃcers, in an unsuccessful sortie, they were “looking very cheap.”43 On September 1, 1880, the British army, commanded by General Roberts, defeated the army of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan in an engagement in the Baba Wali Pass, near the city, with a loss of about 200 to the British and about the same number to the Afghans.44 Ayyub Khan returned to Herat on September 22, 1880, and Roberts and his army left Kandahar for India for good. As William Trousdale states, Roberts’ . . . defeat of [Sardar Mohammad] Ayub near Kandahar was vengeance for the British, but the true victory belonged to Abdur Rahman who was thus spared the necessity of defeating Ayub Khan in a military challenge for the crown.45

The Collapse of the Scheme of Partition The Afghan victory at Maiwand dealt a deadly blow to the ‘independence’ of Kandahar, and Lord Lytton’s ‘new order’ for Afghanistan. Foreign Secretary Alfred Lyall, who visited Kandahar shortly after Maiwand to assess the situation, concluded that, “. . . the Durranis of Kandahar are much opposed to the occupation, either directly through [Wali] Sher Ali or any other nominee, or directly through our oﬃcers.”46 The British government then decided to hand over

42

MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 232. Ibid., 239. 44 Ibid. Oﬃcially, the British casualties were 35 killed and 229 wounded. The Afghan losses are diﬃcult to ascertain, and estimates vary from 700 to 1,200. It is to be noted that since the Baba Wali battle was not a major one these ﬁgures appear to be high. 45 Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanistan, 63. 46 Lyall on Kandahar, Nov. 90, PSLI, 27, 547. 43

56

chapter three

Kandahar to the amir despite the strong opposition of the viceroy’s council,47 but since Ayyub Khan was “. . . the most popular candidate for rule in southern Afghanistan”48 the amir did not want to occupy it immediately.49 However, the British were anxious to withdraw their troops before the summer heat hit the region, and on April 16, 1881 they handed over Kandahar to the amir’s oﬃcials along with weapons and money, but let themselves meet the feared challenge of the victor of Maiwand. Shortly afterward, they left the city for good. Wali Sher 'Ali Khan, who had been guaranteed ‘dynastic hereditary rule’ was granted an allowance for life, settled in Karachi, and faded into obscurity. Thus, the Second British War on Afghanistan came to an end. It was fought with the utmost ferocity, had an enormous death toll, weakened economies and disrupted the normal ways of Afghan life. The war also stained Britain’s reputation and doomed its Forward Policy. What the British gained from this and their ﬁrst Afghan war was the everlasting bad will of Afghans.

Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and the Heratis Upon his return to Herat Mohammad Ayyub faced a major rebellion which forced him to postpone his early march on Kandahar.50 The Heratis, that is, the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Parsiwans, the nomadic and semi-nomadic Char Aimaq ( Jamshedis, Firozkohis, Taimanis and the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao) and others—were sick and tired of Kabuli rule. When the position of Ayyub Khan had been weakened, ‘Northern Afghanistan’ had formed the amir’s kingdom, and Kandahar was still controlled by the British, the Heratis felt that the time had come for them to rule Herat themselves. Animosity had ﬁrst appeared in Mazar between the Herati and Kabuli troops

47

For details see Memoranda on Kandahar, PSLI, 27: 541, 547, 566, 1354, 1143, 1137, 1141. 48 Lyall on Kandahar, Nov. 80, PSLI, 27, 547. 49 Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 1, 208. 50 My description of the relations of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan with the people of Herat, featured in my book (1971), is basically the same as that provided by Riyazi in 'Ayn al-Waqayi'. While my 1971 account is based on reports from the Kandahar Diary, my present account is based mainly on the work of Riyazi, a native of Herat.

the afghan victory at maiwand

57

during the anarchy that followed the death of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. This and the tyranny exercised over the Heratis by the Kabuli troops prompted them to initiate an uprising. They declared Fayz Mohammad Khan as their ruler and Colonel Yar Mohammad Khan Alkozay as their military leader. According to Mohammad Yusuf Riyazi, a contemporary native chronicler, “165,000” ordinary men and artisans from “every class and tribal sections” took part in the uprising. On the day of the action a small number of people from the army joined them, but the leaders were not up to the task. The Kabuli troops of Ayyub Khan commanded by seasoned Ghilzay oﬃcers and armed with superior weapons and artillery suppressed the rebels.51 Sardar Ayyub Khan had already crushed the Jamshedi and Qibchaq tribes by disposing of their elders, Khan Agha Jamshedi and Qazi Jahandar Khan Qibchaq for their pro-British policies, even though the former was his father-in-law.52 Sardar Ambia Khan, elder of the Taimani tribe, also refused to pay revenue and, in addition, showed loyalty to the British.53 Of the Char Aimaq tribes only the Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao, under their elder, Mohammad Khan Nizam alDawla, remained loyal and fought on the side of Ayyub Khan.54 Thus, the sardar asserted his rule over the people of Herat, but they became alienated, and the alienation later became fatal to his rule. Ayyub Khan’s next step was to recover Kandahar, and he began to build up his army for the purpose of doing so. However, he needed to raise money, and was, therefore, compelled to exact taxes and customs dues. He was also in need of war materials, since the British had pressured the shah of Persia to prohibit their export to Herat.55 Still, the sardar was able to build up an army of 4,400 men,56 made up of the Kabuli, Herati and Uzbek regiments, in addition to a large number of Herat and Qibchaq feudal cavalry.57 In early July 1881 the sardar, accompanied by his oﬃcers, set out

Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 200–205. Ibid., 195. MacGregor writes of Khan Agha Jamshedi whom he had met while on the way to Kandahar: “I had a long talk with him, he was very anxious for us to go to Herat, saying it was ours.” The War in Afghanistan, 228. 53 Sardar Ambia Khan to St. John, Kand D, 28 Mar. 80, PSLI, 28, 767. 54 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 200, 209. 55 St. John to Lyall, 15–21 Jan. 81, PSLI, 27, 1039. 56 St. John to Lyall, 19 July 81, PSLI, 29, 508. 57 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 206. 51 52

58

chapter three

for Kandahar. After his advance force encountered a setback in Girishk, it defeated in Girishk the amir’s larger force at Karez-e'Atta. Subsequently he entered Kandahar without a military encounter.

The War of Reuniﬁcation The occupation of Kandahar set Sardar Mohammad Ayyub in direct opposition to the amir. The sardar, who had the superior claim and more public support still did not march on Kabul even though the amir’s position there was said to have been “. . . extremely critical.”58 Instead, he stayed in Kandahar and waited for the amir to confront him there. He did so because his Durranay supporters did not show enthusiasm for marching on Kabul. Also, from a vague letter addressed to him by St. John, then the Political Agent in Baluchistan, Ayyub Khan suspected59 that if he marched on Kabul the British forces at Quetta might occupy Kandahar. In contrast, the amir acted boldly to meet the ﬁrst challenge to his rule. After holding consultations with elders of the eastern Ghilzays and the Tajiks of Kohistan he set out for Kandahar in early August 1881. On the way, he won over the support of the southern Ghilzays mainly by presenting gifts and cash to their elders and the promise of a just government to all. He also provided free cooked food for the public. It was during this time that he demonstrated the greatest generosity of his life time. Although he was the legal ruler, the amir was only able through presents and money to persuade the mullas to denounce Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan as a ‘rebel’. In contrast, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub, though only a claimant to the throne, declared jihad against what he called the “farangi amir.” The mullas of Kandahar went even further, denouncing the amir as a “kaﬁr” and calling on Muslims “. . . to ﬁght against the nominee and coadjutor of the inﬁdels.”60 The legal rulings ( fatwas), thus, justiﬁed bloodshed between cousins and Muslims of the same denomination, and showed that the sardar enjoyed more public support than the amir. Still, Ayyub Khan expressed willingness to negotiate with the amir, proposing an alliance

58 59 60

AB, Kabul Correspondent, 4 Aug. 81, PSLI, 29, 771. St. John to Ayyub Khan, 10 Aug. 81, PSLI, 29, 721. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ripon, 22 Shawal 1298, PSLI, 33, 86.

the afghan victory at maiwand

59

with him against the British. He also proposed that Afghanistan be ruled in eﬀect as a confederation by the six surviving princes whose fathers had ruled provinces under their grandfather, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan.61 However, the amir refused either to forge an alliance with him or rule the country in association with his peer cousins in spite of the fact that at the Zimma meeting he had shown no desire either for Kandahar or Herat.62 The matter was, thus, left to be settled by the sword. St. John, who widely reported on the developments in southern Afghanistan, described the confrontation between the rival cousins as a war between the two “hereditary foes”—the Ghilzays and Durranays whose “ancestral animosity” he considered to have been “. . . by far the strongest political passion in southern Afghanistan.”63 He concluded that the Durranays ﬂocked to Ayyub Khan, “. . . the representative of the Durranay against the Ghilzays [to defend] their city against the Ghilzay invader.”64 Although the southern Ghilzays were traditionally on bad terms with the Durranays, the conﬂict was not inter-tribal, but shaped more by religion, fear of foreign domination, and the hope of the acquisition of rewards. The Ghilzays took part on both sides; while the Tarakay Ghilzays supported Ayyub Khan, and closed the road behind the amir as a sign of rebellion.65 the Hotak Ghilzays were divided in their loyalty. As the name indicates, the Qalat regiment, which went over to Ayyub Khan in Girishk, was, in all probability, composed of the Ghilzays. Further, many of Ayyub Khan’s senior oﬃcers were Ghilzays, although most Ghilzays supported the amir, but he bought their service with money and the promise of plunder. The amir’s army also had two thousand Kandahari horseman, most of whom were Durranays, although the Durranays ﬂocked to Ayyub Khan in the belief that he was ‘a champion of Islam’ and the amir ‘a creature of the British.’ This was because they opposed the idea of being ruled by another puppet which they believed the amir to be. This also accounts for the presence of many mullas and talibs (students of Islamic studies) in the army of the sardar. Further, as

61 62 63 64 65

St. John to Foreign, (T), 5 Sept. 81, PSLI, 29, 977. Griﬃn to Stewart, 4 Aug. 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 5, 869. St. John to Lyall, 22 Sept. 81, PSLI, 30, 117. Ibid., 118. St. John to Lyall, 22 Sept. 81, PSLI, 29, 1063 a.

60

chapter three

already noted, the Maiwand battle had made Ayyub Khan an unquestionable hero. The sardar had a larger army—seventeen thousand versus the fourteen thousand of the amir’s army—with more experienced oﬃcers—Sipah Salar Hussayn 'Ali Qizilbash, Na"ib Salar Haﬁz Allah Ghilzay, Sardar 'Abd Allah Nasir, and General Taj Mohammad Ghilzay. However, the sardar had fewer guns than the amir had because he had lost many guns to the British.66 On the day of the battle (September 22, 1881), the prevailing impression was a victory for the sardar’s army. Indeed, at the start of the encounter, his army made advances against its adversary, but all of a sudden it retreated and dispersed; this occurred when some of the sardar’s troops from the rear ﬁred on the main body of the army. This was apparently the result of the discord that existed between the oﬃcers of the sardar about some unreliable troops; some oﬃcers wanted to disarm them, while others were against doing so.67 In the heat of the battle, these troops, which according to one source, were the three Kabuli regiments that had surrendered in the battle of Karez-e-'Atta,68 and according to another69 were the Herati and Kabuli regiments, ﬁred on the Kandahari troops and the mullas and talibs. The latter constituted the core of the army of the sardar. The retreat and dispersal of Ayyub Khan’s troops were also due to the discord of his oﬃcers that the sardar’s army had been withdrawn from inside the city to a suburb near Chilzeena, close to the old city (Shahr-e-Kohna) where the armies fought. The relocation, which was intended to save civilians from being killed and property from being destroyed, created fear among the troops of the sardar while, conversely, it emboldened the amir’s troops.70 The relocation was looked upon as a retreat for the army of the sardar and an advance for that of the amir. Also, unlike the amir who “was everywhere deploying and reinforcing his troops” and was “in full control 66 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi' 206. According to Mohammad Hashim, a native agent of the British, the total number of the amir’s army was 14,000 while that of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was 17,000. Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept 81, PSLI, 30, 8. But Sultan Mahomed’s ﬁgures for the former are 22,000 and for the latter are 20,000. The Life of Abdur Rahman, I, 212. The ﬁgures noted by Hashim seem to be more accurate. 67 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 211. 68 Ibid., 208. 69 Mohammad Hashim to St. John, 26 Sept. 81, PSLI, 30, 81. 70 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 211.

the afghan victory at maiwand

61

of the battle”, the sardar watched it from “a ruined tower (Burj-eDedah) from the crumbling walls of the still sturdy fortress of Shahre-Kohna.”71 In Chilzeena Sardar Mohammad Ayyub failed to realize that the solidarity that had made his troops unbeatable in Maiwand was not as solid in the ﬁght for power with his own cousin when victims on both sides were bound to be his own compatriots. To win the war for power it was necessary for both to personally command their armies, maintain discipline, and act decisively. However, the sardar “who was too much of a gentleman . . . in a world dotted with pitfalls of cheat, deceit and chicanery”72 proved to be no match for the cunning amir who maintained discipline in the army and personally commanded it in the battle. Already, when on his way to Kandahar he had shown generosity in money and won people by promising them a fair rule as already noted. Thus, mainly by the default of his adversary, the amir won the battle that secured for him his rule. The casualties of the battle were countless as “[t]he widely scattered bodies of the dead and wounded had turned the battleﬁeld of meadows, gardens and undulating plains into a ﬁeld of slaughter.”73 Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan again headed toward Herat, but on the way he learned that on October 2, 1881, it had fallen to Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, the governor of Shiberghan whom the amir had ordered there to occupy it. He had done so with the help of those Heratis who had been alienated from Ayyub Khan, as previously described. Consequently, Ayyub Khan once again ﬂed to Mashhad with his followers. Meanwhile, in Kandahar, the amir allowed his victorious army to plunder the city for twenty-four hours. His own wrath fell on a religious scholar-Mawlawi 'Abd al-Rahim— who, prior to the ﬁghting, had issued a fatwa to the eﬀect that “. . . aiding the inﬁdels was blasphemous.” The amir ﬁrst told him in rage that “I arrived to liberate the country from the occupation of foreigners”, and then “With one stroke severed his head from his frail body and threw it out like a football” with his Caucasian sword. He did so even though the scholar had taken refuge in the khirqa where the assumed robe of the Prophet Muhammad had been, and

71 72 73

Tarzi, Reminiscence, 23. Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 233. Tarzi, Reminiscences 24.

62

chapter three

on that account had made it a sanctuary.74 With the exception of the province of Maymana which was paciﬁed in 1884, all of Afghanistan was, thus, brought under the control of the central government, and reunited. As the result of his victory at Maiwand, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan had become so popular that his presence even in Mashhad was considered a threat to the amir’s rule. The British once again helped the amir; in order to neutralize the danger, and also to keep the amir under pressure the British Government of India, in 1887, persuaded Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan as well as Persia to make a deal in which Ayyub Khan agreed to live in India. India granted Persia a handsome sum of money in return for this deal. In 1888, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, accompanied by over eight hundred followers, arrived in Karachi via Iraq (where the author Eﬀendi was born) and settled in Lahore on an allowance. The British never before or afterward had such an Afghan dignitary with so many followers in India. As a resident of India, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan was not the same person that he had been in his native land. According to his son, “While in Afghanistan and Iran he was virile and active, in India he became morose and reserved.”75 Content with the life of a ‘Royal Mendicant’ he kept his distance from the British oﬃcials, declining even “. . . to draw the increment in his allowance, which rendered his ﬁnancial position deplorable” and also aﬀected his twelve sons and seven daughters and several wives.76 In 1907, he visited ﬁrst Kashmir and later Japan. Living with the dignity of a fallen hero among his conservative followers, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who was the epitome of Afghan patriotism, “died in his sleep of heart failure, caused by chronic blood pressure” in 1914, at the age of ﬁfty-seven.

74 75 76

Ibid., 30. Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 272. Ibid., 231.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE PACIFICATION OF EASTERN AFGHANISTAN

The preceding chapters have described the events that led to the establishment of the rule of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. This and the following chapters describe how he extended the government authority throughout Afghanistan. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, who was well experienced in the politics of his people and their intractable elders; knowledgeable about the willingness of elders of some minority ethnic groups to undergo foreign domination; and concerned about the presence of dynastic rivals in the neighboring lands as well as about the danger to Afghanistan posed by the Russians and the British, took a wide range of measures for the institution of a centralized government in order to safeguard the country as well as to ensure his dynastic rule. This two-pronged program made it necessary for him to build up a strong army and create sources of income by imposing a wide range of taxes. All of these measures enabled him to rule the country directly through government oﬃcials. He was, thus, the ﬁrst Afghan ruler to do so in a country where people resented government control of their autonomous communities. The people most of whom were small landowners and landless peasants living within an agrarian economy opposed the taxes, as well as the amir’s absolutist style of ruling. The amir, nevertheless, pushed his program, and this resulted in over forty uprisings of which I have studied only the major ones.1 1 The minor failed rebellions not studied in the present study are, as follows, and the source of all references to this entry is Siraj al-Tawarikh, vol. 3: a rebellion in Panjsher in 1881 (111, 384); a rebellion in Sedrah in Nijrao in 1881 (385); a rebellion in Rustaq and Badakhshan until crushed in 1882 (395); a rebellion by the Nurzays of Dehrawud in Kandahar in 1881 (398); a rebellion by the inhabitants of Khost in 1881 (401); a rebellion by Patanzay Achakzays in1881 (406); a rebellion in Katawaz and Zurmula (Zurmut) in 1882 (407); a rebellion in Farajghan in Laghman in 1882 (401); a rebellion in the Ghassak valley in Nijrao in 1882 (413); a rebellion in Chaghanserai in Konarr in 1882 (413); a rebellion by the Achakzays in 1883 (416, 417); a rebellion in the upper part of the Alishang valley in Laghman in 1883 (441); a rebellion in Waigal, Kulman and Sao in Laghman in 1885 (443); a rebellion in Pasha in the district of Jalalabad in 1885 (592); a rebellion by the Sapays of Konarr in 1886 (490); a rebellion in Baghran in 1886

64

chapter four

The Eastern Province

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

65

This chapter describes how the amir vindicated the authority of the central government in eastern Afghanistan. An able oﬃcer, Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, whom the amir had commissioned there as his viceroy with special powers over civil and military aﬀairs assisted him in the implementation of his program. During the warm winter months, the amir also ruled from Jalalabad, the capital city of the province, and at times from his summer resort in Mamakhel, in Khugiani. In this important frontier province adjacent to India lived Pashtuns—who were mainly small landholders, peasants, clients (hamsayas)—along with other ethnic groups, predominantly in river valleys largely free of government control, but within the fold of Islam and the Pashtun codes of behavior (Pashtunwali ). On the other hand, the British government of India in the pursuit of its Forward Policy of the 1890s advanced its own program of expansion and curbed the amir’s advance eastward.

The Mohmands The Mohmands (or Momands), who are divided, according to their location, into the Upper Mohmand (Bar Mohmand or the Sori Mohmand) and the Lower Mohmand (Kuz Mohmand or the Petawi Mohmand) were one of the most important tribes in eastern Afghanistan. The inhabitants of the Upper Mohmand generally occupy the agriculturally poor valleys and hills between the Kabul and Swat

(490, 510); a rebellion by the Alkozays of Arghistan in 1887 (530); the robbery of caravans by Sa'd al-Din (alias Sadu) Karokhel Ghilzay in conjunction with Sardar Nur Mohammad Khan, son of Sardar Wali Mohammad Khan (former wali of Kabul), and their instigation of the Mangals, Zazays and Shinwars until Sadu died in Tirah in 1888 (385); a rebellion by the Firozkohis until they were crushed in 1888 (399, 423, 563, 667, 687); a rebellion by the Tatars of Doab in 1888 (615); a rebellion by the Habash who lived in the neighborhood of Tatars in 1888 (615); a rebellion by the Shaykh Ali Hazaras in 1888 (619); a rebellion in Ragh, Pas-eKoh, and Shahr-e-Bozorg in 1888 (620, 623); a rebellion in Durnama in Panjsher in 1888 (623, 645); a rebellion by the mirs of Badakhshan in 1888 (753, 804); a rebellion by the Zadrans in 1892 and again in 1893 (753, 804); a rebellion by the Baluches of Chakhansur in 1892 (757); a revolt by the Baluches of Chaghai (782); a rebellion by the Sunni Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao of Herat in 1893 (790); a rebellion in Maymana in 1892 and again in 1893. (800, 802); a rebellion by the Muqbils in 1894 (922); an ongoing rebellion by the Mangals until it was suppressed in 1894 (878); a revolt by the Tanays in 1896 (912); and a rebellion by the Kayan bordering the Wazirs in 1896 (922, 937).

66

chapter four

rivers, while those of the Lower Mohmand reside in the northwestern corner of the relatively fertile Peshawar plain. The city of Peshawar is in the Mohmand country, and members of the Khalil and Khwaezay divisions are conspicuous among its inhabitants. Both parts of Mohmand are divided into the main divisions of the Tarakzays, Baezays, Halimzays and Khwaezays. These divisions are the descendants of the Masayzay, who, along with Uthmanzay and Dawaizay are the descendants of Mohmand, known as Mohmand Baba. The Mohmands like the Durranays and Yusufzays are the descendants of Sarbun. The ﬁrst known dwelling place of the Mohmands was Murgha, east of Kandahar from which they, like many other divisions of eastern Pashtuns, migrated ﬁrst to Ghazni and then to their present land, in the sixteenth century. It was after their settlement here that they were divided into the two parts. In both parts the very strict Masayzay code known as dode grando (Code of Grando?) is applied in criminal cases such as theft, homicide, adultery, rape, etc. In these matters this code rather than the Shari'a is applied even though the latter is the law of the land, and the clergy enjoy considerable inﬂuence among the Mohmands. In controversial cases, the Masayzay code speciﬁes that certain households in both parts of the Mohmand are authorized to act as courts of appeal. Their verdict is ﬁnal with no right of appeal.2 The inhabitants of the two parts of Mohmand did not have much dealing with each other. Strangely, the inhabitants of the Lower Mohmand were mild by comparison to those of the Upper Mohmand who were warlike. Also, the power of the khans of the Upper Mohmands had developed greatly, and, among them the khan of Lalpura was the most important, and the other khans of signiﬁcance were those of Pandiali and Goshta. Carpenters, blacksmiths, weavers, barbers, and potters lived in almost all of the villages of the Mohmands, as in those of other tribes; a special group of people, the Parachas, carried on trade among them. The only khan (head of a tribe with feudal privileges) who retained his position throughout the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was the khan of Lalpura, Mohammad Akbar Khan. Lalpura was

2 For details see, Siyal, Mira Jan, Mohmand Baba, (in Pashto), University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1950. I am grateful to Dr. Zamin Mohmand for lending me this book.

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

67

the main seat of the Upper Mohmand, and Akbar Khan was a descendant of Morcha Khan, the founder of the Morcha Khel section of the Shahmansur clan of the Tarakzay Mohmands. Morcha Khan had established the khanate of Lalpura in the second half of the sixteenth century apparently with the blessing of a local saint, Murzad Wali Baba for an act of chivalry. Additionally, for his service with the Mughal Emperor, Jalal al-Din Akbar (1556–1605), Morcha Khan was placed in charge of the Dakka Fort, the command of which had apparently become hereditary in his family. From this time onward, the position of the Morcha Khel as the khan khel (ruling section) was recognized by all of the Mohmands.3 The most famous of Morcha Khan’s successors was Sa'adat Khan, who served as khan for about forty years and who had arranged the marriage of his daughter, Qamar Jan, to Sardar Sher 'Ali Khan before he became amir. Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan and Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan were the sons of Qamar Jan. In his monographic study, H. Merk states that Of all the Khans, Saadat Khan appears to have made the deepest impression on the Mohmands; simple in his habits, generous and accessible to the people, sagacious in council and the champion of the national cause, he is held up as the model of what a Khan should be.4

Because of Sa"adat Khan’s commitment to the “national cause” his opposition to the British was so strong that during his khanate the Mohmands committed eighty-ﬁve raids on British territory between January 1855 and March 1860. The raids ﬁnally led to his imprisonment, as the British remonstrated to Amir Sher 'Ali Khan who, for wider considerations, listened to them. According to the author Christine Noelle After a major military confrontation between the Mohamnds and the British at Shabkadir on 2 January 1864, Sher 'Ali Khan seized Sa'adat Khan and Nauroz Khan and took them to Kabul. A few months later, Sa'adat Khan died in captivity from the eﬀects of the inclement climate of Kabul.5

3 Noelle, Christine, State and Tribe in Nineteenth-Century Afghanistan, The Reign of Amir Dost Muhammad Khan (1826–1863), Curzon Press, 1997, 182, 183. 4 Merk, W. R. H., The Mohmands, Introduction by Akbar S. Ahmed, ﬁrst published in 1898. Reproduced by Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1984, 46, 50. 5 Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, 186.

68

chapter four

Even though the Upper Mohmands were a poor people owing to the shortage of arable land except for that along the Kabul River the oﬃce of their khanate was more developed than those of “. . . the little republics of Safed Koh and Tirah” as well as that of the Lower Mohmands. This was due more to the strategic location of their country than to its tribal structure. As guardians of the Khyber, the khans of Lalpura collected tolls on the Jalalabad–Peshawar road at Dakka, and levied dues on the rafts on the Kabul River. The signiﬁcance of the Mohmands in the area can be understood from the fact that, as Moutstuart Elphinstone had noted in the early part of the century that “A single Mumand will pass a whole caravan” through the Khyber. For the same reason Kabul paid the khans of Lalpura allowances for keeping the Kabul road safe as well as for providing militia in times of emergency. All of this may account for the existence, especially among the khans, of a destructive sense of competition and the custom of badal (revenge). This destructive custom was so prevalent among the Mohmands that important individuals perished at the hands of rivals than due to natural causes. In December 1879 the people of the Upper Mohmand rose in protest after the British in Kabul deported Amir Mohammad Ya'qub Khan to India. Soon a split occurred among elders of the uprising and Mohammad Akbar Khan accepted the position of ruling the Upper Mohmand from the British “. . . on condition of his loyalty and good services to the British Government.”6 In return, Akbar Khan supplied the British forces with provisions and opposed the jihad movement against them,7 so keeping the intractable Mohmands in as well ordered as could be expected.8 After the withdrawal of the British forces from Afghanistan, the amir gradually stripped Akbar Khan of his privileges by taking over the management of the road,9 and in 1883, conﬁscating the Lalpura tolls.10 Before that Akbar Khan’s annual income amounted to about one hundred thousand rupees. Afterward the amir paid him allowances in return for his agreement to serve the state with militias in times 6 Biographical Accounts of Chiefs, Sirdars and Others of Afghanistan, Oﬃcial publication, Calcutta, 1888. Henceforth BACA, 31. 7 Ibid. 8 Griﬃn to Stewart, 8 May 80, PSLI, 33, 512. 9 Peshawar Diary (PD), 18 Sept. 80, PSLI, 34, 9. 10 Mohammad Akbar Khan to Peshawar Commissioner, 30 Nov. 83, PSLI, 38, 999.

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

69

of emergency.11 Akbar Khan had no alternative but to comply: ﬁrst, his request “. . . for the intervention of the British Government”12 met with the reply that he comply with “. . . the orders received from . . . the amir;”13 second, among his many peers, Akbar Khan was only the ﬁrst among equals, and had brothers and cousins, who were formidable rivals.

The Pacha of Konarr For centuries the long and narrow valley of Konarr (Kunar) with Pashat as its main town had been ruled by a Pashtunized reputedly sayyed family of 'Arab descent. Sayyed 'Ali Termizi, known as the Pir Baba, who had accompanied Mohammad Zahir al-Din Babur from Termiz, was the founder of the family. His shrine in the village of Paucha in Bonair is venerated to the present day. Emperor Humayun, who was the son and successor of Babur, had granted him Konarr free of revenue. His descendants known locally as de Konarr pachayaun (rulers of Konarr) as well as de Konarr sayyedaun (sayyeds of Konarr) gradually became secular. They took the revenue at the rate of one-third of the production of the land14 and in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries their annual income ﬂuctuated between sixty thousand and eighty thousand rupees.15 According to Malcolm Yapp, they . . . had successfully maintained a substantial degree of independence of the Kabul Government but under the Barakzays there began a series of attempts to bring the area under control. . . . In 1834 Sayyid Faqir was deposed by Dost Mohammad and Sayyid Baha al-Din made ruler on his undertaking to pay an annual tribute of 19,000 rupees. In 1839 Baha al-Din was deposed and replaced by his brother, Sayyid Hashim, who agreed to pay 28,000 rupees per annum.16

11 PD, 31 May 83, PSLI, 44, 860. Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, 183. 12 BACA, 32. 13 Ibid. 14 Statement by Sayyed Mahmud, 1893, PSLI, 67, 1078. Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’lo Shajaray, 86. 15 Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, 193. 16 Yapp, M. E., “Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan, 1839–42”, BSOAS, xx, pt. 3, 1962, 504.

70

chapter four

The dissension that prevailed among members of the sayyed family helped Amir Dost Mohammad Khan to annex a portion of Konarr to Kabul.17 During his second reign the Amir divided Konarr between Sayyed Baha al-Din and one of his brothers, Mohammad Hashim, while annexing a large portion of it to his kingdom. While the amir’s son and successor, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, kept the arrangement, his other son, Amir Mohammad Afzal Khan, arrested Sayyed Baha al-Din.18 During the second British occupation of Afghanistan, Sayyed Mahmud Pacha, who had succeeded his father, Baha al-Din Pacha probably in 1868, took possession of the whole of Konarr. He sided immediately with the British even though his father had held Konarr under Amir Sher 'Ali, and himself was married to the daughter of Wazir Mohammad Akbar (brother of Amir Sher 'Ali) and had served the late amir as a member of his advisory council in Kabul. Believing that by assisting the British he would retain Konarr “. . . independent of any ruler in Kabul and only subordinate to the British”19 he opposed the jihad movement against them. In 1880 in Jalalabad in a meeting with the British Political Agent, Sir Lepel Griﬃn, when he was on his way to Kabul, Sayyed Mahmud even suggested to him that Afghanistan should be divided up into minor principalities, independent of each other, but subordinate to the British. Griﬃn was so impressed by him that on behalf of the government he guaranteed his “hereditary possession”, promising him that, he might rest assured Government would fulﬁll literally and fully all promises made to him, and would take care, happen what might, he would not suﬀer for having placed himself upon the side of the British.20

However, despite this guarantee the pacha did suﬀer. After the withdrawal of the British forces, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan conﬁrmed Mahmud Pacha’s land possessions on both sides of the Konarr river, but subjected them to revenue demands. Soon, however, the pacha’s relations with the amir deteriorated, as his son, Sayyed Ahmad Pacha, deserted the amir when he was on his way

17 18 19 20

Statement by Sayyed Mahmud, 1078. Ibid. Griﬃn to Roberts, 29 Mar. 80, PSLI, 33, 546. Griﬃn to Roberts, 29 Mar. 80, PSLI, 33, 548.

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

71

to Kandahar to oust Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan.21 Fearful of his son’s defection as well as of his own partisanship of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, Mahmud Pacha refused a summons to Kabul unless he obtained an assurance of his safety from the British Government. The pacha also reminded Griﬃn, who was then the Viceroy’s Agent in the Central Province of India, of the services that he had rendered the British Government. The pacha wrote to him that Up to date as far as lay in my power, I had served the Government, and incurred a bad name among my clansmen. The service was not rendered with the object that it should bear good fruit in the next world.22

The British Government of India and the amir exchanged several letters on the subject. In one letter, Foreign Secretary Alfred Lyall even addressed the amir in an unusually complimentary language, stating that the viceroy “is assured that the feelings of justice for which Your Highness is so distinguished will make you hesitate of visiting upon Syud Ahmad [Sayyed Mahmud] the sins of his son.”23 This failed to impress the amir as in reply he wrote that if the pacha . . . comes with the purity of heart to pay his respect to me . . . I will not punish him for the sins of his son. Should his actions prove contrary to his professions, I shall have no other course but to drive him away.24

When it had occupied Afghanistan, the British Government of India considered Konarr as well as Kandahar, strategically important. Consequently, it gave explicit guarantees to the rulers of both. Like Kandahar, Konarr was situated on a road leading ultimately to Central Asia and western China. Also, from the upper part of Konarr, one road led to Chitral and another to the territories of the tribes along the northwestern parts of India, territories that were part of Afghanistan but at that time were not under centralized administrative control. From the lower part of Konarr was a road leading to Jalalabad. Despite the strategic importance of Konarr the Government of India reneged on its promise to the ruler of Konarr,

21 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Ghilzay elders, AB (in Ghazni), 16 Aug. 81, PSLI, 29, 1014. 22 Sayyed Mahmud to Griﬃn, PSLI, 33, 514. 23 Lyall to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 12 Jan. 82, PSLI, 33, 514. 24 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Lyall, 1 Feb. 82, PSLI, 33, 414.

72

chapter four

just as it had to the ruler of Kandahar. It did so because, due to much wider considerations, it had pledged to assist the amir in the consolidation of his rule, and to refrain from interfering in the internal aﬀairs of his kingdom. Nevertheless in the same manner that the government of India had backed away from Kandahar it likewise backed away from Konarr. It did so because, due to much wider considerations, it had pledged to assist the amir in the consolidation of his rule, and to refrain from interfering in the internal aﬀairs of his kingdom. The viceroy then left the fate of the pacha to the amir’s mercy, arguing that because of its geographical location . . . the possessions of the Badshah are so situated as to render it impossible to give him any active assistance without the violation of the amir’s territory in a manner amounting practically to an act of war.25

In November 1882, after an advance was made against him by a contingent of the government army, the pacha, who had been abandoned by his British ally, and was opposed by his own people for his pro-British activities, ﬂed ﬁrst to Mittai and later in 1886 to Hassan Abdal, in India. Soon afterward, Kabul established direct control over Konarr. During his residence in India, the pacha lived on a British allowance, and returned to Konarr after the amir had died in 1901.

The Shinwarays Kabul treated the Shinwarays more leniently than it treated other tribes because they kept the road to the Khyber pass open. Kabul also allowed them to levy tolls on the road to Peshawar and, in addition, paid allowances to them.26 It even exempted two of their divisions—Sangu Khel (or Sun Khel) and Sipai—from paying revenue. The Shinwarays have four main divisions, the others are Ali Sher Khel and Mandozays. The Shinwarays, though a very important tribe, had no one khan or elder as inﬂuential as that of the Mohmands. Kabul changed its policy in 1882, when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman garrisoned Dakka27 Prior to the rebellion, the Shinwarays sent a jirga 25

Ripon to Hartington, 23 Dec. 82, PSLI, 34, 221. Jenkyns, W., A Report on the District of Jalalabad, Chieﬂy in regard to Revenue, Calcutta, Oﬃcial publication, 1879, 12–15. 27 PD, 18 Dec. 82, PSLI, 34, 9. 26

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

73

(a council or deputation of elders) to the amir to discuss the restoration of what they called their ‘rights’. The amir imprisoned the jirga and executed some of its members. During this time he declared the introduction for the ﬁrst time in the whole of the eastern province, including the Shinwar (land of the Shinwarays) the three-portion system of taxation on land (se-kot) whereby landowners were demanded to pay one third of their revenue to the government.28 The Shinwarays opposed the new measures, but in 1883 they were defeated in a battle with the government army, led by General Ghulam Hayder Khan Orakzay. The battle hardened the attitude of the Shinwarays, especially when more radical younger members assumed leadership after some of their elders were killed in the battle.29 The new leaders rejected the concessions which required them to pay a tithe ('ushr), or onetenth of their revenue, to the government, instead of one-third, provided they agreed to be disarmed and hostages taken from them.30 Several battles were fought in many of which the Shinwarays were routed. They then ﬂed to the upper part of the Spin Ghar Mountain, but still persisted in their demand that the amir should completely annul the revenue. The victorious army burned their houses and destroyed their crops. The Shinwarays resorted to robbery, announcing, “We have no mind to return to our country, and we do not care for the amir. We will support ourselves by plunder and robbery.”31 In 1885, Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, the Sipah Salar, (commander-in-chief ) took over the administration of the eastern province in both civil and military aﬀairs. His arrival signaled hope for a settlement as he sent many jirgas to the Shinwarays. Although the jirgas failed to bring about a settlement, they caused dissension among the Shinwarays.32 Some of the Shinwarays stood for a settlement, while others opposed it. During the uprisings of the Ghilzay in 1886 (See Chapter Five) and of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan in 1888 (See Chapter Six), the amir adopted a conciliatory attitude

28 Gazetteer of Afghanistan, pt. 4, Kabul, Oﬃcial publication, Calcutta, 1910, 495. Henceforth GAK. 29 GAK, 488. 30 PD, 1 June 83, PSLI, 36, 1549. 31 Shinwaray elders to General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay, 11 May 85, PSLI, 44, 1079. 32 Monthly Memorandum (Henceforth MM), Sept. 86, PSLI, 48, 511.

74

chapter four

toward the Shinwarays. During these periods, many jirgas attempted a settlement, but failed to produce a substantial result. Although the Shinwaray elders agreed to pay revenue in proportion to the quality of the land,33 and although the Sangu Khel section accepted the payment of a tithe and the stationing of a government—appointed judge (qazi ) in their region,34 the bulk of the tribesmen rejected the agreement, because they had lost faith in the amir. Compelled by the tribesmen the elders wrote to the amir, stating, We are ready to submit to Your Highness’s authority . . . but two things prevent us from carrying these wishes into eﬀect: ﬁrst, that we are in poverty and are compelled to commit depredations; allowances should be ﬁxed upon us; secondly, Your Highness’s subjects are in great straits; both days and nights arrests are made. Most of the Khugianis and Mohmands have ﬂed on account of oppression. How can we be consoled and assured that we will be treated well?35

However, the Shinwaray elders made this plea too late, for by then the tribesmen had lost their unity. After the other, more serious uprisings elsewhere had been put down, the amir began to pressure the Shinwarays to submit to his authority. Toward the end of 1888 he dispatched tribal militias from other parts of Ningrahar36 and the district of Tagao37 which, together with government troops and some Afridays and Shinwarays of the occupied areas, defeated the Sangu Khel, the most determined of the Shinwarays.38 Although they were still far from being defeated, their position had actually become untenable, since by then they had been driven to the upper parts of the Spin Ghar Mountain, and the Sangu Khel were living under extremely harsh conditions. Exhausted, they ﬁnally agreed to pay half a rupee per half acre of land ( jarib) as revenue.39 However, the Sangu Khel still held out until 1892, when the tribe as a whole settled down.40 The extension of the government authority in Shinwar illustrates how the government tried to extend its authority elsewhere, especially 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Col. 'Atta Allah, British agent in Kabul, 17 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52, 1073. PD, 22 Feb. 88, PSLI, 52, 768. Shinwaray elders to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 16 Mar. 88, PSLI, 53, 511. PD, 28 Nov. 88, PSLI, 55, 1243. PD, 22 Dec. 88, PSLI, 55, 1368. MM, Mar. 89, PSLI, 56, 1072. Col. 'Atta Allah (in Mazar), 5 Nov. 89, PSLI, 58, 849. GAK, 500.

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

75

in the outlying parts of the country. The takeover of the Jalalabad– Dakka road by the government led to the struggle that was intensiﬁed with the introduction of the three-portion system of taxation of land revenue (se-kot) and the seizure of the jirga elders, the latter of which was contrary to the Pashtun code of behavior (Pashtunwali ). It was to take a decade before the Shinwarays accepted government authority. Immediately afterward, the amir tried to extend government control over the vast regions of Bajaur, Dir and other territories as will be described in the following sections. However, by that time the British Government of India had devised a new strategy for the defense of India, which required it to bring these territories under its inﬂuence, and block the advances of Kabul within them. Had the amir attempted to pacify these vast territories of the Afghan hinterland before embarking on pacifying the Shinwarays he may not have been obliged to forgo his traditional right to rule over them— for it was toward the end of the 1880s that the British formulated the Forward Policy that ultimately led to the Durand Agreement, in 1893 (See Chapter Ten). Thus, the victory over the Shinwarays was achieved at too great a price.

Asmar After the paciﬁcation of the Shinwarays government troops under Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Khan moved to the Konarr valley with the apparent objective of pacifying the regions further east. Beforehand, all of the side valleys on the right bank of the Konarr valley inhabited by the Sapays (Saﬁs) and other ethnic groups were paciﬁed and a ﬁxed amount of tax was imposed on their land and cattle.41 In early 1892, Asmar, a small khanate on the left bank of the river, in the upper part of the Konarr valley, was also occupied. This was the ﬁrst step in the extension of oﬃcial authority over the much vaster and more populous territories of Dir, Swat, and Bajaur. Although the amir claimed that Asmar was a part of Konarr,42 it was, in fact, geographically and demographically a part of Bajaur43

41 42 43

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 200. PD, 23 Nov. 91, PSLI, 64, 1452. Khan of Asmar, MM, Sept. 89, PSLI, 58, 376 a.

76

chapter four

while Bajaur itself was a dependency of Jalalabad.44 Importantly, Asmar held a key position in the territories further east and because of this signiﬁcance it can be compared to the Khyber Pass, as a gate to India. Over two thousand three hundred years ago, Alexander the Great of Macedonia chose Konarr, not Khyber, for his advance on India. The people he encountered there, as well as in Bajaur and Swat, during his military campaign, from November 327 BCE to February 326 BCE, were called Aspasians and Acvaka [the Asva–Ghana of Sanskrit and Abgan of the middle Persian] from which the names Yusufzay and Afghan have evolved. In the words of the historian Peter Green, . . . most of the tribesmen he came against proved themselves ﬁrst class ﬁghters. During one engagement he got an arrow through his shoulder; and by the end of the campaign his condition can perhaps best be described as jittery.45

In 1892, the easy paciﬁcation of Konarr and the stationing of government troops in Asmar under Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Charkhay became a signal for the paciﬁcation of Bajaur and the regions further east. Because of the conﬂicting policies of the khans of Bajaur, there was even a strong impression among its inhabitants that their khans might accept the amir’s rule.46

Bajaur, Dir and Swat The vast territories of Bajaur, Dir and Swat were autonomous principalities or khanates commonly known as yaghistan (the land of rebels), to the east of the Konarr valley from which they were separated by a rocky mountain. Numerous divisions of the Pashtun Yusufzay and Mandir tribal confederation, their clients (hamsayas), and others populated the three khanates. The relatively fertile region of Bajaur is

44

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 749. Kakar, Afghan, Afghanistan and the Afghans and the Organization of State in India, Persia and Afghanistan, (in Persian), Kabul University Press, 1979, 17. Kohzad, Ahmad Ali, Afghanistan Dar Shahnama, (in Persian) [Afghanistan in the Shahnama], Baihaqi Book Publishing House, Kabul, 1976, 288. Green, Peter, Alexander of Macedon 356–323 BC, A Historical Biography, University of California Press, 1992, 382. 46 PD, 23 Feb. 93, PSLI, 65, 722. 45

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

77

comprised of the ﬁve valleys of Charmang, Babuqara, Sur Kamar, Rud and Mamund (or Watalai). Nawagai, the seat of the khanate, lies in the Sur Kamar valley. Bajaur is peopled principally by theYusufzay Tarkanays, but Mohmands, Sapays, Uthman Khel and others also live there. Although outnumbered by other groups of people, the Yusufzays and Mandirs were supreme in the region as a whole on account of owning the land and were as important there as the Durranays were in Kandahar. (The Durranays and Yusufzays are descendants of a common ancestor, the Sarbun.) A khan ruled over a khanate, maintained some troops, and collected revenue on the basis of a tithe ('ushr). However, his power was limited by a jirga (council) of the heads of clans among whom the khan was the ﬁrst among equals. No khan’s position was secure or permanent, though some were khans because their fathers had been khans. On the whole, a khan was powerful when he had a strong character and many relatives with a substantial following among the minor khans under his jurisdiction. Only with the approval of the elders did he have the right to levy a tithe as tax and recruit men for military service in times of war.47 During the period under discussion, 'Omara Khan (Umra Khan) of Jandol emerged as the most powerful khan. Situated between the Bajaur and Panjkora rivers, Jandol had many khans known as Mast Khel. Among them 'Omara Khan, son of Aman Khan Tarkanay, ﬁnally emerged victorious, and by 1890 he made himself the khan of Jandol as a result of a decade-long struggle.48 He scored the victory that made him powerful in 1890 when he occupied Dir, and expelled Mohammad Sharif Khan. The defeated khan who was a member of the ruling house founded by Mulla Ilyas, known as the Akhund Baba, took refuge in Swat. By expelling the khan of Dir, 'Omara Khan threatened the mehtar (ruler) of the principality of Chitral. By the middle of 1891, he likewise threatened Nawagai and, to a lesser extent, Swat.49

47 Momand, M. J. Siyal, Da Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 97. Yapp, M. E., “Disturbances in eastern Afghanistan, 1839–42”, reprinted from the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. xxv, part 3, 1962, 500. Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, 178. 48 Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, North West Frontier Province, Calcutta, 1908, 129. Henceforth GNWFP. 49 MM, Apr. 91, PSLI, 63, 120. Siyal, Da Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 92.

78

chapter four

'Omara Khan’s rapid rise to power turned many khans against him. Safdar Khan, the khan of Bajaur, made an alliance with Mohammad Sharif Khan, the exiled khan of Dir.50 Additionally, Mian Gul 'Abd al-Wadud of Swat incited the people in his domain against 'Omara Khan;51 his support was important because he was the son of 'Abd al-Ghafur Khan, who was known as the Akhund of Swat, as well as the Ghous (Saint) of Saido or the Babajee of Swat, and was the most celebrated former ruler of Swat. Among his many disciples some were as inﬂuential as he himself was such as Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam, and Mulla Najm al-Din. The Mohmands of Mittai likewise supported the khans who were against 'Omara Khan in their endeavors.52 The amir supported Safdar Khan with larger allowances, and even expressed willingness to support him with troops if necessary.53 The concentration of troops at Asmar under the command of Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, himself a Yusufzay Pashtun, had changed the balance of power in favor of the latter, in particular after his troops scored a victory in Shurtan, in Bajaur.54 The defeat of 'Omara Khan and the extension of the amir’s rule in Bajaur seemed imminent. However, at this juncture the Government of India warned the sipah salar as well as 'Omara Khan not to move against each other. Speciﬁcally, it warned the former that his advance into Bajaur would be “. . . regarded as an act of hostility to the Government of India.”55 The strong tone of the warning indicated the resolve of the British to implement its Forward Policy, which culminated in concluding the Durand Agreement in 1893 (See Chapter Ten). Although the amir maintained his claim to Bajaur, he instructed the sipah salar not to advance on it. As for 'Omara Khan, the British ﬁnally forced him to ﬂee to Afghanistan after he, in conjunction with Sher Afzal, the pro-Kabul exiled brother of the mehtar of Chitral, occupied that principality in 1895. Thus, a remarkable khan, the socalled ‘Napoleon of Bajaur’ was forced out of the region. He had,

50

MM, May 91, PSLI, 63, 497. PD, 21 July 91, PSLI, 63, 1068. 52 PD, 13 June 91, PSLI, 63, 624. In 1917, Mian Gul was acclaimed as the ruler of Swat, and later in 1926 recognized by the British as the wali of Swat. Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtanao Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 89. 53 PD, 8 Aug. 91, PSLI, 63, 1183. 54 PD, 28 June 92, PSLI, 67, 308. 55 PD, 28 June 92, PSLI, 67, 308. 51

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

79

through statesmanship and military action, carved out a kingdom that comprised Dir, Jandol, and Chitral and, like the amir; he had been determined to overrun Bajaur and Kaﬁristan. The exiled Mohammad Sharif Khan became the khan of Dir once again, this time with the additional title of nawab (ruler). This occurred in 1897 through an agreement with the British in which they undertook to pay him a regular allowance and grant him weapons in return for his keeping the road to Chitral open. He ruled the khanate until he died in 1904.56

Kurma From late 1891 onward, Kurma (Kurram), inhabited by Shi'i "Ali Khel Pashtuns, commonly known as the Turis (the Blackened), was frequently raided by the neighboring Sunni tribal elders and mullas, who had been encouraged to do so by Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan.57 Finally a widely known adventurer, Sarwar Khan of Chinarak, nicknamed Chikkai, who had given much trouble to the British at Kohat, occupied Lower Kurma (Kuz Kurma) and the Turis paid him revenue.58 This occurred after Chikkai and his armed men returned from Kabul where the amir had received him “. . . with unusual honor.”59 Having given up hope of recovering the territory60 the Turis concluded a truce with Chikkai, according to which they agreed to let him retain Lower Kurma, while he agreed to make no further advances.61 The amir tried to make the Turis his subjects, but he wanted to do this through a proxy to avoid antagonizing the Government of India, which had already told him that Kurma would not be restored to Afghanistan.62 By the treaty of Gandumak Kurma had ﬁrst been conditionally assigned to the Government of India, and later annexed

56

Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 92. Derajat Conﬁdential Diary, 15 Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 513. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawaikh, 826. 58 KD, 4–8 Dec. 91, PSLI, 69, 1706. 59 MM, Oct. 91, PSLI, 66, 1324. 60 MM, June 91, PSLI, 66, 1323. 61 MM, May 92, PSLI, 66, 884. 62 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 82. 57

80

chapter four

by it. After the Government of India exchanged some correspondence with the Amir on the subject, British troops forced Chikkai and others out of Kurma, in October 1892, and aﬀected a settlement there.63 The amir remained silent.

The Afridays Settled in high walled forts and villages in the Khyber, Akhor, Kowwatt and Tirah from ancient times the Afridays or Apridays are the most important Pashtun tribe of the historic twenty-three—milelong Khyber Pass extending from Jamrud to Dakka. The Afridays are probably the people known as Aparaytae, described by Herodotus. Due to their mountainous territory, and their hard style of living they have lived beyond the pale of government authority even to the present day. Parts of the Khyber valley are also inhabited by the Mohmands and Shinwarays, but the Afridays are the predominant tribe. As the guardian of the Khyber, these tribes were collectively referred to as the Khyberays. They were, thus, singularly important because as a gateway of Central Asia to South Asia, the Khyber Pass served as the shortest thoroughfare for the passage of caravans, conquerors, merchants and people. Additionally, the Khyber Pass directly connected the cities of Peshawar and Jalalabad. The Khyberays became famous in the latter stage of the Roshaniyya movement when they rose several times in rebellion under the leadership of Aimal Khan Mohmand and Darya Khan Afriday against the Mughal rulers of India. Aimal Khan “who was a born general, declared himself king, struck coins in his name and invited all the Pathan tribes to take part in the national struggle.” For four years he kept alive the independence struggle of the Afghans from Kabul to Peshawar. In the Khyber area in 1672, the Pashtuns under his leadership killed “. . . a large number of soldiers and oﬃcers of the [Mughal] empire. . . and enslaved thousands of them.” According to the Imperial Gazetteer of India, the entire Mughal army numbering 40,000 soldiers perished in this encounter. The Afridays are divided into the eight distinct divisions of Malik Din Khel, Qambar

63 Harris, L., British Policy on the North West Frontier of India, 1889–1901, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis at London University, 1960, 88.

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

81

Khel, Koki Khel, Zakha Khel, Akaw Khel, Se Pai, Kamar Khel, and Adam Khel.64 After the Second Anglo-Afghan War an agreement had been reached between the Government of India and the Afridays in which the latter allowed the Khyber Pass to remain open, in return for allowances and a guarantee of non-interference in their domestic aﬀairs.65 The Afridays did not consider this to be a surrender of their rights, and, as before, regarded themselves as fully independent of the British66 and continually oﬀered allegiance to the amir. However, the amir temporized, encouraging them to look to Kabul for support without actually supporting them with troops. To the repeated oﬀer of allegiance by the various jirgas of the Aﬁdays the amir kept replying that the “Afridis must be unanimous in accepting his rule before he could address the British Government as such.”67 The amir actually did not intend to run afoul of the British Government over the Afridays, as the British had extended control over the Khyber as a result of the Gandumak treaty which they had imposed on Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, in 1879. Hence, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s excuse that the Afridays were interested in getting allowances, but unwilling to inform the British Commissioner of their intention to submit to him.68

Waziristan Waziristan comprised Northern Waziristan and Southern Waziristan where the Massyd or Masawud (not Massoud or Mahsud of the English sources) and Darwesh Khel Wazirs constitute the bulk of its inhabitants and the Ghilzays, the Ormurr, the Dawars, the Hindus and the sayyeds constitute its smaller groups of people. In Southern Waziristan the Gomal is the oldest of all the trade routes in this quarter along which proceeded every year a succession of caravans of thousands of well-armed traders, called powindas, from Afghanistan 64 Herodotus, The History, 3.91. Kakar, Afghans and Afghanistan, 50. Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 254. GNWFP, 7. 65 Harris, British Policy, 33. 66 Afriday elders to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 4 Nov. 97, PSLI, 99, No. 205, Encl., 231. 67 MM, Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 108. 68 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 777, 786.

82

chapter four

to India. The Wazirs “. . . are by instinct intensely democratic, and any man may rise by courage and wisdom to the position of malik or leader; but these maliks have often little inﬂuence and no real authority.” In 1881, the Punjab Government of India characterized the Massyds thus: “Notorious as the boldest of robbers, they are more worthily admired for the courage which they show in attack and in hand-to-hand ﬁghting with the sword.”69 Just as other tribes in eastern Afghanistan, the Wazirs of Waziristan also looked on the ruler of Afghanistan as a Muslim sovereign of their own ethnic stock. In 1883, they invited the amir’s oﬃcials to their land, but when the oﬃcials arrived there the Kabul Khel section of the tribe drove them away70 even though a militia of Kabul had been stationed in Wana, a town in Southern Waziristan. Subsequently, however, the Wazirs and Dawars agreed to pay a tithe, but the Biland Khel section incited the speen gund, as opposed to the tore gund against the amir.71 Among the Wazirs, as among some other Pashtun tribes, the speen gund (white bloc) and tore gund (black bloc) were two leagues of tribes traditionally at odds with each other. Although the existence of the leagues should have made it relatively easy for the government to penetrate the Wazirs, it actually made this more diﬃcult. The schism between the two leagues was so pronounced that even the amir’s marriages with the daughter of Malik Rahmat Khan and the sister of Malik Tirin Khan did not help him extend his authority in Waziristan. These maliks were probably associated with the tore gund, as one Shahzada, a leader of the speen gund, went so far as to invite Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to return, promising him the support of “sixty-thousand” families of the Wazirs and Tanays to unseat the amir.72 Actually, Shahzada resented the allowances, which the amir paid to his relations, fearing that the allowances would strengthen his opponents.

69 GNWFP, 243–255. Siyal, De Zeeno Pashtano Qaba’ilo Shajaray, 275–281. The word Wazir is derived from Wadair, denoting a subdivision of the Sapay (Sapi or Saﬁ) tribe, the other being the Gurbuz, and the Massyd. Sections of the Sapays also lived in Konarr, Laghman, Tagao, Paktia, Ghorband and other localities inside Afghanistan. Dr. Nasir Ahmad Sapay, personal communication, California, 2004. 70 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 414. 71 Ibid., 552. 72 Ibid., 882.

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

83

Notwithstanding the setback, the amir could have paciﬁed Waziristan by force or other means, but he refrained from doing so. The reason for this was the warning he received from the viceroy in July 1892, stating that . . . the British Government will not tolerate any further advance on the part of your oﬃcers or permit Your Highness to establish new posts or to increase any garrison you may now have in Waziristan or the country to the south of it.73

This was after foreign secretary, Mortimer Durand, had stated in June 1991 that We are getting very bad news all along the border from the Black Mountain to the Waziri country. The Amir is threatening Kurram; the Afridis are in a very shaky condition, with his emissaries among them giving them ammunition.74

Afterward, the amir made no advances further east, and made excuses to those Wazirs who persisted in submitting to him, arguing that they were interested only in getting allowances whether they received them from the British or the Afghan government.75 The British presence in the area was due to the British India’s so-called “Scientiﬁc Frontier” which led to their advances toward Afghanistan. For this purpose they had already tunneled the Khojak range and built the railway at Chaman, pointing unmistakably toward Kandahar. The amir resented the construction of this railway greatly describing it, as quoted by Durand, as “running an awl into his navel.”76 The ﬁnal outcome of these events was the Durand Agreement (See Chapter Ten).

The Bar Durranays and Afghanistan The amir’s advance into the lands of the eastern Pashtuns or the Bar Durranays of Ahmad Shah Durranay can be understood in the context of their relationship with Afghanistan. Following the expulsion 73 Lansdowne to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 16 July 92, Past Records and Files, Archives of the Royal Afghan Ministry of External Aﬀairs, Kabul, 5, Henceforth ARAMFA. 74 Durand, M., quoted in Sykes, Sir Percy, The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand, A Biography, Cassell and Co. Ltd., London, 1926, 201. 75 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 415. 76 Sykes, Mortimer Durand, 201.

84

chapter four

of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir concentrated on consolidating his rule in the interior of the country and on extending it into the outlying regions, especially those inhabited by his kinsmen, the Pashtuns. Diﬃcult as the latter program was, the amir had the resources and the determination to implement it. In the background was, of course, the ethnic aﬃnity, as well as family and personal marriage relationships that he had with some of the tribes. He was also personally well acquainted with the region and the people. However, while the amir was certain to succeed in his policy of paciﬁcation, he had other concerns. Since the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan the British and Russian empires were steadily approaching Afghanistan and their oﬃcials did not hesitate to curb the advances toward them of the amir’s forces. Consequently, the amir could not become a second Ahmad Shah, although in military skill and the ability to organize he was his equal if not superior to him. Of all the outlying regions of Afghanistan, the regions to the south east of the country were especially signiﬁcant because Afghanistan as a country had originated from this region. From time immemorial this was the land that was inhabited predominantly by the Pashtuns, who in the eighteenth century helped Ahmad Shah Durranay establish the kingdom of Afghanistan. These Pashtuns have professed allegiance to Afghan rulers ever since. It was because of this kind of relationship that the Pashtun tribes moved unhindered within this vast region. For example, in the post-Mongol era, some tribes, including the Durranays, have spread from these lands toward the west as far as Kandahar and Herat. In the opposite direction, “. . . between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries, numerous Pathan tribes from Afghanistan spread over and conquered the country roughly corresponding to the modern North-West Frontier Province.”77 Migration of the Pashtun tribes in both directions was not uncommon. Every time the Pashtuns were pressured by outsiders, or when they themselves found it proﬁtable to migrate in search of new lands and pastures, they did so in both directions. They have actually engaged in this type of migration from the Vedic period as the original inhabitants of “the Paropamisade of the Ancients”, Ghor, and the Sulaiman mountains [the Kisay Ghar]. However, the southeastern region was not exclusively inhabited by them, and other ethnic groups

77

38.

Davies, C. C., The Problem of the North-West Frontier of India, Cambridge, 1932,

the pacification of eastern afghanistan

85

had a share in it.78 In medieval times, the Pashtuns did so within the then contemporary conﬁnes of Afghanistan, which stretched roughly from the Indus to Helmand and populated predominantly by the Pashtuns, called Paktues and Pakthas in the Vedas79 and Pactyes by Herodotus as noted in Introduction.80 The name Afghanistan was initially applied to the land lying between the Indus River and Ghazni on which the Pashtuns had settled.81 It was probably this country which Herodotus described as the “the Pactyic country”, placing it “north of the rest of India” and referring to its people “as the most warlike of the Indians” who lived “much like the Bactrians.”82 The terms Acvaka and Aspasians of the ancient Greek historians also refer to these people. Modern Afghanistan emerged, as already noted, mainly through the eﬀorts of the Pashtuns, notably eastern Pashtuns. They had played a major part in assisting Ahmad Shah establish Afghanistan not only as a political entity up to the Indus but also as an empire. From Ahmad Shah down, all Afghan rulers looked on these Pashtuns as their subjects, not only because they were Pashtuns—that is, people of their own stock related to them by ethnicity, language, religion, history and culture, but also because they had accompanied them during their campaigns in northern India, as far as Delhi. The Sadozay rulers had even adopted Peshawar as their winter capital. To Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the land up to the Indus River formed the eastern limit of Afghanistan,83 speaking of its inhabitants as “. . . people of my nationality and religion.”84 An outward sign of this aﬃnity was the fact that beginning with the Sadozays, Afghan rulers as well as members of the royal families had established marriage ties with the Pashtuns. The amir’s grandmother, mother, two of his wives and some wives of his sons were Pashtuns from these areas. As already noted, a wife of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan was a daughter of Sa"adat Khan Mohmand. However, the main weakness of Afghan rulers was their inability to rule directly over the Pashtuns.

78 Dorn, B., Annotations on Part the First in Ullah, Neamet, History of the Afghans, 65, 72. 79 Tate, R., The Kingdom of Afghanistan, originally published in 1911, reproduced by Indus publications, 1973, 15. 80 Herodotus, The History, 7.67. 81 For details see, Kakar, Afghan, and Afghanistan. 82 Herodotus, The History, 3. 101. 83 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1012. 84 Sultan Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 2, 158, 159.

86

chapter four

This was due to the type of government which allowed, or had to allow, autonomy for the outlying provinces, especially the lands of the eastern Pashtuns, who resented the interference of the central government in their aﬀairs. Additionally, with regard to some districts of eastern Afghanistan the amir was in a less advantageous position than his predecessors had been. In critical moments of the negotiations for the amirate, the representative of the British Government of India told the then Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan that the frontier districts and some passes mentioned in the Gandumak treaty would not be restored. At the time he remained silent, presumably allowing himself space for future political maneuver. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, the amir embarked on establishing control over the lands of the eastern Pashtuns. However, it took him ten years to pacify the Shinwarays, and also to put down major rebellions elsewhere before he was able to pacify the eastern Pashtuns. Throughout this period, and later, until his death even in spite of the Durand Agreement he concentrated on peaceful penetration. He did so mainly by granting allowances to the Pashtun elders and mullas, employing many mullas and emissaries for this purpose. Also, from nowhere else to the same extent as from these areas did so many jirgas of elders visit Kabul where the amir treated them as his subjects. The amir’s many booklets on the jihad were addressed mainly to the people of the regions as noted. The progress of his paciﬁcation of these areas was slow but steady. After the paciﬁcation of the Shinwarays he ﬁnally dispatched a military force under his most able general to Asmar with the speciﬁc aim of pacifying Bajaur and beyond. It was just at this juncture that the British Government of India intervened. Had it not done so the amir would probably have paciﬁed all of the regions in eastern Afghanistan over which his grandfather, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, had exercised control.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE GREAT GHILZAY UPRISING AND ITS SUPPRESSION

In 1886 the amir’s alliance with the Ghilzays was shaken to its foundation when the latter rose against him. This was an extremely serious event because the Ghilzays, after the Durranays, were the second major Pashtun tribal confederation with their major divisions of Hotak, Tokhay, Andar, Tarakay, Sulaiman Khel, Nasir, and Kharotay. The view held by some non-Afghan writers concerning the origin of the Ghilzays is as strange as the view of others about the Pashto language and the Pahtuns. The view held by the Ghilzays themselves concerning their origin is basically diﬀerent from that held by non-Afghan writers. According to the Ghilzays their ancestors whose original name was Gharzay lived in the Gharj district of Ghor from where they migrated to the Kisay Ghar [the Sulaiman Mountains]. Slowly, over the years due to their increasing population, they spread as pastoralists in various districts in Ningrahar, Logar, Paktya, Kalat and Kandahar.1 However, unlike the Durranays, the Ghilzays neither settled in one particular region, nor owned as much land. Those Ghilzays, who settled on the land between Kabul and Kandahar were referred to in English-language sources as the ‘Western Ghilzays’, while those who settled on the land between Kabul and Laghman were referred to as the ‘Eastern Ghilzays’. A portion of almost every major division of the Ghilzays lived as transhumant nomads in the summer on pastures near Ghazni and in the winter in northern India. The Ghilzays considered themselves to be peers to the Durranays particularly because in 1709 their celebrated elder, Mir Wais Hotak, was the ﬁrst to liberate Kandahar from the Safavi domination, while his son, Shah Mahmud Hotak, overran Persia in 1722, ushering the era of the rise of Pashtuns. Due to these feats the Hotak section of the Ghilzays was considered to be the badshah khel (ruling section),

1 Hotak, A. Aman Allah, De Khpilwakee Lmar Srak, ya de Hotako de Afghani Dawlat 'Urooj aw Nizool, (Pashto), [The Beacon of Independence, The Rise and Decline of the Afghan Hotak State]. Daunish Book Store, Peshawar, 1989, 6.

The Ghilzay Land

88 chapter five

the great ghilzay uprising and its suppression

89

as the Sadozay section was subsequently referred to in the same way. Consequently, relations between the Durranays and Ghilzays were marked more by competition and enmity and less by cooperation and amity.

The Seeds of Enmity As previously described, the amir made an alliance with the Ghilzays when he confronted his rival cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. However, following his expulsion in late 1881 the amir’s relations with the Ghilzays became increasingly strained. First the government detained elders of the Andar for refusing to pay revenue arrears. Afterward it suppressed the Tarakays for the support they had given to Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, and demanded that they should also pay their revenue arrears. Additionally, the government imprisoned Mir Afzal Khan Hotak, a descendant of Mir Wais Khan Hotak, charging that he had aspired to the throne during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.2 The arrest was probably due to the support he had given to the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Whatever the truth, the arrest provoked the whole tribe, since it considered the Hotak section to be its ruling section, as previously noted. The amir, further, angered the tribe by alienating Mulla Mushke-'Alam when he refused, as the mullah had requested, to release Ghazi Mohammad Jan Khan Wardak and 'Asmat Allah Jabar Khel. The amir had imprisoned and later had them executed on charges that the former had plotted to assassinate him3 and the latter had corresponded with Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. As described in Chapter Two, General Wardak had campaigned heroically against the British occupation of Afghanistan for which he had gained the title of ghazi, and the mulla was extremely inﬂuential with the people south of the Hindu Kush in general and the Ghilzays in particular. He had played a major part in the patriotic war, and, in addition, was related to the tribe by being an Andar from Shilgar. 2

Col. Mohammad Afzal (Mamakhel), 13 July 83, PSLI, 37, 543. AB, Kabul Correspondent, 7 Dec. 81, PSLI, 31, 305. Ghobar maintains that the leaders of the jihad movement turned away from the amir when they found out that he was an Anglophile. Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 658. 3

90

chapter five

Although the amir had reasons for the arrests and executions, the Ghilzay elders were not convinced by his argument. The actual problem was the lack of trust between the amir and the elders. This was because during the resistance period the Ghilzay elders had become so powerful that the amir came to fear them. He also feared Mohammad Jan Wardak, whom the common people revered as a saint and a hero for the exceptional dynamic leadership that he had provided during the patriotic war, and who, afterward, had demonstrated signs of independence. In addition to those previously mentioned, the amir also imprisoned many others and the arrests frightened the people. The mulla declared: Three thousand men who took defense during the British occupation and endured hardship in protecting the honor and the country of Islam are today in prison in Kabul. Therefore all the people including me consider us in danger.4

The amir did not deny the charge, but reasoned that he had not arrested any innocent man and that many of those arrested had been held in accord with the Shari'a.5 While he still attempted to gain the mulla’s trust by referring to him as his friend and religious leader6 the latter could not be persuaded, replying that the amir had killed many people through similar treachery.7 Thereafter, he intensiﬁed his anti-amir rhetoric, inciting the Sulaiman Khel Ghilzay8 and the people who lived between Ghazni and Kabul. He died in 1886 at the age of 96, leaving a discontented tribe behind.

New Taxes The next phase of the worsening of relations between the government and the Ghilzay landowners began when the amir imposed new taxes on them. These taxes were wider in range and at a higher rate9 than the ﬁxed quotas ( jam" bast) that the tribe as a whole had 4 5 6 7 8 9

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 408. Ibid. KD, 21 Sept. 83, PSLI, 3, 153. KD, 21 Dec. 83, PSLI, 39, 338. MM, Nov. 86, PSLI, 49, 76. KD, Jan. 86, PSLI, 46, 193. Kand D, 12 Mar. 86, PSLI, 46, 1533.

the great ghilzay uprising and its suppression

91

formerly paid through its elders.10 Even more serious was a new system of taxation which the amir introduced to increase land revenue. Accordingly, landowners were to pay a tax of one-third (se-kot) of the produce of land irrigated by streams (nahri ), a tax of one-ﬁfth (khums) on land irrigated by springs (chishmai ), and a tithe ('ushr) on land irrigated by underground canals (karezi ).11 These were the heaviest rates of taxes the tribe had ever been asked to pay, whereas the Durranay landowners enjoyed the fruits of rent-free lands. The amir also stopped the customary allowances that the government paid to the late Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam, and his son and successor, Mulla 'Abd al-Karim, and, in addition, made their rent-free land subject to the payment of revenue.12

The Uprising The discontented Ghilzay elders rose in rebellion in October 1886, in support of the exiled sardar, Mohammad Ayyub Khan,13 after General Taj Mohammad Khan Ghilzay who had accompanied him to Persia, had conspired with them.14 To make their uprising legitimate, the rebel leaders granted the title of caliph (khalifa) to Mulla 'Abd al-Karim,15 and they allowed Mohammad Shah Hotak, a son of Mir Afzal Hotak (freed from prison), to lead them in military campaigns. There is some confusion about the title which Mulla 'Abd al-Karim assumed to make the uprising legitimate. According to some reports, the latter was given the title of amir,16 while the former had declared himself king,17 and had read the religious sermon (khutba),18 and issued coins in his own name.19 The latter reports seem doubtful, since the rebel leaders had invited Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to lead them in their campaigns against the amir.

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

GAK, 141. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Col. Afzal, 9 Aug. 87, PSLI, 51, 310. Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir to Peshawar Commissioner, 7 Dec. 86, PSLI, 49, 111. PD, 8 Jan. 87, PSLI, 49, 283. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 226. PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 243. BACA, 178. PD, 29 Mar. 87, PSLI, 49, 1320. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, KD, 29 Oct. 86s, PSLI, 48, 1173. PD, 20 May 87, PSLI, 50, 725.

92

chapter five

Probably, as Fayz Mohammad, the oﬃcial chronicler states, Mulla 'Abd al-Karim was declared something similar to badshah (ruler).20 Whatever the truth, by inviting Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan the rebels planned to oppose the amir more eﬀectively. The Sulaiman Khel and the Andar took the ﬁrst step toward rebellion by looting a Durranay army contingent in the Muqur area,21 and afterward marching on the city of Ghazni. However, in late October 1886, at Talkhakzar [ Talkha Guzar?] the army led by General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay defeated them, and the general sent the heads of about two thousand fallen rebels to Kabul where, after the fashion of Timur Lane, a tower of skulls (kala munar) was displayed as a warning to others.22 The leading rebels escaped to the country of the Kakars in the British territory.

Confrontation and Suppression After the victory, the amir instructed General Ghulam Haydar Orakzay to disarm the Andar and their allies. He also instructed him to stop the allowances that the government paid to religious scholars, to sell the lands and underground irrigation canals of those who had escaped, and to conﬁscate the lands of the Qarabagh region. In addition, he instructed the general to build a fort in Ataghar in the heart of the Hotak land.23 With the exception of the latter the instructions were carried out, the Ghilzays were harshly treated, and their women insulted. The uprising appeared to have been suppressed, although it was the winter that created that impression. Meanwhile, the amir tried to isolate the Ghilzays as a whole while he appealed directly to their elders to submit. He also tried to win the support of his own tribesmen, the Durranays, who, until then, were on bad terms with him, warning them that the Ghilzays were after their ruling position.24 The Ghilzays had, after their looting of the Durranay contingent, made it known that they had risen against

20 21 22

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 516. MM, Nov. 86, PSLI, 49, 75. The Amir to Colonel 'Ata Allah, British Agent, KD, 2 Nov. 86, PSLI, 48,

117. 23 24

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 531. KD, 29 Oct. 86, PSLI, 48, 1173.

the great ghilzay uprising and its suppression

93

the amir only, and that they had no quarrel with the Durranays. However, the amir still continued to incite them against the Ghilzays, just as he had done the opposite when he was engaged in the ﬁght against Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. Further, the amir let them enjoy their lands free of revenue as before, whereas prior to the Ghilzay uprising he had ordered them to pay it.25 Ultimately, the amir failed to win over other people against the Ghilzays. He succeeded only in weaning the Hazaras from the Ghilzays with the help of the Qizilbashes,26 but failed to win the support of the Tajiks of Ghazni and Kohistan. The amir’s notable failure was with the 'ulema (Sunni religious scholars), as only a small number of them condemned the Ghilzays as rebels, while most sat on the fence by declaring that he was justiﬁed in ﬁghting those who were dangerous to Islam.27 This reference could not apply to the Ghilzays because a distinguished scholar, Mulla 'Abd al-Karim-led them in the campaigns against the amir. More importantly, the amir failed in his eﬀorts to calm the rebel leaders, even though he promised them that he would lower their rate of revenue if they desisted from rebelling.28 The rebel leaders rejected his overtures, and Mulla 'Abd al-Karim declared that the amir’s tyranny “had exceeded all bounds,”29 and that he was “. . . an inﬁdel, the extirpator of Islam, worshipper of himself, and the friend of an alien Government.”30 The nonDurranay Pashtuns of the neighboring lands, including the Kakars, supported the Ghilzays, but among the latter the Tokhays did not participate in the rebellion.31 The uprising took formidable proportions during the following spring. The total number of the rebels was reported to have increased from twenty thousand in March 188732 to one hundred thousand in April.33 However, after their initial successes in Qalat and Ataghar,34 the rebels were defeated at Ataghar,35 Qal'a-e-Katal, and still later 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Kand D, 25 Jan. 87, PSLI, 48, 487. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 539, 527, 541. KD, 29 Oct. 86, PSLI, 48, 1137. PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 244. PD, 8 Jan. 87, PSLI, 49, 283. PD, 29 Mar. 87, PSLI, 49, 1320. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 539. MM, Mar. 87, PSLI, 49, 1281. PD, 7 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 243. BACA, 178. KD, 20 May 87, PSLI, 50, 879.

94

chapter five

in other unspeciﬁed places,36 by the government army under the command of General Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay. In its ﬁnal phase the uprising found support in an unexpected quarter. The Ghilzays in the army at Herat, who had earlier risen in support of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan,37 arrived and joined their recalcitrant kinsmen, and inﬂicted the ﬁnal defeat on the army and recovered Nawa in July 1887.38 However, thereafter with the onset of winter and against the well-organized army which was continually reinforced they could no longer ﬁght, and the uprising petered out. About twenty-four thousand Ghilzays were killed in all the clashes. The Ghilzay uprising provided an opportunity for Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to try his luck once again. However, he traveled in the wrong direction, and failed to arrive at the Afghan border until late September when the uprising was over. Thus, the sardar lost his ﬁnal opportunity to enter Afghanistan, as by then the amir had fortiﬁed the frontiers, and the Persian Government, under pressure from the British Government, had ordered his seizure.39 The Ghilzay uprising was essentially a war between the government and the Ghilzay landowners, whose power the amir had resolved to break. Among the provocative measures that the amir took, he imposed heavy taxes on the landowners, resulting in the uprising led by the Ghilzay elders. The elders were actively supported in their stand by almost all of their own tribesmen, while others responded with good will. The amir had neither, as he failed to send tribal militias against them, or to obtain a legal ruling ( fatwa) from the ‘ulema to denounce them as rebels as he had done in response to other rebellious tribes. However, since the Ghilzay elders had poor weapons and no other means of ﬁghting, they had no chance of success against the well-disciplined and well-equipped army. The uprising illustrated the ineﬀectiveness of a popular uprising against a well-organized military power. After their defeat, the amir intentionally disabled the Ghilzay by impoverishing them economically and weakening them politically, doing so with a view to preventing future uprisings. What the amir

36

MM, June 87, PSLI, 50, 1239. Riyazi, 'Ayn Waqayi', 262. 38 KD, 5 July 87, PSLI, 50, 283. 39 For detail see, Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 226–232. Riyazi had met Sardar Mohammad Ayyub when the latter was on his way to Afghanistan. 37

the great ghilzay uprising and its suppression

95

had once believed about the Andar he now believed about the entire tribe, stating that “when they [Andar] have no money left with them, [they] will not again raise disturbances.”40 He proved correct in his prediction, and the Ghilzays never rose en masse again. The uprising also had another important consequence; after its suppression the amir drew closer to his own Durranay tribe—in particular, to the Mohammadzay section to which he belonged. He provided annual allowances to its members residing in Kabul whether female or male and treated the whole section as a partner of the state (sharik-e-dawlat).

40

The Amir to Na"ib Kotwal of Kabul, KD, 7 Dec. 86, PSLI, 49, 149.

CHAPTER SIX

THE REVOLT OF SARDAR MOHAMMAD ISHAQ KHAN AND ITS SUPPRESSION

The extension of the power of Kabul over the province of Afghan Turkestan marks an important increase in the power of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. In 1880, at the same time that he established himself in Badakhshan, his full-cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, took possession of Turkestan of which province he remained governor. Ishaq Khan ruled the province as governor in virtual independence until in 1888 he revolted, was defeated and ﬂed to Samarqand in Bukhara.

Historical Background Since the Vedic time, Turkestan—formerly known as Bakhdi, Balkh and Bakhtar (the East), as well as Bactria (or Bactriana) by the Greek historians, had been an important region. Its importance lay in its history as the ﬁrst center of civilization in former Afghanistan. The region was, basically, important for its agriculture and pastures as well as its geographic location that directly connects Central Asia to the regions south of the Hindu Kush and South Asia. The ruins of the old capital city of Balkh (ancient Zariaspa, or Bactra) which still exist there, attest its former grandeur. King Gushtasp of the Aspa ruling dynasty, in the Avestan period, is said to have founded the city of Balkh or Bakhtar.1 It was there during the reign of King Vishtaspa of the Aspa dynasty that the reformer Zoroaster began to preach his Zoroastrianism, a religion based on the dual concept of the god of virtue (Ahura Mazda) and the god of evil (Ahriman), sometime between 1000 and 600 BCE.2 1 The Greek name ‘Bactriana’ is derived from the river ‘Bactrius’, the Balkhab of the locals. Leitner, G. W., “Dardistan”, Woking 1895, 10. 2 Kakar, M. H., “The Avesta and Zoroaster of Mr. Babi and the Trace of Pashto in the Avestan Period” in Light and Defense or Essays on the Population, History and the Current Aﬀairs of Afghanistan, (Pashto), Sapay Center for Pashto Research and Development, Peshawar 1999, 105–122.

97

Afghan Turkestan

the revolt of sardar mohammad ishaq khan

98

chapter six

With its excellent cotton and wheat, Balkh was still a kingdom, though a dependency of the Achaemenian Persia, when Alexander the Great invaded it in 330 BCE. Its ruler, Bessus, and his successor, Spitamenes, waged “a nationalist war, with strong religious overtones”, and “between them they gave Alexander more continuous trouble than all the embattled hosts of Darius.”3 Afterward, in the Hellenistic Greco-Bactrian period, “Bactria occupied much of modern Afghanistan”, a country then known as “the land of a thousand cities.” The Greek colonists of the post-Alexander period had contributed to this development by fraternizing with the native population so much that, according to Frank Holt, nineteenth century European scholars “. . . saw in Bactria the best of all ancient worlds.”4 It was for its grandeur that in the Islamic times Bactria was called umm al-bilad (the mother of cities), as well as janat al-arz (the paradise of the earth), and khair al-turab (the best of soil).5 However, the city of Balkh was totally destroyed in the Chingizid onslaught of the thirteenth century as were all other cities of Afghanistan. During the second reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the governor of Turkestan, Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan, transported the debris of Balkh to Takhtapul. During the second reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, the Shi'i governor of the region, Na"ib Mohammad 'Alam Khan, enlarged Mazar-e-Sharif (the noble mausoleum) at the expense of Balkh. Mazar was (and still is) assumed to be the site of the shrine of 'Ali, the fourth caliph of Islam, and the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. 6 There also lie the graves of Ghazi Mohammad Akbar Khan and Amir Sher 'Ali Khan.

3 Green, P., Alexander of Macedon, 338. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, transl. by A. de Selincort, Penguin Books, 1958, 229–232. That the inhabitants of Bactria were patriotic is evident from a statement by Zoroaster as, according to him, instructed by Ahura Mazda: “I have made every land dear to its people, even though it had no charms whatever in it: had I not made every land dear to its people, even though it had no charms whatever in it, then the whole living world would have invaded the Airyana Vaego. The ﬁrst of the good lands and countries which I, Ahura Mazda, created was the Airyana Vaego.” “Selections from the ZendAvesta”, Transl. by Darmestetter, James in The Sacred Books of the East, the Colonial Press, New York, MDCCCXCIX, 67. 4 Holt, Frank L., The Thundering Zeus, The Making of Hellenistic Bactria, University of California Press, 1999, 9–20. 5 Leitner, Dardistan, 10. 6 McChesney, R. D., Waqf in Central Asia, Four Hundred Years in the History of a Muslim Shrine, 148–1889. Kakar, Government and Society of Afghanistan, 141.

the revolt of sardar mohammad ishaq khan

99

By the 1830s, Balkh still functioned as a city, but afterward was completely replaced by Mazar as the political and commercial center of the region, and Turkestan comprised all of the territories lying between the Oxus, the Hindu Kush, the Pamir steppe and Herat.7 However, under Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan (b. 1851) Turkestaninhabited by Uzbeks, Arabs, Hazaras, Tajiks, Pashtuns and others with its capital at Mazar, comprised only the plains south of the Oxus between Andkhoy and Badakhshan.

Estrangement of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan As early as 1881, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan asked the amir to recognize him as “. . . the exclusive owner of Turkestan.” Unwilling to provoke the sardar, the amir promised him that he would do so “When all our anxieties and troubles [are over];”8 the “anxieties” he spoke of were caused by the presence of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan in Herat. However, the demand strained relations between the amir and the sardar. When Kandahar and Herat fell in late 1881, and Ayyub Khan was expelled, Ishaq Khan asked the amir to appoint his younger brothers as governors there. The amir refused to do so and instead trusted the sardar with vast power and the authority to keep the revenue of the province to himself. Further, the amir even sent him money from Kabul to consolidate his position in this important frontier province. Consequently, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan had de facto independence in Turkestan, although, like all governors, he also sent valuable presents, especially horses, to the amir from time to time. The presentation of gifts by provincial governors to the Kabul ruler was a custom of the land, as was the reading of Friday sermon (khutba) in his name. In Kabul, the amir kept the sardar’s three younger brothers apparently as his ‘guests’, but they were actually hostages. In 1884, the fall of Maymana proved crucial in the relationship between the amir and Ishaq Khan. Because the latter had undertaken an expedition against Maymana, and because the district had 7 Wheeler, J. T., Memorandum on Afghan-Turkistan, Calcutta, 1869, Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Part 2, Afghan Turkistan, Calcutta, 1912, i–xii. 8 BACA, 107.

100

chapter six

often been a part of Turkestan, the sardar expected that the amir would give him jurisdiction over it after it was paciﬁed. However, the amir did not do so. Following his disappointment over Maymana, Ishaq Khan tried to consolidate his position still further and gain more popular support. Reports are unanimous concerning the popularity of the sardar with the people under his jurisdiction. In fact, even in 1880, the people themselves had chosen the sardar as their governor after he crossed the border from Samarqand where he, like the amir, had been in exile. More importantly, the sardar’s administration was mild in sharp contrast to that of the amir which was rigid. The contrast between the two men was apparent even more in their characters; the sardar was gentle and pious whereas the amir was stern and rigid. Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan’s adherence to the Naqshbandiyya mystic order of Islam had drawn him closer to the Uzbeks who observed Islam in its “minute detail”,9 and to the Turkmen in particular, among whom the order was widespread;10 he had ﬁrst adhered to the order while he was living in exile in Samarqand. He was also popular with his army which he paid regularly.11 Because Turkestan was a frontier province, and because it was under the apparent threat of Russia the amir had allowed the sardar to raise a large army, and, in addition, from to time sent him money from Kabul to meet the expenditure.12 Thus, the sardar had not been obliged to exact money from the people and make himself unpopular with them. For the reasons cited, relations between the amir and Ishaq Khan were far from cordial. The amir’s eﬀorts at aﬀecting conciliation with the sardar through some inﬂuential dynastic members failed to bear fruit. While the amir maintained the facade of good relationship, he tried to remove the sardar from Turkestan. Several times he invited him to come to Kabul. The summons was not unusual, and in line with the amir’s policy of removing governors in disgrace before they became wealthy and inﬂuential, and then giving their posts to nonMohammadzay sardars, or head servants of the royal court. Governors from inﬂuential families, including those from among the Mohammadzay sardars, were especially subject to this policy.

9 10 11 12

Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, 2, 188. Sultan Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 1, 265. Khaﬁ, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 160. BACA, 106.

the revolt of sardar mohammad ishaq khan

101

Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan was the only Mohammadzay sardar with a claim to the throne who still governed a province, as he was the eldest surviving son of the late Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan, the full-uncle of the amir. Under the circumstances, it was unlikely that the sardar would visit the amir in Kabul, and his refusals to obey the summons alarmed the amir. Since he was subject to attacks of gout,13 the amir feared that in the event of his own collapse the sardar would secure the throne for himself. He was especially fearful because at the time his own sons were minors, had no brothers and the sardar was his nearest relative with a claim to the throne.14 When the Ghilzay uprising was over, the amir decided to remove this probable danger. He ﬁrst tried to undermine Ishaq Khan’s position by sending oﬃcials from Kabul to take senior posts in Turkestan.15 The amir then again summoned him to Kabul, ostensibly to consult with him on state aﬀairs, but in reality to remove him.16

The Rebellion The elders of Turkestan viewed the repeated summons as a sign that the amir intended to rule the province himself and tyrannize its people. They undertook to uphold the cause of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, and occupy Afghanistan for him. Leaders of the Naqshbandiyya order assured the sardar that they had been inspired by championing his cause, and that the Khwaja Baha al-Din Naqshband, the founder of the order, had bestowed the throne on him.17 Soldiers and oﬃcers also took the oath of allegiance to him. On August 10, 1888 they all declared him to be their amir and read the religious sermon (khutba) in his name as a proof of their ﬁdelity and determination.18 In the mean time the sardar revealed that the people of Kabul, too, had sent him their words of support, and that he was the avenger of the oppressed people of Afghanistan against the tyrant amir.19 13 Owen, Surgeon, C. W., Member of the Afghan Boundary Commission who visited the amir in Kabul, 12 Oct. 86, PSLI, 49, 51. 14 A female servant of the amir, MM, July 86s, PSLI, 47, 1128. 15 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 234. 16 Khaﬁ, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 168. 17 Sultan Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 2, 171. 18 Khaﬁ, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 168–170. 19 Ibid., 171.

102

chapter six

For tactical reasons, Ishaq Khan also spread rumors that the amir had died. However, at this juncture, events in Maymana and Andkhoy turned against the sardar. In Maymana, although General Sharbat Khan, commander of the troops, declared his allegiance to Ishaq Khan, the army and civilians remained loyal to the amir and seized the general.20 The elders of the Andkhoy and Dawlatabad districts also reiterated their loyalty to the amir.21 Thus, the sardar’s northwest ﬂank became insecure. Despite the aforementioned event, Ishaq Khan still marched on Kabul at the head of his army, leaving his minor son, Sardar Mohammad Isma'il Khan in charge of Turkestan. Upon his arrival in Qunduz, its mir, Sultan Murad, joined him, as did the army stationed in Khanabad and Badakhshan. Subsequently, the whole of Badakhshan also fell to him, an occurrence made easier by the absence of its governor, Sardar 'Abd Allah Khan Tokhay, who was on his way to Kabul at the time.22 Thus, northern Afghanistan minus Maymana, fell to Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, and he stayed in Khanabad for three weeks. During this time the amir decided to take action against him. The revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan presented the amir with problems similar to those that the rebellion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan had caused, in 1881. Both sardars claimed the throne, and both were sons of former amirs, though the claim of Ishaq Khan was of lesser weight. However, under the latter a large army with many guns23 advanced on Kabul at a time when the amir was so ill that “. . . he could not walk for more than . . . two or three steps.”24 Further, because of the prevailing discontent in the country in the wake of the Ghilzay uprising, public opinion was in favor of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan.25 However, as usual the amir, despite his illness, acted swiftly and with determination. 20

Khaﬁ, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 72. MM, Aug. 88, PSLI, 55, 133. 22 Khaﬁ, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 173–176. According to Fayz Mohammad, the military and civilian population of Qataghan and Badakhshan joined Sardar 'Abd Allah Khan, the governor of Badakhshan in Andarab against the rebel Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 587. 23 The forces of the rebel sardar included 18,700 soldiers, 86 guns minus the number of troops stationed in Maymana, Andkhoy, and Dawlatyar. Military Resources of Afghanistan, November 1886, No. 78, 1. 24 KD, 21 Aug. 88, PSLI, 72, 64. 25 Ibid. 21

the revolt of sardar mohammad ishaq khan

103

The Battle of Ghaznigak and the Flight of Ishaq Khan As was usual on such occasions, the amir tried to mobilize public opinion against his rival even though he was in a less morally defensible position. The amir obtained a legal ruling ( fatwa) from the 'ulema, in which they declared the sardar a rebel.26 On the basis of the ruling, the amir called on all tribes to act against the rebel sardar,27 and, further, gave out that the rebellion of the sardar was due to Russia.28 By implicating Russia in the rebellion, the amir intended to turn the rebellion into a “religious war”,29 even though there was no indication that Russia had either incited or supported the sardar. The amir’s description of the rebel sardar as “the bastard Armenian servant of Russia,” (the sardar’s mother was an Armenian) and the sardar‘s accusation that the amir was “a British protégé”30 was no more than propaganda directed at inciting Muslims against each other in the game of power politics, just as when the amir was confronting Sardar Mohammad Ayyub in Kandahar in 1881. The amir speedily dispatched a strong force under Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay, now deputy commander-in-chief (na"ib sipah salar) to quell the rebellion. At the same time, according to the foreign secretary of the British Government of India, Mortimer Durand, “in his straits” the amir “wished us to occupy Kandahar and Jalalabad.”31 The army was reinforced by tribal levies of the Hazaras of Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi, after it had defeated the advance force of the rebel sardar under the command of General Najm al-Din at Kahmard,32 as well as some regulars. By the time the amir’s main force under the Na"ib Salar Orakzay arrived at Ghaznigak, where the rebel force had already taken position, it numbered more than the rebel force that was commanded by Mohammad Hussayn Khan, the commander-in-chief (sipah salar)33 At Ghaznigak the two forces fought the decisive battle.

26

PD, 9 Sept. 93, PSLI, 72, 64. The amir’s ﬁrman, KD, 28 Aug. 88, PSLI, 55, 21. 28 The amir’s ﬁrman, KD, 28 Aug. 88, PSLI, 55, 24. 29 KD, 4 Sept. 88, PSLI, 55, 190. 30 MM, Sept. 88, PSLI, 55, 600. 31 Quoted in Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 200. 32 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 606. 33 The amir’s forces were comprised of 13 regiments of infantry, four of cavalry with twenty-six guns and an unknown number of irregulars. 27

104

chapter six

On September 27, 1888, on the eve of the battle, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan who had taken position on a hill, received a sealed Qur"an from a section of the amir’s army, in which it had promised desertion during the coming engagement.34 On the day of the actual ﬁghting, that part of the amir’s army which was led by Sardar 'Abd Allah Tokhay opened ﬁre, but was defeated.35 Afterward an additional seven regiments submitted.36 The apparently victorious army began looting the apparently defeated army. At this point, Na"ib Salar Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay made a surprisingly forceful attack and compelled the sardar’s troops to retreat, but the retreat was indecisive and the outcome uncertain. What ﬁnally and surprisingly decided the outcome of the battle in favor of the amir was the sudden ﬂight of the sardar himself as the result of a misunderstanding. He ﬂed after his adjutant informed him that the “orderlies” (orderly regiments) had submitted. This adjutant meant the orderly regiments of the amir, but the sardar thought that his own orderly regiments had submitted. The news of the word “submission” had frightened the sardar so much that upon hearing it he took to ﬂight without verifying the news.37 Leaving his army behind, the sardar continued ﬂeeing across the Oxus River to Samarqand in total haste once again, but this time his exile was permanent. The rebellion of the sardar had stirred the people throughout the country, and criminals had engaged in robbery in an open manner.38 The early collapse of the rebellion checked disturbances elsewhere in the country that otherwise might have become widespread. The ﬂight of the sardar was fortunate for the amir, since after that no other ambitious member of the dynasty remained in the country to claim the throne. The revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan resulted from the clash of his views on ruling Afghanistan with those of the amir. The sardar held the traditional view of ruling by dynastic sardars, which had also been held earlier by Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan. Speciﬁcally, Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan requested that the amir 34

Khaﬁ, The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2, 178–186. MM, Oct. 88, PSLI, 55, 927. 36 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to British agent (in Mazar), 5 July 89, PSLI, 57, 1068. 37 Griesbach, C. L., Notes on the Battle of Ghaznigak, Mazar, No. 224, 28 Mar 89, Foreign Dept., Secret-F, Pros., May 89, Nos. 216–225, 4. 38 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 614. 35

the revolt of sardar mohammad ishaq khan

105

allow him and his brothers, to rule over Turkestan, Herat, and Kandahar under the amir’s overall hegemony. However, the latter did not respond favorably, because he wished to rule over the entire country himself autocratically with a centralized political structure. By 1884, when Ishaq Khan was disappointed in his scheme, he drew still closer to the people, and became popular, whereas the amir was not. The latter’s oppressive rule, which was evident from the desertion of the army and the acceptance of the rebel sardar’s claim by the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan helped him in his bid for the amirate of the whole land. Had he shown courage and resoluteness in the critical hour of military confrontation he might have unseated the amir, and changed the course of Afghan history. However, during the fateful hour of the battle, he revealed cowardice and a lack of sound judgment. He ﬂed precipitously, and his ﬂight left the people of Turkestan and Badakhshan at the mercy of the amir who went to Mazar the next year. For about one year of his stay in Mazar, the amir took very stern measures against all those who had supported the rebel sardar. Meanwhile, he stepped up anti-Russian rhetoric and arranged for the fortiﬁcation of military posts along the border, especially in Dehdadi. More important in the long run, the amir encouraged Pashtun and other ethnic groups from the densely populated regions south of the Hindu Kush to settle in the sparsely populated regions north of the Hindu Kush, and to cultivate the plots of state land which the government granted them on favorable terms.39 This land grant continued to be issued until recently as part of the population relocation policy. In particular in the 1930s, Sher Khan Kharotay and Mohammad Gul Khan Mohmand became, as the nationally— known governors of Kunduz and Mazar respectively, overzealous in implementing the policy. As a consequence, from demographic perspective, northern Afghanistan became largely mixed and transformed from a dependency into an integral part of the country.

39

For details see Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, 132–135.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PACIFICATION OF THE BORDER PRINCIPALITIES IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN

Maymana Maymana, a large district in northwestern Afghanistan was inhabited mainly by Uzbeks and Turkmen, and had a small population of Tajiks, and Pashtuns.1 Ahmad Shah Durranay recognized Haji Khan Uzbek as the wali [governor] of Maymana and Balkh on the condition that he would provide the state with a military force in times of war.2 However, his son and successor, Timur Shah Durranay, restricted the wali’s son and successor to the district of Maymana. When the Sadozay and Barakzay princes fought against each other, Maymana was left to its own destiny. Subsequently, when the Mohammadzay sardars fought against each other over succession Maymana experienced the same ordeal, until 1830, when Mizrab Khan prevailed over his rivals. Under his rule Maymana prospered, but his death, in 1845,3 triggered another civil war that lasted until 1848, when Yar Mohammad Khan Alkozay, the governor of Herat, annexed Maymana to his domain.4 The rule of Yar Mohammad Khan did not last long. Opposition mounted and ﬁnally resulted in the independence of Maymana under Wali Hekmat Khan. This event coincided with the eﬀorts of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan in extending his rule over Turkestan. Wali Hekmat Khan submitted to the amir in 1855; ﬁve years later the wali’s brother, Mir Mohammad Hussayn Khan, succeeded him after having him killed.5 During the civil war of the 1860s that followed the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan the wali acted as an independent ruler. In 1866 he submitted to Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, agreeing to pay one hundred thousand tangas as an annual tribute. 1 2 3 4 5

Hamilton, A. Afghanistan, London, 1906, 259. BACA, 98. Yate, C. E., North Afghanistan, London, 1888, 338. BACA, 99. Yate, North Afghanistan, 338.

the pacification of the border principalities

107

The wali reasserted his independence after the amir lost the throne to his rival brothers. In 1868, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan besieged Maymana with sixteen thousand men. The month-long siege was, however, lifted after the sardar returned to Kabul to help his full uncle, Amir Mohammad A'zam Khan, against the fugitive Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. In late 1868, when Amir Sher 'Ali Khan regained Kabul, the wali refused to submit, and held correspondence with the king of Bukhara as well as Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who was then in Samarqand. In 1869–70, Maymana was struck by a famine which swept away almost all the sheep, the staple wealth of the region. Finally, during the second reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan his well-known governor, Na"ib Mohammad 'Alam, laid siege to the city of Maymana with twenty four thousand men and occupied it in March 1869. Mir Hussayn Khan was taken to Kabul, and from then on until the Second AngloAfghan war, in 1879, Maymana was administered by government oﬃcials.6 On the accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan Maymana was ruled by Mir Delawar Khan, who had seized the reign of power after the government garrison had evacuated the district. Since he had supported Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, Wali Delawar Khan feared the amir, and opposed his attempts to bring Maymana under control. However, the wali was willing to become a tributary vassal,7 although he was unwilling to accept government troops stationed in Maymana.8 Later, he reversed his position by refusing to pay even the revenue that he had already agreed to pay.9 Meanwhile, the wali tried in vain to place himself under the protection either of Britain or Russia. To the British he wrote, “It is known even to the Russians that I am a dependent of the British Government. I desire instructions regarding the management of my aﬀairs.”10 In reply he was informed that “The British Government regards Maymana as a part of the amir’s domain.”11 The British Government also informed the amir of the wali’s proposal. Afterward,

6 7 8 9 10 11

Ibid. KD, 15 May 82, PSLI, 34, 64. Mir Delawar to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Kand D., 215 May 82, PSLI, 32, 119. Herat Diary (HD), 9 Apr. 83, PSLI, 36, 1137. Mir Delawar to Col. Waterﬁeld, 8 May 82, PSLI, 32, 1131. Waterﬁeld to Delawar, 31 May 82, PSLI, 32, 1132.

108

chapter seven

the wali asked the Russian oﬃcials in Merv to occupy Maymana,12 but they were unable to do so because of the intervening of the Salor and Sarik Turkmen of Panjdeh, who were still independent. However, the Russians were reported to have given the wali arms, and in return, the wali hoisted their ﬂag in Maymana.13 Meanwhile, the wali tried to fortify his position. He was reported to have bought ﬁve hundred breach-loading riﬂes from the Turkmen.14 He also asked the Sarik Turkmen of Panjdeh to join him against the Afghans, and as a token of his good will toward them, he reduced tolls on their merchandise destined for Maymana.15 Next, the wali also asked Fath Allah Khan, head of the Firozkohi tribe of Herat, to come and settle with his tribesmen in Maymana, since the latter was also on bad terms with the amir; however this request was futile.16 At the same time, the wali engaged in correspondence with Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, and then announced that the sardar was coming to Maymana.17 The wali’s exaction of money from his subjects for the fortiﬁcation of his defenses caused unrest.18 About three hundred families from Khairabad emigrated to Andkhoy19 and the Turkmen cultivators of Qal'a-e-Wali, a dependency of Maymana near Murghab, informed the government’s oﬃcial in Herat that they were ready to submit.20 The wali had become so unpopular that it was generally believed that if the amir encouraged the inhabitants of Maymana they would abandon him.21 The early paciﬁcation of Maymana was not a compelling necessity for the amir. He only instructed Mir Hussayn Khan, the former wali of Maymana, to replace the incumbent wali, but he failed to do so.22 Meanwhile, the amir instructed Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, the governor of Turkestan, in Mazar, to keep the wali under

12 Shahzadah of Khoqand to Commissioner of Peshawar, PD, 23 Sept. 84, PSLI, 42, 123. 13 HD, 12 Apr. 84, PSLI, 40, 1315. 14 Col. Waterﬁeld, 22 Apr. 82, PSLI, 32, 525. 15 HD, 14 Sept. 82, PSLI, 34, 385. 16 HD, 12 Dec. 82, PSLI, 35, 386. 17 HD, 6 May 82, PSLI, 32, 867. 18 HD, 25 Jan. 83, PSLI, 35, 832. 19 HD, 6 June 83, PSLI, 37, 299. 20 HD, 21 June 83, PSLI, 37, 1066. 21 Kand D., 3 Oct. 93, PSLI, 38, 413. 22 BACA, 100.

the pacification of the border principalities

109

pressure, but his attempts at coercing him without undertaking military expeditions against him also failed. In 1884, when the Russians reached Merv, the matter became serious, as Maymana was considered to be their likely target.23 Only then did the amir order the simultaneous dispatch of troops from Herat and Mazar against Maymana, leading to its fall. In the words of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, When the people of the city [of Maymana] saw Your Highness’s troops . . . they were surprised and struck with terror, and came out until their number reached 2,000. Mir Delawar . . . ﬁnding himself unable to eﬀect his escape, came over to my camp.24

Mir Hussayn Khan, the former wali of Maymana was appointed as its wali independent of Herat and Mazar, but his power was restricted by a contingent of government troops that were stationed in the district. With the incorporation of Maymana in 1884, the reuniﬁcation of Afghanistan became complete. However, in 1892, when the Hazara war was in progress, the wali of Maymana, who was a son of the former Wali Mir Hussayn Khan, revolted. The revolt was speedily put down, and thereafter government oﬃcials administered Maymana.

Shighnan and Roshan The mountainous districts of Shighnan and Roshan in northeastern Afghanistan formed one principality as part of the province of Badakhshan with Fayzabad as its capital city. Badakhshan was the ﬁrst province over which the amir had extended his authority in January 1880, as previously noted. Shighnan and Roshan as well as the districts of Darwaz and Wakhan lie on both sides of Panja, referred to erroneously the Upper Oxus in English-language sources. The greater part of Shighnan lies on the right side of the river as far as the Ak-su or the Murghab River. This means that the province of Badakhshan extends as far as Murghab. The Panja River is narrow and does not constitute a signiﬁcant barrier for the people of either part. There, as well as in all the Upper Oxus where valleys

23 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to General Amir Ahmad, KD, 3 June 84, PSLI, 41, 1674. 24 Sardar Mohammad Ishaq to the amir, KD, 24 May 84, PSLI, 40, 1523.

110

chapter seven

are often separated from one another by impassable peaks, the rivers become the main thoroughfares and the same people dwell on both banks. Often the rulers of Balkh have extended their sway over Badakhshan. The inhabitants of Roshan and Shighnan are mistakenly thought to be Tajiks or Mountain Tajiks. According to Aerghawan, those who live on the skirts of the Pamir and the highlands of Badakhshan speak languages such as Munji, Wakhi, Roshani, Sanglechi and other Pamiri dialects; they are neither Tajiks, nor Pashtuns, nor Hazaras, but separate ethnic groups. Their languages [especially Sarghulami] are closer to Pashto than to any other language. So other than the speakers of the Pamiri dialects most inhabitants of Badakhshan are Tajiks.25

The Pamiri languages are collectively called Galcha, and the land on which its speakers live is mountainous and unfavorable to cultivation to such an extent that most of its inhabitants subsisted until the early part of the twentieth century on dried mulberry and a few boiled herbs (chakari ), especially in late winter and early spring. The common folk of Roshan and Shighnan, as distinct from members of the ruling house, were peaceful and fatalistic. Rarely, if ever, did they possess weapons, and they did not steal. Neither did they feud among themselves nor with their neighbors, even though the more zealous Sunni Uzbek marauders frequently overran their territory in raids called alaman, and sold their children and women into slavery. The Shignis and Roshanis, thus, behaved diﬀerently from the inhabitants of some of the other similar mountainous districts who lived within similar subsistence economies, but took to plundering and ﬁghting. The communities of the Shighnis and Roshanis were hierarchical, divided into the ruling elite (khawass) and commoners ('awam). Indeed, the history of Roshan and Shighnan, and all of Badakhshan is more the history of the khawass (mirs, shahs, and begs) than of the 'awam, and among the former civil wars and feuds were common. Apparently, approximately, seventy percent of the inhabitants of Shighnan smoked opium and drank opium-potion (ghamza), and lived in a state of permanent inebriety and resignation.26 25

Aerghawan, “Is the Federal System Practicable for Afghanistan?” Khpilwaki ( Journal), Peshawar, No. 3, 1992, 62. 26 Kushkaki, Burhan al-Din, Rahnuma-e-Qataghan wa Badakhshan, (in Persian) [A Guide to Qataghan and Badakhshan], Kabul, 1302 / 1924, 317–336.

the pacification of the border principalities

111

The Shighnis practiced the Isma'ili Shi'i brand of Islam and focused much on religion, although they neither prayed nor observed fast. Also, in their worldview religious leaders ( peers), rather than the religion itself, personiﬁed the faith, and the Shignis showed them unbounded devotion. The religious leaders also acted as temporal rulers (mirs) and the Agha Khan of Bombay was their supreme peer. Thus, wielding spiritual as well as secular powers, the mirs had become so powerful that they styled themselves as shahs (kings). The term shah, a derivation of khshatra, an Avestan word, which symbolizes power and domain, is probably a part of Shah-e-Khamosh, the founder of the dynasty. Seemingly Shah-e-Khamosh (the Reticent King) had been the title that he had assumed after he, whatever his given name, had founded the dynasty. The mirs or shahs ruled their subjects in an absolute fashion, even selling their children or oﬀering them as gifts to others.27 Through their representatives (khalifas) the mirs exacted a tithe ('ushr) as revenue,28 and enforced their authority through their retinue. They had no consultative assemblies, and had rivals among members of their own house. Since succession among them did not follow the principle of primogeniture they fought for power, whenever an opportunity arose, and the result was often civil war. The Shighni mirs improved their status by establishing marriage ties with the princes of surrounding regions. In the 1870s, for instance, they had such bonds with Ya"qub Beg of Kashghar, Khudayar Khan of Yarkand, Prince Afzal al-Mulk of Chitral, the Uzbek mir of Qunduz, and some Afghan princes and oﬃcials. A wife of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan whom he married before he became amir was a daughter of Jahandar Shah, the once powerful mir of Badakhshan. After her death the sardar married her maiden, Gulrez, with whom he had two sons, one son, Sardar Habib Allah Khan, succeeded him as amir. However, since Shighni females were singularly attractive they were married primarily for their beauty, and the marriages were politically insigniﬁcant. As guardians of the route leading to Kashghar, Yarkand, Bukhara, Chitral and Peshawar, the mirs of Shighnan levied tolls on merchandise. Cotton, china, tea, shoes and other goods were brought 27 28

Ibid., 338. Ibid., 318.

112

chapter seven

there by merchants to exchange for slaves, woolen items, and furs. When the Chinese occupied Kashghar in 1759, they paid the Shighni mirs “a kind of subsidy” to keep the route safe and open.29 The mirs paid a portion of their incomes to the then Agha Khan of Bombay who was the supreme peer of the Isma'ili sect. Although the district of Shighnan was a dependency of the province of Badakhshan its mirs acted as equal partners in a kind of confederation. The mir of Badakhshan allowed the mir of Shighnan to be autonomous just as he had allowed the mirs of other districts to be autonomous. He occasionally received horses and iron as tributes from some, and also military aid in times of emergency.30 From the seventh century, Shighnan and Roshan were ruled as previously noted, by the descendants of Shah-e-Khamosh, who came from Persia and converted the majority of the inhabitants from Zoroastrianism to the Shi'i faith of Islam. He wrested Shighnan from Kahakah (the Qahqah of the locals) the governor of the Zoroaster, whose capital seat was Balkh.31 To this day the shrine of the shah at Bar Panja is visited by the faithful. Afterward the shah’s descendants expanded their rule, which at one point reached the frontiers of Badakhshan and Chitral;32 at another point “Wakhan and Darwaz and all the surrounding States were under the rule of the King of Shighnan.”33 From 1749 Roshan and, indeed the whole of Badakhshan became part of the Durranay Empire, although it retained its autonomy because of its inaccessible location. During the civil war that followed the break-up of the empire, in 1818, Mir Murad Beg “the most powerful Uzbek prince south of the Amu [Oxus] up to Bamian”34 overran Badakhshan, and “made himself master of the whole country from Wakhan to Balkh inclusive, and from the Hindu Kush to the borders of Karatigin.”35 He sold a large number of the inhabitants 29 BACA, 233. The actual annual amount was ten yambus or about 1,730 Indian rupees. 30 Yule, Col. H., “An Essay on the Geography and History of the Regions of the Upper Waters of the Oxus”, LXXIX, in Wood, J., A Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus, London, 1872. 31 BACA, 233. 32 Kushkaki, Qataghan and Badakhshan, 336. 33 BACA, 233. 34 Masson, C., Narrative of Various Journeys in Baloochistan, Afghanistan and the Panjab, 1826–1838, London, 1842, 2, 306. 35 Yule, “An Essay on the Geography and History of the Regions of the Upper Waters of the Oxus”, xxxvii, in Wood, J., A Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus, London, 1872.

the pacification of the border principalities

113

of Badakhshan into slavery, or let them perish from fever in the swampy plains of Qunduz. The mir of Shighnan paid him ﬁfteen slave-girls as annual tribute.36 This state of aﬀairs ended in the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, when Governor Na"ib Mohammad 'Alam Khan paciﬁed the whole of Turkestan, including Badakhshan after it had asserted independence in the Civil War. In 1874, Shah Yusuf 'Ali Shah, the mir of Roshan, also accepted the suzerainty of Kabul,37 but maintained a free hand in running his domain. During the ﬁrst three years of the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the mir ruled as before, sending slave-boys, slavegirls, and other goods as tribute.38 In 1883, his relations with Kabul worsened. At the time, Shighnan had become internationally signiﬁcant, and the mir showed an inclination toward the Russian-dominated Bukhara. The mir of Shighnan had become perturbed over the fate of his domain since 1873, when he heard of the understanding that had been reached between Russia and Britain concerning the Oxus River, which had been agreed upon as the boundary between Afghanistan and Bukhara. This was to split the domain of the mir with its larger and more populous part (the area lying between the Panja and Aksu-Murghab which included the valleys of Shakh, Ghund, and Bartang) becoming a part of Bukhara. To retain his entire domain the mir intended to maintain good relations with both the Russian-dominated Bukhara and Kabul. As a precaution he handed over Roshan to one of his minor sons. Roshan was also signiﬁcant for having abundant supplies of iron which was included as part of the mir’s tribute to Kabul.39 In 1882, the mir received a Russian explorer in Shighnan.40 The next year a Russian mission visited him and reportedly assured him that “he need not fear the Ruler of Badakhshan” as “The Russians are looking upon Shighnan on the right bank of the Oxus as within the sphere of their inﬂuence.”41 This was during the time when the mir had refused a summons from the Afghan Governor 'Abd Allah Tokhay of Badakhshan and had removed his family to Sarojan, (adjoining Darwaz), which had 36 37 38 39 40 41

Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 102. Kushkaki, Qataghan and Badakhshan, 338. Ibid., 339. BACA, 234. Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 103. PD, I Aug. 83, PSLI, 37, 1007.

114

chapter seven

been held by the amir of Bukhara since 1877. The mir feared that if he presented himself to the governor he would be removed as the governor had replaced many mirs from other districts with government oﬃcials42 even though this was contrary to the promise that Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had given them in 1880. Early that year, when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman came to Badakhshan from Samarqand he had promised them that “so long as he held power, the mirs of Badakhshan would be exempt from paying revenue; [and] all that would be required of them was to acknowledge his supremacy.”43 In addition to his refusal to meet the governor, the mir, had engaged in correspondence with oﬃcials of Russia, Bukhara and China in Yarkand. Although he informed the governor that he had only told the foreign oﬃcials that he was a subject of Afghanistan,44 and on that account was unwilling to receive their emissaries, the governor, nevertheless, suspected him. Meanwhile, a rival faction had risen in Shighnan under one Darab Shah, which had weakened the mir’s position.45 The amir suspected the mir of Shighnan of intriguing with Russia “for allowing Russians to visit Shighnan”46 and ordered his removal.47 This was accomplished with some diﬃculty, and the mir accompanied by one hundred and thirty followers arrived in Kabul in September 1883.48 Subsequently, a subgovernor was appointed, and troops were stationed there. Shighnan and Roshan were, thus, brought under the direct rule of Kabul. It was widely rumored that a new order had been established in Shighnan. The Shighnis who had lived in bondage elsewhere for years escaped from their masters and returned homes to live in freedom.49 However, their troubles were far from over. Though freed from the clutches of their masters, they now found themselves subject to the excesses of government oﬃcials. Barely a year had passed, when from Badakhshan “. . . nearly half the population . . . deserted for Hissar, Kulab, and Karatigin.”50 Afterward, the amir started

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

PD, 4 Feb. 82, PSLI, 31, 449. Chitral Diary (CD), 8 May 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 111, 315. Yusuf Ali Shah to governor of Badakhshan, . . . , 1882, PSLI, 34, 453. Kushkaki, Qataghan and Badakhshan, 340. BACA, 234. Col. Afzal (in Mama Khel), 21 Aug. 83, PSLI, 37, 1093. Col. Afzal (in Mama Khel), 11 Sept. 83, PSLI, 37, 1427. Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 107. PD, 5 Sept. 84, PSLI, 41, 1586.

the pacification of the border principalities

115

fortifying the government’s position, by setting up posts across the river, including one as far away as Surmatash (Somatash) on the extreme eastern point of Yahsikol, near the Pamir. Shortly after taking oﬃce, the new subgovernor, prevented the Russian scholar M. M. Ivanoﬀ from entering Shighnan.51 All of these developments brought Shighnan into the limelight of international diplomacy. Russia protested to Britain over the amir’s proceedings in Shighnan. While claiming that the principality was always independent, Russia, moreover, claimed that it was not “. . . among the number of those provinces which were recognized by the agreement arrived at in 1873 between Russia and England, as forming part of the possessions of the amir of Afghanistan.” Russia considered the amir’s proceedings in Shighnan “in ﬂagrant violation of the terms of the agreement in question,” and asked Britain to induce him “to renounce forever all interferences in its aﬀairs.”52 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan claimed that the principality was a part of Afghanistan because it had always been a dependency of Badakhshan,” a province which had been even formally decided to belong to Afghanistan.”53 In support of the claim it was argued that the Aksu-Murghab River, not the Panja River, ﬂowing from Sarikol, was the river that had been agreed upon as the international boundary. Indeed, the last oﬃcial dispatch of the British Government that Russia accepted on the subject, and which constituted an understanding between the two powers speaks of “the Oxus, from the junction of the Kokcha River to the post of the Khojeh Saleh inclusive” toward the west,54 indicating that Panja had been left outside the understanding. Several letters on the subject were exchanged 51

Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 104. Ibid., 105. 53 Ibid., 106. 54 Ibid., 182. The so-called ‘agreement’ consisted of two dispatches, the ﬁrst of which was written by Lord Granville. In this dispatch, the British government claimed for Afghanistan the following: “Badakhshan with the dependent district of Wakhan; Afghan Turkestan comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm and Balkh, the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus, from the junction of the Kokcha River to the post of Khoja Saleh inclusive, on the high road from Bokhara to Balkh. The internal districts of Akcha, Sari Pul, Maimana, and Shibergan and Andkhui, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to the independent tribes of Turkomans.” In response, Prince Gortchakov of Russia sent a dispatch to his ambassador in London, in January 1873, agreeing to these terms. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 82. 52

116

chapter seven

between the British and the Russian governments, but the amir maintained a ﬁrm stand, keeping the principality under his rule. However, in the early 1890s Russia backed its diplomacy with brute force. In 1892, a Russian contingent under Colonel Yanoﬀ massacred Afghan frontier guards at Surmatash (Somatash).55 The following year, another Russian contingent of two hundred troops under the command of Colonel Yannovsky entered Shighnan, but the Afghans repulsed them as they had already repulsed a Chinese contingent in Alichur, north of Somatash. Meanwhile, the Russian government in its negotiations with Britain stressed that Kabul should evacuate transShighnan and Roshan. Finally, in the same manner that it had acquiesced to Russia’s demand on the Panjdeh in 1885, the British Government complied, and urged the amir to do the same. In return, the amir was to occupy the extreme eastern corridor, Wakhan, and a small part of Darwaz to the south of the Panja, which Bukhara was to surrender. The amir consented because, in July 1892, the viceroy had warned him not to cause any trouble with an active policy on the Pamirs, a warning that reached him, ironically, at the same time as news of the Afghan casualties in the collision at Somatash.56 For eight years prior to the British request, the amir had been under pressure from the British Government of India about the delimitation of his eastern frontiers (See Chapter 10). In an agreement concluded between the amir and Foreign Secretary Mortimer Durand, in Kabul, on 12 November, 1893 it was decided that the amir . . . hereby agrees that he will evacuate all the districts held by him to the north of this portion of the Oxus [from Lake Victoria or Sarikol on the east to the conjunction of the Kokcha with the Oxus] on the clear understanding that all the districts lying to the south of this position of the Oxus, and now not in his possession, be handed over to him.57

The Panja stream remained the boundary between the Russiancontrolled Bukhara and Afghanistan58 even though it “. . . is almost unknown as a boundary, and is as artiﬁcial as a wire fence or a degree of latitude.”59

55

Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 185. Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 252. 57 For details see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 144–148. Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 248–298. 58 Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 187 59 Kushkaki, Qataghan and Badakhshan, 274, 288. 56

the pacification of the border principalities

117

Wakhan Wakhan, a long sparsely populated corridor northeast of Badakhshan up to the Greater Pamir in the Lake Victoria (Sarikol) area, was inhabited predominantly by Isma'ili Shi'as known as the Wakhi, and a small number of pastoral Sunni Kirghiz Turkmen.60 A land of high altitude and extremely low temperatures, Wakhan’s land production was limited. While at times the Pamirs had been under the suzerainty either of Ferghana or China, Wakhan had been ruled by local mirs who often were, like the mirs of Shighnan, Darwaz, and Zebak, vassals to the mirs of Badakhshan or of Qataghan. They collected animals, rare birds, ghee, and slaves from their subjects as revenue. In the period under discussion, Wakhan became internationally signiﬁcant for its location between the empires of Russia and Britain. However, in the early 1890s, the retention of Wakhan became a problem. Although in the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1873 Russia had recognized “Badakhshan with its dependent district Wakhan”61 as a part of Afghanistan, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was unwilling to occupy it with force for a number of reasons. Russian pledges of the same kind had applied to Shighnan62 but the Russians had later reversed their position and, acting under British pressure, the amir, agreed to the demands of Russia. Further, the British Government had not fulﬁlled its obligation to Afghanistan with regard to Russia’s unprovoked aggression by occupying Panjdeh, in 1885 (See Chapter Eleven). More importantly, Wakhan would have been diﬃcult to defend if Russia had chosen to invade it. This was evident, as in 1892, when Colonel Yanoﬀ of Russia annihilated the Afghan military post at Surmatash near Yashil Kul, as previously noted. Despite all of this, Foreign Secretary Mortimer Durand raised the question of Wakhan with the amir in Kabul in October 1893, with the intention of turning it into a buﬀer zone between the empires of Russia and Britain. He wanted the amir to occupy it because Russia was against its retention by any other power. Alternatively, Durand intended to persuade the amir to at least acknowledge his suzerainty over it. In such a situation Wakhan was to be nominally 60 61 62

Ibid., 314. Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 184. Ibid., 187.

118

chapter seven

held by an Afghan wakil (representative), but actually managed from Gilgit by the British.63 The amir, anxious for the support of the British against Russia’s threat to northeastern Afghanistan, ﬁnally agreed to establish his authority over Wakhan, but without occupying it with troops.64 In the agreement that was concluded between them on November 12, 1893 on the matter it was decided that “. . . the River Oxus should form the northern boundary of Afghanistan from Lake Victoria (Wood’s Lake) or Sarikul on the east to the junction of the Kokcha with the Oxus.” The Wakhan Corridor lies to the south of this line. Pleased with the arrangement Durand observed, “The amir’s fear of Russia did more for us than any diplomacy of mine.”65 In 1895, the Anglo-Russian oﬃcial commissions and the unoﬃcial representatives of the Afghan government demarcated the boundaries between Russia, Afghanistan, China and the British Indian Empire. Although China did not take part in the negotiations it did not raise any objections. Thus, the Wakhan Corridor and the Afghan Pamirs were established as “neutral ground” or a buﬀer zone between three of the world’s strongest powers of the time in an area popularly known as the “roof of the world.”66 Why did the viceroy pressure the amir to forgo trans-Oxus Roshan and at the same time required him to hold Wakhan as noted? The answer lies in the concern of the British Government for the safety of its most precious colonial possession, India. This is evident from the fact that, in delimiting the boundaries of Afghanistan, the British Government of India had always primarily tried to meet its own strategic requirements, even at the expense of Afghanistan. The crescent-shaped northern frontier of the British Indian Empire had three main lines of approach from the north—on the east, from Kashghar towards Ladakh; in the center, from the Pamirs towards Hunza and Yasin; and on the west, from the western Pamirs or the Upper Oxus provinces towards Chitral.67 This explains why Russia’s military advances in the territories north of the Pamirs and the Upper Oxus

63

Durand to Lansdowne (from Kabul), 27 Oct. 93, Mss. Eur. 727, No. 5. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 145. 65 Durand to Lansdowne, (from Kabul), 25 Oct. 93, Mss. Eur., D., 727, No. 5. 66 Shahrani, N., The Kirgiz and Wakhis of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1979, 37. 67 Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 300. 64

the pacification of the border principalities

119

in the early 1890s prompted both London and Simla to ﬁx a limit for Russia’s southward march by agreement with the Russian government, even though it was common knowledge that it was next to impossible for Russia to embark on a large scale military advance toward India on any of the line of approache, as previously noted. It also explains why Viceroy Lansdowne believed that “it would be better to risk oﬀending the Amir than to allow the presence of Russians on the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush.”68 He was not alone in his concern about Russia. According to the author G. J. Alder, Most British statesmen disliked the idea of coterminity [with Russia] anywhere, and, hence, of course, the traditional policy of maintaining on India’s frontier the buﬀer-state of Afghanistan.69

68 69

Ibid., 267. Ibid., 304.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE PACIFICATION OF THE HAZARAS

In 1891, the semi-independent Hazaras of the central highland, the Hazarajat, agreed to the stationing of government oﬃcials in their territory. Shortly afterward, government oﬃcials and troops were stationed in parts of it, but they oppressed the local population so much that they rose in rebellion that lasted for three years (1891–93). Since the Hazara elders had supported the British in the Second AngloAfghan war, and since, as Shi'i Muslims, they had been on bad terms with their Sunni neighbors, they were vulnerable, despite their highland terrain. This enabled the amir to dispatch a large number of troops and militias against them. Ultimately, the Hazaras were overcome; some Durranays and Ghilzays were settled in parts of their land, while their pastures were given to nomads. The Hazaras live in most parts of the central highland, called the Hazarajat,1 and at times also Hazaristan,2 or Barbaristan.3 It has little arable land, six-month long winters and vast pastures. The Hazarajat was divided into 15 regions or districts (olgas or nawas),4 each of which was ruled by one family, notably the Beg family of Dai Zangi (also called the toll sardar, which owned the whole of Dai Zangi) and the Ibrahim Beg family of Dai Kundi.5 The Hazara ruling elders, or mirs were so powerful that they ruled their respective communities as they pleased, without recourse to councils. They even sold the children of the Hazara commoners into slavery. Hazara women performed domestic chores and bore children as if they existed only to

1 Smaller groups of Hazaras settled in the provinces of Herat, Turkestan and Badakhshan would not be discussed as they were already under government control. 2 GAK (1895), 272. 3 Riyazi, M. Y. Zia al-Mu'arafa (The Light of Knowledge), Mashhad, 1907, 44. 4 These olcas [olus?] were Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, Behsud, Dai Mirdad, Saypawy, Gizao, Ajaristan and Malistan, Chora and Baburi, Dai Folad, Uruzgan, Zawli and Bobash, Dai Chopan, Tirin and Dehrawud, Jaghuri, and Shaykh Ali. 5 Riyazi, Zia al-Mu'rafa, 44.

the pacification of the hazaras

The Hazarajat

121

122

chapter eight

serve the needs of their male relations; sometimes they were even exchanged for donkeys. Although all Hazaras spoke a variant of the Persian language, known as Hazaragi, and although their overwhelming majority practiced the Shi'i faith of the brand of the Twelvers and only some were Sunnis among them, they were far from a cohesive people. Their mirs often fought among themselves even though their relations with their Sunni neighbors were always strained.6 Reports about the number of the Hazaras vary greatly. In the second half of the nineteenth century, all the Hazaras were said to number over half a million7 and the Hazaras of the Hazarajat proper were said to number 340,000 families.8

The Origin of the Hazaras The Hazaras began to live in Afghanistan in the ﬁrst half of the thirteenth century. Until recently, it was believed that they were the descendants of the army left by Chinggis Khan,9 as the people of former Kaﬁristan were said to be the descendants of the army left by Alexander the Great. However, neither of these statements is true. Chinggis Khan (? 1167–1227) withdrew his forces as soon as the objective of his campaigns was accomplished.10 It was sometime after his death, after his empire had been divided among his sons, that the Mongol forces encamped in the pastures of Afghanistan notably Lal and Kirman in the Hazarajat, Badghis in Herat and Ishkamish and Rustaq in Tukharistan. They chose the pastures as encampments ( yurts) so that they could continue their nomadic way of life. As skilful horse riders they ruled from there in an absolute fashion,

6 Molly, Major, “Reports on the Hazarajat, Tokhi Ghilzais, and Kabul Districts”, For. Dept. A-Political-E., Sept 83, Nos. 312–319, No. 316, NAI. 7 Riyazi, Zia al Mu'arafa, 47. 8 GAK (1895), The Hazaras have been noted to number 66,900 families in 1838 (Burnes, A., Cabool, 1973, 230) and 120,000 families in 1886. The latter ﬁgures have been provided by Subadar Mohammad Hussayn son of Rajab Ali, (elder of the Jaghatu Hazara). Kakar, Afghanistan, (1971), 160. Population ﬁgures for the Hazaras recorded in the second half of the nineteenth century vary. 9 Bellew, W., The Races of Afghanistan, London, 1880, 115. Burnes states that 3,000 families of the Hazaras are said to have been left by Chinggis Khan, and 1,000 families by Timure Lane. Cabool, 231. 10 Bacon, E., “An Inquiry into the History of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan,” South Western Journal of Anthropology, University of Mexico, vol. 7, 1951, 241.

the pacification of the hazaras

123

and exacted heavy taxes from what was left of the rural population some time several times a year. The Mongols had destroyed the centers of population and massacred their inhabitants. In this period, when the Tajiks in the cities had been wiped out, the Pashtuns of the rural areas began to move on in large number to northern India. Conversely, Mongols and Turcomongols entered Afghanistan in large number. Each of the military units encamped there consisted of one thousand soldiers, and these were known by the term hazara in Persian.11 Gradually, the word was applied to these new settlers, who became known as Hazaras, and the land upon which they settled was called the Hazarajat. The Hazarajat seems to have been populated chieﬂy by Chaghatay Mongols from Transoxania. Other Mongols and some Turks or Turcomongols might have joined the Chaghatays, and it is possible that the rebellious troops of the Ilkhanids in Khurasan also sought refuge in the Hazarajat. Later under Timur Lane and his son, Shah Rukh Mirza, troops and administrative oﬃcials were sent into the area and probably some of them remained there when the Timurids returned to Samarqand. Thus, it appears that the Hazara Mongols are descended from Mongol troops, many of them Chaghatays, who entered Afghanistan at various times from 1229 to c. 1447.12 An anthropological study has conﬁrmed this nexus; according to Debets the features of the present Hazaras indicate that the Mongoloids of Central Asia—whose contemporary representatives are the Mongols, Buryats, South Altains and others, and, to a lesser degree, the Kirghiz and Kazaks, have entered into the composition of the Hazaras.13

11

For details see, Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 206–237. Bacon, E., The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, A Study in Social Organization, Ph.D. thesis, Berkeley, 1951, 5. Abul Fazl quoted in Schurmann (The Mongols of Afghanistan, 117) writes, “The Hazaras are of the army of Chaghatai.” However, the anthropologist Schurmann doubts whether the main Hazara groups are related to each other. They are, according to him, diﬀerentiated on the basis of certain cultural features even though they all call themselves Hazaras. (111) Likewise, G. K., Dulling, a specialist on Hazaragi (Hazara Persian) notes of the presence of “esoteric” Mongol words in the Hazarajat, and indicates that it is possible to conclude that the Hazaras were originally an Iranian people who came under Mongol/Turkish domination and adopted many of the conquerors’ words and forms because they had no equivalents of their own. (Quoted in Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, 110). 13 Debets, G. F., Physical Anthropology of Afghanistan, transl. by E. Proston, edited by H. Field, Russian translation Series of the Peabody Museum of Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University Press, Vol. V, No. 1, p. 3. 12

124

chapter eight

By the sixteenth century the Hazaras were a distinct people, living in an area in or near their present highland.14 The original Mongols or Tatars15 who settled in the Hazarajat were male warriors probably without women. They were said to have obtained wives from the Tajiks with whom they mingled. Their association with these and other neighboring Tajiks may account for the gradual change of speech from Turkic and Mongolian to [Hazaragi] Persian.16 The Hazaras gradually borrowed the culture of the Iranian aborigines. Today the Hazaras have recognizable Tajik, Pashtun, and generally Caucasian features.17 This is due partly to the custom of krubast among the Jaghuri Hazaras, according to which they lent their wives to their guests18 with the consequence that among them some were the oﬀspring of non-Hazara fathers. Additionally, the Hazaras of Ghazni, Badakhshan, Qataghan and Kandahar had always lived side by side with people of other ethnicities. Conversely, the Tajiks have lived even in the interior of the Hazarajat proper. In Chora and Gizao there was a colony of the Shi'i Tajiks,19 but it is not known whether they were really Tajiks. This is because a subsection (ta"ifa) of the Hazaras was also known by the name of Tajik.20 More importantly, in Bamiyan the Tajiks are predominant21 over the Hazaras, while in Dai Kundi subordinate groups, as distinct from the ruling Dawlat Begi Hazara groups, reveal a social structure, which is similar to that of the Tajiks.22 The ‘real’ Hazara tribes seem to be the

14

Bacon, The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, 5. Originally the Tatars were of the easterly tribes in Mongolia, but now in Persian literature the word is synonymous with the appellation Mongol (from Mangkhol), the name of the leading tribes of the Union which conferred the title of Chinggis Khan on Timujin in 1206.) Spuler, B., The Mongols in History, Praeger Publishers, 1971, 2, 6. 16 Bacon, The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, 6. 17 Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, ’s-Gravenhage, 1962, 111. 18 Wood, J., A Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus, London, 1872, 128–129. To Alexander Burnes the custom of lending wives [krubast] to guests among the Jaghuri Hazaras is an established fact. He, further, states that “Throughout this tribe a stranger may marry for a night or a week, and either leave his wife or take her along with him, but this [custom of sigha] is only according to Shi'a usage.” Cabool, 232. 19 Isfahani, A. M., Aman al-Tawarikh, [The History of Amani, or the General History of Afghanistan], manuscript in Persian, Vol. 5, 102). 20 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 728. 21 Molly, “Reports on the Hazarajat”, 7. 22 Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, 145. 15

the pacification of the hazaras

125

Dai groups, which inhabit the Hazarajat proper, stretching from the southern slopes of the Kohi-Baba to the conﬁnes of Kandahar.23

Relations with Neighbors Situated in central highland the Hazarajat was surrounded by regions inhabited by Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Aimaq with all of whom the Hazaras were on unfriendly terms for various reasons, even though their relations were basically symbiotic. While the Hazaras depended on their neighbors for wheat, rice, salt and other necessities of life their neighbors purchased ghee and woolen fabrics from them. As a people surrounded by more numerous neighbors the Hazaras were at a disadvantage. Distinct from most of their neighbors in physical appearance, their religious sect, and also, to an extent, speech, the Hazaras by and large kept to themselves. These distinctions may account for the clashes between them and their neighbors. However, during the winter months some lived in cities,

23

Ibid. This view of the origin of the Hazaras can be elaborated as follows: The word dai or dia is probably a form of the Persian word daha (decade), the latter the basic unit of ten soldiers of Mongol military formations, the others being sada (century), hazara (a unit of one thousand), and tuman (a unit of ten thousand), (Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 189, Spuler, The Mongols in History, B., 8). As noted in the text, a unit of one thousand soldiers, (a hazara), was encamped in the pastures around Hazarajat following the death of Chinggis Khan, in 1227. Up to the Timurid times, the terms sada and hazara were in use for the Hindu Kush region. (Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, 123, 124) Both Bacon (quoted in Schurmann, The Mongols of Afghanistan, 124) and Fayz Mohammad (quoted in Isfahani, Aman al-Tawarikh, 5, 108) note with slight variations, sada-e-sueka and sada-e-qabr as the survivals of tribal terms. Schurmann maintains that these medieval sadas broke down, because of the incessant wars among the Hazaras, ultimately leaving the various dais. As late as Elphinstone’s time (the early nineteenth century) these dais, as well as other Hazara groups were still considered to be tribes, each having their own sultan (ruler), while others doubt this usage. Elphinstone is the only author who has used the term ‘sultan’ for a Hazara tribal ruler. In time, the various dais or dias have became territorial designations. Originally, there were nine or ten dais or dias, who, according to Fayz Mohammad, were the tribes of Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, Dai Mirdad, Dai Mir Kashta, Dai Mirak, Dai Chopan, Dai Khitai, Dai Luri, Dai Miri, and the Dai. (Quoted in Aman al-Tawarikh, 5, 108). To these can be added Dai Zinyat for the Hazaras of Qala-e-Nao in Herat and Dai Kalan for the Hazaras of Shaykh Ali. The Hazaras are predominantly Shi'as of the Twelve Order but the Seveners or Isma'ili Shi'as and Sunnis are also found among them. For detail see Timur Khanov, L. A National History of the Hazaras, transl. into Persian by Tughyan, A., The Press Institute of Isma"iliyan, Tehran, 1993, PP 42–53, 65–72.

126

chapter eight

particularly Kabul. In 1838, Alexander Burnes noted that “All the drudgery and work in Kabul is done by some Hazaras, some of whom are slaves and some free; in winter there are not less than ten thousand who reside in the city, and gain a livelihood by clearing the roofs of snow and acting as porters.”24 What the Hazara shared with their neighbors was Islam, although even with regard to this they were distinct from them. As previously noted, most Hazaras were Shi'as, and only some were Sunnis, whereas their neighbors were all Sunnis. Consequently, the Hazaras were “. . . oppressed by all their neighboring nations, whom they served as hewers of wood and drawers of water.”25 The oppression began with the decline of the Mongol power, a situation that enabled their neighbors to expel them from their pasture encampments and besiege them in their present highland, just as they had besieged the Kaﬁrs in Kaﬁristan. Their neighbors even viewed them as ‘inﬁdels’ (kaﬁrs) and thereby justiﬁed their sale,26 although the sale of Muslims was forbidden in Islam. Down to the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, the Uzbeks and Turkmens enslaved and sold the Hazaras in Turkestan as well as Central Asia. Although the Hazaras of Dai Kundi and Dai Zangi and the Shaykh 'Ali Hazaras, sent slaves as tributes to Mir Murad 'Ali, ruler of Qunduz, when they were subject to his rule27 the Uzbeks and Turkmens still sent raiding parties into the Hazarajat until they were checked by the government during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and by the development of local fortiﬁcations in northern Hazarajat.28 Of the Char Aimaq who were “at hereditary enmity with the Hazaras”29 the Firozkohis enslaved them, and sold them in Bukhara.30 The Jamshedis enslaved the Hazaras even though on a smaller scale up to the last year of the nineteenth century, after which time they were unable to do so because of the pressure applied by the government. The Russian authorities also checked the sale of the Hazaras in Panjdeh.

24

Burnes, Cabool, 231. Ibid. 26 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 543. 27 Wood, The Sources of the Oxus, 128–129. 28 Canﬁeld, R., Faction and Conversion in a Plural Society, Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush, Ann Arbor, 1973, 93. 29 Harlan, J., Central Asia, Personal Narrative of General Josaiah Harlan, 1823–1841, edited by Ross, F. E., London, 1939, 152. 30 HD, 1 Feb. 94, PSLI. 73, 1228. 25

the pacification of the hazaras

127

The Hazaras were on friendly terms with the Ghilzay Pashtuns in the beginning of the eighteenth century, and a contingent of them had accompanied Shah Mahmud Hotak in his Persian campaigns. Subsequently, however, relations between them and the other Pashtuns soured,31 principally over pastures and arable lands. The Pashtuns did not enslave the Hazaras, but took over their land. Charles Masson notes that Wardak territory . . . was anciently possessed by the Hazaras, who, about one hundred years since, were expelled by the Afghans. The Hazaras would also seem to have held the country from Qarabagh to Ghazni, but have been in like manner partially expelled.32

Similarly, advancing in wealth, number and power the Durranays of Kandahar started to take over Hazara lands. As early as in the reign of Timur Shah Durranay the Popalzays and Nurzays of Kandahar took over Tirin and Dehrawud from the Hazaras.33 Hazara relations with the Tajiks were not as strained mainly because they spoke the same language and lived in some places side by side.34 In general relations between the Hazaras and other groups were poor because the Hazaras, especially the Shaykh 'Ali Hazaras, robbed caravans and travelers. At all times, especially when the government in Kabul was weak, few dared to go to the Hazarajat: the nomads kept to the Pashtun areas, and trade caravans preferred the longer routes of the Unai and Iraq passes to Bamiyan. The route in the Ghorband valley that stretched through the areas of the Shaykh 'Ali Hazara was kept open by force or subsidies.35 This was the situation until 1888, when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan ordered the removal en masse of the Shaykh 'Ali Hazaras to other parts of Afghanistan. This was done because they were committing robbery, and had supported Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan in his ﬁght against the amir.

31

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 540. Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys, 2, 224. Canﬁeld, Faction and Conversion, 97. 33 Rawlinson, H., “Report on the Dooranee Tribes dated 19th April 1841”. The Report has been quoted in full in MacGregor, C. M., Central Asia, Part II, A Contribution towards the better knowledge of the topography, ethnology, resources and the history of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1971, 829. 34 In Bamian the Tajiks predominated over the Hazaras. Molly, “Reports on the Hazarajat”, 7. This topic has been described in detail in Bamyani, B., Nigah-e-ba kultur wa Tarikh-e-Bashindagan-e-Bamyan, (in Persian) [A Glance at the History and Culture of the Inhabitants of Bamyan], privately published, Peshawar, 1380/2001, 47–180. 35 Ferdinand, K., quoted in Canﬁeld, Faction and Conversion, 96. 32

128

chapter eight

Another serious oﬀense committed by the Hazara was their sacking of Ghazni at the instigation of the British oﬃcials during the Second Anglo-Afghan war, when the Sunni inhabitants were ﬁghting the British army in Kabul.36 In particular, the Hazaras of Jaghuri and of other areas cooperated with General Donald Stewart against the Ghilzays when he was on his way from Kandahar to Kabul in April 1880. At Ahmad Khel, south of Ghazni, over fourteen thousand Ghilzays and others attacked and nearly routed the British army of over four thousand men, but at the end of the conﬂict they lost over one thousand men to the superior weapons and the good discipline of the British.37 After the Ghilzays had ﬂed, the Hazaras looted their houses and insulted their women.

The Historical Background In the early sixteenth century, when he ruled Kabul, Mohammad Zahir al-Din Babur did not invade the Hazarajat even though he passed Bamiyan in the late ﬁfteenth century. Thereafter, Bamiyan, though not considered a part of the Hazarajat,38 but an important center linking the Oxus River, the Indus River and the Hazarajat, remained more or less open to expeditions, which were undertaken by his successors, notably Emperor Shah Jahan (1628–1658). While the Emperor Shah Jahan’s attempts at invading the Hazarajat did not succeed,39 the Safavi emperor, Shah 'Abbas I (1587–1629) inﬂuenced the Hazaras by appointing an elder over them.40 It was probably during this period that the Shi‘i faith of Islam began to replace the shamanism of the Hazaras, although exactly who persuaded the Hazaras to accept the new faith, and also when they

36

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 403. At Ahmed Khel, on April 19, 1880, the Ghilzays were comprised of 1,000 horse and 13,000 foot soldiers against a division of the British troops numbering 3,000 riﬂes, 350 lances, 700 sabers, and 22 guns. Trousdale in MacGregor, War in Afghanistan, 178n. The Ghilzays had no guns and were also poorly armed. See also Robson, B. The Road to Kabul, The Second Afghan War, Arms and Armour Press, London, New York, 1986, 194, 195. 38 Bacon, The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, 8. 39 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 248. 40 GAK, (1895), 277. 37

the pacification of the hazaras

129

used takya khanas as centers for the performance of religious rituals is unknown.41 In the ﬁrst part of the eighteenth century, Nadir Shah Afshar was said to have received the submission of the Hazaras and to have removed a number of the Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi Hazaras to Badghis, in Herat, as a counterpoise to the Jamshedi tribe.42 Afghan rulers before Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had brought some areas of the Hazarajat under control. As early as the reign of Ahmad Shah Durranay, the Mohammad Khwaja and Jaghatu Hazaras of Ghazni paid revenues to the government.43 Ahmad Shah Durranay had appointed Darwesh 'Ali Khan Hazara, as governor of Herat. He was probably an elder of the Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao of Herat, who are Sunnis. Under Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the Behsud Hazaras to the southwest of Kabul also recognized government suzerainty. The amir’s best-known governor was Haji Khan Kakar, who received from Bamiyan according to him 120,000 Rupees and according to Charles Masson 150,000 Rupees, in 1832, whereas the actual jagir “. . . was originally ﬁxed at 72,000 rupees per annum” for the province as well as the transit-duties of Charikar.44 Notable progress was made during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, when the Hazaras of Balkhab, Shaykh 'Ali, Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, and Jaghuri were paciﬁed. However, they were ruled as before by their own mirs, who were made responsible for the payment of taxes to the government. For their services, the amir conferred the title of ilkhan (head of the tribe) on Mir Mohammad Amir of Dai Zangi, of sardar (military general) on Sher 'Ali Khan of Jaghuri, and of nizam al-dawla (order of the state) on Mohammad Khan of Qal'a-e-Nao of Herat. On the eve of paciﬁcation of the entire Hazarajat under Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, only the 44,500 Hazaras of Uruzgan, had remained independent while the rest had been brought still more closely under government control. Their old taxes were increased,

41 For a discussion of this subject see also Timur Khanov, L. The National History of the Hazaras. The Isma'iliyan Press Institute, Iran, 1993, 42–53. 42 GAK (1895), 278. Other reports indicate that Shah Rukh, the son and successor of Timur, had removed the ancestors of the Hazaras from Qunduz to Qal'a-e-Nao in Herat. Whatever the case may be, by 1880 they had lost all their Hazara features and were Uzbek in all but name. (Yate, North Afghanistan, 136.) 43 Report by Subadar Mohammad Hussayn, son of Rajab Ali (elder of Jaghatu Hazara) member of the Afghan Boundary Commission, 1886, PSLI, 49, 418. 44 Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys, 2, 316.

130

chapter eight

various other kinds of new taxes were imposed, and subgovernors (hakims) appointed to rule over them. Only the mirs of the Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi Hazaras were allowed to administer their communities in return for the support they had given the amir against Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan. For the same reason, the amir had promoted Mohammad 'Azim Khan, of the Se-Pai section of the Dai Kundi Hazaras, to the rank of sardar and appointed him his head servant ( peshkhidmat).45

The Submission of the Hazaras In 1890, the amir appointed Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, the governor of Shiberghan, as governor of Bamiyan with the authority to pacify the still-independent Hazaras in the Hazarajat proper. Meanwhile, the amir invited the mirs of 45 clans (tawa"if ) of Uruzgan, Ajaristan, Malistan, Dahla, Zawli, Dai Chopan, and other areas to submit to the government.46 In the proclamations ( ﬁrmans) which he sent them the amir did not oﬀer them terms for submission. He only asked them to submit, because he believed that their further insistence on rebellion, in view of the closeness of the Christian powers, would be injurious to Afghanistan.47 However, the Hazaras claimed that they were invited to submit on terms that included autonomy, and exemption from paying taxes for several years to come.48 Whatever the truth may have been, the Hazaras agreed to submit. In the spring of 1891, Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, accompanied by an army and tribal levies of ten thousand men, including the Hazaras of Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi and Behsud entered the independent Hazarajat. Sardar Mohammad 'Azim Khan Hazara and Mir Mohammad Ilkhan had led the Hazara levies, and the entry of the army was smooth except for sporadic light resistance.

45 GAK (1895), 279. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 247. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj alTawarikh, 606. Subadar Hussayn Khan, 1886, PSLI, 49, 415–547. 46 For names of tribal sections and elders see, Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 727–728. Riyazi, Zia al-Mu'arafa, 44–45. 47 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 728. 48 Statement by Mir Mohammad Hussyan Beg, elder of Sultan Mohammad clan, 11 Apr. 94, PSLI, 74, 547.

the pacification of the hazaras

131

The Hazara Uprising In the winter of 1891, the Hazaras rebelled for a number of reasons, the ﬁrst of which involved the conﬁscation of their weapons. Due to the lack of a single quarter the government army was stationed in diﬀerent places, and this made it vulnerable to attacks. To forestall such attacks the amir ordered that the Hazaras be disarmed;49 some Hazaras surrendered their weapons, and others refused. The weapons that were collected were sent to Kabul,50 and the Hazaras considered this a breach of the government’s promise that their weapons would be returned when the situation warranted it. The second provocation occurred when oﬃcers and soldiers of the army in the course of collecting revenue also raped married and unmarried women alike,51 and tortured and killed men who refused to surrender arms.52 Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan could not restrain these soldiers and oﬃcers who were acting independently.53 Actually, he was among the ﬁrst to enjoy the company of Hazara women. In an eﬀort to break Hazara power, the amir ordered that their mirs and religious leaders (sayyeds and zawwars) be separated from the Hazara commoners and sent on to Kabul where lands would be given to them.54 Although the order was not fully carried out, it created fear among all of the Hazaras as the mirs and sayyeds, constituting two-thirds of the population, were very inﬂuential.55 Even though the mirs acted as tyrants to the point of selling the children of the Hazara commoners into slavery56 and in some places usurping their land the Hazara commoners still viewed them as their elders. Since class-consciousness had not developed among the Hazaras even though theirs was a class society for a mountain people, the policy of separating the religious and secular groups from the Hazara commoners incited the latter to action. Initially, it may have been because the Hazara commoners were unwilling to ﬁght57 that the entry of the troops was not

49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 735. Ibid., 736. Ibid., 891. Ibid., 745. Ibid., 761. Ibid., 761, 891. Ibid., 862. Ibid., 891. Ibid.

132

chapter eight

opposed, but as the troops became oppressive, the Hazara commoners stood fast behind their mirs and sayyeds. In the oﬃcial chronicle, Siraj al-Tawarikh, there is no mention of whether the Hazaras were made to pay taxes, but other sources indicate that they undertook to pay one rupee per family annually.58 The Hazaras were also hard pressed for supplies.59 After having killed a few soldiers, the Palo subsection of the powerful Sultan Mohammad clan of the Uruzgan Hazaras, under the leadership of Mir Hussayn Beg, rebelled. Soon, other Hazaras joined them, killing and expelling the rest of the army scattered throughout the Hazarajat. Further, they declared a war and a jihad against the kingdom of Afghanistan. Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus Khan, who had been stationed with his army of four thousand soldiers in Gizao ﬂed to Qalat in the Ghilzay country.60 The Hazaras may have killed the rest, numbering, about six thousand soldiers and others.

The Mobilization of Public Opinion The Hazara rebellion crystallized animosity between the Sunni and Shi'i population still further, and religious leaders on both sides incited their co-religionists. The 'ulema gave the amir the legal ruling ( fatwa) to the eﬀect that the Hazaras were “inﬁdel”, rebel, and deserving of death.61 They preached this theme in their sermons and incited the soldiers, whom they accompanied to the battleﬁelds. At this time, Amir ‘Abd al-Rahman called himself the “amir of Islam.”62 He tried to turn the war into a sectarian war by stating that the Hazaras were “inﬁdels” and that the army and tribal levy were free to act as they pleased with regard to them and their property after they conquered their land.63 The Hazara land was promised only to the Durranays and the Ghilzays.64 The amir also declared that his object in conquering Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 249. KD, 22 Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 103. MM, Dec. 91, PSLI, 65, 103. 60 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 250. Mir Hussayn Beg, 11 Apr. 94, PSLI, 74, 548. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 761. 61 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 891. KD, 22–24 June 92, PSLI, 1511. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 253. 62 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 543. 63 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s Firman, Kand D, 28 May 92, PSLI, 66, 1259. 64 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 781. 58 59

the pacification of the hazaras

133

Uruzgan was to secure “an impregnable natural position” for the Durranays as the inﬁdels on both sides now exposed them to attacks.65 Despite all of this, hostility to the Hazaras was not universal. About twenty seven thousand “Afghans” (of unknown tribal identity) living side by side with the Hazaras were reported to have joined them against the amir. This population had been refractory for some time.66 Near Kabul, the inhabitants of Kohistan encouraged the rebel leaders in their stand against the amir.67 The mir of Maymana, who had revolted at the time, promised his support to the Hazaras.68 For their part the Hazaras also declared a religious war,69 and elected Timus Shah, a descendant of Imam Musa Raza, as their ruler (khalifa).70 In her, A Tale of the Hazara War, Lady Hamilton who lived in Kabul at the time notes that the Hazaras detested “the unholy alliance” that existed between the amir and the English. She quotes the Hazaras as having declared that “We will ﬁght for one true God, and his true prophet, and for 'Ali against these Kaﬁrs and the allies of Kaﬁrs.”71 This statement is true in the sense that the Hazaras cloaked the war in religion, but untrue with regard to the point that they wanted to ﬁght the British also. On the contrary, in view of their cooperation with the British during their invasion of Afghanistan, the Hazaras expected that they would help them against the amir,72 and so they asked them, although in vain, to assist them in their present struggle in return for their cooperation in future “in every way.”73 Both sides resorted to religion for the justiﬁcation of their bellicose stand. The amir and the ‘ulema on one side, and the mirs, and the mujtahids (Shi'i 'ulema) on the other, for reasons best known to them, invoked the names of God, the Prophet, 'Ali and Islam in inciting the Sunni and Shi'i

65

MM, July 92, PSLI, 67, 275. KD, 21–24 May 92, PSLI, 66, 1103. 67 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 251. 68 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 821. 69 Ibid., 781. 70 KD, 10 May 92, PSLI, 66, 606. 71 Hamilton, L., A Vizier’s Daughter, a Tale of the Hazara War, London, 1900, 31. Based on the experience of the author with the Hazara prisoners in Kabul, this is a historical novel. The author, who was sympathetic toward the prisoners, has dramatized her account and so has made it unreliable as a source. 72 Brown, Major J., to secretary to Government of India, 11 Apr. 91, PSLI, 74, 547. 73 MM, Sept 92, PSLI, 68, . . . . 66

134

chapter eight

Muslims to wage war against each other, a war that resulted not only in physical destruction but also in enslavement of the Muslim Hazaras at the hands of their own Muslim compatriots. It also caused the disruption of the Hazara political and, to a certain extent, the religious order. Never had the amir been as successful in rallying his Sunni subjects around him as during that time, when tribal elders volunteered their service against the Hazaras. Occasionally, each side made peace overtures, but these were futile. The original proposal of the Hazaras to retain autonomy in return for becoming tributary vassals74 was repeated several times, but the amir was willing only to pardon them, provided they disposed of their mirs.75 This was, of course, unacceptable to the Hazaras. The amir had singled out the mirs because earlier they had stated that they would never trust him, as they knew how he had done away with many leading men in the country, and how he governed his own nation with brute force.76 Ultimately, the matter was left unsettled.

The Fighting The uprising spread throughout the Hazarajat. Although more uniﬁed than ever, the Hazaras were far from united. The smaller tribes of the periphery—the Char Dasta, the Jaghuri, the Jaghatu, and the Mohammad Khwaja—supported the government,77 as did a small segment of the Dai Zangi, and Behsud Hazars,78 and a number of the mirs from the hitherto independent Gizao and Panjab in Uruzgan.79 However, most of the Hazaras fought, believing that the shrine of Imam Musa Raza, in Shah Tus, in Uruzgan, would cause defeat to the amir’s army as it had, so they thought, repulsed similar attempts in the past. They fought recklessly under the leadership of Qazi 'Askar, elder of the 'Inayat section, Mir Mohammad Hussayn Beg, elder of the Sultan Mohammad section, and Sardar Mohammad 74 Hazaras of Daya and Folad to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, KD, 25 Apr. 91, PSLI, 63, 528. 75 Herat governor in darbar, HD, 6 Aug. 92, PSLI, 67, 528. 76 Hazara elders to the amir, KD, 8–10 June 92, PSLI, 66, 1296. 77 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 773, 774. 78 Ibid., 956. 79 Ibid., 890, 995, 1015. According to Riyazi, ('Ayn al-Waqyi', 260) the cattle owners of Uruzgan left their fortiﬁcations for pastures and others accepted bribes.

the pacification of the hazaras

135

'Azim Khan, elder of the Se-pai Dai Kundi, who was until then the amir’s head servant. The amir poured about one hundred thousand troops and tribal levies into the Hazarajat from all sides.80 He had never previously been able to employ so many soldiers and militias against an enemy. The army was led by Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Orakzay, Sardar 'Abd al-Quddus, General Sher Ahmad and others. Many battles preceded the decisive ones that were fought in Daya, Folad, and Uruzgan. In Uruzgan the battle continued for ﬁve days,81 and ﬁfty skirmishes took place before it was reoccupied.82 In the winter, the troops evacuated the Hazarajat just short of Uruzgan. During the next spring, the Hazaras of the northern Hazarajat were the ﬁrst to rise. However, after their initial successes in April 1893, they were defeated by the tribal levies, and the army led by Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Orakzay and General Amir Mohammad. It appears that General Amir Mohammad won the last decisive battle on the bank of the Helmand River between Dai Kundi and Dai Zangi. The Hazaras were ﬁnally crushed in September 1893.83

The Hazara Settlement After the defeat of the Hazaras, the amir tried to break their power. As an ethnic group of the Shi'i sect occupying the central highland, the Hazaras were a signiﬁcant force, and the amir regarded them as a source of potential danger to the country.84 He considered their mirs and religious elders in particular to be the enemies of both the Hazara commoners and the Afghans. These “enemies” he ordered to be separated from the rest of the Hazaras and settled elsewhere,85 and commissioned Na"ib Padshah Gul to round up the elders and send them on to Kabul. However, since the government oﬃcials

80 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Durranys of Kandahar, Kand D, 2 July 92, PSLI, 66, 1721. According to Riyazi, ('Ayn al-Waqayi', 258) the number of regular troops was 20,000, of tribal levies 60,000; and of guns 40. His ﬁgures of 10,000 for the Hazara ﬁghting men are incredibly low. 81 Mir Hussayn Beg, 11 Apr. 94, PSLI, 74, 548. 82 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, KD, 21–23 Sept. 92, PSLI, 68, 105. 83 MM, Sept. 93, PSLI, 72, 257. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 898. 84 Sultan Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 1, 276. 85 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 957, 1100.

136

chapter eight

were corrupt most of the real mirs escaped the ordeal, and Hazara commoners were sent to Kabul instead.86 They were settled in Bagram and Nahr-e-Shahi in Jalalabad, and were allowed to return to their land after the amir had died.87 As the amir had already promised, everyone involved in the war actually enslaved the Hazaras and looted their property.88 Since a large number of the Hazaras had been made prisoners, they became subject to the slave trade. Traders from all over the country bought them from soldiers and sold them at a proﬁt.89 The famine that spread following the war also compelled many Hazaras to take their children to the market to be sold.90 The government prohibited Hindus and Sikhs from participating in the slave trade, and in Kandahar, a few Hindus who sold some Hazaras, and reportedly tried to convert others to their religion were ﬁned.91 The state reaped the largest share of the sale of the Hazaras and the seizure of their property, as it levied a tax of one-tenth ('ushr) on the sale92 of each Hazara and one-ﬁfth (khums) on his or her seizure as war booty.93 In Kandahar alone, such sales tax amounted to seventy thousand rupees.94 As a result, slavery which the amir had previously banned was, in eﬀect, reintroduced. Finally, the judge (qazi) and the expounder of the Islamic law (mufti ) of Jaghuri raised their voices in dissension, arguing that the sale of Muslims was prohibited by Islam.95 Afterward, the sale was banned, although the Hazaras still remained, in eﬀect, in bondage until the 1920s, when King Aman Allah, the amir’s grandson, emancipated them.96 Due to the destruction of the Hazaras’ shelters and crops97 during the war, the Hazarajat could no longer support even the diminished population, as was evident from the fact that they were eating

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

819.

Ibid., 987. Ibid., 934. Ibid., 853. Ibid., 830, 937. Ibid., 863. Ibid., 989. Ibid., 863. Ibid., 830. Ibid., 969. Ibid., 1115. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 670. The fertile valley of Ajaristan was laid waste. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh,

the pacification of the hazaras

137

grass and selling their children for wheat.98 With the additional suppression exercised over them and the ﬁne imposed on them for their rebellion, it was reported perhaps with some exaggeration, that the “majority”99 of the Hazaras had left for Central Asia, Khurasan, Quetta, Baluchistan, and Sind.100 The amir then asked the Durranays and Ghilzays to settle in Uruzgan.101 He also announced that everyone wishing to settle in the rest of the Hazarajat would be exempt from paying revenue for the ﬁrst year and allowed to pay it at a lower rate in the future.102 At the same time, he also announced that money and seeds would be advanced on easy terms to Hazara cultivators. The government converted the pastures of the Hazarajat into state property and then sold them to the nomads (kuchays) who had helped it to transport supplies during the war.103 Until then the nomads had been unable to graze their cattle beyond Behsud, Nahur, and the Saydasta of the Jaghuri area;104 with the blessing of government oﬃcials, they forced their way onto the pastures of Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi, Malistan, and other interior localities.105 The lands of those who had fallen in the war and had left no inheritors were conﬁscated, as were the lands of the mirs of Dai Zangi and Dai Kundi. Since in the past, these mirs had taken over lands from the Hazara commoners, the latter now claimed their lands. The amir ruled that such lands were to be handed over to their original owners, and the mirs were to be left only with those lands, which they themselves cultivated.106 The Qizilbashes, who were followers of the same Shi'i faith as the Hazaras, sympathized with them, incited them by saying that “. . . the British were going to bring an end to the Emirate, and that now was the time to assert Hazara independence against the Amir’s ﬂedgling government.”107 The government then accused the Qizilbashes

98 Of the 20,000 families of Behsud only 6,400 families in total and only 60 families of the Sultan Mohammad clan survived the war. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 854, 1031. 99 Ibid., 989. 100 Ibid., 855, 914. 101 MM, Nov. 94, PSLI, 80, 21. Kand D., 6 Jan. 94, PSLI, 69, 627. 102 KD, 2 June 95, PSLI, 80, 21. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 829, 855. 103 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 986. 104 Ibid., 714, 715. 105 Ibid., 1100. 106 Ibid., 1011. 107 Gulzad, External Inﬂuences and the Development of the Afghan State, 150.

138

chapter eight

of having cooperated with the British in the past,108 and compelled them, as well as the Hazaras, to observe only Sunni Islam.109 For that purpose, the government instructed the judges (qazis) and the expounders of Islamic law (muftis) of the districts of Uruzgan, 'Askarabad, Malistan, Ajaristan, Jaghuri, Behsud, Gizao, Yakawlang, Bamiyan, Kahmard and Saighan110 to settle the legal aﬀairs of the Hazaras in accord with the Hanaﬁ system of jurisprudence. By forcing the Shi'as—that is, the followers of the Ja'fari system of law—to embrace the Sunni system the amir intended to unite his subjects religiously, as the Safavi rulers had converted the Sunnis of Persia into the Shi'i faith in the sixteenth century. Nadir Shah Afshar had unsuccessfully tried to do the opposite in the eighteenth century. At the same time the amir also tried to weaken the hold of the mujtahids (Shi'i 'ulema) of Persia over the Shi'as of Afghanistan, and this had given the mujtahids a chance to interfere in the aﬀairs of Afghanistan. However, the professed conversion of the Shi'as was just a pretense in line with the doctrine of concealment (taqiyya) that allowed them to temporarily change faith in a time of danger.111 The Hazara war revealed how the religious, social and cultural institutions in Afghanistan released forces for destruction. The amir, the 'ulema, the tribal elders and senior government oﬃcials, on one side, and the mirs and mujtahids, on the other, as well as common men on both sides involved themselves in a war to physically destroy the adversary and his property. In the absence of restraining inﬂuences on both sides this war was fought as if in a non-Muslim land (dar al-harb). The Hazaras were crushed for the ﬁrst time in their history, but the war also ended their centuries-old isolation forever. Afterward, they mingled with their neighbors and settled in cities particularly Kabul. In Kabul, while most Hazara males did menial jobs, the women secured places with wealthy families as wives, concubines, and domestic helpers. Enterprising Hazara businessmen ﬂourished, and their children studied in government-run educational institutes, and later entered state employment. Today the Hazaras constitute a considerable portion of the permanent residents of the city of Kabul.

108 109 110 111

Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 253. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1065. Ibid., 986. Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, 158–161.

CHAPTER NINE

THE CONQUEST OF FORMER KAFIRISTAN

Kaﬁristan,1 a highland in northeastern Afghanistan, with patches of pastures, some arable land, and tall woods in its numerous narrow valleys, had remained independent for centuries because of its inaccessible location and the determination of its inhabitants in defending it. Until the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, only minor incursions had been undertaken against it, but these had, nevertheless, reduced its size. The amir did not overrun Kaﬁristan earlier in his reign because he was preoccupied elsewhere. Instead, he adopted a paternal attitude toward its elders on the occasions when they visited him in Kabul, whenever their overzealous neighbors pressured them. Only in the mid-1890s when Russia and Britain had reached almost to the border of Kaﬁristan through their occupation of the Pamirs and Chitral, respectively, did he order its conquest. 1 ‘Kaﬁristan’ (‘the land of the inﬁdel’) is the name reputedly given by the Muslims to the land where the ‘Kaﬁrs’ lived. The name has been in use since the sixteenth century. According to Ghobar (Afghanistan, 671) before that Kaﬁristan was called Bilor or Bular. As noted in the present study Bilor is derived from the word Bakhtar. Seemingly this name had been in use by the Kaﬁrs who after their migration from Bakhtar (Bactria) lived in the south and west of former Kaﬁristan. According to Wheeler M. Thackston “The origin of the name Kaﬁristan probably has nothing at all to do with the Arabic Kaﬁr but rather with Gabarik, the tribal name Babur gives. Overtime and also because of the paganism of the region, ‘Gabar’ could have been transformed into ‘Kaﬁr.’” (The Baburnama, Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor), Transl., edited and annotated by Thackston, Modern Library Paperback edition, 2002, New York, 484). According to Sir H. M., Elliot, (“Notes on the Hindu Kings of Kabul”, Appendix, B., GAK, 1895, cxxxiii) the Kaﬁrs lived in Katorman, a statement based on the writing of Abu Raihan al-Bairuni’s Tarikh al-Hind. Elliot also states that a prince as well as a tribe of the same name lived in Katorman bordering Kabul. Charles Masson also notes that “. . . the general name of the northern part of the region of Kaﬁristan was Ketuer, or Katawar.” He likewise states that “the princes of Chitral, who in the time of Timur were no doubt inﬁdels . . ., being still [1832] stiled [Sic] Shah Katawar.” (Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan and the Panjab, 1,198) In the late nineteenth century Riyazi ('Ayn alWaqayi', 269) states much the same and notes that before Timur (1336?–1405) invaded Kaﬁristan it was called ‘Kator’. The names Kator, Katorman, and Katawar are seemingly variations of Katir who constituted the great majority of the population of Kaﬁristan. Among the “Kaﬁr” tribes, they have appeared most prominently in history.

chapter nine

Kaﬁristan

140

the conquest of former kafiristan

141

The People and Society of Former Kaﬁristan The inhabitants of Kaﬁristan, an Indo-Aryan people, had preserved their ancient beliefs and customs in their largely inaccessible and isolated highland. Generally, they were tall, lean, fair, and quarrelsome. Some had green eyes and blond hair. Due to these and various other features, they were said to be the descendants of the troops of Alexander the Great, but there is no evidence to suggest that they were of Greek origin. The Kaﬁrs did not have a single name for their land or for themselves as a whole, and used regional names instead. The eastern region was called Prigrom, the central region Kalshom, and the western region Ramgul. Each consisted of a number of very narrow river valleys.2 The Kaﬁrs also employed more than one name for the same village and the same clan. It is generally believed that because their ancient religion was a form of polytheism of an Indian type, with pantheons varying from tribe to tribe, these people were called ‘Kaﬁrs’ (inﬁdels) and their land as ‘Kaﬁristan’ (the land of inﬁdels) by their Muslim neighbors. The Afghan historian Ghobar, however, states that the name ‘Kaﬁr’ is probably derived from the word kapira originally by the Siyahposh Kaﬁrs of western Biloristan. The name ‘Kaﬁristan’ is also derived from the word Kapria,3 with the addition of stan, signifying place in Sanskrit, as well as in Kaﬁri languages.4 The Kaﬁrs and their society stood in sharp contrast to those of their Muslim neighbors, essentially because of diﬀerent religious beliefs and mutually hostile relationship in general, a situation that has aﬀected the Kaﬁr character and society in more than one way. To begin with, the former Kaﬁrs had numerous deities to whom they oﬀered sacriﬁces and presents in their shrines made of wood or stone, for the protection of themselves, and their crops, cattle and villages. These deities were worshiped through sacriﬁces; with dances, and with the singing of hymns (lalu Kunda), and by uttering invocations (namcha kunda). The deities common to all tribes, in order of signiﬁcance, 2

Tauza, Sami' Allah, The Historical and Cultural Roots of Nuristan, Ministry of Information and Culture, Kabul, 1988, 7 (Dari). Mr. Tauza is a native author. 3 Ghobar, Mir G. Mohammad, Goghraﬁyya-e-Tarikhi-e-Afghanistan (Persian) [The Geographical History of Afghanistan], Reprint, Maiwand Publication House, Peshawar, 1999, 36. 4 Tauza, 319.

142

chapter nine

were Imra, or Yamra (the creator), Moni, or Mani, (his prophet), Gish, or Gesh, (the war god); Bagisht (the god of wealth), Diazane, Krumati and Nirmali, (three goddesses).5 There were also many other deities, but they were of inferior status and peculiar to individual localities. A belief in spirits (dogan), heroic ancestors, demons and fairies likewise formed the Kaﬁr religious outlook. For example, the god Bagisht, like all other gods, was “. . . believed to have lived in this world as a man, and to have become deiﬁed after his death.”6 Not only did the Kaﬁrs invoke their assistance; they also believed that the spirits managed their worldly aﬀairs. As a whole the Kaﬁr religion was, as Robertson believed, a somewhat low form of idolatry, with an admixture of ancestor worship and some traces of ﬁre-worship.7 The religious beliefs and rituals of the Kaﬁrs were simple, and they knew little about their theology. Humbly standing in front of their shrines, they would invoke their assistance in protecting their crops and themselves from the forces of nature and their Muslim enemies; Utah, the high priest, presided over all of their religious ceremonies, including sacriﬁces at shrines. However, it was their religious beliefs and the danger posed by their Muslim enemies that held the Kaﬁrs together as a people. Otherwise they had no common bonds. The Kaﬁr religious beliefs and practices were, thus, an example of the powerlessness of a small, superstitious and traditional society against the indomitable forces of nature and of the Muslim enemies, who had reduced their once larger habitat, and then kept continually for centuries in a state of permanent siege and pressure. The people of Kaﬁristan who lived in large and compact villages situated at the foot of hills with attached storied-houses made mainly of wood, were tribal and non-tribal, a division which corresponded roughly to the division of society into freemen (atrogen) and slaves

5 Robertson, Sir George S., The Kaﬁrs of the Hindu-Kush, Reprint, Johnson Corporation, London, 1970, 381. It was ﬁrst published in 1895. Robertson (1852–1916) twice had traveled into Kaﬁristan on the eve of its conquest, and had lived among the Kaﬁrs for over a year. His book based on his own observations and ﬁndings gives the most comprehensive account of the Kaﬁrs, their society and politics that exists in any language. Because of its signiﬁcance the book was in the same year rearranged and reissued entitled Kaﬁristan and Its People. I am indebted to Mr. M. Hassan Sahak for sending me a photostat copy of this book. Tauza, 227. 6 Robertson, 406. 7 Robertson, 376.

the conquest of former kafiristan

143

(borjan).8 Tribal Kaﬁrs were in the majority, and only they owned land and cattle, and, therefore, had wealth and power. Their Muslim neighbors distinguished them by the names ‘Siyah-posh’, (Black-robed) and ‘Safed-posh’ (White-robed). This division was more apparent than real as the Kaﬁrs were known to each other by the name of the tribe and social group to which they belonged. The Kata tribe (Katir, or Kator) which was larger than all of the others combined, lived in the Kantiva and Ramgul and Bashgul (Bashgol) valleys. In the past, the eastern Kata was known as ‘Bilor’ and the western Kata as ‘Kator’. The Kam tribe also lived in the Bashgul valley. These Siyah-posh tribes, with their large town of Kamdesh, adjacent to Chitral, carried on trade and made other kinds of contact with the outside world to a greater extent than the other tribes. Hence the signiﬁcance they had over others. Among the other tribes were the Safed-posh tribes of Kalsha (or Wai in Waigul), Prasun (in central Kaﬁristan), Ashkun and Gowar (Sutra Gor). The Prasun are perhaps the oldest inhabitants of Kaﬁristan.9 The Kata, including the Muman and Kam, spoke one language, which was called Kati, with local variations; others spoke the languages of Waiguli, Presun and Ashkun. The Presun language was so diﬃcult that it was impossible for a non-native speaker to learn it. The last- mentioned three languages were mutually unintelligible, and all languages spoken in Kaﬁristan belonged to the Dardic group of the Indo-European family. Each tribe consisted of a number of clans whose headmen, known as Jast (or Jashtt) and others constituted councils. Tauza, a native author, states that in former Kaﬁristan each village had two councils: the common council (urey), which was composed of free tribesmen and headed by a Jast, settled village aﬀairs, while the council of elders, composed of the inﬂuential individuals such as Jast, Shoramuach, Batur and others made laws and executed them.10 Since the latter held meetings in a special house it may not have been known to the English author George Robertson, who traveled twice in the eastern parts of Kaﬁristan and stayed there for over a year. Or, he may be referring to this council when he states that “The aﬀairs of a tribe such as the Kam are managed by the Jast nominally, 8 9 10

Tauza, 166. Tauza, 149–158. Tauza, 182–183.

chapter nine

144

but actually by a small group of greybeards, who at ordinary times rule in a more or less absolute way.”11 At any rate, Robertson focuses only on the common council (urey) which he calls “parliament” and which he attended. He states: A Kaﬁr parliament is a strange sight. . . . A dozen men, perhaps, try to speak at once; each has his own little group of listeners, whose attention . . . he seeks to recall by loud ejaculations of ‘ai ai’ or by little pokes in the ribs with his walking club. If some very exciting topic is being discussed, perhaps all are talkers and none are listeners; but, as a rule, when one of the tribal orators begins to speak, he gets the attention of the greater part of the assembly.12

Since the illiterate Kaﬁrs could not record their decisions they often did not stick to them. Robertson notes: . . . the discussion [decision] arrived at on one day is quite likely to be rescinded on the next, and reverted to on the third. But such occurrences are exceptional and only happen when people are laboring under strong excitement on some subject.

Further, Robertson states that “Generally the Jast, or its inner council, manage every thing.” He then refers to the political order of the Kaﬁrs as “oligarchy, or, in some tribes, an autocracy.”13 While it is true that the Kaﬁr political order was an oligarchy, it is also true to say that it was not an autocracy, since membership in the council was only for one year, and the position of Jast as head of the clan was not hereditary. More importantly, in the absence of landed aristocracy as well as a cash economy to enable some one to retain militias even the powerful Jast were unable to rule autocratically, and had to rely on the good will of the tribesmen in conducting public aﬀairs. Robertson even speaks of “. . . a public opinion which avenges any outrage on itself by promptly burning down the culprit’s house and destroying his property.” In his view public opinion is “a power not to be disregarded.”14 Also, by the time a tribesman attained the status of Jast he had become ﬁnancially worse oﬀ. This may explain why no one has evidently attempted to set up a monarchy. The reason for this is simple; the process of choosing the Jast was elaborate and very expensive. 11 12 13 14

Robertson, Robertson, Robertson, Robertson,

234. 435. 434, 435. 436.

the conquest of former kafiristan

145

A candidate was required to have shown special valor in ﬁghting the Muslim enemy and to have hosted feasts for elders and the tribe. The Kam, for example, required a candidate to wait for three years and give twenty-one feasts to become a Jast. Still as Robertson states “. . . many men utterly ruin themselves in becoming Jast, spending their substance to the last goat, the last cheese, the last pound of ghee.”15 However, although it was an ordeal for a candidate to undergo this process, he did so to become not necessarily rich but socially important. According to Robertson “While going through the ordeal the man himself or his immediate relations are all conscious of the digniﬁed position the family is attaining.”16 He endures the expenses because, as Robertson notes, An individual cannot become of great importance in the tribe until he is a headman or Jast, one of those individuals who are permitted to wear the women’s coroneted earrings, and to wear whatever gorgeous dress he can procure for religious ceremonies and dances.17

In addition, only the Jast had the privilege of sitting on a special chair before the public. The main privilege of the Jast, as noted, was membership and chairmanship in the tribal council (urey),18 but the function and authority of councils diﬀered somewhat from tribe to tribe. What was common to all councils was this. Even though in theory every tribal Kaﬁr was entitled to become a Jast in actual practice only the valorous wealthy could do so. Thus, among tribal Kaﬁrs, only the wealthy and the valorous with strong religious beliefs could raise themselves to the pinnacle of power. However, they could rise only within the traditional framework, as the Kaﬁr political culture was only conventional and routine. Within this order, the position of the Jast was of paramount importance because he headed the community of the tribal Kaﬁrs, who alone were economically and politically the most important among a people who were divided into various clans, and had feuds among themselves, some of which had lasted for generations. The non-tribal or client Kaﬁrs, who were fewer in number were either freemen or slaves. The freemen were de-tribalized, but owned 15 16 17 18

Robertson, 450. Robertson, 450. Robertson, 449. Tauza, 171.

146

chapter nine

neither land nor cattle, maintaining themselves by laboring mainly as shepherds. The slaves (borjan) were divided into the Bari and the Showala, and were either artisans or domestics. They were the property of families whose heads enjoyed wide power. The slaves were originally prisoners of war, whom the Kaﬁrs had acquired in conﬂicts with their neighbors in past centuries.19 The position of the artisan slaves was much better because they owned property and the community needed their services as carpenters, tanners, weavers, goldsmiths, ironsmiths and the like. Slaves of both types were forbidden to visit shrines, and domestic slaves were even banned from going beyond certain limits in the house. Like the shudras or dasas of ancient India slaves were considered unclean. Of all the Kaﬁr tribes the Kam and the Calsha had the highest number of slaves, and they were sold and bought in the town of Kamdesh.20 The Kaﬁrs had some other customs as well that distinguished them markedly from their neighbors. Their women, being unveiled and therefore able to move freely, tilled the land. However, since Kaﬁristan was a mountainous country it had narrow valleys and only limited stretches of cultivable land. Tauza claims that women tilled the land so that men have ample time to defend the country against the ever—present danger to which they were exposed from their Muslim neighbors.21 Consequently, it was not uncommon for Kaﬁr women to engage in sexual aﬀairs both out of wedlock and extra-maritally. If discovered, the women were not severely punished and any resulting problems were settled by a council of elders, who ordered the male ‘seducer’ to give a few goats to the wronged husbands. Young unmarried women were especially indulgent, and their fathers accepted and raised their out of the wedlock children without grudges. It is even said that the Siyah-posh Kaﬁrs were inclined to “. . . resign their wives to those who reside under their roofs” out of hospitality to their guests.22 The Kaﬁrs were polygamous to the extent that some of them married more than four wives. It was even considered a reproach to have only one wife—a sign of poverty and insigniﬁcance.23 However, 19

Ghobar, The Geographical History of Afghanistan, 140. Tauza, 178. Tauza, 177–181. 21 Tauza, 185. 22 Masson, Charles, Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the Panjab, First published in 1842. Reprint by Oxford University Press, 1874, 1, 227. 23 Robertson, 435. 20

the conquest of former kafiristan

147

unlike Pashtuns, among whom parallel cousin marriage was common, the Kaﬁrs did not marry wives even from their own clans, a custom which had contributed to the solidarity of society. “[A]s no man may take a wife from his own clan, or from his mother’s or from his father’s clan, it can easily be imagined how closely the people are connected with one another.”24 Their marriage as well as divorce ceremonies were simple. Marriage was performed by the tying together of two twigs or rods of the height of the groom and bride, and divorce was performed by their being broken. Even though the Kaﬁr women overworked, and were undervalued the Kaﬁr family life was full of aﬀection. The Kaﬁrs were extremely social within their own community. They held parties at home in which men, women, and even young boys drank wine. Alexander Burnes notes that the Kaﬁrs “. . . are very fond of honey, wine, and vinegar all of which they have in abundance.”25 The Kaﬁrs were likewise fond of music and dancing, although men and women danced separately and diﬀerently. With regard to work, every Kaﬁr, who was physically capable, did so. Even elders and aristocrats with lofty titles labored as shepherds, warriors, and even cultivators.26 The Kaﬁrs could not understand suicide, and the very idea of man killing himself struck them as inexplicable. “They are never melancholy”27 and “[s]ingly, they are often reasonable.”28 Also, they slept as they pleased, and, in contrast to their Muslim neighbors, the Kaﬁrs did not have blood feud, and made murderers outcasts forever or until payment of a ransom, which was so heavy that it was rarely paid. The inﬂiction of severe punishment upon the murderer was meant to prevent blood feud, which if not checked, would have meant “the extinction of a tribe” and the loss of warriors, who were badly needed in feud with their Muslim neighbors.29 Further, the killing of a Kaﬁr who had accepted Islam (shaykh) was treated as if an ordinary Kaﬁr had been murdered.30 Unlike

24 25

Robertson, 86. Tauza, 185. Burnes, Alexander, Cabool, First published in 1842. Reprint 1973. Graz, Austria,

210. 26 27 28 29 30

Tauza, 180. Robertson, 381. Robertson, 432. Robertson, 442. Robertson, 73.

chapter nine

148

their Muslim neighbors, who buried their dead, the Kaﬁrs neither buried nor burned their dead, and placed the body of the dead in a box that was put on the summit of a nearby hill, a custom similar to that which prevailed in the Avestan period. Since the Kaﬁrs were illiterate they had no written records of their own. Also, because of their small-scale contact with the outside world they were not exposed to change, and held steadfast to their cultural values. Consequently, for centuries their society had been essentially retentive. The biggest change in their long history that aﬀected them as well as their society in a fundamental way came with their conversion to Islam in 1896. On the eve of their conversion the author Robertson characterized the Kaﬁrs in the following manner. “Their present ideas and all the associations of their history and their religion are simply assassinations and blackmailing; yet they are not savages. Some of them have the head of philosophers and statesmen. Their features are Aryan, and their mental capabilities are considerable. Their love of decoration, their carving, their architecture, all point to a time when they were higher in the human scale than they are at present.”31 The Kaﬁrs had a hostile as well as symbiotic relationship with their Muslim neighbors. Although they suﬀered from disunity they would unite whenever the latter would threaten them, but would not conduct a combined operation, preferring instead to retaliate in small parties. On the other hand, the Muslims would raid their territory to exact tribute, grab their land and capture their women, or to take revenge for their relatives whom the Kaﬁrs had killed. The Muslim and Kaﬁr communities in return would reward their respective successful raiders with the title of ghazi (Muslim ﬁghter against non-Muslims) for the Muslims, and of shoramauch for the Kaﬁrs. Nevertheless, the Kaﬁrs and their neighbors maintained a symbiotic relationship through trade in local commodities. Muslim peddlers carried on such trade in times of peace, even in the interior of Kaﬁristan. The Kaﬁrs also maintained relationships with the Muslims individually as well as collectively. They had ‘brothers’ among some frontier Muslims, and both sides extended hospitality to each other when called upon. It was this symbiotic relationship and the introduction of currency that contributed to the spread of

31

Robertson, 165.

the conquest of former kafiristan

149

Islam in the fringes of Kaﬁristan. Here, particularly in Bashgul, lived a large number of converts to Islam, known as shaykhs or neemchas. Although they had converted, their kinsmen accepted them without prejudice, because their blood ties were much stronger than religious ones. Thus, on the eve of the invasion, Islam had made considerable inroads among the Kaﬁrs, who were said to number about 52,500 people in 1891.32

The Historical Background of the Kaﬁrs As previously noted, the Kaﬁrs were an indigenous people. According to Ghobar they were the descendents of the people of Bakhtar who left their land (Bakhtar or Bactria) after the overthrow of the GrecoBactrian rule by the people of Takhar. They settled in regions south of the Hindu-kush, which they called Biloristan after their former land Bakhtar. In their new habitat, where they partly mixed with the indigenous people, but largely kept to themselves, they maintained their former predominantly Zoroastrian ways of life,33 as previously described. In the Islamic period, when Islam was being introduced in what is now eastern Afghanistan, the Kaﬁrs were pressured to accept Islam, and those who refused proceeded further up the highland, from Laghman, Konarr, Bajaur and other valleys. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna may have been the ﬁrst Muslim ruler to have pressured them to embrace Islam, in the beginning of the eleventh century. Although he invaded India seventeen times, he did not conquer the highland of the Kaﬁrs. The example he set was followed by Timur Lane (1335–1405) and by the Muslim princes of Turkestan, in the ﬁfteenth century. 34 In the early part of the sixteenth century, Mohammad Zahir al-Din Babur (1483–1530), the founder of the Mughal dynasty of India, had a small encounter with the Kaﬁrs in the Konarr valley. During the reigns of his successors, notably Jalal al-Din Akbar (1556–1605) and Jahangir (1605–1627), the Kaﬁrs of

32

GAK, 250. Ghobar, The Geographical History of Afghanistan, 135–139. 34 McNair, W. W., Exploration in Eastern Afghanistan, Kaﬁristan, 1883, 38, PSLI, 44, 1208. Masson, Narrative of Various Journeys, 1, 198–201. 33

150

chapter nine

Tagao, Nijrao, Pech, Konarr and Laghman were converted to Islam.35 In the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth century, Nadir Shah Afshar (d. 1747) left the Kaﬁrs unmolested, as did the Sadozay rulers afterward. However, later in 1874, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan tried to conquer Kaﬁristan, although the details of his attempt are unknown. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan did not take a military expedition against them until 1895, since he was not ready to confront them. Nor did the Kaﬁrs present a problem. After Russia occupied Panjdeh in 1885, the amir feared that the Russians viewed the Kaﬁrs as “. . . their auxiliary force.”36 A year later he also feared that “. . . the British Government intended to annex Kaﬁristan.”37 This was after the British Government requested him that he permit a British party under Colonel Lockhart to enter Kaﬁristan for collecting geological data.38 The amir turned down the request, but was still unable to bring the Kaﬁrs within the orbit of Kabul, due to more pressing problems elsewhere. Instead, he lent his blessing to the jihad movement that Mulla Khalil Mohmand and others were waging against the Kaﬁrs at the same time that he also adopted a paternal attitude toward those deputations of Kaﬁr elders who were turning to him in Kabul, for protection. Pressured by overzealous Muslims on the fringes of their land, groups of Kaﬁr elders frequently visited the amir and received good treatment, as well as presents of robes and cash. 'Omara Khan and the Kaﬁrs In the late 1880s 'Omara Khan (Umra Khan), the famous khan of Jandol, revived the centuries-old custom of jihad against the Kaﬁrs. In 1891, he occupied the Kaﬁr village of Nasrat on the left bank of the Konarr River even though his local rivals and the mehtar (ruler) of Chitral had made a coalition against him, which prevented him from undertaking a large-scale invasion. However, his second attempt

35

Rahim, M., Sifat Nama-e-Darwesh Mohammad Khan Ghazi (Persian) [in Praise of Darwesh Mohammad Khan Khan Ghazi], 1288 H.Q., Islamabad, Laghman, Introduction and Annotation by Scarcia, G., Rome, 1965, 74. 36 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Afzal, KD, 17, Mar. 85, PSLI, 44, 740. 37 MM, Apr. 86, PSLI, 63, 496. 38 Durand to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 22 Jan. 86, PSLI, 47, 1027.

the conquest of former kafiristan

151

at invading the Kaﬁr’s territory, after he had defeated his rivals, was anticipated by the Kaﬁrs,39 and they invaded his territory instead. They did so with the encouragement they received from Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, who had arrived at the time at Asmar with a large number of troops. Further, as a result of the Durand Agreement of 1893, when Kaﬁristan was oﬃcially recognized by India as a part of Afghanistan, the sipah salar warned 'Omara Khan to leave the Kaﬁrs alone.40 However, 'Omara Khan was still undeterred, stating that in Kaﬁristan his claim was “superior”41 to that of the amir’s and of the Mehtar of Chitral. He gave up his planned invasion only after the Government of India prevented him from carrying it out.42

The Mehtar of Chitral and the Kaﬁrs Previously Kaﬁristan, Chitral and Gilgit formed one land,43 and the Mehtar of Chitral, entitled Shah Kator,44 was viewed as the suzerain of the Kaﬁrs, for which they paid him tribute.45 Although, during the period under discussion, the mehtar was unable to administer their aﬀairs, the Kaﬁrs, especially those of the nearby Bashgul valley, still sought his protection when pressured by other Muslims. After they found out that he could no longer protect them from the threats of 'Omara Khan, they turned to the amir for protection.46 When the Government of India, the suzerain of the mehtar, accepted the amir’s claim that the whole of Kaﬁristan was a part of Afghanistan47 the centuries-old relationship between the former and Chitral came to an end.

39

PD, 23 Nov. 92, PSLI, 68, 703. PD, 8 Jan. 94, PSLI, 7, 208. 41 'Omara Khan to Mehter, PD, 8 Jan. 94, PSLI, 73, 208. 42 Secretary to government of India to 'Omara Khan, 30 Mar. 94, PD, 9 May, PSLI, 74, 711. 43 Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 671. 44 Elliot, “Hindu Kings of Kabul”, GAK, Appendix B., cxxlv. 45 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1129. 46 Kam elders to Ghulam Haydar Khan, PD, 8 Jan. 94, PSLI, 74, 128. 47 Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr. 96, F.L. No. 77 (1896), PSLI, 85, 20. 40

152

chapter nine The Negotiations

The concentration of troops at Asmar, as described in Chapter Four, alarmed the Kaﬁrs. The amir instructed the sipah salar to allay their fear by negotiating with them. However, the purpose was not a settlement through negotiation, but to dissuade the Kaﬁrs from ﬂeeing to Chitral, as, reportedly, they would do, if military expeditions were taken against them before the winter set in. The sipah salar was most suited for conducting the negotiation. As a Yusufzay Pashtun, well versed in the art of negotiations and settlements and enjoying wide authority as the amir’s viceroy in the eastern province, the sipah salar also preferred negotiation to the employment of force. Since one political center did not exist among the Kaﬁrs, he began negotiating with the tribes separately. Extensive negotiations were held with the Kam Kaﬁrs of the Bashgul valley bordering Chitral. However, these were no more than a delaying tactic. The sipah salar and his troops moved to Barikot (Birkot), closer to the Kam Kaﬁrs of the Bashgul valley, and proposed that they accept Islam and the amir’s rule.48 While, they were willing to submit to the amir, they were unwilling to accept Islam. They were also unwilling to accept the construction of a road through their valley to Badakhshan, which the sipah salar had planned to build. Subsequently, they agreed to the construction of the road, provided they were left free to practice their religion. The sipah salar went along with their request, but when work was begun on the road, the Kaﬁrs changed their minds, proposing instead to accept Islam, not the road. For the sipah salar, the construction of the road and their submission were of greater urgency than the Kaﬁrs’ immediate conversion, because without the road the invasion would be diﬃcult. For precisely the same reason, ultimately the Kaﬁrs of the whole valley made it clear that they wanted to become zimmis (non-Muslim subjects), but would accept neither Islam nor the road.49 Evidently, the Kaﬁrs, who had lived in freedom since their arrival in their territory, resented losing their freedom, and so wanted to retain it by becoming zimmis. The sipah salar gave way, knowing that if he refused to accept their proposal they would resist and then escape to Chitral.50 48

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1124, 1125, 1129, 1130. Ibid. 50 Sayyed Shah of Daryu of Luthkoh to British agent, Gilgit Diary, 2 Nov. 95, F.L., No. 4493 (1896), PSLI, 83. 49

the conquest of former kafiristan

153

Elsewhere the negotiations, which were mixed with intimidation, were more successful: Some even submitted and accepted Islam and the impression prevailed that Kabul might not undertake the military expedition after all. In reality, Kabul accomplished its intended goal; the negotiations created a false sense of security as the result of which the Kaﬁrs remained in their areas of habitation. During the coming winter when it was most diﬃcult, if not impossible, for them to ﬂee either to Chitral or to the upper parts of their valleys the last grand invasion of Kaﬁristan was undertaken.

The Invasion In the winter of 1895 Kaﬁristan was invaded from all sides by regular troops and tribal levies (eljaris). The purpose was to bring about the “. . . absolute submission and conversion to Islam”51 of the Kaﬁrs. 51

For details of the military operations in the Bashgul valley see, Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1163, 1165, 1166 and 1167. Dr. S. Jones in his book, Men of Inﬂuence in Nuristan, (Seminar Press, 1974) has devoted a chapter to the invasion of Kaﬁristan. Essentially, a chronology, the chapter is based exclusively on some, not all, of the diaries of the agents of the British Government of India. However, he has viewed the Kaﬁristan issue in isolation, not in the context of the region. Besides, Dr. Jones is selective in the citation of reports, and has cited unreliable reports on a number of topics. He has, for instance, noted a report from a dubious source in which it is stated that prior to December 1895 “10,000” Kaﬁrs were killed in the ﬁghting with Afghan troops, and that the casualties among the latter amounted to about “600” men. (p. 13) The report is about the military operation in the Bashgul valley before it was overrun. In a population of about 20, 000 with a ﬁghting force of about 7000 men which the Bashgul valley had the ﬁgures cited by Dr. Jones can not possibly be true. Kaﬁr women and old men neither fought nor were massacred by the Afghan army. Also, the shaykhs or neemchas (Kaﬁrs converted to Islam) supported the army of Islam against their own kinsmen, and among the inhabitants of large villages, especially Kamdesh with 600 houses, some did not oppose the army. Dr. Jones had not cited a report from a reliable source, namely the Chitral Diary, stating that about 200 tribal levies and 180 Kaﬁrs were lost in the ﬁghting in the upper part of the Bashgul valley. (Kakar, (1971), 198). Obviously, by the end of the ﬁghting this number must have risen, but not much since in the whole valley no major battle was fought, and the casualties inﬂicted on the Kaﬁrs seems proportional with those inﬂicted by them on the Afghan army, which were 29 killed and 30 wounded. (Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1178) Dr. Jones has no word in his book about the penetration of Islam among the Kaﬁrs and the amir’s paternal treatment of the prisoners of war. The amir’s paternal treatment is evident from his decree which states that anyone who tried to enslave a Kaﬁr would be ﬁned 3,500 rupees. (Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1182) Contrary to this, Dr. Jones (p. 233) claims that the amir “even sold” handsome slave-girls to the oﬃcers ( ghulam bachas) of the court, ignor-

154

chapter nine

The sipah salar overran the Bashgul valley and returned to Asmar in early January 1986, after having left a garrison there; resistance was light and a number of Kaﬁrs ﬂed to Chitral.52 Next, along with troops from Munjan, he paciﬁed the long valley of Pech and all of its side vales. The Ramgul and Kulum Kaﬁrs, who lived in the interior of Kaﬁristan and stood fast by their religion, proved diﬃcult to overcome. This ﬁnally occurred in the winter of 1896, after both sides incurred heavy casualties. With the fall of Kulum the conquest was complete.

The Settlement and Conversion Following the invasion the conversion to Islam of the Kaﬁrs began. Armed Sunni mullas of the Hanaﬁ system of laws guarded by armed khassadars (militia) were commissioned to convert the Kaﬁrs. Further, mosques were built in all of the villages and hamlets, where the Kaﬁrs were taught in the fundamentals of Islam. Many wooden eﬃgies and statuettes depicting Kaﬁr deities, and presumably also their ancestors, were collected and sent on to Jalalabad and Kabul, where they disappeared. Thus, the Kaﬁr art which was the work of client artisans, and exempliﬁed the religious beliefs of the Kaﬁrs vanished. Except for a few ugly incidents here and there the mass conversion went on smoothly, and the Kaﬁrs gradually became staunch Muslims. This was particularly true of young Kaﬁrs, although the elderly felt sorrow over the loss of their traditional religion. By the amir’s order, no one was to pillage Kaﬁr property or to enslave a Kaﬁr. The Kaﬁr slaves were declared to be free as the amir had already abolished slavery in Afghanistan. If anyone did so, he was to pay a ﬁne of seven thousand rupees—an exorbitant sum. Qazis and hakims (subgovernors) were appointed to manage the land ing the fact that the amir’s betrothal of the Kaﬁr slave-girls was in line with the custom that allowed dowry and bride-price. Additionally, according to Dr. Jones (p. 3) following the British invasion of Afghanistan Amir Sher 'Ali Khan accompanied the Russian mission to Russia where “Sher 'Ali was something of an embarrassment and he was advised to return.” The plain fact is that Russia’s governor-general von Kaufmann did not allow the amir to enter even Central Asia, and that this refusal became partly responsible for the estrangement in Russo-Afghan relations until 1917 when the Bolsheviks came to power. 52 CD, 29 Dec 96, F.L., No. 78-F., (1896), PSLI, 90.

the conquest of former kafiristan

155

of the Kaﬁrs with the support of contingents of troops. Over a quarter of all Kaﬁrs from the interior of Kaﬁristan, who resisted the invasion, were deported ﬁrst to various parts of the country and then to Paghman, a district that resembled Kaﬁristan. From there, too, like the Hazara deportees, they were eventually allowed to return to their own region. About ten thousand Kaﬁrs were recruited into the army. Kaﬁristan was ﬁrst renamed Nur al-Islam (the light of Islam) and later Nuristan (the Land of Light), and the Kaﬁrs were called Nuristanays. For the ﬁrst time in their long history, the Kaﬁrs came out of isolation. Thus, in the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan the last enclave of ‘inﬁdels’ in Afghanistan was Islamized and with its Islamization the ‘inﬁdels’ found a new identity that enabled them to co-exist with their neighbors for the ﬁrst time in a spirit of Islamic brotherhood. The raison d’être for the vendetta with their neighbors as well as their isolation ceased to exist. Side by side with the conquest, three roads were built along the main valleys. Although the best of the roads was like “. . . a sort of track”53 these were passable with loaded animals. After the AsmarBadakhshan road was opened merchants used it freely. It was made exempt from tolls for three years. Previously, the merchants had sent their merchandises to India along the much longer route of Chitral. While, it might appear that the purpose of constructing the new road was solely to encourage trade, but the construction was probably linked to the occupation of the Pamirs by the Russians and of Chitral by the British in 1895. Thereafter, the amir repeatedly warned his people of the impending danger, stating, “The time is not very far oﬀ that this country of us Afghans will be divided by the Russians and the English among themselves.”54 The conquest was thought necessary at the time, because situated as it was, Kaﬁristan was “. . . a danger to Afghanistan.”55 The roads were built there in the hope that the Russians might use them if they choose to invade India,56 thus avoiding Afghanistan proper.

53

Lorimer, J. G., Afghan Troops and the Roads in Ningrahar and Kaﬁristan, 7 Aug (4). Letters Received from India (1899), 865. 54 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s ﬁrman to the people of Ningrahar and others. PD, No. 23, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83. 55 The amir quoted by Pyne, S., to Reuter’s agent. 20 Jan. 96, 66-F., PSLI, 84. 56 PD., No. 1, 8 Jan. 96, F–L., No. 159-F (1896), PSLI, 84.

156

chapter nine Internal and External Signiﬁcance

The conquest produced strong repercussions in Afghanistan, as well as in India, Great Britain, and Russia. While in Afghanistan the people lauded the amir, in the other three countries, the press and some Christian societies expressed concern and sought to bring pressure upon their respective governments to prevent the amir from annexing Kaﬁristan, and failing that to save the Kaﬁrs from what was referred to as “extermination.” However, the protestations failed to arouse their governments to action. In an age of European domination, devout Christians found it hard to tolerate the conquest of the ‘Land of the Inﬁdel’ by a Muslim ruler, and consequently, they demanded counteraction from their own governments. The intellectual ground for this had already been laid by Christian missionaries in India to the eﬀect that because the Kaﬁrs of Kaﬁristan “. . . are almost without a religion . . . such people are open to receive the Gospel.”57 This view had originated with a Jesuit priest, Benedict Goes. Upon hearing that the Siyah-posh Kaﬁrs were not Muslims, and that they drank wine, he had “inferred that they were Christians.” Goes had made this assertion in 1603, when crossing the Hindu Kush by the Parwan Pass to Andarab.58 Until George Robertson traveled into Kaﬁristan in 1890–1891 no European had penetrated it, and Robertson had found no evidence to suggest that the Kaﬁrs were Christians or were even their sympathizers. Nevertheless, after the conquest, some Christian societies in Britain raised their voices against it, charging that it was intended to result in the “enslavement” and “extermination” of the Kaﬁrs. Sympathizing with the Kaﬁrs on the basis that they had always “relied on British protection”, and that they were “the brethren of the Europeans”, these societies asked the British Government to rescue them from “the present danger.”59 Others viewed the conquest as an “irredeemable loss to our [British] prestige”,60 predicting that “England in India will be the ﬁrst to suﬀer by it.”61 57

Downes, E., Kaﬁristan, London, 1873, 15. Masson, Narrative of Journeys, 1, 205. 59 Aborigines Protection Society to Secretary of state for India, 22 Jan. 96, 5. The Anti-Slavery Society in London also made similar assertions and requests. For details see, Memoranda-Parliamentary Questions, Chitral, Afghanistan, etc., 1896. 60 A Missionary, “The Amir’s Paean, the Mittai Valley and the Kaﬁrs”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 2, 1896, 186. 61 Chamberlain, N., “Russia’s Countermeasures to the Kaﬁr Encroachment,” The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 2, 1896, 186. 58

the conquest of former kafiristan

157

Some Russian journals referred to Kaﬁristan as the “Montenegro of the Hindu Kush”,62 and to the Kaﬁrs as “the white men” and “our neighbors”,63 arguing that “The conquest of Kaﬁristan means the expansion of the Khalifate,” which in essence is “. . . the old ﬁght between Christianity and Islam.”64 One Russian journal stated that “. . . we must curb the propensity for annexations of the great man Abdurrahman.” An overzealous missionary even suggested that “. . . if there ever was a time for Crusade, it is now.”65 The utterances echoed some concern. During an era when the Christian powers of the West had dominated the Muslim world, the conquest increased the amir’s prestige among Muslims everywhere. In Afghanistan, he was given the title of the Light of the Nation and Religion and of Ghazi (Zia al-Millat wa al-Din, and Ghazi ), and praised as “equal to Alexander in power and to Darius in pomp.”66 On August 17, 1896 pledges of loyalty were given to the amir on the occasion when he instituted the Festival of Unanimity ( Jashn-eMutaﬁqqiya) as a symbol of national solidarity. Abroad, the conquest increased the amir’s prestige among the Muslim subjects of Russia in Central Asia, and of the British in India so much so that it was feared that the outcome of the conquest might cause the rise of “Mahdism in Central Asia”67 and stir “in India some 60 millions of fanatical Musulman subjects “. . . among whom it was said that “the time of other Kaﬁrs . . . will come next.”68 As a result of the conquest even the transfer of the “Khalifat of Islam from Constantinople to Kabul” was considered to be “merely a question of time”, which, if it occurred, would cause,” untold possibilities of harm to peace and civilization in the future.”69 The alarmist voices, however, failed to incite the British and Russian governments to action. Apart from other issues, the Kaﬁrs

62 The Petersburg Vidomosti, quoted by Leitner, “Kaﬁristan and the Khalifa Question,” The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 294. 63 The Rega Messenger, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 294. 64 Ibid. 65 A Missionary, “The Amir’s Paean”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 2, 283. 66 Jalalabadi, S., A., Fathnama-e-Kaﬁristan (Dari), [The Ballad of the Conquest of Kaﬁristan], The full translation of the text is found in The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 2, 283–290. 67 Chamberlain, N., “Russia’s Countermeasures” The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 2, 186. 68 A Missionary, “The Amir’s Paean”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 2, 279. 69 Chamberlain N., “Russia’s Countermeasures”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 2, 186.

158

chapter nine

had not expressed a desire to become Christians, and the claim in certain missionary circles that during the previous forty years they had invited them several times “to bring Christianity into their secluded homes”70 was simply untrue. Contrary to this assertion, in 1886 the Kaﬁrs themselves had blocked the entry into Kaﬁristan of a British mission led by Colonel Lockhart. The stated purpose of the mission was to examine the passes of the Hindu Kush for “a scientiﬁc” survey, but it was, in fact, political. From George Robertson’s travel accounts of Kaﬁristan it is clear that the Kaﬁrs had no love for their so-called European ‘Kaﬁr brethren.’ They even suspected Robertson of being a spy and his journey, in his own words, “. . . a mere preliminary to an attempt to annex their country.”71 In the second place, in comparison to his rebellious subjects, the amir treated the Kaﬁrs mildly. He realized that since they were fewer in number they could never become a threat. It was because of all these considerations that the British Government thought it inadvisable even to address the amir on the subject, although certain members of the House of Commons (where the subject was discussed) asked it to do so.72 In a similar fashion, the oﬃcial Turkestan Gazette, wrote, “We, Russians can only, against our wish, remain deeply sad spectators of the tragedy enacted in Kaﬁristan which is one of the darkest blots on European domination in Asia.”73 From all this one good result emerged for the Kaﬁr refugees when the British Government of India declared that they would be given asylum with small grants of land in Chitral.74 The Kaﬁr refugees were then settled in the upper Bumber-et and Gobar. They were also allowed to retain their beliefs. They gradually became Muslims, who are now known as Bashgulay shaykhs.75

70 Leitner, W., “Kaﬁristan and the Khalifa Question”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 288. 71 Robertson to Cunningham, 14 Jan. 90, PSLI, 59, 1006. 72 Memoranda-Parliamentary Questions, 1896, 6. 73 Quoted in The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 294. 74 Memoranda-Parliamentary Questions, 1896, 4. 75 Shah, Wazir A., “Invasions Preceding the Conquest of Nuristan,” in Cultures of the Hindu Kush, ed. by Jettmar, K., Wiesbaden, 1974, 25.

CHAPTER TEN

RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE DURAND AGREEMENT Great Britain was the ﬁrst European country with which Afghanistan came into contact, but relations between them were often hostile. Britain twice invaded Afghanistan, ﬁrst in 1838 and then in 1878, but failed to make it a colony. However, it did succeed in controlling Afghanistan’s external relations after the second invasion, and it also helped deﬁne and delimit the country’s international boundaries. Thus, Anglo-Afghan relations are the most important aspect of Afghanistan’s external relations during the period under consideration.

Before 1880 The ﬁrst oﬃcial contact between Afghanistan and Britain was made in 1809, when a British mission led by Mountstuart Elphinstone, an envoy of the East India Company, concluded a treaty with the Afghan ruler, Shah Shuja" Sadozay, in Peshawar, his winter seat. By the terms of the treaty concluded on June 17, 1809, the Afghans agreed to prevent the French from entering Afghanistan as the Sindians and the Persians had agreed to prevent them from entering their countries. Both parties to the treaty agreed to refrain from meddling in the internal aﬀairs of each other’s country.1 The treaty had been prompted by the fear of a joint FrancoPersian invasion of India through Afghanistan. In it the Afghan king agreed that he would “prevent their passage, and, . . . not permit them to cross into British India.”2 However, the fear proved unreal, and Shah Shuja' was soon overthrown. Consequently, the treaty lost its purpose, even though it had declared friendship between the two states “to continue for ever”, and Anglo-Afghan relations remained in limbo for the next twenty years. However, the treaty caused the 1 2

Norris, J. A., The First Afghan War, 1839–1842, Cambridge, 1967, 14. Kaye, J. W., History of the Afghan War, London, 1851, 1, 150.

160

chapter ten

production of a permanent value. Elphinstone, who was more of a scholar than a civil servant, managed to collect wide range information on Afghanistan on the basis of which he, in cooperation with his colleagues, composed the most comprehensive book which has ever been written in any language on the state and society of the Durranay Empire entitled, An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul. In the 1830s, Russo-phobia struck British India once again. By then, as a result of the treaty of 1828 of Torkmanchai, Russian inﬂuence had replaced British inﬂuence at the court of Tehran, in Persia. Afghanistan had been fragmented into the principalities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Peshawar. This led the British government to conclude that the pro-Russian king of Persia, Fath 'Ali Shah, intended to dominate Kandahar and Herat, and inﬂuence Afghanistan.3 Britain considered such an eventuality detrimental to her interests in India, and to forestall the perceived danger, it charged Governor-general Lord Auckland to counteract the progress of Russian inﬂuence in Afghanistan. For this purpose Lord Auckland sent a mission under Alexander Burnes to the court of Kabul, but it failed in its purpose. Although by then “Russia declared to abstain from entering into any political relationships with Afghan chiefs and not to take part in their civil wars or in their family feuds”4 Lord Auckland still decided to intervene. Apparently, Auckland saw it necessary to forestall a perceived Russian intervention in Afghanistan in order to make way for the actual British military intervention there. In preparation for this intervention, he along with Rangit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Panjab and the former Afghan king, Shah Shuja", then a fugitive in India, concluded a treaty.5 For its purpose it had the placing on the throne of Kabul a ruler who would be subject to the British. The tool of its accomplishment became Shah Shuja"—a rejected claimant to the throne who soon became unpopular with the Afghans during his brief period of British-dominated reign.6 Britain failed in its purpose by losing more than 16,500 soldiers and Indian servants in its war with Afghanistan, and Dost Mohammad 3

Habberton, W., Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1833–1907, Illinois Studies in Social Sciences, Vol., XXI, 1933, 10. 4 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 4. 5 Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations, 19. 6 Ibid., 20.

relations with the british government of india

161

Khan became its independent ruler once again. The Afghans whose friendship was advantageous to Britain, turned against it, and in the process its military fame was undermined, and the defeat of its “splendid dignity” echoed throughout its colonies.7 Afghanistan “Once again . . . had reverted to its original position, and the British interest in Central Asia remained threatened as before.”8 Shah Shuja" no longer symbolized a “brave king” as his name indicates; on the contrary, his name became synonymous with a puppet ruler. Thereafter, the British pursued a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan dubbed “masterly inactivity.” In 1854, however, a changed situation in Europe prompted the British and Amir Dost Mohammad Khan to an attempt at reconciliation. Governor-general Lord Delhousie made overtures to the amir with a view to providing in Afghanistan a barrier against any possible Russian aggression.9 Finally, in 1855, the amir concluded a treaty with British India, according to which he declared himself to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the British Government of India. But the British did not make a similar pledge, and only agreed to refrain from interfering in the territories that were then in the possession of the amir. Thus, by implication, the British had a free hand with regard to Peshawar, which was a part of Afghanistan, but which they had occupied in 1849. This one-sided treaty was the ﬁrst diplomatic victory for the British in Afghanistan. The 1855 treaty was followed, in 1857, by the conclusion of a second treaty that was similar to the ﬁrst in substance. Both treaties proved eﬀective, and the amir stood by his pledges, making no attempt whatsoever to recover Peshawar even at a time when the British were in trouble during the Indian mutiny in the summer of the same year. He did so in spite of the pressure brought on him by the public “. . . to attack the British at Peshawar.”10 Although, according to Bellew who was in Kandahar at the time, “A word from Dost Mohammad would have sent the tribes in a wave of fanatical irredentism to overrun and possess again the rich valley of Peshawar and the Derajat” he cooled down the public temper, arguing that because the British “. . . were supporting him against the Persian foe 7 8 9 10

Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 572. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 5. Ibid., 6. Bellew, H. W., Journal of Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857, London, 269.

162

chapter ten

with the aid of both arms and money”11 he “. . . declared his friendship with the British Government.”12 To a certain extent, the British compensated the Afghans for the loss of Peshawar by granting weapons and money to help recover Herat, which Persia had invaded in 1856 as it had unsuccessfully invaded it several times before. This was to be Persia’s last invasion of Herat. At the same time, Calcutta and Kabul were to exchange diplomatic representatives, known as wakil, although the former refrained from concluding “a treaty of oﬀensive and defensive alliance” with Afghans.13 On the whole, the treaties improved relations between the two countries so long as the amir was alive. From the death of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, in 1863, and the accession of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan the British policy toward Afghanistan falls into three phases: the so-called “neutrality”, from 1864–to 1868; reconciliation without commitment, from 1868 to 1876; and active intervention, once again, afterward. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan expected Britain to follow the same policy toward him that it had followed toward his father. However, during the Afghan civil war, Britain followed a policy of partiality in the name of neutrality in the hope that his rival, pro-British brother, Sardar Mohammad A'zam Khan, would establish” . . . a strong government in Afghanistan friendly to the British power.”14 Nevertheless, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan still preferred British friendship to that of Russia’s, as he was concerned about the integrity of his kingdom, and its independence from the feared Russian encroachment. He 11

Ibid., 256. Ibid., 269. Amir Dost Mohammad Khan’s reluctance to restore Peshawar in 1857 was crucial as in 1848 when the Sikhs rose up against the British and “. . . in their extremity appealed to Amir Dost Mohammad Khan to help them in return for the cession of Peshawar.” (Hamid-ud Din, “Dost Mohammad and the Second Sikh War”, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. 11, pt. 1v, Oct. 1954, 280). But Amir Dost Mohammad Khan helped the Sikhs only with a token force under his son Sardar Mohammad Akram Khan, even though he regarded Peshawar as “the burial place of my forefathers, and my hereditary country.” (Ibid., 281) He did so probably because he stuck to the promise that he had given after he had concluded the treaty of 1857 with the British government in Peshawar. He had promised that “I have now made an alliance with the British government, and come what may I will keep it till death.” (Fraser-Tytler, W. K., Afghanistan, A Study in Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, 125. 13 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 7. 14 MacGregor, C. M., Central Asia, Pt. 11, A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnology, Resources and History of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1871, 102. 12

relations with the british government of india

163

then endeavored to establish friendly relations with British India and for that purpose visited India oﬃcially in early 1869, after he had overcome his rivals in September the previous year. At Ambala, he met with Viceroy Lord Mayo, but the latter did not share his alarm with regard to Russia. Further, Lord Mayo politely refused to recognize the amir’s dynasty, and only reaﬃrmed the policy of friendship, help and non-interference. Additionally, the amir was granted some weapons and cash.15 The Amir’s visit provided a chance for London to approach St. Petersburg over the establishment of an intermediate zone between their empires in Central Asia. After some correspondence initiated by London, in 1869, and went on for years in long intervals, the British and Russian governments ﬁnally, in 1873, reached an understanding—not an agreement as is generally understood—over the northern boundary of Afghanistan. According to this understanding, the northern boundary of the country followed the course of the Oxus from the junction of the Kokcha River to a point known as Khwaja Saleh, and thence south-west to the Persian border as to include the provinces of Badakhshan, Turkestan, Herat, Andkhoy, and Maymana within Afghanistan.16 Actually, the Oxus River had been the northern boundary of Afghanistan ever since Ahmad Shah Durranay had founded modern Afghanistan in the mid-eighteenth century, but now the two imperial powers oﬃcially accepted it as an international boundary. However, as noted in Chapter Seven, whether the river Murghab (Ak-su) or the Panja constituted the Upper Oxus, or indeed whether that portion was called Oxus at all, subsequently became a subject of controversy; but the understanding meant that Russia agreed to regard Afghanistan as a country beyond its sphere of inﬂuence, and not to interfere behind the line in any way. The implication was that Afghanistan fell within the British sphere of inﬂuence, especially when all possible steps were taken to prevent intercourse between Russia and Afghanistan.17 This also meant that 15 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 9. India oﬀered Amir Sher 'Ali Khan 60,000 Pounds in 1868 and a similar sum in 1869. For the so-called agreement of 1873 see Sykes, Sir Percy, Mortimer Durand, A Biography, Cassell and Co. Ltd., London, 1926, 82. 16 Anglo-Russian Dialogue on Afghanistan, 30 Nov. 81, PSLI, 31, 856. FraserTytler, Afghanistan, A Study in Political Developments, 135. Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 175. 17 Wheeler, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 121.

chapter ten

164

Afghanistan, lying between the Russian and British empires, would serve as a buﬀer state. Ultimately, the situation, which was in a way the continuation of the policy of “masterly inactivity” adopted earlier when Governor-general Lord Lawrence ruled India, helped Amir Sher 'Ali Khan to concentrate on the reforms of the state, as described in Chapter One. When the Marquis of Salisbury again became secretary of state for India in early 1874, he considered the arrangement inadequate for the safety of India. While not Russo-phobic, he demanded far more accurate information about Russian activities in Central Asia, and in particular from the buﬀer state of Afghanistan, than Viceroy Lord Northbrook was able to give from British spies operating there. His fear was not so much that Tsar Alexander II of Russia wished to harm British India, but, as he told Northbrook, “he is not rigorous enough to prevent his oﬃcers doing it in spite of him.”18 Like Russia’s Foreign Minister, Prince Gorthchakov, the Marquis of Salisbury held a deterministic view of history, stating that “the Russian avalanche is moving on by its own weight.”19 Actually, he feared that how two hundred and ﬁfty thousand Britons could rule over two hundred and ﬁfty million Indians if British prestige suﬀered or Russia dominated Afghanistan in which case “our subjects” would be excited “to revolt”20 as they had revolted on a large scale in 1857. This scenario, he argued, would require a large British permanent force to guard the North-West Frontier, something Britain could ﬁnancially ill aﬀord. Despite his concern regarding Russia, the Marquis of Salisbury was not for an alliance with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, even though the latter had approached Viceroy Lord Mayo for friendship, and had an organized government with a strong army and a nation willing to support him against foreign encroachments. Salisbury distrusted him, perhaps because he did not want to surrender his own dignity and the independence of his country. Finally on January 22, 1875, Salisbury gave the viceroy a direct order to request the amir to accept British agents in Herat, and if possible also Kandahar, for the ﬁrst time since the First Anglo-Afghan war.21 However, the bit18

Roberts, Andrew, Salisbury, Victorian Titan, Phoenix Paperback, 2002, London,

144. 19 20 21

Ibid., 145. Ibid., 147. Ibid., 145.

relations with the british government of india

165

ter memory of the war with the “inﬁdel Farangi” was still too fresh in the minds of Afghans to tolerate a British presence in the country. Consequently, Viceroy Northbrook did not make the request, stating that “all those best qualiﬁed to form an opinion” believed that the amir would refuse the request.22 He also stated that the fear of Russian design upon India was based upon chimera. Concluding that “Salisbury was bent on war”23 the viceroy left India in April 1876. However, the ﬁrst step for the Second AngloAfghan war had been taken in the same year after the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli (later Earl Beaconsﬁeld) adopted a new policy, known as the “Forward Policy”, which meant intervention and occupation. It consisted of securing by Britain key frontier points close to Afghanistan, and turning Afghanistan into a protectorate state. The implementation of the Forward Policy began after Lord Edward Robert L. B. Lytton replaced Lord Northbrook as viceroy and governor-general in the spring of 1876. Lytton “arrived in India armed with an entirely fresh set of instructions to guide the government of India’s attitude to the Central Asian problem.” In particular “. . . [h]e came to India with speciﬁc instructions to deal with Afghanistan in accordance with the aims of the Forward Policy.”24 He not only had the full support of Salisbury; Beaconsﬁeld too assured him that “[m]y conﬁdence in you is complete.” With regard to the administration of the North-west Frontier, Salisbury even told him that “whatever you decide on, I shall uphold.”25 This point will be explained soon. Lytton was willing to conclude a defensive and oﬀensive alliance with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and also to recognize his heir apparent. In return, he demanded that the amir forgo the external independence of his country, and accept the stationing of British oﬃcers along its frontiers. For obvious reasons, the amir did not accept the proposal.26 The Peshawar conference that was held in March 1877 between Lytton and the amir’s representatives on the subject failed. A mission from the Ottoman Sultan to the amir in September 1877, which attempted

22 23 24 25 26

Ibid., 146. Ibid., 147. Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanistan, 49. Roberts, Salisbury, Victorian Titan, 215. Singhal, India an Afghanistan, 25–26.

166

chapter ten

to estrange him from the Russians, and to persuade him to come to an agreement with the British also failed. Lytton accused the amir of being under the Russian spell, while the latter viewed the Russians as devils, who were concerned only with their own interests.27 During this time, in August 1878, General Constantine P. von Kauﬀmann, Russia’s governor-general in Tashkand forced a mission under General Stolietoﬀ on the amir in Kabul. Stolietoﬀ concluded a treaty with the amir, the actual content of which has never been disclosed, but it was said to be a defensive and oﬀensive alliance without any restrictions placed on the amir.28 However, the Russians were insincere in their pledge, and gave it only to frighten the British so that embroiled in Afghanistan they might withdraw the Indian troops that they had sent to Malta in support of the Ottomans with whom the Russians were then at war.29 The Russian plan worked; it provided Lytton with a pretext to win the support of the cabinet in London for his plan of action with regard to Afghanistan. At ﬁrst he tried to force a mission under Neville Chamberlain on the amir, but when it was refused permission to cross the border at the Khyber Pass he declared war on Afghanistan on November 20, 1878. The Second Anglo-Afghan war started as simple as that. However, as Trousdale describes, “The Second Afghan War was not a popular war. It was also not a necessary war; at least it was no more necessary than the First Afghan War had been.”30 The overconﬁdent Lytton viewed the conﬂict as a means to impose his will on the amir, disregarding the fact that war especially with the “inﬁdels” arouses strong passions among the Afghans to action, resulting in a massive death of themselves and of their adversaries. Amir Sher 'Ali Khan died shortly after the invasion. His son and successor, Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, accepted all of the demands that Lytton had made on his father, plus some additional ones. All of these became part of the treaty that he concluded with a British envoy, Major Louis N. Cavagnari in the village of Safed Sang in Gandumak in eastern Afghanistan on May 26, 1879, as previously described. Through this treaty 27 28 29 30

Ibid., 28. Ibid., 34. Ibid., 33. Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanistan, 8.

relations with the british government of india

167

. . . the ultimate goal was temporarily postponed . . . The British were determined that the Afghans should abrogate this agreement in order to gain the fullest support for their military aims.31

In line with the treaty, a British embassy, headed by Cavagnari was quartered inside the Bala Hissar near the amir’s palace, on July 24, 1879. “Part Italian, part French, part Irish and all British” Cavagnari had actually dictated the treaty to the amir in Gandumak. In Kabul, Cavaganari behaved as if he had been appointed ruler of Afghanistan. He was mistaken. On September 3, 1879, the people and the army of Kabul massacred all the inmates of the embassy which consisted of Cavagnari, W. Jenkyns, A. H. Kelly, W. R. P. Hamilton, and seventy ﬁve members of the cavalry and infantry.32 Soon afterward, in response to the massacre, the British invaded Afghanistan once again. During this second phase of the war, Lytton embarked on a policy with the purpose of dismembering Afghanistan in accord with the requirements of the Forward Policy. Ultimately, this policy, as described in Chapter Two, also failed and Afghanistan emerged reunited under the leadership of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan During the Zimma meeting ( July 31–August 1, 1880) Sir Lepel Griﬃn, the British Political Oﬃcer at Kabul, secretly handed over the following letter to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan: His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council has learnt with pleasure that your Highness has proceeded toward Cabul, in accordance with the invitation of the British Government. Therefore in consideration of the friendly sentiments by which your Highness is animated, and of the advantage to be derived by the Sirdars and

31 Ibid., 49. That Cavagnari viewed the Gandumak treaty with contempt is clear from the note of Frederic Villiers, the Graphic’s special artist, who was present on the occasion: “Cavagnari was kneeling on the ﬂoor when I entered, melting the wax [to seal the treaty] by the aid of a candle. On the tent-stool by his side were the pens with which the treaty had just been signed. ‘Ah,’ said I, ‘these pens, so unimportant but yesterday, are now wonderfully historic.’ ‘Do you think so?’ he replied with just a faint touch of the brogue in his voice, for he was a son of the Emerald Isle, ‘then take the things, and put them into your museum.” Trousdale, Introduction, in War in Afghanistan, 50. 32 For a detailed account of the massacre of the British embassy and the Kabul uprising see, Kakar, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis, 57–68.

168

chapter ten people from the establishment of a settled government under your Highness’s authority, the British recognises your Highness as Ameer of Cabul. I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to inform your Highness that the British Government has no desire to interfere in the internal Government of the territories in possession of Your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident should be stationed anywhere within those territories. For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such as is maintained between two adjoining states, it may be advisable that a Mahomedan Agent of the British Government should reside, by agreement, at Cabul. Your Highness has requested that the views and intentions of the British Government, with regard to the position of the ruler of Cabul, in relation to foreign powers, should be placed on record for your Highness’s information. The Viceroy and GovernorGeneral in Council authorizes me to declare to you that since the British Government admits no right of interference by Foreign Powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the aﬀairs of Afghanistan, it is plain that Your Highness can have no political relations with any Foreign Power except with the British Government. If any foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the domains of Your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you to such an extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary, in repelling it, provided that Your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations.33

It is rather curious that this letter, which is a masterpiece of imperial logic, had the signature only of Sir Alfred Lyall, Foreign Secretary to the government of India. Apparently, it was, as Griﬃn states, “merely a memorandum of an obligation granted by the British Government.”34 Yet it was this memorandum that constituted the basis of relations between the two governments for a generation to come. No treaty or agreement to regulate relations between Afghanistan and Britain during the reign of the amir was signed, even though at Zimma the amir pressured Lepel Griﬃn for the conclusion of a treaty. Mahmud Tarzi’s statement that at Zimma “. . . the amir of Afghanistan and the British would sign a treaty of friendship”35 is simply not true. Although the letter was not actually a treaty, as time passed, it was invested with the signiﬁcance of a treaty. If at 33 34 35

Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 87–88. Quoted in Wheeler, Ibid., 125. Tarzi, Mahmud, Reminiscences, 20.

relations with the british government of india

169

ﬁrst, it was no more than a conditional promise to help the amir in defending the territories then in his possession, it subsequently was regarded as applicable to the whole of Afghanistan.36 However, according to the letter only the British government was to judge whether or not an aggression against Afghanistan had occurred. This showed its unwillingness to enter into treaty obligations with the amir. At the time, the British government believed the amir’s position to be insecure. It also claimed that the treaties that the British governments had concluded with Afghan rulers in the past had proved impermanent.37 Contrary to this claim, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan had stood ﬁrm by his treaties with the British, and it appears that the reference is probably to the Gandumak treaty, which was clearly an imposition on Afghanistan and grossly unjust and, therefore, abrogated by the Afghans. For his part, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan treated the letter the way it had been handed over to him: he went along with it when it suited him, and ignored it when it did not. As early as December 1880, the amir desired to meet the viceroy, probably to obtain assistance against his rival, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who held Herat, and who, it was feared, might occupy Kandahar when the British government evacuated it in the spring of the following year as the British government of India had declared that it would. India was actually doubtful about the amir’s ability to overcome his rival. Having recently withdrawn its forces from Afghanistan it was unwilling to embroil itself in the imminent Afghan civil war. In fact, the government of India was cautious to the point of even not publicly taking the side of the amir. The viceroy, Lord Ripen, wrote . . . there is great doubt whether it is judicious to agree to such a meeting, which would be universally construed as a public manifestation of our resolution to adopt his [amir’s] cause and support his interest.38

However, since India wanted to strengthen Afghanistan under the amir, it granted him weapons and cash, but made it clear that he should meet his rival without direct British involvement. 36

Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman, 123. For the unwillingness of the British to conclude a treaty with the amir see verbatim records of the Zimma meeting in Kakar, Afghanistan, 1971, 256–281. The original source of these records is PSLI, 26 pt. 5, 863–875. 38 Ripon to Hartington, 19 Jan. 81, PSLI, 27, 365. 37

chapter ten

170

Meanwhile, Lord Ripon saw that the time was ripe for the two governments to station agents in each other’s capitals in line with the understanding that had been reached between the amir and Lepel Griﬃn, in 1880. The amir was asked to send a delegate, but instead he sent an agent, with the instruction that he was only to listen and report what he had been communicated, because “. . . no other [person] than the amir can settle the diﬃculties of Afghanistan.” The British Muslim agents who were stationed in Kabul from 1882 onward also suﬀered from similar restrictions. Up to that time, (1882) Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir, under the name of AB, Kabul Correspondent, reported from Kabul to Calcutta. After the expulsion of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, what troubled the amir was Russia’s advance toward northwestern Afghanistan. As early as October 1881, he told the viceroy, Lord Ripon, that the time had come for Britain to ﬁx the undeﬁned boundaries of Afghanistan with the Russian protectorate.39 However, Britain did not share his alarm. The amir still continued to concentrate on his concern, stating that the danger from Russia would be on the border of Herat,40 a region that was considered to be the “key to India” (See Chapter Eleven). The amir intended to “. . . put Afghanistan in proper order as a barrier to the Russian advance”,41 but his overtures for grants produced no favorable response for two years. Coupled with his earlier disappointment over his attempts to have a treaty, he expressed his dissatisfaction. To Lord Ripon he wrote, if the British . . . do not wish to set the aﬀairs of this country to right, I should like to know whether it is on account of expenditure that they shrink from it, or because I do not ﬂatter them; but I can not ﬂatter as the Rajas of India . . . do.42

Earlier, Colonel Mohammad Afzal, the British Agent in Kabul, had stated that should the amir became disappointed with the British, he would come to terms with the Russians.43

Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to The Amir quoted by AB, 41 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to PSLI, 31, 735. 42 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to 43 Col. Afzal ( Jalalabad), 24 39 40

Ripon, 18 Oct. 81, PSLI, 35, 364. Kabul Correspondent, 9 Feb. 82, PSLI, 31, 739. Zain Khan, AB, Kabul Correspondent, 9 Feb. 82, Ripon, I June 83, PSLI, 37, 135. Jan. 83, PSLI, 35, 66.

relations with the british government of india

171

In July 1883, the viceroy, Lord Ripon, ﬁxed the amir an annual grant of 1,200,000 rupees, stating that The internal disorders of Afghanistan were so largely due to our invasion of that country that we felt it to be our duty to aid him [the amir] in the establishment of a regular government.44

The British government of India also granted weapons to Kabul in critical times. By the “establishment of a regular government” Ripon meant the organization of a strong army, because the internal resources of Afghanistan for that purpose were insuﬃcient. The grant indicated the signiﬁcance which the British attached to Afghanistan. However, it was bound to injure the amir’s public image, as it made him look like a British vassal. As a countermeasure, the amir announced that . . . this grant of theirs is not a favor or an obligation, but the security and safety of India is in view. The English do not give a single cowry to any without motive. In the second place, I am the shield of their country, and on account of me, they are secure from the Russian attack. If my government remains stable, I go on in this way, taking riﬂes and money from the English; and having made my foundation ﬁrm, I shall be able to ﬁght the Russians and the English.45

In his private darbars [courts] the amir used to say that the grants he received were a poll tax ( jazya).46 The statement was not entirely rhetoric. Although the amir could not ﬁght the British or the Russians, he did not allow them to inﬂuence him in running the country. This was clear, among other things, from his negative responses to the British requests. But in this he went so far as to block the introduction of modern technology by rejecting the proposal of the viceroy that the British be allowed to construct a telegraph line connecting Kabul with Peshawar47 or a railway line linking Kandahar with Herat.48 He even discontinued the work of a British specialist in a copper mine in a location near Kabul. He did all of this to deprive the British of a chance to meddle in the internal aﬀairs of Afghanistan. This meant that the amir preferred isolationism and medieval autocracy to renewal and modernization. 44 45 46 47 48

Ripon to secretary of state for India, 13 July 83, PSLI, 37, 121. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, KD, 5 Apr. 87, PSLI, 50, 268. KD, 214–16 Feb. 94, PSLI, 73, 1029. The Amir’s Visit to India, 1885, PSLI, 44, Encl. No. 3, 7. Ibid., 15.

172

chapter ten

The amir’s responses were even more deﬁnite to the British requests that aﬀected his rule directly. All along, he opposed the stationing of British personnel in Afghanistan, or even accepting their ad hoc commissions, arguing that his people were against them. He also did not allow the British agents in Kabul to maintain a separate postal service, stating that he could not permit them to assume a position of equality with him or to interfere with his internal administration.49 Additionally, the agents had even been restricted in their movements. In the same vein, the amir refused to accept the recommendation of the Government of India to leave the Pacha of Konarr undisturbed in his domain. Lepel Griﬃn even noted that the recommendation annoyed the amir.50 The amir likewise rejected Lord Curzon’s proposal to depute an Indian physician to Herat,51 arguing that his presence might have grave consequences.52 All he asked for and obtained were weapons and cash with no strings attached to. To him the restriction, which had been placed on his external relations, was enough. In 1885, in India, when the viceroy, Lord Duﬀerin, jokingly asked the amir to accept his advice, the latter responded by saying that, I do not act in regard to foreign aﬀairs without your advice, but in the internal aﬀairs of my country, I have nothing to do with your advice. My people will not approve of your advice.53

As the viceroy pointed out, it was probably a unique case in history that a small state applied for assistance to a neighboring power without at the same time allowing the active aid and supervision of its oﬃcials.54 After 1883, as a result of the establishment of the grant; the honorable reception in India in 1885 of the amir as a state guest; and the Russian occupation of Panjdeh in the same year, Anglo-Afghan relations improved. The improvement was reﬂected in a speech, that the amir gave at a banquet in Rawalpindi in which he said that he was, 49

The Amir’s Visit to India, 1885, PSLI, No. 12. Griﬃn to government of India, 4 Mar. 82, PSLI, 33, 514. 51 Curzon to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 23 Feb. 1901, PSLI, 134, No. 831. 52 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Curzon, 7 Mar. 1901, PSLI, 134, No. 831. Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati (The Amir’s Interview with the Viceroy), Kabul, 1302 A.Q., 1885, PSLI, 47, 611 (5). 53 Ibid. 54 The amir’s Visit to India, 1885, PSLI, 44, Encl. No. 13. 50

relations with the british government of india

173

. . . ready with my army and my people to render any service, which may be required of me or of the Afghan nation. As the British Government have declared that it will assist me in repelling any foreign enemy, so it is right and proper that Afghanistan should unite in the ﬁrmest manner and stand side by side with the British Government.55

To reciprocate the British commitment to Afghanistan, the amir added “. . . should disturbances arise in your empire of India . . . the people of Afghanistan can . . . give you friendly help by protecting the frontiers of India.”56 However, this honeymoon period did not last long. In the late 1880s, certain events stained Anglo-Afghan relations. The Government of India did not invite Kabul to participate in the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission which was set up to delimit Afghanistan’s north-western boundary, even though the issue was bound to aﬀect the country’s integrity. This angered the amir, and in retaliation he did not allow the British commission to travel to the areas through Afghanistan. The commission, under Colonel Ridgeway, then had to travel through a barren and inhospitable route along the Persian-Afghan border, mainly in Seistan. For this and his diatribes the viceroy accused the amir of using “unfriendly language and unfriendly acts.”57 Later, in 1889, the amir resented what he considered interference in his administration by the viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, who had sent a letter asserting that his punishment of the people of Turkestan, following the suppression of the revolt of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, was “abhorrent to civilization.”58 As the viceroy, Lord Elgin, later stated the amir had resented Lansdowne’s interference in his internal aﬀairs very much, and he had never forgiven him for sending him that letter. Consequently, this personal resentment had aﬀected political relations disadvantageously.59 The amir also resented the presence of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, with over eight hundred of his followers in India, believing that that through him the Government of India intended to pressure him.60 However, what actually restrained Anglo-Afghan relations was the British “Forward 55 56 57 58 59 60

Ibid., 9. Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab, 11. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 129. Lansdowne to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 27 Feb. 89, PSLI, 56, 721. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 135. PD, 8 Jan. 92, PSLI, 65, 171.

174

chapter ten

Policy of the nineties”, the beginning of which had already been manifested in the opening of the Gomal Pass, and in the extension of the railway to Chaman. This policy will be described shortly. The amir responded to these developments. Believing that the viceroy was not a sovereign ruler like himself, and that he could not get satisfaction in India, the amir tried to establish diplomatic relations with Britain, independent of India.61 With a view to being invited to England,62 he addressed a letter to the secretary of state for India, Lord Salisbury, which contained expressions of friendship with the British and complaints about the Government of India, and proposed to submit his grievances to parliament.63 Since it was not the policy of the British government to establish relations with Burma and Afghanistan64 the Government of India refused the amir permission in polite language, before the disputed points between India and Afghanistan had been settled. Instead they asked him to accept their invitation to come to India. In 1895, after the disputed points had been settled the British government invited the amir to visit England. However, then the amir only exploited the invitation to his advantage at home. In an eﬀort to demonstrate his popularity with the people, and to make the propaganda of the Afghan refugees in India ineﬀective against him65 the amir made public his intended visit to England, hoping “. . . to introduce new schemes and reforms in the State, and to lay down satisfactorily the boundaries of Afghanistan.”66 However, he said that he would do so only when the Afghans, including the military, gave him guarantees that in his absence they would maintain peace in the country.67 Although various groups of Afghans gave him such guarantees in writing, soon he announced that tribal “elders” had advised him against making the trip.68 In 1895, the amir sent his second son, Sardar Nasr Allah Khan, after providing him with a detailed guideline as to how he should behave with European dig-

61

MM, Nov. 91, PSLI, 64, 1404. Ibid. 63 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 137. 64 Ibid., 136. 65 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in private darbar, KD, 19–22 Sept. 91, PSLI, 64, 237. 66 Parwana Khan, Kabul kotwal and nai"b salar addressing the army, KD, 9–11 Sept. 91, PSLI, 64, 186. 67 Khan-e-mulla (in a public mosque), PD, 8 Oct. 91, PSLI, 64, 755, 756. 68 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 743. 62

relations with the british government of india

175

nitaries. Meanwhile, the Government of India thwarted the amir’s eﬀorts to station his representative in London.69 The amir’s failure to establish relations with the British government was followed by his eﬀorts to make Afghanistan independent by other means. To dishonor his pledge with the British, who had helped him to the throne and had afterward strengthened him with money and weapons, was out of the question. This was particularly so, when the viceroy, Lord Duﬀerin, had assured him that the British government wanted . . . to maintain a powerful, independent and united Afghanistan under a ruler capable of enforcing peace and order within his own territories, of conciliating the good-will and conﬁdence of his people, and of showing a formidable front to an invading foe.70

Nevertheless, mutual trust was often lacking, and the type of relationship that developed between the amir and the British government was only the result of mutual necessity. The amir fully realized that the British could make trouble for him, and even unseat him, as they had unseated Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan.71 Even without undertaking military action, themselves, the British could do so through the former Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, and hundreds of other Mohammadzay sardars and Ghilzay elders most of whom lived on British pensions in India and had followers in Afghanistan. Additionally, just around the corner was the standing menace of a Russian invasion. All of these points restrained the amir from forcing any issue at any time with the British government, and they even prompted him to cooperate. As the viceroy, Lord Curzon, noted on the broader issues of foreign relations the amir always acted within the framework of the British imperial policy. Nevertheless, toward the end of his reign, when he had consolidated his position, the amir acted as an independent ruler. For the sake of appeasing the Afghans72 and “[f ]irmly impressed with belief in the divine right of Kings and with determination to make Afghanistan a powerful and independent State unhampered by interference 69 70 71 72

Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 149. Marquis of Duﬀerin to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 20 July 87, PSLI, 50, 1420. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Col. Afzal, KD, 20 Jan. 82, PSLI, 23, 720. Curzon, Tale of Travels, London, 1923, 54.

176

chapter ten

of either England or Russia”73 the amir strove for an independent international position by dealing with other powers directly. He was reported to have said that he could not consent to be bound up with the British government alone, and that he would treat Russia and Germany and all other powers with the same respects as he showed to Britain.74 Assuring the Afghans that he had not adopted a servile attitude toward foreign powers,75 the amir maintained correspondence with the Czar of Russia,76 and the Ottoman Sultan.77 Even in a letter to the viceroy, he styled himself as “Independent King of the domains of Afghanistan.”78 Further, the amir intensiﬁed the movement of jihad by which he incited the public against the “inﬁdels”, who were understood to be the Russians and the British. In one of the many booklets that was issued on the subject, it was stated that it was incumbent on the people of Afghanistan to be ready for sacriﬁce, because the “inﬁdels” wanted to invade their country for the third time,79 a reference to the British, who had invaded Afghanistan twice in the past. In particular, he warned his subjects that now their wives, their faith, and their land were in danger because of the closeness of the “inﬁdels.” In the middle of the 1890s, when the Russians reached the Pamirs and the British occupied Chitral with troops, which the latter dispatched there through the hitherto unpenetrated lands of Dir and Swat, the amir was alarmed. Thereafter, the amir became more vocal in his anti-inﬁdel propaganda. Believing that the Anglo-Russian enmity was only a screen for these powers to cover up their design on Afghanistan80 he declared that they were allies to each other and the enemies of Afghanistan.81 In his view, their design was to divide Afghanistan between them-

73

Griﬃn, L., “The Late Amir and His Successor”, Fortnightly Review, 1901, 752. MM, Aug. 99, PSLI, 115, No. 888, 4. 75 Kand D., 8 Sept. 93, PSLI, 72, 1025. 76 KD, 12 Jan. 95, PSLI, 80, No. 22. 77 MM, Jan. 99, PSLI, 111, Regst. No. 237. 78 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 25 Aug. 96, PSLI, 88, F.L.. No. 178, 96. 79 Anonymous, Kalimat-e-Amir al-Bilad fee Targhib illal Jehad (The Words of the Amir of the Land for the Encouragement of the Jihad), (a pamphlet in Dari), Kabul, 1304 A.Q., 8–9. 80 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to elders in darbar, Malakand Agency Diary (MD), 23 Apr. 1901, PSLI, 133, No. 619. 81 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s ﬁrman to the people of Ningrahar etc., PD, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83, No. 23. 74

relations with the british government of india

177

selves at an opportune moment,82 with the Russians taking Herat and Balkh, and the British occupying Kabul, Kandahar and Jalalabad.83 Meanwhile, he repeatedly stressed that any power that may try to set foot on the Afghan soil was to be regarded as the enemy of the King of Islam. However, in the amir’s view, friendship with the British was advantageous.84 While, the alarmist pronouncements were not meant to disturb Anglo-Afghan relations drastically, they made the public more inward- looking and xenophobic. The Government of India watched the developments, but showed no concern. It only thwarted the amir’s eﬀorts to deal with Persia directly by pressing that power to refrain from dealing with the Afghan agent at Mashhad on matters other than commercial ones.85 After the amir died it showed concern, and made overtures to his successor over the nature of its relationship with Afghanistan.86

The Durand Agreement The amir’s advance in eastern Afghanistan, as described in Chapter Four, coincided with the British Forward Policy of the 1890s. The main point of this policy was the so-called ‘Scientiﬁc Frontier’, which called for the speedy occupation of the Kabul-Ghazni-Kandahar line in the event of Russia’s advance toward India, or in the case of domestic troubles inside Afghanistan following the amir’s death.87 The implementation of the Forward Policy required the extension of control over the main passes leading to the ‘Scientiﬁc Frontier’, and the devising of a means of political control over the tribes in whose territories these passes lay.88 All of this made it necessary for India to ﬁx its frontier with Afghanistan. For this purpose, the British

82

Dir, Swat, Chitral Agency Diary (DSCD), 21 Aug. 1900, PSLI, 126, No. 1026. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s ﬁrman to the people of Ningrahar etc., PD, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83, No. 23. 84 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s ﬁrman to the people of Kabul, PD, 8 May 1900, PSLI, 123, No. 604. In Sultan Mahomed’s, The Life of Abdur Rahman (2,260), there is undue stress on the amir’s hostile attitude toward Russia and friendly attitude toward Britain. 85 MM, Oct. 98, PSLI, 109, Regist. No. 1088, 1. 86 For details see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 166–173. 87 Harris, L., British Policy on the North-West Frontier of India, 1889–1901, Ph.D., Thesis, London, 1960, 2, 46. 88 Ibid., 2, 41. 83

178

chapter ten

Government of India exchanged many letters with the amir at the same time that it pressured him heavily by various other means. Among the measures taken were the ban of the transport of iron which Afghanistan needed for making guns for the war in the Hazarajat, and the detention of “a large consignment of munitions, ordered from Europe by the Amir.”89 Viceroy Lansdowne even proposed to the amir to receive Lord Roberts on a mission in Kabul with a powerful military escort, a proposal to which the amir reacted thus: “I considered the position very critical, to receive 10,000 soldiers, whom I was expected to receive as my guests. I had, therefore, to prepare 100,000 to receive them.”90 Finally, the viceroy directly warned the amir “. . . that it will be necessary to decide what territory does and what does not form part of the kingdom of Afghanistan.”91 The Government of India had already proposed that, a certain line be determined and announced, beyond which the authority of the amir did not extend, and that any Afghan troops found beyond this line be forcibly pushed back. The line was to be marked so as to exclude Asmar, Chageh and Wana from Afghanistan.92

The amir still could not be moved, and continued the delaying tactics skillfully that he had adopted since 1888, when he had been asked for the ﬁrst time to receive a British mission in Kabul. He accepted only after Russia embarked on its own forward march of the 1890s, toward the Pamirs and northeastern Afghanistan. At the same time Russia urged Britain to fulﬁl the so-called agreement of 1873, with regard to some territories across the Oxus held by the amir’s troops, as described in Chapter Seven. Apprehensive about Russia’s pressure the amir, at the request of the viceroy,93 received a small civil British mission in Kabul, led by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, foreign secretary to the Government of India. On November 12, 1893 the amir and Durand signed two agreements, one concerning northeastern Afghanistan, and the other concerning the southeastern region. The latter agreement, concerning the southeast, came

89

Sykes, Sir Percy, A History of Afghanistan, 1940, 2, 173. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 142. 90 Sykes, A History of Afghanistan, 2, 172. 91 Lansdowne to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 23 July 92, ARAMFA, 5. 92 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 142. 93 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 144.

relations with the british government of india

179

to be known as the Durand Agreement or the Kabul Convention of 1893. The Forward Policy was, of course, not ‘scientiﬁc’, but ‘forward’, a term that implies expansion and domination. The new ‘Scientiﬁc Frontier’ policy was, in fact, a modiﬁcation of the one which had led to the war with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, about which Trousdale had stated, For most of the Forward Policy believers, the Scientiﬁc Frontier was but a temporary screen for their real aim. If the government would support annexation of the southern half of Afghanistan, it would in time tolerate annexation of the whole.94

This was why the reasons for devising the new Forward PolicyRussia’s southward advance or the amir’s death—were unconvincing. As will be seen later in this chapter and in Chapter Eleven, Russia had, in 1873, declared Afghanistan to be beyond its sphere of inﬂuence. After Russia’s occupation of Panjdeh in 1885, particularly following the demarcation of Afghanistan’s entire boundary with its colonies, and the boundary adjustment between Afghanistan and Russian-controlled Bukhara in 1892, the issues of the ‘Great Game’, the rivalry between Britain and Russia for the domination of Central Asia—had been settled, and an atmosphere of rapprochement between the two powers had been created. While it is true that, despite this, trust was lacking, in reality a Russian military invasion of India through Afghanistan—an organized state with a strong army and a xenophobic people—would have been extremely diﬃcult, if not impossible. As its text states, the Durand agreement was for the purpose of “. . . ﬁxing the limit of their [Afghanistan and the British Government of India’s] respective spheres of inﬂuence”, marked by a line drawn from Wakhan to the Persian border, covering about 1,500 miles drawn on a map produced by the British. As Zalmay Gulzad states, Nowhere in the Agreement is the word boundary used to deﬁne the Durand Line. Rather, it was a line that functioned to illustrate where the Amir’s inﬂuence ceased and limitations of the British sphere.95

Sir Olaf Caroe is even more explicit, stating that “. . . the agreement did not describe the line as the boundary of India, but as the frontier 94 95

Trousdale, Introduction in War in Afghanistan, 49. Gulzad, Afghan State, 182.

180

chapter ten

of the amir’s domain and the line beyond which neither side would exercise interference.”96 The concept is even plainer in the text of the agreement itself, which states that “The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan”, while the amir agreed that “. . . he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley.” However, the amir relinquished his claim to the main part of the Wazir country, and the small pieces of lands of Dawar and Chagheh, whereas the Government of India agreed to leave the Birmal tract of the Wazir country to Afghanistan. In addition, both sides made adjustments on a number of smaller points. The British Government of India added a sum of 600,000 rupees a year to the amir’s grant. Despite the importance of the issue, Afghan records on the agreement, which has ever since constituted the basis for Afghan irredentism and friction with the country’s eastern neighbors, have been lost. Although it is known that a secretary, who was concealed, had been assigned to note the negotiations, this information is not available. Even the pamphlet, which contained the transcript of the talks held between the amir and Durand that was made public at the time, cannot be traced.97 The oﬃcial Afghan chronicle, Siraj alTawarikh, has noted only the proceedings of the council of some elders and courtiers stationed in Kabul which was convened after the agreement was concluded. Addressing the council about the outcome of the agreement and about external pressure, the amir said that at the time every nation sought alliance with friends against enemies and that under his leadership the Afghans were lucky to ﬁnd a worthy friend. He also argued that there was no alternative but to rely on the British government, which, he said, had no motive but to strengthen Afghanistan with weapons and money. About the actual agreement he said little, and that little too was vague. Only about the Wazirs [actually the main part of the Wazirs] he was speciﬁc, saying that he gave them up because they did not listen to him. The elders and courtiers raised no objections, and only said that they would accept whatever agreement their rightful king would conclude with foreign powers. They 96 97

Quoted in Gulzad, The Afghan State, 182. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 950. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 211.

relations with the british government of india

181

likewise assured the amir that as they had inherited service and obedience during the past eighty [sic] years of the Mohammadzay rule, they were willing to sacriﬁce their lives for him.98 The Durand Agreement was the work of the amir alone. In concluding it, he did not consult the elders or even his own courtiers or advisers. Durand is speciﬁc about this. In a talk to the Central Asian society in London, on 6 November 1907, he said: “He conducted the negotiations entirely himself, his ministers being mere ciphers, without the smallest power or responsibility. He knew his mind, and wanted no help from anyone.” Remarkably, this occurred at a time when the amir was suﬀering much from gout, as attested by Durand, who states, “. . . he walked with diﬃculty, leaning on a stick.” As the above statement indicates, the amir only told his courtiers about the circumstances and the external pressure that led to its conclusion. It is important to note that the agreement was between a ruler and an oﬃcial of a foreign state, and was not a treaty. If it had been a treaty the state bodies of both parties on behalf of their peoples should have endorsed it. A matter of such supreme importance required the consensus of at least the elders of Afghanistan. While it is true that the amir summoned Afghan elders and courtiers, they were relatively few and of his own choosing, and lived in Kabul. He did so only to tell them what had happened, but did not seek their consensus about it. That was why what they uttered on the occasion was irrelevant and even the irrelevance was unreal. For fear of the amir known as the ‘iron amir’, they could not oppose the agreement without risking their lives. More importantly, the Afghan elders and courtiers acted as those who had “inherited service and obedience during the . . . Mohammadzay rule” not as representatives of the people. Consequently, instead of evaluating the agreement and its relationship to the country and the people, they only expressed their willingness to sacriﬁce their lives for the amir. In reality, not only did the elders and courtiers fear, the ‘iron amir’ himself feared. He feared the Russians, the British Government and, in a way, also his own people. Russia and the British Government of India had both pressured him. As previously noted, the British viceroy had kept him under pressure from 1888 onward for the conclusion of an agreement, while Russia, in its expansionist drive in 98

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 946–950.

182

chapter ten

the Greater Pamir area in the 1890s, had annihilated Afghan posts there, and posed a danger to Afghanistan itself. Even while Durand was in Kabul a “small Russian force under the son of the War Minister, Vannovsky, entered Roshan and was refused permission to advance. Shots were exchanged.”99 It was because of this danger that the amir succumbed to the British demand and concluded the Durand Agreement. Thus, the conditions under which the agreement was concluded were more fearsome than those under which capitulatory treaties were concluded in the nineteenth century between the stronger European and weaker Asian powers. Additionally, even though he was known as the ‘iron amir’ Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan feared his own people because he had relinquished sovereignty over a vast region that had been part of their homeland; he had no right to do so even though he was their ruler. It was because of this fear that he kept them in the dark about the purpose of the mission as attested by Durand, who states that “. . . the true objects of the mission which until then [the convening of the council] had been kept secret” was ﬁnally disclosed by the amir. Evidently, the amir’s fear was the real factor that made the agreement possible in the ﬁrst place. The Afghan historian, Mir Ghulam Mohammad Ghobar, has correctly concluded that the amir “. . . signed the treaty blindfolded solely under the shadow of British threat and deception, and accepted a great historical responsibility forever.”100 This “great historical responsibility” becomes clear when it is born in mind that the amir made no attempt to either limit its duration or let the British to ﬁx the frontier themselves without he himself becoming a party to it. Further, Durand deceived the amir; his pledge of “no interference” inserted in the text of the agreement, was contrary to the requirement of the so-called Scientiﬁc Frontier. More seriously, Durand misled the amir by presenting him with an inaccurately drawn map, or else the amir misunderstood it. Consequently, the amir did not sign the map, because he “. . . did not really understand all the implications of the line drawn on the map”, and “. . . refused to agree to some of the details shown on the map.”101

99 100 101

Alder, British India’s Northern Frontier, 276. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 212. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 692. Rastogi, R. S., Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880–1900, Lucknow, 1965, 180.

relations with the british government of india

183

More importantly, the amir did not sign the Persian text of the agreement, even though Durand had done so.102 This point raises a question of fundamental signiﬁcance. When the amir refused to sign the Persian text it is safe to assume that he had not signed the English text for the obvious reason that he did not understand English. Consequently, it can be assumed that Durand had read the amir the Persian translation of the English-language text, which he was able to understand well. If the amir did not sign either version of the text then the validity of the agreement becomes doubtful. The validity of the agreement is also in question due to the fact that the amir did not agree to a number of major points later at the time of the demarcation of the line, known as the Durand Line. One point concerned the Bashgul valley. The amir only wrote on the map (without signing it) that the Bashgul valley was a part of Afghanistan, whereas in the English text it was stated to be within the British sphere of inﬂuence. When the line was demarcated, in 1896, the amir insisted on the point so ﬁrmly that the viceroy, Lord Elgin, gave way, admitting that “. . . it was an unfortunate error.”103 Another point refers to the Mohmand country which the amir, at the time of the demarcation, insisted that the whole of the Mohmand belonged to Afghanistan. This very important point will be discussed shortly. Now, the pertinent question is to ask where is the text, which the amir had signed, whereas he had the habit of putting his signature on all kinds of documents after he had approved of them? In the archival centers in Kabul, New Delhi and London where I have carried on research I have not come across the text of the agreement signed by him. In all probability there had been no text of the agreement signed jointly by the Amir and Durand. Azmat Hayat Khan’s assertion in his study, The Durand Line (2000), that the amir had put his signature “on the [t]reaty” is simply not true.104 Additionally, it was not a treaty’ but an agreement, as previously noted. It was due to all of these points that the demarcation of the line by three Anglo-Afghan commissions took much longer than anticipated, and that the entire Mohmand country and the Khyber area were left undemarcated. 102

The Incoming State Documents, vol. 7, 109, ARAMFA. Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr. 96, PSLI, F.L., No. 77, (1896), 85. 104 Khan, Azmat Hayat, The Durand Line, Its Geo-Strategic Importance, University of Peshawar, 2000, 150. 103

184

chapter ten

The amir, as noted, insisted that the entire Mohmand country was a part of Afghanistan,105 whereas on the map it was not. However, the Lower Mohmand, as described in Chapter Four, stretched as far as and included Peshawar. Peshawar was, since 1849, under the British control, which they had taken from the Sikhs, who had previously usurped it from the Mohammadzay rulers, in 1833. Even the Lower Mohmands still recognized the Khan of Lalpura of the Upper Mohmands, as their khan, receiving the customary allowances from him as well as from the Kabul government. Perhaps no other tribe ever caused as much trouble for the British as the Mohmands did, after the British occupation of Peshawar. After the Durand Agreement was signed, the British authorities proposed the partition of the Mohmand country between Afghanistan and India, and asked the amir to withdraw his levies from Mittai. However, the amir refused to cooperate either in dividing the tribe or in erecting the pillars. As a result of pressure from the British he ordered the withdrawal of the levies but without oﬃcially declaring it. The problem persisted, and ﬁnally the viceroy, in face of opposition even from his own council, backed away from giving the green light for the erection of the pillars unilaterally as a line of division of the Mohmands.106 Thus, as the author Sir Percy Sykes states “the boundary through the Mohmand country to the Khyber Pass was never demarcated, and remains to this day [1926] a cause of trouble on a small scale.”107 However, the British extended their inﬂuence over the Mohmands of the plains by delivering the traditional allowances to their clans and elders that were paid to them by Kabul and the khan of Lalpura. They also granted allowances to some clans, who had not been paid before. All of these clans known subsequently as the ‘assured clans’ received the allowances in return for their acceptance of the British “political control”;108 but “political control” did not mean administrative control. This distinction applied not only to the Mohmands, but to all tribes of the region, as Durand “did not propose to move forward the administrative border of India, and merely wished for

105 106 107 108

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1209, 1210. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 157. Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 220. Merk, The Mohmands, 33–42.

relations with the british government of india

185

political control”109 to meet the requirements of the so-called Scientiﬁc Frontier. Almost all of the Mohmand clans, both with and without allowances, including the “assured clans” (except for their Tarakzay clan), took park in the great uprising of 1897, to be described soon. Apparently to assert his rule over all of the Mohmands, the amir ordered the construction of a road in their country to extend up to Peshawer. He also intended to make the new road a counterpoise to the Khyber Pass, which was under the control of the British as a result of the Gandumak treaty of 1879. The construction of the road had started in earnest, but was abandoned after the amir died, in 1901. As noted earlier, the amir agreed not “to exercise interference” in the territories within the British sphere of inﬂuence. However, this does not mean that he had renounced his claim, on behalf of Afghanistan, over the territories as Durand110 and Sultan Mahomed111 have claimed. These assertions which have universally been accepted as reliable original sources are indeed invalid. Sultan Mahomed’s book, The Life of Abdur Rahman Khan, is unreliable on external issues, as Lord Kitchener, in a memorandum to Viceroy Lord Curzon, had stated that “. . . all the latter part [of it] is made up in England.” I have established this invalidity in detail in my book published in 1979.112 Strangely, this spurious part, unlike the genuine part, has been widely quoted as the real words of the amir. As for Durand, his private letters, which have been made public in the 1970s, and which reﬂect the more actual state of aﬀairs, contradict his oﬃcial stand on this point. In one of his letters, he has quoted the amir as saying that if the British withdrew their objections to his staying at Asmar he would refrain from interfering in Chitral and Bajaur.113 Durand is even more speciﬁc on the tribes that came within the British sphere of inﬂuence. In an interview in 1897, he has stated that . . . the tribes on the Indian side are not to be considered as within British territory. They are simply under our inﬂuence in the technical 109

Sykes, Sir Mortimer Durand, 219. Durand to Cunningham, 3 Dec. 93, PSLI, 73, 14. For Durand’s complete oﬃcial report see, For Dept., Sec-F, Pros., Jan. 94, Nos. 193–217. 111 Sultan Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 2, 161. 112 Kakar, (1979), 248. In this study, I have fully established the unreliability of the second part of Sultan Mahomed’s The Life of Abdur Rahman. 113 Durand to Lansdowne, Kabul, 24 Oct. 93, Mss. Eur. D., 727, No. 5. 110

186

chapter ten sense of the term, that is to say, so far as the amir is concerned and so far as they submit to our inﬂuence, or we exert it.114

The viceroy, Lord Elgin, also stated that the Durand Line made the amir accept only the status quo. In his own words, The Durand Agreement was an agreement to deﬁne the respective spheres of inﬂuence of the British government and of the amir. Its object was to preserve and to obtain the amir’s acceptance of the status quo.115

The author, Louis Dupree, has grasped the essence of the agreement in stating that the object of the Durand Line was “. . . the extension of the British authority and not of the Indian frontier.” Further, he states “The Line was not described as the boundary of India, but as the eastern and southern frontier of the amir’s domains, and the limits of the respective spheres of the two governments.”116 By the word “interference” the amir as well as his successors meant armed interference, and they did not consider inﬂuencing the tribes117 to be a breach of the contract.118 That was why they continually inﬂuenced the tribesmen through many and varied non-military means in spite of the agreement. Further, like his predecessors, Amir Abd al-Rahman also looked on the tribesmen as the people of Afghanistan, and the Indus as the natural and demographic boundary of the country.119 As described in Chapter Four, the people of the region were overwhelmingly Pashtuns, and Afghanistan itself had originated from this region. By the amir’s compelled adherence to the status quo, the Durand Line checked the extension of his actual control over his own kinsmen, depriving him “. . . of his natural sovereignty over the kindred Pathans of Bajaur and Swat.”120 Hastily drawn on the map with a lack of local knowledge, the Line was “. . . not based on any natural,

114 Durand quoted by Leitner, G. W., “The Amir, the Frontier Tribes and the Sultan”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, Series 3, 1897, 4, 237. 115 Elgin to Hamilton, 22 Apr 96, F.L., No. 77, (1896), PSLI, 85. 116 Dupree, L., Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1980, 767. 117 Rastogi, Indo-Afghan Relations, 180. 118 Harris, British Policy, 263. 119 Mahomed, The Life of Abdur Rahman, 2, 158, 159. 120 Leitner, “Kaﬁristan and the Khalifa Question”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896, 1, 285.

relations with the british government of india

187

topographical, ethnographical or political principle of delimitation.”121 In fact, it was impossible to draw a line taking into account all of these delimitations, but to bifurcate major tribes, and even smaller ethnic groups at villages and other places, with strong kinship ties. Among these ethnic groups were the Tarkalanays, the Wazirs, (later the Mohmands), the Shinwarays, the Nurzays, the Achakzays, the Bareches, the Baluches and others. More seriously, the Durand Line marked for eventual separation a signiﬁcant portion of the Pashtuns who constituted the backbone of Afghanistan, and who had defended it against foreign invaders. No wonder that they, more than any other non-European people whom the British had encountered, deﬁed and frustrated them. Clearly, the separation and the bifurcation of its people weakened Afghanistan as a whole, and that by creating the Durand Line the British Government of India actually “. . . transformed Afghanistan into a landlocked country, making it politically and economically more dependent on India.”122 The bifurcation of major tribes and individual ethnic groups also opened a Pandora’s Box that continues to be a source of trouble in Afghanistan and the region to the present day. There was no reason other than the logic of imperialism to dissect a people of the same stock, the same speech, the same system of beliefs, the same mode of life and weltanschauung, who lived under the same geographical and economic conditions. The presumed occasion—the Russian invasion of India through Afghanistan—did not arise for which the Durand Line had to be used for which it was apparently intended. Instead, it caused untold hardship to the people of the area, and problems of all kinds for governments on both sides, the most serious of which was deterioration in the security situation. Despite the many military expeditions that were undertaken the Line did not alter the situation substantially on the ground from what it had been before it was drawn. In 1877, the viceroy, Lord Lytton had stated that I believe that our North-Western Frontiers present at this moment a spectacle unique in the world; at least I know of no other spot where,

121 Leitner, “The Amir, The Frontier Tribes and the Sultan”, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, Series, 3, Vol. 4, 237. 122 Gulzad, The Afghan State, 182.

188

chapter ten after twenty ﬁve years of peaceful occupation, a great civilized power has obtained so little inﬂuence over its semi savage [!] neighbors . . . that the country within a day’s ride of its most important garrison (Peshawar) is absolutely terra incognita and that there is absolutely no security for British life a mile or two beyond our border.123

Professor Akbar Ahmad, a native political anthropologist, familiar with the aﬀairs of these Pashtuns, has recently stated that “[t]he pious hope of international harmony contained in the Durand Agreement was rarely respected and the treaty constantly revoked on both sides of the Durand Line.”124 The fact of the matter is that for tribesmen, the Durand Line has never existed in reality, but only on the map. It is impossible for governments on either side of the Line to prevent the tribesmen from crossing its passes, of which there are 141. The agreement, however, left a profound mark on the people of the region. The blocking of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan from extending control over these people, and the British inability to administer them created a no-man’s land. By introducing the Durand Line, the British caused the region to remain “. . . isolated, with its inhabitants more divided and economically undeveloped”,125 resulting in the retention of a medieval way of life. Further, due to the Durand Line tribal peoples perpetuated the destructive custom of revenge (badal ), mainly because the Afghan authorities invoked it when culprits ﬂed to the British side.126 Since the Durand Line was a by-product of the Forward Policy, Viceroy Lord Elgin disrupted it by adopting measures aimed at extending control over the region in question, even though earlier he had stated that the aim was to maintain the status quo. The measures, in particular the demarcation of the Line which started following the conclusion of the agreement and was completed (except in the Mohmand country and the Khyber area) in 1896, resulted in a great uprising in June 1897. Except for the Shi'i Turis all of the tribes of this vast region, led by their elders as well as religious per123

Noelle, State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan, 167. Ahmad, Akbar, S., “Pakhtun Tribes in the Great Game, Waziristan Case”, Afghanistan and The Frontier, eds. Fazal-ur-Rahim Marwat, Sayed Wiqar Ali Shah Kakakhel, Peshawar, [1993?], 200. 125 Gulzad, The Afghan State, 182. 126 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 1180, 1196. 124

relations with the british government of india

189

sonalities—(Mulla Najm al-Din, Mulla Faqir, the Mulla of Manakai, the Palam Mulla and others) rose against the British.127 However, the latter with an army of about seventy thousand men, including the future Sir Winston Churchill, suppressed them in their biggest operation west of the Indus up to that date.128 The greatest impetus that prompted the tribes to action came from the Durand Line. Its demarcation suggested visibly and forcefully to them that they were no longer inhabitants of an independent country, but had been brought within the circumference of British inﬂuence and control.129 That was why they rose against it en masse. Of course, the amir encouraged them to rise. As their ruler, he could not remain a spectator, but was obliged to support them in their uprising. However, because of his fear of the British he did not support them openly with regular troops; rather, he supported them with some soldiers in plain clothes, tribal levies, and money. Mulla Najm alDin even announced that the amir had promised him that he would proclaim jihad.130 The amir as well as the Sipah Salar Ghulam Haydar Khan were said to be behind the uprising because they had instigated the khans of Bajaur and Swat.131 However, the amir soon backed away from his token support, even going so far as to assure the British that, as was requested of him, he would disarm any tribes that might ﬂee to Afghanistan, and would expel Mulla Najm al-Din to Arabia.132 This assurance followed the determined suppression of the uprising and the spread of a rumor to the eﬀect that the British intended to invade Afghanistan proper also. It is probable that the amir’s full backing of the uprising would have made a huge diﬀerence as the commander-in-chief of the government of India stated: “Had he but raised his little ﬁnger, he could have set the whole country ablaze

127 Kakar, (1971), 113. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 159–162. For the leading and interpretive role of the Hadda Mulla and Mulla Faqir in the uprising see Edwards, David B., Heroes of the Age, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996, 176–219. I am grateful to the author for giving me a copy of this excellent work. 128 Harris, British Policy, 276. 129 Ibid., 278. 130 Mulla Najm al-Din to Main Gul of Swat, 2 Sept. 97, ARAMFA, 7. 131 Nawab Mohammad Khan to viceroy, 19 Feb. 1901, Sec F., 5–10, NAI. Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi ', 296. 132 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s autograph on a letter to him from Cunningham, 6 Sept. 97, ARAMFA, 7.

190

chapter ten

beyond the borderland already aﬀected, but he held to his engagements with a high sense of honor and remained faithful to the pledges given to the British Raj.”133 The amir believed that he had saved Afghanistan, and his dynasty from imminent danger, but actually consented to the fragmentation of the country in the long run, and had alienated such a great portion of the population, including those who had taken a leading part in founding the country in the eighteenth century and who had defended it against external aggressors ever since. Consequently, it was natural for them to complain as they actually did when the British overran their country. They complained that the amir did not care, because, as they put it, he had sold them “. . . to the British Government for money.” As an excuse in a carefully written proclamation that was intended for the British, the amir declared that “. . . as you did not consult me when you raised this revolt, you are not justiﬁed in throwing blame on me.” After reviewing Amir Sher 'Ali Khan’s policy toward the British, which ultimately led to the downfall of his dynasty, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan continued,” Don’t be led to think that, like Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, I am such a fool as to annoy and oﬀend others for your sake.” However, he was careful not to alienate them forever, stating, “If you now choose to leave yourselves at my disposal and authority I shall try, please God, to settle your aﬀairs with the British government satisfactorily.”134 The uprising, the military operations and the consequent expenditures made the British also cautious not to antagonize further either the tribesmen or the amir. A senior British oﬃcial made the following recommendation: [I]nstruct our oﬃcials on the frontier not to push forward, and not to give the amir any cause for suspicion. I would wait until the amir dies before making any further endeavor to bring the tribes under our control. I believe we lose nothing by the delay.135

133

Quoted in Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 162. For details see, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Izah al-Bayan fee Nasihat al-Afghan [A Word of Explanation for the Beneﬁt of Afghans], (Dari), 13 Aug 97, Sir R., Udny to secretary to government of Panjab, 24 Sept. 97, PSLI, 96, No. 1043, No. 376. 135 Gulzad, The Afghan State, 236. 134

relations with the british government of india

191

In conclusion, to obviate an assumed threat to their Indian empire the British deprived Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan and his successors from their right to govern their kinsmen in the hope that they themselves could do so to ensure the requirements of the Forward Policy. However, with the demarcation of the Durand Line they set in motion a movement that ultimately led to the division of Afghanistan and the bifurcation of the Pashtuns who had been the backbone of the country, founding and safeguarding it. This provoked the tribes to the extent that because of it they (the British) failed in their eﬀorts to ensure the requirement of the Forward policy, despite their ingenuity in colonial aﬀairs, their skill in dealing with overseas nations, and their military prowess as a superpower of the time. Although the British still persisted in the implementation of the Forward Policy, the people of the region persisted in their eﬀorts to retain their independence. To keep these ever-deﬁant people compliant, the British frequently undertook military expeditions against them, especially after the amir died, in 1901. In response, the local people continually resisted, and even carried on raids on India itself. For instance, from 1920 to 1938—that is, in the course of 18 years— they carried on eighteen such raids from the Tribal Areas.136 An incidental corollary of these military expeditions and raids, as well as that of the Anglo-Afghan wars, was the strengthening of religious and xenophobic feelings of the people and the incremental increase in the inﬂuence of religious personalities. The raids were called ghazas in emulation of the raids carried on in Arabia at time of the Prophet Muhammad.137 Individual tribesmen likewise distinguished themselves in showing their opposition to the Durand Line sometimes with such daring enterprises that they soon turned into legends. A conspicuous example of such a legend is the story of 'Ajab Khan Afriday, who abducted Miss Elis, a British woman, from her family, which was securely quartered in Peshawar, and treated her as an honorable guest, even providing her with European food that he stealthily procured from Peshawar. The story of these people’s struggle is an odyssey of a ﬁght for independence. All of this activity kept alive anti-British feeling and a state of permanent anarchy 136

Akbar, “Pakhtun Tribes in the Great Game”, 195. Mohmand, Siyal, de Mohmando Ghazaganay, (Pashto), [ The Raids of the Mohmands], University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1354/1975. 137

192

chapter ten

pregnant with local and international tensions, not only during a time when the British ruled India until 1947, and also to the present day. This colonial legacy is still a source of local and international conﬂict, and will probably remain so until it is settled to the satisfaction of all those aﬀected by it.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND THE RUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF PANJDEH

Relations with Russia The ﬁrst oﬃcial contact between Russia and Afghanistan was made in 1837, when the government of Russia sent Captain Paul Vitkevich to Kabul to obtain its support for Persia’s design on Herat. Since the province of Herat was a part of Afghanistan, but then besieged by Persia, it was impossible for Vitkevich to succeed in his mission. What he actually did in Kabul is unknown, but whatever overtures he might have made to Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, were rejected.1 Ironically, the Vitkevich’s mission along with Persia’s siege of Herat provided an alibi for the British Government of India to invade Afghanistan, in 1838. The British Government feared that since after the conclusion of the Tukomanchay treaty in 1828, Persia had been under the inﬂuence of Russia, its occupation of Herat might endanger its Indian colony. Earlier in the century, especially in the 1830s, some British and Indian Muslim travelers, among them Eldred Pottinger, Alexander Burnes, James Abbott, John Wood, Percival Lord, 'Izzat Allah and Mehdi 'Ali Khan, had established that the routes through which Russia could reach India led through Afghanistan.2 Thereafter, Herat was looked upon as the key or the gate to India. At that time, the Indian oﬃcial circles believed that “[o]f all the external inﬂuences beyond Indian frontiers, the Russian advance in Central Asia threatening British supremacy in Afghanistan constituted the greatest danger.”3 The “danger” also had something to do with the nature of 1 Yapp, M. E., Strategies of British India, Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798–1850. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, 234, 235. I am grateful to Professor Yapp, my former supervisor at the University of London for giving me a copy of this excellent book. Waller, J. H., Beyond the Khyber Pass, The Road to British Disaster in the First Afghan War, University of Austin Press, 1993, 97. 2 Gulzad, The Afghan State, 115. 3 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, xl.

194

chapter eleven

the Russian empire that was compact, centralized, expanding and run autocratically by unpredictable masters. Also, as Plehve, Russia’s minister of the interior stated at the time, “Russia has been made by bayonets not diplomacy.” Actually, as B. H. Sumner states, “. . . the root of the trouble lay in St. Petersburg itself where the diﬀerent ministries were usually at loggerheads with one another, as well as often divided within themselves.”4 The British Empire, in comparison, was diﬀused, open, and ruled democratically. Since it had already reached its broadest limits its masters concerned themselves mainly with safeguarding it. However, after the Vitkevich’s mission Russia, did not pose a danger for Afghanistan for a quarter of a century. After its defeat in the Crimean war (1854–56) and the perceived failure of its policies in Europe, Russia embarked on expansion southward in the vast region of Central Asia. Early in the century, it had already subdued the Kazakh steppes and established a strong military fort in Orenburg from which it dispatched troops in every direction. In 1864, Russia extended its authority to the borders of the organized khanates, or states, of Khoqand, Bukhara and Khiva (Khwarazm or Khorezm). In the following year (1865), it occupied Tashkand; in 1867, it created the new province of Russian Turkestan and compelled Muzafar al-Din, the amir of Bukhara, to sign a treaty in which he placed his state under Russia’s protection; and in 1868, Russia annexed Samarqand.5 Russia then became, for the ﬁrst time, co-terminous with Afghanistan and the Russian-dominated Central Asia a rival to the British-dominated South Asia. Russia’s advances sharpened the so-called ‘Great Game.’ Played by diﬀerent actors in various forms to the present day, the phrase was ﬁrst coined in the 1840s by a British traveler, Captain Arthur Conolly, and immortalized years later by the British poet, Rudyar Kipling, in his novel, Kim. The ‘Great Game’ referred to the rivalry that existed between Russia and Britain over the domination of Central Asia. The chessboard on which it was played was, however, much wider in extent and “. . . stretched from the snow-capped Caucasus in the west, across the great deserts and mountain ranges

4 Sumner, B. H., Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880–1914, Archon Books, 1986, 6, 14. 5 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 9. Audrey, C. Sh., Long Years of Exile, Central Asian Refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan, University Press of America, Lanham, New York, 1994, 17.

afghanistan’s relations with russia

195

of Central Asia, to Chinese Turkestan and Tibet in the east.” According to Peter Hopkirk, “The ultimate prize, or so it was feared in London and Calcutta, and fervently hoped by ambitious Russians serving in Asia, was British India.”6 The ‘Great Game’ escalated after Russia made Khiva a protectorate in 1873 and occupied Khoqand three years later, in 1876. This state, which included the fertile Ferghana valley, was subsequently abolished by Russia. The ‘Great Game’ became likewise a challenge to the rulers of Afghanistan with regard to how to safeguard their country at a time when the viceroys and military generals of the expanding Asian empires of Russia and Britain were trying to occupy new territories. All of this was in an age when no international community existed to curb the expansionist drive of the colonial powers. As noted in Chapter Ten, Russia regarded Afghanistan as a country beyond its sphere of inﬂuence as the result of an understanding that had been reached between it and Britain, in 1873. Nevertheless, in 1878, Russia’s governor-general at Tashkand, General Constantine P.von Kauﬀmann, forced a mission under General Stolietoﬀ on Amir Sher 'Ali Khan in Kabul. Stolietoﬀ is said to have concluded a defensive and oﬀensive treaty with the amir.7 Two Afghan senior oﬃcials, Mohammad Nabi and Mohammad Hassan Khan, later told General Roberts in Kabul, after he had occupied it that a “treaty” had been concluded. However, from the correspondence exchanged between the amir and Kauﬀmann the author D. P. Singhal has concluded that “. . . there was no ‘treaty’ at all.” He has based his conclusion on the amir’s letters, in which he had asked for military assistance from Russia without invoking the treaty. He had only requested of Mohammad Hassan Khan, who was then in Tashkand, that Russia not “. . . withhold the aid of troops at this time of need and in accordance with the requirements of the friendship between the two Governments, and not to defer the aid till some other time, but to send to Afghan Turkestan the 32,000 troops of Tashkand which General Stolietoﬀ told in your presence were ready and would be dispatched whenever I required them.”8

6 Hopkirk, P. The Great Game, The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Kandansha International, New York, London, 1992, 2. 7 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 34. 8 Singhal, D. P., “Russian Correspondence with Kabul, 1870–1879”, The Journal of Indian History, April 1963, No. 121, vol. XLI, Part 1, 122, 125.

196

chapter eleven

It was the presence in Kabul of the Stolietoﬀ mission that Britain made an excuse for its second invasion of Afghanistan, in 1878. It should be noted that its ﬁrst invasion of Afghanistan forty years earlier had also been prompted, in part, by the presence in Kabul of a Russian mission, as noted in Chapter Two. While on his way to Afghan Turkestan, the amir, in a letter, addressed to Kauﬀmann expressed his desire to proceed to the Russian capital to “. . . have a congress held there to inquire into and settle my cause with the English after asking them what right they had to advance on Afghanistan.” Kauﬀmann hastened to advise the amir “. . . not to leave your kingdom”, adding that the “Emperor has caused the British Government to agree to the continuance of Afghan independence, and that the “British Government have promised this.” However, subsequently he wrote that the Czar had directed him to ask the amir to come to Tashkand. With regard to the military aid requested by the amir, he had earlier replied that “. . . it is impossible to assist you now. I hope you will be fortunate. It all depends on the decree of God.”9 Ill, betrayed, and helpless, the amir died in Mazar on February 21, 1879. Singhal writes, Thus ended the life of a prince who refused to surrender an iota of dignity before the threat of war and betrayal of friendship alike, to accept diminution of his authority as a prelude to certain foreign domination, as had happened to many Indian and Asian princes.10

When the British invaded Afghanistan, Russia ignored the treaty if it had been concluded. Russia not only did not provide arms and assistance to the amir, as it had agreed to if Afghanistan was attacked; Kauﬀmann even refused permission to the amir to cross the border, in January 1879.11 When Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had died and his son and successor, Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, had been deported to India, and the roads south of the Hindu Kush had been occupied by the British, Russian oﬃcials in Tashkand seemed to have devised a plan with regard to northern Afghanistan. This was during the period when Russia had embarked on expansion in the Turkmen country northwest of Afghanistan, to be described shortly. Although the lack of

9 10 11

Ibid., 126. Ibid., 127. Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 40.

afghanistan’s relations with russia

197

oﬃcial documents makes it diﬃcult to be certain about the design, but from the available evidence it is clear that, like Britain, Russia also intended to partition Afghanistan, and help establish an Afghan kingdom12 north of the Hindu Kush favorable to its interests. The linchpin of its design was intended to be Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who had gone as early as 1869 to Russian Turkestan in the hope of occupying Afghan Turkestan with Russia’s help.13 Although at the time Russia did not help him, after the deportation of Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan to India the Russian oﬃcials at Tashkand entertained the idea. According to Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan Kauﬀmann’s secretary encouraged him to expel the governor from Afghan Turkestan and establish himself there.14 Upon his arrival in Badakhshan, in January 1880, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was reported to have said that Russia had sent him to occupy Turkestan on its account, as it had come to an understanding with Britain on dividing Afghanistan, making the Hindu Kush their boundary.15 In actual fact, the sardar did not share Russia’s design, and instead came to terms with the British, as previously described. The Russian plan had failed. The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan During his negotiations with the British in 1880, Sardar 'Abd alRahman Khan was apparently in contact with the Russians, but the nature of their communication is unknown. Sardar Mohammad Afzal Khan, head of the British delegation sent by Lepel Griﬃn to Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who was then in Khanabad in northeastern Afghanistan, had concluded that Russia had assisted him with money and arms.16 Griﬃn even believed that the sardar was “. . . a Russian nominee”;17 this was at the time when the sardar had refused

12 13 14

Griﬃn, L., “The Late Amir and his Successor”, Fortnightly Review, 1901, 758. BACA, 16. Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman (in Kunduz) to Mohammad Sarwar, 1880, PSLI, 25,

603. 15

CD [?], 14 May 80, PSLI, 26, pt. 3, 320. Col. Mohammad Afzal and his companions to Griﬃn from Khanabad, 18 May 80, PSLI, 25, 1972. 17 Griﬃn to government of India, (T), 3 June 80, PSLI, 25, 1077. 16

198

chapter eleven

to come to terms with the British. In one of his letters, the sardar had even referred to Russia as a co-guarantor of a neutral Afghanistan,18 and he had also shown reluctance to visit the British oﬃcials in Kabul. However, he ﬁnally changed his mind and accepted the throne of a reduced Afghanistan with a limitation on his external relations, as described in Chapter Ten. It is unknown whether 'Abd al-Rahman maintained oﬃcial correspondence with Russia after he became amir, but it is known that many news writers, notably Mulla Ya"qub, worked for Russia in Herat, Kabul and Turkestan.19 Mulla Ya"qub, who was a Russian renegade, was believed to have been a colonel in the Russian army, and was in charge of the Russian subjects arriving in Kabul.20 Attending the Kabul court frequently in the guise of a Muslim,21 he acted as an interpreter when the amir interviewed new Russian visitors. In December 1882, Mulla Ya"qub left for Mecca through India.22 Another Russian envoy, Sayyed Khan, who accompanied the amir to Jalalabad in early 1883, succeeded him. The Russian counselor at Mashhad also had employed certain native merchants of Herat to provide him with information about Afghanistan. Reportedly, the amir had permitted them to work as Russian agents.23 One of them, Mirza Mohammad Sadiq, in anticipation of being harassed volunteered information about his profession with Russian permission to the amir.24 Although the presence of the Russian agents was a source of concern to the amir, he took no action against them. One exception was his refusal to permit some Russians who had entered Shighnan, in northeastern Afghanistan to proceed to Kabul.25 About Mohammad Sadiq the amir asked the viceroy as to what to do with him.26 This was during the period when Russia was advancing toward Merv, and northwestern Afghanistan was considered to be under the evenSardar 'Abd al-Rahman to Mohammad Sarwar, 15 Apr. 80, PSLI, 25, 603. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 24 Feb. 82, PSLI, 32, 324. 20 BACA, 219. 21 AB, Kabul Correspondent, 8 Feb. 82, PSLI, 32, 366. 22 BACA, 219. 23 Mirza 'Abbas, British agent at Mashhad to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 12 Jan. 82, PSLI, 32, 322. 24 Mohammad Sadiq to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 21 Sept. 82, PSLI, 34, 783. 25 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Col. Mohammad Afzal, British agent in Kabul, KD, 22 Dec. 82, PSLI, 35, 341. 26 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 11 Oct. 82, PSLI, 34, 785. 18 19

afghanistan’s relations with russia

199

tual threat of its occupation. At the time the amir’s position and the aﬀairs of the country were far from being satisfactory, and the British were unwilling to conclude a treaty with Afghanistan. Under the circumstances, the amir considered it inadvisable to alienate the Russians. He dwelt on the British fears arising from the Russian advance by stating, Nothing but full understanding respecting Afghanistan will satisfy me and that necessitates large expenditure of money. Now the Russians have come close and day by day they approach.27

During this period, as previously noted, the British had no reliable information about Russia’s activities in Afghanistan. Following their evacuation of Afghanistan, they commissioned Qazi 'Abd al-Qadir in Kabul, to inform them of the possible Russian activities and the amir’s handling of the Russians, but 'Abd al-Qadir had also entered into the amir’s service.28 In this confusing situation the viceroy, Lord Ripon, asserted that any display of fear of the presence of the Russian agent, Mohammad Sadiq, in Kabul at the time, would be “unwise.”29 He disagreed with Lord Hartington, the secretary of state for India, in London, that the amir should be told that the presence of the Russian agent in Afghanistan was objectionable. However, at a later date Ripon informed the amir that the expulsion of Mohammad Sadiq “. . . would be proper.”30 By that time the viceroy had formulated an approach to the situation. In his view, the proper course with regard to the agent would be for London to remonstrate to Russia.31 It was also to arrange a treaty with Russia in which Afghanistan was to be considered by it beyond the sphere of Russia’s inﬂuence. In return, Britain should do the same with regard to the Turkmen tribes beyond northwestern Afghanistan. Such a treaty, Ripon believed . . . would show a clear understanding between the two countries in regard to Afghan aﬀairs, and should prove to the Ruler of Afghanistan that it would be useless to play oﬀ one of them against the other.32 27 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Sardar Mohammad 'Alam Khan, AB, Kabul Correspondent, 22 Mar. 82, PSLI, 32, 469. 28 BACA, 5. 29 Ripon to Hartington, 1 Apr. 82, PSLI, 32, 326. 30 Ripon to Ami 'Abd al-Rahman, 11 Oct. 82, PSLI, 34, 785. 31 Ripon to Hartington, 1 Apr. 82, PSL1, 32, 326. 32 Ripon to Hartington, 16 Jan. 82, PSLI, 31, 84.

200

chapter eleven

Not interested in the subject, Russia prolonged the current state of aﬀairs with evasive responses.33 Finally, after the British ﬁxed a grant for the amir, in July 1883, and, in particular, after Russia occupied Panjdeh in 1885 (to be described shortly) there were no reports concerning the activities of the Russian agents in Afghanistan. Thereafter, Anglo-Afghan relations improved while, conversely, Russo-Afghan relations deteriorated.34

The Russian Occupation of Panjdeh The wide valley of Panjdeh to the northwest of Herat was the habitation of nomadic tribes of Turkmen with no permanent residences,35 but with vast pastures and small portions of cultivable land here and there. Panjdeh depended on Herat and Maymana for supplies of grain. Around 1850, Panjdeh, up to Maruchak and Qal'a-e-Wali, was occupied by about eight thousand families of Sarik Turkmen,36 divided into the ﬁve sections; the Soktis, the Harzagis, the Khurasanli, the Bairach and the 'Ali Shah.37 This wealthy tribe, possessed large ﬂocks of sheep—each of which consisted of from 1,200 to 1,500 head38 and lived in a series of hamlets or kibitkas.39 Their nomadic pastoral lifestyle dictated that they always be ready to pack up and move at a moment’s notice.40 In 1882, the Sariks voluntarily submitted to the amir,41 and agreed to pay a tithe ('ushr) as revenue.42 A sub-governor (hakim) was placed in charge of Panjdeh, and a military contingent was stationed there. The Sariks did so, after 1881, when the Tekke Turkmen of the Akhal oasis had submitted to Russia. After the fall of Khiva, in 1873, a Trans-Caspian military zone had been formed. At that time the only area in Central Asia that remained undisturbed was the country of the Turkmen, which stretched from Khiva, in the north, to the border of Afghanistan, in the south, 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42

Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 102. Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati, 8. Yate, North Afghanistan, 184. Ibid., 189. Ibid., 186. Ibid., 191. Ibid., 184. Ibid., 189. . . ., 17 July 82, PSLI, 33, 1173. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 403, 436.

afghanistan’s relations with russia

201

and from Bukhara, in the east, to the Caspian Sea, in the west. Persia exercised some suzerainty over the Turkmen until 1861, when the Tekke Turkmen of Merv defeated its forces.43 In June 1879, a Russian force under General Lomakin, reached Geok Tepe in the Akhal oasis and assaulted the camp of the Tekke Turkmen, but was repulsed with losses. In January 1881, another Russia force under General Skobelev attacked the same position and secured a decisive victory. This victory resounded like a thunder blast throughout Central Asia, and in February 1884 the Tekke Turkmen of Merv were, in consequence, subdued and annexed later in the same year.44 More than six hundred Turkmen were massacred with a view to intimidating the recalcitrant Turkmen in the countryside. This gigantic stride of hundreds of miles made the frontiers of Afghanistan coterminous with Russia. Thus, Herat, considered to be the key to India, came within the reach of Russia for the ﬁrst time. After the fall of Merv, the British government concluded that the time had come to settle the northwestern frontiers of Afghanistan, which were then indeﬁnite. This was the area where, if a settlement was not reached, the Russian and British forces were likely to collide. Letters were exchanged on the subject, and it was ﬁnally agreed that an Anglo-Russian commission was to be sent to the frontiers to demarcate them in the spirit of the understanding of 1873. In the mean time both Russia and Afghanistan became active in the area. Russia’s advance forces reached Pul-e-Khatun, north of Panjdeh, and Russia disputed the Afghan rule of it arguing that . . . even if the Sarik Turkmen established at Panjdeh formerly paid tribute to Afghanistan, this fact would not of itself conﬁrm the claim of the present amir to the place, looking to the fact that it had never been accompanied by the Afghan troops, and that its population had enjoyed complete independence.45

Although, at the time, the greater part of the Turkmen had passed into its hands, Russia still did not lay claim to Panjdeh, probably because its inhabitants, the Sariks, were distinct from the Tekke 43 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 109. Sykes, Sir P. M., A History of Afghanistan, 2, 1975, 88. Allworth, E., Central Asia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, 148. 44 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 110. 45 Ibid., 117.

202

chapter eleven

Turkmen of Merv whom it had subjugated.46 The fact that the Sarik Turkmen had rejected the overture of the khan of Organj, a vassal of Russia, to accept his rule on the grounds that they were the subjects of Afghanistan might have also inﬂuenced Russia in its stand.47 However, afterward Russia changed its stand, insisting on ethnic consideration for the demarcation of its frontiers with Afghanistan.48 The Russians contended that the tranquility of the Turkmen country was impossible to accomplish unless all of the Turkmen were brought under control. Speciﬁcally, they believed that should the Sarik Turkmen in the east remain either independent, or under Afghan rule, their nomadic and plundering habits would complicate matters between Afghanistan and Russia, and render it impossible to establish settled rule among those who had already submitted to Russia.49 This was, in fact, an echo of the apologetic, deterministic, expansionistic, and colonialist view of Prince Aleksandr M. Gortchakov, Russia’s foreign minister. Gortchakov had expressed this view on 21 November 1864, in a well-known memorandum in which he had stated that, in their drive for expansion, all of the colonial powers, including the United States, “. . . have been drawn into a course wherein ambition plays a smaller part than imperious necessity, and where the greatest diﬃculty is in knowing where to stop.”50 This manifesto in which the peoples of Central Asia have been called “half-savage tribes” and Russia has been commissioned with “a mission to civilize” them is strange because relative to most people of Central Asia Russia was a late comer to the fold of civilization. Nevertheless, the manifesto has ever since impressed like-minded pundits. It is true that at times “. . . military actions taken in Central Asia were often in violation of orders from above”, but “. . . once conquest had been completed, the Czar accepted as fait accompli.”51 Sumner’s statement that, in dealing with imperial problems Alexander II (r. 1855–1881) and Nicholas II (r. 1894–1917) suﬀered from

46 Shahzada of Khoqand to Peshawar Commissioner, PD, 23 Sept. 84, PSLI, 42, 123. 47 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 422. 48 Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations, 51. 49 Ibid., 52. 50 For the full text of the Gortchakov Memorandum see, Fraser-Taytler, Afghanistan, A Study in Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, 333–337. 51 Gulzad, The Afghan State, 127, 128.

afghanistan’s relations with russia

203

“. . . a certain blunt autocratic naivete”52 applies to all of the Czars in various degrees. As a colonial power, Russia, like Britain, had deliberately set out on the road to grab land. In this situation its high priests, like Gortchakov, formulated views that justiﬁed not only the occupation of land, but also the slaughter of indigenous people, the plundering of their collective wealth, and the resulting disruption of their social order. Afghanistan’s claim to the region inhabited by the Turkmen was historical as well as demographic. The Turkmen were linked to Afghanistan through Herat. Ghobar, maintains that Merv was a province of Afghanistan for centuries.53 According to Qazi Sa'd alDin, the governor of Herat, formerly the elders of Merv and of Sarakhs accompanied Afghan rulers as their vassals, and, because they were subject to Herat, the elders of Akhal and the Tekke Turkmen were with Amir Sher 'Ali Khan in Kabul.54 The Sarik Turkmen of Panjdeh were still more closely linked to Herat. Formerly, the Jamshedis, who were subject to Herat, inhabited Panjdeh, but were driven out of it by the Arsari Turkmen who, nevertheless, agreed to pay tribute to them. The Arsari Turkmen were, in turn, expelled by the Sarik Turkmen in about the middle of the nineteenth century.55 The new settlers also agreed to pay tribute to the Jamshedi tribe, which had always been subject to Herat.56 In addition to the fact that the northern frontier of Panjdeh beyond Sari Yazi was the natural and traditional frontier of Herat,57 and that Merv itself was a dependency of Herat, by the time the Russians approached Panjdeh, the Afghans had established their rule there.58 All of this demonstrates that Panjdeh was ethnically, geographically as well as historically a part of Herat, and through it a part of Afghanistan. This explains why Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, who knew the area well, favored a forward policy there.59 As a Muslim ruler, he enjoyed the support of the Muslim rulers of Central Asia and northern 52

Sumner, Tsardom and Imperialism, 6. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 674. 54 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 47. 55 Yate, North Afghanistan, 186. 56 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 499. 57 Yate, North Afghanistan, 178. 58 Peter Lumsden, Chief member of the British delegation to the Joint Afghan Boundary Commission quoted in Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 117. 59 Ibid., 113. 53

204

chapter eleven

Muslim India, in particular the tribal area (later oﬃcially called the North-West Frontier of India) and, after the fall of Panjdeh, these elders asked him to declare a jihad against Russia.60 A number of elders from Central Asia had either taken asylum with the amir, or engaged in correspondence with him.61 Others, from Central Asia, had promised him that they would rise against Russia from within, when he rose against it from without.62 Consequently, because of these assurances the amir believed that in the event of war with Russia the Turkmen would rise en masse against it.63 As late as 1889, he even cherished the idea of raising a rebellion against Russia and becoming a second Timur Lane.64 In spite of all this, when the Russian forces arrived near Panjdeh, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan instructed his army under the command of General Ghous al-Din Khan to desist from opposing them when they chose to attack it, and to retreat to Bala Murghab.65 He did so for the following reasons. First, he had been discouraged in his forward policy in the area by the British. In 1881, they had advised him not to accept the allegiance66 of the Tekke Turkmen of Merv, oﬀered by their ruler, Makhdum Quli Khan.67 Perhaps for the same reason, the amir had earlier turned down the oﬀer of submission by the khan of khwarazm.68 Second, the British government had ignored the amir’s warnings for the delimitation of the undeﬁned boundaries of Afghanistan with Russia,68 in spite of his repeated complaints to the eﬀect that the British had abandoned their responsibilities with regard to Afghanistan, and about impending advances by Russia.70 At ﬁrst, neither Britain nor India took the amir’s warnings seriously. The viceroy, Lord Ripon, only reminded him that Afghan boundaries with Russia were so ﬁxed in 1873, and that it would be unwise to reopen the question.71 60

Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 474. Ibid., 546. 62 Ibid., 483. 63 Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati, 7. 64 Griechbach, C. L., to Ellias, N., 5 Mar 89 (Mazar), For Dept., Secret-F., Pros., May 1889, Nos. 216–225, NAI. 65 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 455. 66 Ripon to Hartington, 22 May 81, PSLI, 28, 887. 67 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 388. 68 Ibid., 383. 69 The Amir’s Visit to India, 1885. PSLI, 44, Enclo., No. 3, 2. 70 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in darbar, PD, 9 Dec. 82, PSLI, 35, 5. 71 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 107. 61

afghanistan’s relations with russia

205

As previously noted, only after Russia occupied Merv in 1884 did the Government of India and Britain consider the situation a threat to Afghanistan as well as India. After an agreement with Russia had been reached, the Government of India sent a mission, led by Sir General Peter Lumsden, to the area in the autumn of 1884, to deﬁne the undemarcated boundary in collaboration with Lumsden’s Russian counterpart. Kabul was not invited to take part in the commission, even though the issue in question was the delimitation of its boundary. By then, because Russia had forcefully entered the area between Merv and Panjdeh, the situation had turned favorable to it; that was why Russia delayed the work of the commission, and in the meantime reinforced its army.72 The Russians did not heed the British, who wanted the subject to be settled quickly. Hoping that this would occur, Lumsden discouraged the Afghans from reinforcing the garrison, arguing that reinforcement was likely to jeopardize the settlement. His discouragement led the amir to believe that, In reality the General intended to witness an engagement between the Russians and the Afghans, since he had the foolish idea that if bloodshed did not take place between the Afghans and the Russians, the Afghans might become their friends, and this will be altogether injurious to the British interest.73

Third, among the amir’s reasons for instructing his army to desist from opposing the Russians was that he believed that the Sariks were unreliable even though they were the subjects of Afghanistan. It was feared that, in the event of war, they would side with the Russians because the Afghan oﬃcials had oppressed them, and because they were a wealthy people concerned with safeguarding their wealth.74 Fourth, the most important consideration for the amir in not ﬁghting with Russia over Panjdeh was the disorganized state of aﬀairs. The army which was stationed in various parts of the country, acted more as a police force than as an element of ﬁghting strength suitable to 72

For details see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 107–129. For details see, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Nasayih Namcha [A Book of Advice], Kabul, 1303/1866, 4–6. Riyazi ('Ayn al-Waqayi', 222, 223) also maintains that the British oﬃcials of the Boundary Commission duped the Afghans by assuring them that the Russians did not pose a threat to Panjdeh. He adds that the British oﬃcials intended to create enmity between the Afghans and the Russians. Wheeler (Abdur Rahman, 175), however, rejects the allegation, stating that “We may be quite sure that Sir Peter Lumsden never for a moment entertained ‘the foolish idea’ imputed to him.” 74 Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati, 7. The Amir’s Visit to India, 5. 73

206

chapter eleven

defend the country against invaders.75 In the amir’s view “. . . his enemies were powerful, his nation weak, and his friends procrastinating.”76 Faced with the threat posed by Russia, the amir took a long-range view of Afghanistan itself. In his view, if the Afghan army retreated the fall of Panjdeh was unlikely to endanger the integrity of the country. He believed that if the Afghans opposed the Russians, and Herat and Maymana fell to them, the country would disintegrate.77 In his view, “. . . war between Russia and England on Afghan soil would ultimately destroy his country, and his supreme interest was to avoid such a catastrophe.”78 Actually, the amir was opposed to any power, whether Christian or Muslim, who may try to pass through Afghanistan to ﬁght against another country.”79 That was why, at the height of the crisis, he showed unwillingness to allow even a small number of British engineering oﬃcers to fortify the defenses of Herat.80 Only in the event of Russia advancing on Heart would he have been willing to accept British troops,81 and then together with them would ﬁght with his army to the end.82 On March 30, 1885 Panjdeh fell to the Russians. The Afghan troops opposed them, even though they were overwhelmed by them, and even though they had been handicapped by the amir’s instruction not to ﬁght.83 At the time Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was on a state visit to India. When informed of the fall he advised his host “not to distress yourself ( gham ma khurid ).”84 Not only did he not make any attempt to invoke the British commitment to Afghanistan which had been subjected to “unprovoked aggression”, but he also 75

The Amir’s Visit to India, 5. Ibid., 10. 77 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 455. 78 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 120. 79 Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, Nasayih Namcha (A book of Advice), PD, 22 Dec. 88, PSLI, 55, 1372. The amir has developed this theme in the above booklet. In his view “Any government which desires to pass through Afghanistan . . . is its enemy. If Persia desires to pass through Afghanistan to ﬁght with the Chinese, she will be the enemy of Afghanistan. The same may be said of China if she wishes to proceed through Afghanistan against Persia. If the British ask Afghanistan to let them through it for war with Russia or Central Asia they will make Afghanistan their enemies. It is hardly possible that friendship can be established between Afghanistan and Russia, because the latter has a ﬁrm intention to advance and take possession of India. Afghanistan is to make no distinction between such enemies as regard religion; they may be Christians or Mohammedans such as Turkey or China.” 80 The Amir’s Visit to India, 5. 81 Ibid., 14. 82 Ibid., 9. 83 Ibid., 11. 84 Ibid., 9. 76

afghanistan’s relations with russia

207

made the British position easier by volunteering to “give up a part of the disputed frontier [Panjdeh and its dependency to the south] for the honor of the Russian Government and the Great Emperor”,85 provided Afghanistan was left in possession of Maruchak, Gulran and Zulﬁqar.86 In excuse for the loss of Panjdeh, the amir stated that his occupation of it was in anticipation of such a day, when it could become a basis for bargaining to make a settlement.87 In his view by making the sacriﬁce of Panjdeh, Afghanistan would be safe from total disaster.88 Nevertheless, the Panjdeh crisis brought Russia and Britain to the brink of war.89 However, after exchanging letters and telegrams, they agreed to settle it through arbitration. The concession, which the amir had already made, and which was, in fact, recognition of the fait accompli, was accepted by Russia as a basis for a settlement. Accordingly, Panjdeh was exchanged for Zulﬁqar,90 and afterward a new Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission delimited the undeﬁned boundary of Afghanistan from Zulﬁqar to Khamiab, on the Oxus.91 The demarcation alleviated the crisis, but the boundary here as elsewhere was “only an arbitrary line based on the circumstances of the moment rather than on any permanent and natural basis.”92 Sir West Ridgeway was then in charge of the British Boundary Commission; Colonel C. E. Yate, a member of the commission stated that “. . . there can be little doubt that the Russian foot now advanced will at some future time be either advanced still further or withdrawn altogether, and a frontier thus arbitrarily deﬁned . . . cannot be expected to be permanent.”93 Finally, as already noted in Chapter Seven, with the demarcation of the northeastern boundary, in the region of the Pamirs, with Russia and China, and with the exchange of the Bukhara-held 85

Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati, 7. The Amir’s Visit to India, 6. 87 Mohammad Nabi, Sawal wa Jawab, 7. 88 The Amir’s Visit to India, 5. 89 For the international repercussions of the Panjdeh crisis see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 119–122. Sumner also holds that “. . . the Panjdeh crisis . . . had nealy brought Great Britain and Russia to war with each other.” Tsardom and Imperialism, 6. 90 Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 122. 91 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 476. For details of the demarcation of the northwest and northeast boundaries of Afghanistan with Russia’s protectorates see Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 124–129, 146–148. Habberton, Anglo-Russian Relations, 54–57, 58–67. 92 Yate, North Afghanistan, 178. 93 Ibid., 179. 86

208

chapter eleven

territory of Darwaz south of the Oxus with the Afghan-held territories of Shighnan and Roshan, north of the Oxus, the entire boundary of Afghanistan and Bukhara and the Russian-held territories north of the Oxus, were deﬁned and ﬁxed. The Russian occupation of Panjdeh and Russia’s subsequent intrusion into the northeastern parts of Afghanistan, particularly its dislodging of an Afghan outpost in Surmatash (or Somatash) in the Pamirs, in 1892,94 produced serious consequences, both nationally and internationally. The leading men of the Char Aimaq of the Herat province, who were said to have oﬀered their land to Russia,95 were arrested, and the Jamshedis were removed en masse from the frontiers to the Herat Valley.96 The border with Russia was fortiﬁed, and reliable tribes, especially the Pashtuns, were settled along it. Also, the traditional free movement of pilgrims from Central Asia to Mecca through Afghanistan97 was restricted. This and the imposition by Russia of high tariﬀs on British and Indian goods reduced the volume of trade. The Panjdeh incident drew the amir closer to Britain, and strained Russo-Afghan relations for a generation until the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, in 1917. In particular, after the rebellion of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan in 1888, which the amir believed had been instigated by Russia, he began to direct anti-Russian propaganda toward his subjects to such an extent that ﬁnally the viceroy warned him that it will have the “. . . eﬀect of provoking a collision between Your Highness’s forces and those of Russia.”98 Despite this warning, the amir expanded the jihad movement,99 and continually claimed that the Russian threat to Afghanistan was just around the corner. Further, the amir made Russian duplicity and the bad faith Russia had shown in Afghanistan during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan a permanent theme of propaganda. By inculcating fear among his subjects, the amir probably also intended to exact money from 94 For details see Wheeler, Abdur Rahman, 185–187. See also, Shighnan and Roshan in Chapter 6. 95 PD, 18 Mar 85, PSLI, 44, 572. The Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in his booklet, Nasayih Namcha, alleged that the sons of Khan Agha Jamshedi sent messengers to the Russian oﬃcers and oﬀered them submission. 96 HD, 15 Jan. 91, PSLI, 62, 768. BACA, 228. Military Report on Afghanistan, 70, Delhi, 1925, Pt. 1, History, 70. 97 Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 738. This restriction was enforced with a view to checking Russian spies entering Afghanistan in the guise of Muslims. 98 Viceroy to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 27 Feb. 89, PSLI, 56, 1071. 99 Riyazi, 'Ayn al-Waqayi', 223.

afghanistan’s relations with russia

209

them to strengthen the army and to persuade them to make even bigger sacriﬁces to safeguard their faith, their women, their honor and themselves from what he referred to as ‘Russian bondage.’ The completion of the demarcation of the entire boundary with Russia made it impossible for its forces to march further south without clashing with Britain and Afghanistan. Marking the beginning of an era of rapprochement between Russia and Britain, which had a signiﬁcant impact on world aﬀairs, it detracted from the emphasis put on the ‘Great Game.’ In the mid-1890s, as the result of an improvement in Anglo Russian relations in Central Asia, a marked shift of emphasis became apparent in the amir’s policy toward Britain and Russia. Although the amir regarded Britain as the bigger danger, because of its Forward Policy of the 1890s, the foundation of his foreign policy remained intact. Only his hostile attitude toward Russia gave way to his suspicion of both powers. While he tried to alert the Afghans to the dangers posed by the “inﬁdels”, the amir also tried to open the channel of communication with the Russians. Since he believed that every thing changes rapidly in foreign relations100 he favored maintaining a balance between both powers, believing that any gesture of friendliness toward Britain was likely to provoke Russia to pressure Afghanistan. The amir believed that the movement of the Russians along the Afghan frontiers in 1895 was due to the departure of Sardar Nasr Allah Khan for England. The amir then advised his eldest son, Sardar Habib Allah Khan, that “We should try in every way to be on friendly terms with him [the Russian Emperor].”101 One year later, out of the same presents that he had received from Queen Victoria through Sardar Nasr Allah Khan, the amir sent a few items to the Russian emperor with an apology for the inability of his son to have visited him.102 The channels of communication with the Russians were Afghan agents and the amir’s assumed uncle, Mohammad Afzal Khan, who had shops in Samarqand and Bukhara.103 Also, from time to time, contacts were made and correspondence was exchanged between the governor of Herat, and the Russian oﬃcers at Panjdeh and elsewhere.104 100

PD, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83, No. 23. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to Sardar Habib Allah Khan, KD, 7 Mar. 95, PSLI, 80, No. 17. 102 KD, 2 Mar. 96, PSLI, 85, No. G., 736. 103 GD, 15 Mar. 94, PSLI, 78, 1005. 104 MM, Jan. 95, PSLI, 78, 685. 101

CHAPTER TWELVE

RELATIONS WITH PERSIA AND THE OTTOMAN TURKEY

Relations with Persia Throughout the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, PersianAfghan relations were regulated through the medium of the British Government of India. Persia was under the inﬂuence of foreign powers, and had little direct contact with Afghanistan, even though the two countries had a long border and extensive cultural ties. Following the British evacuation of Kandahar and its restoration to the amir in April 1881, the Persian government intended to annex the Afghan part of Seistan. It intended to do so because at the time the position of the amir was precarious, and his rival cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who held Herat, had challenged his rule. For that purpose, Persia’s minister in London made overtures to the British government, which referred the matter to India as to whether or not Persia should be allowed to proceed with its design. The viceroy, Lord Ripon, opposed the design, arguing that in 1873, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan complained that he lost “. . . the better part of Seistan because we [the British] persuaded him not to resort to arms against Persia and to trust to our arbitration.” Further, he stated that if Persia was allowed to go on with its scheme Amir 'Abd al-Rahman would be discredited among his subjects “. . . who are already too much displeased to regard him as under the dictation of foreign powers.”1 Lord Ripon suggested to the British government that it should negotiate the matter with Persia. However, Persia made no further move since there was no room for negotiation on the matter. After the arrival of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan at Mashhad in October 1881, Persia feared that his presence there, with over eight hundred followers, would disturb Persian-Afghan relations. The amir, who wanted to have friendly relations with Persia, expected that the shah of Persia would intern the sardar somewhere, such as 1

Ripon to Hartington, 8 May 81, PSLI, 28, 771.

relations with persia and ottoman turkey

211

Tehran, away from the border city of Mashhad. As a gesture of goodwill, the amir instructed the governor of Herat to send an oﬃcial to the governor of Khurasan to express his condolences with regard to the death of his uncle, Hisham al-Sultana.2 The presence of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan with his followers was rightly considered to be a disturbing factor in the area, as the Turkmen of the area had expressed their willingness to occupy Mashhad for him. The Persian authorities were likewise disturbed after the sardar and his followers began to buy arms and ammunition.3 As a result of this situation, Persia dispatched a mission composed of one hundred men under the leadership of Mirza Ma'sum Khan, to Kabul in September 1883. According to the shah the mission was only to congratulate the amir on his accession.4 There were, however, indications that the mission was political, and commissioned to aﬀect reconciliation between the amir and the principal refugee sardars5—Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, his cousin Sardar Mohammad Hashim Khan and his nephew Sardar Musa Jan, the son of the former Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, all of whom had taken refuge in Persia. The content of the letter addressed to the amir by the brother of the shah was not disclosed, but the two interviews, that the envoy held with the amir centered on Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and Russia. With regard to the sardar, the amir told the envoy that, “[i]t would not serve either Persian or Afghan interests if the shah permitted intriguing refugees to remain on his frontiers,” because, “[t]hey would give fresh encouragement to the advance of the Russians.” Further, he told the envoy that “. . . his friendship for the shah was merely the sympathy of one Mohammedan Ruler with another.” But he “. . . inveighed vehemently against the Russians and advised the envoy to warn his master against their intrigues.”6 The question of reconciliation had been brushed aside, since at the end of his meeting the envoy indicated that the shah proposed to let Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to go either to Turkey or Russia. Naturally, the amir was against allowing the sardar going to the border region of Russia, where he would be a standing menace.

2 3 4 5 6

MM, June 83, PSLI, 37, 26. Kand, D., 22 Feb. 84, PSLI, 40, 243. The shah of Persia to British minister at Tehran, 19 Oct. 83, PSLI, 38, 465. MM, Sept. 83, PSLI, 38, 46. MM, Oct. 83, PSLI, 38, 465.

212

chapter twelve

In a strong tone he told the envoy, “Very good . . . Let him go to the boundaries of Russia, so that he may die in their territory in the manner that his father died in the hope of getting help from them.”7 The mission failed to accomplish anything signiﬁcant. It was even prohibited from proceeding to Herat via the Hazarajat as the envoy requested, presumably with a view to impressing his coreligionist Hazaras. In Kabul the mission was watched closely, and made to stay inconspicuously. Afghans were not allowed to visit it. The dispatch of the mission to Kabul coincided with the application of pressure by the British Government of India to persuade the shah to remove Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan from Mashhad. The failure of the mission, the danger to Mashhad due to the presence of the sardar, and British pressure ﬁnally persuaded the Persian government to remove him to Tehran, in June 1884 in return for the money it had received from India. Subsequently in Tehran, too, Persia “considered the presence of [Sardar Mohammad] Ayyub and his many followers dangerous.”8 Finally, as previously noted, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and his followers were persuaded to move to India, and he arrived in Lahore via Iraq in 1888, and resided there for the rest of his life. In 1885, when Russia occupied Panjdeh, Persia occupied Hashtadan, a small district in Kohsan, west of Herat. The Afghans reversed the occupation easily,9 but the controversy concerning whether the district belonged to Afghanistan or Persia lingered on. Under British arbitration, both sides were asked to produce evidence to prove their ownership,10 but neither side was able to do so. However, the amir gave way, stating “Where we do not have the right and are unable to prove it we should not insist, and where we possess documents we should not leave it.”11 Actually, since at the time, the amir was seriously ill, and, in addition, was confronted with the rebellion of Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan, he accepted the arbitration of General Mclean through which Hashtadan was partitioned between the two countries.12

7 8 9 10 11 12

Ibid. BACA, 53. Ghobar, Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh, 53. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh, 597. Ibid., 604. Ibid., 604.

relations with persia and ottoman turkey

213

An Afghan agent, with the title of Head of Traders (tajir bashi ), was stationed at Mashhad. He was commissioned to provide facilities to traders, and, in addition, to report on Persia as well as on Afghan refugees in the Persian province of Khurasan. In response, the Persian government demanded the stationing of its own agent in Herat, but the amir refused to accept the demand, and, further, threatened to stop trade and close the border with Persia. At the same time, he made it clear to the Persian government that his agent was commissioned only to report on the Afghan refugees, and had not been instructed to interfere in the aﬀairs of that country. Under the advice of the Government of India, the shah ﬁnally acquiesced.13 In the early 1890s, the Persian-Afghan relations reached their lowest point. During the Hazara war, the Hazaras were persecuted, and along with the Qizilbashes compelled to practice only Sunni Islam. Led by Shaykh Mohammad Taqi, the mujtahids (Shi'i 'ulema) of Mashhad issued a legal ruling ( fatwa) in which they declared war on the Sunni population of Afghanistan. The ruling was issued after the shah twice failed to stop the persecution, although in late 1892, he had sent remonstrance to the British government, in London, about the persecutions.14 As instructed by the British government, the viceroy of India wrote to the amir, stating, “It would be a great advantage if Your Highness were to authorize me to contradict these reports [the reports of persecution].”15 Not only did the amir not contradict the reports, but he also adopted an uncompromising attitude, stating I gave instructions for the punishment of my rebellious Shiah [Shi'i] subjects, who are ryots [ra'iyats] of Afghanistan and sentenced them to death, imprisonment and banishment according to their respective merits.16

Further, he wrote, . . . should it be known that the shah of Persia and his mullas entertain a thought of interfering with the subjects of Afghanistan, the Sunnis of Afghanistan will render a good account of the matter without aid from the Sunnis of Turkey.17 13 14 15 16 17

Ibid., 530, 1054. Viceroy to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman, 19 Oct. 92, PSLI, 68, 335. Ibid. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to viceroy, 27 Oct. 92, PSL1, 68, 1053. Ibid.

214

chapter twelve

At the same time, to appease the Persian public, the amir sent a decorated Quran as a gift to be placed in the shrine of Musa Imam Raza in Mashhad. Ultimately, the viceroy dropped the subject altogether.

Relations with the Ottoman Turkey Afghanistan and the Ottoman Turkey had no commercial or other ties between them. However, as Sunni Muslim states separated by Shi'i Persia, they were traditionally on friendly terms with each other. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had great respect toward the person of the Caliph Sultan 'Abd al-Hamid, and regarded him as the protector of the Muslims, calling on every Muslim to be loyal to him.18 The amir’s respect for the caliph sultan, as the guardian of Mecca and Medina and the spiritual head of the Muslim world was, of course, religiously signiﬁcant, but more importantly, his autocracy and the police state he had created appealed to him. Additionally, it was prestigious for Afghan rulers to be on good terms with the Ottoman sultans. The amir tried to respect and even imitate the caliph sultan. In The Booklet on Islamic Aﬀairs (Risala-e-Islamiya), he declared that since the caliph of Islam had decreed that his subjects should pay ten percent of their annual income over and beyond their usual tax, his subjects should also do the same.19 Hence the exaltation of the sultan and of his innovation whether real or imaginary. In a ﬁrman, the amir called on his subjects, to “[b]e at least as zealous in this cause as the subjects of the sultan of Turkey . . . who have oﬀered their lives for the sultan.”20 Further, in his treatises on jihad the amir expressed that he had been inspired by the example of the sultan, because, apart from the fact that they were both Muslims, both the Ottoman Empire and Afghanistan were threatened by the same power—Russia. Like the Ottoman sultans, the amir was likewise on good terms with the British government and, conversely, on bad

18

Kabul Series, Pt., 111, 141, Nos. 233–234, Encl. No. 22, Ikdam Turkish Paper, 9 Oct 1901. 19 For details see, Sarrishta-e-Islamiyya-e-Rum (The Islamic Management of Turkey), Kabul, 1311/1894. 20 PD, 9 Dec. 95, PSLI, 83, No. 23.

relations with persia and ottoman turkey

215

terms with the Russian government, as explained in the preceding chapters. That was why he did not show any interest in the Pan Islamic movement, which Sayyed Jamal al-Din Afghani had initiated to incite the Muslims against the British for their domination of the Muslim world. While at the same time that the amir tried to obtain international recognition for his own position, he also established communication with the sultan. The sultan was said to have oﬀered him the title of ‘Light of the Religion, Ghazi’ (Zia al-Din, Ghazi ).21 It was due to his deference to the sultan that the amir did not adopt the title of the sultan in 1896, despite the advice of his advisers to do so. The two rulers communicated with each other, and this communication and the existence of friendly relations between their countries resulted in the spread of rumors, especially in Mashhad, to the eﬀect that an alliance had been concluded between them. In response, the amir declared: Up to the present [1898], there has been no intention on our part either to cause the khutba [Friday sermon] to be delivered or the coin struck in the sultan’s name, but should we wish to consider this with His Majesty, we are not afraid of anyone to do so. Nothing could be better for the two governments which belong to the same religion and sect than to combine with each other.22

The dispatch of the ﬁrman to Mashhad must have been signiﬁcant. In summary, with regard to external relations, it is clear that when Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan agreed to rule over a reduced Afghanistan, he also agreed to deal only with the British Government of India, not other powers. He did so apparently because at the time he needed the British support against his rival cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, who held Heart, and also due to the fact that the country was in a disorganized state. The preceding pages show that he was temporizing. For at the same time that he reorganized the state and suppressed internal revolts and rivals, the amir reunited the country and extended control over the outlying regions to the east and south, and northeast and northwest of Afghanistan. As the preceding chapters make also clear the amir intended to proceed still further in these directions, as well as to make himself

21 22

MM, July 96, PSLI, 87, F.L., No. 134, 96. MM, Oct. 98, PSLI, 109, Regist. No. 1088, 1.

216

chapter twelve

the ruler of a completely independent country. But Britain and Russia in their forward movements, in opposite directions, not only curbed his advances, but also grabbed territory from Afghanistan, and reduced its size. Had they not done so, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan would probably have become a second Ahmad Shah Durranay. The advances which Russia and Britain made toward Afghanistan created nearcrisis and crisis situations. However, these were ultimately managed through diplomacy, and, in addition, the two powers cooperated with each other in completely delimiting the boundaries of Afghanistan. Although these boundaries were drawn up at Afghanistan’s expense, their delimitation helped the amir to build a nation-state, and they became the internationally agreed-upon boundaries that now constitute modern Afghanistan. Despite the limitations on his external relations that the amir had accepted, he did not feel bound by them. The objective of his policy was to do away with these limitations and make the country strong. However, as long as there was internal opposition to crush, and the threat of a Russian military advance to counteract, the amir remained loyal to his obligations to the British government, despite the disagreements that he had with it a number of times. During this period, the amir made no attempt to keep a balance of power between Russia and Britain as Ludwig Adamec maintains.23 On the contrary, until the mid-1890s he acted in a way that was decidedly pro-British, and bitterly anti-Russian. Thereafter, as a result of the military presence of Britain in Chitral, and of Russia in the Pamirs, and the rapprochement between them, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan tried to maintain a kind of balance of power between them, while simultaneously attempting to make Afghanistan completely independent. But he failed in his latter program as well as in his eﬀorts to establish direct relations with the British government, in London. Also, the extent of his secret communications with other powers, including Russia, remained limited. However, Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan bequeathed a strong Afghanistan to his successors, who ﬁnally made the country completely independent.

23 Adamec, L., Afghanistan, 1900–1923, University of California Press, 1967, 2, 17, 24.

CONCLUSION

The last four decades of the nineteenth century, which included the ﬁrst and second reigns of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan and the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, constitute an extremely eventful period in the history of modern Afghanistan. During this period, two trends dominated the political scene of the country: political centralization with traditional individual liberty, and political centralization without individual liberty. The ﬁrst trend appeared in the second reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, and the second in the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. By the end of the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, as a result of the reforms that he had introduced, Afghanistan was on the road to becoming a nation-state. The amir’s reforms included the establishment of a consultative assembly, the creation of a standing army, the expansion of the oﬃcial bureaucracy, the opening of schools, and the establishment of the periodical, Shams al-Nahar. In rural areas, most elders were assisted by councils, while others managed the aﬀairs of their communities by themselves in line with traditional codes of behavior. The communities enjoyed the loyalty of their members to a degree that ensured stability. Civil suits were settled throughout the land on the basis of the Islamic law (Shari'a), in cities by state-appointed judges, and in rural areas by self-appointed religious scholars. The overwhelming majority of the people, whether they belonged to tribal or mixed communities, or whether they were their clients, or detribalized city residents of known or unknown origin, believed in Islam. They all enjoyed a degree of individual liberty unparalleled elsewhere in the East.1 But wherever the government ruled directly it ruled harshly. On the administration of Kandahar, Henry W. Bellew, a British specialist on aﬀairs of Afghanistan writes in his unusual overcritical way thus: The oppression of its [government’s] successive governors and the location of a strong body of troops . . . has almost completely ruined the

1

Kakar, Afghanistan (1971), 4.

218

conclusion place and has reduced the citizens to a state of poverty bordering on despair.2

Still, by the standard of the region and the time this combination of political centralization and individual liberty was an accomplishment, and that time was needed for the country to become a modern nation-state. However, in 1878 the British invasion destroyed the whole arrangement. Thereafter, disturbances bordering on anarchy shook the society, until Amir 'Abd al-Rahman stabilized it by instituting such a rigid system of administration which the people of Afghanistan had never experienced. During the British occupation, Afghanistan did not have a legitimate government; in fact, it did not even have a functional government, except in the city of Kabul and its immediate environs. The reigning ruler, Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, had died and the British had deported his son and successor, Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, to India. In this situation, the Sunni Muslims of the greater Kabul region, known in the British oﬃcial reports sometimes as the Ghazni Party and at other times as the National Party, strove for a ruler of their own to lead them in their struggle against the ‘inﬁdel’ invaders. This was what time-honored tradition and Islam demanded, but since there were several claimants to the throne they failed in their purpose. The British occupiers likewise failed in their eﬀorts to elevate a Mohammadzay sardar of their choice to the throne; it was out of the question for them to rule the country directly. They failed because the National Party upheld the cause of the family of the late Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. For the same reasons, a few middle-of-the-road Mohammadzay sardars also failed in their eﬀorts to attract a substantial following, while the non-Mohammadzay elders who had distinguished themselves in the campaigns against the British invaders could not aspire to the throne for the simple reason that they were not Mohammadzays. Only the house of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan was viewed as the ruling dynasty. The failure of the British oﬃcials dealing with Afghanistan to set up a functional government was due to the opposition of its people. Prompted by their loyalty to their country, their religion and their own Muslim rulers, they opposed the British and their various schemes.

2

Bellew, H. W., From the Indus to the Tigris, London, 1874, 148.

conclusion

219

Further, their determination to live according to their own rules proved too strong for the invaders to break. The diﬃculties of the British oﬃcials can be traced to their inability to comprehend the Afghan people. Overconﬁdent of the power of their empire and of their own convictions, they underestimated Afghan patriotic and religious values. For example, the Viceroy Lord Lytton believed that “It is as idle to talk of the national sentiments of the Afghans as it would be to talk of the corporate feeling of the parish of Marylebone.” In Lytton’s view, Afghanistan was not a country, and he even went so far as to assert that “If ever there was a mere geographical entity it was Afghanistan.”3 Consequently, Lytton tried to wean the Afghan people from the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan with a view to dominating them. In his declaration of war, he stated in part, With the Sardars and the people of Afghanistan this government has still no quarrel, and desires none. Upon the Amir Sher 'Ali Khan alone rests the responsibility of having exchanged the friendship for the hostility of the Empress of India.4

However, soon the British oﬃcials demonstrated by their actions that the declaration was only a bunch of words. After the same people destroyed the small British embassy in an uprising, Lytton instructed the Supreme Commander General, Frederick S. Roberts, that for it the “Afghan nation must be held to be collectively responsible.” About the participants in the uprising, he explicitly ordered that they should be punished, and that their punishment “. . . should be swift, stern and impressive.”5 To day we have come a long way from the time when even a European viceroy could proclaim the people of another country “collectively responsible.” Actually, it was the uprising which forced Lytton to change his mind about Afghans and their land. Whereas before the uprising he viewed Afghanistan as a mere “geographical entity” afterward he referred to them as the “Afghan nation.” The nationhood of the Afghans became further evident from the fact that, even though 3 Quoted in Robson, B., The Road to Kabul, The Second Afghan War, 1878–1881, Arms and Armour Press, London and New York, 1886, 203. 4 Lytton quoted in Duﬀ, M. G., The Afghan Policy of the Beaconsﬁeld Administration, London, 1880 [?], 29. 5 Lytton to Roberts, 29 Sept. 79, in Balfour, Lytton’s Indian Administration, 372.

220

conclusion Afghanistan was invaded, conquered, occupied and dismembered; her peoples suﬀered mass arrests, collective ﬁnes and mass executions; yet she successfully survived all these ordeals and acquired a political personality.6

It was because of this “political personality” that Lytton was forced to change his view. It was also the reason that he had previously failed to rule over Afghanistan ﬁrst through Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan and afterward directly, even when the country was to have been divided among Russia and Persia and British India. After the uprising and the almost continuous unsettled situation, Lytton decided to evacuate Afghanistan, even if a new ruler had not been found for it. This was because the resistance was appreciated even by the people of Great Britain, who replaced the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, which had devised the ‘Forward Policy’ by the liberal government of William Gladstone in the general election that was held later, in April 1880. The Afghan war had become an issue in the election, and Gladstone won in part because he had promised an “honorable withdrawal” from Afghanistan. Until the evacuation, set for October 1880, the search for a native ruler for what Lytton and his lieutenants called “Northern Afghanistan”, an entity from which the provinces of Kandahar and Herat were to be excluded, continued. This was during the period when Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan had arrived in Badakhshan from Samarqand, where he had lived in exile for eleven years. Lytton, who had declared war on Afghanistan, apparently in an eﬀort to forestall the danger to India posed by Russia, had become so desperate that he tried to negotiate terms with a claimant to the throne who was a known Russian pensioner. He did so because, like him, 'Abd al-Rahman Khan was also opposed to the rule of any member of the family of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan. Lytton found it necessary to search for an able dynastic rival because the National Party had already rejected the pro-British candidates to the throne. It accepted the sardar mainly in order to get rid of the ‘inﬁdel’ invaders. Although, it had preferred the house of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, its opposition to the ‘inﬁdel’ invaders was stronger. Further, the war had dragged on for too long and the people of Afghanistan as well as Britain desired for someone to bring

6

Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 178.

conclusion

221

peace. An additional inﬂuence in the matter was the failure of Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan to reach Kabul from Herat. For his part, Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, in the critical weeks of the negotiations, demonstrated realism in keeping a balance between the opposing sides. At the same time that he impressed upon the British that he was not a Russian nominee he convinced his countrymen that he had returned home to deliver them from the ‘inﬁdel’ invaders. Further, he reached Kabul before his rival, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, could arrive even in Kandahar, and acceded to the throne, albeit on British terms. It is untrue to state, as some have stated that the British installed the sardar in Kabul. They did not, and if they could have done so they would not have waited for Sardar 'Abd-al-Rahman Khan. As Singhal states . . . it was almost impossible to ﬁnd a puppet ruler who could retain his head on his shoulders once the back of the British troops was turned, while the maintenance of a permanent British force to quell frequent rebellions was ﬁnancially unendurable and politically unproductive.7

For the same reason the annexation of the country had also been ruled out. In fact, the British could not raise a ruler to the throne without the concurrence of the National Party, and this had become impossible for them to achieve. The opposition of the National Party and of others to the presence of the invaders was so strong that they neutralized the various schemes that the invaders had devised for ruling the country. No wonder that, as instructed by Lytton, the British oﬃcials in Kabul ‘recognized’ 'Abd al-Rahman Khan as amir, rather than ‘declared’ him as such. With the accession of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, the British war in Afghanistan came to an end, but the country lost its external independence. Nevertheless, its people rejoiced, because they were victorious in rescuing themselves from the ‘inﬁdel’ invaders, and had found a ruler of their own in the person of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. With his accession, a new period in the history of the country began to unfold, but, as it turned out, it proved more violent than either the occupation period or the reign of any of his predecessors. But ﬁrst here is a brief account of the external aspect of the subject.

7

Ibid., 187.

222

conclusion

Whatever their real aim, the British twice invaded Afghanistan, apparently in an eﬀort to forestall a Russian danger to India. Toward that end, in 1878, Lytton devised a strategy to secure a line of defense along the passes of the Hindu Kush range. This made it necessary for British India to occupy Afghanistan up to or beyond the Hindu Kush—a scheme that, whether by chance or design, coincided with the western limit of the Mughal Empire at its zenith. But the Sunni inhabitants of Afghanistan foiled the scheme, as their fathers had foiled a similar British scheme some forty years earlier. The policies that the British Government of India adopted toward Afghanistan following each war were diﬀerent. After the ﬁrst war, it pursued the policy of ‘containment’, known as ‘masterly inactivity’, the essence of which was non-interference in the aﬀairs of the land beyond the Indus, that is, Afghanistan. This policy which had a strong proponent in the person of John Lawrence, the governorgeneral of India, was successful because no major clashes occurred during the period in which the policy was in place. After the Second Anglo-Afghan War, two concepts crystallized in British oﬃcial circles, regarding Afghanistan, though both had been conceived of much earlier: the concepts of the ‘buﬀer zone’, and the ‘scientiﬁc frontier.’ These concepts, which were interrelated, appeared to be a product of Russo-phobia, and were applied for the ultimate purpose of making India secure from the threat of a Russian invasion. Whether the danger was real is uncertain, but the fear of it was, and it permeated oﬃcial circles in India whenever the Conservative Party was in power in Britain. This fear aﬀected Afghanistan, internally as well as externally. To make India secure, the British government attempted to make Afghanistan secure from Russian inﬂuence; at the same time it sought an additional alternative. The former made it necessary for the British government to arrange a buﬀer zone, and the latter to occupy strategic points in Afghanistan’s eastern hinterland. The idea of creating a buﬀer zone between the empires of Russia and Britain in Central Asia was an old one, which had arisen following the British withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1841. Three years later, in 1844, Britain and Russia had arrived at an understanding concerning what was known as the ‘Asiatic Question.’ They agreed that “. . . the Khanates of Central Asia should be left by Russia to form a neutral zone between the two empires, so as to preserve them

conclusion

223

from dangerous contact.”8 But Russia violated that agreement following its defeat in the Crimean war of 1854–56, at the hands of European powers, as a result of which its passageways toward the West were blocked, and after the Indian uprising of 1857, when the grip of the British on India had been loosened. To compensate for its Crimean defeat, Russia, as previously noted, turned to the East “. . . with a mission to civilize neighboring countries on the continent of Asia.”9 The ‘mission’, however, was only a pretext for conquest as was the ‘Forward Policy’ of the British, both of which had been summed up as ‘The Great Game’, a poetic phrase that is still alive. As described in Chapter Eleven, by 1868, Russia had reached the frontiers of Afghanistan. However, in 1873, it arrived at an understanding, not an agreement, as is generally claimed, with Britain that the Oxus River was the boundary between the Russian-dominated Bukhara and Afghanistan, and that the latter was beyond the sphere of Russia’s inﬂuence.10 This understanding marked the beginning of a buﬀer-status for Afghanistan. It also implied that Russia regarded it to be within the sphere of British inﬂuence, and that Britain, in return, accepted Russia’s conquests beyond the Oxus River. In 1878, Lytton’s Afghan war upset the arrangement between Britain and Russia. During the war when Britain realized that it could not conquer Afghanistan it tried to restore the status quo ante. Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan went along with the scheme, although at the time the northwestern boundary of Afghanistan had neither been surveyed nor demarcated. Russia in its southward advance of the 1880s occupied Panjdeh, in violation of its pledge of 1873, since it lay inside Afghanistan to the south of the line between Sarakhs and Khoja Saleh. Afterward, Britain took counter-measures, but these still fell short of its obligations to repel ‘unprovoked aggression’ against Afghanistan. Yet in the middle of the 1880s, and again in the early 1890s, when Russia pressured Afghanistan in the Pamir area, Britain in cooperation with Russia managed to demarcate Afghanistan’s entire northern boundary line. Afterward, Russia could not encroach on Afghanistan without violating an international boundary, and without colliding with Britain and Afghanistan. 8 9 10

Krausse, A., Russia in Asia, 1558–1899, London, 1899, 222. Prince Gortchakov quoted in Krausse, Russia in Asia, 225. Krausse, Russia in Asia, 228.

224

conclusion

The demarcation of Afghanistan’s northern boundary, and Russia’s pledge that Afghanistan lay beyond its sphere of inﬂuence made it a buﬀer zone as far as Russia was concerned; however, this was not so with regard to Britain. Britain controlled Afghanistan’s external relations, and, in addition, British India was coterminous with Afghanistan’s eastern and southern populous hinterland, where even the drawing of an international boundary could not alter the status quo. However, because Russo-phobia was so pronounced in British oﬃcial circles, the British Government of India decided to have an alternative line in Afghanistan’s hinterland. This was after Britain had realized that it could not establish a forward line along the Hindu Kush range. British oﬃcials referred to this alternative line a ‘Scientiﬁc Frontier.’ In an age of European optimism when sheer assumptions were called ‘laws’, they called this assumption also ‘scientiﬁc’. Probably, the real purpose of this ‘Scientiﬁc Frontier’ was the containment of India itself, lest its people rise up against the British, at the instigation of Russia. Henry Rawlinson, the “high priest of the forward school”11 had expressed this phobia when he stated that India is a conquered country, where a certain amount of discontent must be ever smoldering which would be fanned into a chronic conﬂagration by the contiguity of a rival European power.12

However, the demarcation of the Durand Line proved disastrous. Shortly after its introduction, in 1897, it led to the greatest uprising against the British west of the Indus, forcing them to employ more troops than they had in their two wars in Afghanistan. Subsequently, it also resulted in numerous clashes between the British forces and the ever-deﬁant peasants of the frontier regions, until Britain left India in 1947. The problems emanating from the so-called ‘scientiﬁc Frontier’, as well as the Anglo-Afghan wars, have left a legacy of anti-British feelings that is still alive to the present day. The demarcation of the Durand Line made it imperative for the British to try to make Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan neutral as far as the frontier tribes were concerned. In this regard the British followed a carrot-and-stick policy to compel the amir to keep out of the aﬀairs of the tribes, at the same time that it increased the amount 11 12

Duﬀ, The Afghan Policy of the Beaconﬁeld Adminstration, 33. Rawlinson, Sir H., England and Russia in the East, London, 1874, 144.

conclusion

225

of grants for him and delivered weapons to Kabul from time to time. All this helped the amir to suppress internal revolts and to consolidate the state and his dynasty. Thus, Britain aﬀected the course of events inside Afghanistan, although it had nothing to do with its internal aﬀairs directly. It is now time to deal with the internal aspect of the subject. An important feature of this period was a sharp interplay of external and internal inﬂuences in the shaping of Afghan history. The circumscription of Afghanistan checked the amir’s expansionist drive, and it also indicated that danger to the country from the imperial powers was just around the corner, in spite of their pledges of noninterference in Afghanistan’s internal aﬀairs. Meanwhile, due to the British monopoly on Afghanistan’s external relations, the amir had ample time to devote to domestic issues. He made strenuous eﬀorts to organize a strong central government to meet external and internal challenges, and he opposed the federal-style system of administration, which Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan and Sardar Mohammad Ishaq Khan had advocated. When his more popular cousin, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan, vied for power, the amir ruled relatively mildly. After he expelled him, in 1881, the amir leaned toward autocracy. Torn and fragmented by the British as well as by the civil wars, and sandwiched between the Russian and British empires, Afghanistan needed a strong central government, so the amir thought. He then took such measures that led to the enlargement of the standing army, the expansion of bureaucracy and the intelligence service, the over-haul of the system of taxation in order to increase revenue, the development of state monopoly on foreign trade, and the enforcement of the central government authority by a police state. All of this resulted in the highhandedness of government oﬃcials, and a ﬁnancial burden on every group of the ra'iyats—or subjects— that is, landlords, peasants, nomads, artisans, spiritual leaders, secular elders, the sardars and traders. The ra'iyats were treated as subjects, not as citizens with equal rights. Further, even though the amir obtained pecuniary grants from the British he expected the ra'iyats to meet the ever-increasing expenses of the state. However, since the ra'iyats were mostly small landowners and crop-sharing peasants who lived under the conditions of a subsistence agrarian economy it was diﬃcult for them to meet these demands. They could not do so unless compelled, and they were compelled mainly during the ﬁrst

226

conclusion

decade of the amir’s reign, when almost all groups of the ra'iyats rebelled. The amir managed to suppress the more than forty rebellions that occurred, and he also employed other tactics as a matter of policy. For example, he would send tribal levies (eljaris) to oppose a rebellious tribe, from among its neighbors. This was, of course, standard practice, but the amir also would instruct his oﬃcials to create dissension between tribes to weaken them in relation to the government—a tactic that none of his predecessors had adopted. Consequently, this divide-and-rule policy deepened old animosities that existed between tribes, and created new ones among the ra'iyats, a practice that weakened national solidarity. The amir also inculcated a fear of the inﬁdels among the ra'iyats, and set the jihad movement, or a kind of ideological war, in motion. Scores of other new measures were also adopted to keep the ra'iyats calm. For example, the amir placed restrictions on the movement of the ra'iyats, sometimes even from one village to another. Additionally, eﬀorts were even made to keep the rebellions secret, and anyone who talked about them as well as politics was punished. Once a man’s lips were sewed closed because he had talked about politics. The subjects of peace, war and politics even though they aﬀected the lives of people in a fundamental way, were considered to be the concern only of the amir and of those who were directly involved in them. The suppression of the rebellions took a tremendous toll on the population. The number of casualties from the uprisings and the number of those who were killed by the police will never be known; the amir quotes a ﬁgure of over 100,000. In a population of approximately six million, even this number, if true, is proportionately very high, and many times higher than the combined number of Afghans and the British killed in the two Anglo-Afghan wars. In addition, those persons who were in a position to oppose the government were either killed or expelled, or they went into exile for safety. Consequently, the country was purged of known elders to such an extent that it was said that if the British invaded Afghanistan again, they would encounter no resistance. This was evident from the reactions to the amir’s rule by the general public who, on many occasions, especially after prayers in mosques, wished the amir bad luck. They even prayed for the return of the British to deliver them

conclusion

227

from his tyranny. The loss of property was also immense: villages and crops were destroyed; cattle were conﬁscated; and underground canals (karezes) for cultivation dried up. Agriculture, which was the foundation of the economy, suﬀered much. The hardship was, however, impermanent and replete with rewards. During the last years of the amir’s reign, he reversed his policy of divide-and-rule, and embarked on a policy of forging unity among the ra'iyats. This was after the demarcation of the boundaries of the country had been completed, rebellions had been put down, the elders of some ethnic communities crushed for their willingness to undergo foreign rule, and the Hazarajat and Kaﬁristan had been paciﬁed. The countrywide institution of the ‘Festival of Unanimity’ ( jashn-e-mutaﬁqqiyya), in 1896, is an illustration of the amir’s revised policy. The amir instituted a program to arm the entire nation, and centers were set up in many parts of the country where men able to carry arms were trained in the military arts and armed with riﬂes, which the government had accumulated in abundance. By referring to the country as the ‘God-granted state of Afghanistan’ (dawlat-e-khudadad-e-Afghanistan), the amir stressed the Islamic character of the state, even though the state that he had organized was essentially secular, as will be described shortly. At times he even called himself ‘the amir of Islam.’ In an eﬀort to forge unity among his subjects, he tried to blend Islamic values with nationalistic ones, overlooking their inconsistent aspects and treating them as though they were complementary. This was perhaps because Islam in Afghanistan had become a mighty national religion, and, as noted by Jacob Burckhardt, was “closely interwoven with the memories, culture and history”13 of the people. This was so in spite of the fact that, in Afghanistan, Islam and nationalism suﬀered from limitations. Among these limitations was discrimination directed against the religious minorities of Hindus, Sikhs and Jews through the imposition of a poll tax ( jazya), although some of the Brahman Hindus were allowed to hold administrative posts. More serious was the fact that, among the Muslim population, the Shi'as, especially the Hazaras, were persecuted, and that some of the latter were kept in bondage, despite the oﬃcial abolition of slavery. 13

Force and Freedom, ed. Nicolos, Meridian Books, New York, 115.

228

conclusion

Additionally, the amir treated ethnic groups unequally, favoring the Pashtuns, but without reviving the reform that Amir Sher 'Ali Khan had begun for making Pashto the oﬃcial language. The amir served the Persian language by readopting it as the sole medium of an extensive and expanding bureaucracy, and Persian also penetrated the court, although he spoke Pashto more ﬂuently than either Persian or Uzbeki. He likewise treated the Pashtuns diﬀerentially, raising the Mohammadzays to the top of the new polity. Even they he treated unequally, raising the descendants of his great grandfather, Sardar Payanda Khan, to a privileged position by providing them with regular allowances and making them partners of the state (sharik-e-dawlat). The Kabul Mohammadzays, who, following the British intervention were in twilight period, began to emerge as aristocrats among a people who were more or less egalitarian. The nationalism the amir envisaged had another, more serious, limitation. This was the bifurcation of the Pashtuns by the demarcation of the Durand Line, which weakened the state, in a fundamental way. This occurred because Afghanistan subsequently lost a vast region inhabited by a people who had played a leading role in creating and safeguarding the country. However, the amir laid down the foundation of a nation-state by instituting a uniform political structure throughout multi-ethnic Afghanistan. The new structure replaced the system of regional self-administered communities, and, as a result people throughout the country began to identify themselves with the concept of Afghanistan as a nation, while they retained their own ethnic identity. In brief, during the reign of Amir 'Abd al Rahman Khan, the enforcement of uniﬁed political, economic, legal and currency systems heralded the emergence of a single society in which a centralized dynastic nation-state was instituted. In view of the fact that, as a result of the triumph over the ‘inﬁdel’ army in the war, religious beliefs had become stronger and the clergy had become more popular, the establishment of the secular nation-state was an accomplishment, indeed. The clergy, who had played a strong role in the resistance, had helped Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan in scoring spectacular victories. Had he unseated the amir, Afghanistan probably would not have had the secular state that developed under Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. As his own son states, Sardar Mohammad Ayyub Khan’s “. . . religious side of character was pronouncedly bigoted, ﬂowing with lush orthodoxy, which made him a tool in the

conclusion

229

hands of the priests.”14 The amir suppressed the clergy as well as the landlords and tribal elders, and this suppression helped prepare the ground not only for the institution of a strong secular government, but also for modernization and industrialization in the decades to come. The amir set up workshops where modern weapons were produced and modern military technology introduced. Social and educational reforms were not attempted, not because the amir was indiﬀerent to them but because against the external forces, which threatened the integrity of the country, and the internal forces, that threatened its stability, he devoted most of his attention to the maintenance of stability and the centralization of political power. He had no time to devote to social and educational reforms. Overall he tried to conserve rather than to change. What he accomplished in conserving none of his predecessors even Ahmad Shah Durranay had accomplished. He did all of this during the period when Afghanistan was sandwiched between the expanding British and Russian empires. However, his accomplishments were at the expense of individual liberty which the people of Afghanistan enjoyed in their hitherto selfadministered tradition-oriented communities. No longer could individuals act as free agents; rather, they were there to serve the state and society to which they were attached still more closely. In the names of Islam, society, homeland and honor, as well as the monarch, obedience was sought and obtained through organized oﬃcial bodies. In these names violence was allowed to be used extensively against individuals. The amir made no eﬀorts to organize a society based on reason, free discussion and the rule of law. He neither initiated, nor was he asked to adopt a constitution in which the fundamental rights and obligations of individuals as well as those of the state were clearly stated. Rather, he treated the people as subjects (ra'iyats), not as citizens, with a voice in the management of the government through their representatives. In this system of centralized power the amir became, as all absolute rulers are, oblivious to the notion that “[n]o society can be of value to man’s life if the price is the surrender of his right to his life.”15 Consequently, the individual on whom the

14 15

Eﬀendi, Royals and Royal Mendicant, 35. Rand, A. The Virtue of Selﬁshness, A Signet Book, 1964, 32.

230

conclusion

progress or stagnancy of society depends was stiﬂed. The new society that was composed of such individuals then could not become creative, dynamic and productive, especially intellectually. Not that the amir meant ill. He worked hard, indeed, to make Afghanistan strong, but he did so by consolidating the society at the expense of the individual. In this endeavor, too, he acted mainly on his own views, discarding even the traditional system of consultation. Through the systems he organized, the amir centralized and institutionalized state power and raised the monarch—that is—himself to the pinnacle of the new polity. Resultantly, he made himself the source of emulation for most of his successors, but became unpopular with the ra'iyats. However, in his own era the state he organized was able to stand up to the threats directed at it, and, through it, the amir also ensured stability and order for the ra'iyats. In the age of European colonialism and imperialism when Afghanistan was sandwiched between two imperial powers, the amir perhaps saved the country as well as the nation from being torn asunder, and, in addition, laid down the foundation for a nation-state, albeit in a reduced Afghanistan. In the words of D. P. Singhal, a specialist of the external currents of the period, Afghanistan owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to 'Abd al-Rahman who guided her destiny in an hour of extreme danger with remarkable political perception, diplomatic shrewdness and perseverance. In spite of the many cruel deeds and inhuman punishments he inﬂicted upon the people in his bid to consolidate his power, he gave the Afghans a government such as they had never known before.16

This accomplishment as well as the earlier victories of the Afghans over the British in the two Anglo-Afghan wars in a life time, contributed to the establishment of a proud Islamic warrior nation. However, in the long run Amir 'Abd al-Rahman’s concern for society at the expense of the individual contributed to the weakening of the country and the nation-state, and to-day’s backward Afghanistan is the result. This is because “. . . even the best intentions and aspirations must inevitably be smashed against the evils inherited in any system of centralized power.”17

16

Singhal, India and Afghanistan, 178. Serven, M., quoted in Noam Chomsky, N., Problems of Knowledge and Freedom, Vintage Books, 1971, 66. 17

APPENDICES

A. The Peshawar Treaty of 1855 Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, Wali of Kabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, concluded on the part of the British Government by John Lawrence, Esquire, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab in virtue of full power vested in him by the most Noble James Andrew, Marquis of Dalhousie, KT, &C., GovernorGeneral of India; and on the part of the Amir of Kabul, Dost Mohammad Khan by Sardar Ghulam Hayder Khan, in virtue of full authority granted to him by His Highness—1885 Article 1 Between the Honorable East India Company and His Highness Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, Wali of Kabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, and the heirs of the said Amir, there shall be perpetual peace and friendship. Article 2 The Honorable East India Company engages to respect those territories of Afghanistan now in His Highness’s possession, and never to interfere therein. Article 3 His Highness Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, Wali of Kabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, engages on his own part, and on the part of his heirs, to respect the territories of the Honorable East India Company and never to interfere therein; and to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the East India Company.

232

appendices B. The Peshawer Treaty of 1857

Articles of Agreement made at Peshawer on the 26th January 1857 (corresponding with Jamade-al-Awwal, 29 A.H. 1273), between Dost Mohammad Khan, ruler of Kabul and of those countries of Afghanistan now in his possession, on his part, and Sir John Lawrence, K.C.B., Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, and Lieutenant-Colonel H. B. Edwardes, C.B., Commissioner of Peshawer, under the authority of the right Honorable Charles John, viscount Canning, GovernorGeneral of India in the Council. 1. Whereas the Shah of Persia contrary to his engagement with the British Government, has taken possession of Herat, and has manifested an intention to interfere in the present possession of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, there is now war between the British and the Persian Governments therefore the Honorable East India Company, to aid Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, to defend and maintain his present possessions in Balkh, Kabul, and Kandahar against Persia, hereby agrees out of friendship to give the said Amir one lakh of Company’s rupees monthly during the war with Persia on the following conditions: 2. The Amir shall keep his present number of cavalry, and shall maintain not less than 18,000 Infantry, of which 13,000 shall be regulars divided into 13 Regiments. 3. The Amir is to make his arrangements for receiving the money at the British treasuries and conveying it through his own country. 4. British Oﬃcers, with suitable native establishments and orderlies, shall be deputed, at the pleasure of the British Government, to Kabul or Kandahar, or Balkh, or wherever an Afghan army be assembled to act against the Persians. It will be their duty to see generally that the subsidy granted to the Amir be devoted to the military purposes for which it is given, and to keep their Government informed of all aﬀairs. They will have nothing to do with the payment of the troops, or advising the Kabul government; and they will not interfere in any way in the internal administration of the country. The Amir will be responsible for their safety and honorable treatment, while in his country, and for keeping them acquainted with all military and political matters connected with the war. 5. The Amir of Kabul shall appoint and maintain a Vakeel in Peshawer.

appendices

233

6. The subsidy of one lakh per mensem shall cease from the date on which peace is made between the British and Persian Governments, or at any previous time at the will and pleasure of the GovernorGeneral of India. 7. Whenever the subsidy shall cease the British oﬃcers shall be withdrawn from the Amir’s territory; but at the pleasure of the British Government, a Vakeel, not a European Oﬃcer, shall remain at Kabul on the part of the British Government, and one at Peshawur on the part of the Government of Kabul. 8. The Amir shall furnish a suﬃcient escort for the British oﬃcers and to the British border when returning. 9. The subsidy shall commence from 1st January 1857, and be payable at the British treasury one month in arrears. 10. The ﬁve lakhs of rupees which have been already sent to the Amir (three lakh to Kandahar and two to Kabul), will not be counted in this agreement. They are free and separate gift from the Honorable East India Company. But the sixth lakh now in the hands of the mahajuns [sic] of Kabul, which were sent for another purpose, will be one of the installments under this Agreement. 11. This agreement in no way supersedes the Treaty made at Peshawer on 30th March 1855 (corresponding with the 11th of Rajab 1271), by which the Amir of Kabul engaged to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the Honorable East India Company; and the Amir of Kabul, in the spirit of that Treaty, agrees to communicate to the British Government any overtures he may receive from Persia, or from the allies of Persia during the war, or while there is friendship between the Kabul and the British Governments. 12. In consideration of the friendship existing between the British Government and Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, the British Government engages to overlook the hostilities of all the tribes of Afghanistan, and on no account to visit them with punishment. 13. Whereas the Amir has expressed a wish to have 4,000 muskets given him in addition to the 4,000 already given, it is agreed that 4,000 muskets shall be sent by the British Government to Tull, whence the Amir’s people will convey them with their carriage.

234

appendices C. The Gandumak Treaty of 1879

Treaty between the British Government and His Highness Mahommad Ya'qub Khan, Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, concluded at Gandumak on the 26th May, by His Highness the Amir Mahommad Ya'qub Khan on his own part and on the part of the British Government by Major (afterward Sir Louis) P. L. N. Cavagnari, C.S.I. 1. From the day of the exchange of the ratiﬁcations of the present Treaty there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the British Government on the one part and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies, and his successors, on the other. 2. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies engages, on the exchange of the ratiﬁcations of this Treaty, to publish a full and complete amnesty, absolving all his subjects from any responsibility for intercourse with the British forces during the war, and to guarantee and protect all persons of whatever degree from any punishment or molestation on that account. 3. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with Foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government. His Highness the Amir will enter into no engagements with Foreign States, and will not take up arms against any Foreign State, except with the concurrence of the British Government. On these conditions the British Government will support the Amir against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for this purpose. Should British troops at any time enter Afghanistan for the purpose of repelling foreign aggression, they will return to their stations in British territory as soon as the object for which they entered has been accomplished. 4. With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established between the British Government and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, and for the better protection of the frontiers of His Highness’s domain, it is greed that a British Representative shall reside at Kabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact.

appendices

235

His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may on his part depute an Agent to reside at the court of His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India and at such other places in British India as may be similarly agreed upon. 5. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies guarantees the personal safety and honorable treatment of British Agents within his jurisdiction; and the British Government on its part undertakes that its Agents shall never in any way interfere with the internal administration of His Highness’s domains. 6. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies undertakes, on behalf of himself and his successors, to oﬀer no impediment to British subjects peacefully trading within his domains so long as they do so with the permission of the British Government, and in accordance with such arrangements as may be mutually agreed upon from time to time between the two Governments. 7. In order that the passage of trade between the territories of the British Government and of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan may be open and uninterrupted, His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan agrees to use his best endeavors to ensure the protection of traders and to facilitate the transit of good along the well-known customary roads of Afghanistan. These roads shall be improved and maintained in such manner as the two Governments may decide to be most expedient for the general convenience of traﬃc, and under such ﬁnancial arrangements as may be mutually determined upon between them. The arrangements made for the maintenance and security of the aforesaid roads, for the settlement of the duties to be levied upon merchandise carried over these roads, and for the general protection and development of trade with and through the dominions of His Highness, will be stated in a separate Commercial Treaty, to be concluded within one year, due regard being given to the state of the country. 8. With a view to facilitate communications between the allied Governments and to aid and develop intercourse and commercial relations between the two countries, it is hereby agreed that a line of telegraph from Kurram to Kabul shall be constructed by and at the cost of the British Government, and the Amir of Afghanistan hereby undertakes to provide for the protection of this telegraphic line. 9. In consideration of the renewal of a friendly alliance between the two States which has been attested and secured by the foregoing Articles, the British Government restores to his Highness the

236

appendices

Amir of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Kandahar and Jalalabad with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin and Sibi. His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and is dependencies agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram and Pishin and Sibi, according to the limits deﬁned in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom. The revenue of these districts, after deducting the charges of civil administration, shall be paid to His Highness the Amir. The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, which lie between the Peshawar and Jalalabad districts and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these passes. 10. For the further support of His Highness the Amir in the recovery and maintenance of his legitimate authority, and in consideration of the eﬃcient fulﬁllment in their entirety of the engagements stipulated by the foregoing Articles, the British Government agrees to pay to His Highness the Amir and to his successors an annual subsidy of six lakhs of Rupees. 26 May 1879 – 4 Jamade-Ussani 1296

D. The Durand Agreement or the Kabul Convention of 1893 Whereas certain questions have arisen regarding the frontier of Afghanistan on the side of India and whereas both His Highness the Amir and the Government of India are desirous of settling these questions by friendly understanding, and of ﬁxing the limit of their respective sphere of inﬂuence, so that for the future there may be no diﬀerence of opinion on the subject between the allied Governments, it is hereby agreed as follows: 1. The eastern and southern frontier of His Highness’s domains, from Wakhan to the Persian border, shall follow the line shown on the map attached to this agreement. 2. The Government of India will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of Afghanistan,

appendices

237

and His Highness the Amir will at no time exercise interference in the territories lying beyond this line on the side of India. 3. The British Government thus agrees to His Highness the Amir retaining Asmar and the valley above it, as far as Chanak. His Highness agrees, on the other hand, that he will at no time exercise interference in Swat, Bajaur, or Chitral, including the Arnawai or Bashgal valley. The British Government also agrees to leave to His Highness the Birmal tract as shown in the detailed map already given to His Highness, who relinquishes his claim to the rest of the Wazir country and Dawar. His Highness also relinquishes his claim to Chageh. 4. The frontier line will hereafter be laid down in detail and demarcated, whenever this may be practicable and desirable, by joint British and Afghan commissioners, whose objet will be to arrive by mutual understanding at a boundary which shall adhere with the greatest possible exactness to the line shown in the map attached to this agreement, having due respect to the existing local rights of villages adjoining the frontier. 5. With reference to the question of Chaman, the Amir withdraws his objection to the new British cantonment and concedes to the British Government the rights purchased by him in the Sirkai Tileraj water. At this part of the frontier the line will be drawn as follows: From the crest of the Khwaja Amran range near the Psha Kotal, which remains in British territory, the line will run in such a direction as to leave Murgha Chaman and the Sharobo spring to Afghanistan, and to pass half-way between the New Chaman Fort and the Afghan outpost known locally as Lashkar Dand. The line will then pass halfway between the railway station and the hill known as the Mian Baldak, and, turning southwards, will rejoin the Khawja Amran range, leaving the Gwasha Post in British territory and the road to Shorawak to the west and south of Gwasha in Afghanistan. The British Government will not exercise any interference within half a mile of the road.

6. The above articles of agreement are regarded by the Government of India and His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan as a full and satisfactory settlement of all the principal diﬀerences of opinion which have arisen between them in regard to the frontier; and both the Government of India and His Highness the Amir undertake that any diﬀerence of detail, such as those which will have to be considered hereafter by the oﬃcers appointed to demarcate the boundary line, shall be settled in a friendly spirit, so as to remove for the

appendices

238

future as far as possible all causes of doubt and misunderstanding between the two Governments. 7. Being fully satisﬁed of His Highness’s goodwill to the British Government, and wishing to see Afghanistan strong, the Government of India will raise no objection to the purchase and import by His Highness of munitions of war, and they will themselves grant him some help in this respect. Further, in order to mark their sense of the friendly spirit in which His Highness the Amir has entered into these negotiations, the government of India undertake to increase by the sum of six lakhs of rupees a year the subsidy of twelve lakhs now granted to His Highness. Kabul, November 12, 1893

E. The Covenants of Unanimity, 1896 Following is an English translation only of the covenant, which the Mohammadzay sardars gave to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan after Kaﬁristan was conquered in 1896. All other groups of the people throughout Afghanistan followed their example—the Hindus, artisans, businessmen, nomads, soldiers, and civil and military oﬃcials. Some of these covenants were identical with the one that the Mohammadzay sardars gave. Others were slightly diﬀerent, but all were signed by the mullas, tribal elders, countersigned and oﬃcially sealed by the muftis and qazis. All stated that the covenants were issued with the “free” consent of the people. On 26 Asad 1275 H.Sh. (7 Rabi' al-Awwal 1314 H.Q., 17 August, 1896) a grand total of 194 covenants were presented to the amir, who named that day Jashn-e-Mutaﬁqqiya (The Festival of Unanimity). In the covenants the people undertook in strong words to confer the title of Zia alMillat-e-wa al-Din (The Light of the Nation and Religion) on the amir. They also pledged themselves to defend the boundaries of Afghanistan, now ﬁxed for the ﬁrst time. They likewise undertook to obey and observe the religious and secular arrangements that the amir had made, to remain faithful to him and his descendants, and to accept the hasht nafari (one out of eight) system of conscription.

appendices

239

The Covenant “The purpose of this covenant is this. Since the Almighty God, out of extreme graciousness, has chosen a leader of the religion and the state of Afghanistan from among the Mohammadzay tribe, and made us and the other tribes of Afghanistan subjects of this august existence, and since by following is meant obedience, and obedience makes incumbent upon the followers to follow the sovereign, and since we, the above-mentioned tribe, because of close relationship, are the ﬁrst in obedience and following, so obedience in the sense of following became our right. The other tribes of Afghanistan should follow our lead.” “Therefore, we state that, since the title of imam is obligatory on behalf of the Almighty God and, since our King who, out of religiosity expelled from the country the tribes opposing the religion, has certainly and evidently not failed to fulﬁl the ﬁve religiously and worldly commandments, their safeguarding became our right.” “And again, since he has improved the disorganized state of the land, its consolidation has become obligatory on us.” “Again, since he deﬁned the boundaries with our close neighbors and with those far away, their safeguarding became our duty.” “Again, since he reconstructed the fallen and ruined mosques and pulpits, and fulﬁlled religious commandments by appointing the president, the muhtasibs and prayer leaders, their preservation became our duty.” “Again, since he manifested honesty in state aﬀairs we are duty bound not to commit treachery to its integrity. Now that our sovereign has fully fulﬁlled his responsibility, it is incumbent upon us followers to act accordingly so that it should not happen that while our imam has fully fulﬁlled his duties, we stand shameful when we present ourselves before the real King, in accordance with the real promise of the day, when all the people go forward with their imam as has been mentioned in the Quran.” “Therefore we, the Mohammadzay tribe who, in line with the general principle, considered ourselves the number one followers, observed and understood and held God as guarantor and His Prophet, (may peace be upon him), as witness, swore on the Quran, which has been sent by God, not to give away his acquired land to anyone so long as we have the power and the strength.”

240

appendices

“Secondly, not to disrupt the arrangements he has made.” “Thirdly, to safeguard the boundaries, which are the frontline so long as we have the soul and life in our body.” “Fourthly, not to dispute the right of the religion and to strengthen our religious arrangements of God and the Prophet.” “Fifthly, to recognize his sons as the inheritors to his crown and kingdom, not to deviate from his will, to keep on obeying whether he is alive or dead, be on guards to dangers all the time, not to be ignorant of our responsibilities to our selves, to our religion and honor and of the other Muslims, and it is for his sons, neither for us nor for our descendants to choose the inheritors, so that we may have acted in accord with the heavenly dispensation and are not shamed in this world and the next.” “And also whoever puts forward claims for amirate, during the lifetime or after the death of our king, is either the untrue son of his father, or is not from our religion, or has intended a new destruction. And also since we would like to see his name remembered forever in Islam we add the title of Zia al-Millat wa al-Din after his blessed name. 1313.” Signed and sealed by the descendants of the Amir-e-Kabir, Sardar Amir Mohammad Khan and Wazir Fatih Khan

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

For a detailed evaluation of the unpublished and published documents and important secondary sources see Kakar, Government and Society in Afghanistan, 243–254. Manuscripts Isfahani, A. M., Aman al-Tawarikh [The Histories of Aman [Allah]], Vol. 5. The original of this volume as well as of the six other volumes in the series are in the private collection of Mr. and Mrs., Iionnidis in Cambridge, Massachusetts, U.S.A. A copy of volume 5 can be found in The National Archive in Kabul. Tarzi, Mahmud, Reminiscences, A Short History of an Era, 1869–1881. Translated from the original Persian and edited into English by Wahid Tarzi. A copy of this is available with this author. Unpublished Documents Unpublished records of the government of Afghanistan Files relating to the reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. Afghan Archival Records have not yet been made public, but I was given access to them. What I actually found was so little, whereas the records pertaining his reign were very much. Unpublished records of the British government of India a) In London in India Oﬃce Library and Records (now in the British Library) Political and secret letters and enclosures received from India from volume 25 to 141 covering the period from 1878 to 1902. b) In New Delhi in the National Archives of India. Foreign and Political Department. The above two entries are the most comprehensive archival sources there are in any language on nineteenth century Afghanistan. Published records and oﬃcial publications Publications of the government of Afghanistan Kalimat-e-Amir al-Bilad fee Targhib illal Jihad [The Words of the Amir of the Land for the Encouragement of Jihad], Kabul, 1304/1886. Sarrishta-e-Islamiyya-e-Rum [The Islamic Management of Turkey], Kabul, 1311/1894. Izah al-Bayan fee Nasihat al-Afghan [A Word of Advice for the Beneﬁts of Afghans], 1897, PSLI, 96, No. 1043, No. 376, India Oﬃce Library, London. Nasayih Namcha (A Book of Advice), Kabul, 1886. Sawal wa Jawab-e-Dawlati [The Amir’s Interview with the Viceroy], Kabul, H.O. 1302/1885.

242

select bibliography

Publications of the government of India and Britain Papers relating to Afghanistan, Narrative of Events in Afghanistan, 1878–1880. Biographical Accounts of Chiefs, Sardars and others of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1888. Dispatches from the government of India containing a Statement of the Cases Tried before the Military Commission, London, 1880. Military Report on Afghanistan, New Delhi, 1925. Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Kabul pt. 4, Calcutta, 1910. Gazetteer of Afghanistan, Kabul pt. 4, Calcutta, 1895. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, North West Frontier Province, Calcutta, 1896. Warner, L., Kaﬁristan, Calcutta, 1896. Wheeler, J. T. Memorandum on Afghan Turkistan, Calcutta, 1896. Memoranda-Parliamentary Questions, Chitral, Kaﬁristan, etc., London, 1896. Books Adamec, L., Afghanistan, 1900–1923, A Diplomatic History, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Alder, G. J. British India’s Northern Frontier, A Study in Imperial Policy, 1895–95. London, 1963. Allworth, E., Central Asia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967. Arrian, The Campaigns of Alexander, Transl. by Aubrey de Selincourt, Penguin Books, 1971. Audrey, C., Long Years of Exile, Central Asian Refugees in Afghanistan and Pakistan, University Press of America, Lanham, New York, 1994. Baburnama, The Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor, Translated, edited and annotated by Thackston, Wheeler M., The Modern Library, New York, 2002. Balfour, B., The History of Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration, 1876–1880, London, 1899. Bamyani, B., Nigah-e-ba Tarikh wa Kultur-e-Bashindagan-e-Bamyan (Persian), [A Glance at the History and Culture of the Inhabitants of Bamyan], Privately published, Peshawar, 2001. Barﬁeld, J. T., The Central Asian Arabs of Afghanistan, University of Texas Press at Austin, 1981. Bellew, W. H., The Races of Afghanistan, London, 1880. ——, From the Indus to the Tigris, London, 1874. ——, Journal of a Political Mission to Afghanistan in 1857, London, 1857. Burnes, A., Cabool, First published in 1842, Reprint, 1973, Graz, Austria. Canﬁeld, R., Faction and Conversion in a Plural Society, Religious Alignments in the Hindu Kush, Ann Arbor, 1973. Chomsky, N., The Problem of Knowledge and Freedom, Vintage Books, 1971. Curzon, Lord, Tales of Travels, London, 1923. Davies, C. C., The Problem of the North West Frontier, Cambridge, 1932. Debets, G. F., Physical Anthropology of Afghanistan, Transl. by Proston, E., ed. Field, H., Russian Translation Series of the Peabody Museum of Archeology and Ethnology, Harvard University Press, vol. v, No. 1. Downes, E., Kaﬁristan, London, 1873. Duﬀ, M. G., The Afghan Policy of the Beaconsﬁeld Administration, London, 1880. Durranay, Sultan M., Tarikh-e-Sultani, (Persian) [The History of Sultani] Bombay, 1298 H.Q. Edwards, D., Heroes of the Age, California University Press, Berkeley, London, 1996. Eﬀendi, Sirdar M. A. K., Royals and Royal Mendicant, A Tragedy of the Afghan History, 1791–1947, Lion Press, Lahore, [1948?].

select bibliography

243

Elphinstone, M., An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul and Its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India, Comprising a View of the Afghan Nation and a History of the Dooraunee Monarchy, 2 vols., London, 1939. Fayz Mohammad, Siraj al-Tawarikh [The Lamp of Histories], vol. 3, Kabul, 1915. ——, Siraj al-Tawarikh, vols. I and 2 in one cover, Kabul, 1331. H.Q. Forbes, A., The Afghan Wars, London, 1892. Frank, H., The Thundering Zeus, The Making of Hellenistic Bactria, University of California Press, Berkeley, London, 1999. Fraser-Tytler, W. K., Afghanistan, A Study in Political Developments in Central and Southern Asia, Oxford University Press, 1967. Ghobar, Mir G. M., Afghanistan Dar Masir-e-Tarikh (Persian) [Afghanistan along the Highway of History], Kabul, 1967. ——, Goghraﬁyya-e-Tarikhi-e-Afghanistan [The Geographical History of Afghanistan], (Persian), Reprint, Maiwand Publication Center, Peshawar, 1999. Green, P., Alexander of Macedon, 356–323 B.C., A Political Biography, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992. Gregorian, V., The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1968. Gulzad, Z. A., External Inﬂuences and the Development of the Afghan State in the Nineteenth Century, Peter Lang, New York, San Francisco, 1994. Habberton, W., Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1833–1907, Illinois Studies in Social Sciences, vol. XXI, 1933. Hamilton, Lady, A Vizier’s Daughter, A Tale of the Hazara War, London, 1900. Hamilton, A., Afghanistan, London, 1906. Hanna, H. B., The Second Afghan War, 1878–1879, 3 volumes, London, 1899–1910. Harlan, J., Central Asia, Personal Narrative of General Josaiah Harlan, 1823–1841, edited by Ross, F. E. London, 1939. Hensman, H., The Afghan War of 1879–80, London, 1881. Herodotus, The History, transl. by Grene, D., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London, 1987. Hopkirk, P., The Great Game, The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia, Kandansha International, New York, London, 1992. Hotak, A., De Khpilwakee Lmar Srak, De Hotako de Afghani Dawlat 'Urooj aw Nizool, [The Beacon of Independence, The Rise and Decline of the Hotak Afghan State], Daunish Book Store, Peshawar, 1989. Jalalabadi, S. A., Fathnama-e-Kaﬁristan [The Ballad of the Conquest of Kaﬁristan], The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1996 Jenkyns, W., A Report on the District of Jalalabad, Chieﬂy in regard to Revenue, Calcutta, 1879. Jettmar, K., ed. Cultures of the Hindu Kush, Wisebaden, 1974. Jones, S., Men of Inﬂuence in Nuristan, Seminar Press, 1974. Kakar, M. H., Afghan, Afghanistan and Afghans and Organization of the State in India, Persia and Afghanistan, Kabul University Press, Kabul, 1979. (Persian) Reprint, Writers’ Union of Free Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1988. ——, Afghanistan, A Study in Internal Political Developments, 1880–1896, Punjab Educational Press, Lahore, 1971. ——, Jang-e-Dowom-e-Afghan-Englis (Persian), [The Second Anglo-Afghan War], The National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, Peshawar, 1989. ——, Government and Society in Afghanistan, The Reign of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 1880, 1901, Texas University Press at Austin, 1979. ——, Afghanistan, The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979 –82, California University Press, Berkeley, 1995. ——, ed., Light and Defense or Essays on the Population, History and Current Aﬀairs of Afghanistan, (Pashto) Sapay Center for Pashto Research and Development, Peshawar, 1999.

244

select bibliography

Kaye, J. W., History of the Afghan War, London, Vol. 1, 1851. Keddie, N., Sayyid Jamal ad-Din “al-Afghani”, A Political Biography, University of California Press, Berkeley, London, 1972. Khan, Azmat H., The Durand Line, Its Geo-strategic Importance, University of Peshawar, Peshawar, 2000. Khaﬁ, M. Y., Shahan-e-Muta"khir-e-Afghanistan (Persian) [The Recent Kings of Afghanistan, 2 vols., Kabul, 1336/1957. Reprint of both volumes in one cover by Maiwand Publication Center, Peshawar, 1998. Khanov, T., The National History of the Hazaras, The Isma'iliyan Press Institute, Iran, 1993. Khattak, A., Tarikh-e-Morassa' (Pashto), [A General History of the Pashtuns], ed. Mohmand, Dost D. M., University Book Agency, Peshawar, year of print unknown. Kohzad, A. A., Afghanistan Dar Shahnama (Persian), [Afghanistan in the Shahnama], Baihaqi Publication, Kabul, 1355/1976. ——, Gharghasht ya Gharshasib (Persian), [Gharghast or Gharshasib], First published in 1976, Reprint by Daunish, Peshawar, 1999. Krausse, A., Russian in Asia, London, 1899. Kushkaki, B., Rahnomay-e Qataghan wa Badakhshan (Persian), [A Guide to Qataghan and Badakhshan], Kabul, 1302/1924. McChesney, R. D., Waqf in Central Asia, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991. MacGregor, C. M., Central Asia, Pt. II, A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnology, Resources and History of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1871. ——, War in Afghanistan, 1879–80, The Personal Diary of Major General sir Charles Metcalf MacGregor with an Introduction by Trousdale, W., Wayne State University Press, Detroit, 1985. Mahomed, S., The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan, 2 vols., John Murray, London, 1900. Masson, C., Narrative of Various Journeys in Balochistan, Afghanistan, and the Panjab; including A Residence in Those Countries From 1826–1838, 3 vols., First Published in 1842, Reprint, Oxford University Press, 1974. Marwat, F. R., ed. Afghanistan and the Frontier, Peshawar, 1993. Merk, W. R. H., The Mohmands, First published in 1898, Reprint by Vanguard Books Ltd., Lahore, 1984. Mottahedeh, R., The Mantle of the Prophet, Religion and Politics in Iran, Pantheon books, New York, 1985. Nicolos, ed. Force and Freedom, A Signet Book, 1964. Neamet Ullah, History of the Afghans, trans., Bernard Dorn, Reprint, Vanguard Books, Lahore, 1999. Noelle, C., State and Tribe in Nineteenth Century Afghanistan. The Reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan, 1826–1863, Curzon, Press, 1997. Norris, J. A., The First Afghan War, 1839–1842, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967. Nuri, Mawlawi N. A., Gulshan-e-Amarat [ The Garden of the Amirate], Kabul, 1336/1957. Plato, The Trial of Socrates, transl. by Grube, C. M. A. Haket Publishing Co., Indianopolis, Cambridge, 1975. Rahim, M., Sifat Nama-e-Darwesh Mohammad Khan Ghazi (Persian), [In Praise of Darwesh Mohammad Khan Ghazi], 1288 H.Q., Introduction and Annotation by Scarcia, G., Rome, 1965. Rand, A., The Virtue of Selﬁshness, Signet Book, 1964. Rastogi, R. S., Indo-Afghan Relations, 1880–1900, Lucknow, 1965. Rawlinson, Sir H., England and Russia in the East, London, 1874. Rishtia, Sayyed Q., Afghanistan Dar Qarn-e-Nuzdah (Persian), [Afghanistan during the Nineteenth Century], Kabul, 1336/1957.

select bibliography

245

Riyazi, M. Y., Zia al-Mu'arafa (The Light of Knowledge), in Kulliyat-e-Riyazi (Persian), [The Collected Works of Riyazi], Mashhad, 1904. ——, 'Ayn al-Waqayi' (Persian), [Events Observed], in Kulliyat-e-Riyazi [the Collected Works of Riyazi], Mashhad, Iran, 1904. Roberts, A., Salisbury, Victorian Titan, Phoenix Paperback, London, 2002. Robertson, G., The Kaﬁrs of the Hindu Kush, London, 1895 ——, Kaﬁristan and Its People, London, 1895. Robson, The Road to Kabul, The Second Afghan War, Arms and Armor Press, London, 1986. Schurmann, G., The Mongols of Afghanistan, S-Gravenhage, 1962. Shahrani, M. N. The Kirghiz and Wakhis of Afghanistan: Adaptation to Closed Frontiers, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1979. Singhal, D. D., India and Afghanistan, University of Australia Press, Australia, 1971. Siyal, M. J., De Zeeno Pashtano Qaba"ilo Shajaray aw de Hugho Mainay aw Lund Tarikh (Pashto), [The Genealogy of Some Pashtun Tribes, and Their Lands and Short History], University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1986. ——, Mohmand Baba (Pashto), University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1950. ——, De Mohmando Ghazaganay (Pashto) [The Raids of the Mohmands], University Book Agency, Peshawar, 1975. Spuler, B., The Mongols in History, Praeger Publishers, 1971. Sumner, B. H., Tsardom and Imperialism in the Far East and Middle East, 1880–1914, Archon Books, 1986. Sykes, Sir P. A History of Afghanistan, London, vol. 2, London, 1940. ——, Sir Mortimer Durand, A Biography, Cassell and Co. Ltd., London, 1926. Tapper Nancy, Bartered Brides, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. Tate, R., The Afghan Kingdom, Originally published in 1911, Reprint, Indus Publications, Karachi, 1973. Tauza, S., The Historical and Cultural Roots of Nuristan (Persian) Ministry of Information and Culture, Kabul, 1988. Wak Foundation of Afghanistan, De Afghanistan Qoami Jorisht (Pashto), [The Ethnic Composition of Afghanistan], Sapay Center for Pashto Research and Development, Peshawar, 1998. Waller, Hohn H., Beyond the Khyber Pass. The Road to British Disaster in the First Afghan War, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1993. Wheeler, S., The Ameer Abdur Rahman, New York, 1895. Wood, J., A Journey to the Sources of the River Oxus, London, 1872. Yapp, M. E., Strategies of British India. Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798–1850, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980. Yate, C. E., North Afghanistan, London, 1888. Zoroaster, Selections from the Zend-Avesta, Translated with an Introduction by Darmestetter, James in Sacred Books of the East, revised edition, New York, MDCCCXCIX. Theses and Articles Ahmad, A. S., Pakhtun Tribes in the Great Game, Waziristan Case, in Afghanistan and the Frontier (eds.), Marwat, F. R. and Kakakhel, Sayed W. A., Sh. Peshawar, [1993?]. A Missionary, The Amir’s Paean, the Mittai Valley and the Kaﬁrs, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 2, 1896. Bacon, E., An Enquiry into the History of the Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, South Western Journal of Anthropology, University of Mexico, Vol. 7, 1951. ——, The Hazara Mongols of Afghanistan, A Study in Social Organization, Ph.D., thesis, Berkeley, 1951.

246

select bibliography

Chamberlain, N., Russia’s Countermeasures to the Kaﬁr Encroachment, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, 1896. Elliot, Sir H. M., Notes on the Hindu Kings of Kabul, Appendix B, GAK, 1895, cxxxiii. Griﬃn, L., The Late Amir and His Successor, Fortnightly Review, 1901. Hamid ud-Din, Dost Mohammad and the Second Sikh War, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, Vol. 11, pt. IV, October 1954. Harris, L., British Policy on the North-West Frontier of India, 1889–1901, Ph.D., Thesis, London University, 1960. Leitner, G. W., Kaﬁristan and the Khalifa Question, The Asiatic Quarterly Review, Series 3, vol. 4. ——, Dardistan, Woking, 1895. Morgenstierne, G., Afghanistan, The People; The Pashto Language; Pashto Literature, The Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 1, 1960. Rawlinson, H., Report on the Dorranee Tribes dated 19th April 1841, in MacGregor, C. M., Central Asia, Part 11, A Contribution towards the Better Knowledge of the Topography, Ethnology, Resources and History of Afghanistan, Calcutta, 1871. Singhal, D. P., Russian Correspondence with Kabul, 1870–1879, The Journal of Indian History, April 1963, No. 121, vol. XLI. Shah, W. A., Invasions Preceding the Conquest of Nuristan, in Cultures of the Hindu Kush, ed., Jettmar, K., Wisebaden, 1974. Yapp, M. E., Disturbances in Eastern Afghanistan, 1839–42, BSOAS, XX pt. 3, 1962. Yule, Col. H., An Essay on the Geography and History of the Regions of the Upper Waters of the Oxus, LXXIX, in Wood, J. A., Journey to the Sources of the Oxus River, London, 1872.

GLOSSARY amir

Ruler; king; chief military commander of a province in medieval India; title of rulers of the Mohammadzay dynasty. The dynasty’s founder, Amir Dost Mohammad Khan adopted the title for the ﬁrst time in modern Afghanistan; he was known as Amir alMu"minin as well as amir-e-kabir (‘the great amir’). amir al-Mu"minin Commander of the faithful. amirate Reign or domain of an amir. 'awam Commoners as distinct from the khawass (elite). badal Revenge; retaliation. badshah King; ruler; chief. Badshah Khel ruling clan of a tribe such as the Hotakay, Sadozay and Mohammadzay. Bar Durranay (s) Literary Durranays of the highland; name given by Ahmad Shah Durranay to the Pashtuns living in the region between Kabul and the Indus. borjan Kaﬁr term for ‘slaves’. chakari Herb boiled for consumption in Badakhshan. daha Decade; Persian term for the Mongol military formation of ten soldiers. dai Probably a corruption of daha. Originally a Mongol military formation of ten soldiers; now a preﬁx of territorial as well as tribal designation among the Hazaras such as Dai Zangi, Dai Kundi and Dai Mirdad. darbar Court of rulers; princes and governors. darwesh Member of a religious order; a pious person indiﬀerent to materialism. dawlat State; wealth. Dogan Kaﬁr term for ‘spirits’. eljari (s) Tribal levies; all kinds of irregular recruits assisting the government in suppressing a rebellion in conjunction with the regular army. fatwa Expression of opinions of the 'ulama on legal matters; legal ruling. ﬁrman Royal or oﬃcial edict. ghazi Fighter against inﬁdels in the cause of Islam. ghamza Opium-potion used mainly in Badakhshan and Seistan. ghulam bacha Page-boy gund Traditional political faction or block among Pashtuns, especially the Bar Durranays. Among the latter some communities are divided into speen gund (‘white faction’) and tore gund (‘black faction’); others into samil and ghar. In modern times gund indicates a political party. hakim Subgovernor. hamsaya Client; a person or a group of people living with others in a subordinate position; neighbor. hazara Mongol military formation of one thousand soldiers. hazaragi The form of Persian spoken among the Hazaras.

248 ilkhan imam

glossary

Head of a tribe. Leader of prayer; chief of the Muslim community. Originally, the imam was the Prophet, Muhammad, himself; subsequently, his successors (khalifas or caliphs) held the oﬃce. To the Shi'as, imams are those who belong to the family of the Prophet. The title is hereditary in the line of 'Ali through his wife Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. However, the Sunni concept of the imam requires that he be chosen by consensus. Isma'ili(s) Followers of Imam Isma'il, the controversial seventh imam; the “seveners” as distinct from the “twelvers” or imami Shi'as. jam"bast Assessment of land revenue on a tribal community as a whole in 1896. Jashn-e-mutaﬁqqiya Festival of unanimity established throughout Afghanistan by Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan. jazya Poll tax paid by non-Muslims to Muslim rulers in return for protection. jirga Council of elders; deputation of elders. In some Pashtun communities every male adult is required to attend the jirga. However, members of the client groups (hamsayas) are excluded from attending it, unless they are a party in the dispute under consideration. kaﬁr Inﬁdel, non-Muslim, especially the European aggressor; utterly cruel. karez Subterranean canal for irrigation. khalifa Caliph; successor to the Prophet; head of a guild and occupational profession; master. khalisa State land. khassadar Militia. khan Big landlord; one who had under him many maliks (village headmen) and provided levies and military service to the government in return for allowances or a grant of land or both; now a complimentary title. khan-e-mulla Chief judge; khan-e-'ulum. khawass Elite; privileged persons. khirqa The reputed robe of the Prophet; also its location. khutba Friday sermon in which the name of the Muslim ruler is mentioned; no mention of the ruler is tantamount to rebellion. khums one-ﬁfth; share of the state in booty. kotwal head of the department which dealt with security aﬀairs; roughly the minister of the interior. lala Tutor mir Probably a corruption of the term amir; head of kinship groups among the Hazaras, Tajiks of Badakhshan and the Hotak Pashtuns. mufti Adviser to the court or qazi in legal aﬀairs. mujtahid Someone especially among the Shi'as who has attained such preeminence in religious scholarship which permits him to issue opinions on matters of faith. mustauﬁ head of the central diwan or ﬁnancial oﬃce. ‘Kaﬁr’ term for the uttering of invocations. namcha kunda Naqshbandiyya A Suﬁ tariqa (mystic order) ascribed to Baha al-Din Naqshband (1318–1389) based in a village near Bukhara in Central Asia. Unlike the majority of other tariqas that trace their descent through 'Ali, the Naqshbandiyya traces its descent through Abu Bakr. Also, unlike other tariqas, the Naqshbandiyya has “insisted on political activity for the sake of Muslim welfare and the service

glossary

249

of God” and has recently devoted itself “to the cause of supremacy of the Shari'a and the ascendancy of the Islamic ideal in Muslim society”. nawa Valley; community. neemcha A ‘kaﬁr’ of former Kaﬁristan converted to Islam. nizam al-dawla Order of the state; title granted to elders of some tribes. olga Region, district; fatherland; a term used only in the Hazarajat. pacha Pashto term for badshah; king; title of the sayyeds of Konarr. pir Head of a suﬁ tariqa (mystic order); a religious person with profound inﬂuence over his disciples. qazi Judge. ra'iyyat (ra"iyya) Subjects of a ruler. sada Mongol military formation of one hundred soldiers; century. sada-e-qabr Hazara medieval tribal term. sada-e-sueka Hazara medieval tribal term. safed-posh ‘White-robed’ tribal ‘kaﬁr’. sardar Originally a military general; title granted by a king to an elder, especially the head of a tribe or a section of it. se-kot Three portions, the system of taxation according to which the state exacted one-third of the land production as revenue. sayyed Actual or claimed descendant of the Prophet through his daughter, Fatima. shah King; title of Sadozay rulers and also of rulers of certain local communities in Badakhshan; derived from the Avestan word, khshatra. Sharik-e-dawlat Partner of the state. shaykh Title of religious persons, especially of the disciples of a pir; ‘Kaﬁrs’ of Kaﬁristan converted to Islam before 1896. sigha (or seegha) Temporary marriage sanctioned by the Shi'i sect and practiced among the Hazaras of Afghanistan. ta"ifa Section of a tribe. talib Student of Islamic studies. tanga Coin with a value of one-third of a rupee. tariqa An Islamic mystic order. tuman Mongol military division of 10,000. wali Governor of a province. 'ulama Sunni religious scholars, plural of 'alim, a learned man. urey Common council in former Kaﬁristan. 'ushr Tithe; Islamic tax. wali 'ahd Heir apparent. Wakil British Muslim diplomatic agent in the court of Kabul. yaghistan Autonomous principalities or khanates; the land of rebels. zimmi ‘Protected’; non-Muslim subjects of a Muslim ruler.

INDEX

'Abd al-Rahman Khan, Sardar, as a refugee in Samarqand in 1865, 4, again in 1868, 11–12; internal and external problems of the amir, 5; administrative system of, 5; as amir of “Northern Afghanistan”, 5; arrival of, in Badakhshan, 38–39; claim for an undivided Afghanistan, 41; communication of, with all Afghan sides, 41; British negotiations with, 41–42; declaration as amir of, in Charikar, 42; reasons for, to become amir, 43–44; generous on the way to Kandahar in 1881, 58, 85–86; strained relations of, with Russia, 105, 117, 150, 208, 216; religious policy of, 137, 167; aversion of, to British meddling in internal aﬀairs, 171–172; improvements in relationship of, with India, 172–173; strained relations of, with India, 173–174; suspicion of, of Russia and Britain, 176–177, eﬀorts of, toward independence, 176–177, 188, 190–191, 197–198, 203–204; view of, on defense of Afghanistan, 206, 206n; visit to India of, 206; policy of balance of power, 209–210; respectful to sultan of Turkey, 214–218, 220–221, 223–224; novel and traditional administrative measures of, 226; consequences of measures adopted by, 226; treatment of ethnic groups by, 228; eﬀorts by, to save society at the expense of individuals, 229–230 'Abd al-Rahim, Mawlawi, killing of, by the amir, 61 'Abd al-Karim, Mulla, 91–93 'Abd Allah Jan, Crown prince, 17 'Abd Allah Khan Tokhay, Sardar, governor of Badakhshan, 102, 113 'Abd Allah Nasir, Sardar, 60 'Abd al-Qadir, Qazi, as adviser to Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, 18; as British correspondent in Kabul, 170, 199

'Abd al-Quddus Khan, Sardar, occupation of Herat by, 61, 130, 132 'Abd al-Rahman Barakzay, Khan-e-mulla, 42 'Ajab Khan Afriday, 191 'Asmat Allah Jabar Khel, 89 'Abd al-Hamid, Caliph Sultan of Ottoman Turkey, 214 Abgan, 76 Aboot, James, 193 Abu Rihan al-Beruni, 139n Achaemenian Persia, 98 Achakzays, 187 Acvaka, 76, 85 Adamec, Ludwig, author, 216 Afghan army, strength of, during the reign of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, 17 Afghan, 2n, 76 Afghanistan, a buﬀer state, 5, 118–119, 222, 224; British invasion of, in 1878, 27; reuniﬁcation of, 4; Lytton’s scheme of fragmentation of, 38; fragmentation of, after the fall of Sadozays, 160; relations of, with Russia, 193; with Ottoman Turkey, 214–215; with Persia, 210–214; claim of, to the Turkman land, 203 Afridays (Apridays), divisions of, 80; agreement of, with the British, 81; relations of, with Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan, 81 Afzal al-Mulk of Chitral, 111 Afzal Hotak, Mir, 89 Agha Khan of Bombay, 112 Agreement of 1873, 115n, 195 Ahmad Shah Durranay, 83–84, 106, 129, 163, 216, 229 Ahmed Khel, Battle of, 128 Ahriman, 96 Ahura Mazda, 96, 98n Aimal Khan Mohmand, anti-Mughal struggles of, 80 Airyana Vaejo, 98n Akbar Ahmad, anthropologist, 188

252

index

Akhund Baba (Mulla Ilyas), 77 Alaman, raids committed by Uzbeks against Tajiks, 110 Alder, G. J., author, 119 Alexander II, Russia’s emperor, 164, 202 Alexander the Great, 45, 76, 98, 157 Aman Allah Khan, King, 7 Ambia Khan, Sardar, elder of Taimani tribe, 57 Andkhoy, 102, 108 Anglo-Afghan Wars, First, 1838–1841, 2, 164; consequences of, First, 160–161; Second, 4, 26–27, 166 Aparytae, see Afriday Apriday or Afriday, 2n Arsari, Turkmen tribe, 203 Asmar, 75–76, 86 Aspasians, 76, 85 Asva-ghana, 76, see also Pashtun Auckland, Lord, viceroy of India, 160 Azmat Hayat Khan, 183 Babuqara, 77 Babur, Mohammad Zahir al-Din, Founder of Mughal dynasty, 69, 128, 149 Bactra, see Balkh Bactria, see Balkh Bactriana, see Balkh Bactrians, 1n, 85 Badakhshan, 109–110; slavery in, 113, 115 Badal (revenge), 68 Baha al-Din, Khwaja, founder of the Naqshbandiyya order, 101 Baha al-Din, Sayyid, of Konarr, 69–70 Bahadur Khan Kabuli, 23 Bajaur, 75–76, 78, 180, 185–186 Bajgah, Battle in 1864 of, 11 Bakhdi, see Balkh Bakhtar, 96, 149 Balkh, 96, 98–99 Baluches, 187 Baluchistan, 19, 58; India’s treaty with, in 1876, a feudatory of Afghanistan, 26 Bamiyan, 128 Bar Durranays and Afghanistan, 8, 83 Bar Panja, 112 Barakzays, 1, 106 Bareches, 187

Barikot, 152 Bashgal valley, 180, 183 Beaconsﬁeld, see Disraeli Beett, see Pashtun, 2n Bellew, Henry W., 217 Besus, ruler of ancient Balkh, 98 Bibi Hawa, widow of Sardar Rahimdil, 52 Bonair, 69 British embassy in Kabul, destruction of, 29, 167 Buﬀer zone, emergence of, as a concept, 222, see also Afghanistan Bukhara, 111, 113, 194 Burnes, Alexander, 160, 193 Burrows, Major General G.R.S. takes position in Maiwand, 47 Buryat, 123 Caro, Sir Olaf, author, 179 Cavagnari, Major Piere Louis, 28, 33; death of, 29, 166–167 Cavagnarizays (pro-Cavagnari or pro-English party), 37 Chaghatay, 123 Chagheh, 180 Chamberlain, Neville, mission of, 26, 166 Char Aimaq of Herat, 57, 208 Char Asia, Battle of, 30 Charmang, 77 Chinggis Khan, 122 Chitral, 29, 118, 139, 150; mehter of, 77, 79, 151–152, 180, 185 Churchill, Winston, Sir, 189 Civil war of the 1860s, 4, 10; causes of, 12–15 Conolly, Captain Arthur, 194 Crimean war (1854–56), 194, 223 Curzon, Lord, Viceroy of India, 175 Darab Shah, 114 Darius, emperor, of Achamaenid Persia, 98, 157 Darwaz, district of, 109 Darwesh 'Ali Hazara, 129 Darya Khan Apriday, 80 Dawars, 81 Dawlatabad, 102 Delawar Khan, wali of Maymana, 107; attempts of, to become a Russian or British protégé, 107–108 Din Mohammad, Mulla, see Mulla Mushk-e-'Alam

index Dir, 75–76 Disraeli, Benjamin, British premier, 38, 165, 220 Dost Mohammad Khan, Amir, founder of Mohammadzay dynasty, 1–3, 7; biography and death of, 9, 11; disunity among sons of, 13; character of, 14, 69–70, 86, 98, 106, 160, 162, 169, 186, 193, 218 Dupree, Louis, author, 186 Durand Agreement, 5, 83, 86; conclusion and purpose of, 177; British pressure for, 178–179; proceedings in Kabul about, 180; fear the cause of the, 181–182; invalidity of, 183; Mohmand and, 184–186 Durand Line, 2n, 183, 186–189, 191; maintaining status quo by, 185–186, 224 Durand, Sir Henry Mortimer, Foreign secretary of India, 83, 116–117; arrival at Kabul of, 178–179, 181–182, 184–185 Durranay Empire, rise and fall of, 9 Durranays, main divisions of, 45–46, 66, 87, 92–93, 95 Eﬀendi, 'Abd al-Qadir, 7 Elgin, Lord, Viceroy of India, 188 Elliot, Sir H. M., 139n Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 159–160 Faqir, Mulla, 189 Fath 'Ali Shah, king of Persia, 160 Fath Allah Khan, elder of Firozkohis, 49, 108 Fatwa, failure of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman to obtain, against the Ghilzays, 94; of Kandahar ulama against the amir, 58–59 Fayz Mohammad, historian, 92 Forward policy of British India toward Afghanistan, 25–26 Frank Holt, 98 Game, The Great, about Central Asian states, 6, 179, 194–195, 209, 223 Gandahara, 2n Gandaharii, 2n Gharj, district, 87 Gharzay, 87 Ghazni Party, or National Party, 36

253

Ghazni, 34 Ghazni, battle of, in 1868, 12 Ghaznigak, battle of, 102, 104 Ghilzays, uprising of, 87; divisions of, 87; reasons for uprising of, 94–95; new taxes on, 90, 92–94 Ghobar, Mir Ghulam Mohammad, historian, 34, 141, 149, 182, 203 Ghor, 2n, 84, 87 Ghorgasht, see Pashtun Ghous al-Din, General, 204 Ghulam Haydar Khan Charkhay, Sipah Salar, 34; as viceroy in eastern province, 73; arrival of, at Asmar, 75–76, 78, 151–152, 189 Ghulam Haydar Khan Orakzay, General, 73, 92, 94, 104 Ghulam Haydar Wardak, General, military commander at Mazar, 39 Gladstone, William, British premier, 220 Gomal, 81 Gorthchakov, Alexandr M. Russia’s foreign minister, 164; deterministic view of, 202; memorandum of, 202–203 Goshta, 66 Green, Peter, historian, 76 Griﬃn, Lepel Sir, British diplomat, 40; oﬃcial recognition of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman 42; letter by, on Anglo-Afghan relations, 168, 170 Gulzad, Zalmay, author, 179 Gushtasp, 96 Habib Allah Khan, Sardar, the amir’s son, 209 Habib Allah Wardak, Mustauﬁ, 21, 33; dispatch of, to Ghazni, 40; deportation of, to India, 42 Haﬁz Allah Ghilzay, Na"ib Sipah Salar, 60 Haji Khan Kakar, 129 Haji Khan Uzbek, 106 Hamsayas, 76 Harrison, Frederick, 32 Hashtadan, occupation of, by Persia, 212; partition of, 212 Hazara war, The, as a sectarian war, 132–133; peace overtures during, 134; intensity of, 138; consequences of, 138 Hazara-British relationship, 128, 133

254

index

Hazarajat (Hazaristan, or Barbaristan), division of, into 15 regions, 120; government inroads in, 126, 129 Hazaras, 93; religion and number of, 122; origin of, 122, 125n, 123; relations of, with neighbors, 125–128; religious groups of, 131; submission by agreement of the, 130; uprising of the, 131; ﬁghting between the, and government forces, 134; submission of the, 135; settlement of the, 135–137; enslavement of the, 136; ﬂight of, to Quetta and Central Asia, 137; pastures of, to nomads, 137; forced conversion of, to Sunnism, 137–138 Hekmat Khan, Wali, 106 Helmand, 85 Herat, 10; fall of, to the amir’s forces in 1881, 61, 90, 203 Herodotus, 1n, 2n, 85 Hill-Jones, Major General, Sir James, governor of Kabul, 30, 36 Hindu Kush, 909 Hindus, looting of the houses of pro-British Hindus, 35 Hopkirk, Peter, 195 Hunza, 18 Hussayn Ali Qizilbash, Sipah Salar, 60 Hussayn Beg, Mir, leader of the Hazara rebellion, 132 Indus River, 85 Ivanoﬀ, M. M., Russian scholar, 115 'Izzat Allah, 193 Jahandadar Shah, mir, of Badakhshan, 39, 111 Jahandar Khan Qibchaq, Qazi, 57 Jahangir, Mughal emperor, 149 Jalal al-Din Akbar, Mughal emperor, 67, 149 Jam" bast, 90 Jamal al-Din Afghani, Sayyed, expulsion of, from Kabul, 15, 16n, 215 Jamshedis, 203; removal of, to interior of Herat Jandol, 77 Jashn-e-mutaﬁqqiya (festival of unanimity), 157, 227 Jirgas (councils), 22

Kabul Convention, see the Durand Agreement Kabul, occupation of, by Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman, et al., 11; Sardar Wali Mohammad as governor of, 37; British occupation of, 29, 46; capital of Afghanistan since 1776, 46 Kaﬁristan, 2n, 8; interpretation and historical development of, 139, 139n; invasion of, 153; renaming of, as Nuristan, 155; construction of roads in, 155; European societies against occupation of, 156; lauding of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman Khan for conquest of, 157 Kaﬁrs, religious beliefs of, 1; pattern of settlement of, 2; tribes and tribal councils of, 143–146; slave population (borjan) of, 143, 145–146; position of women of, 146; marriage and other customs of, 147; relations of, with Muslims, 148; history of, 149–150; negotiations with, 152; conversion of, to Islam, 154 Kahaka (Qahqah), Zoroaster governor of Balkh, 112 Kajbaz, battle in 1865 of, 11 Kakars, 93 Kalat, 87 Kam, ‘Kaﬁr’ tribe, 2n Kandahar, occupation of, by Sardar Mohammad Yaqub Khan, 12; a separate principality, 45; inhabitants of, 45; commercial and strategic signiﬁcance of, 46; Lytton’s view of, 46; declaration of, as an independent principality, 38, 46; handover of, to Amir 'Abd al-Rahman in April 1881, 56; occupation of, by Sardar Mohammad Ayyub, 58; battle of Chilzeena in, 60; plunder of, by the amir’s soldiers, 61; foundation of the city of, by Alexander the Great, by Nadir Shah Afshar, and by Ahmad Shah, 45–46, 90 Karatigin, 112, 114 Kauﬀmann, General Constantine von, Russia’s governor-general in Turkestan, 26, 166, 195–197 Kazaks, 123 Khalil Mohmand, Mulla, 150 Khan Agha, elder of Jamshedi tribe, 57

index Khan, position and signiﬁcance of, among eastern Pashtuns, 77 Khattak, 2n Khiva (Kharazm, Khorezm), 194 Khojak Range, cutting a tunnel through the, 83 Khojeh Saleh, 115, 115n Khoqand, 194–195 Khudayar Khan of Yarkand, 111 Khyber Pass, 4, 80–81; loss of, to Afghanistan, 38, 166 Kipling, Rudyar, 194 Kirghiz, 117, 123 Kisay Ghar, 2n, 84, 87 Kohzad, Ahmad 'Ali, historian, 2n Kokcha River, 115 Konarr (Kunar), 69; strategic signiﬁcance of, 71, 75–76 Krubast, custom of, 124 Kulab, 114 Kurma (Kurram), district of, 4; loss of, to Afghanistan, 38, 79 Ladakh, 118 Lalpura, 66 Lansdowne, Viceroy of India, 119; warning of, about Waziristan, 83; warning of, for the Durand agreement, 178 Lawrence, John, Viceroy of India, 222 Lockhart, Colonel, 150, 158 Logar, 87 Lomakin, Russian General, 201 Lord, Percival, 193 Lumsden, Sir General Peter, 205 Lyall, Alfred, foreign Secretary, visits Kandahar, 55 Lytton, Edward Robert, L. B., viceroy of India, 4, 32; “new order” of, for Afghanistan, 36–38, 165–166, 187; view of, of Afghanistan as a geographical entity, 219; as a nation, 219; proposed partition of Afghanistan, 220, 222; guide lines on Afghanistan to Griﬁn, 40; see also Afghanistan Ma"sum Khan, mission of, in Kabul, 211–212 MacGregor, Major General Sir Charles, M., 8, 30–32, 34, 39 Mahmud Hotak, Shah, 87

255

Mahmud Pacha, Sayyed, submission of, to the British, 70; view of, on Afghanistan, 70; British guarantee to, 70; communication between the British and the Amir on, 71; abandonment of, by the British, 72; ﬂight to India of, 71 Maiwand, battle of, 4; account and casualties of, 50–52; consequences of, 53–55 Makhdum Quli Khan, ruler of Merv, 204 Mamund (Watalai), 77 Manakai, Mulla of, 189 Marquis of Salisbury, 164 Masayzay code, 66 Massion, Charles, 129, 139n Massyd (Massoud), 81–82 Maymana, 8, 62, 90, 100, 102; history of, 106; paciﬁcation of, in 1884, 109; besiegement of, by Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman in 1868, 197 Mayo, Lord, Viceroy of India, 163–164 Mazar-e-Sharif, 90, enlargement of, 98 Mclean, General, 212 Mehdi 'Ali Khan, 193 Merv, occupation of, by Russia, 201 Michni Pass, 4; loss of, to Afghanistan, 38 Mir Baba of Badakhshan, 39 Mir Baba of Kohistan, 34 Mir Wais Hotak, liberator of Kandahar, 45, 87, 89 Mohammad 'Alam Khan, Na"ib, governor of Afghan Turkestan, 98 Mohammad 'Ali Khan, death of Prince, 11 Mohammad 'Azim, Sardar, elder of Se-pai Hazaras, 130 Mohammad 'Omar of Badakhshan, 38 Mohammad A'zam Khan, Amir, rebellion of, in 1864, 10; becomes amir in 1867, 12–13; death of, 12, 101, 107 Mohammad Afzal Khan, Sardar, rebellion of governor, 10–11; becomes amir in 1866, 12; death of, in 1867, 12–13, 70, 98 Mohammad Afzal, Sardar, British agent, 197 Mohammad Afzal, the Amir’s supposed uncle in Samarqand, 209

256

index

Mohammad Akbar Khan, of Lalpura, 66; agreement of, with the British, 68; income of, 68; submission of, to Kabul, 69 Mohammad Akbar Khan, Sardar, 10, 14, 35, 70, 98 Mohammad Amin Khan, Sardar, rebellion of, 11 Mohammad Aslam Khan, Sardar, 10 Mohammad Aslam, Kabul Kotwal, 32 Mohammad Ayyub Khan, Sardar, victor of Maiwand, 4, 7; ﬂight to Mashhad of, 24, 42; in possession of Herat, 48, 56; occupation of Kandahar by, 47–48; biography of, 48; inﬂuence of clergy on, 48; instigation of army by, 49; failed negotiations of, with the British, 53; proposal of, for a federal system, 59; failed uprising of the Heratis against, 56–57; occupation of Kandahar by, 57; as a refugee in India and death of, 62, 82, 86, 89–91, 93–94, 107–108, 130, 169–170, 175, 210–211; arrival of, in Lahore, 212, 221, 225, 228 Mohammad Gul Mohmand, 105 Mohammad Hasan, Shahzada, opposition of, to Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman in 1880, 38 Mohammad Hashim, Sayyed, of Konarr, 70 Mohammad Hashim Khan, Sardar, claimant to kingdom, 40, 211 Mohammad Hassan Khan, Sardar, senior oﬃcial, 30, 195 Mohammad Hussayn Khan, Mir, 106, 108–109 Mohammad Ilkhan, Mir, 130 Mohammad Ishaq Khan, becomes governor of Mazar in 1880, 39, 90, 100; rebellion of, 101; sudden ﬂight of, 104; reasons for revolt of, 104–105; consequences of the revolt, 105, 108, 208, 212, 225 Mohammad Isma'il Khan, Sardar, son of Ishaq Khan, 102 Mohammad Jan Wardak, General, 34–35, 36n, 89–90 Mohammad Khan Nizam al-Dawla, elder of the Hazaras of Qal'a-e-Nao, 57 Mohammad Nabi, Afghan oﬃcial, 195 Mohammad Raﬁ' Ludin, General, 15

Mohammad Sadiq, Mirza, Russian agent, 198–199 Mohammad Shah Hotak, 91 Mohammad Shah Surkhabay, 34 Mohammad Sharif Khan of Dir, 78; as nawab, 79 Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, Amir, in league against his father, 23; imprisonment of, in 1874, 24; becomes amir in 1878, 27; concludes the Gandumak treaty, 28–29; resignation of, 30; deportation of, to India, 33, 38, 40, 81, 166, 175, 196–197, 211, 218, 220 Mohammadzay sardars, 1, oﬃcial posts to pro-British, 36, in a state of decline, 37, made sharik-e-dawlat, 95, 106 Mohmand Baba, 66 Mohmand, history of, 65; divisions of, 65–66; signiﬁcance of, 68; rising of, in 1879, 68; remained undemarcated, 183–184, 187 Mongols, destruction of Tajiks and Pashtuns by, 123–124 Morcha Khan Mohmand, founder of Morcha Khel, 67 Muqur, Battle of, in January 1867, 12 Murgha, 66 Murghab River (Ak-su), 109, 113, 115, 163 Murghab, District of, 108 Murzad Wali Baba, 67 Musa Jan, Sardar, minor son of Amir Mohammad Ya"qub Khan, 36, 211 Mushk-e-'Alam, Mulla, preaching of jihad by, 34, 89; estrangement of, 90; death of, in 1886, 90–91 Nadir Shah Afshar, 45, 150 Najm al-Din, mulla, 189 Naqshbandiyya order, 100 Nasr Allah Khan, Sardar, the Amir’s son journey to England, 175, 209 National Party (Ghazni Party), partisan of the house of Amir Sher 'Ali, 40, 218, 221 Nawagai, 77 Nicholas II, Russia’s emperor, 202 Ningrahar, 87 Noelle, Christine, historian, 67 Northbrook, Lord, Viceroy of India, 164–165

index Northern Afghanistan, Scheme of, 40–41 Nur Mohammad Foshanji, Prime Minister, 21 Nurzays, 187 'Omara Khan of Jandol, 77–78, 150–151 Opras (strangers), 46 Ormurr, 81 Oxus River (Amu Darya), 3, 90, 128, 163 Pakthas, see Pashtun Paktues (Pakthas, Pactyes), 1n, 85 Paktya, 87 Palam Mullah, 189 Pamir, 90 Pandiali, 66 Pan-Islamic movement, 215 Panja River, 109, 113, 115, 163 Panjdeh, 150, 179; inhabitants of, 200; Russian occupation of, 206; Russia disputes occupation of, by Afghans, 201, 203–204; the Amir’s reasons for not defending, 204–206, 206n; international crisis on, 207; consequences of occupation of, by Russia, 208–209, 223 Panjsher, battle of, in September 1867, 12 Paropamisade, 84 Pashto titles for government oﬃcials, 20 Pashtun, 1; ancestors and divisions of, 1n, 63, 85–86, 106, 124 Pashtunwali, 22, 63, 75 Pathan, see Pashtun Patna, district in India, 2n Payanda Khan Mohmmadzay, Sardar, 37 Persia, intention of, to occupy Afghan Seistan, 210 Perso-Afghan, worsening of, relations, 213 Peshawar, 66, 85; pressure for recovery of, 161–162 Pishin, district of, 4 Plehve, Russia’s home minister, 184 Political trends, emergence of new, 217 Popalzays, 1 Potinger, Eldred, 193 Powindas, 81

257

Qamar Jan (Mohmand), wife of Amir Sher 'Ali Khan, 67 Qataghan, arrival of Sardar 'Abd al-Rahman at, 39 Qays 'Abd al-Rashid, 2n Qizilbahses, 32; looting of the quarters of pro-British, 35, 37; forced conversion of, to Sunnism, 137 Quetta, 58 Rahmat Khan Wazir, Malik, 82 Rangit Singh, 160 Rawlinson, Henry, 224 Rebellions, list of over 40 minor, 63n–64n Religious minority, discrimination against, 227 Ripon, Lord, Viceroy of India, 42, 170–171, 199, 204, 210 Rishtia, Sayyed Qasim, historian, 34 Riyazi, Mohammad Yusuf, 7, 57 Roberts, Frederick, General, British supreme commander in Kabul, 30, 35–37; brutalities of, 31; view of, regarding the Kabul uprising, 31–32; proposed mission of, to Kabul, 178 Robertson, George, 143–144, 156, 158 Roshan, district of, 8, 109; people of, and their characteristic 110; division of, between Afghanistan and Bukhara, 116 Roshaniyya movement, 80 Sa"adat Khan Mohmand, Khan of Mohmands, personality, anti-British struggles, 67, 85 Sa"d al-Din, governor of Herat, 203 Sadozays, 1, 85, 106 Safdar Khan of Bajaur, 78 Salor Turkmen, 108 Samarqand, 100 Sapays, 75, 77 Sarbun, 66, 77 Sarik, Turkmen tribe, 108, 200–201, 203 Sarikol (Lake Victoria), 117–118 Sarwar Khan of Chinarak (Chikkai) occupies Lower Kurma, 79; expulsion of, from Kurma, 79–80 Sayyed 'Ali Termizi (Pir Baba), 69 Sayyed Khan, Russian envoy, 198 Sayyedabad, battle of, in 1866, 12 Sayyeds, in Aghanistan, 2n

258

index

Scientiﬁc Frontier, real aim of policy of, 26, 83; emergence of, as a concept, 177, 224 Se-kot, 91 Shah 'Abbas, Safavi emperor, 128 Shah Jahan, Mughal emperor, 128 Shah Mahmud Hotak, 11 Shah Mohammad, minister of external aﬀairs, deportation to India of, 33 Shah Rukh Mirza, 123 Shah Shuja' Sadozay, 11, 159–160 Shah-e-Khamosh, 112 Shahpisand Khan Barakzay, 23 Shahzadah of Waziristan, 82 Shams al-Nahar, 217 Shaykhs (or neemchas), 149 Sher 'Ali Khan Jaghuri, Sardar, 129 Sher 'Ali Khan, Amir, 1, 7; accession of, in 1863, 10; takes refuge in Khirqa, 11; becomes active again, 11; enters triumphantly in Kabul in September 1868, 12; meets Lord Mayo in India, 10–11, 15; reforms of, 15–22; taxation system and income during the reign of, 19; why, does not ﬁght the invaders, 27; death of, in 1879, 27; strained relations of, with his sons, 23, 98, 106, 126, 150, 166, 179, 190, 196–197, 203, 210, 217–218, 220 Sher 'Ali, Sardar, wali of Kandahar, 46; recognition of, as an independent wali of Kandahar by the Queen-Empress, 46; opposition to, 47; declaration of jihad against, 49; becomes refugee in India, 56 Sher Khan Kharotay, 105 Sher Mohammad (William Campbell), 11 Sherpur (or Sher Abad), New cantonment of, 21 Shighnan, district of, 8, 109; traits and divisions of people of, 110; mirs of, autonomous and powerful, 111; relations of mirs of, with neighboring lands, 111; trade of, with neighboring lands, 111; history of, 112; ﬂight of people of, 114; claim and counter-claim on, 115 Shinwaray, Pashtun tribe of, 2n; divisions of, 72; se-kot on the, 73, 75; rising of, 73; tribal militias

against, 74; submission of, in 1892, 74, 86, 187 Shurtan, 78 Sibi, district of, 4 Singhal, D. P., historian, 30, 197 Sittagydae, 2n Skobelev, Russian General, 201 Speen gund, 82 Spin Ghar Mountain, 73 Spitamenes, ruler of ancient Balkh, 98 St John, Political Agent in Kandahar, 47, 49; in Baluchistan, 58, Stewart, General Donald, replaces Roberts as Supreme Commander, 39–40, 42 Stolietoﬀ, General, mission of, to Kabul, 166, 195–196 Subsidies to Afghanistan, 171, 180 Sulaiman Khel Ghilzay, 90, 92 Sultan Mahmud, Emperor, 22, 149 Sultan Murad, mir of Qataghan, 39 Sumner, B. H., historian, 184 Sur Kamar, 77 Surmatash (Somatash), Afghan military post near Pamir, 115; Russian occupation of, 116–117 Swat, 75–77, 180, 186 Sykes, Sir Percy, author, 188 Taj Mohammad Ghilzay, General, 60, 91 Tajiks, 58, 93, 106, 124 Talkhakzar, battle of, 92 Tarkanays, 187 Tartars, see Mongols Tarzi, Mahmud, 7, 17n, 168 Tashkand, 197; Russia’s occupation of, 194 Tekke, Turkmen tribe, 200–203 Three Days and Nights in Kabul, Battle of, 34 Timur Lane, 123, 149, 204 Timur Shah Durranay, 14 Tirin Khan, Malik, 82 Tore gund, 82 Torkmanchai, Treaty of (1828), 160 Traditional animosity between Ghilzays and Durranays, 59 Treaty, Anglo-Afghan, of 1809, 159; of 1855, 36, 161; of 1857, 36; of Gandumak, 4, 28, 38, 79, 81, 166, 167n

index Trousdale, William, 26, 29, 32, 166, 179 Turburi (rivalry among paternal cousins), 13 Turkestan, 91, 96 Turkestan, Russian protectorate, 194 Turkmen, 106 Uprising, Afghan, against the British, 34 Uzbeks, 100, 106 Vedas, 85 Vitkevitch, Paul Captain, 193–194 Wakhan, 109, 112; inhabitants of, 117–119 Wali Mohammad Khan, Sardar, 30; as governor of Kabul, 37 War of reuniﬁcation in 1881, 58, 60; defeat of Ayyub Khan’s army, 60; consequences of, 61 Wars, Anglo-Afghan, First, 164; consequences of First, 160–161; Second, 166 Waziristan, 8, 83 Wazirs, characteristics of, 82, 187 Wood, John, 193

259

Ya"qub Beg of Kashghar, 111 Ya"qub, Mulla, Russian news writer, 198 Ya"qubzays (pro-Ya"qub Khan party), 37 Yaghistan, 76 Yahya Khan, Sardar, deportation to India of, 33, 37 Yapp, Malcolm Edward, historian, 69 Yar Mohammad Alkozay, wali of Herat, 106 Yarkand, 114 Yashil Kul, 117 Yate, Sir West Ridgeway, 207 Yufuzays, 2n, 66, 76 Yusuf 'Ali Shah, Shah, mir of Roshan, 113 Zakaria Khan, Sardar, deportation to India of, 33 Zar Pacha Surkhabay, 34 Zariaspa, ancient name of Balkh, 96 Zimma, 59; the Amir-Griﬃn meeting at, 167–169 Zimmis, 152 Zoroaster, 96, 98n Zoroastrianism, 96, 112

BRILL’S INNER ASIAN LIBRARY Editors NICOLA DI COSMO DEVIN DEWEESE CAROLINE HUMPHREY ISSN 1566-7162 The Brill’s Inner Asian Library Series is dedicated to the scholarly research of every aspect of the history, literature, religion, arts, economy and politics of Inner Asian cultures and societies. The Series aims to contribute to the development of Inner Asian studies by representing also non-Western scholarly traditions. 1. Di Cosmo, N. and D. Bao, Manchu-Mongol Relations on the Eve of the Qing Conquest. A Documentary History. ISBN 90 04 11777 6 2. Williams, B.G., The Crimean Tatars. The Diaspora Experience and the Forging of a Nation. 2001. ISBN 90 04 12122 6 3. Levi, S.C., The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and its Trade (1550-1900). 2002. ISBN 90 04 12320 2 4. Allworth, E.A. Evading Reality. The Devices of #Abdalrauf Fitrat, Modern Central Asian Reformist; Poetry and Prose of #Abdul Qadir Bedil. Transl. from Persian by William L. Hanaway. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12516 7 5. Gross, J. and A. Urunbaev, The Letters of Khw§ja ‘Ubayd All§h AÈr§r and his Associates. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12603 1 6. Atwood, C.P., Young Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia’s Interregnum Decades, 1911-1931. 2002. ISBN 90 04 12607 4 7. Rachewiltz, I. de, The Secret History of the Mongols. A Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13159 0 (Set), ISBN 90 04 13596 0 (Vol. 1), ISBN 90 04 13597 9 (Vol. 2) 8. Elverskog, J., The ‘Jewel Translucent Såtra’. Altan Khan and the Mongols in the Sixteenth Century. 2003. ISBN 90 04 13261 9 9. MuÈammad-SharÊf-i ‘adr-i Z8 iy§. The Personal History of a Bukharan Intellectual. The Diary of MuÈammad-SharÊf-i ‘adr-i Z8 iy§. 2004. ISBN 90 04 13161 2 10. Dale, S.F., The Garden of the Eight Paradises. B§bur and the Culture of Empire in Central Asia, Afghanistan and India (1483-1530). 2004. ISBN 90 04 13707 6

11. Amitai, R. and M. Biran, Mongols, Turks, and Others. Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14096 4 12. Frank, A.J. and M.A. Usmanov, An Islamic Biographical Dictionary of the Eastern Kazakh Steppe: 1770-1912. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14127 8 13. Drompp, M.R., Tang China and the Collapse of the Uighur Empire. A Documentary History. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14129 4 14. Russell-Smith, L., Uygur Patronage in Dunhuang. Regional Art Centres on the Northern Silk Road in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14241 X 15. Tighe, J.R., Constructing Suiyuan. The Politics of Northwestern Territory and Development in Early Twentieth-Century China. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14466 8 16. Newby, L.J., The Empire and the Khanate. A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c. 1760-1860. 2005. ISBN 90 04 14550 8 17. Kakar, M.H., A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901. 2006. ISBN-13: 978-90-04-15185-7, ISBN-10: 90-04-15185-0